



UNICEF's Role in Aceh and Nias: An Interim Evaluation of UNICEF's Programmes, 2006-2007

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Foreword

On behalf of UNICEF Indonesia, I would like to present this interim evaluation report of UNICEF's role in Aceh and Nias, three years on from one of the world's largest ever humanitarian interventions.

The overwhelming worldwide contributions to the tsunami disaster over Christmas 2004, presented humanitarian organizations with the opportunity to deliver widespread emergency responses, to rebuild sustainable infrastructure and to work towards peace in a region wrought by decades of conflict. As part of its initial response, UNICEF established new field offices and recruited more specialist staff in preparation for an intense and ongoing programme of rehabilitation.

This evaluation was commissioned by UNICEF Indonesia to assess our impact and effectiveness within the region in anticipation of the upcoming Mid Term Review. The study was conceived in recognition of the need to review organizational and staffing structures within the Programme to ensure the continuation of a sustainable response. Three years after the tsunami, general reconstruction in the area has been so successful that it seems difficult to find evidence that it happened at all. However, there is still a vast amount of work to be done behind the scenes, such as capacity building with local governments and service providers. Poverty in the area also remains a significant concern and we must work together with partners to design and implement strategies to overcome this important issue.

The evaluation shows that UNICEF has maintained its good reputation throughout the aftermath of this enormous emergency but it is imperative that we support the transition from reconstruction towards sustainable development within Aceh and Nias, and also throughout the entire country.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank all those who have participated in this report and also in the tsunami recovery programme overall; local authorities, partners, National and International NGOs as well as other UN agencies.

The UNICEF staff based in Aceh, Nias and surrounding areas must be commended for their hard work in delivering an effective response, their perspectives are detailed in Annex 1 and are extremely valuable in assessing the future direction of the programme. As the report highlights, a shift in focus, to bring the work in line with the Country Programme is essential to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

Equipped with the results from this report, we will build on the successes of our work so far and apply what we have learned to the rest of the country. Through this, we will ensure that we continue working effectively towards a better future for all of Indonesia's women and children.

Gianfranco Rotigliano
Representative, UNICEF Indonesia

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List of Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AusAid	Australian Government Agency for Overseas Aid
BAPPEDA	Government Planning Department
BRR	Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCC	Core Commitments for Children
CFO	Chief of Field Office
CLCC	Creating Learning Communities for Children
CO	Country Office
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
DoE	Director of Emergency Operations
ECD	Early Childhood Development
EU	European Union
GAM	Free Aceh movement
Gol	Government of Indonesia
HRBAP	Human Rights-Based Approach to Programming
IAS	Information Analysis Section
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MTR	Mid Term Review of the UNICEF-Government of Indonesia Country Programme of Cooperation
MYP	Multi-Year Plan for Aceh and Nias 2006-2010
NAD	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Aceh Province)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NYHQ	UNICEF New York Headquarters
PBA	Programme Budget Allotment
PBR	Programme Budget Review
PPCM	Programme Planning and Coordination Meeting
RO	Regional Office
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNORC	United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Promotion

Executive Summary

This evaluation was commissioned to assess implementation of the UNICEF programme strategy in Aceh and Nias, originally designed to respond to the 2004 earthquake and tsunami disaster and the 2005 Nias earthquake. It makes recommendations to integrate future assistance into UNICEF's overall Country Programme of Cooperation for 2006-10 with the Government of Indonesia at the mid-term of the programme cycle. The evaluation covered the period January 2006 through December 2007. An earlier evaluation covers the period from the time of the tsunami through 2005.

Aceh has a strongly Islamic religious and cultural identity. In alignment with the Helsinki peace agreement, which was signed after thirty years of conflict, it now enjoys considerable autonomy, including large and expanding provincial budget allocations, wider freedom in the local government election process and the introduction of Sharia law. The context of Nias island, part of North Sumatra province, is quite different from that of Aceh. Its homogenous ethnic population, which is predominantly Christian, has been largely neglected by the provincial government, resulting in poor social outcomes. Administrative capacity is weak and the island's remote location and poor infrastructure present many logistical challenges.

