

Formative Evaluation of the Cash Based Assistance (CBA) Programme in Afghanistan, 2020 - 2023

EVALUATION REPORT

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CONTENTS

Executive summary	i
1 Introduction.....	1
2 Background.....	1
3 Description of UNICEF's CBA programme	6
3.1 UNICEF's cash-based intervention in Afghanistan	6
3.2 CBA programme logic	8
3.3 Reconstructed theory of change.	8
3.4 UNICEF ACO's CBA programme organisation	10
3.5 UNICEF CBA programmes	11
4 Evaluation purpose, objectives and scope.....	13
4.1 Purpose	13
4.2 Objectives	14
4.3 Scope.....	14
4.4 Intended Users	14
5 Evaluation design and methodology	14
5.1 Approach	14
5.2 Data collection	15
5.3 Training of enumerators	17
5.4 Data analysis and validation	17
5.5 Ethical considerations.....	17
5.6 Evaluation limitations.....	18
6 Evaluation findings.....	19
6.1 Relevance.....	20
6.2 Coherence.....	26
6.3 Effectiveness	30
6.4 Efficiency.....	53
6.5 Impact.....	60
6.6 Sustainability	61
7 Conclusions.....	63
7.1 Relevance.....	63
7.2 Coherence.....	63

7.3	Effectiveness and Impact	64
7.4	Efficiency.....	65
7.5	Sustainability	66
8	Lessons Learned.....	66
9	Recommendations	68
10	Annexes	72
Annex 1.	Terms of Reference	72
Annex 2.	Evaluation matrix	86
Annex 3.	Stakeholder Analysis	96
Annex 4.	Map of Cash-Based Assistance in Afghanistan.....	100
Annex 5.	Complete list of remote interviewees.....	101
Annex 6.	ATR data collection report.....	103
Annex 7.	Household survey data.	112
Annex 8.	Data collection Tools	138
Annex 9.	Evaluation Reference Group	161
Annex 10.	Ethical considerations	162
Annex 11.	List of ToC assumptions.....	164
Annex 12.	Ethical Approval Form	165
Annex 13.	Bibliography	166

TABLE OF TABLES

Table 1: Brief description of each CBA programme implemented by UNICEF ACO	11
Table 2 Data collection details.....	16
Table 3 Limitations and mitigation measures	18
Table 4: Reaching regular cash programmes objective (planned vs. being reached).....	30
Table 5: participants and transfer amounts planned against reached for early support and emergency cash response.....	31
Table 6 Achievements versus targets, Cash+ Child protection programmes.....	34
Table 7 Participants and transfer amounts planned against reached for Cash+ response	36
Table 8: Pros and cons of different cash modalities	40
Table 9 Advance knowledge of Cash programming disaggregated by gender and province	47
Table 10: Timeliness of CBA programmes	53
Table 11: Table Satisfaction rate on the timelines of the earthquake and the winterisation cash responses	54

Table 12 Calculation attempt of cost efficiency	57
Table 13 Cost of MSP fees	57
Table 14 Cost of IP fees	58

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1 IPC Insecurity Analysis 2020 and 2022	3
Figure 2 Interlinked and reinforcing components of UNICEF's Afghanistan cash strategy	8
Figure 3 CBA Theory of Change	9
Figure 4 Division Of Roles Regarding CBA Programmes	11
Figure 5: Main operational agencies for the year 2022	26
Figure 6 Ability of households to cover children's needs before and the PDM for earthquake assistance	32
Figure 7 Ability of households to cover children's needs after multiple rounds of assistance in Nuristan and Wardak	33
Figure 8 Comparison of ability to meet children's needs at time of PDM across vulnerability criteria	34
Figure 9 HH ability to cover children's needs before and after the PDM (Badghis)	35
Figure 10 Previous and future birth intentions among Nutrition Cash+ participants	36
Figure 11 Proportion of PDM respondents following Post-natal care	37
Figure 12 Family members having most benefited from cash assistance	38
Figure 13 Survey respondent knowledge of community consultations prior to the selection phase	42
Figure 14 Interviews conducted during the profile survey assessment According to CBA participants	43
Figure 15 Knowledge of Categorical criteria of the selection for being part of the cash program (N = 771)	47
Figure 16 Information source for selection criteria on CBA programmes (n=624)	48
Figure 17 Awareness of who to speak to if there is a problem with assistance	52
Figure 18 rating of access according to UNICEF staff	56
Figure 19 cost incurred by participants to collect CBA cash	59
Figure 20 Comparison of per cent of PDM respondents reporting costs associated with cash receipt (2022 and 2023)	59
Figure 21 Comparison of reported opportunity and other costs (2022 and 2023)	60

ACRONYMS

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
ACO	Afghanistan Country Office
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ANC	Ante-natal care
ATR	Assess, Transform, Reach Consulting
AWD	acute watery diarrhoea
AWMS	Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey
BHA	Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CBA	Cash-based assistance
CBE	Community-based education
CBT	Cash based transfer
CCC	Core Commitments to Children
CDC	Community Development Council
CER	Consolidated Emergency Report
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standards
CPD	Country Programme Document
CRS	Catholic Relief Service
CSO	Central Statistics Organization
CVA	cash and voucher assistance
CVWG	Cash and voucher working group
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DfA	De facto authorities
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EQ	Evaluation question
ET	Evaluation team
FAO	(United Nations) Food and Agriculture Organization
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FCV	fragile, conflict and violence
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FSP	Financial Service Providers

GAP	Gender Action Plan
GBV	gender-based violence
GEROS	Global evaluation reports and oversight system
GEWE	Gender Equity and Women's Empowerment
GRM	Grievance and response mechanisms
HAC	Humanitarian Action for Children
HACT	harmonized approach to cash transfer
HCT	Humanitarian cash transfer
HER	Health Emergency Response
HH	Household
HOPE	Humanitarian cash operations and program ecosystem
HPD	Humanitarian Programme Document
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Rights
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally displaced person
IFI	International Financial Institution
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IP	Implementing partner
IPC	Integrated Phase Classification
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices
KfW	KfW Development Bank
KI	Key informant
KII	Key informant interview
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIS	management information system
MNCH	maternal, newborn and child health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPC	Multi-purpose cash
MPCT	multi-purpose cash transfers

MSP	Money Service Providers
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PLW	Pregnant and lactating women
PMU	Project Management Unit
PNC	Post-natal care
PSEA	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
RB	Regional Bureau
RCT	Regular Cash Transfer
RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SBC	Social & Behaviour change
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SLA	Service Level Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPEAR	Social policy evaluation and research
ToC	Theory of change
ToR	Terms of reference
TPM	Third party monitor
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
UNSDG	United Nations Sustainable Development Group
US	United States
USD	United States Dollar
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

WFP	(United Nations) World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WOPS	Whole of Office Payment System

Executive summary

1. This Formative Evaluation of the cash-based assistance (CBA) Programme in Afghanistan is commissioned by the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF) Afghanistan Country Office (ACO). The evaluation covers the period from the start of UNICEF's cash programme implementation in Afghanistan in 2020 to March 2023, encompassing all provinces where CBA programmes were implemented.¹

2. UNICEF's CBA in Afghanistan started in 2020 as part of the response to the worsening humanitarian situation including the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2020, CBA programming has expanded exponentially, mostly humanitarian cash programmes and Cash+ supporting nutrition, child protection and education activities. The first implementation of a regular cash programme started in late 2022 with the first instalments distributed in May 2023. In May 2022, UNICEF ACO established its Afghanistan Cash Strategy, "to give children a positive start in life by addressing the underlying drivers of poverty and deprivation". To achieve these objectives the strategy is comprised of five components designed to be interlinked and reinforcing: i) regular cash transfers (RCT) to households on a regular basis; ii) cash for early support and emergencies through humanitarian cash transfers (HCT); iii) provision of complementary services, iv) gender sensitive processes, and v) evidence generation and learning agenda.

3. The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess and guide the expansion of UNICEF CBA in Afghanistan and eventually serve as the basis for UNICEF support to the Afghan government in developing a nascent social protection system. The timing of this independent evaluation is appropriate given objectives to assess both programme design and implementation mechanisms and explore to what extent the cash transfers have been implemented as intended. The evaluation primarily fulfils a learning function as it will be used by the ACO, the evaluation's primary user, to identify what adjustments are required to effectively bring CBA to scale. Members of the United Nations (UN) Social Protection Working Group, UN Common Cash System and the Afghanistan Cash and Voucher Working Group (CVWG) are also expected to be primary users based on the evaluation's contribution to knowledge and learning on social protection and cash transfers in Afghanistan.

4. The evaluation used a theory-based approach applying contribution analysis to each evaluation question (EQ) grouped under the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. Cross-cutting issues of gender and equity (including disability inclusion) have been integrated into the evaluation criteria per the Terms of Reference (ToR). The evaluation team worked with the UNICEF Social Policy, Evaluation, Analytics and Research (SPEAR) team to reconstruct the theory of change (ToC) which serves as the analytical framework.

5. The ET gathered evidence using a mixed methods approach on observed results (or absence of results) and the roles played by internal and external actors and events. Data collection relied on i) secondary data review; ii) primary qualitative data collection through Key Informant Interviews (KIs)² and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs);³ and a quantitative household (HH) survey.⁴ Sampling for quantitative data collection was designed to maximise regional coverage and provide a holistic view of CBA programming within the financial and temporal constraints while taking advantage of existing data to minimise duplication. Qualitative sampling balanced efforts to represent diverse stakeholders (covering different stakeholder groups and CBA programmes) alongside practical considerations of budget availability and access. Data was collected remotely and in person between June 19 to August 31, 2023.

6. The combination of a lack of clarity on design objectives, restrictions on primary data collection and limited availability of up-to-date secondary data were important limitations which impacted the

¹ Badakhshan, Badghis, Bamiyan, Daikundi, Ghor, Herat, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Logar, Nuristan, Paktika, Panjshir, Samangan, Sar-e-Pul, Wardak, Zabul

² In total 41 key informants (KIs) were reached remotely; 37 KIs were done with men face-to-face.

³ FGDs could only be conducted with men (14 FGDs). Women FGDs were replaced with phone interviews reaching 44 women.

⁴ 868 households were interviewed (18% women) in Khost, Paktika and Badghis

evaluation. While the ET sought to overcome these challenges, they presented evaluability challenges for most criteria and specifically for assessing relevance and effectiveness as well as Human Rights (HR) and Gender Equity and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) as cross-cutting issues.

Findings

Relevance

7. The CBA programmes are consistent with the ACO Cash Transfer Programme (CTP) strategy's objectives to address financial barriers to meet the needs of children in the short term. The designs are less relevant for meeting the long-term and service needs of participating households, especially in programmes with very low and/or short-term transfers. Out of the 15 programmes reviewed, only three lasted longer than three months. While all designs prioritised women and children, this may not have been necessary or sufficient to significantly create and leverage opportunities for empowerment (the second objective of the CTP). Assessing the relevance of each CBA objective is challenging given frequent unavailability of design documents, particularly for HCT and Cash+ child protection programmes. In general, objectives are limited to successful cash distribution, for which activities are consistent.

8. The CBA designs are based on categorical criteria within geographically prioritized areas. They seek to target women and children, in line with UNICEF's mandate, and do not consider ethnic or cultural differences. Most key informants with whom the subject was raised (ACO Kabul and field staff, implementing partners (IPs), community leaders, etc.) did not identify differences that should have been considered, instead affirming the strategy's focus on categorical targeting separate of ethnic or cultural considerations.

9. Implementing partners mostly agreed with the categorical selection criteria given the widespread poverty (most noted that at least 80 per cent of the population is in need), but many felt more could be done to narrow the selection to ensure a greater focus on the most vulnerable. All stakeholders agreed that in the majority of cases, vulnerable households (though not necessarily the most vulnerable) were reached and women and children in vulnerable households were prioritised by the various CBA programmes. However, analysing the differing vulnerabilities by province and district, disability status, by ethnicity or even displacement status and the associated underlying risks were not apparent.

10. At the time of the evaluation, UNICEF ACO had not yet undertaken any thorough gender assessments which could comprehensively inform program designs, specific gender objectives, indicators and related targets against which change could be assessed. While CBA programmes were aligned with the gender policy and action plan, and generally reflected their immense long-term experience in Afghanistan, key stakeholders felt much more could be done to further understand gender dynamics and address the worsening situation for women and children due specifically to gender discrimination.

Coherence

11. Cash coordination remains centralised in Kabul for which UNICEF is represented by SPEAR/Social Protection (SP). UNICEF has attended several CVWG meetings and participated in some technical committee meetings. However, ACO Kabul stakeholders noted that the SPEAR unit provides less attention to the CVWG given their primary focus to get a social protection system in place. At the provincial and local level, coordination appears mixed with most extenders noting good coordination by UNICEF at the provincial level while IPs provided more mixed feedback. According to KIs, UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP), the two biggest cash actors, overlap in some provinces but are primarily working in different districts. Feedback suggests that needs outstrip available resources throughout the country; thus duplication was not a concern.

12. According to KIs with programmatic units, Cash+ interventions do not build enough on the programmatic interventions, rather they are run alongside them. As no staff in the programmatic unit are directly dedicated to CBA, it makes it hard for the programmatic units to follow and ensure a better complementarity of CBA programmes with non-cash intervention. Potential gaps that were identified

focused on cross-cutting issues, specifically, greater integration of social and behaviour change (SBC) and gender approaches in all CBA programming as well as limited monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes to inform evidence generation.

Effectiveness

13. Half of the programmes (HCT and Cash+) did not have set distribution objectives or did not include sufficient details in reporting to assess effectiveness. Most of the CBA programmes with established cash distribution and participant targets met these objectives. These objectives were often scaled down in terms of both participant numbers and cash distribution from the original design documents, when available, due to limited financial resources. This is most notable for RCT, scaled down from three to one year of assistance.

14. Evidence is inconclusive and not sufficiently rigorous to identify outcomes beyond cash receipt. Qualitative and quantitative data overwhelming highlights that assistance is essential but insufficient to meet household's basic needs. Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) that attempted to establish a baseline show an increase in household's ability to cover children's needs, though the timing of the PDM is unclear to confirm the validity of pseudo baselines established. PDM data is also positive that children benefit specifically from cash transfers with three-quarters of PDM respondents reporting that there are goods and services that they can access for children now thanks to the grant that they would not have access to otherwise. Based on the team's limited analysis, there are no notable differences in change in ability to meet needs based on households with unique needs, such as those with a person with disabilities or among households headed by women. There are no processes yet for evaluating effectiveness of programming on the empowerment of women and girls; these are planned for the RCT programme.

15. For now, cash in hand is the most effective way for UNICEF to deliver CBA programmes for hard-to-reach populations with low literacy and limited access to technology. UNICEF continues to explore possibilities for mobile money which offers potential benefits in terms of lower operational delivery costs, transfer risks and risks of aid deviation but is currently less relevant for UNICEF's assisted populations due to low network coverage, high illiteracy and lack of mobile devices in many households.

16. Processes are largely effective following the four operational stages described in UNICEF's Humanitarian Cash Transfer Field Guidance. While IPs make considerable efforts to communicate objectives and availability of feedback and complaints mechanisms, gaps remain. Interviewed IPs stated that communication at the mobilisation stage was effective, and people received the needed information about the projects. However, household survey results show gaps in knowledge, particularly concerning the duration and timing of distribution. UNICEF staff has positively reviewed the digitization of systems as increasing the effectiveness of participant registration data and payment management.

17. The effectiveness of UNICEF CBA is improved by UNICEF's partnership model, working with local IPs and money service providers (MSPs) to deliver cash in an extremely difficult operational context. The expertise of the Project Management Unit (PMU) and UNICEF's reputation as a "good partner" have also been essential to the scale-up. Effectiveness has been damaged by the low transfer value and short-term nature of most CBA programmes, primarily resulting from dictated by decreasing financial resources available in country. Finally, the De facto Authority's (DfA's) governing has undermined achievement of programmatic results at multiple levels, particularly in coordination and access as well as increasing restrictions on gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) results UNICEF hopes to promote.

Efficiency

18. Considering only Service Level Agreements (SLA) signed between the SPEAR team and PMU, there were consistent delays in cash distribution according to distribution timelines. Importantly, there were often lengthy delays during negotiations with donors and through other processes which shifted the time initially planned according to needs assessments to comply with implementation. All KIIs report that access authorisations are a daily negotiation, inevitably delaying the start of most programmes. Key Informants (KIs) report that UNICEF and its IPs, as much as possible, put efforts and time into maintaining open channels of discussion with authorities both at the national and decentralised levels.

The winterization programmes experienced substantial delays which were mainly related to donor funding schedules.

19. According to most UNICEF staff interviewed at field offices, delivering cash is far more efficient than in-kind distributions. The accumulated experience and currently available infrastructure position the ACO well to achieve more efficiency as programmes are scaled-up. The ACO staff estimate an existing capacity that can accommodate a 30 per cent increase in the cash-based activities caseload with no major overhead increase. As PMU transitions out, SPEAR capacity needs to increase to maintain the achieved results.

20. Overall, data from UNICEF ACO PDM dashboard indicates that most surveyed participants are satisfied with both the location and timing of distribution: 91 per cent of PDM respondents included in the UNICEF ACO PDM dashboard reported that the location was 'convenient', 96 per cent reported the timing as 'convenient'. While positive overall, feedback from those participants that did not find the location/timing convenient signifies access barriers to specific populations, including persons with disabilities. Transportation and other costs are reported to variable extent, with a much higher proportion of participants reporting costs in 2023 compared to 2022. The ET does not have an explanation for this difference.

Impact

21. In general, participants, community leaders, IPs and ACO stakeholders did not note any significant positive or negative effect on intra-household gender relations. When asked if the cash assistance has had any impact on relations between husband and wife, the vast majority of participants of qualitative data collection said it had no impact. The inability to conduct FGDs with women challenged the evaluability of this question.

Sustainability

22. UNICEF does not provide robust evidence on how CBA programming led to longer term benefits. While this is reasonable for HCT programmes with short-term objectives, donors expressed concern about the lack of available evidence for Cash+ nutrition programming.

23. According to all KIs reached during the data collection phase, it is clear that the DfA are not currently following a political and ideological path that is compatible with instituting a national social policy scheme in Afghanistan. However, UNICEF's implementation model utilises key best practices to ensure transferability to the government in the future. These best practices are building local capacity through partnerships with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), running a digital management information system (MIS) for future transferability, and continued exploration of electronic payment systems for efficient payment management.

Lessons learned for scaling up cash programming

24. There are several key lessons in terms of resources and capacity requirements for UNICEF at the national and sub-national levels to manage and deliver at scale:

- Lesson 1: Donor engagement strategies need to be reviewed to ensure UNICEF is interacting with the right donors at the right times to meet CBA programme objectives.
- Lesson 2: CBA objectives need to be reviewed in light of the imbalance between broad categorical targeting criteria and the resources available to fund programmes.
- Lesson 3: Ensuring an appropriate balance of cash and complementary service provision is also paramount to achieving CBA objectives.
- Lesson 4: The expertise and flexibility of the PMU has been essential to UNICEF's success in scaling up cash assistance.
- Lesson 5: Investments in human resource capacity at sub-national level are equally important to scaling up cash assistance and should be expanded.
- Lesson 6: UNICEF has the experience to lead in the deployment of digital systems for expansion and scale-up of CBA.
- Lesson 7: Liquidity issues should be monitored to assess MSP capacity to meet distribution needs.

Key conclusions

25. **Conclusion 1:** The CBA programmes are relevant to the needs of vulnerable stakeholders and could be further strengthened through more systematic integration of cash programmes with commensurate resources, including financial, that allow UNICEF to fulfil long-term objectives, including for GEWE. More detailed selection criteria would help tailor programming distribution to allocate scarce resources to reach the most at risk.
26. **Conclusion 2:** The prevailing reality where needs consistently surpass available resources has reduced the attention given to ensuring careful external coordination, internal coordination is also challenging. There is potential for increased partnerships.
27. **Conclusion 3:** Available evidence suggests that the cash infusions temporarily increase access to limited services but are not sufficient to meet basic needs. Improved evidence streams are required for better tracking of household outcomes
28. **Conclusion 4:** The ET did not identify any specific issues of intentional exclusion of specific social groups. Moving forward, UNICEF will need to assess the risks that specific needs are ignored against the cost of differential needs assessments.
29. **Conclusion 5:** For now, cash in hand modalities are the most appropriate for serving affected populations. There are opportunities to strengthen IP capacity for following UNICEF SOPs.
30. **Conclusion 6:** UNICEF is taking proactive action to address barriers to community inclusion and participation that are inhibiting the degree to which programme objectives can be reached.
31. **Conclusion 7:** While efficiency is improving with experience, timeliness is a continual challenge within the CBA programme affected by contextual factors, donor schedules and internal processes.
32. **Conclusion 8:** Participants are very positive about the efficiency of delivery, but there are barriers that may affect the most vulnerable households.
33. **Conclusion 9:** Insights into variation in IP and MSP costs offer opportunities for UNICEF to explore 'best practices' in implementation to improve efficiency.
34. **Conclusion 10:** While UNICEF is following good practices to develop a transferrable social protection scheme, the sustainability of CBA programming and long-term GEWE changes to households is limited due to contextual constraints.

Recommendations

35. The following recommendations are derived from the conclusions which flow logically from the evaluation findings. Recommendations are presented in order of importance according to the evaluation team. All presented recommendations are relevant for UNICEF's objective of scaling up CBA in Afghanistan as the team considers these elements important in enhancing the quality of UNICEF's cash response.

- **Recommendation 1:** As UNICEF is planning to expand its CBA activities, the expertise coming from the PMU needs to be completely integrated into the country office architecture.
- **Recommendation 2:** Additional efforts should be invested into gender and social behaviour change related activities especially when related to the Cash+ and regular cash programmes.
- **Recommendation 3:** UNICEF should invest resources in measuring the outcomes of Cash+ and regular cash programmes to i) ensure expected outcomes are reached, ii) re-orientate programming if needed, and iii) provide evidence to donors for possible increased funding.
- **Recommendation 4:** UNICEF needs to continue working towards separating implementation partners and monitoring partners.
- **Recommendation 5:** UNICEF should find mitigation measure to ensure timely winter cash assistance.

- **Recommendation 6:** To provide a more holistic response to the Afghan people, UNICEF should collaborate more with other actors so that the CBA results can be further leveraged. Partnerships with external actors in livelihoods, community level WASH, etc. could enhance UNICEF core programming outcomes in a more sustainable way.
- **Recommendation 7:** UNICEF should support regional sub-offices to conduct detailed assessments to inform more localised vulnerability criteria for CBA planned programmes.
- **Recommendation 8:** During the participant selection process, UNICEF should ensure all measures are put in place to ensure a transparent and well accepted procedure.
- **Recommendation 9:** UNICEF should ensure that communication around the different CBA components is better disseminated.
- **Recommendation 10:** The cost of transportation to the distribution points should not be borne by the participants.

1 INTRODUCTION

1. This is the Formative Evaluation of the Cash Based Assistance (CBA) Programme in Afghanistan commissioned by the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF) Afghanistan Country Office (ACO). The evaluation covers the period from the start of UNICEF's cash programme implementation in Afghanistan in 2020 to March 2023.

2. The timing of this independent evaluation is designed to assess and guide the expansion of CBA by the UNICEF ACO. The evaluation primarily fulfils a learning function as it will be used by the ACO to identify what adjustments are required to effectively bring CBA to scale. More specifically, the evaluation will focus on the following objectives as proposed in the Terms of Reference (ToR) in Annex 1 and confirmed during the inception phase:

- Conduct a forward-looking evaluative analysis to refine the programme design and roll-out to make needed adjustments early in the implementation process rather than later;
- Review partnerships, coordination, and the monitoring system in place for effective delivery of the programme; and
- Draw lessons learned to bring CBA programmes to scale and eventually serve as the basis for UNICEF's support to the Afghan government in developing a nascent social protection system

3. During the inception phase, one of the evaluation's International Specialists met with ACO staff, implementing partners and external stakeholders in February 2023. During the data collection phase (June 19 to August 31, 2023), data was collected remotely by the international evaluation team (ET), and in-country by ATR Consulting, a local consultancy firm. In total 41 key informants (KIs) were reached remotely, 868 household (HH) interviews were conducted, and 37 key informant interviews (KIIs) with men were done face-to-face. Focus group discussions (FGDs) could only be conducted with men (14 FGDs). FGDs with women were replaced with phone interviews reaching 44 women.

2 BACKGROUND

4. **Politics:** Afghanistan has been devastated by decades of war with the Soviet invasion in 1979 followed by years of civil war, the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s, and the United States of America (U.S.)- led invasion in 2001. These conflicts have resulted in widespread displacement, poverty and human rights abuses.

5. Afghanistan is characterised by a diverse range of social groups shaped by ethnic, tribal and religious affiliations. The Pashtuns constitute the largest ethnic group, concentrated in the south and east. Most Taliban are Pashtun. The Hazaras have historically faced discrimination, with a long history of violence and exclusion. Despite some improvements since 2001, Hazara regions remain impoverished and subject to societal discrimination.⁵

6. The Taliban became the de facto authority (DfA) in August 2021 and restructured the political environment assigning new leadership in all high-level positions in the different ministries. Many technical staff have, however, remained in place.⁶ All provincial governors have also been replaced by the DfA after August 2021. No country has officially recognised the regime. The United Nations recognise the DfA as the primary duty bearers for delivering on the needs of all people in Afghanistan without discrimination and for protecting their rights in accordance with international norms and standards.⁷

7. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), there has been an improvement in overall security since August 2021, enabling humanitarian access to all provinces, including areas

⁵ UNHCR; [Persecution and perseverance: Survival stories from the Hazara community](#); July 2020; (Accessed on August 29, 2023)

⁶ Information provided by various UNICEF staff during KIIs.

⁷ United Nations Country Team in Afghanistan; United Nations Strategic Framework for Afghanistan (2023-2025); July 2023

which had been inaccessible for decades. However, the humanitarian, economic and human rights situation continues to deteriorate substantially, particularly for women and girls.⁸

8. **Economy:** Afghanistan's economy is dependent on agriculture, with opium poppy production being a significant source of income for many farmers. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), agriculture remains primarily on a subsistence basis while Afghanistan's population relies heavily on international aid to meet its basic nutritional needs. The nation is the world's largest opium source, representing a sizeable portion of GDP.⁹ Conflict and instability have hindered exploitation of the country's considerable natural resources.¹⁰

9. Asset freezes,¹¹ anti-money laundering policies and concerns over the financing of terrorism hinder the functioning of normal correspondent banking relations between Afghan and foreign banks.¹² International banks are reluctant to re-establish relations with Afghan banks. Political uncertainty and fear following the Taliban takeover resulted in a confidence crisis causing a mass exodus of highly skilled people and the closure of many businesses and economic activities.¹³

10. **Poverty and vulnerability:** With a Human Development Index of 0.478, Afghanistan is ranked 180th out of 191 countries.¹⁴ The Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Surveys (AWMS) conducted by the World Bank show a strong deterioration in conditions with the proportion of respondents finding it hard to meet basic food and non-food needs nearly doubling between May 2021 and August 2022, and 62 per cent of women and 50 per cent of men unemployed.¹⁵ Further, 24.9 per cent of the Afghan population is in severe multidimensional poverty with 54.5 per cent living under the national poverty line.¹⁶ Progress towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1 (No Poverty) is deteriorating with rising levels of both poverty and extreme poverty.¹⁷

11. While most basic food and non-food items remain available in the market, the year-on-year inflation for the price of basic household goods has increased up to an estimated 51.7 per cent in June 2022.¹⁸ Headline inflation, which includes food and energy costs, is now decelerating but remains slightly above pre-August 2021 levels.¹⁹

12. The Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) food insecurity analysis shows a deterioration in the food security situation between 2020 and 2022. In March-April 2022, 6,593,000 people were classified as being in Phase 4 ('emergency') and 13,037,000 in Phase 3 ('crisis'). This is approximately twice as many as in April/May 2020 (Figure 1).

⁸ UNHCR, 'Regional Refugee Response Plan for Afghanistan Situation 2023 – January-December 2023', March 2023

⁹ National Statistics and Information Authority, "Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2019", March 2020,

¹⁰ CNN, "[The Taliban are sitting on \\$1 trillion worth of minerals the world desperately needs](#)", August 19, 2021, (Accessed on March 6, 2023)

¹¹ USD\$9.5 billion in central bank reserves have been frozen according to the 2023 Humanitarian Needs Overview.

¹² The World Bank, "[The World Bank in Afghanistan](#)", Last Updated: Oct 7, 2022, , (Accessed on March 6, 2023)

¹³ The National Interest, "[The Afghan Exodus Is a Story of Civil Disobedience](#)", December 19, 2021, , (Accessed on March 6, 2023)

¹⁴ UNDP, "Human Development Report 2021/2022", 2022

¹⁵ Ibid.


¹⁶ United Nations Development Programme and Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, "Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2022", 2022

¹⁷ [Sustainable Development report](#). Accessed 14 August 2023.

¹⁸ The World Bank, "Afghanistan Economic Monitor", February 24, 2023, P. 2.

¹⁹ The World Bank, "Afghanistan Economic Monitor", February 24, 2023, p. 4.

FIGURE 1 IPC INSECURITY ANALYSIS 2020 AND 2022



April-May 2020

March-May 2022

Source: IPC

13. The level of vulnerability increases for people with specific needs. Women, older people, adolescents, youth, children, people with physical and mental disabilities, refugees, migrants and minorities experience the highest degree of socioeconomic marginalization and vulnerability to shocks, particularly emerging from more difficult periods such as winter and the lean season.²⁰

14. **Education:** Progress towards SDG4 (Quality Education) is stagnating²¹ with an estimated 3.7 million children out-of-school, 60 per cent of them are girls.²² According to the Human Development Report 2021/2022, the mean year of schooling is three years.²³ The underlying reasons for poor enrolment of both boys and girls include geographic barriers, school shortages, child labour, and gender-based cultural norms, particularly affecting girls.²⁴

15. Girls and women were banned from schools and universities during the last Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001. From 2003 to 2017, girls' secondary school attendance rose from 6 to 39 per cent.²⁵ In September 2021, the 1.1 million secondary-school aged girls who were ordered to stay at home.²⁶ In December 2022, university was suspended for all women students.²⁷

16. In Afghanistan, UNICEF supports the formal school system and the government's Community-Based Education (CBE) programme, establishing Community-Based Schools and Accelerated Learning Centres within a three-kilometre range of each child's community. UNICEF works with the Ministry of Education (MoE) and other partners to improve the quality of education, build better education systems and support environments that are conducive to learning and development. The vision for the coming years is to enrol approximately 50 per cent of the out-of-school children, around 1.7 million children, by mobilising support for the CBE investment case.²⁸

17. **Health and nutrition:** Progress towards SDG3 (Good Health and Well-being) is stagnating; moderate improvements in some key indicators such as maternal mortality neonatal mortality and births attended by skilled health personnel are being reversed.²⁹ The collapse of the previous government resulted in a suspension of direct international development assistance, which had

²⁰ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan, January 2023.

²¹ [Sustainable Development report](#), Accessed 14 August 2023.

²² UNICEF, ['Education Providing quality education for all'](#), (Accessed on March 10, 2023)

²³ 2.3 for girls and 3.4 for boys.

²⁴ UNICEF, ['Education Providing quality education for all'](#), (Accessed on March 10, 2023)

²⁵ BBC, ["Afghanistan: Girls' despair as Taliban confirm secondary school ban"](#), December 8, 2021, (Accessed on March 10, 2023)

²⁶ UNICEF, Implementation summary UNICEF Afghanistan, August 2022.

²⁷ CNN, ["Taliban suspend university education for women in Afghanistan"](#), December 20, 2022, (Accessed on March 10, 2023)

²⁸ UNICEF, ['Education Providing quality education for all'](#), (Accessed on March 10, 2023)

²⁹ [Sustainable Development report](#), Accessed 14 August 2023.

accounted for 75 per cent of public expenditure, including the maintenance of the public health system.³⁰

18. Following the takeover, the United Nations (UN) and humanitarian partners have rapidly scaled up support to slow the rapid deterioration of the health situation. The USD333 million Health Emergency Response (HER)³¹ project, financed through the World Bank with funding from the Asian Development Bank and implemented by UNICEF and its implementing partners, is a primary example of the increase in the availability of and access to improved health care service.

19. Infectious diseases, like acute watery diarrhoea and measles, surged in 2022, partly due to COVID-19's impact.³²³³ Afghanistan remains one of the last two polio-endemic countries, with rising cases.³⁴

20. Afghanistan has one of the world's highest rates of stunting in children under five at 44.7 per cent.³⁵ Acute malnutrition is also widespread with most of the 34 provinces being classified as 'serious' (23 provinces) or 'critical' (2 provinces).³⁶ Acute malnutrition affects 3.7 per cent of children under five.³⁷ Acute malnutrition is projected to worsen due to food insecurity, limited health care access, and other factors. Though maternal mortality has decreased, Afghanistan still has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world 638 deaths per 100,000 live births.³⁸

21. UNICEF support health outcomes by providing mobile health and nutrition services and plans to support the government in training and supporting nutrition counsellors, community health workers, midwives and other health workers.³⁹

22. **Child protection:** Afghanistan is one of the most dangerous places for a child to grow up in, with 41 per cent of children displaying symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, with boys at higher risk than girls, and young children more vulnerable than older.⁴⁰ During the first half of 2021, a record number of child casualties were recorded with 468 children killed and 1,214 injured. Children represented 32 per cent of all casualties during this period.⁴¹

23. Violence at home is prevalent; three-quarters of Afghan children between the ages of 2 and 14 reporting violent discipline at home. Almost 90 per cent of Afghan women believe a husband is justified in beating his wife, indicating that children are likely frequent witnesses to violence, if not also victims themselves.⁴² Internal displacement, forced migration and ongoing conflict also increase the risk of young people being recruited by armed groups.

24. Among others, UNICEF engages religious and traditional leaders in communities, government and civil society in nationwide efforts to protect children from practices such as child marriage, violent corporal punishment, domestic abuse and child labour. UNICEF helps the government provide greater access to justice for children who are victims, witnesses, and alleged offenders of violence.

25. **Gender:** Afghanistan's history of women's rights includes periods of reform followed by resistance and violence. Progress was made during the U.S. occupation, but the Taliban's return led to tighter restrictions on women's freedoms. While the SDG5 (Gender Equality) ratings had been

³⁰ The World Bank. 2019. [Afghanistan: Public Expenditure Update](#). (Accessed 12 December 2023).

³¹ The overall objective of the Afghanistan Health Emergency Response (HER) project is to increase the utilisation and quality of essential health services, including the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS), community- and facility-based nutrition services, and COVID-19 prevention and response interventions, in Afghanistan.

³² UNICEF Humanitarian Situation Review #13, January – December 2022.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ UNICEF, ['Polio eradication'](#) (Accessed 31 October 2023)

³⁵ UNICEF, 'Afghanistan MICS 2022-2023 Summary Findings Report'.

³⁶ IPC: Afghanistan: Acute Malnutrition Situation for September - October 2022 and Projection for November 2022 - April 2023, p. 11.

³⁷ UNICEF, 'Afghanistan MICS 2022-2023 Summary Findings Report'.

³⁸ UNDP, UNDP, "Human Development Report 2021/2022", 2022

³⁹ UNICEF, ['Nutrition, Good nutrition for the most vulnerable children and mothers'](#), (Accessed on March 10, 2023)

⁴⁰ The EU's Program for Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, National Mental Health Survey and Assessment of Mental Health Services, Final Report, July 2018.

⁴¹ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview – Afghanistan, January 2022.

⁴² UNICEF, ["Child protection, Protecting Afghanistan's most vulnerable children"](#), (Accessed on March 10, 2023)

moderately improving, progress towards this SDG would be expected to drastically reverse with reductions in education parity, labour force participation and political representation.⁴³ There has been an increase in the scale and severity of gender-based violence (GBV), which 87 per cent of Afghan women had experienced even before 2021.⁴⁴

26. In December 2022, the Ministry of Economy sent a letter to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) ordering them to suspend Afghan women employees "until further notice".⁴⁵ Restrictions on women's movement are increasing.⁴⁶

27. **Natural hazards:** Afghanistan is prone to a variety of natural hazards that can cause considerable damage to infrastructure and loss of life. Climate hazards alone affected 33 out of 34 provinces in 2022, impacting more people than average due to floods, earthquakes, and drought.⁴⁷ Overall, the combination of exposure to natural hazards and lack of coping capacity in Afghanistan make the population particularly vulnerable to disaster. Notable events relevant to the evaluation subject include an earthquake of magnitude 5.9 killed over 1,000 people and injured 1,500 in Paktika and Khost provinces in June 2022⁴⁸ as well as droughts in 2021, reportedly the worst in 27 years.⁴⁹

28. **Humanitarian assistance:** Humanitarian partners work to deliver assistance to all districts in Afghanistan. National NGOs make up the largest proportion of humanitarian responders in Afghanistan (58 per cent), followed by international NGOs (36 per cent), and United Nations (UN) agencies (6 per cent).⁵⁰ The World Food Programme (WFP) is the largest UN recipient of funding in Afghanistan (46 per cent in 2022) followed by UNICEF (16 per cent).⁵²

29. Despite the major scale-up of assistance in 2022, increasing from USD2.1 billion in 2021 to USD3.7 billion in 2022,⁵³ levels of aid have been sufficient only to prevent catastrophe but not to move people out of crisis or into stability.⁵⁴ While in previous years humanitarian needs have been largely driven by conflict, the key drivers of humanitarian needs in 2023 are multidimensional: drought, climate change; protection threats, particularly for women and girls; and the economic crisis.⁵⁵

30. Access to communities has improved in some ways in 2022 but become more complex in others. After the DfA takeover, UN agencies continued to operate in a highly complex and fragile context, with a non-normalization of relations with the DfA. The DfA had made several unlawful decisions under international law, including the UN Charter, which created a dilemma for the international community's further recognition based on a potential reformed authority. "Protecting by presence and bearing witness" was the main driver of all humanitarian partners' continued presence in the country.⁵⁶

31. The cluster system was established in Afghanistan in 2008 with an Afghanistan Coordination Architecture Review undertaken in 2019 to assess whether the cluster coordination architecture in place was fit for purpose. There are currently eight clusters and ten thematic working groups. UNICEF coordinates the Education Cluster, the Nutrition Cluster, and the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

⁴³ Sustainable Development report. Accessed 14 August 2023.

⁴⁴ UN Women Gender Alert, December 2021. Even before recent political events, ranked at the very bottom of multiple gender equality indices, ranking 170/170 in the Women, Peace and Security Index and 166/167 in the Gender Development Index.

⁴⁵ Voanews, [Afghan Women Following Taliban's Rules Still Banned from NGO Work](#), March 3, 2023, (Accessed on March 4, 2023)

⁴⁶ CNN; [Afghan women once worked in this popular national park. Now they're not even allowed to visit](#); August 28, 2023; (Accessed on August 30, 2023)

⁴⁷ OCHA, [Afghanistan Overview of Natural Disasters](#), March 5, 2023. Accessed at Relief Web Natural Disasters Dashboard. (Accessed on March 5, 2023)

⁴⁸ BBC News, ['Afghan earthquake: At least 1,000 people killed and 1,500 injured'](#), June 22, 2022, (Accessed on March 11, 2023)

⁴⁹ UNICEF. Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report. November 2021.

⁵⁰ OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan 2023, March 2023, p. 31.

⁵¹ According to the [UN website in Afghanistan](#), there are currently 24 UN agencies, funds and programmes in the UN Country Team, of which 20 are located in Afghanistan, (Accessed on March 13, 2023)

⁵² OCHA, [Afghanistan 2022](#), 15 March 2023, (Accessed on March 15, 2023).

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ Humanitarian Action, [Afghanistan](#), (Accessed on February 2023)

⁵⁵ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview – Afghanistan, January 2023.

⁵⁶ United Nations Country Team in Afghanistan; United Nations Strategic Framework for Afghanistan (2023-2025); July 2023

(WASH) Cluster. A very large cohort of international and national actors are active in Afghanistan providing a range of humanitarian, recovery and developmental services given the immense scale of needs. According to Relief Web/the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in quarter three of 2021, there were 158 humanitarian actors in 370 districts and this grew to 252 actors operating in 401 districts by quarter two of 2023.⁵⁷

32. **Cash assistance:** Cash and voucher assistance, introduced in 2009, has become a preferred modality, with a significant proportion of the population favouring physical cash aid.⁵⁸ This approach is expanding in Afghanistan despite challenges in ensuring liquidity and accessibility.⁵⁹ In 2023 it is estimated that at least US 972 million (21 per cent) of the USD4.63 billion requested for Afghanistan responses is planned to be delivered in sectoral and multipurpose cash.⁶⁰

33. The Cash and Voucher Working Group (CVWG) was initially established in 2012 under the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster. Since 2014 it has become an inter-cluster working group which is overseen by the Inter-Cluster Coordination Team. By early 2024 the CVWG will transition to the new cash coordination model, the global Cash Advisory Group, adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).⁶¹


3 Description of UNICEF's CBA programme

34. In 2022, with support from UNICEF, more than 18 million people accessed primary healthcare in Afghanistan and 662,866 children under five received life-saving treatment for severe wasting. More than 556,000 children (55 per cent girls) accessed education through community-based education classes, while over 9 million people received child protection services. Since 2020, available funds for the ACO have increased almost thirty-fold going from USD28 million in 2020 to USD381 million in 2021, reaching USD789 million in 2022.

3.1 UNICEF's cash-based intervention in Afghanistan

35. UNICEF's cash-based assistance (CBA) in Afghanistan started in 2020 as part of the response to the worsening humanitarian situation including the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. That year, UNICEF reached 4,814 households (33,698 people including 24,070 children) with CBA using a 'cash plus' approach combining cash transfers with other modalities or activities.⁶²

36. During the first half of 2021, Afghanistan was the second country in the world to roll out UNICEF's new dedicated information management system.⁶³ In doing so, UNICEF ACO ensured systems were in place to securely handle rightsholder data, apply selection criteria, create payment lists, carry out payment verification, process feedback and grievances, and more.⁶⁴ After August 2021, multi-purpose cash (MPC) was widely used to support households in meeting their basic needs, using a network of MSPs.⁶⁵ By the end of 2021, UNICEF ACO had reached 36,459 households (266,151



⁵⁷ This refers to organizations that have an active project funded by the Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund – one of OCHA's country-based pooled funds.

⁵⁸ OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan 2023, March 2023, p. 45.

⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 46.

⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 45.

⁶¹ The Global Cash Advisory Group was formed following the IASC Principal's endorsement of a model for predictable cash coordination which was developed by the Grand Bargain Cash Coordination Caucus. The purpose of the global Cash Advisory Group (CAG) is to support country-level cash coordination technically and in terms of capacity with the overall aim of improving the quality and effectiveness of cash coordination. IASC, technically and in terms of capacity with the overall aim of improving the quality and effectiveness of cash coordination. IASC; [Global Cash Advisory Group](#); (accessed on May 5, 2023)

⁶² UNICEF; Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report #3; Year 2020.

⁶³ HOPE (Humanitarian Cash Operations & Programme Ecosystem) is a UNICEF tool that enables the collection and processing of data required for cash programmes to respond to humanitarian crises all over the world. Service users are registered in the HOPE database and are selected for programmes based on their vulnerabilities.

⁶⁴ UNICEF; Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report from January – December 2021.

⁶⁵ Ibid. / At submission, UNICEF is using MSPs to implement their CBA programme.

people including 156,819 children) with CBA,⁶⁶ increasing to 124,523 households through CBA by the end of 2022.⁶⁷ Up to August 30, 2023, UNICEF reached 215,609 households.⁶⁸ By 2025 the UNICEF ACO has the objective of reaching approximately 519,000 households in the 10 most vulnerable and poorest provinces of Afghanistan.⁶⁹ In 2023, UNICEF is setting up a Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) with the use of cash. The RRM aims to provide cash as a response modality within the first 72 hours of the emergency, which is out of scope of this evaluation.

37. **UNICEF's Humanitarian Cash Strategy in Afghanistan.** In May 2022, UNICEF ACO established its Afghanistan Cash Strategy, "to give children a positive start in life by addressing the underlying drivers of poverty and deprivation."⁷⁰ The objectives set by this strategy are twofold:

- To address financial barriers of households to meet the multiple needs of children across the lifecycle and ensure access to basic services in the short as well as the long term; and
- To create and leverage opportunities for the empowerment of women and girls.

38. To achieve these objectives the strategy is comprised of five components envisioned to be interlinked and reinforcing illustrated in Figure 2 below.⁷¹ These components are:

- Provision of **regular cash to households every month** to provide long-term assistance (three years) through small transfer values.
- Provision of **cash for early support and emergencies** to provide short term assistance (two to three months) with high transfer value. This component aims to support early action and/or cope with acute needs related to severe winter, drought, earthquakes, etc. Additionally, to further support ongoing programmes, households can be provided with extra support to achieve specific sector outcomes such as education, nutrition, health, etc. This **Cash+ component** can last up to one year.
- Provision of **complementary services**. In addition to cash transfers, UNICEF has the objective to support social behaviour change and communication primarily to women and girls (including information on women's self-care, childcare practices, and encouraging the use of cash for the fulfilment of children's rights).
- **Gender-sensitive process**. Cash delivery is to be done close to health services to enable health-seeking for pregnant and lactating women (PLW). Furthermore, all financial service providers and implementing partners are to be trained to prevent and mitigate sexual exploitation and abuse.
- **Evidence and learning**. By systematically capturing outcomes and gathering information on the effectiveness of design features, implementation processes and operational mechanisms, UNICEF will be more effective in developing the nascent Social Protection System in Afghanistan and/or in other similar fragile, conflict and violence (FCV) contexts.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ UNICEF; Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report 1 January – 31 December 2022.