The explicit intention of UNICEF to replace its successful early recovery efforts with support to sustainable development is evidenced by the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2006-10 and in particular by the Multi-Year Plan (MYP) for Aceh and Nias 2006-10, which highlights the need to mainstream a Human Rights-Based Approach to Programming (HRBAP) at all levels. Community empowerment and strengthening the capacity of local district and provincial authorities to effectively deliver comprehensive multi-sectoral services are also stressed. However, the absence of a system analysis identifying capacity gaps at the level of families and service providers makes it difficult to understand how strategic UNICEF's interventions were, since they did not systematically identify or address the causes of children's and women's rights violations.

This slow and uneven programme realignment to the MYP has occurred for a number of reasons. The early decision to assume a prominent role in physical reconstruction was probably influenced by the mistaken assumption that building schools, health facilities and water systems would quickly absorb the unexpectedly large volume of funding. The unforeseen complexity of this task, which still requires at least another 18 months to complete, has consumed the majority of staff members' time and creative energy until now, preventing them from focusing on the strategies, programmes and partnerships mandated in the CPAP and MYP. The lack of a clear structure of accountability for programme oversight and leadership inhibited implementation of the vision so clearly described in the plans.

An additional obstacle to implementing the MYP has been the ineffective management of human resources. The most senior staff in Aceh, a two-year duty station, are now beginning their fourth year of service. All Head of Programme posts including the vital Head of Construction position, are currently vacant. Officers who had successfully shouldered the early phase of relief and reconstruction were therefore expected to manage the transition to and implementation of a long-term sustainable programme, while already tasked with the complex responsibility of completing the construction of schools, health facilities and water systems while key staff positions remained unfilled.

The physical reconstruction of the tsunami-related damage in Aceh has been remarkable and much has been done in Nias. Very clearly, the emergency is over and much credit is due to all involved. Equally clearly both Aceh and Nias, albeit for different reasons, suffered poor basic services with resultant poor social outcomes before but also after the natural disasters. UNICEF must now focus on securing the future of Aceh, which is still uncertain given the high prevalence

of poverty and the fragility of peace. Conditions in Nias have highlighted the plight of the many neglected remote areas in the vast archipelago.

Looking forward, it is essential that UNICEF fulfil its public commitment to school construction in Aceh and Nias, including the accompanying software components. It is also opportune to accelerate the implementation of the vision of the MYP and focus on the Millennium Development Goals. All other commitments made during the emergency phase should therefore be reassessed in the light of the current situation in Aceh and Nias and phased out if they are no longer relevant. Should this process result in financial savings, funds should be applied toward current high-priority issues that have not yet been effectively addressed, such as the consolidation of peace, reduction of malnutrition, community development and reduction of maternal and neonatal mortality. To this end, UNICEF should complete a comprehensive situation analysis and sectoral reviews as soon as possible.

There is wide consensus that strengthening the government's ability to deliver quality services through capacity building at all levels is a foremost priority in order to secure long lasting peace. Aceh presents a unique opportunity for the UN to demonstrate its ability not only to respond to a major disaster but to consolidate peace and effectively support a resource-rich province with a very high prevalence of poverty to achieve the MDGs. In coordination with the Asian Development Bank, European Union, USAID, and AusAid, UNICEF should form an operational team with UNDP and the World Bank to support local governments in planning and budgeting to achieve the MDGs. In the context of UN reform, this would constitute a replicable model of 'Delivering as One.'

Future UNICEF assistance to Nias should be in the context of a wider strategy to provide support to the many similarly neglected areas of Indonesia.

It is impossible to restructure the programmes in Aceh and Nias without realigning the Jakarta Country Office with the changes that have taken place over the last decade, particularly with respect to the decentralization and democratization of Indonesian society. UNICEF is now challenged by the urgent need for capacity building in resource-rich provinces such as Aceh (and also, for example, Papua) as well as the human-rights imperative to respond to neglected pockets of poverty such as in Nias and undoubtedly in many other areas throughout the archipelago. To tackle this challenge, the staffing and structure of the Country Office and the roles and locations of its sub-offices will require urgent and comprehensive review and reorganization.