⁶⁸ UNICEF; PMU tracker.

⁶⁹ UNICEF, Afghanistan Cash Transfer Programme Strategy; May 10, 2022. UNICEF ACO's strategy has subsequently been adjusted. Information was requested from the ACO for inclusion in the report.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Components as described in the UNICEF Afghanistan Cash Strategy.

FIGURE 2 INTERLINKED AND REINFORCING COMPONENTS OF UNICEF'S AFGHANISTAN CASH STRATEGY



Source: UNICEF; Afghanistan Cash Transfer Programme Strategy; May 2022. Revised by the authors

3.2 CBA programme logic

39. As per the Afghanistan Cash Transfer Programme Strategy, the expected outputs of UNICEF ACO CBA are the following:

- Households have economic means to access essential goods and services
- Women and girls have access to need-based knowledge and information
- Women and girls have access to safe spaces to connect and advance their knowledge
- Opportunity for women's mobility is created
- Women have access to health services and checkups
- Reports and knowledge products on the evidence.

40. These outputs are expected to result directly from i) income transfers, ii) knowledge and empowerment, and iii) evidence and information.


41. The expected outcomes of UNICEF ACO CBA are the following:

- Children's multi-dimensional needs and rights are protected
- Households refrain from coping strategies that negatively impact children
- Improvement in women and girls' self-care and childcare practices
- Improved programmes and policies in fragile, conflict and violence contexts.

3.3 Reconstructed theory of change.

42. During the inception mission, the ET worked with the UNICEF Social Policy, Evaluation, Analytics and Research (SPEAR) team to reconstruct the theory of change (ToC) to help clarify what is being evaluated and to better grasp the underlying logic of CBA programmes, together with inputs (see Figure 3). The ToC strives to make explicit the main influencing factors (also called assumptions) whose realisation is expected to influence the mechanisms that allow moving from planned activities to expected outputs and from expected outputs to expected outcomes. The ET amended the ToC during the data collection phase to update the influencing factors based on findings from the data collection. Notation has also been added to show the ET's assessment of where influencing factors (assumptions) have not been realized and activities and subsequent outputs/outcomes have not been implemented as planned. Additional notation is included to specify where data gaps exist limiting ET analysis. Further explanations are provided in the findings section. A list of the influencing factors (assumptions) from the ToC is provided in Annex 11.

FIGURE 3 CBA THEORY OF CHANGE



3.4 UNICEF ACO's CBA programme organisation

43. The UNICEF ACO is still running under its Country Programme Document (CPD) which was originally for the period 2015-2019. The CPD has since been extended several times, initially for 2 years to 2021, then for an additional period of 3 months from January to March 2022, and again for an additional eleven months to February 2023. The most recent extension is for ten months up to December 2023.

44. UNICEF's entire Country Programme is divided into different operational units that have evolved. The units are Health, Nutrition, WASH, Education, Child Protection, Gender, Social & Behaviour Change (SBC) and SPEAR. Each unit focuses on its area of expertise contributing to the overall goal of addressing inequity so that all children, adolescents, and women have access to the services necessary to fulfil their rights to survival, development, protection and participation.⁷²

45. In the UNICEF ACO structure, CBA is within the SPEAR unit. CBA sits under the Shock Responsive Social Protection section, covering both humanitarian and regular social protection interventions. It is the SPEAR team that initiated the revival of CBA activities in Afghanistan during the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020. SPEAR's Shock Responsive Social Protection unit leads all CBA programmes in coordination with the focal points of the relevant programme units or the emergency support team. Its output statement is the following: "Government at national and sub-national levels have the strengthened capacity to deliver integrated social protection services, including goods and cash, to the most deprived families, as well as in support of families, including children, during acute emergency and recovery, in line with [Core Commitments to Children]-CCCs".⁷³

46. **The Programme Management Unit (PMU)** was deployed In November 2021 to help the UNICEF ACO rapidly adapt to the multiple operational constraints in the highly volatile and unpredictable context at the time.⁷⁴ Deployment was based on lessons and practice from similar set-ups in other UNICEF operations. PMU was set up as a stand-alone unit. The different units did not have an overview of the PMU activities. Facing resistance from the rest of the ACO, PMU changed its approach in February 2022. For humanitarian Cash Transfers, funds are now channelled to the PMU Cost Center through the SPEAR unit, and service level agreements are signed between SPEAR and PMU. Instead of pursuing its own outcome, PMU became an operating arm of all UNICEF ACO units.

47. PMU is responsible for i) rightsholder registration and data management; ii) payment processing; iii) Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) and Accountability to Affected People (AAP) services; iv) Implementing partner management; v) Project-level operation support; vi) Project level risk management; and vii) Project level process monitoring.

48. The SBC unit works in collaboration with the programme units (Education, Child protection, Nutrition, etc.) in the elaboration of knowledge and empowerment activities and works in collaboration with the implementing partners for the roll out of activities.


49. The division of responsibilities for the CBA programmes is summarised in Figure 4.

⁷² UNICEF; Afghanistan Country programme document 2015-2019; 2014

⁷³ UNICEF; SPEAR Team Debrief for Rep Presentation; 2023

⁷⁴ To date, UNICEF has only deployed PMUs in three other countries: Yemen, Sudan and Ukraine.

FIGURE 4 DIVISION OF ROLES REGARDING CBA PROGRAMMES



Source: reconstructed by the ET

3.5 UNICEF CBA programmes

50. Since 2020, UNICEF has implemented several CBA programmes, mostly humanitarian cash programmes and Cash+ supporting nutrition, child protection and education activities. The first implementation of a regular cash programme started in late 2022 with the first instalments distributed in May 2023. A brief description of all 15 CBA programmes implemented by the UNICEF ACO since 2020 is provided in Table 1

51. Table 1 below. A map of CBA programmes is provided in Annex 4.

TABLE 1: BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH CBA PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTED BY UNICEF ACO

CBA type	Province	1st distribution /Status	households	Total transferred	Programme objectives ⁷⁵	Code
Cash+ CP	Herat	n.d./ Completed (2020)	3,718 ⁷⁶	No info.	One-off cash distribution was a small part of a larger programme covering Herat, Ghor and Farah provinces with the overall goal was to help protect children from violence, abuse and exploitation as well as from the effects of the spread of COVID-19 and related impacts. Households affected by COVID-10 were to receive humanitarian multi-sector cash grants for basic needs.	C+1
Cash+.CP	Kabul, Bamiyan, Wardak & Kapisa	2020/ Completed	1,113	\$165	Three-month distribution aiming to build synergy between the child protection and social protection sectors to address risks faced by street children through providing direct cash support and case management to mitigate negative coping mechanisms	C+5

⁷⁵ From HPD, SLA, FSP or proposals unless otherwise specified

⁷⁶ Per the 2020 RAM, UNICEF reached a total of 3,718 household with cash programming in 2020. It is unclear if all these participants came from this programme.

HCT (Winter 20/21)	Ghor & Herat	January 2021/ Completed	900	No info.	One-off cash transfer project to support vulnerable households.	HC2
HCT (Drought)	Samangan	November 2021/ Completed	1,165	No info.	Three-month distribution to respond to the basic needs of drought-affected families in a timely manner.	HC1
HCT (Winter)	Nuristan, Logar & Wardak	December 2021/ Completed	60,898	\$360	Three-month distribution of Humanitarian cash for winter response in winter-affected provinces	HC3
Cash+ CP	Kandahar	December 2021/ Completed	741	No info.	One-off distribution. The project aimed to build synergy between the child protection and social protection sectors to address risks faced by most vulnerable children and their families through providing case management and direct cash support to mitigate negative coping mechanisms and prevent abuse, violence and exploitation of children.	C+2
Cash+ CP	Badghis	February 2022/ Completed	32,538	\$340	Three months of monthly payment to households.	C+3
Cash+ Health/Nutrition	Daikundi	February 2022/ Completed	6,231	\$234	Three months of UNICEF's cash for pregnant women to incentivize institutional delivery. Cash transfer part of a larger project aiming to improve quality of, and access to, essential Nutrition, WASH and Child Protection services for the most vulnerable children, women and communities affected by the crisis in Afghanistan.	C+6a
Cash+ . CP	Kabul, Panjshir, Khost & Paktika	March 2022/ Completed	6,291	\$180-360	One-off cash transfer to the most vulnerable children and their families.	C+4
HCT (EQ)	Khost	Sept 2022/ Completed	1,198	\$310	One-off disbursement to IDP and host community households with children whose house has been partially or fully destroyed receive a humanitarian cash transfer.	HC4
Cash+ Nutrition	Daikundi	October 2022/ Ongoing	18,648	\$272	Three-month distribution for women and newborns to have improved economic security to enable improved food security, sufficient diets and improved access to nutrition and health services through the provision of short-term, nutrition-sensitive cash transfers.	C+6b

HCT (Winter)	Badakhshan, Panjshir and Ghor	December 2022/ Completed	86,563	\$215	One-off disbursement to ensure children's basic needs are met and households are able to cover essential one-off expenses to prepare for winter. The response is based on four separate proposals which include a range of output and outcome measures. ⁷⁷	HC5a
	Sar-e-Pul		915	\$386	One-off distribution of MPCA to meet basic survival needs, enabling households to access critical winter items, such as warm clothes, shoes, and blankets for their children.	HC5b
Cash+ Nutrition	Kabul	2022/ Completed	1,400	\$100	One-off distribution supporting the caregivers of IPD-SAM patients in the completion of inpatient treatment through the provision of cash assistance. The programme also sought to expand SAM treatment services in MoPH health facilities, build frontline health staff capacity and improve access to nutrition services.	C+8
Cash+ Education	Nuristan & Jawzjan	April 2023/ Ongoing	87,311	\$360	Nine months of cash distribution. The objective of the programme is two-fold and aims at supporting adolescent girls to go to school and stay in school, but also to support: 1. Retention and early drop-out prevention 2. Increase enrolment of adolescent girls in schools	C+9
Regular Cash Transfer	Samangan & Zabul	May 2023/ Ongoing	45,000	\$264	One year of distribution. The objectives are to ensure that the immediate to medium term needs of the most vulnerable households in Afghanistan are met to prevent households from resorting to negative coping mechanisms, while at the same time strengthening the basis for a nascent social protection system for longer term impacts	RCT
Cash+ Nutrition	Kunar	July 2023 Ongoing	1,820	\$828	One year of distribution of unconditional, unrestricted cash assistance and promoting good nutrition practices and providing access to quality and equitable nutrition services.	C+7

4 Evaluation purpose, objectives and scope

4.1 Purpose

52. The main purpose of this independent formative evaluation is to assess and guide the expansion of UNICEF CBA in Afghanistan and eventually serve as the basis for UNICEF support to the Afghan government in developing a nascent social protection system. Furthermore, the evaluation can, to a certain extent, serve as reference for UNICEF CBA programmes in other fragile, conflict and

⁷⁷ The Tahir Foundation and UNICEF: A new humanitarian partnership for children and women in Afghanistan. September 8, 2022; UNICEF Afghanistan, Application for USAID/BHA Award: Provision of humanitarian Nutrition, cash, WASH and protection assistance to the most vulnerable children, women and families in Afghanistan; UNICEF Afghanistan, Concept Note to the FCDO: Providing urgent emergency winterization assistance for children and communities in Afghanistan; UNICEF, Annex 1: Expanded Narrative of the Action [157199]/RQ/01/01

⁷⁸ PMU-SPEAR Service Level Agreement

violence contexts. The evaluation will also contribute towards knowledge and learning on social protection and cash transfers in Afghanistan for members of the UN Common Cash System and the Afghanistan CVWG.

4.2 Objectives

53. The overarching objective of this evaluation is to assess both programme design and implementation mechanisms and explore to what extent the cash transfers have been implemented as intended. More specifically, the evaluation objectives are to:

- Conduct a forward-looking evaluative analysis to refine the programme design and roll-out to make needed adjustments early in the implementation process rather than later;
- Review partnerships, coordination, and the monitoring system in place for effective delivery of the programme; and
- Draw lessons learned to bring CBA programmes to scale and eventually serve as the basis for UNICEF's support to the Afghan government in developing a nascent social protection system.

4.3 Scope

54. **Programmatic scope.** The evaluation encompasses all the CBA programmes as designed and implemented in all current and planned areas of operation since 2020 (per

55. Table 1). However, some CBA programmes have been excluded from primary data collection and were reviewed only through the literature review based on the following criteria: i) CBA programmes not having started the first disbursement; ii) CBA programmes ended over 18 months ago; and iii) CBA programme in the province of Panjshir, for security reasons.

56. **Geographic scope.** The evaluation scope includes all provinces where CBA programmes were implemented since from 2020. The geographic scope for primary data collection was based on the sampling criteria (see methodology section).

57. **Thematic focus.** Within the CBA programming, the evaluation included thematic focus areas aligned with CBA programme objectives including health, education, nutrition, child protection, social protection and humanitarian response. Additionally, the evaluation sought to assess CBA programme alignment with accountability to affected populations commitments and human rights and gender elements.

58. **Temporal scope.** The temporal scope of the evaluation includes all CBA programmes rolled out from 2020 up to May 2023.

4.4 Intended Users

59. A range of internal and external stakeholders have an interest in this evaluation and many of them have participated in the evaluation process. A detailed stakeholder analysis is included in Annex 3. UNICEF ACO is the primary audience based on the evaluation's main purpose to inform elaboration of the ACO cash transfer strategy in the short, medium and long term. Members of the UN Social Protection Working Group, UN Common Cash System and the Afghanistan CVWG are also expected to be primary users based on the evaluation's contribution to knowledge and learning on social protection and cash transfers in Afghanistan. Other stakeholders such as implementing partners (IPs), money services providers and donors will find interest in the findings of this evaluation.

5 Evaluation design and methodology

5.1 Approach

60. The evaluation used a theory-based approach applying contribution analysis to each evaluation question (EQ).⁷⁹The ToC (Figure 3) served as the analytical framework. Contribution analysis

⁷⁹ Better Evaluation. 'Contribution Analysis.' Global Evaluation Initiative. <https://www.betterevaluation.org/methods-approaches/approaches/contribution-analysis> (Accessed 29 March 2023).

allowed the ET to produce a credible, evidence-based narrative of programmatic contribution. The ET gathered evidence using a mixed methods approach on observed results (or absence of results) and the roles played by internal and external actors and events.

61. The evaluation used three main sources of information covering different levels of stakeholders: 1) Pre-existing documentation (project monitoring data, UNICEF reports, IP reports, UNICEF databases, external data from UN and others on context, needs and humanitarian approaches in Afghanistan etc.); 2) Primary qualitative information (interviews and FGDs with participants and other key stakeholders); and 3) Primary quantitative information (household survey with participants).

62. The evaluation used the OECD-DAC⁸⁰ evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. Cross-cutting issues of gender and equity have been integrated into the evaluation criteria per the ToR. The evaluation questions were grouped under the OECD criteria. During the inception phase, the evaluation team developed an evaluation matrix which aimed to ensure consistency in data collection throughout the evaluation. The evaluation matrix defines a rubric for how judgment was informed; the criteria and indicators, including gender-responsive and human-rights based indicators, on which answers were to be based; as well as the utilised information sources and analysis methods. The evaluation matrix is provided in Annex 2.

63. The evaluation approach was designed considering the political and security context in Afghanistan. The ET continuously adapted data collection techniques and plans as required to account for the changing environment in the country.

64. The ET was composed of three core team members supported by a local consultancy firm, ATR.⁸¹ Given the security constraints, the ET followed a hybrid approach whereby the international team members conducted interviews remotely while ATR conducted in-country data collection.

5.2 Data collection

65. **Desk review.** The document and data review included a review of all available/provided CBA records including concept notes, proposal and reports to donors, monitoring data, broader UN documentation, plans and appeals for Afghanistan and other relevant secondary research, data, and evidence.

66. The ET comprehensively analysed the information according to the evaluation questions, indicators and criteria. The results of the document and data review were triangulated with data collected during the evaluation with the aim of confirming or challenging assumptions, and filling key information gaps.

67. **Remote interviews (in English) by international evaluators.** The three international evaluators conducted remote interviews with key partners at national and sub-national levels. The international evaluators used a standard protocol and set of questions to guide the interviews, tailored to the specific area of expertise and experience of the interviewees. UNICEF originally provided a primary list of key interviewees, with purposeful sampling to include people thought to be best able to provide the data needed. The ET interviewed 41 stakeholders including 14 women through remote interviews (see Annex 3).

68. **In-country field interviews and focus group discussions (in Dari Persian or Pashto) by national consultancy firm.** ATR conducted 37 in-country face-to-face interviews with stakeholders such as community leaders, UNICEF extenders, IPs and MSPs. Fourteen FGDs were held in six provinces with men participants. FGDs were initially planned with women but eventually converted to phone interviews (44 total) as the evolving security conditions and restrictions on women working prevented gathering women in person for FGDs.

⁸⁰ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC)

⁸¹ Founded in 2012 in Afghanistan, ATR (Assess, Transform, Reach) has experience in Afghanistan, the Middle East, Central Asia, and West Africa. ATR has worked for the World Bank and the ADB, UN agencies, governments, international institutions, development contractors, and international NGOs in more than 200 projects.

69. **Household interviews (in Dari Persian or Pashto) by ATR enumerators.** ATR enumerators conducted 868 HH interviews (including 149 with women) with people who had previously received cash assistance. A total of 868 persons were interviewed (17 per cent women).⁸² The evaluation team randomly selected the people to be interviewed from the complete service user list provided by UNICEF. Daikundi (education Cash+) was eventually dropped from the planned sample after consultation with UNICEF ACO based on DfA refusal to issue the required authorization letter.

70. **Sampling:** Sampling of the CBA programmes for the household survey was designed to maximise regional coverage and provide a holistic view of CBA programming within the financial and temporal constraints while taking advantage of existing data to minimise duplication. The final sampling frame includes participants from two Cash+ CP programmes and the earthquake response in Khost. Due to DfA restrictions, the education Cash+ programme was dropped after discussion with ACO. Data collection in Khost covered the Earthquake response instead of the planned child protection Cash+ programme due to a miscommunication between the CO and ET.

71. Given the variety of CBA programmes and differences in contexts by province, results can be considered representative of these particular programmes but cannot be generalized to an overall experience with CBA in Afghanistan. The final sample yields representative results of CBA programme participants at 95 per cent confidence level with ± 6.5 per cent margin of error by province. The low response rate of women respondents, except in Badghis, means that gender disaggregated results are not representative when also disaggregated by province.

72. Qualitative sampling was determined balancing efforts to represent diverse stakeholders (covering different stakeholder groups and CBA programmes) alongside practical considerations of budget availability and access. Various constraints linked to the political situation did not allow the ET to reach the planned quantitative or qualitative data collection samples, as explained below in the limitation section (see Table 3). Data collection details alongside a summary of main changes from the evaluation design are provided in Table 2 below. The complete report provided by ATR is in Annex 6.

TABLE 2 DATA COLLECTION DETAILS

Tool	# (% women)	Geographic scope	Remote/in person	Change from evaluation design
Document review	n/a	National	n/a	n/a
Household survey	868 (17%)	Khost, Paktika, Badghis	In-person	No access granted in Daikundi (education Cash+); low women response rate
KII	84 (18%)	Badakhshan, Badghis, Daikundi, Kabul, Khost, Paktika, Wardak, Zabul	In-person and remote	KIIs not possible with women participants in Daikundi or Samangan province
FGD	14 FGDs, (0%)	Badakhshan, Badghis, Khost, Paktika, Wardak, Zabul	In-person	Only allowed to meet with men
Individual interviews	44 (100%)	Badakhshan, Badghis, Paktika, Wardak, Zabul	Remote	New data collection activity to include women's voices

⁸² Survey respondents were participants in the Khost Earthquake response; in Paktika participants benefitted from the C+4 Child. P and in Badghis from the C+3 Child Protection.

5.3 Training of enumerators

73. In June, ATR conducted a six-day training in Kabul to ensure enumerators built a comprehensive understanding of the evaluation purpose and the data collection tools. To have a more effective training, the training sessions were divided into two classes based on field researchers preferred local languages: one Pashto class and one Dari class. The training thoroughly explained all aspects of qualitative and quantitative data collection. As authorisation from authorities arrived in early August, ATR conducted a two-day refresher training for the field researchers before sending them to the field (see Annex 6 for further information on enumerator training).

5.4 Data analysis and validation

74. **Data analysis.** The ET met virtually for regular coordination of the evaluation (weekly meetings) and for in-depth analysis at the end of data collection. The analysis meetings were used to triangulate data gathered in diverse ways and from various sources to answer the evaluation questions, according to the evaluation matrix.

75. Quantitative data from the household survey was cleaned; the process involved checking the completeness, precision, reliability and internal consistency of the dataset (see Annex 7 for more detail). Of the 826 surveys submitted, the final sample consists of 771 surveys. The cleaned dataset was then transferred to SPSS producing summary crosstabulations and descriptive statistics. Qualitative analysis of open-ended questions used a thematic approach to identify the main themes for each question. All data has been disaggregated by gender and province. Some questions have been disaggregated by whether there was a person with disabilities identified in the house. The ET analysed pre-existing quantitative data ahead of the analysis meeting and provided a basis on which the ET built on (noting the limitations of existing quantitative data).

76. The ET analysed qualitative data collected during the evaluation according to the evaluation questions to identify patterns and test findings. A light form of contribution analysis was done to ascertain the degree to which programme actions have contributed to the perceived outputs and outcomes, using the CBA theory of change as a foundation.

77. **Gender and other cross-cutting issues.** Gender and equity principles were integrated into the methodology in line with UNICEF's Gender Action Plan (2018-2021) and based on the gender-related United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards. Data was disaggregated by gender and location to avoid making generalisations across distinct locations and population groups. Disability was considered as a cross-cutting issue for analysis to some extent; for example survey data was disaggregated by households with and without children with disabilities to identify potential differences in CBA programme effectiveness. Other key issues that were incorporated into the analysis include protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) and AAP. The ET had limited ability to assess some inclusion issues for marginalized groups (detailed in the Limitations section below).

78. **Data protection.** The ET followed principles of informed consent, voluntary participation, and confidentiality for all interviews conducted. No compensation for participation in the evaluation process was provided. Data quality control mechanisms were applied throughout the analysis process to preserve the integrity and confidentiality of respondents.⁸³ Based on the non-disclosure agreement signed by KonTerra, all data was submitted to UNICEF and deleted from ET and ATR computers three months after the finalisation of the evaluation.

5.5 Ethical considerations

79. The evaluation approach and methodology were guided by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards⁸⁴ of independence, impartiality, credibility, conflict of interest and accountability and Ethical Guidelines,⁸⁵ UNICEF's Evaluation Policy, UNICEF Global Evaluation

⁸³ See Annex 6 for further details on training and data quality assurance. Annex 7 provides further details on data quality assurance.

⁸⁴ <http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards/index.jsp>

⁸⁵ <http://www.unevaluation.org/ethicalguidelines>

Reports Oversight System (GEROS) as well as the Core Commitment for Children in Humanitarian Action. The evaluation design was reviewed through a formal institutional ethics review process as part of the inception process.⁸⁶ There is no conflict of interest for any team member supporting this evaluation.

80. Key ethical principles of the evaluation methodology included: commitment to ensure no harm to participants; respect for cultural norms, dignity, and diversity; commitment to an inclusive approach; commitment to ensure that participation in the evaluation is voluntary and with full consent; commitment to confidentiality and anonymity of participants; commitment to flexibility to respond to an evolving context considering security and access constraints and other contextual considerations. Specific obligations are further elaborated in Annex 10.

5.6 Evaluation limitations

81. There are some important limitations which impacted the evaluation. While the ET sought to overcome these challenges, they presented evaluability challenges for most criteria and specifically for assessing relevance and effectiveness as well as Human Rights (HR) and Gender Equity and Women's Empowerment GEWE as a cross-cutting issue (see Table 3). The Findings sections includes specification of impacts on specific areas of inquiry.

TABLE 3 LIMITATIONS AND MITIGATION MEASURES

Limitation	Mitigation measure and effect on evaluability
DfA-imposed restrictions on data collection. It took over two months for UNICEF and ATR to get approval for sending enumerators in the different provinces with no data collection authorisation in Daikundi or Samangan. The increasing restrictions on women working prevented FGDs with women.	The ET could not identify any mitigation measures to reach populations in Daikundi or Samangan. To maintain women's voices, ATR replaced FGDs with individual interviews conducted by phone. There are limitations in comparing results for different Cash+ programmes (Daikundi was selected to include the education Cash+ program). This also contributed to issues assessing GEWE and HR issues (see below).
Geographic isolation of communities prevented ATR from accessing certain parts of the country, primarily in Paktika.	ATR replaced clusters to compensate for those that were missing. Limitations in including populations from hard to access areas were not overcome.
Data and information gaps. The UNICEF CBA information management system is spread across several units within the ACO. ⁸⁷ Turnover and gaps in staffing in key units, particularly SPEAR and Social Protection, have led to gaps in data management to the extent that it was not clear until the data collection phase how many different CBA programmes had been implemented. Additionally, given the number of stakeholders involved in CBA across a myriad of units,	The ET has worked closely with the Cash team on the information needs and gaps, working to update data, maps and developing a ToC to help ensure understanding. Lack of clarity in design documents on objectives and subsequent implementation records limit ET assessment of some programming aspects, particularly concerning relevance and effectiveness.

⁸⁶ HML IRB Review #729AFGH23, Approved 25 May 2023. Approval form provided in Annex 12

⁸⁷ Programme designs sometimes sitting with SPEAR and sometimes with Programme units; implementation data sits with PMU while donor reporting is with the Partnerships team

overall accountability for results appeared to be diffused.	
<p>Quality of Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM). PDMs are the primary source of M&E information for UNICEF's cash portfolio. The design of PDMs has focused on operational elements over more complex outcome measurements. There are potential issues with data transparency given that IPs were responsible for conducting PDMs from 2020-2022. UNICEF maintains control of participants selected to be included in PDMs, though third-party monitors (TPMs) now conduct PDMs.⁸⁸</p>	<p>The methodology was designed to explore more complex issues of impact through qualitative data collection. However, the sensitive security context and DfA restrictions limited the ET's ability to engage in more complex topics. The ET did not uncover any evidence of corruption in selection of PDM respondents. When identified, differences in PDM results comparing when IP/UNICEF collected data compared to when TPMs collected data are noted.</p> <p>Evaluability of effectiveness and impact, as well as more complex HR and GEWE factors, is compromised (see below)</p>
<p>Limited ability to assess GEWE and HR issues: The combination of a lack of clarity on design objectives, restrictions on primary data collection and limited availability of up-to-date secondary data limited the ET's ability to assess GEWE and HR issues.</p>	<p>There was low representation of women in quantitative data collection, particularly in Khost and Paktika (84 per cent of sampled women are from Badghis). Gender disaggregated data potentially obscures differences between women in Badghis compared to Khost and Paktika.</p> <p>Cultural sensitivities, particularly in light of increasing DfA restrictions, prevented ATR from conducting FGDs with women having benefited from the assistance, only phone interviews were possible. In respect to do no harm principles, understanding the sensitivity of gender empowerment issues, sensitive topics were not explored via phone. Demographic data such as ethnicity or religion, which would be useful for understanding potential equity issues, but is extremely sensitive to collect in Afghanistan, are not collected by UNICEF nor the ET.</p> <p>The ETs ability to assess HR and GEWE outcomes is limited. This impacts a number of EQs.</p>

6 Evaluation findings

82. This section provides the ET's findings for each of the evaluation questions grouped by evaluation criteria. EQ20 is included separately as a Lessons Learned section. All data collected through the HH survey can be found in Annex 7.

⁸⁸ While using TPMs is an important improvement toward reducing conflict of interest and accounts for segregation between implementation and monitoring, it appears from the monitors interviewed that the procedures followed for ensuring neutrality in terms of monitoring are still not fully reached. The major issue is the fact that the sampling for TPM is done by UNICEF, instead of letting TPM sample straight from the participant list.

6.1 Relevance

EQ.1. To what extent are the planned activities and outputs of each CBA consistent with the overall goal and attainment of each CBA objectives?

83. This question focused on two components: first, the extent to which CBA activities and outputs are consistent with the ACO Cash Transfer Programme strategy goals (see paragraph 37) is discussed (paragraphs 84-**Error! Reference source not found.**). Then, the extent to which the planned activities and outputs are sufficient to meet each of the CBA project's objectives is discussed (paragraphs 88-95).

84. **Alignment with ACO Cash Transfer Programme strategy:** The implementation of CBA programmes operated more as individual programmes rather than the interlinked and reinforcing components envisaged in the cash strategy (see Figure 2) and the reconstructed theory of change (see Figure 3**Error! Reference source not found.**). The ET did not find any clear strategy linking participants of different types of CBA programming (HCT, RC, Cash+), provision of complementary services and generation of evidence and learning was inconsistent throughout the different CBA programmes.

85. All CBA activities are aligned at least in part with the first goal of the cash strategy in that vulnerable households are receiving/received unconditional cash to help them meet self-determined needs in the short term. However, activities do not provide for their needs in the long term. Some of the Cash+ programmes include specific objectives in their design to also provide greater access to basic services such as health, social services or education but this is not consistent (see

86. Table 1 for more details).

87. Consistency is mixed when examining the CBA designs related to strategic objectives of creating and leveraging opportunities for the empowerment of women and girls. While all designs prioritised women and children, this may not have been necessary or sufficient to significantly create and leverage opportunities for empowerment.

88. Emergency response, which by design is focused on immediate lifesaving responses for a shorter duration, focus on cash distribution to financially empower vulnerable households without additional interventions to support the empowerment of women and girls more specifically. Per the designs, most of the Cash+ programmes⁸⁹ facilitate some additional interventions beyond cash to help improve outcomes. However, the majority provide only short-term cash support and no other substantial interventions to help meet the overall goal of the ACO Cash Transfer Programme strategy. Stakeholders mentioned that SBC was expected for most programmes to support the promotion of key messages and behaviours but that the team was understaffed for the demand. The role and planned impact of SBC was not sufficiently apparent in the majority of designs to assess its relevance.

89. **Alignment with individual CBA project objectives:** The ET reviewed CBA designs to assess the extent to which each CBA programme's activities and outputs were sufficient to achieve their stated objectives.

90. Paragraphs 91 to 96 discuss the relevance of activity design. Importantly, there were frequently substantial changes between design and actual implementation in terms of timeline (lengthy delays) and planned objectives (reduced participant and cash transfer targets). The success of implementation measures is discussed against funded agreements within the effectiveness criteria (see section 6.3)

91. The **RCT** was designed as a three-year programme with two stated Objectives: Objective 1: Provision of cash transfers, to support the basic needs of 80,000 vulnerable households in the poorest provinces of Afghanistan and Objective 2: Initiating an evidence-based process to support the

⁸⁹ CP4 is not included as there are no proposals and the available files mention only cash support.

development of a child and nutrition sensitive social protection system in Afghanistan'. As designed, it had the potential to meet both objectives of the cash strategy. The programme's second objective is aligned with UNICEF ACO's evidence and learning agenda.⁹⁰

92. There were five **HCT** programmes to assess: one drought, one earthquake and three winterizations.⁹¹ Design documents are not consistently available for these programmes. The design of the Earthquake response in Khost (HC4) is described as a small component of a much larger earthquake response plan. For the 2022/23 Winterization response (HC5 a and b), the design is guided by four separate proposals. There are no proposals or concept notes available for the remaining HCT programmes (2020/21 and 2021/22 winterization and drought), only annual appeals or consolidated emergency reports. The ET used available documentation to determine programmatic objectives. However, the lack of clear design documents challenges the ET's assessment of relevance given ambiguity in the objectives and associated activities for some CBA. Except for the earthquake response (HC4) and 2022/23 Winterization response (HC5), the HCT programmes had simple designs with a singular focus – getting cash to people for them to meet their needs. The activities and outputs are aligned with these straightforward objectives.

93. There are four separate proposals for the 2022/23 Winterization response (HC5); expected results for the programme include a range of output and objective measures that were not sufficiently aligned with the stated objectives. The primary intervention is cash but is complemented by child protection (case management, referrals, child-friendly spaces). Based on these documents, the expected results are significant including sustained access to a range of critical goods and services including transport to access school, health and nutrition services; food; clean water; hygiene; clothing; fuel; and heat. The cash was also expected to help offset negative coping strategies such as increased debt, child labour, child marriage and school dropouts. The ET did not assess outcomes related to child protection that may be available within other programme documents (outside of the scope of this evaluation). However, the outputs and outcomes of the 2022/23 Winterization programme appear to exceed what could reasonably be achieved with the dedicated resources of the short-term cash transfer programme.

94. **Cash+ programmes** also do not have consistently available design documents. There were five child protection programmes. One was guided by a proposal (C+1 COVID response), one is detailed in a paper on child protection (CP) and Case Management (C+5 case management pilot) while the three others appear to be guided by the UNICEF annual appeal; designs for these were assessed by either the Annual Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) or Consolidated Emergency Report (CER). The primary intervention in CP programming is cash to affected families. Occasionally case management and referral to other services is mentioned but the scope and scale of the planned referrals and services is not apparent. Reporting is primarily focused on the number of households (who met the criteria) receiving cash and participant satisfaction. In at least one CP program, an expanded PDM was used with households asking about the welfare of children and if they were working on the street. This could at least potentially give some indication of the relevance of the programme, though it is still only self-reported data.

95. **Cash+ Nutrition.** Cash for nutrition programming in Daikundi and Kunar (C+6 and C+7) includes additional interventions beyond cash and importantly, reportedly will measure more than outputs. These programmes are ongoing but reported they will include outcome measurements. Programming in Daikundi (C+6) will report on increased access to services and the percentage of participants recovering from severe acute malnutrition in addition to numbers reached with cash. The proposal for the CBA in Kunar (C+7) specifies that a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) baseline and endline will be conducted and be used to measure wasting, per cent exclusively breastfed, and two self-reported indicators regarding intake of iron-rich foods and iron supplements. The programme in Kunar is based on a detailed proposal with a range of interventions spread across several provinces while cash is focused on 3,000 households in a specific geographical area. Assuming the cash recipients are also receiving the other services mentioned (it is not clear from the

⁹⁰ Donor concept note and the aforementioned ACO Cash Programme Strategy

⁹¹ The 2022/23 response includes two separate responses

designs) these designs appear to include sufficient activities and inputs to meet their objectives and are aligned with the cash strategy. C+8 was a large, nationwide programme providing a range of nutrition, WASH and health services. The cash component was focused in Kabul for families receiving support for a child with Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM). Cash participants received a one-off payment which was expected to help pay for food for the child and accommodation for the caregivers. A review of the proposal indicates that support was also provided in specific Kabul hospitals to expand space for SAM patients, along with a media campaign on related health messaging. Taking the combination of these activities into account, the activities included in this Cash+ programme would be expected to be relevant to increase access to, availability and utilization of key services. The programme also seems to address the objectives of the Cash strategy.

96. **Cash+ Education (C+9)** is another comprehensive programme seeking to increase access to, availability and utilization of education services; cash to selected households is only one component. The programme is to measure enrolment and attendance rates. The main challenge in this design is the drastic change in context whereby girls cannot officially attend school. UNICEF has done well to pursue opportunities as they arise at the provincial and district levels and has worked to increase informal or community-based options. According to UNICEF stakeholders in Kabul and the field, while girls are reportedly attending informal and some formal schools in some areas, girls' attendance is not widespread. Although it is a comprehensive and well-thought-out design, it is not clear if the donor(s) will support the flexible and opportunistic approach that is required in the context and which UNICEF is pursuing to increase girls' access to education despite the increasing restrictions in the environment.

EQ.2. To what extent was the design of the CBA programmes sensitive to the needs and realities of different social groups (defined along cultural, ethnic, religious, or any other relevant criteria)?

97. **The CBA designs are based on categorical criteria within geographically prioritized areas. They do not consider ethnic or cultural differences.** There was no evidence of any differential data being used to inform designs or selection decisions beyond gender which is addressed in EQ4 (see pp. 25). Most key informants with whom the subject was raised (ACO Kabul and field staff, implementing partners, community leaders etc.) did not identify differences that should have been considered. In contrast, as expressed by one IP, consideration of cultural or ethnic differences would go against the design, whereby everyone had to be considered equally, and the work had to be only needs-based: "We treat everyone equally, it has nothing to do with ethnicity nor culture". Further discussion on whether the actual implementation responded to the needs of different social groups is discussed in the effectiveness section under EQ.12.

98. **Marginalized groups are potentially underserved, though there is no evidence that they are intentionally excluded.** One stakeholder noted that IDPs were underserved and not a priority of the Community Development Council (CDCs): "The CDCs do not enlist them", and hence IDPs remain very vulnerable. Two programmes (Cash for child protection in Kandahar:- C+2 and the Earthquake HCT in Khost: HC4) included IDPs in the selection, though available data does not confirm how many were served. In total 714 HH were reached but this number included vulnerable families and host households as well as IDPs. The proposal for the 2022/23 Winterization response in Sar-e-Pul (HC5b) included 915 displaced and returnees but the selection criteria were PLW, children with disabilities and persons with disabilities. Presumably, these types of participants were selected from IDP/returnee families, but it is not clear from the documentation. Notably, IDPs may sometimes be difficult to isolate especially when they are settled in regular host communities.

99. **While UNICEF as an organization can be seen as a neutral, apolitical and non-religious entity, staff in the field may belong to ethnic groups or tribes seen as dominant in the local context which may deter participants from voicing complaints.** In accordance with UNICEF guidelines, CBA programmes include mechanisms for two-way communication with the affected communities. Based on KIIs, IPs were requested to ensure the availability of at least three different communication channels so that participants could reach out whenever they had any complaints (see additional

information in EQ.13).⁹² No interviews with UNICEF staff reveal any particular attention or specific measures in place to ensure acceptance and use of grievance systems by minority groups.

100. As a diverse country, which groups are 'minority' may differ at the local level. However, within the national context, especially considering rising systematic discrimination under the DfA rule, minority groups can be identified based on ethnicity, language and/or religion outside the predominantly Sunni Muslim, Pashtun ethnic group speaking Pashto of the DfA.⁹³ When asked by the ET, a few KIs did say that the ethnicity of agents needs to be considered when sending those agents to the field. Since April 2023, to have better control over the feedback of their programmes, UNICEF ACO set up a new UNICEF-supported call centre. The timing of this evaluation does not allow for enough feedback to investigate the effectiveness of this new grievance mechanism.

101. **Requiring different mechanisms for providing feedback is relevant to meet the needs of different social groups as data suggests that there are different preferences according to the province and gender of participants.** Within this evaluation, there were notable differences in terms of willingness and to whom/how respondents would hypothetically reach out for a complaint when data is disaggregated by gender or province. Half of women respondents (50 per cent) reported that they would reach out with a complaint compared to over three-quarters of men respondents (79 per cent). Regionally, respondents in Badghis were much more likely to report that they would reach out compared to respondents in Khost, 80 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively. When asked who they would be most comfortable reaching out to, 51 per cent of men respondents preferred UNICEF, while women were more inclined toward community leaders (49 per cent). In Badghis, IPs are the preferred channel for 36 per cent of respondents while UNICEF is favoured in Paktika and Khost. There are further differences when asked how respondents prefer to reach out. For example, women were more likely to prefer physical outreach (53 per cent) compared to men respondents. While the response rate among women was too low to obtain representative findings and may mask provincial-level differences due to concentration of responses in Badghis, the consistent differences in preferences between men and women respondents suggest gender-specific patterns. This evidence suggests that some channels would be more or less relevant depending on the context and specific needs of affected groups.

EQ.3. To what extent was the selection of participants for the different CBA programmes targeting the most vulnerable people, and how was it consistent with equity consideration?

102. UNICEF ACO applies five selection criteria: i) Pregnant and lactating women; ii) Households with children with disabilities; iii) Households with children under 2 for nutrition support; iv) Households headed by women; and v) Households led by a person with disabilities. These selection criteria are used in different combinations depending on the CBA programme. Selection is also tailored to the programme objectives, particularly in the Cash+ programmes such as education whereby adolescent girls are included.

103. **With the exception of two emergency programmes, the CBA programme designs mostly align with the universal selection.** Exceptions for two emergency programmes is reasonable given the affected population and populations expected to be most vulnerable. Specifically:

- Earthquake: The selection criteria are families with children with partially or fully destroyed homes in Khost.
- Winter in Sar-i-pul: This CBA selected persons displaced from nearby Balkhab district due to conflict.

104. **Implementing partners mostly agreed with the universal selection criteria given the widespread poverty (most noted that at least 80 per cent of the population is in need), but many felt**

⁹² Physical desk -with women staff where possible- set at the registration or distribution sites, Sharing Awaz-e-Afghanistan's contact number; Sharing the UNICEF GRM phone numbers for feedback (printed cards or brochures); Sharing the IP hotline number for calling, SMS and email; Setting up complaint boxes, banners, and writing on the walls

⁹³ University of Notre Dame. "Human Rights Defenders and the Future of Multi-ethnic Democracy in Afghanistan," 2022. <https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2022/11/17/human-rights-defenders-and-the-future-of-multi-ethnic-democracy-in-afghanistan/> (Accessed on 31 October 2023).

more could be done to narrow the selection to ensure a greater focus on the most vulnerable.

Suggestions to ensure prioritization included a more thorough household survey or otherwise have better data to accurately identify the most vulnerable or that UNICEF do more follow-up to validate that the most vulnerable are selected.⁹⁴

105. Numerous ACO stakeholders also noted the criteria is too broad, that there are many more vulnerable people than can be served and that there are many inclusion and exclusion errors. These sentiments

were shared by UNICEF technical staff in Kabul and by management in the field. Those KIs reported that more specific criteria would help programmes from being over-subscribed which often resulted in UNICEF reducing the number of payments, the value of the payment, or both. Many field staff felt they could help in identifying the most vulnerable by having varying criteria per geography and having the field staff weigh in on the criteria. A few UNICEF Kabul stakeholders noted there would be efficiency trade-offs if more stringent criteria were included. With over 90 per cent of the population considered 'poor' it is not feasible for UNICEF to include everyone within the programme with available resources, instead the strategic focus on women and children anchors targeting within UNICEF's mandate given other agencies that seek to assist populations with other vulnerabilities (such as UNHCR's focus on refugees/IDPs).

'Everyone is vulnerable but they are not the most vulnerable'.-UNICEF Technical staff

106. Lacking more specific vulnerability criteria, implementing partners in many cases described detailed efforts to try and identify the most vulnerable. Efforts balanced the involvement of the communities and local leaders, respecting UNICEF procedures and maximising available resources while remaining within time constraints. Some IPs noted door-to-door assessments of 80 to 100 per cent of a village while others reportedly worked within a set number while still trying to ensure support to the very vulnerable. More stringent criteria would help IPs as some stakeholders noted that, when everyone qualifies, they stop registration when the program is fully subscribed (or even over-subscribed). A few IPs and numerous participants spoke of a quasi-quota system where the IP would have a set number of households they could select in a village and would stop registration when that number was reached, even if other households met the criteria.

107. In primary qualitative data collection, men (in FGDs) and women (in phone interviews) mostly agreed that the most vulnerable were selected for cash assistance. However, many also noted that not all the most vulnerable were selected because the cash would run out. Participants in a few cases also noted that the IPs had a set number of households they could assist and could only select a small number of the total households in need. Although they agreed that those chosen met the criteria and were vulnerable, they felt there were still many others who were equally vulnerable. There were a few complaints or suggestions of a village leader and CDCs not using resources appropriately including registering family and friends as noted in KIIs by participants, IPs, and extenders.

108. The inclusion of households with disabled persons as a criterion for some CBA programmes is a clear effort of the ACO to ensure that at least some CBA programmes are inclusive of persons with disabilities, in line with the UN Disability Inclusion guidance. However, this criterion was not included in all programmes. It is not clear the extent to which the 'twin-track' approach recommended by UN guidance was followed to refer households with persons with disabilities to programmes providing targeted support. The CBA programme does not include any specific programming for persons with disabilities.

109. The CBA designs, operational guidance and work of the IPs clearly attempted to support equity considerations in a complicated setting. Equity for UNICEF means 'identifying risks and underlying vulnerabilities, targeting humanitarian action and prioritising the needs of those most vulnerable and disadvantaged'.⁹⁵ All stakeholders agreed that in the majority of cases, vulnerable

⁹⁴ Suggested by some IPs, participants, extenders and ACO field staff

⁹⁵ UNICEF: Strengthening UNICEF's Humanitarian Action: The Humanitarian Review: Findings and Recommendations. September 2020, p. 8. The original reference is the UNICEF Reference Document for Emergency Preparedness and Response, UNICEF, New York, 2017.

households (though not necessarily the most vulnerable) were reached and women and children in vulnerable households were prioritised by the various CBA programmes. However, analysing the differing vulnerabilities by province and district, disability status, ethnicity or even displacement status and the associated underlying risks were not apparent.

EQ.4. Did the design of the CBA programmes properly account for gender dynamics at the household and community level?

110. **The overall CBA cash programme is aligned with the UNICEF gender policy and directly touches on goals three and five.**⁹⁶ There are five key goals in the latest Gender Action Plan (GAP); the UNICEF ACO CBA supports four of the five goals. Alignment with the gender policy and GAP is further reinforced through the provincial prioritization focusing on multi-dimensional poverty measures and the universal selection criteria of all CBA specifically focusing on women and children.

111. **The CBA designs featured the selection and inclusion of women despite widespread restrictions on women's rights.** Some Cash+ programmes (education and nutrition) emphasised empowerment. Some designs also highlighted the importance of listening to women and in using women enumerators to reach women more effectively. The designs continued to push for this even as the space to operate and to include and empower women was shrinking.

112. **IPs took practical steps to enhance the inclusion of women.** Identified adjustments to increase women's direct access to cash included registering women as primary or secondary recipients, prioritising women with children and pregnant women when coming to pick up the cash, ensuring separate lines and allowing them to be processed first.

113. **Internal stakeholders had differing opinion on the extent to which CBA programmes effectively addressed gender issues.** Some IPs and ACO field staff equated inclusion with addressing gender issues. Other ACO technical and management staff at field and Kabul levels suggested much more could be done to address the gender dynamics at both household and community levels which could help ensure that women are treated well, are supported to be mentally and physically well and that cash is used as intended. Some suggestions included greater use of extenders, more SBC messaging and including gender indicators in ACO staff performance reviews to help increase accountability for this strategic priority.

114. **At the time of the evaluation, UNICEF ACO had not yet undertaken any thorough gender assessments which could comprehensively inform program designs, specific gender objectives, indicators and related targets against which change could be assessed.** While CBA programmes were aligned with the gender policy and action plan, and generally reflected their immense long-term experience in Afghanistan, key stakeholders felt much more could be done to further understand gender dynamics and address the worsening situation for women and children due specifically to gender discrimination. Doing more along these lines would align with the latest overarching goal in the GAP theory of change for the timeframe 2022 – 2025, to “integrate gender equality programming for transformative results in all areas of work across the humanitarian-development nexus...”⁹⁷

115. **Designs did not include any outcome indicators to measure such results such as women's empowerment.** While not specified in design documents, PDMs did include several questions to monitor gender and protection-related risks potentially created by CBA activities. Some ACO technical staff at the field and Kabul level noted that UNICEF has the capacity to measure and manage these types of data, but this has not yet been prioritized. The CVWG is starting to talk about ways to measure the empowerment of women.

⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 5. Aim 3: to support parents, families, and communities to gain the resources they need to support children and adolescents through healthy and gender equitable life course transitions, from infancy to adulthood, and to establish positive norms and social structures based on shared values of equality, justice, and human rights; Aim 5: to close gendered divides in access to education, employment, and technology; and to ensure that all children and adolescents benefit from and drive innovations and new pathways to learning and interacting;

⁹⁷ UNICEF: Gender Action Plan 2021 – 2025, UNICEF, New York, 2021:7.

6.2 Coherence

EQ.5. How well aligned or complementary are UNICEF's CBA programmes with other large actors implementing cash programming in Afghanistan?

116. Approximately 252 humanitarian actors are working in Afghanistan with the largest number working in Food Security and Agriculture. While this assistance does not equate 100 per cent to cash-based assistance, it is relevant given that the number one need identified as food,⁹⁸ with cash and vouchers being the preferred mechanisms according to CVWG members. The biggest funding recipients are WFP followed by UNICEF, UNHCR and the World Health Organization (WHO, see Figure 5).

FIGURE 5: MAIN OPERATIONAL AGENCIES FOR THE YEAR 2022

Top Recipient Organisations (UN, INGO, Other) (source fts 15th March 2023)

Destination org.	Funding US\$	% of total Funding 2022
WFP	\$1,736,189,538	46%
UNICEF	\$612,502,916	16%
UNHCR	\$170,250,344	5%
WHO	\$136,272,641	4%
IOM	\$129,354,366	3%
ICRC	\$122,722,414	3%
FAO	\$122,162,769	3%
Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund	\$100,489,220	3%
International NGOs (Confidential)	\$97,975,704	3%
UNFPA	\$91,058,401	2%
Other	\$423,241,835	11%

Source: Inception Report: Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Afghanistan: June 2023: Page 36.

117. **There are a large number of international and national actors supporting cash transfers in Afghanistan – quite a few are part of the CVWG.** This

group has a mailing list of around 300 actors with regular participation at meetings by 50 to 70 participants, sometimes expanding to 100 according to the co-chair. This group works very closely with the Food Security and Agriculture cluster but does not provide operational coordination as cash sits within most clusters. The CVWG is more of an advisory body providing technical aids, tools and guidelines.

118. **According to the CVWG, WFP is the biggest cash actor, followed by UNICEF in terms of budget. WFP primarily does cash for food, while UNICEF is reportedly the biggest actor in multi-purpose cash assistance.** WFP has a nationwide presence while UNICEF is focused on ten provinces based on multi-dimensional poverty analyses. UNICEF and WFP both implement their projects with the support of implementing partners – both local and international NGOs. As highlighted in Figure 5, WFP and UNICEF programming dwarfs all other actors.

119. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and International Rescue Committee (IRC) are among the bigger International non-governmental organisation (INGO) cash actors – though the ban on women staff is reported to have an impact on the scale of their operations. UNHCR does some cash for protection in targeted areas of return, while FAO focuses on rural areas with cash largely for farmers to support livelihoods.

120. **Coordination has improved following the launch of the Humanitarian System-wide scale-up protocols.** To support the response to the crisis and immense needs, the IASC launched the Humanitarian System-wide scale-up protocols for Afghanistan on September 11, 2021, and deactivated them on March 23, 2023.⁹⁹ During this time, OCHA worked diligently to get staffing in place to support their scale-up and overall coordination, which some UN stakeholders noted as having been somewhat lax before mid-2022. Before August 2021, the UN did not have good access across the country; this changed when the DfA took over. Eventually, the coordination system caught up but

⁹⁸ Noted by numerous stakeholders and reported by the World Bank in their Social Protection Monitoring Bulletin. April - June 2022. <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/1f5096ddda6569daaaef6a22458045f-0310012022/original/Afghanistan-SPM-Bulletin-2.pdf>

⁹⁹ The IASC Humanitarian System-Wide Scale-Up Protocols are a set of internal measures designed to critically enhance the humanitarian response given drastically increasing humanitarian needs and to ensure that IASC member organisations and partners can rapidly mobilise the necessary operational capacities and resources to respond to critical humanitarian needs on the ground. These exceptional measures are activated based on a set of criteria and will only be applied for a time-bound period of up to six months (which can be exceptionally extended by another 3 months). <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-humanitarian-system-wide-scale-activations-and-deactivations> (Accessed on October 11, 2023)

there were reportedly challenges along the way according to interviews with UNICEF field management and other UN Agencies (including OCHA). Sectoral coordination was centralised in Kabul with the normal cluster architecture until early 2023, after which OCHA was able to roll out a new sub-national coordination architecture at the provincial levels.

121. According to KIIs, UNICEF and WFP overlap in some provinces but are primarily working in different districts. If actors overlap with WFP, then they coordinate and reduce their Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) as was done when overlaps occurred with UNICEF or IRC. Local-level overlap between the two was only noted as problematic by UNICEF during the earthquake response when WFP ran out of food and switched to cash without prior coordination in areas where UNICEF was planning cash assistance. Other village and district-based coordination issues were also noted in the Afghanistan Earthquake Response Lessons Learned Report.¹⁰⁰

122. **ACO field chiefs noted both formal and informal coordination in their areas of operation.** A few noted that their staff are participating in the recently launched OCHA provincial coordination groups for their key sectors but not for cash as it remains centralised in Kabul. UNICEF has attended several CVWG meetings and participated in some technical committee meetings. However, ACO Kabul stakeholders noted that while coordination is important for cash, the SPEAR unit provides less attention to the CVWG given a myriad of other priorities and especially noting that the distribution of cash and vouchers is not their primary goal; rather their priority is to get a social protection system in place for which there is no coordination mechanism. The CVWG principles concurred that UNICEF contributes only minimally to this working group and more attention and support from UNICEF could be beneficial. UNICEF noted that where they have planned overlap with WFP at the district, which is reportedly minimal, UNICEF reduces the MEB to account for what WFP is providing.

123. Most extenders interviewed noted good coordination by UNICEF at the provincial levels. However, feedback from IPs was more mixed. Some implementing partners noted that they (the IPs) do not coordinate with other NGOs or WFP. One IP noted, “This is a special programme, and we don’t have to coordinate with other NGOs”. Another IP noted there was no coordination before or during the registration with any other partner, only UNICEF. Another reported: “We distribute from the same site as WFP (cash vs. food) but we do not coordinate with them”. This quote does not necessarily indicate that there is WFP and UNICEF duplication; in some areas, a distribution point can pull in participants from multiple districts. However, other IPs described good coordination at the field level, taking turns when using key distribution sites, sharing participant data so as not to include those who have received assistance in the past six months, and generally sharing information on programmes and plans.

124. **Given the high level of need in the UNICEF ten priority provinces and across the country, no stakeholders noted any significant overlap in services beyond the lack of coordination during the earthquake response.** Rather, they noted gaps in available services. This primarily refers to needs outstripping resources throughout the country. It was particularly highlighted as an issue in the North and Central regions. KIIs provided a variety of sectors in which needs were unmet. For example, one KI noted the WFP’s distribution of food does not account for all needs. Another stakeholder noted opportunities to increase vouchers for transportation and more cash via other local partners, particularly in areas where community-based education is needed and children are walking three to four hours to get to school.

125. However, several UN stakeholders noted that since there is no data interoperability combined with the fact that “everyone does their own assessment” and has their own non-shared participant lists, there could be an overlap in services, but it was not apparent. According to UN stakeholders, there are general efforts to improve data sharing. In a few FGDs and KIIs, participants noted receiving WFP food assistance as well as UNICEF cash. This was highly welcomed by participants as they could then use cash for other pressing needs such as health care, medicines and clothing for their children.

¹⁰⁰ <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-earthquake-response-lessons-learned-exercise-final-report-january-2023>

126. Coordination between UNICEF and WFP appears to be informal and not strategic. One large donor noted they could not see how UNICEF and WFP were integrating (coordinating) in a clear way; nor did they understand why both were doing multi-purpose cash transfers (MPCT). Strategic coordination appears to be changing at least in part as the World Bank, WFP, UNICEF, KfW Development Bank (KfW) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are collaborating on a major new investment in health and nutrition from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.

127. **The CBA programmes largely follow the CVWG technical guidance, including the principle of unconditionality of cash, transfers being made in local currency and the MEB transfer value calculation guidance.** The MEB¹⁰¹ is adjusted every six months; it has been reviewed twice during the evaluation period, once in September 2022 and again in April 2023, based on context-related variables and socio-economic triggers. The CVWG co-chair reiterated that the MEB is based on a 'minimum', and there is an expectation that it will be modified upward based on field conditions and regular consultation with the relevant cluster. There were no instances of the MEB being raised based on local conditions and a few examples of it being lowered. In some incidents, the transfer frequency was not adhered to due to underestimation of eligible participant caseload, resulting in funding shortages.

128. **There is debate internally and externally about the validity of a national MEB value.** A few ACO field management/program staff felt that field contextualisation was essential and that not all districts/provinces should receive the same amount. A similar debate was discussed at the CVWG for establishing a province-level MEB, but operational and "do-no-harm" aspects supporting a national MEB prevailed, similar to efforts at setting up an urban/rural MEB.

129. **Stakeholders suggested utilising area-based approaches to improve the relevance and effectiveness of CBA vis-à-vis other actors.** Stakeholders from two UN organisations suggested UNICEF look more at area-based approaches – whereby more comprehensive services are provided to households in a set area to address needs in a more impactful and sustainable way. A few ACO field management and technical staff suggested this as well noting that a more integrated approach, working with international and local partners at the district level, could more holistically address the needs of a district. In doing so, staff felt they could better map who does what at a district level which would contribute to improved planning for all.

130. UNHCR recently released impact stories of their successes in Afghanistan by working with UN agencies (not UNICEF), INGOs, NGOs, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and development banks in an area-based approach. Improved access to education and health services are among their key results in 2022.¹⁰² OCHA noted they hoped to restart their pilots of area-based approaches which had been started and stopped just as the Taliban were taking over in August of 2021.

131. One potential option for UNICEF to maximize their CBA is to work alongside actors who specifically support livelihoods, such as FAO. The need for livelihoods was mentioned by numerous participants in the FGDs, KIIs and HH survey. A few IPs also suggested job creation was needed or noted that participants were requesting job opportunities. External stakeholders also noted the importance of livelihoods and job creation to reduce vulnerabilities more sustainably. There were mixed opinions on the suitability of livelihoods programming among the ACO staff. While one Kabul technical staff member felt that livelihoods were not feasible at this time given the challenging context, two other ACO staff (one management staff in Kabul and one management staff in the field) felt that livelihoods were an important option and could be pursued by partnering with other agencies.

132. **External stakeholders highlighted the importance of increased reporting on CBA to make what they do more visible to the international community within Afghanistan.** This could help enhance coordination. One large donor felt that UNICEF could focus their efforts more on cash and give them

¹⁰¹ The MEB is based on the needs of a family of seven; the calculation factors in the estimated average household income and the resulting gap.

¹⁰² UNHCR. Impact Stories: Area-Based Approaches for Return, Reintegration, Resilience and Solutions. 2022.

(the donor) more of a prioritisation while continuing with their coordination and complementarity. This donor suggested they were spreading their efforts too thinly.

EQ.6. How complementary are the CBA programmes with other non-cash-based programmatic interventions in the different (UNICEF) thematic areas? What are the existing/potential synergies across the programmes that could be useful to improve the design and delivery of the programmes?

133. Overall the ET found the CBA programmes to be well aligned with or complementary to the HAC 2022, with cash plus programming directly supporting two of the four key targets. Improved access to safe water and increased vaccination rates were not directly addressed.¹⁰³ The use of HCT and MPCT are featured as key strategies to facilitate a more dignified response and to help vulnerable households meet basic needs. Moreover, CBA supported results in seven of the eight priority programme areas in 2022 touching on all except WASH.¹⁰⁴

134. According to KIs with programmatic units, Cash+ interventions do not build enough on the programmatic interventions, but they are run alongside them. As no staff in the programmatic unit are directly dedicated to CBA, it makes it hard for the programmatic units to follow and ensure a better complementarity of CBA programmes with non-cash intervention.

135. Potential gaps that were identified focused on insufficient integration of M&E systems and cross-cutting issues, specifically, greater integration of SBC and gender approaches in all CBA programming. This is discussed in further detail in EQ1.

136. UNICEF could capitalize on their experience in CBA and footprint in priority regions to build on the M&E expertise of the various sections and ensure inclusion of more rigorous M&E systems in Cash+ programmes and RCT to improve design and delivery of programmes. Limited integration of M&E could be symptomatic of CBA was introduction coinciding with an immense humanitarian crisis. No unintended effects were identified. Systematic integration of PDMs shows adherence to minimum accountability standards, while broader evidence generation was less prioritized. Some programming staff expressed frustration with the lack of outcome indicators for measuring the potential impacts of Cash+ programming. Sound evaluation approaches seem to be well-integrated into programming managed by the health and nutrition unit, but less so in the Cash+ programming. Some design documents highlight the importance of evidence generation, such as in the regular cash transfer programme, though implementation has not adequately addressed objectives.

137. Building complementarity between programming internally, involving greater alignment across sectors in targeted provinces and districts, was also suggested to improve programming. Some stakeholders felt that more emphasis on achieving sector objectives¹⁰⁵ within the cash plus programming, alongside the basic distribution of cash could be beneficial.

138. Numerous internal stakeholders (field and Kabul; management and programmes) and external stakeholders (IPs, UN) as well as participants noted a need for improved access to water (in addition to livelihoods as noted in the previous section, see paragraph 131). While UNICEF works to ensure access to water at an institutional level (health posts and clinics), a focus on community-level access could help ensure health outcomes achieved at the health post, hospital and clinic level are not undermined at home. If this is beyond the remit of UNICEF, then it represents an opportunity to partner with other agencies that have such capacity.

¹⁰³ In 2023 – 2024 UNICEF is looking at adding CBA to increase the uptake in polio vaccination programming.

¹⁰⁴ UNICEF, 2022 Humanitarian Action for Children, Afghanistan. Released December 2021, pp. 3.

¹⁰⁵ Examples of sector objectives include: improving nutrition outcomes for women and children, increasing access to education, reducing child marriage, getting children off the street, etc.

6.3 Effectiveness


EQ.7. To what extent were the different CBA objectives achieved/are likely to be achieved (both in terms of delivering outputs as planned and influencing outcomes as intended)?

139. While the evaluation methodology envisaged to use the ToC as a framework for evaluating CBA effectiveness, the ET found that individual CBA programmes operated as standalone projects with varied objectives rather than the unified strategy of interlinked and reinforcing components envisaged in the ToC. Thus, effectiveness is assessed against programme-specific objectives as determined in implementation documents.¹⁰⁶ UNICEF did not specify any gender-specific participant targets for CBA programmes as they are delivered at the household level. Thus, the discussion of effectiveness does not discuss disaggregated data. Not all available reports included gender-disaggregated results. No unintended effects were observed, despite systematic exploration of these issues throughout data collection tools.

Regular Cash Transfer

140. **The expected outputs of the RCT programme have been scaled down dramatically from what would be expected according to the cash strategy and what was initially proposed in the concept note.** According to the UNICEF Afghanistan Cash Transfer Programme Strategy, regular cash transfers are expected to be planned over a period of 36 months. The concept note for the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) elaborated in 2021 proposes a duration of 18 months for 80,000 participants, while the actual programme agreements (Service Level Agreement-SLA) anticipated distribution for 12 months for 45,000 participants (see Table 4 below). The reduced duration and caseload were because UNICEF was unable to secure funding for the planned duration.

TABLE 4: REACHING REGULAR CASH PROGRAMMES OBJECTIVE (PLANNED VS. BEING REACHED)

Initial plan	Regular transfers of cash to 80,000 households for a period of 18 months with an additional top-up as emergency cash transfers in the initial 4 months to help beneficiary households cope with the peak of stress created by the current crisis. Evidence building, learning and knowledge sharing are important components of the programme that will guide the direction of a future social protection system in the country.		Address financial barriers of households to meet the multiple needs of children across the lifecycle and ensure access to basic services in the short as well as the long-term; and leverage opportunities for the empowerment of women and girls.
Ongoing Plan	Regular transfers of cash to almost 62,000 households for a period of 12 months in the provinces of Zabul (31,000) and Samangan (31,000). ¹⁰⁷ Transfer value: US\$22 per month. Comprehensive PDM and rapid gender assessment.		

Sources: Concept note; Scaling up cash assistance for the development of a nascent social protection system in Afghanistan and PMU-SPEAR Service Level Agreement.

141. **The RCT transfer value is insufficient to reach the expected objective of addressing household financial barriers and creating and leveraging opportunities for the empowerment of women and girls.** The CVWG calculated the gap between the MEB¹⁰⁸ and the average income of a seven-member household to be US\$140 in February 2022 and US\$181 in August 2022.¹⁰⁹ These regular unmet needs of a household are often compensated for through negative coping mechanisms as described in UNICEF's Afghanistan Cash Transfer Programme Strategy. However, the transfer value

¹⁰⁶ MSP agreements, Humanitarian Programme Document or Service Level Agreement

¹⁰⁷ According to the SLA, the plan was 45,000 households for a period of 12 months in the provinces of Zabul (20,000) and Samangan (25,000).

¹⁰⁸ A Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) is defined as what a household requires to meet basic needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, and its average cost.

¹⁰⁹ CVWG; Afghanistan CVWG Minimum Expenditure Basket and Setting the Transfer Value Guidance Document; August 2022.

of US\$22 per month for regular cash assistance provided by UNICEF compensates for approximately 12 per cent of the income gap. Considering that the programme is not implemented in collaboration with other actors as would be required to fill the remaining 88 per cent, the amount delivered could only be expected to partially address households' financial barriers to meeting their basic needs. The selection criteria including PLW and households headed by women could be expected to provide additional financial resources to households containing these profiles, though the extent to which financial empowerment benefitted these populations specifically is not assessed.

142. If evidence-building activities are followed according to plan, the data collected by UNICEF could provide good insight into how regular cash assistance may impact household spending fulfilling evidence-generation objectives. The Social Protection unit under SPEAR has developed a more comprehensive PDM form than what is used for the Cash+ programmes to fulfil the objective of building evidence of change. The additional data collected will only be quantitative and will allow the analysis of household economy, health, nutrition and education outcomes over time.¹¹⁰ In addition to regular PDMs, the Social Protection unit is recruiting a consultancy firm to undertake a rapid gender assessment in both provinces where the RCT programme is being implemented. The proposed methodology includes a mixed-methods approach combining primary qualitative and quantitative data collection with secondary literature review,¹¹¹ though the design may still change depending on the capacity of the consultancy firm recruited and possible restrictions that could be imposed by the DfA.

143. As data collection has not yet started, and considering the unpredictable environment in which UNICEF is operating, the ET cannot anticipate to what extent the evidence-building objective of regular cash assistance is likely to be achieved or not. The first PDMs were expected to be conducted in August or September 2023. However, they cannot be considered as a baseline as the programme will already have started.

Humanitarian Cash Transfers

144. Generally, cash distribution and participant objectives are met except for the 2022/23 winter cash assistance. Objectives met are compared to the objectives defined once donors provided funds (number provided in the documents signed either by IPs, MSPs or PMU, see Table 5 below). In response to the confiscation of funds from participants from the DfA, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator decided to suspend all cash programmes in the Ghor province from February 2023 onwards. As UNICEF's winterisation programme started late compared to plans, only 8,158 households out of the 43,099 households planned received their payment before the UN suspension. Additionally, the total transferred was reduced due to budget restrictions. UNICEF only distributed one round composed of the MPC amount (US\$ 84) together with the winter top-up (US\$ 131). The reduction of participants for the earthquake response resulted from coordination challenges among all actors involved, the final households selected, transfer value and location were determined among all.

TABLE 5: PARTICIPANTS AND TRANSFER AMOUNTS PLANNED AGAINST REACHED FOR EARLY SUPPORT AND EMERGENCY CASH RESPONSE.

Programme	Participant targets	Cash value targets
HCT Drought (HC1)	1,165 households	No transfer value information
Winter 20/21 (HC2)	900 households (100%)	No transfer value information
Winter 21/22 (HC3)	60,898 households	US\$360
	Logar: 19,274 households	

¹¹⁰ The ET did not review this form


¹¹¹ UNICEF Afghanistan Request for a Contract for Service: Rapid Gender Assessment in Zabul and Samangan Provinces

	Wardak: 27,314 households (93%)	
	Nuristan: 14,310 households	
Earthquake (HC4)	1,198 (21% of target)	US\$310 (no target)
Winter 22/23 (HC5a)	86,563 (77% of target)	US\$215
	Badakhshan: 69,721 households	
	Panjshir: 8,684 households (91%)	
	Ghor: 8,158 households (19%)	
Winter 22/23 (HC5b)	915 households (96%)	US\$386

Dark green: >100% of target; green: 85-100% of target; yellow: <75% of target; Grey: missing information

145. **PDMs suggest improvements in household ability to meet children's needs.** In the earthquake response, UNICEF included a recall question to ask, three months before the PDM was conducted, what was a household's ability to cover their children's needs and, in a separate question, what was their ability to cover their children's needs today. Responses show a clear improvement in the proportion of respondents that reported a 'good' or 'very good' ability to meet the needs of children at present (see Figure 6 below). Importantly, it is unclear whether the recall period could proxy as a 'baseline' as the dashboard does not provide dates of data collection, if data were collected more than three months after distribution, there would be no validity of the recall period as a pseudo-baseline.¹¹² In other PDMs, the recall question was not included. Instead, participants were asked only about their ability to cover their needs today.

FIGURE 6 ABILITY OF HOUSEHOLDS TO COVER CHILDREN'S NEEDS BEFORE AND THE PDM FOR EARTHQUAKE ASSISTANCE



Source: UNICEF; Afghanistan Country Office Multi-Purpose Cash Transfer Post Distribution Monitoring; Power BI

146. **There are no notable differences in change in the ability to meet children's needs when data is disaggregated by whether a household contains a person with a disability within the earthquake PDM cohort.** The dashboard does not allow the ET to disaggregate by other socio-demographic factors such as households with children under two to identify whether the same results were


¹¹²The ET was not provided with underlying datasets for this PDM

achieved with households that may have unique needs.¹¹³ Data on the age of PDM respondent was not available to assess differences in response patterns according to respondent age.

147. **Evaluation analysis does not provide clear insight into whether a household's capacity to meet their children's needs changes through receipt of multiple rounds of funding.** The ET sought to assess whether there was any change in households' ability to meet their needs through the receipt of multiple tranches of funding. To do this, the ET ran a chi-squared test over the data collected for each of the three provinces covered by the winter 2021/22 assistance to assess whether there was a significant increase in the proportion of participants who reported a positive ability to cover their basic needs.

148. PDM data collected in Nuristan in February 2022, right after the first cash distribution, and again in June 2022, one month after the third distribution, suggest that there has been a positive change in the capacity of households to cover children's needs after receiving more than one round of assistance. In February, 26.8 per cent reported that their status was either 'good' or 'very good'. This increased to 38.3 per cent reported as 'good' or 'very good'. On the other hand, the percentage of 'very poor' and 'poor' declined from 73 per cent in February to 53.6 per cent in June.¹¹⁴ (See Graph below). However, analysis of underlying data provided to the ET for Wardak province does not show these same findings.¹¹⁵ There was no significant change in the proportion of households able to cover their household's needs over time.¹¹⁶

FIGURE 7 ABILITY OF HOUSEHOLDS TO COVER CHILDREN'S NEEDS AFTER MULTIPLE ROUNDS OF ASSISTANCE IN NURISTAN AND WARDAK



Source: UNICEF; PDM data

149. There were also no statistically significant differences in the proportion of positive responses among participants in Logar. Unlike in Nuristan and Wardak, in Logar, PDMs were not done following the first distribution, only the second and third.

150. Importantly, there are clear limitations in the methodology. First, PDMs do not follow the same households in each round. Thus, individual household characteristics could be different among the sampling frame within different rounds. Second, the PDM data was collected in different months within the different districts. As costs change over the course of the year, such as higher costs during winter, the ability of households to meet their needs would also be expected to change. Finally, recall data has issues in reliability as compared to a baseline conducted before assistance is provided.¹¹⁷

151. The ET again sought to identify whether the programme was equally effective for households with different vulnerability characteristics. Considering projects categorized as winterization, there does not seem to be notable differences with the majority of households ranking their ability to meet

¹¹³The ET was not provided the underlying dataset for the PDM of this population cohort

¹¹⁴The chi-square result shows that the result is statistically significant (Chi-square 38.022; df=9; p<.001).


¹¹⁵Data was collected in January 2022, right after the first distribution, and again in June 2022 after the third distribution.

¹¹⁶Chi-square 8.472; df=6 and p>.05. This result is statistically not significant.

¹¹⁷Recall questions were also not asked in PDM data collected for the winter 2022/23 assistance.

children's needs as 'poor' or 'very poor' regardless of the presence of certain populations in the household.¹¹⁸ The ET acknowledges that this is an overly simplistic approach to understanding adequacy for meeting the differential needs of households. Data on the age of PDM respondent was not available to assess differences in response patterns according to respondent age.

FIGURE 8 COMPARISON OF ABILITY TO MEET CHILDREN'S NEEDS AT TIME OF PDM ACROSS VULNERABILITY CRITERIA



Source: UNICEF/IP PDM data

152. Those assessed in the program were thankful for the aid that helped fulfill their basic needs. However, they unanimously acknowledge ongoing assistance is required to sustain a sufficient standard of living. The general feeling can be encapsulated by the words of one participant (man) benefitting from the earthquake assistance: "This assistance has helped us up to some extent, but our main problems are not solved".

Cash+ programmes

Cash+ child protection

153. Cash+ child protection programmes that included targets achieved them. For the programme implemented in 2021, the ET did not have enough information to accurately estimate achievements reached against planned. Table 6 below provides further details.

TABLE 6 ACHIEVEMENTS VERSUS TARGETS, CASH+ CHILD PROTECTION PROGRAMMES

Programme code	Participant targets	Cash value targets
C+1 Child Protection	3,718 HH	No transfer value information
C+2 Child Protection	741 households (99%)	No transfer value information
C+3 Child Protection	32,538 (98%)	US\$340
C+4 Child Protection	6,291 households	US\$180-360
	Kabul: 684 HH (96%)	US\$ 180
	Panjshir: 291 households (97%)	US\$ 180
	Khost: 2,513 households	US\$ 360

¹¹⁸The PDM data includes Logar, Nuristan, Wardak


	<i>Paktika: 1,303 households (89%)</i>	<i>US\$ 180</i>
	<i>Balkh: 1,500 (no target)</i>	<i>US\$131 (no target)</i>
C+5 Child protection	1,113 households (no target)	US\$165 (no target)

Dark green: >100% of target; green: 85-100% of target; yellow: <75% of target; Grey: missing information

154. **There are no clear conclusions on programme effectiveness increasing household ability to meet children's needs.** The only programme for which the ET has available data attempting to quantify change is the Cash+ for child protection programme in Badghis (C+3). Like the Earthquake programming discussed above, this PDM includes a recall question to establish a pseudo baseline.

155. As shown in Figure 9 below, the percentage of households rating their ability to meet their children's needs as "very poor" significantly decreased after the initial assistance in April, dropping from 93.5% to 1%. However, the number of households rating their capacity as "good" only slightly increased during this survey round, from 0% to 4.6%. In contrast, when asked in November about their ability compared to January, the proportion of households rating their capacity as "good" increased significantly from 3.5% to 29.5%. Despite improvements, a majority (65.4%) still rated their capacity as "poor" (2 on a scale of 1 to 4) during this survey round. The inconsistency in recalling household situations in January raises concerns about the validity of using recall data as a baseline.

FIGURE 9 HH ABILITY TO COVER CHILDREN'S NEEDS BEFORE AND AFTER THE PDM (BADGHIS)



Source: UNICEF; PDM data

156. **Evidence from the CP cash management pilot provides limited evidence that cash can contribute to reducing child labour, though these effects cannot be sustained.** UNICEF attempted to measure change in child labour after the 2021 CP case management pilot (C+5). According to both quantitative and qualitative data¹¹⁹ collection, 14 per cent of the respondents reported that their children were no longer working on the streets four to six weeks after distribution. However, 35 per cent expressed concern that children would have to go back and work to cover some of the household expenses once money was spent.¹²⁰ As expressed by a participant during data collection: "This cash-based assistance has only solved a small portion of the financial problems." PDM data does not provide information on the use or change in the use of negative coping strategies for other programmes. The ET did not have sufficient resources to pursue these sensitive issues within the context and given restrictions on access to women (see limitations section).

Cash+ Health/Nutrition.

157. **Three of the four Cash+ nutrition programmes have reached or are reaching their objectives in terms of participants and cash values** (see Table 7). The ET cannot assess the effectiveness of cash

¹¹⁹ UNICEF quantified qualitative responses

¹²⁰ UNICEF; Post monitoring report for Case Management and Cash transfers Covid-19 response project; March 2021

distribution for Cash+ programming for institutional delivery in Daikundi (C+6a), as no information was available on the amounts planned.


TABLE 7 PARTICIPANTS AND TRANSFER AMOUNTS PLANNED AGAINST REACHED FOR CASH+ RESPONSE

Programme code	Participant targets	Cash value targets
C+6a Health/Nutrition	6,231 households (89%)	US\$234 (no target)
C+6b Nutrition	18,648 households	US\$272 (ongoing)
C+7 Nutrition	1,820 households	US\$828 (ongoing)
C+8 Nutrition	1,400 households (100%)	US\$100

Dark green: >100% of target; green: 85-100% of target; yellow: <75% of target; Grey: missing information

158. **Distance to health facilities remains a barrier to objectives of improving access to health care and nutrition services for Cash+ participants.** The ET analysed some of the PDM data collected in May 2022 in households having participated in the Cash+ Nutrition (6b) in Daikundi.¹²¹ Data does show some differences in the decision of women to give birth in health facilities rather than at home. While 70 per cent of mothers who have previously given birth report that they have given birth at least once at home, 83 per cent of the currently pregnant women who were due within three months of the PDM survey planned to give at a health facility (see Figure 10 below). The women who were not planning to give birth at the health facility or who were not yet sure where they would be giving birth gave the reason that the health facility was too far from their home or that they did not have the financial means to get there. One respondent reported that they did not believe delivery in a health centre was important. The PDMs that have been conducted by UNICEF include smaller population sizes. Thus, results should be considered as potential areas for further exploration but not to be representative of the population cohort given a larger margin of error within the sampling frame.

FIGURE 10 PREVIOUS AND FUTURE BIRTH INTENTIONS AMONG NUTRITION CASH+ PARTICIPANTS




Source: PDM data collected in Daikundi by UNICEF in May 2022

159. Most pregnant women surveyed in this PDM (89 per cent, see Figure 11) said that they planned to follow post-natal care. Like women not planning to deliver in a health centre, the primary barrier to improving health-seeking behaviour among women who were not planning to follow post-natal care was the distance to the health facility.

¹²¹ This dataset includes ~100 respondents which are not representative of the cohort of over 18,000 participants.

FIGURE 11 PROPORTION OF PDM RESPONDENTS FOLLOWING POST-NATAL CARE



Source: PDM data collected in Daikundi by UNICEF, May 2022. 62 respondents

160. Importantly, as specified in the limitation section, PDM questions and methodology did not seek to isolate whether UNICEF assistance was an influencing factor in seeking care, for example by including a control group for comparison or asking women what was influencing their decision.

161. Comparing health-seeking intentions between Cash+ participants who received messaging regarding care-seeking behaviour with other cash transfer participants not receiving this messaging offers a potential counterfactual to assess the effectiveness of UNICEF messaging. Seventy per cent of women participants of the 2021/22 winterisation cash assistance planned to deliver in a health centre. This compares to 83 per cent of women who intend to deliver in a health centre among women involved in the Cash+ programme in Daikundi.¹²² This suggests that the more integrated programming delivered under the Cash+ health and nutrition-oriented programme can influence behaviour partners. However, further study would be needed as the difference in birth delivery preference is influenced by a multitude of factors such as distance to health facilities and access, especially during winter times, which may have differed between the two survey populations.

162. **Participants of the Cash+ Nutrition programme in Kabul hospitals report that the programme was effective in supporting severe malnutrition treatment but has no impact in the long run.** The five families interviewed during data collection were very grateful for the assistance which allowed them to buy milk, medicine, or medical check-ups for their malnourished child. One household also had enough money to buy some groceries for the entire household.

Cash+ Education

163. **The ACO anticipates an overreach of planned participants of 154 per cent; this comes at the expense of total transfer amounts and duration.** While initially planned to provide US\$480 over 12 months, one transfer round was dropped to account for the expansion in caseload to instead provide US\$360 over 9 months.

164. **The objectives of increased attendance, decreased dropouts, and improved enrolment are no longer relevant for girls in secondary school (the programme is specifically for adolescent girls 10 to 18 years of age while secondary school starts at 12).**¹²³ This programme took place under very unpredictable circumstances. Since the funds have been secured, girls have been banned from going to secondary school. Despite this ban, UNICEF maintained the cash programme not to introduce a second burden by not receiving cash assistance.¹²⁴ Though the ban only officially applies to secondary schools, according to UNICEF stakeholders in Kabul and the field, girls are reportedly attending

¹²² UNICEF; Afghanistan Country Office Multi-Purpose Cash Transfer Post Distribution Monitoring; Power BI; Winterisation 2021/22; page 8

¹²³ UNESCO. "Let girls and women in Afghanistan Learn!" January 18, 2023. (Accessed November 4, 2023).


¹²⁴ No primary data was collected from participants in this programme as cash distribution had not started by the inception phase of the evaluation.

informal and some formal schools in some areas, girls' attendance is not widespread raising broader relevance questions of the entire cohort.

165. **Children and women benefitted specifically from the interventions to variable extents.** Three-quarters of respondents included in the PDM database provided to the ET reported that there are goods and services that they can access for children now thanks to the grant that they would not have access to otherwise (76 per cent). This proportion varies depending on programme ranging from 96 per cent of Cash+ child protection respondents from Khost (C+4) to 26 per cent of respondents from the Cash+ programme for maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH, C+6a). PDM data on the UNICEF dashboard (which included additional programmes) also shows some evidence that women and children benefitted specifically from the cash transfers. For example, a substantial proportion of survey respondents benefitting from child protection (31 per cent) and cash for education programmes (20 per cent) reported that 'education' was one of the top three areas/categories they spent their money on, this compares to less than 10 per cent of PDM respondents for other programmes. A larger proportion of PDM respondents participating in the Cash+ programme for MNCH (C+6a) reported spending money on 'medical expenses' (33 per cent) compared to the dashboard cohort overall (21 per cent).

166. Data from the household survey is less conclusive. Most respondents said everyone in the household benefitted equally (see Figure 12 below). Importantly, the survey did not include any Cash+ nutrition nor Cash+ education participants where this question would have been more valid as objectives under these programmes were for services specifically for PLWs and children under two (Cash+ nutrition) and adolescent girls (education). Unfortunately, planned data collection in Daikundi province, where the main Cash+ nutrition programme is implemented, was not possible due to authorization issues.

FIGURE 12 FAMILY MEMBERS HAVING MOST BENEFITED FROM CASH ASSISTANCE



Source: ET; HH Survey

EQ.8. Which existing modalities are the most and least effective?

167. To answer this EQ, the ET provides an overview of the different ways of providing cash assistance to Afghan people in need of humanitarian assistance around the country followed by a comparative assessment of effectiveness.

168. **Cash-in-hand.** All CBA programmes under the scope of this evaluation use a cash-in-hand modality, where MSPs distribute Afghan bank notes directly to participants. UNICEF has agreements with three Afghan-based MSPs which are officially registered at the Afghanistan Central Bank (Da Afghanistan Bank) and have been vetted by UNICEF Headquarters (HQ) in New York and selected in accordance with the harmonized approach to cash transfer (HACT) procedures. These MSPs can cover any part of the country, transporting money on animals' back when no other option is

possible.¹²⁵ MSPs have been delivering up to US\$10 million to participants before being reimbursed by UNICEF. Each MSP can reach up to 500 participants a day, delivering cash in up to three distribution points in a day.

169. **Banks.** In 2019, the Afghanistan Central Bank estimated that 85 per cent of the adult population did not have a transaction account at a regulated financial institution.¹²⁶ In January 2023, OCHA reported the formal banking system as dysfunctional.¹²⁷ Bank branches are not available in remote areas where roads are sometimes non-existent. Banks are starting to function more regularly following the disruption of the Taliban's assumption of the government in August 2021.¹²⁸ Civil servants are paid through bank accounts and Afghan people are now able to withdraw part of their post-August 2021 savings.¹²⁹ Since November 2023, FAO has been using the Ghazanfar Bank to distribute cash to 1.5 million households in all parts of the country. According to FAO, a fixed rate of five per cent for paying the bank has been agreed upon, allowing better streamlining of the process when rates often vary from one MSP to the other. For areas where the bank does not have a branch, the bank delegates the distribution of cash to an MSP, but the verification process is still operated by the bank. Verification is done either using the national ID, vaccination card, voting card, or unique IDs provided by FAO for people without other form of identification. No bank account is required to receive money. According to FAO, banks ensure each participant receives the exact amount of cash, and identity verification is followed strictly, while it has been reported to FAO that certain MSPs would sometimes ask participants to split notes between them. If participants miss the distribution date for any reason, they can withdraw their money at the closest branch in town.

170. **Mobile money.** Mobile money has been used in Afghanistan since early 2000. A study conducted in 2015 shows how mobile salary payments may increase the efficiency and transparency of traditional systems.¹³⁰ Since 2023, a service provider (Hesab) has proposed a mobile money system that uses all five national mobile service providers, making mobile money payment more efficient across operators. UNICEF's PMU is following the evolution of mobile services proposed in Afghanistan closely. For the moment, the main barriers put forward by UNICEF KIs for using mobile money for HCT are the low literacy rate of people, limited physical access to mobile phones (especially for women) and the low network coverage in the remote areas where UNICEF operates. However, UNICEF is considering mobile money transfers or bank transfers for payments for teachers and health workers issued through other UNICEF programmes as these participants have better access to mobile phones and have higher literacy rates.

171. In June 2023, the World Bank convened an inaugural Afghanistan Payments Conference in Dubai. Participants included experts from domestic and international banks, digital service providers, international partners, MSPs (including the traditional hawaladars) and civil society representatives. A two-day workshop was undertaken to map out the modalities, risks and opportunities emerging in the payment ecosystem of Afghanistan, particularly in the distribution of aid, and to reassess existing payment modalities and develop safer, more sustainable, and lower-cost alternatives.¹³¹

172. Considering the environment UNICEF has been operating over the last two years, cash-in-hand has been the best option in terms of efficiency of distribution (see EQ15). However, the environment is changing, notably in the banking and the information, communication and technology areas. Based on the FAO experience, the banking system could provide an interesting option for cash distribution. A few women participants reached by phone in the province of Badakhshan suggested that UNICEF could use bank cards. While mobile money does not appear to be an option to deliver HCT for the moment, UNICEF is keeping a close eye on future possibilities.

¹²⁵ As reported in a UNICEF report and by MSPs.

¹²⁶ Da Afghanistan Bank; National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2020 – 2024; 2019

¹²⁷ OCHA; Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan; January 2023; page 65.

¹²⁸ World Bank monthly Afghanistan Economic Monitor; August 2023

¹²⁹ World Bank; Afghanistan Economic Monitor; August 2023; page 2

¹³⁰ Joshua E. Blumenstock Et al., Promises and Pitfalls of Mobile Money in Afghanistan: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial; 2015.

¹³¹ World Bank... Blogs; Namoos Zaheer, Rethinking payments in Afghanistan; August 4, 2023;

<https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/rethinking-payments-afghanistan> (Accessed on August 18, 2023).

173. Table 8 below summarizes the positives and negatives of the three modalities as they stand today according to the information gathered by the ET through KIIs and secondary data collection.

TABLE 8: PROS AND CONS OF DIFFERENT CASH MODALITIES

	Pros	Cons
Mobile money	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduces operational delivery costs. • Reduces transfer risks compared to cash-in-hand. • Lower risk of aid deviation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Failing or non-existent networks in remote areas • High illiteracy rate is a barrier to using mobile devices. • Lack of mobile devices in many households.
Cash-in-Hand through banks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The exact amount distributed to each participant • Access to all areas of the country by using MSPs • Once the distribution is over, banks stay accessible for people not having reached the distribution point in time. • High accuracy of transactions and identity verification 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The banking system has been damaged since the Taliban takeover in August 2021 • Low banking network in remote areas. • Need to register in the banking system which increases risk related to anonymity. • Participants do not have the required legal identification documents • Distrust of formal banks¹³²
Cash-in-hand through MSPs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to all areas of the country • Does not require a network during the distribution process. • UNICEF only pays the MSPs once the money has been distributed (financial risk borne by the MSP). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk generated by the movement of large amounts of cash for MSP. • Potential risk to participants in collecting large sums of cash at once¹³³ • Higher operational cost compared to other modalities.

EQ.9. To what extent are the different delivery processes for the CBA effective?

174. The ET sought to evaluate effectiveness across the different delivery processes following four operational stages described in UNICEF's Humanitarian Cash Transfer Field Guidance: i) collecting data and registering participants; ii) communication; iii) managing payments; and iv) managing feedback and grievances. No unintended effects were observed, despite systematic exploration of these issues throughout data collection tools.

175. **"Mobilization" consultation and briefings about the project objectives in each area with religious leaders (Mulla Imam), community leaders and elders were reported by IPs and confirmed by participants.** IP staff then surveyed the proposed list of the most vulnerable to confirm eligibility according to the UNICEF criteria. Surveys were conducted at households in some locations; in others, verification was done in the Mosque or at the local authority office.¹³⁴ According to KIIs with around 50 women participants, the majority confirmed household visits took place as a first step to receiving cash. Flexibility was given for registering participants with a national ID (Tazkira), a polling card or a birth certificate. IPs were not yet able to register many needy participants without legal documents. IPs recommended using CBA activities to advocate for getting civil registration documents, which is vital to improving both registration and distribution processes.

¹³² As reported by certain KIIs and literature (Joshua E. Blumenstock Et al – 2015)

¹³³ PDMs regularly monitor protection risks; these have not been observed to a substantial extent

¹³⁴ UNICEF SOPs do not specify requirements for the preferred location of eligibility assessments

176. **A consent paragraph and standard wording are added to UNICEF's standard participant registration format.** Informed consent is mandatory during the registration of participants as it includes the collection and use of Personally Identifiable Information (PII). As part of the signed HPD, the implementing partners are requested to use a standard registration form through KOBO Collect with data submitted through a UNICEF-dedicated KOBO toolbox server in line with field guidance.

177. **According to interviews, local authorities and other community stakeholders play varying roles in selection, with both positive and negative outcomes.** In some locations, local authorities had a limited role in guiding the IPs to the addresses. Interference by these authorities was not reported. In other locations, more engagement of community elders and CDC heads was necessary as communities had substantial trust in them. In Daikundi and some other locations, their engagement was a challenge that hindered the registration process.

"The local leaders have only played the role of a guide, and it was our personnel who entered the houses and interviewed the potential beneficiaries."

IP staff, Badghis

178. **Household visits, increased communication, sensitisation around the project objectives, and selection criteria were essential for effective registration, according to interviewed participants and IP staff.** For example, in Zabul, interviewed participants recalled wealthy families receiving assistance and incidents of multiple members of the same household enrolled in regular cash transfers. An IP suggested a second verification level by an external TPM to prevent local authorities' interference and reduce inclusion and exclusion errors, the largest category of received complaints from participants according to the grievance mechanism UNICEF officer.

179. Interviewed extenders, based on their field observation, recommended tighter procedures for registering participants that include the provision of proof of pregnancy and breastfeeding from health centres, especially since women field staff are no longer allowed to work on verification through household visits. They also suggested adding more economic factors to identify the most vulnerable and needy of assistance, like the number of breadwinners compared to the HH size and access to salary or land. In contrast to extenders, most interviewed participants believed that assistance reached the most in need, effectively reducing financial burdens. Notably, having benefitted from the funding themselves, these households may have a disincentive to encourage changes to the selection strategy.

180. **The ACO use of "HOPE" for participant registration in 2021 has improved the effectiveness of data management.** Use of HOPE complies with UNICEF Cash Transfers field guidance recommending digital platforms for participant registration and data management. Participant data is imported into the HOPE system, data cleaning and adjudication of potential duplicates is requested by the IP staff as well as consolidating complaints and feedback received through the different channels into the UNICEF management information system (MIS) system, including documenting how each complaint is handled. According to interviewed UNICEF staff, this has increased the effectiveness of data management by reducing errors, duplications, and manipulation of the participant list, despite some delays in distribution during the initial use phase for the winterisation 2021/22 CBA in Zabul.

181. For teachers' or healthcare workers' salary transfers (out of the scope of this evaluation), UNICEF staff suggest using participant cards with QR codes for more effective payment management. For all other cash distributions, interviewees felt cash-in-hand is the most effective delivery mechanism (see EQ.8 for further information). However, IPs highlighted the need to increase centralised registration and distribution points to increase access for the most vulnerable households and asked if MSPs could set up temporary field offices to be able to distribute cash to participants closer to their villages. Other IPs suggested the questionnaire used at the registration be shortened and simplified to speed up the process.

182. **UNICEF's use "HOPE" can be considered a step forward towards a shared participant platform as it has centralized the UNICEF database internally.** Though participant databases are currently not shared due to security concerns regarding handling participants' personnel identification


information, the ACO guidelines encourage sharing participants' information with WFP and UNHCR to avoid duplication. Having this centralized digital database is more easily shareable compared to Excel or paper.

183. UNICEF, in line with the IASC and the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) definition of AAP and respecting its overarching commitment to AAP in its CCC, aims to ensure that all CBA programmes provide vulnerable populations with the information and resources to hold UNICEF to account for promoting and protecting their rights and generating effective results. To this end, the Field Guidance stresses the importance of community consultation and sensitisation throughout CBA programmes.

184. **According to interviewed UNICEF programme and SBC staff, effective communication with the communities is difficult in Afghanistan given the myriad of challenges in the operational context.** Accurate estimation of caseload numbers is a consistent challenge. The last census was completed in 1979; the latest nationally available data from the Central Statistics Organization (CSO) is from 2014-2015. UNICEF bases its estimates on information shared among UN Agencies, estimates from IPs and internal data from previous UNICEF programming. However, particularly when working in new areas previously inaccessible, these estimates are not very precise. Without an accurate estimation of participant numbers who meet the selection criteria at any location, the ACO is required to limit the communication with participants to avoid raising expectations that cannot be met later due to limited resources. Community-level discussion on topics deemed sensitive, such as the promotion of girls' education, is also difficult.

185. Data from the household survey reflects this reality of unsystematic community consultation before the selection. In Khost (Earthquake CBA), less than half (49 per cent) of interviewees reported knowledge of any community consultation before participant selection. In contrast, participants of the Badghis and Paktika (Cash+ child protection CBA) were much more likely to report community consultation with over three-quarters of respondents reporting knowledge of some prior community consultation (see Figure 13).¹³⁵

FIGURE 13 SURVEY RESPONDENT KNOWLEDGE OF COMMUNITY CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO THE SELECTION PHASE




Source: ET HH Survey

186. The PDM done by a TPM in March 2023 also shows a low community consultation in the first stages of the CBA implementation for the provinces of Daikundi, Logar and Khost, with nearly half of the survey respondents saying they had not been interviewed during the profile survey assessment phase (see Figure 14 below).

¹³⁵ Women's participation was too low to ensure statistical analysis between men's and women's answers.

FIGURE 14 INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED DURING THE PROFILE SURVEY ASSESSMENT ACCORDING TO CBA PARTICIPANTS



Source: ATR, PDM, March 2023

187. **The lack of certainty of when approvals will be granted by the DfA prevents UNICEF field offices and IPs from sharing timely information with affected communities.**¹³⁶ When approvals are secured, the ACO is under pressure to implement rapidly, increasing distribution efficiency but at the expense of more in-depth community engagement, which would require more time in some cases. IPs make considerable efforts to make information available. As reported by participants and IPs, mosques and loudspeakers are used at the registration/mobilisation stage to share critical project information such as project objectives and selection criteria with the selected communities. Participants are also encouraged to keep the cash assistance for their household in anticipation of the reported forced sharing of assistance in certain locations. If already known at that time, the IP would prefer to share the amount of cash that will be disbursed, the estimated time of payment and the available feedback and grievance mechanisms, however, this information is usually confirmed later. The challenging context of Afghanistan post-Taliban takeover means that variables like location, caseload, frequency, and transfer value could change and "beneficiaries are the last to learn about [changes]" according to UNICEF staff.

188. Data collected from program participants through key informant interviews and FGDs suggest that the implementing partner's first encounter with the potential project participants during the survey is the first critical step of information dissemination. Sometimes, this is the only chance available. Participants highly appreciated household visits, which were a chance to obtain critical project information directly. With low literacy rates in general, and particularly for women, as well as restrictions on women's movement, home visits were essential for ensuring access to information for this vulnerable group.

189. **Information is disseminated to and collected from participants through multiple channels: most notably through the IP staff during the field visits and mobilisation, via the MSP staff and IP staff at the cash distribution site, as well as through extenders, PDM field monitors, call centres and TPM field monitors.** Interviewed IP staff and extenders confirmed the efforts made to ensure the correct information reaches the communities.

190. Protection of participants and non-participants was also sought, collecting and channelling complaints or feedback anonymously. Some Mulla Imams function as trusted agents, and their involvement in the selection, information dissemination and channelling of complaints and grievances is perceived more positively than CDC staff, who are sometimes accused of influencing the selection lists and forcing re-distribution of received assistance.

¹³⁶ According to UNICEF and IP stakeholders interviewed.

191. Interviewed IPs stated that communication at the mobilisation stage was effective, and people received the needed information about the projects. However, HH survey results show gaps in knowledge, particularly concerning the duration and timing of distribution. EQ10 discusses the effectiveness of these communication strategies in further detail.

192. **Preference for cash in hand is reiterated through various sources.** According to the Humanitarian Response Plan, almost 70 per cent of people in Afghanistan prefer physical cash assistance to in-kind.¹³⁷ Most interviewed UNICEF staff, partners and other UN agencies agreed with this assessment. Preference for cash was also repeatedly confirmed through UNICEF PDMs. As discussed in EQ8, the ACO is exploring other viable delivery mechanisms, in alignment with Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).¹³⁸

"The cash distribution was conducted well because each beneficiary was treated equally and paid an equal amount of money. The program staff had some registers during the selection process, but I am unsure if it was for the monitoring process."

Woman Cash+ Child Protection participant,
Badghis

193. **UNICEF has taken action over the last year to adjust the distribution process, responding to issues faced by implementing partners and increasing effectiveness.** Three trainings took place with the 21 IPs reflecting positively on implementation. PDM data was regularly used to assess participants' satisfaction, monitor risks and adjust the implementation accordingly.¹³⁹ According to field offices, extra efforts have been made to increase the effectiveness of participant verification by increasing the monitoring capacity, recruiting additional field monitors and field coordinators, and conducting joint monitoring visits to distribution sites.

194. **According to interviewed UNICEF staff, the MSP's capacity to secure timely, sufficient liquidity for UNICEF distribution plans along with other UN agencies and INGOs is sometimes a limiting factor.** The PMU expanded cash distribution from one MSP in 2021 to three in 2023. Field offices were concerned about delayed payments and distribution due to a lack of liquidity (for example during the cash for child protection distributions in Badghis-C+3). Interviewed MSPs, nevertheless, expressed their ability to meet the growing demand for humanitarian actors and expressed their satisfaction with the partnership with UNICEF.

195. **Mobile data collection through KOBO and "HOPE" have increased the effectiveness of payment processing.** Digitally processing data has made access to data almost in real-time as distribution progresses in different locations across the country.

196. During registration and in accordance with ACO guidelines/SOPs,¹⁴⁰ an alternative recipient is registered along with the primary recipient; this practice helps ensure the intended assistance reaches the selected household despite the multiple imposed obstacles preventing women's access to much-needed assistance. According to the HH survey conducted for this evaluation, access to distribution sites varied by province ranging from 92 per cent of respondents in Badghis reporting that both genders had equal access to 50 per cent of respondents in Khost (see Annex 7, Table 18). Qualitative data from the HH survey highlights cultural norms and traditions and a lack of identification documents restricting women's access to distribution sites.

¹³⁷ OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan 2023, March 2023, p. 45

¹³⁸ UNICEF, SOP, CBA UNICEF Afghanistan, July 2022

¹³⁹ BHA PIO Report SM210976 April 22 and BHA PIO Report SM210976 Oct 22 final

¹⁴⁰ UNICEF, SOP, CBA UNICEF Afghanistan, July 2022

197. **Most interviewed UNICEF field staff, IP staff and extenders confirmed the effectiveness of the disbursement of funds to the participants and the adherence to UNICEF SOPs and guidelines.**

For example: participant lists were shared with the MSPs through password-protected Excel files. According to interviewed participants in Daikundi Cash+ and Ghor, distributions would have benefited from better coordination with local authorities. For increased effectiveness of assistance in Cash+ nutrition cash assistance, field staff recommended that cash distributions occur at health facilities so that

participants can benefit from the services and information provided there. This approach is endorsed in the ACO cash strategy which had not been finalized at the time of implementation of some of the previous Cash+ programming that began before May 2022 (when the cash strategy was established). One challenge mentioned by IPs is that participants fear a quick depletion of humanitarian assistance and do not follow the recommended distribution schedule.

"There weren't any issues during the distribution of the assistance. We just went to the address where we were called to receive our money. We went there on time. The queues for men and women were separate. Everyone was already registered and their names were called loudly. They would go there and receive their cash assistance."

Woman cash winter participant, Paktika

"People show up in advance of distribution, fearing cash will run out; one partner went door to door to inform people of the pick-up time to prevent everyone from showing up at once."

UNICEF field staff

198. **According to interviewed staff from the PMU, the currently used system for fraud prevention is effective.**

The implementing partners issue a Token number at the registration stage, which is linked to the purchase order number used for HH verification at the cash distribution site. The MSP disburses payments when the two pieces of information match according to the list received directly from UNICEF. The only challenge that MSPs faced was the last-minute changes to the participant list during the distributions which occur for various reasons such as data

cleaning during the de-duplication process, decisions to adopt a different exchange rate or alterations to the implementation strategy based on approval processes.

199. **Together with its associated SOP, the WOPS mechanism enabled close coordination and oversight of cash payment requirements across all sections, including the PMU.**¹⁴¹ The ACO set up a Cash Transfer Taskforce in November 2021 for in-country, centralized management of payments to implementing partners, vendors, individuals and households. This task force used the Whole of Office Payment System (WOPS) mechanism for all cash payment planning.

200. **Various feedback channels are in place to try and ensure that participants can easily get information or report problems linked to UNICEF's cash programmes.**¹⁴² At the field level, IPs are required to have at least one grievance officer at each distribution site and provide community members with one hotline phone number. According to KIIs, issues collected at the field level are mostly related to implementation. IPs also provided the hotline phone number of the Inter-Agency Communications & Accountability Centre (Awaaz Afghanistan).¹⁴³

201. Interviewed IP staff showed an understanding of a rights-based approach to receiving community complaints and feedback. Anonymity for reporters, the importance of segregation of duties between project staff and those handling complaints, and the need to set different communication channels for access and coverage for all participants and non-participants were raised during interviews.

¹⁴¹ Operational Review of Cash Transfer Modalities, Country Case Study Afghanistan, June 2022

¹⁴² UNICEF and IP interviews

¹⁴³ The Inter-Agency Communications & Accountability Centre (Awaaz Afghanistan) is implemented by UNOPS with current financial support from the Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund (AHF), The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), and the Japanese Supplementary Fund (JSF).

202. Despite IP's insistence on global communication on the mechanisms to provide feedback, the household survey results suggest gaps in community awareness of the existing feedback mechanisms. These issues are further discussed in EQ13.

203. The Social Behaviour Change unit has 84 feedback centres in the country. As mentioned by UNICEF staff, those centres are not specifically used to collect data related to the cash assistance but could eventually be used by participants benefiting from the cash programmes.

204. Despite the strong emphasis the ACO guidelines put on closing the feedback loop, field offices raised concerns over delays in acting on received feedback and complaints. According to PMU stakeholders, response time has improved significantly over the past months. It is possible that these recent improvements were not yet accounted for at the time of the evaluation. It is also possible that there is a gap in communication whereby actions are taken but the field office is not informed. Field office stakeholders also voiced the importance of consolidating the various channels for feedback and grievances to lessen the burden of handling complaints and speed up action on them. Despite reported issues, among those survey participants who had provided feedback or complaints, over 95 per cent reported a high level of satisfaction from the responses they got on their inquiries.

EQ.10. How effective is the process of information dissemination to participants through multiple mechanisms in terms of coverage and participant knowledge?


205. based on participant feedback, there are gaps in effectiveness in terms of participant knowledge, particularly in understanding program objectives. This is despite the ACO is using a set of multiple channels for two-way communication with the affected communities (see paragraph 200). UNICEF has limited choices for information dissemination mechanisms in remote areas and with low levels of literacy.

206. **Qualitative and quantitative data shows a good level of knowledge of selection criteria.** Focus group discussions with men participants revealed a good understanding of the need to direct assistance to the most vulnerable, as resources are insufficient to cover all those in need.¹⁴⁴ Most men and women participants in FGDs and the household survey could name one or more of the selection criteria reflecting a reasonable level of information reaching both men and women participants.¹⁴⁵ Overall, 80 per cent of respondents were able to recall at least one criterion commonly included in UNICEF's categorical selection criteria (See Figure 15 below). When probed for what specific selection criteria were required in the household survey, respondents were most likely to recall the criterion of households with PLW (41 per cent) and households with a child under two years of age (33 per cent). In Badghis, the selection criteria were families with PLWs, families with children with disabilities and households headed by women. Over half of respondents in Badghis (65 per cent) were able to identify these specific criteria correctly. The remaining respondents either did not know the criteria or listed criteria not included in the design document.

¹⁴⁴ This question was not asked as directly to women who were interviewed over the phone rather than in-person FGDs

¹⁴⁵ 80 per cent of men, 88 per cent of women

FIGURE 15 KNOWLEDGE OF CATEGORICAL CRITERIA OF THE SELECTION FOR BEING PART OF THE CASH PROGRAM (N = 771)



Source: ET, HH Survey

207. **The household survey results reflect limited communication effectiveness in terms of understanding of the amount and duration of assistance.** Less than 10 per cent of interviewees had prior programme-related information despite over three-quarters reporting knowledge of a community consultation phase before the implementation (see Table 9). Women were more likely to report knowledge of the number of months they were supposed to receive money and the amount they would receive per month.


TABLE 9 ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF CASH PROGRAMMING DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

	Gender				Province			
	Women		Men		Badghis		Paktika	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Did you know in advance for how many months you were supposed to receive money?	11	9%	20	5%	25	7%	6	3%
Did you know in advance the amount you would receive per month?	9	8%	18	4%	23	7%	4	2%

208. **There was limited knowledge of programme objectives.** Half of household survey respondents had knowledge about the activities' objectives (for example how to spend the cash). Limited knowledge was also reflected in qualitative interviews where few women interviewed could specify the main objectives of the programming. While it is difficult to quantify from the qualitative data or generalize, the data suggests a clearer understanding from men compared to women, even though women mentioned exact transfer values much more frequently.

209. **Results suggest that women participants were more reliant on information shared by community leaders than men, who had more chances to interact with UNICEF IP staff.** Discussion in EQ.13 provides further details (Figure 16). Cultural and social norms create multiple barriers between women participants and project implementers limiting their access to information. Data collected suggest that essential information is systematically filtered through Community leaders, Mulla Imams, Wakili Guzar, Community elders and CDCs. In interviews, women reported that the high illiteracy rate and restrictions on women's movement limit their access to information.

FIGURE 16 INFORMATION SOURCE FOR SELECTION CRITERIA ON CBA PROGRAMMES (N=624)¹⁴⁶



Source: ET, HH Survey

EQ.11. What have been the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of each CBA objectives?

210. Throughout the evaluation process, the evaluation team came across multiple factors highlighted by the different stakeholders justifying the achievement and non-achievement of the different cash activity objectives.¹⁴⁷ Internal factors related to project design and process issues. External factors were largely related to the country's context, the international community's collective position on the change in power, and donor preferences.

Internal factors

211. **Short-term assistance with lower transfer values met basic needs but limited sectoral impacts.** It is clear from PDM data that participants spent at least some cash assistance to improve outcomes for WASH, health, education and shelter.¹⁴⁸ However, the fact that nearly half of PDM respondents rate their ability to cover their basic needs and the needs of children as poor or very poor,¹⁴⁹ highlights the inadequacy of transfer values to meet broader CBA objectives. Qualitative data conducted for this evaluation highlights similar findings. Findings from the literature review consistently support the use of cash assistance in improving a household's capacity to meet basic needs but stress the importance of being realistic about objectives, especially when transfer values and duration are limited.¹⁵⁰ Most interviewed community leaders believe that cash assistance objectives were moderately achieved as households did benefit from the cash in meeting their immediate household needs. However, they believed the short duration of assistance limited impact on the communities in the long run. Several interviewees (community leaders and participants) believed that the humanitarian cash transfer value-calculated based on the MEB- sufficiently covered its intended objectives, while the cash + activities, for which amounts were smaller, were able to cover fewer needs. Thus, in terms of meeting the objective to meet essential needs, participants in the focus group discussions and key informant interviews largely agreed that cash distribution objectives were partially achieved.

212. Participants suggested including in-kind food assistance on top of cash assistance. In their opinion, the community's pressing need is food; the small amount of regular cash is not sufficient to meet food and medical needs. Thus, if food was provided in-kind, households could use cash for other expenses, such as health and education.

¹⁴⁶ The question only asked for those persons who knew the selection criteria. The majority of women sampled (84%) are from Badghis.

¹⁴⁷ Evaluation participants generally referred to objectives as cash distributions taking place successfully and the benefits of cash.

¹⁴⁸ Based on UNICEF's ACO PDM dashboard, accessed November 9, 2023, when asked what the top three areas/categories spent money on, 9% reported education, 20% medical expenses, 3% shelter/construction materials, 4% reported hygiene items

¹⁴⁹ UNICEF PDM dashboard accessed 9 November 2023.

¹⁵⁰ Harvey, P & Pavanello, S. 2018. Multi-purpose cash and sectoral outcomes: a review of evidence and Learning. UNHCR.

213. **Narrowing the selection criteria, with household-level visits for verification, was suggested to improve selection accuracy.** The majority agree that the current selection is, to a large extent, reaching the most in need, but there is still room for improvement if a household survey is systematically conducted. According to interviewed participants, consultation with community leaders and a consideration of the lists of widows, orphans, and disabled people that already exist with the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled Affairs were among the things suggested for better achievement of results, while door-to-door household survey to ensure eligibility and meeting criteria was requested by most of the interviewed participants.

214. **Using local NGOs for implementation is a good practice but there are some capacity gaps related to local knowledge of the communities when relying on more centralised teams.** According to interviewed field staff and extenders, the capacity of local NGOs was one of the limiting factors during the implementation of UNICEF activities. Local NGOs have limited resources, so they depend on centralised teams that move to the selected locations for mobilisation, registration and distribution. While this reduces potential conflict of interest compared to embedded teams, it deprives IPs of local knowledge of the communities and sometimes language skills¹⁵¹ needed for following the processes of UNICEF SOPs. This issue was mentioned by interviewed community leaders and some participants.

215. Participants and community leaders requested increasing the number of distribution sites and not limiting it to district centres. This issue was not possible in some CBA activities such as in Baharak district and Abkamari district.

216. **The expertise of the PMU has improved CBA effectiveness; gaps in human resources in other positions need to be addressed.** Interviewed programme staff (SPEAR, SBC, Education and Health) appreciated the high calibre staff deployed at the PMU, a major enabling factor for expanding CBA activities, "the right people at the right time". At the same time, the security situation post-August 2021 resulted in a gap in human resources in different units at the ACO that affected UNICEF's ability to implement at full capacity. Another issue raised by the Field offices was the centralised budget in Kabul, which delayed authorisations to go to the field, for example for monitoring.

217. **UNICEF is perceived as a "good partner" by donors but needs to strengthen donor relations and communications strategies.** Interviewed donors considered UNICEF as a "good partner" and reliable, able to respond to challenges. Interviewees expressed the advantage of operating in multiple sectors (Education, Health, WASH, Nutrition). However, donors expressed some frustration concerning the quality of UNICEF's feedback and showed interest in receiving more insightful information on CBA results including risk management, PDM/TPM data, women's involvement and, most importantly, impact data. Detailed proposals in alignment with each donor's priorities increase the chances of funding at a time of imminent budget cuts. The strategic inclusion of development-oriented activities, through Cash+ and regular cash activities, is not aligned with available funding which has in some cases been reserved for emergency activities. Strategic alignment and coordination between the main humanitarian actors (mostly UNICEF and WFP) with a clear strategy on cash is also a donor demand.

External factors

218. **The DfA's governing of Afghanistan has undermined the achievement of programmatic results at multiple levels.** UN agencies ability to work with a non-recognized/sanctioned authority to support national policies and institutions was very limited. The interaction became restricted to negotiations of access and coordination with local authorities. There is no nationally led aid coordination architecture or a Joint UN-Government Steering Committee. The UN Strategic Framework that was developed for the years 2023-2025 follows the United Nations Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG) guidance for development in exceptional circumstances, and its implementation is operational through an output-level joint work plan towards which all UN entities

¹⁵¹ Pashto, Dari, and additional Tajik and Turkish are well-spoken at the border areas

contribute. Following the ban on girls' secondary education in 2022, and access to universities, recent bans were imposed on Afghan women working for national, international NGOs, and UN agencies. This had a major impact on vulnerable Afghan women and girls, and it undermined the ability of the UN, donors, and partners to deliver critical assistance to the Afghan people .

219. **Donor funding levels and timelines do not align with population needs.** Donors' funding to Afghanistan is further shrinking due to the global context, risk of aid deviation, and considering the recent decisions of DfA suspending education for girls and preventing women from working in different sectors. Timely delivery of cash, which is dependent on early receipt of donor funding, is key for achieving HCT and winterization objectives. Ideally, funding should be confirmed in summer (August at the latest), allowing the country office sufficient time to plan and implement ahead of winter. According to interviewed programme staff, most funding is received towards the end of the year, increasing the pressure on speedy delivery at the expense of quality. For example, the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) fiscal year starts in October and ends in September, so the earliest that funds could be released is in November.

220. **The operational context, including social and cultural factors, limited UNICEF's ability to reach participants with the right information.** As a multi-ethnic and linguistic country, Afghanistan enjoys the presence of different tribal groups. It adopts several social values governed largely by Islamic ones. Honor, resilience, and high awareness of the larger community's perception of individual behaviour affect participant engagement with humanitarian and non-humanitarian assistance activities. Social norms restrict women's movement and their ability to participate in traditionally male-dominated spaces like markets, different types of business and many daily life activities. Lack of national IDs is an added barrier to receiving services and humanitarian support. Interviews with UNICEF staff suggest that these factors combined have limited the ability to reach participants with the right information

EQ.12. To what extent was the implementation of the CBA programmes sensitive to the needs and realities of different social groups (defined along cultural, ethnic, religious, or any other relevant criteria)?

221. **There are limits to the ET's ability to determine the extent to which the programming was sensitive to the needs and realities of different social groups.** The CBA programme design documents are not based on in-depth studies detailing the needs and realities of different social groups in the provinces and districts UNICEF intervenes. This level of analysis of differential needs is essential in complex contexts like Afghanistan where specific populations, such as the Hazaras, have been historically discriminated against.

222. **The fact that proposals are not based on this in-depth analysis highlights risks that specific needs are ignored.** While KIIs do not reveal any major issue regarding the possible exclusion of people due to religious or ethnic background, nothing shows that programme implementation ensures that certain stigmatised populations such as the Hazaras are not excluded during participant registration. Under Taliban rule, minority groups in Afghanistan are experiencing systematic discrimination based on their gender, ethnicity, language, and religion.¹⁵²

223. **The ET did not identify major issues of systematic exclusion through data collection.** Key informants from IPs and UNICEF staff depict a selection process through which selection is only based on UNICEF's specific criteria regardless of race, ethnicity, religion or any other factors. When participants were asked if any vulnerable groups had been excluded from the programmes, several interviewees said yes, but mainly because the needs surpassed available resources. Religion or ethnicity was not given as a justification. In interviews, IPs explain coordinating with community leaders, CDCs and/or Imams to introduce the programme and help identify the people most in need. In certain cases, IPs stated that certain community leaders try and influence participant selection, but through discussions, they ensure registering people based on the UNICEF selection criteria. As noted above, there were a few complaints or suggestions of a village leader and CDCs not using resources

¹⁵² University of Notre Dame. Human Rights Defenders and the Future of Multi-ethnic Democracy in Afghanistan. November 7, 2022. (Accessed November 7 2023).

appropriately including registering family and friends as noted in KIIs by participants, IPs, and extenders. The limitations of quantitative surveys to explore these sensitive topics are again acknowledged.

224. **There are multiple limitations to assessing the transparency of selection outcomes more objectively.** TPMs interviewed by the ET highlighted limits to their ability to monitor selection noting that field monitoring at all stages of the selection process would be needed to ensure the selection of participants is not biased. UNICEF does not collect data on ethnicity or religion nor does the latest data provided by the National Institute of Statistics of Afghanistan.¹⁵³ It is nearly impossible to accurately know the ethnic or religious diversity in intervention areas. This makes it challenging to determine whether the ethnic background or religion of the people reached by the CBA programmes are representative of the diversity existing on the ground. Another way of ensuring that the programme implementation is sensitive to the needs and realities of different social groups is to investigate the complaints reported to the grievance mechanism. However, as UNICEF does not collect data on religious or ethnic affiliation (in line with Do No Harm considerations), patterns cannot be assessed along these lines.

225. One example that could be considered as being sensitive to cultural differences, is in areas where communities and community leaders reportedly redistribute resources. Some KIIs interpret this as a heritage of communism. The evaluation team does not have the necessary ethnographic skills to give an opinion on the particularities of each of the regions or ethnic groups that constitute Afghan society. Redistribution of cash and in-kind is well known and experienced by the humanitarian community in Afghanistan according to KIIs from the CVWG, UNICEF staff and IPs. Hence, if redistribution happens, UNICEF intervenes only when participants do not agree with redistribution. In other areas where it happens and community members agree with the practice, UNICEF ACO will allow the redistribution of resources. However, KIIs and FGDs reveal that redistribution against participant will does happen in some areas and UNICEF has not intervened. As reported by a woman reached through a KII in Badghis: “We get the money and come back home only to find the head of the local council at our doorstep who collects our money and redistributes it among the entire village”. It seems that this practice regularly happens but is far from being generalised. The extent of this practice, nor levels of agreement, could not be measured with the data collected for this evaluation.

EQ.13. How effective are the mechanisms enabling participants to provide feedback?

226. **The expected effectiveness of FCM is strongly undermined by limited awareness as reported by programme participants.** As discussed in EQ9 above (see pp. 45), there are various feedback channels in place to try and ensure that participants can easily get information or report problems linked to UNICEF’s cash programmes. Despite these mechanisms being in place, data consistently highlights gaps in awareness.

227. PDMs conducted by UNICEF since 2021 regularly sought to assess participant knowledge of grievance mechanisms, asking “Which of the following complaints/referrals system for UNICEF programmes are you aware of?” The answer “none” or “I do not know” was not proposed. Hence, all PDMs done in 2021 and 2022 report that 100 per cent of participants are aware of at least one communication channel for complaints. When the same question was asked with the option of “I do not know”, after the form was revised in 2022,¹⁵⁴ less than 40 per cent of respondents were able to identify at least one communication channel.¹⁵⁵

228. Similarly, PDMs conducted by a TPM over three provinces and thirteen districts,¹⁵⁶ shows that over half of the people interviewed report not knowing with whom to speak if they have a problem with assistance (see Figure 17 below). Data collected for this evaluation shows similar findings with

¹⁵³ National Institute of Statistics of Afghanistan; Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2023-24; July 2023


¹⁵⁴ The form was revised by TPMs who started to conduct PDMs instead of IPs themselves.

¹⁵⁵ The ET did not have access to all PDM data done in 2023. Most probably, these other PDMs done by TPMs have collected data similarly.

¹⁵⁶ 1,413 HH members were reached by phone.

nearly half of survey respondents (48 per cent) reporting no information of the existence of a complaint mechanism (see Annex 5).

FIGURE 17 AWARENESS OF WHO TO SPEAK TO IF THERE IS A PROBLEM WITH ASSISTANCE



Source: ATR, PDM, March 2023

229. **Limited awareness of FCM as reported among programme participants contradicts IP confidence in processes to inform participants.** IPs provided examples of multiple means of providing avenues for feedback and were confident in the fact that all programme participants are informed of feedback mechanisms if they have concerns about the programme. Interviewed IPs described providing brochures with different phone numbers (Awaaz, IP and UNICEF phone numbers) to all participants. Certain IPs reported putting up posters with information on the different grievance mechanisms during distributions. Others painted those phone numbers on the walls. KIs report how complaint boxes are also available either on the distribution site or in specific locations known by all participants.

230. **The remote nature of many of the targeted locations and access challenges made it difficult for the IP staff to interact with the participants after distribution.** In many HCT projects, distribution was a one-off opportunity with registration and distribution combined. This could be one factor limiting participant knowledge of the project and available communication channels.

231. The ET does not have a clear explanation to understand the incongruity between IP insistence on global access to the grievance mechanism compared to over half of the participants assessed not being aware of them. However, this shows an important gap between IP analysis of the effectiveness of their communication around the grievance mechanism, and thus potential effectiveness of the mechanism, compared to participant's self-reported awareness.

232. **Data from the household survey suggests that available channels are relevant and could be effective if awareness were increased.** Nearly three-quarters of respondents (72 per cent) said they would reach out if they had a complaint. Among them, UNICEF is the most preferred entity to contact (46 per cent), followed by IPs (26 per cent) and community leaders (25 per cent).¹⁵⁷ When asked for their top preference to make contact, phone calls are the most popular choice, preferred by 69 per cent of respondents. However, the ET notes that all people interviewed had access to phones, which is an important bias to this finding. Physical outreach is also notable at 28 per cent, while only a small percentage would use SMS (2 per cent). A strong preference for contact with UNICEF through phones is a positive indication of the potential effectiveness of UNICEF's call centre that began in April 2023. The timing of this evaluation does not allow for enough feedback to confirm whether usage patterns suggest these centres are effective. The fact that most participants who had previously contacted UNICEF or a related party about the CBA were 'satisfied' (20 per cent) or 'very satisfied' (76 per cent) with the result is a positive indication of the potential effectiveness of the systems in place if awareness is improved.

¹⁵⁷ The survey only allowed a single selection according to the "most" preferred.

6.4 Efficiency

EQ.14. Were the CBA objectives achieved on time?

233. There were consistent delays in cash distribution according to distribution timelines.¹⁵⁸ To answer this evaluation question, the ET used secondary data, attempting to compare planned cash distribution timing in the SLA, HPD or MSP contract against actual distribution timing (see Table 10). As specified in the limitation section, data was not available from the ACO for all programmes. An important nuance to this question is that there were often lengthy delays during negotiations with donors and through other processes which shifted the time initially planned according to needs assessments to comply with implementation realities. Thus, efficiency as measured according to implementation agreements somewhat masks efficiency challenges as these initial delays are not captured.

TABLE 10: TIMELINESS OF CBA PROGRAMMES

Programme	Actual distribution dates			
		Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
	Province	From	From	From
C+CP – Covid response (C+1)	Herat	3 rounds of payment (no information found on timing)		
C+CP (C+5)	Kabul, Bamyan, Kapisa, Wardak	No information found		
HCT: Winter 20/21 (HC2)	Ghor & Herat	Jan 2021 (one-off)		
HCT: Drought (HC1)	Samangan	Nov-21	No information for additional rounds	
HCT: Winter 21/22 (HC3)	Nuristan	Dec 15, 2021 to Jan 30, 2022	March 31 to May 12, 2022	March 28 to May 12, 2022
	Logar	Feb 1 to Feb 28, 2022	April 1 to April 30, 2022	July 18 to Aug 25, 2022
	Wardak	Dec 15, 2021 to Jan 30, 2022	Feb 1 to Feb 28, 2022	March 1 to March 30, 2022
C+CP 2021 Kandahar (C+2)	Kandahar	714 households reached in December 2021 (Progress Report)		
C+CP Badghis (C+3)	Badghis	Feb 27 to March 22, 2022	May 1 to Aug 10, 2022	Sept 25 to Oct 1, 2022
C+Health/Nutrition (C+6a)	Daikundi	Feb 27 to March 13, 2022	March 31 to April 7, 2022	May 15 to May 22, 2022
C+CP multi-province (C+.4)	Kabul & Panjshir	26-May-22		
	Khost	20-Mar-22		
	Paktika	7-Aug-22		
HCT: Earthquake (HC4)	Khost	Sept 14 to Sept 18, 2022		
C+Nutrition (C+b6)	Daikundi	Oct 15 to Nov 15, 2022	March 3 to April 3, 2023	Two rounds to come
HCT: Winter 22/23 (HC5a)	Badakshan	Jan 15 to May 30, 2023		
	Panjshir	Dec 2, 2022 to Feb 28, 2023		

¹⁵⁸ Unless mentioned otherwise, those actual dates come from the PMU tracker database provided to the ET.

	Ghor	Jan 1 to March 19, 2023		
HCT: Winter 22/23 (HC5b)	Sar-e-Pul	14-Dec-22		
C+Nutrition – Kabul (C+8)	Kabul	In 2022, 587 admitted children received cash assistance. By June 2023, the programme reached the target of 1400 households in total		
C+Education (C+9)	Nuristan	April 18 to Jun 5, 2023	August 15 to Sept 18, 2023	To come
	Jawzjan	May 10 to Jun 8, 2023	August 5 to Sept 13, 2023	To come
RCT	Zabul	May 30 to July 6, 2023	Ended August 28, 2023	To come
	Samangan	July 14 to July 31, 2023	Ended August 28, 2023	To come
C+Nutrition – KfW (C+7)	Kunar	20-Jul-23	12 months. Ongoing	
<i>Cash distributed on time</i> Maximum 1 week late for emergency cash Maximum 1 month late for cash +		<i>Cash distributed late</i> Less than 3 weeks late for emergency cash Less than 3 months late for cash +	<i>Cash distributed very late</i> Over 3 weeks late for emergency cash Over 3 months late for cash +	<i>Missing information</i>

234. As emphasized throughout the evaluation, the operational context presents consistent challenges, despite considerable effort by UNICEF and IPs. All KIIs reached (UNICEF, WFP, FAO, TPM) report that regardless of efforts, the authorisations for working in the field must be dealt with in anticipation and daily, inevitably delaying the start of most programmes. KIs report that UNICEF and its IPs, as much as possible, put efforts and time into constantly keeping open channels of discussion with authorities both at the national and decentralised levels.

235. The regular cash programme started over two and a half years after the projected starting date provided in the original concept note in 2021. The arrival of the Taliban in August 2021 halted the programme's progress towards the development of a nascent social protection system in Afghanistan. In May 2022, the SPEAR unit signed an agreement with the PMU but UNICEF subsequently halted the regular cash transfer as a result of the ban on women workers that came into effect in December 2022. The first cash distributions started in June 2023. Regular cash assistance was not prioritised considering the overwhelming humanitarian needs UNICEF was facing.

236. Winterization HCT programmes are consistently delayed. UNICEF has difficulties securing winterization funds to distribute assistance in anticipation of the winter period. BHA, a main donor for UNICEF's winterisation response, acknowledges that internal procedures do not allow signing agreements before the start of the new fiscal year in October. This leaves little time to finalise and operationalise programming. During the winter of 2021/22, households in the province of Logar had to wait for the snow to melt before IPs and MSPs could reach them to deliver their first payments. Their third round of payment was delivered in July.

237. Despite lengthy delays, participants were very positive when asked if they had received the assistance well in time to respond to their needs (see Table 11 below). Nearly all surveyed participants from the district of Logar (98 per cent), having received their second round of distribution in April instead of January, reported that the assistance allowed them to meet their needs.

TABLE 11: TABLE SATISFACTION RATE ON THE TIMELINES OF THE EARTHQUAKE AND THE WINTERISATION CASH RESPONSES

		PDM round	Received the assistance well in time to respond to their needs	Fuel/wood for heating the house	Winter clothing and shoes for children
Winter 2021/22	Nuristan	2	100%	8%	0%
	Logar	2	98%	11%	14%
	Wardak	2	90%	13%	5%

Winter 2022/23	Badakhshan	No data provided			
	Panjshir	1	98%	6%	20%
	Ghor	1	97%	5%	21%
Earthquake 2022	Khost	1	97%	11%	16%

238. **Four out of the nine Cash+ programmes have been implemented with substantial delays.** For the Cash+ education it is clear that the start of the programme was delayed due to the ban on girls education. The reasons for the late start of the other programme are not as clear (cash for child protection in Badghis: C+3; Cash for Nutrition in Daikundi: C+6b; Nutrition-sensitive cash distribution in Kunar: C+7).

EQ.15. How efficient are delivery processes, considering the time and resources (including human) required at each stage of implementation, and coordination between different actors?

239. **According to most UNICEF staff interviewed at field offices, delivering cash is far more efficient than in-kind distributions.** The relative efficiency of cash over in-kind is also supported in the broader literature review for food security outcomes, though less is known on relative efficiency for other objectives.¹⁵⁹

240. **PMU staff believe the system is efficient considering the number of human resources.** However, UNICEF ACO KIs report that IPs need to be further trained to adhere more to the registration SOPs to avoid duplication. Over the last two years, ACO invested in building partnerships with diverse IPs across the country and invested in building their capacity and infrastructure for scale-up. According to interviewed field offices, this investment increases efficiency in the different delivery processes. However, efficient implementation depends mainly on coordinating with local authorities and getting approvals, a highly sensitive issue that varies by location.

241. **Interviewed PMU staff report that MSPs are more efficient than banks regarding cash distribution in hard-to-reach and remote areas; their capacity can reach around 500 beneficiaries daily.** While bank coverage is limited, sub-contracting a field team per location increases the distribution cost (see EQ.8 for additional information on modality efficiency). IP staff believe wait times can be reduced significantly if participants follow the schedule of payment as indicated by IP/MSP; however, previous incidents of cash running out during distribution created a trust issue that urges households to gather at the cash distribution points once it starts.

242. **Direct interaction with women during registration or distribution is a valued opportunity, but it needs the right resources in place.** According to SPEAR and SBC staff interviewed, communication with communities is key to achieving UNICEF objectives. Unfortunately, the limited capacity of the IPs meant that field teams from other locations needed to support the delivery process without always having local knowledge of the context or the local language, resulting in inefficiencies. The ongoing ban on women working in Afghanistan is extremely damaging to outreach capacity.

243. **Considerations of cost efficiency must be made within the responsibility to meet the differential needs of vulnerable populations which may require different mechanisms, with different associated costs, for systems to be effective.** According to interviewed PMU UNICEF staff, the investment already made in setting up the GRM will pay off in increased efficiency as the cash activities expand, and the system can serve a larger caseload with a marginal increase in operating cost. However, other mechanisms should be maintained. For example, some community leaders in Badghis suggested that feedback boxes are essential as many people do not have phones or are fearful of using them.

244. Considering the fact that that women have limited access to phones in some locations and the preference for face-to-face interaction as expressed in the HH survey and interviews, physical desks at registration and distribution sites also remain important. Ensuring sufficient resources for

¹⁵⁹ Jeong, D & Trako, I. 2022. Cash and In-kind transfers in humanitarian settings: a review of evidence and knowledge gaps. Policy Research Working Paper; 10026. World Bank.


neutrality, through the segregation of duties of the IP staff so that those implementing are not also the ones responsible for collecting feedback may prove difficult.

EQ.16. To what extent are the CBA modalities¹⁶⁰ efficient? Where, when, why and how much?

245. As cash-in-hand is the only modality used by UNICEF for HCT, the EQ focuses on this modality. However, further information concerning other modalities is available under EQ8.

246. **Access is a major challenge to efficiency, and sometimes effectiveness, of cash-in-hand as a modality and the overall programme.** The ET asked UNICEF staff to rate access to the various provinces on a scale from 1 (easy access) to 5 (difficult access). Provinces where UNICEF intervenes in the Central and West regions were rated most difficult to access (rated mostly 4) followed by the North (rated mostly 3) and East (1 to 3). Difficulty in access is linked to factors including authorisation, security, denial of access for women and road infrastructure (see Figure 18).

FIGURE 18 RATING OF ACCESS ACCORDING TO UNICEF STAFF



Source: ET, collected during data collection

247. **Efficiency should be contextualized within the incredibly challenging operational context.** The change of power in August 2021 interrupted the dynamics built with the former government. UNICEF has no formal agreements with the DfA. No Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or agreements are signed even if communication channels are open. Hence, for now, medium- and long-term activities cannot be anchored into a nationally owned programme. The disappearance of women from the country's social life makes it particularly challenging for humanitarian actors to operate. The collapse of the financial system after August 2021 must also be taken into consideration. OCHA reported over 150 humanitarian incidents in July 2023 and notes that access impediments remain on the rise compared to the same time last year (a 51 per cent increase), resulting in a temporary suspension of 56 programmes in July alone.¹⁶¹ As stated earlier, cash and food distribution in Ghor province had to be suspended due to increasingly troubling reports of confiscation, diversion and redistribution of aid that is meant for the vulnerable people of Ghor.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ As cash in hand is the only modality used by UNICEF, it will be mostly that modality's efficiency that will be explored, rather than modalities that have not been used by UNICEF. The efficiency of the other modalities will be explored through secondary data collection (KIs having used other modalities).

¹⁶¹ OCHA; Afghanistan Humanitarian Access Snapshot ; July 2023

¹⁶² OCHA; Afghanistan Humanitarian Access Snapshot ; April 2023

248. Until now, cash-in-hand seems to be the only modality that allows UNICEF to reach economically marginalized people in remote areas of the country.¹⁶³ The banking system can only recently be considered as a potential modality to reach those participants according to the FAO (see EQ8 for further information).

249. The ET was unable to determine the cost of CBA based on available financial data. To have a global view of the cost-effectiveness, the ET had a few remote meetings with the finance section and PMU to try and extract information from the accounting figures and see how much cash is received by participants for every US\$100 provided by donors. A first calculation showed that for every US\$100 received, participants receive between US\$86 and US\$94 (see Table 12).

TABLE 12 CALCULATION ATTEMPT OF COST EFFICIENCY

	2021	2022	2023
PMU outcome	15,529,441	213,692	284,991
PMU budget cost centre		245,054,546	192,649,309
Kabul PMU cost (mainly staff)		3,055,855	2,593,403
Total PMU budget	15,529,441	248,324,094	195,527,703
PMU outcome	14,665,487	-346,123	-28,210
PMU budget cost centre		233,137,449	167,914,865
Cash distributed	14,665,487	232,791,326	167,886,655
Ratio cash distributed against PMU cost	94%	94%	86%

Source: UNICEF, Finance unit

250. However, this calculation takes into consideration UNICEF's regular cash transfers to 27,000 health workers and 18,000 to 23,000 teachers every month. As reported by PMU, this cash on behalf of the World Bank assistance, representing around four-fifths of all cash assistance, is very well streamlined and efficient. Hence, including these transfers in the measure of cost-efficiency likely over-estimates cost efficiency of the CBA programmes. Data from other cash partners, such as WFP and the World Bank, was unavailable for the ET to compare costs between different implementers.

251. Fees paid to service providers are one source of implementation costs that can be tracked more directly. The average MSP fee is 5.75 per cent of the amount distributed. Depending on the programme, this fee varies from 4 per cent to 6.43 per cent (see Table 13 below).

TABLE 13 COST OF MSP FEES

Province	CBA type	CBA code	Cash distributed to households	Sum of total fees to MSPs	Fee per centage
Kunar	C+ Nutrition	C+7	512,381	20,495	4.00%
Kabul, Panjshir, Khost & Paktika	C+ CP	C+4	1,515,911	72,476	4.78%
Nuristan & Jawzjan	C+ Education	C+9	21,146,967	1,046,411	4.95%
Samangan & Zabul	RC	RCT	3,584,759	193,698	5.40%
Khost	HCT-Earthquake	HC4	380,620	20,934	5.50%
Badakhshan, Panjshir & Ghor	HCT-Winter	HC5a	18,858,949	1,094,657	5.80%
Daikundi	C+ Nutrition	C+6 b	5,061,809	303,709	6.00%

¹⁶³ KIs with extenders and UNICEF field staff, literature review

Sar-e-Pul	HCT-Winter	HC5b	353,532	21,212	6.00%
Badghis	C+ CP	C+3	8,210,247	498,987	6.08%
Daikundi	C+ Health/Nutrition	C+6a	1,708,867	106,702	6.24%
Nuristan, Logar & Wardak	HCT Winter	HC3	22,136,771	1,423,551	6.43%
Total			83,470,814.24	4,802,830.69	5.75%

Source: UNICEF, PMU tracking

252. Using the same calculation, the ET attempted to calculate what cost contracting IPs incurs as a proportion of money distributed to households. On average, the IPs fee represents 5.60 per cent of the amount distributed to participants. This percentage varies from 2.85 per cent to 11.38 per cent (see Table 14 below).¹⁶⁴

TABLE 14 COST OF IP FEES

Province	CBA Type	CBA code	Cash distributed to households	Sum of total fees to IPs	Fee percentage
Badghis	C+ CP	C+3	8,210,247	233,975	2.85%
Nuristan, Logar & Wardak	HCT-Winter 2021/22	HC3	22,136,771	755,673	3.41%
Nuristan & Jawzjan	C+ Education*	C+9	31,720,451	1,416,482	4.47%
Samangan & Zabul	RCT**	RC1	10,560,000	535,972	5.08%
Daikundi	C+ Nutrition	C+6b	5,061,809	357,367	7.06%
Khost	HCT-Earthquake***	HC4	380,620	28,573	7.51%
Badakshan, Panjshir & Ghor	HCT-Winter 2022/23	HC5a	18,858,949	1,998,462	10.60%
Daikundi	C+ Health/Nutrition	C+6a	1,708,867	194,450	11.38%
Total			98,637,714	5,520,954	5.60%
<p>* The amount of cash distributed is anticipated considering what has already been paid in the first two rounds</p> <p>** Calculation based on HPDs in which 40,000 households receive US\$22 per month for 12 months</p> <p>*** The fee in the HPD has been re-calculated by the ET to reflect the reduction in participant numbers. However, the ET does not know if the contract has been revised.</p>					

253. Another informative figure is given in the Operational Review of Cash Transfer Modalities published in June 2022. UNICEF estimates that in 2022, the proportion of staffing costs to total project value managed by the PMU was under 2 per cent.


EQ.17. How efficient is access to the programme in terms of potential private/opportunity costs from the participant perspective, and considering different social groups?

254. PDM data provided by the ACO shows large provincial variation in in payment for transportation and other expenses. Responses ranged from no respondents in Kandahar to 40 per cent of respondents in Badghis (see Figure 19 below). Opportunity costs were less frequently reported amongst all respondents. Based on the UNICEF PDM database provided, of those who reported paying transportation fees, the average one-way cost was USD\$1.71. Transportation cost varied by programme ranging from USD\$1.20 for cash for child protection survey respondents to

¹⁶⁴These figures would need to be validated by the UNICEF ACO to ensure accuracy. Calculations have been made by the ET with the documents available, however, other documents not provided to the ET may invalidate those figures.

USD\$3.50 for 2022/23 winterization HCT survey participants.¹⁶⁵ Nothing is asked on the cash value of opportunity or 'other' costs to determine the relative cost to participants.


FIGURE 19 COST INCURRED BY PARTICIPANTS TO COLLECT CBA CASH



Source: IPs, PDM data

255. A much a larger percentage of respondents reported incurring expenses related to receiving cash in a PDM in 2023 compared to the PDMs in the same areas in 2022. Over half of respondents in Khost and Logar reported associated costs in 2023 compared to less than 10 per cent in 2022. In Daikundi, approximately 15 per cent of respondents reporting associated costs in 2022 compared to over 40 per cent of respondents in 2023. The vast majority (95 per cent) of costs are related to transportation. The ET does not have any explanation about why there is this large change in associated costs between the two rounds of PDMs (see Figure 20 below).

FIGURE 20 COMPARISON OF PER CENT OF PDM RESPONDENTS REPORTING COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CASH RECEIPT (2022 AND 2023)




Source: UNICEF PDM data & TPM PDM data

256. There are also much higher proportions of PDM respondents reporting opportunity and other costs when comparing the same datasets (see Figure 21 below). No follow-up question on opportunity cost is included in either PDM series. The other types of costs relate mostly to hotel rent, food costs, and expenses related to copying Tazkiras and other documents. The amount of this cost has not been quantified.

¹⁶⁵ Cost calculated based on exchange rate in June 2022 when most of the referenced PDM data was collected

FIGURE 21 COMPARISON OF REPORTED OPPORTUNITY AND OTHER COSTS (2022 AND 2023)



Source: 2022 UNICEF PDM data; 2023 TPM PDM data

257. **Data from the UNICEF ACO PDM dashboard indicates that participants are largely satisfied with both the location and timing of distribution.** The vast majority of PDM respondents included in the UNICEF ACO PDM dashboard reported that the location was 'convenient' (91 per cent) and the timing was 'convenient' (96 per cent). While positive overall, feedback from those participants who did not find the location/timing convenient signifies access barriers to specific populations: seven per cent of dashboard respondents said that the site was not accessible for the elderly, persons with disabilities, etc.

258. Households that have a person with disabilities were not more likely to report access issues, likely indicating that there are household members without disabilities who can pick up the cash (the PDM does not ask whether the person responsible for collecting the cash has a disability). Some respondents mentioned challenges with timing due to household duties or the need to take care of family members (elderly or children). These barriers would likely affect women more frequently, as they are traditionally responsible for household and caregiver responsibilities.

259. **Reducing transportation costs was a frequent recommendation from participants interviewed for the evaluation.** During FGDs with men, reducing transportation costs was mentioned in the districts of Badghis, Wardak, Khost and Badakhshan when asked what improvements could be made to the distribution process. The transportation cost was also mentioned by women participants, extenders and one MSP during KIIs. The different KIIs suggest distributing cash closer to people to reduce the cost of transportation.

260. As discussed in the EQ.12, data cannot be disaggregated by social groups. To see if specific social groups have been more affected than others in terms of costs, in-depth case studies would need to be done for example in locations for which additional costs vary.

6.5 Impact

EQ.18. Did the programme affect/likely to affect intra-household gender relations? If so, in what ways?

261. In the inception report, the evaluability of this question was noted as 'uncertain'. This was because the DfA imposed considerable constraints on women's ability to work. In the evaluation design, this question was to be facilitated by women enumerators leading FGDs with women at woman-and-child-friendly spaces in the community. Due to restrictions, this did not happen. While the evaluation was able to reach women by phone, the ability to establish rapport and ensure privacy during the call was quite limited; women participants may have felt freer to speak in a closed, women-only setting in the community.

262. **In general, participants, community leaders, IPs and ACO stakeholders did not note any significant positive or negative, intended or unintended effect on intra-household gender relations.**

The vast majority of participants in qualitative data collection said cash programming had no impact on relations between husband and wife. Most went on to describe how the cash helped the household, and how decisions were made together or with no negative influence from the spouse. Feedback from several men recipients whose children were part of the Cash+ Nutrition for malnutrition in Kabul programme (C+8) noted that the cash did not have any effect on their relationship with their wives; and that overall, the cash was helpful to their household and the well-being of their children.¹⁶⁶ PDM findings were positive in this respect with over half of PDM dashboard respondents reporting that the cash transfer program decreased tensions (56 per cent) and nearly all others reporting that the programme had no change in relationships (0.2 per cent said it created tensions). Women respondents were slightly more likely to report that the cash transfer decreased tensions (59 per cent) compared to men respondents (56 per cent).

263. One question in the HH survey gives minor insight into the impact on gender relations, but it is inconclusive if it is positive or negative. When asked who decided on how UNICEF CBA cash is spent in the HH survey, 75 per cent reported that men decided while 9 per cent noted that women made the decision; 16 per cent said, 'both men and women'. When asked if this differed from how other resources were spent, 58 per cent said yes, while 37 per cent said no¹⁶⁷. Without further probes, which were expected to be explored in FGDs, the ET is unable to determine whether financial decision-making concerning CBA was more or less inclusive.

264. One area of potential risk raised by a few ACO field staff concerned an unintended negative effect if ex-husbands were able to pick up UNICEF cash. While UNICEF procedures only allow the primary or secondary designate of a household to pick up the cash, who actually picks up the cash is not monitored. One staff member noted that there have been cases of ex-husbands picking up the cash, but that it is a minor occurrence. The same stakeholder noted that it has been reported that elders of the village can be informed in advance to help prevent it from happening.

6.6 Sustainability

EQ.19. To what extent are the benefits of each CBA likely to continue and/or make a difference after UNICEF funding ceases?

265. **Humanitarian assistance does not aim to be sustainable.** The primary objective of humanitarian assistance is to help people overcome a specific event over a defined period. Once the assistance has been provided and the money spent, it is difficult to isolate the benefits resulting from the assistance. Most people have spent their money on food, and the long-term effects are difficult to quantify. As one participant put it: "The cash assistance helped us for a while; it actually rescued my children from death."¹⁶⁸

"We can easily differentiate between a child or mother that this programme has assisted and those who have not."

FGD, Male participant of Cash+ child protection in Badghis. 2021/22

266. **For the Cash+ assistance and RCT, the objective of making a sustained difference after funding ceases is more obvious.** The Cash+ nutrition programmes (and certain aspects of Cash+ child protection programmes) are based on the fact that the first 1,000 days of a child's life (from conception until the age of two) have a profound effect on a child's future.¹⁶⁹ Through FGDs, several participants recognise that mothers and children eat better thanks to the cash assistance. Donors expressed their concern that UNICEF does not provide robust evidence on how the

Cash+ programmes lead to longer-term benefits. The same can be said for the Cash+ child protection programmes. The Cash+ education programme has only just started and the baseline report was not

¹⁶⁶The question was, indirectly about gender dynamics and participants were asked: "Did the cash have any effect on your relationship with your wife)/husband?"

¹⁶⁷ Four per cent did not know whether it differed

¹⁶⁸ FGD, Male participant of cash assistance during winter 2021/22

¹⁶⁹ UNICEF; Early Moments Matter; <https://www.unicef.org/early-moments> (Accessed on September 7, 2023)

finalised. As girls have been banned from going to school, the long-term potential effect linked to access to education will be difficult to achieve.

EQ.21. Is the actual model of CBA transferable to a government's national social policy programme in the future?

267. Before August 2021, Afghanistan's formal social protection system was very weak.¹⁷⁰ Two main schemes were in place at the time: a Public Service Pension programme providing a pension to 114,000 former public servants and the Martyrs and Disabled Pension Programme providing benefits to 90,000 persons with disabilities and 220,000 others affected by conflict. There is little information on how those schemes evolved since 2021. While the Public Service Pension does not seem to reach all its beneficiaries, the Martyrs and Disabled Pension programme seems to continue under the DfA. A greater social policy system was in discussion with the World Bank before the DfA takeover. UNICEF has also been working with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in the elaboration of a National Social Protection Policy. Whilst the technical staff of the ministry is still in place, the higher-level official has changed, but official collaboration with the DfA is not established for the time being.

268. **The DfA is currently not following a political and ideological path that is compatible with instituting a national social policy scheme in Afghanistan.**¹⁷¹ However, while establishing a system of social protection outside government channels is not easy, it is possible.¹⁷² Hence it is interesting to understand if the CBA model could be transferrable if the government was ready to implement such a scheme. The UNDP 2022 report outlines some of the core measures that could be taken to build such a model. These measures can be used as a benchmark to assess future transferability.¹⁷³

- **Partnerships with NGOs** are the first core element. In this domain, UNICEF works with over ten different NGOs/IPs in provinces they work in. UNICEF's five field offices allow for easy collaboration with those IPs. By building local capacity within civil society, UNICEF is contributing to a pool of expertise available for the government in the future.
- A running **digital management information system (MIS)** is another core element. Based on UNDP's analysis, the MIS should be centralised but also accessed at the regional level. Data can be entered offline and updated when the connection is available. UNICEF's HOPE MIS provides these facilities. For the time being, HOPE is only accessible to UNICEF staff for confidentiality purposes. However, this tool (or a similar one) could be transferable to the government and deployed throughout the country. For now, concerns about participant anonymity for security and accountability measures prevent development of a unique and central social protection system.
- **Payment service providers** are the third core element that needs to be in place. While UNDP pushed for the use of electronic payment systems, it does not appear to be a feasible modality for the populations targeted by UNICEF. However, UNICEF's PMU continually explores different modalities to ensure appropriately adapted payment systems.

269. While the implementing tools used by UNICEF could be transferable to the government, capacity building at the higher governmental level is still missing. However, working at the level of political transformation is out of UNICEF's mandate.

¹⁷⁰ KIs with social protection specialists from UNICEF and the World Bank as well as secondary data.

¹⁷¹ According to all KIs reached during the data collection phase

¹⁷² UNDP; Afghanistan: Socio-Economic Outlook 2021-2022; 2022, page 44.

7 Conclusions

270. All conclusions in this section are based on findings gathered during the data collection phase. Conclusions are organized by evaluation criteria.

7.1 Relevance

271. **Conclusion 1: The CBA programmes are relevant to the needs of vulnerable stakeholders and could be further strengthened through more systematic integration of cash programmes with commensurate resources, including financial, that allow UNICEF to fulfil long-term objectives, including for GEWE. More detailed selection criteria would help tailor programming distribution to allocate scarce resources to reach the most at risk.** The evaluation findings indicate gaps in design and available resources to meet the considerable ambitions of the ACO's cash transfer program strategy. Ambitions were particularly high considering the DfA takeover and subsequent tightening of operational space for GEWE objectives. Without additional interventions and longer-term inputs, CBA is unlikely to fully achieve both objectives of the strategy.

272. Individual CBA programmes fulfil the short-term financial objectives of the cash strategy but lack the integration of interrelated components described in the cash strategy to meet longer-term objectives, including GEWE objectives. In general, objectives are limited to successful cash distribution, for which activities are consistent. There are examples of specific HCT and Cash+ programmes that specify additional components more aligned with the cash strategy, but this is not consistent.

273. While CBA programmes align with the gender policy and action plan and generally reflected the ACO's immense experience in Afghanistan, stakeholders believe more can be done. GEWE was promoted primarily through the inclusion of women in categorical targeting. Some Cash+ programmes offered more direct benefits to GEWE outcomes through health and nutrition. There was a general consensus among key stakeholders that the ACO should seek to further understand gender dynamics and address the worsening situation for women and children due specifically to gender discrimination.

274. The CBA designs are based on categorical criteria within geographically prioritized areas and do not consider ethnic or cultural differences. Prioritization of women and children is aligned with UNICEF's mandate and most key informants with whom the subject was raised (ACO Kabul and field staff, implementing partners, community leaders etc.) did not identify differences that should have been considered, instead affirming the categorical selection strategy. However, the fact that design documents are not based on a detailed understanding of the risks and vulnerabilities of diverse groups raises risks to equitable inclusion in programming.

275. All stakeholders agreed that in the majority of cases, vulnerable households (though not necessarily the most vulnerable) were reached. More detailed selection and validation criteria would be required to more accurately identify the most vulnerable. More stringent vulnerability criteria would be relevant to prioritize households within a context of limited financial resources but would incur efficiency trade-offs in implementation.

7.2 Coherence

276. **Conclusion 2: The prevailing reality where needs consistently surpass available resources has reduced the attention given to ensuring careful external coordination, internal coordination is also challenging. There is potential for increased partnerships.** UNICEF is a recognized leader in cash assistance delivery in Afghanistan and the second-largest CBA actor in terms of funding, following WFP. Internal and external stakeholders alike suggested UNICEF could extend their reach and impact within cash programming by enhancing partnerships with other actors. Integrated approaches bringing in complementary sectors and area-based approaches are avenues for expanding/adapting CBA programming.

277. Externally, cash coordination remains centralised in Kabul for which UNICEF is represented by SPEAR/SP. UNICEF has attended several CVWG meetings and participated in some technical committee meetings. However, ACO Kabul stakeholders noted the need for increased attention from the SPEAR unit going forward. UNICEF follows the CVWG technical guidance though on occasion the

MEB was not met and there were no instances found where UNICEF increased the MEB based on local conditions.

278. While there is potential geographic overlap between UNICEF and WFP in selected provinces, the overwhelming extent of needs has mitigated concerns about program duplication and reduced impetus for coordination to avoid overlap. Bi-lateral coordination with WFP has been informal but has increased recently around new health and nutrition strategies to be rolled out in the coming months. The evolving collaboration between UNICEF and WFP positions them to work more strategically, addressing challenges in a more concerted manner to optimize assistance efforts across the diverse regions in Afghanistan.

279. Internally, according to KIs with programmatic units, Cash+ interventions do not build enough on the programmatic interventions but are run alongside them. As no staff in the programmatic unit are directly dedicated to CBA, it makes it difficult for the programmatic units to follow and ensure a better complementarity of CBA programmes with non-cash intervention. Better integration of cross-cutting issues, specifically, greater integration of SBC and gender approaches in all CBA programming as well as more coherent M&E processes to inform evidence generation are reportedly needed. Stakeholders suggested that UNICEF identify opportunities to align all sectors in key provinces and districts- not just health and nutrition—for greater sustainability and impact.

7.3 Effectiveness and Impact

280. **Conclusion 3: Available evidence suggests that the cash infusions temporarily increase access to limited services but are not sufficient to meet basic needs. Improved evidence streams are required for better tracking of household outcomes.** The available evidence streams are limited for identifying household outcomes beyond cash receipt. Qualitative and quantitative data highlights the fact that assistance is essential but largely insufficient to meet a household's basic needs. PDMs show an increase in a household's ability to cover children's needs with three-quarters of PDM respondents reporting that there are goods and services that they can access for children now thanks to cash assistance that they would not have had access to otherwise. Based on the ET's analysis of the available quantitative data, there are no notable differences in household ability to meet needs among those with unique needs, such as households with a person with a disability or among households headed by women.

281. The effectiveness of UNICEF CBA is improved by UNICEF's partnership model, working with local IPs and MSPs to deliver cash in an extremely difficult operational context. The expertise of the PMU has also been essential to the scale-up as has UNICEF's reputation as a "good partner". Effectiveness has been damaged by the low transfer and short-term nature of most CBA programmes, dictated by limited available financial resources. Contributions beyond cash distribution have also been constrained due to DfA governance and increasing restrictions on GEWE considerations.

282. UNICEF's education unit is conducting further evaluation of the education Cash+ programme. There are no processes yet for evaluating the effectiveness of programming on the empowerment of women and girls; these are planned for the RCT programme.

283. Half of the programmes (HCT and Cash+) did not have either set distribution objectives or did not include sufficient details in reporting to assess effectiveness. Most of the CBA programmes with established cash distribution and participant targets met these objectives. These objectives were often scaled down in terms of both participant numbers and cash distribution from the original design documents, when available, due to limited financial resources. This is most notable for RCT, scaled down from three to one year of assistance.

284. New initiatives under the RCT offer an emerging source of evidence for GEWE. In general, participants, community leaders, IPs and ACO stakeholders did not note any significant positive or negative effect on intra-household gender relations. When asked if the cash assistance has had any impact on relations between husband and wife, the vast majority of participants in qualitative data collection said it had no impact. The inability to conduct FGDs with women challenged the evaluability of this question

285. **Conclusion 4: The ET did not identify any specific issues of intentional exclusion of specific social groups. Moving forward, UNICEF will need to assess the risks that specific needs are ignored against the cost of differential needs assessments.** Without differential needs assessments in the design documents or sufficient evaluation resources to undertake in-depth studies of these topics, there are limits to the ET's ability to determine the extent to which the programming contributed to addressing the needs and realities of different social groups. Historical evidence of consistent marginalization of certain populations, such as the Hazara, highlights the risks that dominant groups could continue to exclude those less historically empowered. The ET recognizes that, within the humanitarian crisis, and considering the urgent needs the Afghan population is facing, in-depth studies may not have been a priority while scaling up CBA over the past three years.

286. **Conclusion 5: For now, cash in hand modalities are the most appropriate for serving affected populations. There are opportunities to strengthen IP capacity for following UNICEF SOPs.** Practical considerations underline the continued importance of cash in hand as the most appropriate method of meeting needs of UNICEF's targeted demographic. UNICEF remains forward-looking in exploring technological advancements, continuing to explore possibilities for mobile money which offers potential benefits in terms of operational delivery costs, transfer risks and risks of aid deviation but is currently less relevant for UNICEF's assisted populations due to low network coverage, high illiteracy and lack of mobile devices in many households.

287. The disbursement of funds and payment management was effective to a large extent, with few reported incidents of interference in the process and inclusion/exclusion errors in the list of eligible participants. UNICEF staff has positively reviewed the digitization of systems as increasing the effectiveness of participant registration data and payment management. According to key informants, the effectiveness of the participants' registration process could be enhanced by equipping the IPs with the required resources for conducting a household-level assessment, refining the targeting criteria, and continuing with building the capacity of the IPs for following UNICEF SOPs and procedures in the field during data collection and reporting.

288. **Conclusion 6: UNICEF is taking proactive action to address barriers to community inclusion and participation that are inhibiting the degree to which programme objectives can be reached.** IPs make considerable efforts to communicate objectives and availability of feedback and complaints mechanisms. However, the fact that HH survey results show gaps in knowledge, particularly concerning the duration and timing of distribution, indicates issues in outreach strategy design.

289. Sufficient time is not devoted to proper engagement with the participants and wider community participation in the project design. There is limited capacity in the SBC unit which is limiting the impact of the CBA activities and the Cash+ specifically. Creative ways to cope with the ban on women's work are being explored like engagement through religious leaders, elderly women and youth.

7.4 Efficiency

290. **Conclusion 7: While efficiency is improving with experience, timeliness is a continual challenge within the CBA programme affected by contextual factors, donor schedules and internal processes.** Considering the complex environment UNICEF is operating in, the consistent delays in cash distribution programmes are reasonable. All KIs report that regardless of efforts, access authorisations are a daily negotiation, inevitably delaying the start of most programmes. KIs report that UNICEF and its IPs, as much as possible, put efforts and time into constantly keeping open channels of discussion with authorities both at the national and decentralised levels.

291. The winterization programmes experienced substantial delays which were mainly related to donor funding schedules. Too little time is available between the start of the donor's fiscal year and the start of the winter period to assist in a timely manner.

292. The efficiency of delivery process has been increasing with the accumulated experience and the adoption of systems and procedures for better implementation management. There is room for improvement in consolidating the inputs of the different feedback channels and closing the feedback loop that UNICEF should explore.

293. **Conclusion 8: Participants are very positive about the efficiency of delivery, but there are barriers that may affect the most vulnerable households.** Data from the UNICEF ACO PDM dashboard indicates that participants are largely satisfied with both the location and timing of distribution. While positive overall, feedback from those participants who did not find the location/timing convenient signifies access barriers to specific populations including persons with disabilities. Appropriate strategies to reach households who cannot travel to distribution sites remains important to fulfil Leave No One Behind commitments.

294. **Conclusion 9: Insights into variation in IP and MSP costs offer opportunities for UNICEF to explore 'best practices' in implementation to improve efficiency.** MSP costs tended to be more stable regardless of the programme type or location of distribution usually ranging between four to six per cent of the total funds delivered. In contrast, IP costs fluctuated substantively ranging from 2 per cent to more than 11 per cent. It was not possible to extract relevant accounting figures from UNICEF's accounting unit to be able to provide tangible figures to estimate the percentage of cash provided by donors that reach the Afghan-assisted population. Data from other cash implementers, such as WFP and the World Bank, was similarly unavailable for the ET to compare costs between different implementers.

7.5 Sustainability

295. **Conclusion 10: While UNICEF is following good practices to develop a transferrable social protection scheme, the sustainability of CBA programming and long-term GEWE changes to households is limited due to contextual constraints.** UNICEF does not provide robust evidence on how CBA programming led to longer-term benefits. While this is reasonable for HCT programmes with short-term objectives, donors expressed concern about the lack of available evidence for Cash+ nutrition programming.

296. According to all KIs reached during the data collection phase, it is clear that for the time being the DfA is not following a political and ideological path that is compatible with instituting a national social policy scheme in Afghanistan. Hence, it is unlikely that the DfA would be willing to take over any additional social policy scheme for the time being. However, the system put in place by UNICEF, using local NGOs, national MSPs, and a robust MIS, and now a new centralised and dedicated call centre, follows prudent principles to help ensure transferability to a central government if they are willing in the future. Political transformation to encourage acceptance of this system is beyond UNICEF's mandate.

8 LESSONS LEARNED

297. Lessons learned are included in the report based on EQ.20: What key lessons can be extracted from CBA programmes in terms of resources and capacity requirements for UNICEF at the national and sub-national levels to manage and deliver at scale? What would be the resources and structures needed? Thus, lessons are specific to this topic.

298. The accumulated experience and currently available infrastructure position ACO well to achieve more efficiency as programmes are scaled up. The ACO staff estimate an existing capacity that can accommodate a 30 per cent increase in the cash-based activities caseload with no major overhead increase.

Lesson 1: Donor engagement strategies need to be reviewed to ensure UNICEF is interacting with the right donors at the right times to provide sufficient funding to meet CBA programme objectives.

299. Donors' interviews suggest that UNICEF should prioritise engagement with the right potential donor, for example, the UNICEF/BMZ partnership on building and strengthening social protection systems in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and West and Southern Africa regions.¹⁷⁴ For humanitarian cash transfers, engagement with a diversified pool of potential donors was successful in the past, with challenges of late receipt of funds for seasonal needs responses.

¹⁷⁴ Note on Social Protection initiative in Afghanistan for BMZ

Early engagement and enhanced reporting could reportedly increase donors' support. Tapping into UNICEF core funds that can be released in advance of the actual receipt of confirmed donors' pledges would be a solution for delays in winterization response.

Lesson 2: CBA objectives need to be reviewed in light of the imbalance between broad categorical targeting criteria and the resources available to fund programmes.

300. Multiple studies highlight the need to reflect on the adequacy of cash, aligning objectives with expectations when the amounts and duration of assistance are limited and ensuring strong humanitarian-development linkages.¹⁷⁵ Findings from the household survey highlight the endurance of unmet immediate needs for children with over half of respondents highlighting the continued need for food (64 per cent) and enduring challenges accessing higher-level needs, such as education, with 66 per cent of respondents identifying education as the most pressing need for children.¹⁷⁶ In the Afghanistan context, where the vast majority of the population is expected to be in need, finding ways to ensure the continuity of assistance to the most vulnerable within the groups selected based on categorical criteria in a consistent way will help ensure the sustainability of achieved results.

Lesson 3: Ensuring an appropriate balance of cash and complementary service provision is also paramount to achieving CBA objectives.

301. Supply-side constraints remain a barrier to achieving UNICEF's stated objectives, particularly regarding education for girls and health services¹⁷⁷ as well as access to clean water.¹⁷⁸ As discussed in EQ6, programmatic unit staff interviewed felt that Cash+ interventions did not build enough of programmatic interventions. Continued efforts to integrate planning both internally and externally is essential to achieving the broader development objectives of the Cash Transfer Programme Strategy. Sectoral expertise in M&E processes is also important to ensure the development of an appropriate evidence base to inform decision-making going forward.¹⁷⁹

Lesson 4: The expertise and flexibility of the PMU has been essential to UNICEF's success in scaling up cash assistance.

302. In its reporting, UNICEF attributed the last three years' achievement in scaling up cash assistance to the PMU capacity adopting a "flexible risk-managed approach" to the operations across the country. Interviewed senior management see the necessity of continued PMU support for the upcoming period while also developing a gradual exit strategy. KIIs with UNICEF staff at the national level revealed the need to transfer the cash management knowledge from PMU to other programme departments and SPEAR and increase the integration of different units using CBA as a modality.

Lesson 5: Investments in human resource capacity at the sub-national level are equally important to scaling up cash assistance and should be expanded.

303. The decentralisation of the PMU functions started successfully in 2022 delegating more functions to regional offices. The structure was largely functional and fit for purpose with some areas of adjustment needed. Interviews with CBA participants, IP staff, extenders and UNICEF field office staff highlighted the need to increase the monitoring capacity at the sub-national level and give more authority to field offices in the deployment of monitoring missions.

¹⁷⁵ See, for example, Jeong, D & Trako, I. 2022. Cash and In-kind transfers in humanitarian settings: a review of evidence and knowledge gaps. Policy Research Working Paper; 10026. World Bank. Harvey, P & Pavanello, S. 2018. Multi-purpose cash and sectoral outcomes: a review of evidence and Learning. UNHCR.

¹⁷⁶ See Annex 7 for disaggregated information

¹⁷⁷ Increasing supply-side constraints on education and health are well documented, including the DfA ban on girls attending secondary education.

¹⁷⁸ Numerous internal stakeholders (field and Kabul; management and programmes) and external stakeholders (IPs, UNO) as well as participants noted a need for improved access to water

¹⁷⁹ As expressed by UNICEF KIIs and the broader literature e.g. Jeong, D & Trako, I. 2022. Cash and In-kind transfers in humanitarian settings: a review of evidence and knowledge gaps. Policy Research Working Paper; 10026. World Bank. Harvey, P & Pavanello, S. 2018. Multi-purpose cash and sectoral outcomes: a review of evidence and Learning. UNHCR. WFP Evidence Summary: Cash-based transfers. 2021.

304. The ban on women working means that networks are no longer able to interact effectively with women participants/potential participants. This ban affects the capacity of the SBC section to respond to the different requests. Interviewed staff explained promising work on elderly deployment and youth initiatives, increased dialogue with religious leaders supporting the IPs in conducting assessments and community mobilisation as a way to compensate for the human capital loss resulting from the ban.

Lesson 6: UNICEF has the experience to lead in the deployment of digital systems for the expansion and scale-up of CBA.

305. UNICEF ACO deployed multiple systems that worked for the benefit of the expansion and scale-up of CBA (HOPE, GRM, HACT and WOPS) in addition to multiple accountability and governance structures. These systems will continue to facilitate the management of future CBA programming.¹⁸⁰ UNICEF's outreach capacity through the IPs also positions UNICEF as a leader in large-scale cash interventions. The ET interviews suggest a need to share this experience widely with other cash actors and pay attention to any potential gap in resources due to rotations of international experts.

Lesson 7: Liquidity issues should be monitored to assess MSP capacity to meet distribution needs.

306. Interviewed MSPs confirmed their ability to respond to any increase in demand resulting from more considerable cash assistance. However, interviewed PMU staff, IP staff, and field offices mentioned cases of delays in cash distributions due to liquidity issues. The fact that all UN agencies have only three potential MSPs vetted following HACT¹⁸¹ creates concern over the MSP's ability to respond to and prioritise requests from different agencies simultaneously.

9 Recommendations

307. UNICEF has done well to support the needs of vulnerable households working diligently across the country, accessing difficult-to-reach and very remote villages. UNICEF staff, extenders and implementing partners are to be commended for commitment, efforts and tenacity in this complex environment.

308. UNICEF's implementation of CBA programmes appears to proceed according to individually funded programmes, rather than the interlinked and reinforcing components presented in UNICEF's Afghanistan Cash Strategy. Given the overwhelming needs, UNICEF ACO will need to balance the depth and reach of engagement. The ToC developed during the inception phase of this evaluation should be further reviewed by the ACO to ensure ownership and relevance according to the evolving priorities of the CO.

309. In the current context, the development of a national social protection system is not feasible. Thus, the ET confirms the relevance of UNICEF's strategy, collaborating with local actors and developing a robust MIS system to lay the foundations for a system that can be eventually transferred (see EQ21 for further details). However, no more specific recommendations are available under the current political context.

The following recommendations are derived from the conclusions which flow logically from the evaluation findings. Recommendations are presented in order of importance according to the ET. Recommendations were developed by the ET and validated through a preliminary findings presentation to the Evaluation Reference Group. The suggested timeframes are based on the ET judgement of urgency considering that programmes are ongoing. However, these timelines may need to be adjusted by UNICEF based on internal program and operational dynamics as well as the wider context for which the ET was not able to have a complete picture. All presented recommendations are relevant to UNICEF's objective of scaling up CBA in Afghanistan as the ET considers these elements important in enhancing the quality of UNICEF's cash response.

¹⁸⁰ UNICEF Operation Review of Cash Transfer Modalities, Afghanistan Case Study, June 2022

¹⁸¹ HACT is the harmonized approach to cash transfer which is a common operational framework adopted by UN agencies for transferring cash to government and non-government implementing partners.

Change desired	Recommendations	Timeframe	Responsibility
UNICEF has the means to absorb and embed all PMU expertise into the country office.	<p>Recommendation 1: As UNICEF is planning to expand its CBA activities, the expertise coming from the PMU needs to be completely integrated into the country office architecture.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> In consultation with the main support units (administration, finance, procurement, logistics, etc.), PMU and SPEAR need to establish a transition plan ensuring ACO integration of all PMU expertise in anticipation of the draw down of PMU. To ensure a smooth transition plan, UNICEF should consider additional human resources to ensure sufficient overlap between the actual PMU team and the new incoming staff. Decentralisation of competencies is of uppermost importance and should be further continued in the transitional plan. This is particularly important in terms of decentralization of M&E, SPEAR and PMU and empowering the field offices to make decisions to localize the approach to distribution/targeting and initiate monitoring visits as needed without requiring centralized budget approvals 	Within the next 3 months.	ACO (PMU and SPEAR) together with the regional office.
Cross-cutting themes such as gender and SBC are better integrated into the CBA	<p>Recommendation 2: Additional efforts should be invested into gender and social behaviour change-related activities especially when related to the Cash+ and regular cash programmes.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> UNICEF ACO needs to have an internal and transversal discussion to decide, collectively, what importance to give to gender transformative programming and SBC's activities in CBA. Depending on the importance UNICEF ACO wishes to dedicate to gender transformative programming, provincial gender assessments are required to better inform the barriers and opportunities that could be combined with CBA to support women's empowerment. Depending on the importance UNICEF ACO wishes to dedicate to SBC activities, design specific SBC strategies in collaboration with the different programmatic units. Additional human resources and budget may be needed in both SBC and gender units. SBC and gender objectives could even be added to annual staff performance review depending on the importance dedicated. 	Within the next 6 months	ACO at the managerial level
Collect hard evidence on the impact of Cash+ and regular cash assistance.	<p>Recommendation 3: UNICEF should invest resources in measuring the outcomes of Cash+ and regular cash programmes to i) ensure expected outcomes are reached, ii) re-orientate programming if needed, and iii) provide evidence to donors for possible increased funding.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> SPEAR, together with each thematic unit, must discuss what indicators need to be tracked to ensure change can be measured over time. Specific funding (internal or external) needs to be sourced to ensure evaluation and monitoring can be implemented as desired. The monitoring needs to be independent of the implementation activities (see recommendation 4). 	Within the next 6 months	SPEAR unit with programmatic units

Monitoring of CBA activities becomes separated from implementation activities and should cover all the cash transfer processes.	<p>Recommendation 4: UNICEF needs to continue working towards separating implementation partners and monitoring partners.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. UNICEF should stop asking IPs to conduct PDMs unless internal segregation of duties is institutionally guaranteed. II. UNICEF should allow third-party monitoring companies to be fully responsible for all monitoring processes, starting with the initial sampling of participants. III. In addition to PDMs, monitoring should be implemented by TPM companies at the preliminary stages of the programme (participant sensitisation and selection). 	Within the next 6 months	SPEAR unit with PMU
Winter cash assistance is provided before and during the cold winter period.	<p>Recommendation 5: UNICEF should find mitigation measures to ensure timely winter cash assistance.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. Together with the regional office, the ACO should explore internal advance funding mechanisms to fill the gap created by late donor funding. II. In parallel, UNICEF, together with donors, should explore funding possibilities for rapid cash allocation when needs are anticipated at the very start of the donor's fiscal year. 	In the next 6 months for the timely start of the 2024 winter response.	ACO with regional office (I) ACO with regional office and donors (II)
Further coordination with other humanitarian organizations (local and international)	<p>Recommendation 6: To provide a more holistic response to the Afghan people, UNICEF should collaborate more with other actors so that the CBA results can be further leveraged. Partnerships with external actors in livelihoods, community-level WASH, etc. could enhance UNICEF core programming outcomes more sustainably.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. UNICEF should conduct a gap analysis as well as utilize OCHA 3W maps at district and village levels to better identify opportunities to enhance the sustainability and impact of their work. II. UNICEF should ensure regular attendance of the CVWG including regular presentations of UNICEF's implementation to ensure opportunities for collaboration are enhanced. (The timeline for this sub-recommendation is immediately) 	Within the next 6 months	ACO at the managerial level
CBA designs are systematically informed by regional assessments to ensure local vulnerability criteria are taken into account.	<p>Recommendation 7: UNICEF should support regional sub-offices to conduct detailed assessments to inform more localised vulnerability criteria for CBA programmes planned.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. Assessment should include a greater analysis of minorities and potentially underserved populations. II. Such analysis should be used to better support recommendations to increase the MEB for specific provinces or districts. 	Within the next 6 months	SPEAR (research and evaluation section)

Participant selection is seen as fair by all community members.	<p>Recommendation 8: During the participant selection process, UNICEF should ensure all measures are put in place to ensure a transparent and well-accepted procedure.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. UNICEF, together with IPs, should analyse which are the main issues related to participant selection. This should be done in consultation with participants considering regional, cultural and ethnic specificities. II. Following this assessment, specific participant selection procedures need to be put in place in consultation with SBC and gender units. III. Additional procedures need to be put in place to ensure independent evaluation and monitoring of the selection process. 	Within the next 6 months	PMU in collaboration with SPEAR and relevant units
Communication around CBA is sufficiently disseminated amongst participants and community leaders, especially regarding selection criteria and complaint mechanisms.	<p>Recommendation 9: UNICEF should ensure that communication around the different CBA components is better disseminated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. Ensure global communication regarding selection criteria to selected HH, community leaders and community members. II. Work in collaboration with IPs to ensure communities are fully aware of the UNICEF hotline and other feedback and complaints mechanisms. 	Within the next 3 months	PMU in collaboration with SPEAR
Participants should not have to bear additional costs for receiving cash assistance.	<p>Recommendation 10: The cost of transportation to the distribution points should not be borne by the participants.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. As much as possible, UNICEF should ensure that MSPs and IPs have the means to deliver cash as close as possible to the participants. II. The price of transportation should be added to the amount distributed in environments in which implementing costs are too high for MSPs and IPs to deliver cash close enough to participants to be able to reach them without paying for transportation. III. Close monitoring should be continued regarding transportation costs to anticipate future programming. 	Within the next 3 months	PMU in collaboration with SPEAR

10 Annexes

Annex 1. Terms of Reference

UNICEF AFGHANISTAN REQUEST FOR A CONTRACT FOR SERVICES (RES)		
SHORT TITLE OF ASSIGNMENT		
Formative evaluation of the Cash Based Assistance (CBA) Programme in Afghanistan		
REQUESTING SECTION	SPEAR	
SUPERVISOR (CONTRACT MANAGER)	Evaluation Specialist, UNICEF ACO	
GRANT	Grant	
WBS	0060/A0/07/886/009	
1. PROPOSED DURATION 2.	3 months	NOTES / COMMENTS
PROPOSED START DATE/END DATE	December, 2022 – April 30, 2023	80 working days excluding weekends and public holidays stretched over the contract duration
TYPE OF PROCUREMENT EOI, RFP, RFQ, ITB	ESARO LTA	
SUPPLY PLAN LINE NUMBER		
LOCATION OF REQUIRED SERVICES	CBA programme areas around Afghanistan	Nuristan, Wardak, Logar, Badghis, Daikundi, Kabul, Panjsher and Samangan provinces
ESTIMATED VALUE MAY EXCEED CRC THRESHOLD (Yes/No)	Yes	
Need for procurement of institutional services is reflected in the AWP/ Supply plan or is in response to a specific request		Yes
The tasks cannot be completed by UNICEF staff or counterparts		Yes
TOR is clearly defined with tangible, measurable deliverables or an end-product and with payments (contract fee) clearly linked to these		Yes
TOR includes a description of the specific activities and timeframes for completion of the activities		Yes
The TOR includes performance indicators for evaluation of results (e.g., timeliness or quantitative measures)		Yes
SIGNED FOR AGREEMENT		

Reviewed by SPEAR	Reviewed by	Approved by
.....
Chief SPEAR	Supply Manager	Deputy Representative
Date/Time.....	Date/Time.....	Date/Time.....

UNICEF AFGHANISTAN TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR SERVICES – RES

SHORT TITLE OF ASSIGNMENT

Formative evaluation of the Cash Based Assistance Programme in Afghanistan

BACKGROUND

High levels of poverty compounded by the regular exposure to climate related risks such as droughts, and to armed conflict, form the backdrop of normal life for children and women in Afghanistan for the past 20 years. About half of the population lived in poverty. Children are more likely to live in poverty, in 2020 monetary child poverty was 51 percent compared to 42 percent for the +18-age group¹⁸². While multidimensional child poverty was 55 percent compared to 45 percent for the +18-age group in 2020¹⁸³.

Since 2020, UNICEF sought to increase use of cash transfers to provide flexible assistance to vulnerable families with children in the face of rising insecurity, the combined socio-economic impacts of drought and the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, UNICEF implemented a child cash grant programme targeting a total of 2,010 households in Herat province. Households with children working in vulnerable employment situations in Herat received an unconditional unrestricted one-off cash grant in combination with child protection case management support and Covid-19 information sessions. The transfer value was aligned with the income component (US\$55 equivalent paid in local currency) of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) of Afghanistan. A total of 3,718 households were reached with Cash Based Assistance (CBA) in 2020 across UNICEF programmes. During the first half of 2021, UNICEF reached supported about 1,113 households in Kabul, Bamyan, Kapisa, and Maidan Wardak with short term humanitarian cash transfers of (US\$160) paid in two equal tranches. UNICEF provided cash for winter in Herat and Ghor provinces, shifting from in-kind assistance to CBA, reaching 900 households. About 1,165 households planned for short term social cash transfer support in Samangan targeting families with children with disabilities, households with pregnant and lactating women (PLW) and households headed by women were only delivered after August 2021. The various HCT/SCT pilot programmes reached a total of 5,000 households

In response to the emerging humanitarian catastrophe following the regime change and the imminent risk of total economic fallout since August 2021, UNICEF ACO expanded its Humanitarian Cash Transfer (HCT) programmes. Near universal poverty (97%) is projected by mid-2022, with international sanctions taking hold and Official Development Assistance (ODA) dependent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrinking by 40% almost overnight¹⁸⁴. The estimated number of people in need of Humanitarian assistance rose from 18.4 million in 2021 to 24.4 million in 2022, with more than 13 million of those being children.¹⁸⁵ Women and children have

¹⁸² August 2021: OPHI, NSIA and UNICEF, Multidimensional Poverty in Afghanistan

¹⁸³ Ibid

¹⁸⁴ IMF, 2021

¹⁸⁵ Humanitarian Needs Overview: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afghanistan-humanitarian-needs-overview-2022.pdf>

been, and continue to be, disproportionately impacted by the compounded humanitarian needs and are in urgent need of lifesaving support to be able to meet basic food consumption needs, access basic services like health, WASH, and education, in the absence of jobs and income, and without a basic social protection system. Some families are forced to take recourse to tragic coping mechanisms such as selling of their children and marrying off of their young daughters.

Despite regular shocks, market monitoring data show that markets in Afghanistan are resilient and functioning, even during shocks.¹⁸⁶ There is also a growing acceptance and demand for the use of cash as an assistance modality in Afghanistan, making cash – where feasible – a preferred response modality for UNICEF's emergency response, across sectors. Afghanistan is also one of the focus countries for implementation of the UN Common Cash System (CCS), supporting collaborative approaches and ensuring complementarity in HCT response between UNICEF, WFP, and UNHCR. The UN CCS has been operationalized in Afghanistan since 2020, with UN agencies actively collaborating in four broad streams of work, including Information Management, Finance, Supply and Procurement, and programmes. UNICEF is also an active member of the inter-cluster Cash and Voucher Working Group (CVWG). The objective of the CVWG is to ensure Cash Based Assistance (CBA) in Afghanistan is coordinated, follows a common rationale and is context specific. Through the CVWG, lessons learnt are shared frequently with other humanitarian actors to improve the work on CBA.

UNICEF Afghanistan also recently rolled-out its dedicated management information system for HCT in Afghanistan. The Humanitarian Cash and Operations and Programme Ecosystem (HOPE) provides UNICEF with tools to manage large scale cash programmes with improved data protection and security measures for the management of beneficiary data, transparency of targeting approaches, and payment verification assurances to reduce fiduciary risks.

The UNICEF Afghanistan cash transfer scale up

Since August 2021, in response to multiple shocks linked to the political crisis and impending winter, UNICEF ACO initiated the scale-up of short-term multipurpose cash transfer initiatives to help support selected households to meet their routine basic needs. A 2-stage targeting approach was used as the basis for selecting households:

- Geographical targeting based on poverty and vulnerability indicators such as both multidimensional and monetary poverty. A total of 17 provinces¹⁸⁷ out of 34 were preselected on account of high multidimensional and or monetary poverty according to the most recent data available from the 2020 Income, Expenditure & Labour Force Survey (IELFS).
- Categorical targeting of households based on criteria such as displacement, households that have children with disability, households with pregnant or lactating women, households headed by women and so on.

Action	Response ongoing and planned	Targeted number of households	Categorical targeting
CBA with winter top-up	Ongoing: Nuristan, Wardak, Logar (3 rounds)	~65,000 HH (15K Nuristan, 29K Wardak, 20K Logar)	HH with PLW, Households headed by women, households with children with disabilities
CBA – Multi-sectoral	Ongoing: Badghis	~ 36,000 HH	HH with PLW, Households headed by women, households with children with disabilities

¹⁸⁶ WFP's Monthly Price Bulletin and the Cash and Voucher Working Group (CVWG)/REACH Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) provides regular data on market functionality across the country.

¹⁸⁷ Zabul, Badghis, Kandahar, Samangan, Faryab, Laghman, Urozgan, Helmand, Nangahar, Khost, Farah, Nuristan, Wardak, Kunarha, Badakhshan, Jawzjan, and Logar

CBA- Health	Health: cash for institutional delivery in Daikundi province	~ 5,000 HH	Families with pregnant women
CBA- Child Protection	CP responses in various regions (Kabul, Panjsher, etc.)	TBC	
CBA- Social Cash Transfers	Planned: Samangan	~ 25,000 HH	HH with PLW, Households headed by women, households with children with disabilities, and households headed by a PwD

UNICEF established the Afghanistan Project Management Unit (APMU) to manage large scale, high-risk and time sensitive operations to provide predictable, consistent, and efficient operational delivery capacity of agreed programme interventions using standard approaches, including a comprehensive payment system, beneficiary data management system, risk management, and monitoring approaches post August 2021. The delivery of cash transfers in a high-risk conflict environment requires mitigation measures to be in place to ensure that the money reaches the intended beneficiaries. This requires a foundational risk-informed approach covering a determination of feasibility, design of data collection, registration, targeting, payment, safety and security, monitoring mechanism and prevention of resource diversion. The APMU offers a set of common operational services to support the implementation of cash transfer: (1) beneficiary personal data management, (2) payment capacity to vulnerable families, entities (e.g., schools) or specific partners, (3) partnership set-up and management (both Civil Society Organization (CSO) and private sector), (4) Accountability to Affected Populations and Grievances and Response Mechanism (GRM), (5) TPM and facilitation and (6) risk management.

UNICEF is in the process of developing an office wide cash strategy to buttress the scale up of CBA in Afghanistan. The initial thinking points to 5 interlinked components:

1. Provision of regular cash transfers to households on a monthly basis for consumption smoothing over a period of 3 years and to reduce underlying vulnerabilities that forces households to adopt coping strategies that are
2. Emergency cash transfers to support early action and/or to cope with acute needs on a short-term basis to cope with droughts, severe winters and other shocks etc. This support will be provided as a top up to the regular cash transfers and in line with UNICEF's humanitarian mandate, it will be extended to temporarily include new households as and when needed.
3. Complementary services to accompany cash transfers with a view to strengthen needs-based information and knowledge primarily to women and girls, but including information on women's self-care, caring practices and encouraging the use of cash for the fulfilment of children's rights.
4. Gender sensitive processes aimed at encouraging women's mobility by organising cash distributions closer to health facilities and exploring ways of encouraging women to come to distribution sites. In keeping with differential gender norms and practices across provinces a gender analysis will be conducted to refine this approach in all provinces. In general, a common feature of this intervention will be to build on existing or new separate spaces for women to assemble that could serve as a safe space/hub for information seeking and sharing as well as facilitating their access to health services. Additionally, following the principle of 'Do no Harm', all financial service providers/ implementing partners will be trained to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.
5. Evidence generation and learning agenda to systematically capture outcomes for women and children, along with gathering information on effectiveness or otherwise of programme design features, implementation processes and operational mechanisms to serve as the basis for

<p>developing a nascent social protection system in Afghanistan and other similar fragile, conflict and violence (FCV) contexts.</p> <p>It is with this background that UNICEF seeks hire a consultancy firm to conduct the formative evaluation.</p>
PURPOSE
<p>The main purpose of this independent, formative evaluation is to assess and guide UNICEF's expansion of CBA in Afghanistan. The evaluation will fulfil a mainly learning function as it will be used to identify what adjustments are required to effectively bring CBA to scale. The evaluation will systematically capture outcomes for women and children, along with gathering information on effectiveness or otherwise of programme design features, implementation processes and operational mechanisms to serve as the basis for developing a nascent social protection system in Afghanistan and other similar FCV contexts.</p> <p>To this end, UNICEF ACO is the primary audience of this evaluation in its endeavor to elaborate its cash transfer strategy in the short, medium, and long term. As such the timing of the evaluation intends to contribute to the development of the UNICEF office-wide cash strategy and future positioning of cash transfer programmes.</p> <p>The evaluation will also contribute towards knowledge and learning on social protection and cash transfers in Afghanistan for members of the UN Social Protection Working Group, UN Common Cash System and the Afghanistan Cash and Voucher Working Group who implement and support cash transfer programming in Afghanistan</p>
OBJECTIVES
<p>The overarching objective of this evaluation is to assess both programme design and implementation mechanisms and interrogate to what extent the cash transfers have been implemented as intended, programmatic relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, preferences, and satisfaction of intended beneficiaries. More specifically:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forward-looking evaluative analysis to refine the programme design and roll-out in order to make needed adjustments early in the implementation process rather than later • Review partnerships, coordination, and the monitoring system in place for effective delivery of the programme • Draw lessons learned to bring CBA programmes to scale
SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION
<p>The evaluation will encompass all the CBA programmes as designed and implemented in all current and planned areas of operation, including in the provinces of Nuristan, Wardak, Logar, Badghis, Daikundi, Kabul, Panjshir and Samangan. In terms of thematic scope, the evaluation will seek to clarify to what extent the CBA programme implementation is aligned with design, complementarity with other actors operating in the same CBA space, plus progress towards attainment of programme targets across thematic focus areas. Additionally, the programme will seek to identify the root causes of any shortfalls in attainment of targets and suggest remedial action.</p> <p>Given the formative nature of the evaluation, sample selection will follow a purposive strategy whereby at least one CBA intervention that is currently ongoing or recently completed from each of the target</p>

provinces will be considered. Additionally, consideration will be given to coverage of all key programmatic interventions with a cash-based assistance component.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation will seek to answer the following questions, which will further be refined and/or further elaborated at the inception stage.

Relevance: The extent to which the different CBA are suited to the priorities and needs

- To what extent are the activities and outputs of each CBA consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of their objectives?
- To what extent were the design and implementation of the SP schemes sensitive to the needs and realities of different social groups (defined along cultural, ethnic, religious, or any other relevant criteria)? To what extent was the selection of beneficiaries (targeting) for the different schemes consistent with equity considerations?
- Did the design of the programmes being assessed properly account for gender dynamics at the household and community level?

Coherence: How well does the intervention fit?

- To what extent are the different CBA programmes aligned to the overall cash strategy?
- How complementary are CBA programmes with other non-cash based programmatic interventions in the different thematic areas?

Effectiveness: Extent to which the CBA attains their objectives, approach and implementation modalities including:

- To what extent were the different CBA objectives achieved / are likely to be achieved (both in terms of delivering outputs as planned and influencing outcomes as intended)?
- Which approaches and implementation modalities of the different cash transfer schemes are the most and least effective? (Key issues to be reviewed include the eligibility criteria; payment modalities and information processes) In other words selection, implementation, and information dissemination processes)
- To what extent are the different delivery processes for the CBA effective? To answer this question evaluators will review both implementers and beneficiaries' perspective, and considering areas using the different forms of payment
- How effective is the process of information dissemination to beneficiaries through multiple mechanisms in terms of coverage and beneficiary knowledge?
- What have been the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of each of the programmes objectives?
- What are the existing/potential synergies across the programmes that could be useful to improve design and delivery of the programmes?

Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been adopted.

- To what extent are the CBA modalities effective? Where, when and why?
- Where the CBA objectives achieved on time?
- How efficient are delivery processes, considering the time and resources (including human) required at each stage of implementation, and coordination between different actors?

- How efficient is access to the programme in terms of potential private / opportunity costs from the beneficiary perspective, and considering different social groups?

Impact: Positive and negative changes produced by CBA, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended

- Did the program affect/likely to affect intra-household gender relations? If so, in what way or ways?

Sustainability: Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of the CBA are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.

- To what extent can the benefits of a programme or project likely to continue after UNICEF funding ceased?
- What key lessons can be extracted from CBA programmes in terms of resources and capacity requirements at the national and sub-national levels to manage and deliver at scale?
- How could the CBA be scaled up to additional households? If so, what would the resources and structures needed?

METHODOLOGY

Methodology

Based on the objectives of the evaluation, this section indicates a possible approach, methods, and processes for the evaluation.¹⁸⁸ **Methodological rigor will be given significant consideration in the assessment of proposals. Hence bidders are invited to interrogate the approach and methodology proffered in the ToR and improve on it or propose an approach they deem more appropriate. In their proposal, bidder should clear refer to triangulation, sampling plan and methodological limitations and mitigation measures.** Bidders are encouraged to also demonstrate methodological expertise in evaluating initiatives related to social cash transfers.

It is expected that the evaluation will employ both a theory-based and a mixed methods approach, while maintaining a strategic focus. Evidence will be collected through a comprehensive review of background documents and the Results Framework, completed by Key Informant Interviews (including right holders and duty bearers), case studies, online surveys and internet searches.

The evaluation will thus be non-experimental. Whether possible, a comparative and external perspective is to be included to assess the evaluation criteria, identifying potential variations between UNICEF and other organisations in Afghanistan involved in CBA for child rights. Similarly, the evaluation will be utilisation focused, and it will provide continuous and rapid feedback to primary users in the course of the evaluation process.

At minimum, the evaluation will draw on the following methods:

- Desk review of background documents and other relevant data, including review and analysis of secondary quantitative data; a desk review of all key documents including programme strategy, humanitarian programme documents (HPDs), M&E framework, monitoring data and analysis reports, relevant TORs, MOUs, concept notes, country-level policies, agreements, meeting minutes, and so on
- Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with CBA actors (existing and potential). Key informant interviews with programme stakeholders within the UNICEF country office & at field office level, Implementing partner NGOs, UN agencies, extenders, and third-party monitors (TPMs), among others;

¹⁸⁸The proposed methodology is just indicative and based on internal experience in conducting similar evaluations. There will be a need to develop a detailed design, analytical methods and tools during the inception phase based on additional literature review and in consultation with UNICEF Malaysia.

- Case studies of children and adolescents participating in UNICEF's work on CBA;
- Online surveys (using participatory tools such as UNICEF's U-Report); and
- Household surveys.

Potential bidders for this evaluation should develop an evaluation matrix (i.e., design matrix), outlining how to collect and analyse data against each evaluation criteria. This matrix should provide logical and explicit linkages between data sources and data collection and analysis methods. A sampling strategy should also be included in the proposal. The data collected should be disaggregated by age, gender, etc. Final sampling (with associated data, documents and contract details) will be determined in collaboration with UNICEF. Secondary sources of evidence will be provided by UNICEF electronically upon commencement of this evaluation.

Likewise, conventional ethical guidelines are to be followed during the evaluation. Specific reference is made to the **UNEG Norms and Standards and Ethical Guidelines, as well as to the UNICEF's Evaluation Policy, the UNEG Guidance on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation, the UN SWAP Evaluation Performance Indicator¹⁸⁹, and the UNICEF Procedure for Ethical Standards in Research, Evaluation and Data Collection and Analysis and UNICEF's Evaluation Reporting Standards.¹⁹⁰** Good practices not covered therein are also to be followed. Any sensitive issues or concerns should be raised with the Evaluation Manager as soon as they are identified.

QUALIFICATIONS, SPECIALIZED EXPERIENCE AND ADDITIONAL COMPETENCIES REQUIRED

The evaluation team should be composed of one Team Leader and a sufficient number of team members to ensure the successful implementation of the assignment. Team members proposed in any bidding document must be available for the duration of their assigned tasks. The successful firm/ institution should have the following competencies, experience, and qualifications:

Evaluation firm with:

- Excellent analytical and research experience, including a sound knowledge of qualitative and quantitative research methods with strong technical experience in study design.
- Demonstrated experience conducting participatory research and evaluations on CBA related projects/programmes.
- Successful track record conducting evaluations and studies of a similar nature. Review of prior work products will be requested during the selection process.
- Experience working with governments and UN agencies providing support on CBA programmes.
- Excellent written and oral report drafting skills in English.
- Ability to work independently and respond to feedback in a timely and professional manner.
- Experience in a complex and high threat environment.
- Ability to work in partnership with local research firms with access to remote areas of Afghanistan and to supervise field data collection.
- Strong interpersonal, communication and organizational skills.
 - Familiarity with or past experience working with UNICEF and/or other similar UN organizations or development agencies particularly in programmes related to HCTs.
 - At least some team members with fluency in Dari/ Pashto to oversee field data collection.
 - Strong links with a national research/data collection partner institution to implement the fieldwork component of the assignment.

¹⁸⁹ Please refer to: <http://www.unicef.org/evaluation>

¹⁹⁰ https://www.unicef.org/supply/files/ATTACHMENT_IV-UNICEF_Procedure_for_Ethical_Standards.PDF

- Demonstrated experience in engaging with children in an appropriate and ethical manner. Good understanding of human rights, equity and gender-based approaches to programming and evaluation/research.

The Team Leader must be in possession of the following:

- An advanced degree (PhD) in economics, statistics, public policy, evaluation, research methodology, sociology, or other social science related field from an internationally recognized institution.
- At least ten years' experience in leading the design and conduct of evaluations and evaluability assessments of development programmes particularly those related to humanitarian cash transfers.
- Experience conducting research and/or evaluations in emergency/humanitarian contexts, in Afghanistan or similar contexts.
- Demonstrated ability to supervise and quality assure the work of national research partners or subcontractors in a context that is politically and culturally sensitive.
- Prior experience leading research or evaluation teams on assignments for UNICEF or other UN agencies.

Note: The evaluation team proposed is expected to be available for the duration of the assignment and the team leader is expected to undertake at least one in-country mission during the course of the evaluation, preferably during the inception phase. Any changes in the proposed core team subsequent to offer of contract will result in withdrawal of the offer.

PAYMENT SCHEDULE

Payment will be made upon submission and acceptance of the specified deliverables and submission of an invoice according to the following schedule:

Inception phase	20%
Data collection, analysis & draft reporting phase	40%
Final reporting & dissemination phase	40%

In all cases, the contractor may only be paid their fees upon satisfactory completion of services. In such cases where payment of fees is to be made in a lump sum, this may only be payable upon completion of the services to UNICEF's satisfaction and certification to that effect.

Payment and timeframe:

#	Tasks	Duration	Payment	
1	Inception phase		Deliverable	
1.1	Review UNICEF CBA programme interventions and literature, policy documents and guidelines	25 days	Submission of final inception report incl. workplan, QA plan, and data collection tools.	20 %
1.2	Interview relevant UNICEF and CBA stakeholder staff			
1.3	Develop evaluation methods, sampling strategy, quality assurance plan, plus design & pretest data collection tools incl. interview scripts, surveys, checklists, etc.			
1.4	Submit inception report and executive summary.			

1.5	Make presentation to members of evaluation taskforce for feedback			
1.6	Refine and finalize inception report			
2	Data collection, analysis and draft reporting phase			
2.1	Conduct training of field data collection team	35 days	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Translated and electronically programmed data collection tools. - Weekly fieldwork reports & final report of all field visits. - Draft evaluation report with initial findings, datasets and analysis files. - Presentation of findings to ERG using PPT slides. 	40 %
	Translate data collection tools and programme in electronic format where required plus pretesting			
2.2	Conduct field visits in selected sample sites to collect data			
2.3	Submit a summary report of all field visits			
2.4	Conduct data analysis and present preliminary findings to ERG in a draft report and PPT slides			
3	Final reporting and dissemination phase			
3.1	A final evaluation report based on GERO standards incorporating feedback from ERG, plus an evaluation brief with infographics and PPT slides	20 Days	Submission of final evaluation report, 5-page evaluation brief and PPT presentation.	40 %

CONDITIONS OF WORK

Evaluation Management

ACO SPEAR Section will support the consultants in desk research and data collection through provision of required background documents and datasets, plus establishing contacts with relevant stakeholders. The consultant(s) will be required to make at least one trip to Kabul, and UNICEF ACO will provide support in terms of transport to and from the airport, accommodation within one of UNICEF's guesthouse (payable by the consultant), transport to field locations (airfare to be paid by consultant but road transport provided by UNICEF) and other administrative/logistical support where possible. The consultant(s) will, where available, also be provided with office space during their stay in-country.

The evaluation will be managed by the Evaluation Specialist under the overall oversight and guidance of the Chief of the SPEAR Section. SPEAR Section will manage the evaluation process and ensure that it is conducted according to UNICEF Evaluation Policy and UNEG Norms and Standards.

Quality assurance

An Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) comprised of technical focal points from key stakeholders like UNICEF cash programme specialist, CBA focal points from partner UN agencies, the UNICEF regional evaluation team and government partners will provide quality oversight of the deliverables of this assignment. The evaluation team will be accountable to the ERG in respect to how feedback from ERG is taken incorporated in evaluation outputs. The evaluation team will also prepare an audit plan prior to commencing fieldwork specifying the steps in place to verify the accuracy/reliability of data/information gathered.

Ethical principles

All UNICEF evaluations are subject to approval by an Institutional Review Board (IRB), therefore the evaluation team will be required to submit the final version of the inception report and data collection tools for IRB approval before commencing the fieldwork phase. The evaluation team should take into account the process of preparing and submitting documents, plus the timeframe for acquiring IRB approval in their workplan.

Evaluators are required to identify any potential ethical issues and must disclose in writing any past experiences and relationships, including of their families and friends to the object of the evaluation. Evaluators must exercise independent judgment and not be influenced by statements or view of any party. It is vital that the firm:

- Be impartial and produce a comprehensive presentation of strengths and weaknesses of the programme and take due account of the view of stakeholders based on unbiased findings.
- Illustrate evidence on verified findings and lessons learned.
- Exercise honesty, integrity, respect for dignity and diversity.
- Produce evaluation reports based on fair representation of knowledge, vulnerable groups, gender and ethnic groups.

Evaluators are required to receive informed consent from participants before involving them in the data collection process and respect their right to provide information in confidence. The data collection team must inform participants about the scope and limits of confidentiality and ensure that their data/information cannot be accessed by non-authorized persons or traced back to them. It is essential to prepare risk management plans to reduce potential harm to participants and the data collection team before commencing fieldwork. Evaluation/research methods and procedures for obtaining informed consent should be consistent with UNICEF Ethical and Principle Guidelines for the reporting on children and young people under 18 years old. <http://childethics.com>

Confidentiality

Data collected under this assignment will be treated as strictly confidential. The rights of distribution and/or publication will reside solely with UNICEF. Data collected cannot be used for any purpose not related to this assignment. The contracted institution will not retain any data related to this assignment after completion of deliverables; all datasets will be transferred to UNICEF.

Dissemination and advocacy of evaluation findings

UNICEF will assume primary responsibility for the dissemination of evaluation products and the uptake of evaluation findings and recommendations by the country office and implementing partners. The evaluation results should contribute to evidence-based policy making and programming related to UNICEF's child-focused CBA interventions in Afghanistan.

The evaluation team will contribute to the dissemination of evaluation products through:

1. Publishing a full evaluation report based on UNICEF Geros standards.
2. Compiling a 3-5-page summary/brief of the evaluation process, findings, and recommendations with both vivid infographics and brief text.

<p>3. Delivering a PowerPoint presentation to the ERG and key programme stakeholders to share evaluation findings.</p> <p>Operational procedures</p> <p>UNICEF Afghanistan will facilitate accommodation, transport, office space and other logistical support for institutions' international consultants during in-country missions. The contracted institution will be responsible for availing their own computers for the assignment. All travel should be economy class.</p>	
ASSESSMENT OF CONTRACTUAL RISKS AND PLANNED RISK RESPONSES	
Identify the potential risks for the assignment and mitigation mechanisms to be put in place	
Risk	Risk response
Inaccessibility or Insecurity in selected sample sites	Firm should include alternative measures in event of failure to adhere to sampling design during data collection
Inadequate or unreliable secondary information and deficiencies in programme monitoring data	Any deficiencies in secondary information or programme data should be taken into account in re-framing the scope of the evaluation at the inception stage.
Some core team members may drop out after award of contract	The contracted firm should confirm availability of each member of the core evaluation team for the duration of the assignment.

Evaluation Criteria

After opening of proposal each proposal will be assessed on its technical merits and subsequently on its price. The proposal with the best overall composed of technical merit and price will be recommended for award of contract. UNICEF will set up an evaluation panel composed of technical UNICEF staff and their conclusions will be forwarded to the internal UNICEF contract Review Committee. The evaluation panel will first evaluate each response in compliance with the requirements of this RFP. Responses deemed not meet all of the mandatory requirements will be considered non-compliant and rejected at this stage without further consideration. Failure to comply with any of terms and conditions contained in the RFP, including provision of all required information may result in a response or proposal being disqualified from further consideration. The proposal will be evaluation against the followings;

3. TECHNICAL CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION – INSTITUTIONS		
4. TECHNICAL CRITERIA	POINTS TO CONSIDER	Score
5. Overall Response 6.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completeness of response Overall concord between TOR/needs and proposal 	10
7. Company profile & Experience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Company profile with at least 5 years of experience in similar/relevant projects. Valid Registration certificate. Previous contracts with International organizations including UN or other similar international organization in social sectors relevant to assignment. Positive Client references from three clients. 	15

8. Key Personnel 9.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Experience of team leader that will work on this assignment (should include their CV's and detail of relevant experience and qualifications) Composition and experience of proposed staff with similar projects 10.	11. 10 12. 13. 10
14. Proposed Methodology and Approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposed methodology for assignment including sampling strategy Project management, monitoring and quality assurance process 	15
15. Examples of similar work completed in the past	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Examples of similar work completed in the past 	10
16. TOTAL SCORE	17.	18. 70
19. TECHNICAL CRITERIA	20. POINTS TO CONSIDER	21. Score

Proposal (s) scoring 70 % - i.e., 49/70 or more following Proposal Evaluation will be listed and included for review of Analysis and Evaluation on The Financial Offer

Price Proposal

The total amount of points allocated for the price component is [30]. The maximum number of points will be allotted to the lowest price proposal that is opened and compared among those invited firms/institutions which obtain the threshold points in the evaluation of the technical component. All other price proposals will receive points in inverse proportion to the lowest price, e.g.:

Max. Score for price proposal (e.g. 30) * Price of lowest priced proposal

Score for "Price proposal X" = -----

"Price of proposal X"

Total Technical and Price = 100 Pts

Financial Proposal.

Deliverable	Price (USD)
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10% upon completion of inception report with research tools	
40% upon completion of fieldwork and upon submission of cleaned datasets	
50% upon completion of all remaining deliverable	
Total	

- Costs should be fully inclusive of travel + other incidentals.
Note: All flights should be in economy class only.
- All costs should be shown exclusive of VAT. In accordance with the exemption from Tax in article II, section 7 of the convention of the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations, 1946, UNICEF is exempted from all taxes + duties.
- If the successful bidder is a registered company in Afghanistan, in accordance with national legislation, invoices will be paid in AFN.
- All travel & accommodation is the responsibility of the bidder to arrange. UNICEF can assist in booking of local flights for travel within the country.
- Consultants will be expected to stay in UNICEF accommodation at the applicable rates.
- Cost breakdown to be provided in case of personnel deployment.

22. FINANCIAL EVALUATION FORMAT- INSTITUTIONS				
Activity	Resource to be deployed	Number of days to be deployed	Rate	Total

Annex 2. Evaluation matrix

RELEVANCE - ISTHE INTERVENTION DOINGTHE RIGHTTHINGS? ¹⁹¹ <i>The extent to which the different CBA are suited to the priorities and needs</i>		
EQ.1. To what extent are the activities and outputs of each CBA consistent with the overall goal ¹⁹² and attainment of each CBA objectives?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Method level of analysis
<p>Analysis of each CBA design to determine if planned interventions are necessary and sufficient to achieve CBA objectives and if this, in turn, is consistent with the Cash Strategy Goal.</p> <p>Existing alignment of the results with the overall goals.</p> <p>Stakeholders' perceptions of how the activities and outputs reached are in alignment with the overall goal and CBA objectives.</p>	<p>Desk review: UNICEF's cash strategy, CBA proposals, logframe/results frameworks; PDM reports, IP reports, Service level agreements (SLAs), donor reports.</p> <p>KIs: Participants, IPs, UNICEF staff¹⁹³ and any other relevant KI.</p>	<p>Triangulation of desk review information with qualitative data collected by the ET.</p>
EQ.2. To what extent was the design of the CBA programmes sensitive to the needs and realities of different social groups (defined along cultural, ethnic, religious, or any other relevant criteria)?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Method level of analysis
<p>The inclusion of differentiated data on which decisions were based, highlighting different needs of women, men, girls, boys and marginalised groups</p> <p>Perception of service users, IP's and UNICEF staff on the extent to which needs and realities of different social groups have been respected.</p>	<p>Desk review: Design documents, PDM reports, IP reports.</p> <p>KIs: Participants, IPs, UNICEF staff including gender and social protection staff, community leaders as well as any other relevant KI.</p>	<p>Analysis will be done for each type of CBA and then will be summarised by type and by region if it appears that regional context may be a driving factor of relevance.</p>

¹⁹¹ The ET uses the OECD/DAC criteria definition: Better Criteria for Better Evaluation Revised Evaluation Criteria Definitions and Principles for Use OECD/DAC Network on Development Evaluation ; 2019

¹⁹² As per UNICEF's Afghanistan Cash Transfer Programme Strategy, the overall goal is twofold:

To address financial barriers of households to meet the multiple needs of children across the lifecycle and ensure access to basic services in the short as well as the long term; and
To create and leverage opportunities for the empowerment of women and girls.

¹⁹³ UNICEF staff will be disaggregated by field staff, extenders, Kabul staff (different units) and RB.

External stakeholder perception of the extent to which needs and realities of different social groups have been respected.		
EQ.3.To what extent was the selection of participants for the different CBA programmes targeting the most vulnerable people, and how was it consistent with equity ¹⁹⁴ consideration?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	
Analysis of selection and vulnerability criteria. Stakeholders’ perceptions on how vulnerability is considered in CBA programmes vs. at the community level. Stakeholders’ perceptions on how the selection of participants has considered equity.	Desk review: selection protocols, PDM reports, IP reports. KIIs: Participants , IPs, UNICEF staff, community leaders and any other relevant KI. HH interviews & FGDs. ¹⁹⁵	
EQ.4. Did the design of the CBA programmes properly account for gender dynamics at the household and community level?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	
Alignment with UNICEF gender policy Stakeholders’ perceptions on the extent to which gender dynamics have been addressed.	Desk review: UNICEF gender policy, Gender study, other studies from partners KIIs: Participants , IPs, UNICEF staff, community leaders and any other relevant KI. HH interviews & FGDs.	
COHERENCE - HOWWELL DOESTHE INTERVENTION FIT?“The extent to which other interventions (particularly policies) support or undermine the intervention and vice versa.This includes internal coherence and external coherence. Internal coherence addresses the synergies and interlinkages between the intervention and other interventions carried out by the same institution/government, as well as the consistency of the intervention with the relevant international norms and standards to which that institution/government adheres. External coherence considers the consistency of the intervention with		

¹⁹⁴ For UNICEF, equity means that all children have an opportunity to survive, develop and reach their full potential without discrimination, bias or favouritism.

<https://www.unicef.org/eu/equity#:~:text=For%20UNICEF%2C%20equity%20means%20that,without%20discrimination%2C%20bias%20or%20favouritism> (visited on February 12, 2023)

¹⁹⁵ If household interviews are not possible, they will be replaced with phone interviews.

other actors' interventions in the same context. This includes complementarity, harmonisation and co-ordination with others, and the extent to which the intervention is adding value while avoiding duplication of effort." This criterion is connected with relevance and effectiveness and to some extent efficiency.

EQ.5. How well aligned or complimentary are UNICEFs CBAs with other large actors implanting cash programming in Afghanistan?

- How are services provided by this range of stakeholders. Are there gaps or overlaps?
- How well aligned are ACO CBAs to the technical guidance provided by the CVWG?
- Are there ways to improve the effectiveness and relevance of UNICEFs contributions to cash in Afghanistan vis-à-vis other actors?

Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>Strategic analysis of top 4 cash actors in the country and on how-who is doing what and where- is determined.</p> <p>Analysis of UNICEF ACO efficiency and effectiveness and self-reported benchmarking with other actors</p> <p>Perceptions of key stakeholders (internal and external) including of unintended effects</p>	<p>Desk review: CVWG key documents</p> <p>KIIs: CVWG chairs, key donors, IPs, other CBA actors.</p> <p>Previous EM questions analysis and KIIs</p>	<p>Triangulation of desk review information with qualitative data collected by the ET.</p>
<p>EQ.6. How complementary are the CBA programmes with other non-cash based programmatic interventions in the different thematic areas¹⁹⁶? What are the existing/potential synergies across the programmes that could be useful to improve design and delivery of the programmes?</p>		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	
<p>Analysis of the designs of both CBA and programmatic interventions in contributing to the overall programmatic and cash objectives.</p> <p>Assessment of gaps in design.</p> <p>Assessment of unintended effects</p> <p>Review of changes in implementation over time</p>	<p>Desk review: Programme and CBA design documents including results frameworks, monitoring reports assessing if design changed over time and why.</p> <p>KIIs: ACO staff, IPs and participants on areas to improve complimentary, relevance, efficiency and effectiveness.</p>	<p>Analysis will be done for each type of CBA and then will be summarised by type and by region if it appears that regional context may be a driving factor of relevance.</p>

¹⁹⁶ The thematic areas for which UNICEF has been implementing CBA are Child protection, Health, Nutrition and Education

EFFECTIVENESS – THE INTERVENTION ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVES? The extent to which the CBA achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives and its results, including any differential results across groups.		
EQ.7. To what extent were the different CBA objectives achieved / are likely to be achieved (both in terms of delivering outputs as planned and influencing outcomes as intended)?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>Percentage of outputs achieved vs. target disaggregated by gender and any differential groups as identified in the design.</p> <p>Percentage of outcomes achieved vs. target</p> <p>Analysis of designs from previous questions</p> <p>Risk mitigation plans in place aligned to context</p> <p>Perception of likelihood of achieving outcomes</p> <p>Relevance of the design and its influence on effectiveness</p>	<p>Desk review: Program/donor reports for each CBA, monitoring reports for each CBA, baseline/endline/overall M&E plan for each CBA</p> <p>KIIs: IPs, ACO staff</p> <p>HH interviews & FGDs.</p>	<p>Triangulation of key outputs, stakeholder perceptions and secondary data</p> <p>Disaggregation of data by gender and type of KI. This will allow to see the difference of perception of different KIs, including internally to UNICEF (Extenders, field staff, Kabul Staff and Regional Bureau-RB).</p>
EQ.8. Which existing modalities are the most and least effective? ¹⁹⁷		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>Participants' perception on effectiveness of different</p> <p>Analysis of how the national context impacts on certain modality mechanisms.</p>	<p>Desk review: literature on the matter, CBA reports from various actors (WFP, DRC, UNICEF, CRS)</p> <p>KIIs: IPs, ACO staff, MSPs, CVWG</p> <p>HH interviews & FGDs.</p>	

¹⁹⁷ UNICEF ACO is only using a cash in hand modality for all their CBA activities. The evaluation will attempt to look at alternatives to cash in hand that could be used in Afghanistan either now or in the future.

EQ.9.To what extent are the different delivery processes ¹⁹⁸ for the CBA effective?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>Extent to which risk management plans informed actions.</p> <p>Identification positive and negative unintended effects such as innovations, exacerbation of conflict dynamics,</p> <p>Perceptions of participants disaggregated by gender, role in community to the extent possible</p> <p>Perceptions of the extent of effectiveness and key examples of targeted stakeholders.</p> <p>Contribution analysis of the different delivery processes in impacting the achievement of objectives.</p> <p>Analysis of how data collection and participant registration is implemented</p> <p>Extent to with communities and participants are informed of the programmes.</p> <p>Extent to which the grievance mechanism is been used.</p>	<p>KIIs: UNICEF staff, community leaders, IPs, MSPs.</p> <p>HH interviews & FGDs.</p>	
EQ.10. How effective is the process of information dissemination to participants through multiple mechanisms in terms of coverage and participant knowledge?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>Participant knowledge and awareness of key mechanisms.</p>	<p>KIIs: UNICEF staff, community leaders, IPs, MSPs.</p> <p>HH interviews & FGDs.</p>	

¹⁹⁸ The evaluation will evaluate the different delivery processes following four operational stages described in UNICEF's Humanitarian Cash Transfer Field Guidance: i) collecting data and registering beneficiaries; ii) communication; iii) managing payments; and iv) managing feedback and grievances.

Analysis of various methods of dissemination against participant knowledge and awareness		
EQ.11. What have been the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of each CBA's objectives?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>Major areas of analysis may/will include:</p> <p>Analysis of adherence of key processes with SOPs.</p> <p>Review of management and coordination structure at Kabul and field levels. Quality and effectiveness of 2-way community between the different ACO levels.</p> <p>Review of quantity and quality of staff, extenders and implementing partners.</p> <p>Review of the extent of contextualization of interventions to needs in geographic setting</p> <p>Review of active management of risk management plans</p> <p>Review of active management of external partnerships including DfAs.</p> <p>Perceptions of key stakeholders</p>	<p>KIIs: UNICEF staff, community leaders, IPs, MSPs.</p> <p>HH interviews & FGDs.</p>	
EQ.12. To what extent was the implementation of the CBA programmes sensitive to the needs and realities of different social groups (defined along cultural, ethnic, religious, or any other relevant criteria)?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>The extent to which the design was informed by local needs and contexts and remained so over time.</p> <p>Inclusion of differentiated data and modifications during implementation.</p>	<p>Desk review: UNICEF documentation on design of CBAs,</p> <p>KIIs: UNICEF staff (including gender), community leaders, IPs, MSPs.</p>	

Perception of participants	HH interviews & FGDs.	
EQ.13. How effective are the mechanism enabling participants to provide feedback?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>Participant perceptions</p> <p>Analysis of usage data disaggregated by source/instrument, gender and region as possible; analysis of case closure (how issue was resolved); assessment of efficiency of different mechanisms in receiving and resolving complaints.</p>	<p>Desk review: UNICEF documentation on design of CBAs,</p> <p>KIIs: UNICEF staff (including gender), community leaders, IPs, MSPs.</p> <p>HH interviews & FGDs.</p>	
EFFICIENCY – HOW WELL ARE RESOURCES BEING USED? <i>Measures the output (qualitative and quantitative) in relation to outputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been adopted.</i>		
EQ.14. Were the CBA objectives achieved on time?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
Results planned vs. results actual and contributing and confounding factors	<p>Desk review: PDMs, donor reports, Situation reports</p> <p>KIIs: UNICEF staff (including field level), community leaders, IPs, Financial Service Providers (FSPs).</p>	<p>Triangulation of different sources of data (desk review, KIIs, HH interviews, FGDs, and online survey).</p> <p>Disaggregation of data by gender and type of KI. This will allow to see the difference of perception of different KIIs, including internally to UNICEF</p>

		(Extenders, field staff, Kabul Staff and RB).
EQ.15. How efficient are delivery processes, considering the time and resources (including human) required at each stage of implementation, and coordination between different actors?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>Analysis of timeliness and cost effectiveness vis-à-vis various CBA contexts and vis-à-vis achievement (or likelihood of achievement) of outcomes</p> <p>Analysis of how efficiency has changed over time.</p> <p>Assessment of alternatives in delivery mechanisms</p>	<p>Desk review: UNICEF's guideline on cash, PDMs, donor reports.</p> <p>KIIs: UNICEF staff (field level), community leaders, IPs, MSPs.</p>	
EQ.16. To what extent are the CBA modalities¹⁹⁹ efficient? Where, when, why and how much?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>Timeliness: Delivery target planned vs. achieved</p> <p>Influence regarding the area of intervention.</p> <p>Contributing and confounding factors to efficiency</p> <p>Key stakeholder perceptions on efficiency and supporting documentation/examples</p> <p>Cost of implementation²⁰⁰.</p>	<p>Desk review: reports, existing literature on the matter, budgets.</p> <p>KIIs: UNICEF staff (field level, finance), community leaders, IPs, MSPs.</p> <p>HH interviews & FGDs.</p>	
EQ.17. How efficient is access to the programme in terms of potential private / opportunity costs from the participant perspective, and considering different social groups?		

¹⁹⁹ As cash in hand is the only modality used by UNICEF, it will be mostly that modality's efficiency that will be explored, rather than modalities that have not been used by UNICEF. The efficiency of the other modalities will be explored through secondary data collection (KIs having used other modalities).

²⁰⁰ The ET will try and evaluate the cost of CBA programmes. However, calculation will be done depending on the data provided by the UNICEF ACO.

Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>Assessment of PDM data in terms of participant self-reported access and impacts</p> <p>Participant feedback</p> <p>Key stakeholder perceptions</p>	<p>Desk review: existing literature on the matter, PDMs.</p> <p>KIIs: UNICEF staff (field level), community leaders, IPs</p> <p>HH interviews & FGDs.</p>	
IMPACT – WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THE INTERVENTION MAKE? <i>Positive and negative changes produced by CBA, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.</i>		
EQ.18. Did the programme affect/likely to affect intra-household gender relations? If so, in what ways?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
<p>The extent to which the UNICEF's evaluation plans within projects will be able to assess impact.</p> <p>Assessment of design and likelihood of contribution to impact</p> <p>Stakeholder perceptions of impact</p>	<p>Participants, IP, TPM, community leaders, DfA success stories/case studies</p> <p>Desk review: CBA design, reports, existing literature on the matter, PDMs</p> <p>KIIs: UNICEF staff (gender), community leaders, IPs.</p> <p>HH interviews & FGDs.</p>	<p>Triangulation of different sources of data (desk review, KIIs, HH interviews, FGDs, and online survey).</p> <p>Disaggregation of data by gender and type of KI. This will allow to see the difference of perception of different KIs, including internally to UNICEF (Extenders, field staff, Kabul Staff and RB).</p>
SUSTAINABILITY – WILL THE BENEFITS LAST? <i>Are the benefits of the CBA likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn? Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.</i>		
EQ.19. To what extent are the benefits of each CBA likely to continue and / or make a difference after UNICEF funding ceases?		

Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	Analysis
Analysis of benefits (including gender) for each type of CBA. KIs’ perceptions of sustainability	Desk review: CBA designs and implementation modifications, ACO files, monitoring and donor reports KIIs: UNICEF staff (gender, extenders), community leaders. HH interviews & FGDs.	Triangulation of different sources of data (desk review, KIIs, HH interviews, FGDs, and online survey). Disaggregation of data by gender and type of KI. This will allow to see the difference of perception of different KIs, including internally to UNICEF (Extenders, field staff, Kabul Staff and RB).
EQ.20. What key lessons can be extracted from CBA programmes in terms of resources and capacity requirements for UNICEF at the national and sub-national levels to manage and deliver at scale? What would be the resources and structures needed?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	
Financial Human Systems and tools Procedures and policies	Outputs of all previous evaluation questions	
EQ.21. Is the actual model of CBA transferable to a government’s national social policy programme in the future?		
Indicators / Area of analysis	Main sources of information	
KIs’ perceptions on the matter	KIIs: UNICEF staff (SP), community leaders. Outputs of all previous evaluation questions	

Annex 3. Stakeholder Analysis


Stakeholder	Interest in the Evaluation	Role in the Evaluation
UNICEF Internal Stakeholders		
<p>SPEAR and the Shock Responsive Social Protection unit</p> <p>PMU</p> <p>Resource Mobilisation</p> <p>Evaluation Reference Group (ERG)</p>	<p>Responsible for the country-level planning and operations oversight, data management and donor management for all CBA interventions.</p> <p>Responsible for using evaluation results to inform the updated cash strategy.</p> <p>Responsible for leading the scale up of CBA based in part on evaluation findings and recommendations.</p>	<p>Commissioning the evaluation and drafting the ToR.</p> <p>Provision of all relevant data to ET.</p> <p>Participation in interviews.</p> <p>Support the logistics and operationalisation of the evaluation.</p> <p>Support for planning, implementation, and dissemination of the evaluation.</p> <p>Providing guidance to the evaluation team and comments on the deliverables to enhance the quality and accuracy of the evaluation.</p> <p>In charge of developing a management response and implementing the recommendations.</p>
<p>Leadership in Education unit</p> <p>Nutrition unit</p> <p>Child Protection unit</p> <p>Emergency Response unit</p> <p>Gender unit</p> <p>SBC unit</p>	<p>Interested in learning how to improve coherence and impact of programmes to meet programmatic and strategic objectives.</p>	<p>Participating in interviews.</p> <p>Ensuring timely access to relevant unit-level data.</p>

Field-office staff and outposts	<p>Field offices are closest to service delivery and affected populations and are interested to learn how to further contextualise and sustain support to enhance impacts.</p> <p>These actors are also responsible for implementing partner (IP) management and interested to learn how to support enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery.</p>	<p>Advise on methodology and assist in support to data collection teams.</p> <p>Support in mobilising IPs and extenders to access key stakeholders in appropriate settings that are aligned to UNICEF's evaluation principles.</p>
UNICEF Regional Office South Asia (ROSA) Social Policy Unit	<p>Responsible for supporting contextualisation and alignment of global social policy across 8 priority countries in South Asia.</p> <p>Responsible for documenting learning and ensure programmes are working at scale.</p> <p>Interested to see how CBA can support social protection systems and generate evidence base in fragile contexts.</p>	<p>Participating in interviews.</p> <p>Reviewing evaluation products and supporting the take-up of recommendations</p>
External Stakeholders		
National Level		
Cash & Voucher Working Group (CVWG)	<p>Interested to receive lessons learned to help inform all cash actors in part through CVWG guidance.</p> <p>Open to recommendations on ways to enhance or maintain coherence.</p> <p>Interested to see how guidance is applied or further contextualised.</p>	<p>Participation in interviews.</p> <p>Facilitating access to key members.</p> <p>Sharing key documents.</p>

Other UN actors, cash technical groups as subgroups of sector-working groups.	Learning from the evaluation will be directly relevant and applicable to their work.	Participation in interviews.
Donors	Interest in understanding program quality as they provide funding for the programme and collaborate on strategic direction and support with determination of programme priorities.	Participation in interviews.
Third Party Monitors (TPMs)	Responsible for monitoring implementation of the CBA programmes in insecure/inaccessible areas. Findings and recommendations from the evaluation may influence the type of data collected by TPMs and methodology.	Sharing of data (via UNICEF). Participation in interviews.
Former implicated ministries	N/A	Due to the current political situation, ministries will not be interviewed for the evaluation.
Local Level		
Displaced and conflict-affected households	Participants in the programme with experience to share and with an interest in benefitting from future interventions.	Participation in household interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and/or phone interviews.
Other community members (community leaders, community council members)	Have experience and views of the programme and in particular its relevance and effectiveness for current and future situations.	Participation in interviews.

Local NGO and INGO Implementing Partners (IPs)	Have direct experience in oversight and implementation of CBA programmes. Have views of the programme and in particular its relevance and effectiveness for current and future situations.	Participation in interviews and contributing to evidence base. Supporting access to participants, community leaders and assisting in facilitating access to women in women's safe spaces
Extenders	Contracted by a third party, extenders to support UNCEF programmes in various domains of expertise. Extenders are an important source of information as they are directly implicated at field level.	Participation in interviews and online survey.

Annex 4. Map of Cash-Based Assistance in Afghanistan



Source: ET compilation

Annex 5. Complete list of remote interviewees

	Gender	Function	Organisation / Office	Date
1	Man	Chief of sub-office	UNICEF Western Sub-Office	June 19
2	Man	PMU / Data management	UNICEF	June 19
3	Man	Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist	UNICEF	June 20
4	Man	Social Policy officer	UNICEF Eastern Sub-Office	June 20
5	Woman	PMU / Programme Specialist	UNICEF	June 21
6	Woman	PMU officer	UNICEF Central Sub-Office	June 21
7	Woman	Emergency Coordinator	UNICEF	June 21
	Man	Chief of Field Operation		
8	Woman	Chief of Nutrition	UNICEF	June 22
9	Man	PMU / Programme Manager	UNICEF	June 22
10	Man	Chief of sub-office	UNICEF Southern Sub-Office	June 25
11	Man	Social Protection Officer	UNICEF Central Sub-Office	June 26
12	Woman	PMU Officer	UNICEF Northern Sub-Office	June 26
13	Man	PMU Deputy Team Lead	UNICEF	June 27
14	Woman	Team Lead	BHA	June 28
	Man	DART response		
	Man	DART response on TDY		
15	Woman	Chief of Central Sub-Office	UNICEF	July 6
16	Woman	Chief of Northern Sub-Office	UNICEF	July 7
17	Man	Chief of Eastern Sub-Office	UNICEF	July 11

18	Man	Operations and Market Development Manager- Mobile Money	Afghan Besim Mobile Money Company	July 11
19	Man	Social Policy Specialist	UNICEF	July 13
20	Woman	SBC Specialist	UNICEF	July 13
21	Woman	Child Protection Chief	UNICEF	July 15
22	Man	Manager	Need formal name of MSP company (logistics and supply)	July 15
	Man	Manager		
24	Man	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA	July 16
25	Man	Food Security Specialist/Agricultural Economist	FAO	July 16
26	Man	Chief of SPEAR	UNICEF	July 20
27	Man	Policy Analyst	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)	July 20
	Man	Humanitarian Advisor		
	Woman	Humanitarian Advisor		
28	Woman	Gender Specialist	UNICEF	July 22
29	Man	Social Policy Specialist	UNICEF	July 24
30	Woman	Social Protection	World Bank	August 7
	Man	Social Protection Specialist		
31	Man	Finance	UNICEF	August 8
32	Man	Country director	AACS consulting	August 30
	Man	Programme manager		
33	Man	Programme manager	ATR consulting	September 14
34	Woman	Deputy representative	UNICEF	October 2 (to come)

Annex 6. ATR data collection report



Cash-based Assessment

Challenges & Mitigation Report

Submitted by
Assess Transform Reach Consulting (ATR)
September 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Training, Data Collection & Challenges	105
Training of Field Researchers.....	105
Data Collection	106
Challenges and Mitigation	109
Daikundi	109
Samangan.....	110
Kabul	110
Khost	110
Paktika	110
Badghis.....	110
Wardak.....	111
Badakhshan.....	111
Zabul.....	111

INTRODUCTION

This report describes the project overview, training of field researchers, data collection and challenges and mitigation.

Following the training of field researchers scheduled and conducted in July 2023, data collection was delayed for approximately one and a half months due to the delayed issuance of authorization/access letters from UNICEF. After receiving the authorization letters, ATR proceeded with a two-day online refresher training for field researchers. Subsequently, data collection efforts commenced promptly in the provinces for which the authorization letters had been received from DfAs.

The field data collection commenced on August 12, 2023, and successfully ended on September 1, 2023, in accordance with the pre-established timeline. However, ATR encountered outstanding limitations in the Daikundi and Samangan provinces in processing the authorization letters, consequently resulting in a decision not to collect any data in these two provinces.

Training, Data Collection & Challenges

Training of Field Researchers

The first round of training was conducted over six days in June 2023 for field researchers from all nine target provinces. The initial training round commenced on June 6, 2023, and ended on June 11, 2023. The participants were well-trained in the planned schedule on the project overview and objectives, thematic areas of the data collection tool, and how to define the data collection approach. To have more effective training, the training sessions were divided into two classes based on field researchers preferred local languages: one Pashto class and one Dari class. This comprehensive training thoroughly explained all aspects of qualitative and quantitative data collection.

Upon completing the first round of training, the teams were deployed to their respective provinces, and obtaining authorization letters from UNICEF commenced. This process took one and a half months, and ATR received the last letter from UNICEF on August 6, 2023, causing a significant delay in the data collection. Consequently, conducting refresher training for the field researchers became imperative. ATR scheduled a two-day online refresher training, focusing on revisiting the critical points covered during the initial training round. Moreover, some major discussion points are listed below, covered during the two training rounds.

TABLE 1: TOPICS COVERED IN THE TWO ROUNDS OF TRAINING

Quant Topics	Qual Topics
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Introduction and layout of the project2. Tool 1: Household Survey3. Explanation of technical terminologies of Tool 14. Introducing the questionnaire and its parts5. Review of questions in the tool6. Picking attendee questions7. Tool explanation in SurveyCTO8. Practice with recording of data using SurveyCTO9. Usage of SurveyCTO, practice session	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Tool 2: Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with community members2. Tool 2 explanation in SurveyCTO3. Practice with recording of data using SurveyCTO4. Explanation of technical terminologies used in the tool5. Practice session6. Troubleshooting technical issues if they exist7. Picking attendees' questions (Questions and Answers Session)8. Tool 3: Key Informant Interview (KII)- with community leaders9. Tool explanation in SurveyCTO10. Practice with recording of data using SurveyCTO11. Tool 4: KII with UNICEF extenders12. Tool 5: KII with Implementing partners13. Introducing the questionnaire and its parts in the SurveyCTO14. Explanation of technical terminologies in the tool15. Troubleshooting technical issues if they exist16. Tool 6: KII with Money Service Provider (MSPs)17. Tool explanation in SurveyCTO18. Practice with recording of data using SurveyCTO19. Brief Review of all tools20. Practice of Word tools in the SurveyCTO21. Picking attendees' questions (Questions & answers session)

Data Collection

Data collection commenced on August 12, 2023, in Paktika. On August 13, 2023, data collection started in all other provinces except Daikundi and Samangan, where field researchers could not process the authorization letter. At ATR, preparations for data collection were finalized, and field teams in both provinces were on standby, awaiting the green light to commence data collection. Ultimately, ATR collected 868 household surveys from three provinces (Badghis, Khost, Paktika). Following a thorough quality assessment, 790 surveys were initially approved; 36 of them were rejected by the quality assurance team because they either had GPS issues or did not meet eligibility criteria in the specified clusters outlined in the sample.²⁰¹ The data collection concluded on September 1, 2023.

Additionally, field researchers encountered various challenges while conducting data collection in Badghis province, known for its challenging geographical terrain. Despite visiting all of its districts to reach the target of 400 surveys in Badghis, field researchers could only conduct 390 surveys. This gap was attributed to the inaccessibility of specific clusters. To compensate, ATR endeavoured to meet the remaining targets by collecting data in other clusters. After data cleaning and verification, 354 surveys were approved, and 36 others were identified as irrelevant or rejected: 20 with untraceable beneficiaries in their respective clusters and 16 rejected for quality assurance reasons.

The following table summarizes quantitative (Men and women) data collected (Household Surveys).

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTED

Province	Target	Conducted	Men	Women	Approved	Not found/not eligible	Rejected
Khost	200	237	226 (95.4%)	11 (4.6%)	225	1	11
Paktika	200	241	230 (95.4%)	11 (4.6%)	211	15	15
Badghis	400	390	263 (67.4%)	127 (32.6%)	354	20	16
Total	800	868	719 (82.8%)	149 (17.2%)	790	36	42

Final surveys collected per district are provided in Table 3 below.

TABLE 3 HH SURVEY SAMPLING PER DISTRICT

Province	District	Frequency	Percent
Badghis	Ab kamari	8	2.4
	Ab Kamari	112	33.3
	Bala Murghab	52	15.5
	Ghormach	31	9.2
	Jawand	6	1.8

²⁰¹ Data was subsequently quality assured by the core ET (see Annex 5).

	Qadis	90	26.8
	Qala-e-Naw	37	11.0
	Total	336	100.0
Khost	Spera	225	100.0
Paktika	Barmal	33	15.7
	Giyani	16	7.6
	Gomal	80	38.1
	Sharan	81	38.6
	Total	210	100.0

In addition to the quantitative data collected, the following number of qualitative interviews (FGDs and KIIs) were collected. None of the planned FGDs with women were completed.

TABLE 4 SUMMARY OF KIIs AND FGDs PLANNED VS. REACHED

Province	Planned KIIs	Conducted KIIs	Percentage Conducted	Planned FGDs-Men	Conducted FGDs- Men	Percentage Conducted
Badakhshan	4	4	100%	2	2	100%
Badghis	9	9	100%	4	4	100%
Daikundi	6	4	67%	2	0	0%
Kabul	7	5	71%	0	0	0%
Khost	7	5	71%	3	3	100%
Paktika	4	3	75%	2	2	100%
Samangan	4	0	0%	1	0	0%
Wardak	3	3	100%	2	2	100%
Zabul	4	4	100%	1	1	100%
Total	48	37	77%	17	14	82%

Due to restrictions, planned FGDs with women were converted to individual interviews as detailed in Table 5 below.

TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF FGDs CONVERTED TO KIIs WITH WOMEN: (PLANNED VS. REACHED)

Province	Women FGDs converted to in depth interviews (IDIs)-4 IDIs per planned FGD	Conducted IDIs	Percentage Conducted
Badakhshan	8	8	100%
Badghis	16	16	100%
Daikundi	8	0	0%
Kabul	0	0	0%

Khost	12	0	0%
Paktika	8	8	100%
Samangan	1	0	0%
Wardak	8	8	100%
Zabul	4	4	100%
Total	65	44	68%

District-level sampling data is provided in Table 6 below.

TABLE 6 QUALITATIVE SAMPLING PER DISTRICT

Province	District	KII with community representative	Extender	IP	MSP	FGD/IDI with Participants	Total
Badakshan	Baharak	1				2	3
	Fayzabad	1		2		2	5
Badghis	Ab Kamari	3				8	11
	Qala e Naw	1	2	3			6
Daikundi	Nili		2	2			4
Kabul	Deh Sabz					1	1
	Kabul		1		6	1	2
	Kalakan					1	1
	Paghman					3	3
Khost	Khost		1				1
	Spera	4				3	7
Paktika	Sharan	2	1			4	7
Wardak	Day Mirdad	1				3	4
	Maydan Shahr			1			1
	Nerkh	1				1	2
Zabul	Qalat	1	1	1		2	5

	Shinkay	1					1
Total		16	8	11	6	31	72

Challenges and Mitigation

A summary of challenges, limitations and mitigation during field data collection is provided in the table below.

TABLE 7: CHALLENGES, LIMITATIONS AND MITIGATIONS

Province	Issue Type	Issue related to	Result
Daikundi	Authorization Letter	DfA Governor Office	Data Collection Cancelled
Samangan	Authorization Letter	DfA Director Eco	Data Collection Cancelled
Khost	Women participants unavailable	Sample Issue	3 Women FGDs were not conducted
Paktika	Women FGDs	Cultural Issues	Collected through Phone Calls
Badghis	Geographical Issues/Inaccessible	Nature of Sample	8 Clusters removed from sampling frame
Wardak	Women FGDs	Cultural Issues	Collected through Phone Calls
Badakhshan	Women FGDs	Cultural Issues	Collected through Phone Calls
Zabul	Women FGDs	Cultural Issues	Collected through Phone Calls
Kabul	Refusal From Interviews	Extender, Beneficiary	2 KIs were not conducted

Daikundi

Upon receiving the authorization letter from UNICEF on July 27, 2023 the ATR provincial team was instructed to process the letter and obtain access permission from local DfAs in Daikundi. Simultaneously, ATR requested the UNICEF focal point's support in processing the authorization letter in Daikundi—this collaborative approach aimed to facilitate the field researchers' access to the fieldwork.

Unfortunately, despite continued efforts spanning two weeks, the DfA in Daikundi declined to issue the required authorization letter. In light of these circumstances, ATR enlisted the support of Konterra to resolve the issue. Konterra subsequently escalated the matter to UNICEF, seeking the involvement of a high-level officials to engage with the governor's office in pursuit of the authorization letter. Unfortunately, despite these efforts, no assistance or cooperation was extended, prompting the cancellation of data collection activities in Daikundi following approval from Konterra.

Cash-based Assessment

Essential information, such as the beneficiaries' fathers' names, complete addresses, and contact numbers, was unavailable within the database provided by UNICEF. This absence of critical data would have posed significant challenges in locating intended beneficiaries had data collection been allowed to proceed.

Samangan

Similar to the challenge faced in Daikundi, ATR was unable to obtain the authorization letter from the relevant DfAs in Samangan despite persistent efforts by the field team. Over the course of a week, the ATR team made diligent attempts while engaging with the Governor's office. As with Daikundi, primary data collection was cancelled in Samangan.

Kabul

ATR only had qualitative data collection in Kabul: a total of seven KIIs, among which we could successfully conduct five KIIs, whereas the remaining two beneficiaries refused to be interviewed.

Khost

ATR had initially planned six FGDs, comprising three with men and three with women participants. Unfortunately, the field team encountered a challenge with the women participants in Khost Spera district, where they had identified only 11 women participants across four different villages in the sample. The target required a minimum of 24 women participants for the FGDs. When field researchers attempted to contact these 11 women participants from the sample, many of their phone numbers were switched off, some were unresponsive to calls, and two were not residing in Khost Province.

Konterra and ATR jointly decided to adapt the approach to transform the Women FGDs into KIIs conducted via phone call surveys. However, eventually no women were included in the KII sample as there were a shortage of eligible women participants in the sample.

Paktika

Scattered samples in all district villages caused high costs and more working days in collecting data from beneficiaries by visiting four different districts.

Field researchers could not conduct the FGDs with women participants due to cultural sensitivity and security issues. Instead, interviews were conducted through phone surveys (One FGD was split into four KIIs).

Badghis

ATR field researchers could not conduct FGDs with women participants due to cultural sensitivities and insecurity. Instead, they conducted phone interviews, breaking down one FGD into four KIIs.

Regarding the quantitative data, field researchers encountered significant challenges in Badghis province. ATR provincial teams visited all districts of Badghis; however, many of these areas presented geographical obstacles and had poorly maintained roads. Eight clusters were removed from the sampling frame due to transportation limitations. Reaching these inaccessible clusters would have

Cash-based Assessment

required motorcycles or horses, whereas half of the field team members were women and could not travel by motorbikes or horses.

As a result, ATR focused on collecting additional data from accessible clusters. Field researchers successfully conducted 390 household surveys in Badghis, from which the quality assurance team rejected 16 surveys and 20 beneficiaries were not found or were not eligible.

Wardak

ATR field researchers could not conduct FGDs with women participants due to cultural sensitivities and insecurity. Eight phone interviews were conducted instead of two Women FGDs, splitting one FGD into 4 KIIs.

Badakhshan

ATR field researchers could not conduct FGDs with women participants due to cultural sensitivities and insecurity. Eight phone interviews were conducted instead of two Women FGDs, splitting one FGD into 4 KIIs.

Zabul

ATR field researchers could not conduct FGDs with women participants due to cultural sensitivities and insecurity. Four phone interviews were conducted instead of one Women FGD, splitting one FGD into 4 KIIs.

UNICEF survey data analyses

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Data cleaning notes	115
Survey analyses	116
Demographic data	116
Cash support.....	118
Selection Criteria and access.....	127
Accountability: Community Feedback and Response Mechanism	129
Barriers	132
Feedback over the assistance received.....	136
Recommendations.....	137

TABLE OF TABLES

Table 1: Provinces disaggregated by districts	116
Table 2: Number of participants by programmatic approach.....	117
Table 3: Demographic data of participants.....	117
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the household.....	118
Table 5: Cash programming	118
Table 6: Cash programming disaggregated by gender and province	119
Table 7: Explanations on how to use cash disaggregated by gender and province	120
Table 8: Who benefited most of the money in the household disaggregated by gender and province.....	121
Table 9: Who benefited less from the money in the household disaggregated by gender and province	122
Table 10: Decision on how to spend the support	122
Table 11: Decision on how to spend the support disaggregated by gender and province	123
Table 12: How much does the money you received from UNICEF represent disaggregated by province	124

Table 13: Community consultation over the selection for cash programming	125
Table 14: Community consultation over the selection for cash programming disaggregated by gender and province	125
Table 15: Who did you get this information from disaggregated by gender and location	126
Table 16: The criteria of the selection for being part of the cash program disaggregated by gender and province	127
Table 17: Fairness of the selection criteria disaggregated by gender and province	128
Table 18: Did both men and women have equal access to the distribution site disaggregated by gender and province	129
Table 19: Actual use of the complaint mechanism	130
Table 20: Actual use of the complaint mechanism disaggregated by gender and province	131
Table 21: Use of the complaint and response mechanisms in case of a complaint.....	131
Table 22: Use of the complaint and response mechanisms in case of a complaint disaggregated by gender and province	132
Table 23: What are the most pressing needs in your community for children disaggregated by gender and province	133
Table 24: The most pressing needs of women and girls in this community disaggregated by gender and province	134
Table 25: The most pressing needs of men and boys in this community disaggregated by gender and province	135
Table 26: Did you receive any other services/ messaging/ sensitization disaggregated by gender and province	136

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Province's part of the sample (N = 771).....	116
Figure 2: UNICEF/IP provided explanations on how to spend the cash	119
Figure 3: Explanations on how to use cash	120
Figure 4: Who benefited most of the money in the household	121
Figure 5: Who benefited less from the money in the household	122
Figure 6: How much does the money you received from UNICEF represent (N = 769)	124
Figure 7: How much does the money you received from UNICEF represent disaggregated by gender (Badghis only).....	125
Figure 8: Who did you get information about selection from (N = 624)	126
Figure 9: The criteria of the selection for being part of the cash program (N = 624)	127
Figure 10: Fairness of the selection criteria (N = 29)	128
Figure 11: Did both men and women have equal access to the distribution site?	129

Figure 12: Information on the existence of the complaint mechanism	130
Figure 13: The most pressing needs in your community for children.....	133
Figure 14: The most pressing needs of women and girls in this community	134
Figure 15: The most pressing needs of men and boys in this community	135
Figure 16: Any other services/ messaging/ sensitization	136

Data cleaning notes


1. Data cleaning was an important step to ensure the quality of the analyses. The process involved checking of timestamps of the questionnaire's calculation the average time of the completion of the survey, the participant's involvement in the interventions, and logical checks of questions to identify and correct inconsistencies or outliers.
310. Before the cleaning process, ATR submitted 826 surveys, from which some were removed following data quality assurance protocols:
- 27 surveys where the HH was not located;
 - 20 surveys where there was no one with information to conduct the survey (*I feel that there is no one in this household who meets the criteria*) and
 - 8 surveys where participants confirmed that did not receive any assistance during the last 18 months from UNICEF.
311. The final sample consists of 771 surveys. The cleaned dataset was then transferred to SPSS to be processed with quantitative data analyses. Qualitative analysis of open-ended questions used a thematic approach to identify the main themes for each question. All data has been disaggregated by gender and province.
312. There was low representation of women in quantitative data collection, particularly in Khost and Paktika (84% of sampled women are from Badghis). Gender disaggregated data potentially obscures differences between women in Badghis compared to Khost and Paktika.

Survey analyses

Demographic data

313. Three provinces were part of the survey process, 336 participants from Badghis, 225 from Khost, and 210 from Paktika.

FIGURE 1: PROVINCE'S PART OF THE SAMPLE (N = 771)



314. Table 1 presents the number of participants for each province and their districts. In Khost all the participants are in Spera district, in Paktika are in four districts and seven districts in Badghis, with Ab Kamari having the larger sample (N = 112).

TABLE 1: PROVINCES DISAGGREGATED BY DISTRICTS

		N	%
Badghis	Ab kamari	8	2.4
	Ab Kamari	112	33.3
	Bala Murghab	52	15.5
	Ghormach	31	9.2
	Jawand	6	1.8
	Qadis	90	26.8
	Qala-e-Naw	37	11.0
	<i>Total</i>	<i>336</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Khost	Spera	225	100.0
Paktika	Barmal	33	15.7
	Giyan	16	7.6
	Gomal	80	38.1
	Sharan	81	38.6
	<i>Total</i>	<i>210</i>	<i>100.0</i>

315. Respondents in Badghis and Paktika received multipurpose cash programming (70.8%); humanitarian cash transfer (earthquake response) programming was included through participants in Khost.

TABLE 2: NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS BY PROGRAMMATIC APPROACH

<i>Programming</i>		N	%
	Earthquake	225	29.2
	MPC	546	70.8
	<i>Total</i>	<i>771</i>	<i>100.0</i>
<i>Province</i>			
Badghis	MPC	336	100.0
Khost	Earthquake	225	100.0
Paktika	MPC	210	100.0

316. Table 3 presents demographic information on the participants in the survey. In terms of gender distribution, the majority are men (83.3%, N = 642), while women constitute only 16.7% (129 participants). Nearly all women sampled were from Badghis province; very few women were sampled from Khost (n=9) or Paktika (n=11). The mean age of participants in the study is 36.13, with a range of 14 to 100 years old. Most participants are unemployed (77%). Employed participants make up 16.6% (N = 128), and other categories represent a minor proportion. As for education, a substantial proportion (76.8%, 592 participants) reported having no education.

TABLE 3: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA OF PARTICIPANTS

Gender		N	%
	Women	129	16.7
	Men	642	83.3
	<i>Total</i>	<i>771</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Occupation			
	Disabled	9	1.2
	Employed	128	16.6
	Government employee	19	2.5
	Student	21	2.7
	Unemployed	594	77.0
	<i>Total</i>	<i>771</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Education			
	Islamic school or madrasa (Grade 1-14)	32	4.2
	Lower secondary (Grade 7-9)	24	3.1
	No education	592	76.8
	Primary (Grade 0-6)	64	8.3
	Teacher college (Grade 13-14)	5	0.6
	Technical college (Grade 13-14)	3	0.4
	University (Grade 13-16)	15	1.9
	Upper secondary (Grade 10-12)	36	4.7
	<i>Total</i>	<i>771</i>	<i>100.0</i>

317. The household size ranges between 2 and 47 people, and the total number of household members for the 771 participants is 9834 people. During the time of cash distribution, the number of pregnant women in the household varied from 0 to 4 and the number of children under 2 varied from 0 to 8.

318. The data suggests households are generally large, with a notable proportion of young and potentially vulnerable individuals such as pregnant women and disabled children.

TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE HOUSEHOLD

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean	Standard Deviation (SD)
Age	771	86	14	100		36.13	14.25
People Live in HH	771	45	2	47	9834	12.75	7.01
Pregnant women in HH in Time of Cash Distribution	771	4	0	4	838	1.09	0.93
Children under 2 in HH in Time of Cash Distribution	771	8	0	8	1522	1.97	1.55
Disabled Children in HH	771	6	0	6	301	0.39	0.72
Women and girls in HH	771	18	1	19	4529	5.87	3.24
Children under 18 in HH	771	25	0	25	3578	4.64	2.88

Cash support

319. The data in Table 5 focuses on receipt of cash programming. Out of a total of 771 participants, 99.7% confirmed they received cash support. When asked if they knew in advance how many months they would receive money, 88% said "No". In addition to that, 89% of participants were unaware of the exact amount they would receive each month. Regarding the timely and accurate receipt of the expected amount, 83.2% confirmed they received the correct amount on time, while 16.8% did not.

TABLE 5: CASH PROGRAMMING

Received Cash Support	N	%
No	2	0.3
Yes	769	99.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>771</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Did you know in advance for how many months you were supposed to receive money?		
No	677	88.0
Yes	92	12.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>769</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Did you know in advance the amount you would receive per month?		
No	682	88.7
Yes	87	11.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>769</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Did you receive the correct amount, on time as you expected?		
No	129	16.8
Yes	640	83.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>769</i>	<i>100.0</i>

320. Table 6 provides a gender and province disaggregation of cash support for Badghis and Paktika. A higher proportion of women were informed concerning the duration of assistance (9.2% compared

to men at 4.7%) and the amount to be received (7.5% compared to 4.2% of men). , but no notable differences were observed over the information on the amount of cash support. However, these values are extremely low, as the majority of the participants did not have the knowledge in advance. By province, there are not observed any significant differences between Badghis and Paktika.


321. Regarding timely and accurate receipt, women reported receiving the correct amount (88%), closely matching the proportion of men (88%). Province-wise, Paktika had the highest rate of participants reporting receiving the exact amount at 93%.

TABLE 6: CASH PROGRAMMING DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

	Gender				Province			
	Women		Men		Badghis		Paktika	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Cash Support	120	100.0%	426	100.0%	336	100.0%	210	100.0%
Did you know in advance for how many months you were supposed to receive money?	11	9.2%	20	4.7%	25	7.4%	6	2.9%
Did you know in advance the amount you would receive per month?	9	7.5%	18	4.2%	23	6.8%	4	1.9%
Did you receive the correct amount, on time as you expected?	106	88.3%	373	87.6%	284	84.5%	195	92.9%


322. Fifty-four per cent of participants (N = 356) reported that they were provided with information on how they should spend the cash.

FIGURE 2: UNICEF/IP PROVIDED EXPLANATIONS ON HOW TO SPEND THE CASH



323. Among those that had received an explanation, most reported that cash had been explained as to be used for nutrition for children (88%) and/or healthcare for PLWs (84%). This question was included in the assessment to assess the effectiveness of information dissemination and contribution to program effectiveness. However, as design documents are not detailed on these objectives for the Cash+ child protection programming, the question was of limited utility in analysis. Figure 3 presents the explanations received by the number of participants that mentioned them.

FIGURE 3: EXPLANATIONS ON HOW TO USE CASH




324. Table 7 presents the instruction given on how to use cash, disaggregated by gender and province. Women and men reported different explanations, as would be expected given that nearly all women sampled were from Badghis, where participants received only one programme, versus men sampled from a mix of HCT and MPC participants. In Khost, respondents were most likely to report that cash should be used to recover from a natural disaster or that there was no specific use for cash. This is expected given the HCT programming in Khost compared to MPC which would have been expected to have broader child protection connections in Badghis and Paktika. However, ET assessment of effectiveness of communication mechanisms in Badghis and Paktika is not possible given ambiguity in design documentation (see EQ1 on Relevance).

TABLE 7: EXPLANATIONS ON HOW TO USE CASH DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

	Gender				Province					
	Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Clothes/items for children	21	38.2%	40	13.3%	26	17.1%	15	8.9%	20	57.1%
2. Education	16	29.1%	41	13.6%	26	17.1%	5	3.0%	26	74.3%
3. Healthcare for PLWs	16	29.1%	68	22.6%	54	35.5%	27	16.0%	3	8.6%
4. Healthcare for children	2	3.6%	48	15.9%	20	13.2%	24	14.2%	6	17.1%
5. Nutrition for children	11	20.0%	77	25.6%	60	39.5%	18	10.7%	10	28.6%
6. Face winter	9	16.4%	34	11.3%	18	11.8%	20	11.8%	5	14.3%
7. Help to recover from natural disaster	1	1.8%	50	16.6%	3	2.0%	48	28.4%	0	0.0%
8. Cash could be spent as wanted	14	25.5%	45	15.0%	16	10.5%	40	23.7%	3	8.6%

325. Most of the participants reported that everyone in the household benefited from the money equally. Of those that specified particular populations in the household benefitting more, children (in general) were the most likely to benefit.

FIGURE 4: WHO BENEFITED MOST OF THE MONEY IN THE HOUSEHOLD




326. Table 8 examines who in the household benefited most from the cash support, by gender and province. As with questions concerning explanation of cash usage (see Table 7 above), women and men reported different explanations, as would be expected given that nearly all women sampled were from Badghis, where participants received only one programme, versus men sampled from a mix of HCT and MPC participants. It is somewhat surprising that participants in Paktika and Badghis were most likely to report that everyone in the household benefitted equally from assistance given the categorization of these programmes as 'child protection' (which would conceivably be expected to benefit children most).

TABLE 8: WHO BENEFITED MOST OF THE MONEY IN THE HOUSEHOLD DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

	Gender				Province					
	Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Men	13	10.2%	88	13.7%	17	5.1%	56	25.1%	28	13.3%
2. Women	14	10.9%	90	14.0%	36	10.7%	49	22.0%	19	9.0%
3. Boys	3	2.3%	11	1.7%	6	1.8%	2	0.9%	6	2.9%
4. Girls	3	2.3%	10	1.6%	6	1.8%	3	1.3%	4	1.9%
5. Children (in general)	10	7.8%	99	15.4%	50	14.9%	42	18.8%	17	8.1%
6. Disabled/ill people	1	0.8%	21	3.3%	2	0.6%	6	2.7%	14	6.7%
7. Everyone equally (household needs)	89	69.5%	354	55.2%	234	69.6%	81	36.3%	128	61.0%

327. Participants reported that men benefited the least from the money in the household.

FIGURE 5: WHO BENEFITED LESS FROM THE MONEY IN THE HOUSEHOLD



328. Table 9 details who benefited least from the cash support, by gender and province. In terms of men benefiting the least, Badghis province led at 68.6%, and Paktika had the highest rate at 36.6% for women benefiting the least.

TABLE 9: WHO BENEFITED LESS FROM THE MONEY IN THE HOUSEHOLD DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

	Gender				Province					
	Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Men	15	38.5%	145	50.5%	70	68.6%	69	48.6%	21	25.6%
2. Women	10	25.6%	60	20.9%	21	20.6%	19	13.4%	30	36.6%
3. Boys	8	20.5%	39	13.6%	9	8.8%	25	17.6%	13	15.9%
4. Girls	3	7.7%	15	5.2%	3	2.9%	6	4.2%	9	11.0%
5. Children (in general)	1	2.6%	30	10.5%	8	7.8%	19	13.4%	4	4.9%
6. Disabled/ill people	0	0.0%	4	1.4%	0	0.0%	3	2.1%	1	1.2%
7. Everyone equally (household needs)	5	12.8%	17	5.9%	5	4.9%	6	4.2%	11	13.4%

329. Table 10 explores who decided how to spend the money provided by UNICEF. A significant majority, 75%, reported that men made the decision, while only 9% indicated women made the choice. Regarding whether the decision-making differed from spending from other sources, 57% answered 'Yes' and 38% said 'No'.

TABLE 10: DECISION ON HOW TO SPEND THE SUPPORT

Who decided how the money from UNICEF to be spent?	N	%
Men	578	75.2
Women	69	9.0
Both men and women	121	15.7
Community members outside the household	1	0.1
<i>Total</i>	<i>769</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Does this differ from how decisions on money from other source is spent/would be spent?		

Yes	439	57.1
No	298	38.8
Do not Know	32	4.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>769</i>	<i>100.0</i>

330. When data is disaggregated by Province, the majority of respondents say that men make the decision. However, in Khost, a notable proportion (30%) said that men and women make the decision together. Women were more likely to report that women made the decision for how money was spent (33%) compared to men who were most likely to report that men made the decision (79%).


331. When comparing this to how decisions on money from other sources would be spent, 90% of respondents in Paktika said 'Yes'. In Khost, it was 68.2%, and in Badghis, 29.2%. Women were less likely to see a difference on how the cash would be spent, 21.1% reported that decisions were made differently compared to 64.3% of men.

TABLE 11: DECISION ON HOW TO SPEND THE SUPPORT DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

		Gender				Province					
		Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Who decided how the money from UNICEF to be spent?	Men	72	56.3%	506	78.9%	270	80.4%	144	64.6%	164	78.1%
	Women	42	32.8%	27	4.2%	42	12.5%	13	5.8%	14	6.7%
	Both men and women	14	10.9%	107	16.7%	24	7.1%	66	29.6%	31	14.8%
	Community members outside the household	0	0.0%	1	0.2%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.5%
Does this differ from how decisions on money from other source is spent/would be spent?	Yes	27	21.1%	412	64.3%	98	29.2%	152	68.2%	189	90.0%
	No	71	55.5%	227	35.4%	209	62.2%	68	30.5%	21	10.0%
	Do not Know	30	23.4%	2	0.3%	29	8.6%	3	1.3%	0	0.0%

332. Over half of respondents reported that money received comprises 'a large part' (26%) or almost all of their income (24.2%). About 21% said the funds account for half of their income, followed by 19.9% that said it makes up a small portion.

FIGURE 6: HOW MUCH DOES THE MONEY YOU RECEIVED FROM UNICEF REPRESENT (N = 769)




333. In Badghis, nearly three quarters reported that transfers make up over half of their income compared to less than half of respondents in Khost or Paktika.

TABLE 12: HOW MUCH DOES THE MONEY YOU RECEIVED FROM UNICEF REPRESENT DISAGGREGATED BY PROVINCE

	Province					
	Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Almost all the income	93	27.7%	59	26.5%	34	16.2%
A large part of the income	154	45.8%	32	14.3%	13	6.2%
Half of the income	53	15.8%	44	19.7%	64	30.5%
A small part of the income	20	6.0%	35	15.7%	98	46.7%
An insignificant part of the income	8	2.4%	39	17.5%	1	0.5%
Do not know	7	2.1%	12	5.4%	0	0.0%
Prefer not to answer	1	0.3%	2	0.9%	0	0.0%

334. Disaggregated data is presented for Badghis only. This is because the cash value differed by province with a much higher transfer value in Khost (US\$310) but no women were interviewed in this province. Comparing men and women in Badghis, men respondents were more likely to report that income reported more than half of their income (80%) compared to women respondents (61%, see Figure 7).

FIGURE 7: HOW MUCH DOES THE MONEY YOU RECEIVED FROM UNICEF REPRESENT DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER (BADGHIS ONLY)



335. Most of the participants (76%) said that there was a community consultation before the selection phase for cash programming and most participants understood why they were selected (81%).

TABLE 13: COMMUNITY CONSULTATION OVER THE SELECTION FOR CASH PROGRAMMING

Do you know if there has been a community consultation before the selection phase?	N	%
Yes, there was	582	75.7
No there was not	157	20.4
I do not know	30	3.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>769</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Did you know why you were selected?		
Yes	624	81.1
No	132	17.2
Do not Know	13	1.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>769</i>	<i>100.0</i>

336. Table 13 presents data disaggregated by gender and province. Eighty-two per cent of women were aware of a community consultation compared to 74% of men. A slightly higher proportion of women (88%) also understood why they were selected than males (80%).

337. Respondents in Paktika and Badghis were much more likely to report community consultation, (above 85%) compared to Khost (49%). Regarding the knowledge of selection criteria, the data is consistent across the provinces at approximately 80% of respondents (see Table 14).


TABLE 14: COMMUNITY CONSULTATION OVER THE SELECTION FOR CASH PROGRAMMING DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

Gender						Province					
Women			Men			Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
N	%		N	%		N	%	N	%	N	%

Do you know if there has been a community consultation before the selection phase?	Yes, there was	105	82.0%	477	74.4%	291	86.6%	110	49.3%	181	86.2%
	No there was not	15	11.7%	142	22.2%	20	6.0%	108	48.4%	29	13.8%
	I do not know	8	6.3%	22	3.4%	25	7.4%	5	2.2%	0	0.0%
Did you know why you were selected?	Yes	112	87.5%	512	79.9%	271	80.7%	182	81.6%	171	81.4%
	No	15	11.7%	117	18.3%	59	17.6%	36	16.1%	37	17.6%
	Do not Know	1	0.8%	12	1.9%	6	1.8%	5	2.2%	2	1.0%

338. Information on reason for selection was provided split between UNICEF/IPs for 55% of respondents; 42% received information from community leaders.

FIGURE 8: WHO DID YOU GET INFORMATION ABOUT SELECTION FROM (N = 624)



339. There is large variation in sources of information by province. In Khost and Paktika, most respondents reported receiving information from UNICEF/lps (over 80%) compared to respondents in Badghis who were most likely to report receiving information from community leaders (84%, see Table 15). Patterns differ by gender with women (almost all from Badghis) much more likely to report information receipt from community leaders (84%) while reliance on UNICEF/lps was much higher among men respondents (64%, see Figure 8 below).


TABLE 15: WHO DID YOU GET THIS INFORMATION FROM DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND LOCATION

	Gender				Province					
	Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
UNICEF/IP	18	16.1%	328	64.1%	43	15.9%	150	82.4%	153	89.5%
Community leader	94	83.9%	166	32.4%	227	83.8%	15	8.2%	18	10.5%
Health centre	0	0.0%	6	1.2%	0	0.0%	6	3.3%	0	0.0%
Community worker	0	0.0%	9	1.8%	0	0.0%	9	4.9%	0	0.0%
Other	0	0.0%	3	0.6%	1	0.4%	2	1.1%	0	0.0%

Selection Criteria and access

340. Of the participants that reported knowledge of selection criteria (80%), most were able to identify the reason of having a HH with a Pregnant and Lactating Women (PLW) and/or having a child under 2 (see Figure 9).

FIGURE 9: THE CRITERIA OF THE SELECTION FOR BEING PART OF THE CASH PROGRAM (N = 624)



341. Table 16 presents the data for selection criteria into a cash program, disaggregated by gender and province. For both women (54%) and men (50%), households with Pregnant and Lactating Women (HH with PLW) were the most cited criterion. Selection based on households headed by women was much more common among women respondents (26%) than men (2%).


342. In Badghis, 72% of the selections were based on having a PLW in the household, while this criterion accounted for only 27% in Khost and 44% in Paktika. Khost had a high percentage (45%) of selections under 'Other,' not seen in other provinces and there are no further explanations provided on this option. Likely this was based on selection due to households damaged by earthquakes, but options were not specified to confirm. Paktika had a high percentage of households with children with a disability (32%) as a criterion.

TABLE 16: THE CRITERIA OF THE SELECTION FOR BEING PART OF THE CASH PROGRAM DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

	Gender				Province					
	Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. HH with PLW	60	53.6%	258	50.4%	194	71.6%	49	26.9%	75	43.9%
2. Household headed by a woman	29	25.9%	8	1.6%	25	9.2%	5	2.7%	7	4.1%
3. HH headed by a person with disability	8	7.1%	37	7.2%	23	8.5%	12	6.6%	10	5.8%
4. HH with children with disability	6	5.4%	81	15.8%	20	7.4%	13	7.1%	54	31.6%
5. HH with children below the age of 2	49	43.8%	206	40.2%	139	51.3%	43	23.6%	73	42.7%
6. Other	6	5.4%	87	17.0%	7	2.6%	82	45.1%	4	2.3%
7. Don't know	0	0.0%	4	0.8%	0	0.0%	4	2.2%	0	0.0%

343. Only twenty-nine participants from the total (5%) reported that the selection criteria were not fair. Of those, 11 reported that there was corruption in the selection, 6 said that the selection criteria did not reach the neediest people and 4 stated 'other' reasons.

FIGURE 10: FAIRNESS OF THE SELECTION CRITERIA (N = 29)




344. Only men reported that there was a lack of fairness in the selection criteria; these participants were from Khost and Badghis provinces.

TABLE 17: FAIRNESS OF THE SELECTION CRITERIA DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

	Gender				Province					
	Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. The selection criteria were not accurate to reach the neediest people	0	0.0%	6	20.7%	2	40.0%	4	16.7%	0	0.0%
2. There were needier people than were assisted	0	0.0%	1	3.4%	0	0.0%	1	4.2%	0	0.0%
3. There was corruption in selection	0	0.0%	11	37.9%	0	0.0%	11	45.8%	0	0.0%
4. Other	0	0.0%	4	13.8%	3	60.0%	1	4.2%	0	0.0%

345. Most of the participants (77%) reported that both men and women had equal access to the distribution site; 22% reported that only men had access to the distribution site.

FIGURE 11: DID BOTH MEN AND WOMEN HAVE EQUAL ACCESS TO THE DISTRIBUTION SITE?



346. Table 18 provides data on whether both men and women had equal access to distribution sites by gender and province. Participants in Badghis and Paktika were much more likely to report equal access to distribution sites (over 80%) compared to participants in Khost (50%). A higher percentage of women (95%) reported that both genders had equal access, compared to 74% of men. No women reported that only women had access, while 26% of men participants stated that only men had access.

TABLE 18: DID BOTH MEN AND WOMEN HAVE EQUAL ACCESS TO THE DISTRIBUTION SITE DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE


	Gender				Province					
	Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Men only	1	0.8%	164	25.6%	23	6.8%	104	46.6%	38	18.1%
Women only	0	0.0%	1	0.2%	1	0.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Both men and women	121	94.5%	471	73.5%	308	91.7%	112	50.2%	172	81.9%
Do not know	6	4.7%	5	0.8%	4	1.2%	7	3.1%	0	0.0%
Prefer not to answer	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%

347. Qualitative analyses of the barriers that women face in accessing cash identified as main themes: **cultural normal and traditions** preventing women from going out; **lack of accessibility** due to availability and/or cost of transportation; **lack of identification cards for women**; **gender roles** where men typically go out to receive assistance; and **security concerns**.

Accountability: Community Feedback and Response Mechanism

348. Half of the participants (52%, N = 769) have information over the existence of the complaint mechanism.

FIGURE 12: INFORMATION ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE COMPLAINT MECHANISM



349. Almost half of the participants have contacted someone through the complaint mechanism. The majority have reached out to UNICEF, followed by IPs. Phone call is reported to be the most used channel and over 95% of participants reported high level of satisfaction from the responses.

TABLE 19: ACTUAL USE OF THE COMPLAINT MECHANISM

		N	%
Did you have to contact anyone for complaint or questioning?	Yes	360	46.8%
	No	393	51.1%
	Prefer not to answer	16	2.1%
Who did you reach?	UNICEF	167	46.4%
	IP	116	32.2%
	Community leader	64	17.8%
	I do not know	13	3.6%
	Other	0	0.0%
How did you reach them?	Phone call	303	84.2%
	Phone SMS	3	0.8%
	Talk to someone in person	54	15.0%
	Other (specify)	0	0.0%
Were you satisfied with the response?	Very satisfied	272	75.6%
	Satisfied	71	19.7%
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	9	2.5%
	Dissatisfied	6	1.7%
	Very dissatisfied	2	0.6%

350. Table 20 presents data on the use of complaint mechanisms, disaggregated by gender and province. About 27% of women and 51% of men reported contacting someone for complaints or questioning. Regarding provinces, 68% in Khost contacted someone, compared to 27% in Badghis and 56% in Paktika. Most people reached out by phone call, especially in Khost (93%). The most contacted entity for women was the community leader (62%), while for men it was UNICEF (49%). In Khost, 84% reached UNICEF, whereas in Paktika, 80% reached IP. Participants were satisfied with the response, either women or men, and in the different provinces. More detailed data is presented in the table below.

TABLE 20: ACTUAL USE OF THE COMPLAINT MECHANISM DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

		Gender						Province			
		Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Did you have to contact anyone for complaint or questioning?	Yes	34	26.6%	326	50.9%	91	27.1%	151	67.7%	118	56.2%
	No	91	71.1%	302	47.1%	243	72.3%	58	26.0%	92	43.8%
	Prefer not to answer	3	2.3%	13	2.0%	2	0.6%	14	6.3%	0	0.0%
	UNICEF	8	23.5%	159	48.8%	33	36.3%	127	84.1%	7	5.9%
	IP	5	14.7%	111	34.0%	16	17.6%	6	4.0%	94	79.7%
Who did you reach?	Community leader	21	61.8%	43	13.2%	41	45.1%	7	4.6%	16	13.6%
	I do not know	0	0.0%	13	4.0%	1	1.1%	11	7.3%	1	0.8%
	Other	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	Phone call	24	70.6%	279	85.6%	63	69.2%	141	93.4%	99	83.9%
	Phone SMS	0	0.0%	3	0.9%	0	0.0%	1	0.7%	2	1.7%
How did you reach them?	Talk to someone in person	10	29.4%	44	13.5%	28	30.8%	9	6.0%	17	14.4%
	Other (specify)	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	Very satisfied	4	11.8%	268	82.2%	17	18.7%	137	90.7%	118	100.0%
	Satisfied	28	82.4%	43	13.2%	68	74.7%	3	2.0%	0	0.0%
Were you satisfied with the response?	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	1	2.9%	8	2.5%	3	3.3%	6	4.0%	0	0.0%
	Dissatisfied	1	2.9%	5	1.5%	2	2.2%	4	2.6%	0	0.0%
	Very dissatisfied	0	0.0%	2	0.6%	1	1.1%	1	0.7%	0	0.0%

351. Table 21 illustrates people's hypothetical usage of complaint and response mechanisms. About 72% of respondents said they would reach out if they had a complaint. Among them, UNICEF is the preferred entity to contact (46%), followed by IP (26%) and community leaders (25%).

352. Phone calls are the most popular choice, preferred by 69% of respondents. Physical outreach is also notable at 28%, while only a small percentage would use SMS (1.7%).

TABLE 21: USE OF THE COMPLAINT AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS IN CASE OF A COMPLAINT

		N	%
If you supposedly had a complaint, would you try and reach out to someone?	Yes	293	71.6%
	No	102	24.9%
	Do not Know	14	3.4%
	UNICEF	136	46.4%
	IP	76	25.9%
If so, who would you be most comfortable reaching out to?	Community leader	74	25.3%
	I do not know	6	2.0%
	Other	1	0.3%
	I do not know	4	1.4%
	Phone call	203	69.3%
How would you prefer reaching out?	Phone SMS	5	1.7%
	Reaching out physically	81	27.6%

353. In terms of willingness to reach out for a complaint, 48% of women would, compared to 79% of men. Regionally, the willingness is highest in Badghis at 80% and lowest in Khost at 33%.

354. When asked who they would be most comfortable reaching out to, 51% of men prefer UNICEF, while women were more inclined toward community leaders at 49%. In Badghis, IP is the preferred channel for 36% of respondents, and in Paktika and Khost, UNICEF is favoured. As for the preferred method of reaching out, phone calls were reported in all provinces as the first choice. Regarding gender, women most preferred physical outreach (53%).


TABLE 22: USE OF THE COMPLAINT AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS IN CASE OF A COMPLAINT DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

		Gender				Province					
		Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
If you supposedly had a complaint, would you try and reach out to someone?	Yes	45	47.9%	248	78.7%	196	80.0%	24	33.3%	73	79.3%
	No	45	47.9%	57	18.1%	46	18.8%	37	51.4%	19	20.7%
	Do not know	4	4.3%	10	3.2%	3	1.2%	11	15.3%	0	0.0%
	UNICEF	9	20.0%	127	51.2%	56	28.6%	18	75.0%	62	84.9%
If so, who would you be most comfortable reaching out to?	IP	12	26.7%	64	25.8%	70	35.7%	0	0.0%	6	8.2%
	Community leader	22	48.9%	52	21.0%	67	34.2%	2	8.3%	5	6.8%
	I do not know	1	2.2%	5	2.0%	2	1.0%	4	16.7%	0	0.0%
	Other	1	2.2%	0	0.0%	1	0.5%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	I do not know	1	2.2%	3	1.2%	2	1.0%	2	8.3%	0	0.0%
How would you prefer reaching out?	Phone call	20	44.4%	183	73.8%	115	58.7%	19	79.2%	69	94.5%
	Phone SMS	0	0.0%	5	2.0%	4	2.0%	0	0.0%	1	1.4%
	Reaching out physically	24	53.3%	57	23.0%	75	38.3%	3	12.5%	3	4.1%

Barriers

355. In the surveyed communities, food and education are deemed more urgent, with 64% (N = 488) and 66% (N = 506) respectively from the total participants. Children's health is a pressing need for 34% of participants.

FIGURE 13: THE MOST PRESSING NEEDS IN YOUR COMMUNITY FOR CHILDREN




356. The data on pressing needs for children, disaggregated by gender and province, reveals some differences. In terms of province, Badghis shows the highest concern for food (82%). In Paktika, 93% see education as a need. Badghis and Khost share similar percentages regarding health, 39% and 37% respectively. Disaggregated by gender, women (predominately from Badghis) prioritize food (95%) over men (57%, Table 23).

TABLE 23: WHAT ARE THE MOST PRESSING NEEDS IN YOUR COMMUNITY FOR CHILDREN DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

	Gender				Province					
	Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. None, all needs are met	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
2. Food	122	95.3%	366	57.1%	275	81.8%	97	43.5%	116	55.2%
3. Education	56	43.8%	450	70.2%	155	46.1%	156	70.0%	195	92.9%
4. Health	67	52.3%	192	30.0%	131	39.0%	83	37.2%	45	21.4%
5. Security	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
6. Other (specify)	4	3.1%	70	10.9%	47	14.0%	27	12.1%	0	0.0%
7. Don't know	0	0.0%	2	0.3%	0	0.0%	2	0.9%	0	0.0%

357. Education (65%), food (56%), and health (31%) have been reported as the most pressing needs of women and girls in the communities.

FIGURE 14: THE MOST PRESSING NEEDS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THIS COMMUNITY




358. Provincial and gender trends for specific needs of women and girls follow trends for children with food as a more frequently reported need among populations in Badghis and women (primarily from Badghis).

TABLE 24: THE MOST PRESSING NEEDS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THIS COMMUNITY DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

	Gender				Province					
	Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. None, all needs are met	0	0.0%	3	0.5%	3	0.9%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
2. Food	113	88.3%	315	49.1%	236	70.2%	75	33.6%	117	55.7%
3. Education	74	57.8%	422	65.8%	174	51.8%	128	57.4%	194	92.4%
4. Health	43	33.6%	192	30.0%	98	29.2%	92	41.3%	45	21.4%
5. Security	1	0.8%	5	0.8%	1	0.3%	3	1.3%	2	1.0%
6. Other (specify)	15	11.7%	79	12.3%	65	19.3%	29	13.0%	0	0.0%
7. Don't know	0	0.0%	12	1.9%	1	0.3%	11	4.9%	0	0.0%
8. Prefer not to answer	0	0.0%	1	0.2%	0	0.0%	1	0.4%	0	0.0%

359. The most pressing needs of men and boys are education (56%), food (50%), and other needs (32%). Other needs consisted of work, money, water, electricity, and transportation.

FIGURE 15: THE MOST PRESSING NEEDS OF MEN AND BOYS IN THIS COMMUNITY




360. Table 25 presents the most pressing needs of men and boys in the community, by gender and province. As above, provincial and gender trends for specific needs of men and boys follow trends for children with food as a more frequently reported need among populations in Badghis and women (primarily from Badghis). Security appears as a unique concern expressed by women respondents (17%), while it is virtually never expressed as a need for men/boys by men respondents. The "Other" category is significantly high in Badghis at 54%, which is defined as "work" and "water" by the participants.

TABLE 25: THE MOST PRESSING NEEDS OF MEN AND BOYS IN THIS COMMUNITY DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

	Gender				Province					
	Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. None, all needs are met	1	0.8%	1	0.2%	1	0.3%	1	0.4%	0	0.0%
2. Food	89	69.5%	292	45.6%	197	58.6%	81	36.3%	103	49.0%
3. Education	45	35.2%	386	60.2%	102	30.4%	129	57.8%	200	95.2%
4. Health	39	30.5%	123	19.2%	63	18.8%	51	22.9%	48	22.9%
5. Security	22	17.2%	1	0.2%	21	6.3%	1	0.4%	1	0.5%
6. Other (specify)	44	34.4%	201	31.4%	181	53.9%	63	28.3%	1	0.5%
7. Don't know	1	0.8%	10	1.6%	1	0.3%	10	4.5%	0	0.0%

361. Most of the participants reported not receiving any other kind of message (67%), 24% (N = 181) reported receiving messages to support WASH practices and 13% (N = 99) received messages to support child protection.

FIGURE 16: ANY OTHER SERVICES/ MESSAGING/ SENSITIZATION



362. The types of additional services or messages people have received are presented by gender and province in Table 26. Messages supporting WASH practices were most received in Badghis (48%). Messages on PLW healthcare were more prevalent among women (15%) than men (6%), particularly in Badghis at 17%. Child protection messages had a notable presence in Badghis at 25% but were almost non-existent in Khost (HCT) and Paktika.

TABLE 26: DID YOU RECEIVE ANY OTHER SERVICES/ MESSAGING/ SENSITIZATION DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER AND PROVINCE

	Gender				Province					
	Women		Men		Badghis		Khost		Paktika	
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Did not receive any kind of message	77	60.2 %	437	68.2 %	136	40.5 %	179	80.3 %	199	94.8 %
2. Messages or services to support a healthy diet	15	11.7 %	65	10.1 %	46	13.7 %	30	13.5 %	4	1.9 %
3. Messages or services to support PLW healthcare	19	14.8 %	41	6.4 %	56	16.7 %	3	1.3 %	1	0.5 %
4. Messages or services to support WASH practices.	40	31.3 %	141	22.0 %	162	48.2 %	15	6.7 %	4	1.9 %
5. Messages or services to support child protection	26	20.3 %	73	11.4 %	85	25.3 %	4	1.8 %	10	4.8 %
6. Other	0	0.0 %	3	0.5 %	3	0.9 %	0	0.0 %	0	0.0 %

Feedback over the assistance received

363. Qualitative thematic analyses explore themes articulated by participants. A split of the answers was done by gender to identify any differences over the needs mentioned.

364. All the participants, women and men, express **urgent needs for basic necessities** like food, clean water, and healthcare. All the participant mentioned **financial struggles and lack of employment opportunities** in their communities. Aid provided is short term, and they suggested that creating sustainable job opportunities would offer long-term relief. **Concerns over natural disasters and the upcoming winter** were themes in women and men participants, thus requests for more aid to overcome these challenges. **Inadequate healthcare** facilities result in untreated illness especially in poor families. **Education** was an important factor for all the participants, where women mentioned educational opportunities and skill development and men requests better educational facilities. Participants

mentioned **distribution issues** including discrimination in aid distribution or questioning the integrity of local distribution.

365. Some of the participants express **satisfaction with the aid** they have already received but stated that ongoing and increased support is necessary.

Recommendations

366. The participants were asked to provide any recommendations regarding the programming. The main theme emerging from all the answers provided, is **the need for more assistance and on regular basis**, being this cash, in kind, or both.

367. Other themes that are consistent for women and men are **lack of basic necessities** like food and clean water; **lack of healthcare** like medicine, doctors and clinics; **needed interventions in education** facilities and quality of education; **poor infrastructure** for roads, health clinics and schools; **unemployment** for men and boys, lack of income-generating activities; and **seasonal needs** with winter approaching the need for blankets, wood for fire and food.

368. Other recommendations included:

- Distribution centres of aid should be closer to communities to save on transportation cost, especially in the case where the villages are in remote areas.
- Participants also mentioned the responsibility of the government to help them with aid and especially in the case of the need for wells in their community.
- Many responses indicate a desire for more sustainable forms of aid, like education, job opportunities, and infrastructure, rather than just immediate relief.
- Considering the needs of the most vulnerable was suggested by the participants, noting that “Beneficiary selection has to be done with zero bias. Eligible people have to be selected”

369. Responses from the participants are focused on their needs and not on what could be changed in future programming, but the following recommendations can be drawn from their feedback:

- Consider long-term sustainability in aid programmes.
- Include vulnerable populations in aid distribution plans.
- Provide essential items to better meet the ongoing basic necessities of communities.
- Introduce vocational training and local job opportunities.

Annex 8. Data collection Tools

Household Survey

Hello, I am \${Surveyor_Name} and I work with ATR, an independent Afghan research agency in Afghanistan. We are assigned by UNICEF to evaluate the humanitarian aid they have been providing to the Afghan people across fourteen provinces of Afghanistan. Your participation and feedback will help UNICEF in assessing and improving upcoming cash distribution interventions.

All information you provide here will remain confidential, and neither your name nor contact information will be disclosed to any third party, not even UNICEF staff. Our discussions are expected to last approximately one hour. Your participation is volunteer and you have the right to decline or withdraw the interview at any time or if you do not want to answer any question, you are not supposed to.

Before I start with my questions, I would like to tell you that I have not been part of providing this assistance. Our job is only to collect information about on the program has performed. I will be asking you questions as a neutral person so you can feel free to answer honestly. It is important to mention that I will be asking many people the same questions and reporting the overall result.

This report will help to improve the support provided to the Afghan people by understanding what you and many others, liked or disliked, what you would have preferred, and how things could be done better next time, either for your community or neighbouring communities, or other families in need. However, there is no direct benefit to you for being part of this discussion, nor will anything you say risk your access to the project services now or in the future.

Would you like to participate in this survey?

If no, reason for not participating?

I would like to audio record some of the responses in this interview, so that I can capture all discussion points.

Would you like some of the responses in this interview to be recorded?

Before you start, can you please confirm that you or someone in your household have benefited from at least one cash transfer delivered by UNICEF over the last 18 months?

Demographic Information

Respondent name:

Respondent gender:

Respondent age:

Respondent occupation:

Please specify:

Respondent phone number:

1. Respondent education:
2. How many people are in the household?
3. Is this a female headed household?

4. Is the head of household disabled?
5. How many pregnant women were part of the household at the time of the cash distribution?
6. How many children under 2 were in the HH at the time of the distribution?
7. How many disabled children are present in the household?
8. How many women and girls are in your household?
9. How many are children (under 18)?
10. Now I would like to ask you about the cash support received from UNICEF/IP. The idea is to see how the United Nations can do better next time. Your honest feedback is important, including what you think was not so good or good. Shall we start?

Cash support

11. Did you know in advance for how many months you were supposed to receive money?
12. Did you know in advance the amount you would receive per month?
13. Did you receive the correct amount, on time as you expected?
14. Did UNICEF/IP provide any explanations on what you should have been spending the cash on?
15. If so, tell me?
- Please specify:
16. Who benefited most of the money in your household?
- Please specify:
17. Who benefited less of the money in the household?
- Please specify:
18. In your household, who decided how the money from UNICEF to be spent?
- Please specify:
19. Does this differ from how decisions on money from other source is spent/would be spent?
20. When considering all the money your household earns in a month, how much does the money you received from UNICEF represent?

Selection criteria

21. Do you know if there has been a community consultation before the selection phase?
22. Did you know why you were selected?
23. Who did you get this information from?
- Please specify:
24. What was the criteria?
25. Do you think these criteria were fair considering the needs in the community?
26. Could you describe what was unfair?

Please specify:

27. Assistance modality and access
28. Did both men and women have equal access to the distribution site?

Grievance and response

29. Do you know if there is a complaint mechanism in place in case you have something to report about the programme?
30. Did you have to contact anyone for complaint or questioning?
31. If so, who did you reach?
- Please specify:
32. If so, how did you reach them?
- Please specify:

33. Were you satisfied with the response?

34. If not, why?

Please specify:

35. If you supposedly had a complaint, would you try and reach out to someone?

36. If not, why?

Please specify:

37. If so, who would you be most comfortable reaching out to?

Please specify:

38. How would you prefer reaching out?

Please specify:

Barriers analysis

39. Today, what are the most pressing needs in your community for children?

Please specify:

40. What are the most pressing needs of women and girls in this community?

Please specify:

41. What are the most pressing needs of men and boys in this community?

Please specify:

42. While getting cash/process of getting cash and/or during the process of being part of this programme did you receive any other services/ messaging/sensitisation? (would need to ask UNICEF on how this would be relevant but from proposals understood that their hope is for multisectoral/integrated programming)?

Please specify:

43. If you received any messaging from UNICEF/IP, did it change anything for you or for anyone in your household? If so, what?

Closing group

44. Thank you very much for your time. Is there anything you would like to add in relation to what we have been talking about?

45. Is there anything else that you would like to say about the assistance you received?

Please elaborate your response:

46. Have you any recommendation for improving assistance?

Please elaborate your response:

Enumerator

The following questions need to be answered by the enumerator later once the enumerator is on their own or in a place where they can talk freely. These questions should be provided after each interview. If the enumerator has nothing to say, they should simply state that they have nothing to say, but they should still record their answer and send it to HQ.

Please provide any further information that you may have and that could be interesting for the evaluation. This can be:

- Observations during the interview (eg. maybe you entered in a very wealthy house and you have difficulties understanding how this person is beneficiary)
- Things that would be worth checking later (eg. I feel that people do not say the truth because such and such...)
- Any message you would want to provide to the people that will be writing the report related to the subject
- Any information related to the evaluation but that has not been captured in this interview.
- Any information even if not directly related to the interview. (eg. This morning, while talking to people in the village, some told me that the selection criteria was biased because....). Try and be specific. (eg. only one person said, 5 women said, everyday people tell me that...)

KII with Implementing Partners

Introductions, evaluation objectives and consent	
<p>We are _____ and _____, and we work with ATR, an independent Afghan research agency in Afghanistan. We are assigned by UNICEF to evaluate the humanitarian aid they have been providing to the Afghan people across fourteen provinces of Afghanistan. Your participation and feedback will help UNICEF in assessing and improving upcoming cash distribution interventions.</p> <p>All information you provide here will remain confidential, and neither your name nor contact information will be disclosed to any third party, not even UNICEF staff. Our discussions are expected to last approximately 30 minutes. Your participation is volunteer and you have the right to decline or withdraw the interview at any time or if you do not want to answer any question, you are not supposed to.</p> <p>Before I start with my questions, I would like to tell you that I have not been part of providing this assistance. Our job is only to collect information about on the program has performed. I will be asking you questions as a neutral person so you can feel free to answer honestly. It is important to mention that I will be asking many people the same questions and reporting the overall result.</p> <p>1. Would you like to participate in this KII?</p> <p><i>[This needs to be asked from each participants]</i></p> <p>a. Yes</p> <p>b. No [end the interview and go to another respondent with similar background]</p> <p>I would like to audio record this conversation so that I can capture all discussion points. As soon as the full transcript of the interview is completed, this recording will be deleted.</p> <p>2. Would you like the interview to be recorded?</p> <p>a. Yes [start the interview and audio recording]</p> <p>b. No [interviewer to take notes of responses]</p> <p>Thank you!</p>	
Sampling information	
Interviewer name	
Interview date	
Interview start time	
Interview end time	
Region	
Province	
District	
Demographic Information	
Respondent name	
Implementing Partner name	
Respondent Age	

Respondent Gender	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Man 2. Woman
Respondent designation	
Respondent phone number	
Respondent Education	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No education 2. Primary (Grade 0-6) 3. Lower secondary (Grade 7-9) 4. Upper secondary (Grade 10-12) 5. Teacher college (Grade 13-14) 6. Technical college (Grade 13-14) 7. University (Grade 13-16) 8. Post-graduate (Grade 17 and above) 9. Islamic school or madrasa (Grade 1-14)

Photos of the demographic form and sampling information to be captured using Open Camera to show the exact GPS coordinates where interviews are conducted with KII (Implementing partners).

Questions	
<p>4.1 Have you participated in the selection of beneficiaries? Were the most vulnerable targeted without the influence of ethnicity, race, religion or other differences? Why do you think this? Or please describe?</p> <p>[Please note if the interviewee was directly involved in beneficiary selection or not]</p>	EQ.3
4.2 In your experience, to what degree are the communities and/or community leaders involved in the registration and selection process? Please provide some examples of this.	EQ.4
4.3 Do you think the registration of beneficiaries could be done faster and better? Please explain how.	EQ.9 EQ.15
4.4 What are the main difficulties regarding beneficiaries' registration? Are those difficulties different in each province? If so, explain.	EQ.11
4.5 Were the beneficiaries well informed of the whole programme (selection criteria, reasons of the programme, time and date of cash disbursements, amount received)? Please explain why they are or are not well informed.	EQ.10
4.6 Was cash distributed on time by the money service providers as originally planned (correct amount and on time)? If not, do you know why?	EQ.7
4.7 Is cash-in-hand the best way to distribute cash considering the national context? Should it be done differently depending on the provinces? Please be specific.	EQ.8 EQ.9 EQ.16
4.8 Is it more difficult for some beneficiaries than for others to participate in the	EQ.17

programme or access the cash distribution site?	
4.9 Was the implementation of the cash programme sensitive to the needs and realities of the different social groups (e.g. taking into account various cultural, ethnic, religious difference?	EQ 12
4.10 Is there a system in place where beneficiaries can reach out easily to somebody that is totally independent to the programme implementation if they want to report something sensitive? If so, please explain how this system is easily accessible and totally independent. If not, explain why.	EQ.13
4.11 UN agencies promote gender equity throughout all stages of their activities. Have you been trained on how to ensure that men and women are treated with equity during all the processes of the programme? What about your colleagues? If yes, when were you trained and how long was the session. What are the main points UNICEF has asked you to be aware of regarding this matter?	EQ.4
4.12 Is the UNICEF cash programming in this area/province aligned with other actors doing cash? What are the gaps or overlaps?	EQ5
4.13 Have the cash programmes had positive or negative impacts in the society or in the household between men and women? Please explain providing real examples [not imagining what could happen]	EQ.4 EQ.18
4.14 If you were to compare what UNICEF does in terms of cash transfers with what other actors do, would you say UNICEF is doing better or worse? Please explain.	EQ.5
4.16 What have been the main benefits of the cash programme? What, if anything is likely to continue? Please explain.	EQ.19 EQ7
Question only for IPs at management level. 4.17 If UNICEF wants to increase its cash activities, is it possible for you to increase beneficiaries by ten? [Wait for an answer] If yes, is it possible for you to increase by 1000? [Wait for an answer]. Are the changes needed to increase by 10 or by 1000 the same? Please describe the limitation foreseen and the changed needed.	EQ.20
4.18 Is there anything you would like to add concerning this cash programme or cash programmes in general? UNICEF is really interested in getting feedback from its implementing partners to improve how they do cash programming.	

The Interview is over and thank you for your time and participation!

KII with Extenders

Introductions, evaluation objectives and consent	
<p>We are _____ and _____, and we work with ATR, an independent Afghan research agency in Afghanistan. We are assigned by UNICEF to evaluate the humanitarian aid they have been providing to the Afghan people across fourteen provinces of Afghanistan. Your participation and feedback will help UNICEF in assessing and improving upcoming cash distribution interventions.</p> <p>All information you provide here will remain confidential, and neither your name nor contact information will be disclosed to any third party, not even UNICEF staff. Our discussions are expected to last approximately 30 minutes. Your participation is volunteer and you have the right to decline or withdraw the interview at any time or if you do not want to answer any question, you are not supposed to.</p> <p>Before I start with my questions, I would like to tell you that I have not been part of providing this assistance. Our job is only to collect information about on the program has performed. I will be asking you questions as a neutral person so you can feel free to answer honestly. It is important to mention that I will be asking many people the same questions and reporting the overall result.</p>	
<p>1. Would you like to participate in this KII?</p> <p><i>[This needs to be asked from each participants]</i></p> <p>a. Yes</p> <p>b. No [end the interview and go to another respondent with similar background]</p> <p>I would like to audio record this conversation so that I can capture all discussion points. As soon as the full transcript of the interview is completed, this recording will be deleted.</p> <p>2. Would you like the interview to be recorded?</p> <p>a. Yes [start the interview and audio recording]</p> <p>b. No [interviewer to take notes of responses]</p> <p>Thank you!</p>	
Sampling Information	
Name	
Interviewer name	
Interview date	
Interview start time	
Interview end time	
Region	
Province	
District	
Preliminary check for interview possibility	
Choose one of the following questions depending on the type of programme monitored.	
Are you familiar with the Cash+ programmes that have been provided alongside the regular nutrition programmes in Daikundi / Kabul?	If no, stop the interview
Are you familiar with the Cash+ programmes that have been provided alongside the regular child	If no, stop the interview

protection programme in Badghis / Paktika / Khost?	
Are you familiar with the regular cash intervention programme that has just started in Samangan or Zabul?	If no, stop the interview
Demographic Information	
Respondent name	
Respondent Gender	1. Man 2. Woman
Respondent Age	
How long has he been working with UNICEF	
Domaine of expertise as an extender	
Respondent Education	No education Primary (Grade 0-6) Lower secondary (Grade 7-9) Upper secondary (Grade 10-12) Teacher college (Grade 13-14) Technical college (Grade 13-14) University (Grade 13-16) Post-graduate (Grade 17 and above) Islamic school or madrasa (Grade 1-14)
Questions (only for the CASH+)	
4.1 Could you please briefly describe the Cash+ programme (s) you have knowledge of? <i>If the interviewee is not able to describe the cash component (its objectives, the amount of money provided, the selection criteria, etc., the interview should be terminated here).</i>	
4.2. According to you, how relevant was/is the Cash+ assistance in supporting UNICEF's regular nutrition or child protection programmes? Does/will that cash component make a real difference? Explain.	EQ.6 EQ.7
4.3 Do you believe that this cash component has/ may have long term effects? Please explain.	EQ.19
4.4 Was UNICEF successful in reaching the most in need people? Explain? What	EQ.3

would have made the selection better? please comment on the selection criteria and the selection process if possible	
4.5 Would you say that the process used to provide cash to people works well? We already talked about selection, but what about information provided to communities about the programme (reason, selection criteria, distribution site, amount received, etc.)?	EQ.9 EQ.10
4.6 Then what about the process of distribution? Is it good? Could it be done better? How?	EQ.9
4.7 Do you think that beneficiaries have access to a good grievance/feedback mechanism? Please explain what is good and not good about it?	EQ.13
4.8 Do you know if the assistance arrived on time as planned initially? when delays happen, how do people cope with it? Give specific examples.	EQ.14
4.9 Do you see negative effect regarding cash assistance? Please be specific and give examples.	EQ.18 EQ.17
4.10 Do you think that UNICEF's cash programme are well aligned with other humanitarian actors? Could UNICEF's collaboration with other actors be improved to reach better results? Explain.	EQ.5
4.11 Does UNICEF have the capacity to properly distribute cash? Please explain.	EQ.20
4.12 What would you suggest for improving the cash-based assistance? Please explain on what you base your statement. What can be done to make you do your job better?	
4.13 Is there anything you would like to add concerning this cash programme or cash programmes in general? UNICEF is really interested in getting feedback from its implementing partners to improve how they do cash programming.	
Questions (only for the regular cash programme in Samangan or Zabul)	
4a.1 Could you please briefly describe the regular cash assistance programme you have knowledge of?	
<i>If the interviewee is not able to describe the cash component (its objectives, the amount of money provided, the selection criteria, etc., the interview should be terminated here).</i>	
4a.2 According to you, how relevant is the regular cash assistance in supporting people? Do you think that this regular cash assistance can make a real difference? Explain.	EQ.6 EQ.7
4a.3 Do you believe that this cash component has/ may have long term effects? Please explain.	EQ.19
4a.4 Was UNICEF successful in reaching the most in need people? Explain? What would have made the selection better? please comment on the selection criteria and the selection process if possible	EQ.3

<p>Only ask if cash distribution has already started.</p> <p>4a.5 Would you say that the process used to provide cash to people works well? We already talked about selection, but what about information provided to communities about the programme (reason, selection criteria, distribution site, amount received, etc.)?</p>	EQ.9 EQ.10
<p>Only ask if cash distribution has already started.</p> <p>4a.6 Then what about the process of distribution? Is it good? Could it be done better?</p>	EQ.9
<p>4a.7 If beneficiaries want to reach out to UNICEF and complaint; do you think it will be easy for them? Why. Do you think all beneficiaries know how to reach out for feedback or complain?</p>	EQ.13
<p>4a.8 This programme is starting much latter than planned. Did this create problems? Please explain.</p>	EQ.14
<p>4a.9 Do you anticipate any negative effect regarding the regular cash assistance? Please explain.</p>	EQ.18 EQ.17
<p>4a.10 Did the program take properly take into account the gender dynamics at the HH and community level? Did you witness any impact on intra-HH gender relations? If so, in what way?</p>	EQ.4 EQ.18
<p>4a.11 How does the rest of the people not receiving the assistance react? If the reaction is negative, what should UNICEF and the IPs have done to make it better?</p>	
<p>4a.12 Do you think that UNICEF's cash programme are well aligned with other humanitarian actors? Could UNICEF's collaboration with other actors be improved to reach better results? Explain.</p>	EQ.5
<p>4a.13 Would you say that UNICEF has the capacities to properly distribute cash? Please explain. What could be done to help you do your job better?</p>	EQ.20
<p>4a.14 What would you suggest for improving the cash- based assistance? Please explain on what you base your statement.</p>	
<p>4a.15 Is there anything you would like to add concerning this cash programme or cash programmes in general? UNICEF is really interested in getting feedback from its implementing partners to improve how they do cash programming.</p>	

KII with MSP

Introductions, evaluation objectives and consent	
<p>We are _____ and _____, and we work with ATR, an independent Afghan research agency in Afghanistan. We are assigned by UNICEF to evaluate the humanitarian aid they have been providing to the Afghan people across fourteen provinces of Afghanistan. Your participation and feedback will help UNICEF in assessing and improving upcoming cash distribution interventions.</p> <p>All information you provide here will remain confidential, and neither your name nor contact information will be disclosed to any third party, not even UNICEF staff. Our discussions are expected to last approximately 30 minutes. Your participation is volunteer and you have the right to decline or withdraw the interview at any time or if you do not want to answer any question, you are not supposed to.</p> <p>Before I start with my questions, I would like to tell you that I have not been part of providing this assistance. Our job is only to collect information about on the program has performed. I will be asking you questions as a neutral person so you can feel free to answer honestly. It is important to mention that I will be asking many people the same questions and reporting the overall result.</p> <p>1. Would you like to participate in this KII?</p> <p><i>[This needs to be asked from each participants]</i></p> <p>a. Yes</p> <p>b. No [end the interview and go to another respondent with similar background]</p> <p>I would like to audio record this conversation so that I can capture all discussion points. As soon as the full transcript of the interview is completed, this recording will be deleted.</p> <p>2. Would you like the interview to be recorded?</p> <p>a. Yes [start the interview and audio recording]</p> <p>b. No [interviewer to take notes of responses]</p> <p>Thank you!</p>	
Sampling Information	
Interviewer name	
Interview date	
Interview start time	
Interview end time	
Region	
Province	
District	
Demographic Information	
Respondent name	
Money Service Provider name	
Respondent designation in MSP Company	
Respondent Gender	1. Man

	2. Woman
Respondent Age	
Number of contracts done with UNICEF (provide a name and location for each).	
Date of the first ever cash distribution and location done for UNICEF	
Respondent Education	1. No education 2. Primary (Grade 0-6) 3. Lower secondary (Grade 7-9) 4. Upper secondary (Grade 10-12) 5. Teacher college (Grade 13-14) 6. Technical college (Grade 13-14) 7. University (Grade 13-16) 8. Post-graduate (Grade 17 and above) 9. Islamic school or madrasa (Grade 1-14)

Photos of the demographic form and sampling information to be captured using OpenCamera to show the exact GPS coordinates where interviews are conducted with KII (Money Service Providers).

Questions	
4.1 Can you walk us through a typical process to disburse money to UNICEF beneficiaries starting when you receive the beneficiary list.	EQ.15
4.2 Usually, have you been able to deliver cash according to the timing first agreed upon with UNICEF? If not, why not?	EQ.14
4.3 What are the main constraints you faced when it came to deliver cash for UNICEF in the country?	EQ.11
4.4 We understand that you distribute cash to beneficiaries hand-to-hand. Is this the best option considering the country's financial and/or political environment? Are there better options to deliver cash? Please be specific.	EQ.8 EQ.9 EQ.15 EQ.16
4.5 Describe your organisational structure and capacity (maximum amount of money you could distribute per month for example). What provinces do you service and how (cash in hand, banking system, mobile money or other)?	NA
4.6 Have you been to the field to organise cash distributions or do you have a way of getting feedback from the field? If so, how receptive did you feel people in the community have	EQ.11

<p>been regarding UNICEF providing cash to only certain people, and not others? Is there anyone specific that was not receptive?</p> <p>[If the interviewee has not been in the field, please ensure the information he provides is based on something such as employees, grievance mechanism, etc. Provide this information to the evaluation team. If the person does not know, skip the question.]</p>	
<p>4.7 4.11 UN agencies promote gender equity throughout all stages of their activities. Have you been trained on how to ensure that men and women are treated with equity during all the processes of the programme? What about your colleagues? If yes, when were you trained and how long was the session. What are the main points UNICEF has asked you to be aware of regarding this matter?</p>	EQ.12
<p>4.8 If beneficiaries are not happy with the distribution process, is there a system in place for them to complain? If so, please explain.</p>	EQ.13
<p>4.9 Can you explain what are the main complaints you may have been aware of coming from beneficiaries? If so, how are you aware of these?</p>	EQ.13
<p>4.10 Please describe the contracting & implementation process with UNICEF? Has your organization had any challenges with this? Do you have any suggestions to improve the processes?</p> <p>[We are looking here at contracting issues, legal issues, payment issues, etc. that could make it difficult to operate efficiently for the MSP.]</p>	EQ.11
<p>4.11 Is there anything you would like to add concerning the discussion we just had? Any other recommendations for UNICEF or their implementing partners in the cash- based assistance?</p>	NA

The Interview is over and thank you for your time and participation!

KII with community leaders

Introductions, evaluation objectives and consent	
<p>We are _____ and _____, and we work with ATR, an independent Afghan research agency in Afghanistan. We are assigned by UNICEF to evaluate the humanitarian aid they have been providing to the Afghan people across fourteen provinces of Afghanistan. Your participation and feedback will help UNICEF in assessing and improving upcoming cash distribution interventions.</p> <p>All information you provide here will remain confidential, and neither your name nor contact information will be disclosed to any third party, not even UNICEF</p>	
Interviewer name	
Interview date	
Interview start time	
Interview end time	
Region	
Province	
District	
Community	
Demographic Information	
Respondent name	
Respondent Age	
Respondent Gender	1. Man 2. Woman

<p>Respondent designation</p> <p><i>Facilitate financial assistance to the families of those severely Malnourished children with Complications referred to inpatient care for treatment.</i></p> <p><i>(Cash+ - Kabul)</i></p> <p><i>To support access to accessing case management and health services, including improved access to institutional delivery, antenatal care and immunizations</i></p> <p><i>(Cash+ - Daikundi).</i></p> <p><i>To support access to accessing case management and health services, including improved access to institutional delivery, antenatal care and immunizations (Cash+ Panjshir, Kabul, Paktika and Khost). Same as for Daikundi</i></p> <p><i>To ensure households have access to financial support to meet their essential needs (Cash+ - Badghis)</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Community Leader 2. Mullah (Religious Leader) 3. CDC Member 4. Community member <p>EQ.2 EQ.7 EQ.1</p> <p>Do you think this objective has been (or will be) achieved?</p> <p>Why or why not? What would need to change to achieve those outcomes?</p>
4.1 What benefits, if any, do you think will continue into the future?	EQ.8
<p>4.2 According to you, how could the different steps of the cash programme implementation be improved? <i>(not looking into the selection process that has already been talked about)</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Communicating the objectives of the program and other related information. b. How well the UNICEF/IPs communicates and coordinates with community leaders c. Delivering the money d. Feedback mechanism 	<p>EQ.8 EQ.9 EQ.10 EQ.16</p>
4.3 Has the programme led to negative outcomes?	
4.4 Are there any vulnerable groups that are not receiving cash? Why is this happening?'	EQ.2

4.5 Have you seen that cash distribution programmes have had an impact regarding the relation between husband and wife? Please explain. [Probe: Relationship in here implies to a situation where either a husband or wife get advantageous of monetary contributions and they usually do not share or hide which leads to some sort of disagreement between each]	EQ.18
4.6 In your community, what are the most pressing needs for children? Are they the same or different for boy and girl children?	EQ.2
4.7 What about the needs for women and adolescent girls in the community?	EQ.2
[This question only if specific needs have been mentioned above] 4.8 Thinking about the issues we just talked about, what would be needed to solve some of the issues? [Ask for specifics on how and who should be involved in designing/implementing solutions.]	EQ.2
4.9 Is there anything else you would like to add that would help UNICEF to improve cash programme?	
4.10 Is there anything you would like to add concerning this cash programme or cash programmes in general?	

The Interview is over and thank you for your time and participation!

FGD/individual interview with CBA participants

Introduction, evaluation objectives and consent	
<p>We are _____ and _____, and we work with ATR, an independent Afghan research agency in Afghanistan. We are assigned by UNICEF to evaluate the humanitarian aid they have been providing to the Afghan people across fourteen provinces of Afghanistan. Your participation and feedback will help UNICEF in assessing and improving upcoming cash distribution interventions.</p> <p>All information you provide here will remain confidential, and neither your name nor contact information will be disclosed to any third party, not even UNICEF staff. Our discussions are expected to last approximately one hour. Your participation is volunteer and you have the right to decline or withdraw the interview at any time or if you do not want to answer any question, you are not supposed to.</p> <p>Before I start with my questions, I would like to tell you that I have not been part of providing this assistance. Our job is only to collect information about on the program has performed. I will be asking you questions as a neutral person so you can feel free to answer honestly. It is important to mention that I will be asking many people the same questions and reporting the overall result.</p> <p>This report will help to improve the support provided to the Afghan people by understanding what you and many others, liked or disliked, what you would have preferred, and how things could be done better next time, either for your community or neighbouring communities, or other families in need. However, there is no direct benefit to you for being part of this discussion, nor will anything you say risk your access to the project services now or in the future.</p> <p>1. Would you like to participate in this FGD?</p> <p><i>[This needs to be asked from each participants]</i></p> <p>a. Yes</p> <p>b. No [end the interview and go to another respondent with similar background]</p> <p>I would like to audio record this conversation so that I can capture all discussion points. As soon as the full transcript of the interview is completed, this recording will be deleted.</p> <p>2. Would you like the interview to be recorded?</p> <p>a. Yes [start the interview and audio recording]</p> <p>b. No [interviewer to take notes of responses]</p> <p>Thank you!</p>	
Sampling Information	
Interviewer name	
Note taker name	
Interview date	
Interview start time	
Interview end time	

Region	
Province	
District	
Community name	

Demographic Information						
Respondent code number	Respondent name	Age of respondent	Gender of respondent 1. Man 2. Woman	Respondent Occupation 1. Employed 2. Unemployed 3. Student 4. Retired 5. Disabled 6. Gov employee 7. Other (Specify)	Respondent education/ i.e. 0. No education 1. Primary (Grade 0-6) 2. Lower secondary (Grade 7-9) 3. Upper secondary (Grade 10-12) 4. Teacher college (Grade 13-14) 5. Technical college (Grade 13-14) 6. University (Grade 13-16) 7. Post-graduate (Grade 17 and above) 8. Islamic school or madrasa (Grade 1-14)	Respondent contact number
1						
2						
3						

Photos of the demographic form and sampling information to be captured using OpenCamera to show the exact GPS coordinates where interviews are conducted with FGD (Community members).

Questions

4.1 Could you please briefly tell when the cash programme took place? ▪ Probing questions for interviewer: <i>Which month and year?</i>	
4.2 Can you please explain briefly the reasons why certain people were chosen to benefit from the programme and not others?	EQ.2
4.3 Did UNICEF and the IPs select the people most in need of cash support? Why do you think that? What would have made the selection better?	EQ.3
4.4 The cash assistance had (or has) the objective to help people <i>[choose one according to programme evaluated]</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recover from the earthquake. better support the cold of wintertime (winter cash) have better access to basic needs during one year (regular cash, Zabul & Samangan) Facilitate financial assistance to the families of those severely malnourished children with complications referred to inpatient care for treatment. (Cash+ - Kabul) To support access to accessing case management and health services, including improved access to institutional delivery, antenatal care and immunizations (Cash+ - Daikundi). To support access to accessing case management and health services, including improved access to institutional delivery, antenatal care and immunizations (Cash+ - Panjshir, Kabul, Paktika and Khost). Same as for Daikundi To ensure households have access to financial support to meet their essential needs (Cash+ - Badghis) Do you think this objective has been (or will be) achieved? Why or why not? What would need to change to achieve those outcomes?	EQ.2 EQ.7 EQ.11
4.4 According to you, how could the different steps of the cash programme implementation be improved? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communicating the objectives of the programme and other related information. How well the UNICEF/IPs communicates and coordinates with community leaders Delivering the money Feedback mechanism 	EQ.8 EQ.9 EQ.10 EQ.16
4.5 Can anyone share how you and your family benefitted from this programme? How long do you think these benefits will last?	EQ.19
4.6 Has the programme led to negative outcomes?	
cash? If so, why is this happening? Where and when?	EQ.2
4.8 In your community, what are the most pressing needs for children? Are needs the same or different for boy and girl children?	EQ.2
4.9 What about the needs for women and adolescent girls in the community?	EQ.2
<i>[This question only if specific needs have been mentioned above]</i> 4.10 Thinking about the issues we just talked about, what would be needed to solve some of the issues? <i>[Ask for specifics on how and who should be involved in designing/implementing solutions.]</i>	EQ.2
4.11 Have you seen that cash distribution programmes have had an impact regarding	EQ.18

the relation between husband and wife? Please explain. <i>[Probe: Relationship in here implies to a situation where either a husband or wife get advantageous of monetary contributions and they usually do not share or hide which leads to some sort of disagreement between each]</i>	
4.12 Do you have any recommendations to improve the overall implementation of the programme?	EQ.12
4.13 Do you think the way money is given to families and the reason why this money is given are good? Does it respect the Afghan way of living, or should it better take into consideration your culture? Please explain.	EQ.12
4.14 Is there anything you would like to add concerning this cash programme or cash programmes in general?	

The FGD is over and thank everyone for their time and participation!

Individual Interview with Kabul Cash+ Nutrition Participants

Introductions, evaluation objectives and consent	
<p><i>"Hello, my name is xxxxx. I am interviewing/calling you because I am doing an evaluation of UNICEF on how well they have been providing humanitarian aid to the Afghan people. Would you please be willing to answer to some question for 20 to 30 minutes? You do not have to participate if you do not feel comfortable. Your participation will be kept confidential as all the interviews we'll be doing for this evaluation.</i></p> <p><i>This evaluation is just to help UNICEF improve its work."</i></p> <p>Wait for answer (if negative, thank the person and wish them a good day. If positive, continue).</p> <p><i>"Before you start, can you please confirm that you have benefited from a single cash transfer from UNICEF to help you concerning a child of your that was admitted to hospital because he suffered complication due to malnutrition.</i></p> <p>Wait for answer. If positive, proceed. People that do not confirm should leave the room.</p>	
<p><i>"Before I start with my questions, I would like to tell you that I have not been part of providing this assistance. My work is only to assess whether the work has gone well. I will be asking you questions as a neutral person so you can feel free to answer honestly. I will not be sharing your name with anyone, not even with UNICEF staff. I will be asking many people the same questions and reporting the overall result. This report will help to improve the support provided to the Afghan people by understanding what you and many others, liked or disliked, what you would have preferred, and how things could be done better next time, either for your community or neighbouring community, or other families in need. Participation is voluntary, and you do not have to take part in this discussion. You can change your mind and leave at any time. You don't have to answer all the questions I ask if you don't want to. There is no direct benefit to you for being part of this discussion, nor will anything you say risk your access to the project services now or in the future. We will be taking notes during the discussion, but we won't name anyone here in the report, and all quotes in the report will be anonymous.</i></p> <p><i>In case you may have any questions or concerns at a later stage, you can contact us at the following number: XXXXXXXX.</i></p> <p><i>Do you understand, and do you accept to participate?</i></p> <p>Wait for consent. If no questions, start the questionnaire. If the interviewee has a question about the interview, answer if you're able.</p>	
Presentation	
Number of people present	

Gender	
Age range	
Questions	NA
<p>4a.1. The cash assistance had (or has) the objective to help families with financial assistance for those with severely malnourished children with complications referred to inpatient care for treatment.</p> <p>Do you think this objective has been (or will be) achieved? Why or why not? What would need to change to achieve this objective?</p>	<p>EQ.2 EQ.7 EQ.11</p>
4a.2. How long do you think these benefits will last?	EQ.19
<p>4a.3. According to you, how could the different steps of the cash programme implementation be improved?</p> <p>Communicating the objectives of the programme and other related information.</p> <p>How well the UNICEF/IPs communicates and coordinates with community leaders</p> <p>Delivering the money</p> <p>Feedback mechanism</p>	<p>EQ.8 EQ.9 EQ.10 EQ.16</p>
4a.4. Has the programme led to negative outcomes?	
4a.5. In your community, what are the most pressing needs for children? Are they the same or different for boy and girl children?	EQ.2
4a.6. What about the needs for women and adolescent girls in the community?	EQ.2
<p>This question only if specific needs have been mentioned above</p> <p>4a.7. Thinking about the issues we just talked about, what would be needed to solve some of the issues? Ask for specifics on how and who should be involved in designing/implementing solutions.</p>	EQ.2
4a.8. Has the fact your received money had an impact regarding the relation between husband and wife? Please explain.	EQ.18
4a.9. Do you have any recommendations to improve the overall implementation of the programme?	EQ.12
4a.10. Do you think the way money is given to families and the reason why this money is given are good? Does it respect the Afghan way of living, or should it better take into consideration your culture? Please explain.	EQ.12
4a.11. Is there anything you would like to add concerning this cash programme or cash programmes in general?	

Annex 9. Evaluation Reference Group

Information is available upon request.

Annex 10. Ethical considerations

The evaluation was conducted in a high-quality and ethical manner guided by professional standards and ethical and moral principles. All KonTerra evaluations are managed by procedures that are designed to both establish minimum and binding standards for ethical evaluations and ensure accountability processes for ethical oversight. This is particularly important in the case of vulnerable populations that have fewer means to protect themselves and maintain their dignity. As in all KonTerra evaluations, the evaluation team complied with the 2020 UNEG Ethical Guidelines and the 2014 Guidelines on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations, as well as adherence to Accountability to Affected Populations commitments and humanitarian principles. Additionally, the evaluation team adhered to the UNICEF procedure for ethical standards in research, evaluation, data collection and analysis (2015) and adhere to the UNEG Pledge of Commitment to Ethical Conduct in Evaluation

Evaluation team considerations

Ethical considerations begin with building the appropriate human, financial and time resources required to develop and implement ethical evaluation processes. KonTerra intentionally seeks out diverse team compositions that are gender balanced, include contextual (social, historical, political) and technical knowledge relevant to the evaluation criteria, and are geographically diverse, including national evaluators. This diversity helps ensure the cultural competence of our evaluation teams with constructive discussions fuelling investigator triangulation to identify appropriate approaches to analysis and presentation of findings that minimize error generated through cultural biases, stereotypes, and differing worldviews among stakeholders. Attempts are made to include team members with competencies in human rights-based approaches (HRBA) to programming, gender and participatory approaches. Upon contracting, teams sign the UNEG Pledge of Ethical Conduct in Evaluation and adhere to the strict ethical and behaviour guidelines required. The impartiality of team members is verified through review of potential conflicts of interest.

Prior to beginning activities, KonTerra conducts a risk assessment to anticipate potential harm (physical, social, and/or psychological/emotional) that could arise from participating in the evaluation, both for informants and the evaluation teams themselves. KonTerra weighs these risks with the potential benefits of evaluation activities to determine the appropriate course of action and develop mitigation measures as needed.

Evaluation design

At inception, the evaluation team budgeted sufficient time for meaningful stakeholder engagement alongside a thorough context review to ensure sensitivity in undertaking the evaluation. Risks considered at proposal design stage were further elaborated during this phase to understand and try to anticipate both intended and unintended consequences of the evaluation process. The team iteratively reviews the initial risk assessment throughout the evaluation process. Available data sources were reviewed to restrict duplication of data collection, reducing the evaluative burden on involved stakeholders.

In line with HRBA, the methodological design incorporated participatory and empowerment approaches and are gender responsive. Evaluation questions explicitly addresses issues of gender and under-represented. The evaluation respects key AAP principles, working as much as possible to incorporate rights holders' feedback to enable meaningful feedback and contribution to evaluation questions.

According to UNICEF processes, an Ethics Review Panel examined the inception report and provided recommendations for meeting ethical standards based on the Ethics Review. The panel was composed of qualified experts having applied an ethics rubric based on the UNICEF procedure for ethical standards in research, evaluation, data collection, and analysis.

Data collection

The evaluation team took practical measures to ensure the empowerment of disadvantaged groups including paying attention to the constitution of group discussions, careful consideration of language and cultural issues, and contextual understanding to ensure that samples adequately reflect the diversity of intervention stakeholders. Evaluators minimize risk to participants through thoughtful design of evaluation tools, avoiding questions that could cause harm and choosing secure locations that are accessible to the invited population group in terms of timing, location, availability of communication means, etc. Data collection tools are designed to be value-neutral and gender, culture and age-appropriate.

Stakeholders are given the time and information to determine whether they would like to participate including explaining the intended outputs of the process. As is done during all KonTerra interviews, before starting data collection, team members clarified their commitments to relevant codes of conduct for these interviews, notably its voluntary nature, non-attribution and confidentiality requirements and that they will not be directly quoted in the report – unless they give specific consent. Evaluators comply with international, national and agency-specific codes governing interaction with participants.

Data protection

Data is collected respecting the confidentiality of participants with clear safeguards when processing personal data, particularly when vulnerable people are concerned. KonTerra's evaluation team treats all personally identifiable information and sensitive personal data of affected populations as strictly confidential. The evaluation team clearly defined roles, responsibilities, standards and protocols for data management, storage and destruction after the evaluation. KonTerra requires that interview notes from the evaluation team are kept electronically on password encrypted computers and that data is compiled in reporting so that individual responses cannot be traced to specific locations or individuals. All aspects of data management are governed by the Personal Data Protection and Privacy Principles adopted by the UN High-Level Committee on Management. Additionally, KonTerra coordinated with the ACO to follow and respect evaluation-specific rules on data protection as relevant.


Analysis and reporting

Analysis and reporting are based on rigorous, fair and balanced assessments of verifiable evidence applying the highest standards of validity and reliability. The evaluation report explicitly addresses how ethical considerations were handled and the TL and QA Specialist assessed the extent to which reports meet the gender related UNEG Norms and Standards through application of the UN-SWAP Evaluation Performance Indicator (UN-SWAP EPI).

Annex 11. List of ToC assumptions

Assumptions	Influence on:	
	Outputs	Outcomes
Quantity of cash received is appropriate to support objectives.	X	X
Duration of support is appropriate to support objectives.	X	X
Participants are integrated into broader/complementary assistance mechanisms.		X
UNICEF is able to effectively coordinate with the De Facto Authorities	X	X
There is sufficient market capacity to respond to participant needs.		X
Currency fluctuations do not distort true value of cash transfer (inflation/deflation)	X	X
There is sufficient cash available to meet distribution objectives.	X	X
Participants can access markets.		X
Cash can be delivered in a secure environment.	X	
Donors' contributions are sufficient to meet needs.	X	
UNICEF has the internal financial capacity to deliver CBA programmes.	X	
UNICEF's risk management capacity is appropriate.	X	
Financial institutions have financial capacity to deliver CBA programmes.	X	
Implementing partners have capacity to deliver CBA programmes.	X	
UNICEF has the leadership capacity to deliver CBA programmes.	X	

Annex 12. Ethical Approval Form



Annex 13. Bibliography

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