While the emergency is over and UNICEF can be proud of its role during the relief and reconstruction phase, its credibility in Aceh and Nias is still in jeopardy. NYHQ and the Regional Office must actively re-engage to support the transition from a successful emergency operation toward a similarly effective UN-wide initiative to achieve the MDGs in Aceh and Nias and by extension, throughout Indonesia.

1. Introduction

On December 26, 2004, a massive earthquake measuring 9.1 on the Richter scale struck 150 km off the coast of Aceh, triggering a tsunami with waves as high as 12 meters that devastated much of the western coast of the province, including part of the capital of Banda Aceh. Approximately 170,000 people perished and about 500,000 were left homeless. The natural disaster also caused immense social, economic, and environmental devastation to areas that were already poor, and severely damaged the institutional and human resource base on which sustainable development is dependant. While the Island of Nias was only slightly affected by the tsunami, the March 2005 earthquake caused severe damage and destruction to the island's infrastructure and economy, both of which were already weak prior to the disaster.

While the tsunami left a trail of widespread destruction in its path, it also opened previously closed areas to the outside world, which provided opportunity and momentum for the peace agreement between the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed on August 15, 2005 in Helsinki. This ended thirty years of armed conflict which had claimed some 15,000 lives, dislocated thousands of families, and greatly impeded not only public service delivery but also economic and social development.

Prior to the December 2004 tsunami, UNICEF had a limited presence in Aceh and Nias. Country Programme (CP) interventions were implemented by the local authorities and supported through a small UNICEF Field Office (FO) in Banda Aceh. Assistance was exclusively focused on responding to the ongoing conflict by providing essential services in health, nutrition, and basic education. However, in response to the unprecedented size and scope of the December 2004 and March 2005 tsunami and earthquake, UNICEF launched the largest humanitarian relief operation in its history. The initial limited human resources capacity, the need for ensuring transparency, and the pressure to deliver while meeting the Organization's quality standards were major factors in the early phase of the operation. An evaluation report, published in May 2006, identified UNICEF's major achievements in the first six months of response, as well as constraints that were encountered.

In 2006, to smooth transition from recovery to reconstruction and eventually to sustainable development, and to effectively support the Government of Indonesia's (GoI) efforts in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected areas, UNICEF developed a "Multi Year Plan for NAD and Nias" in consultation with the newly established Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR), the UN system and donors. The upcoming Mid Term Review and Regional Programme Budget Review (PBR) scheduled for April 2008, provide an opportunity for UNICEF to review and redefine its role and strategies in light of commitments made in the Multi Year Plan. An interim evaluation of UNICEF's current programme strategies was thus commissioned to define the scope and nature of UNICEF assistance in NAD and Nias for the coming years. By linking the evaluation to the MTR, UNICEF, the GoI and its partners will have the opportunity to fully realign and absorb the tsunami operation into the Country Programme, while applying lessons learned from the tsunami response to other areas of Indonesia.

2. Background to Evaluation

2.1 Purpose

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to conduct an interim assessment of UNICEF's programme strategy and MYP for the tsunami response in NAD and Nias and to recommend a strategic plan to integrate UNICEF's assistance to the tsunami affected area into the Country Programme of Cooperation 2006-2010 at the mid-term of the programme cycle.

In particular, the purpose of the evaluation is four-fold:

- To determine the extent to which UNICEF's commitment and expected results as described in the MYP for NAD and Nias have been met;
- To provide source of evidence of the achievement of the results and UNICEF performance;
- To provide recommendations for the future role, design, focus, strategy and human resources needed for UNICEF's support in NAD and Nias;
- To contribute to building knowledge and to organizational learning on linking emergency response to recovery and long-term development efforts.

2.2 Scope

The scope of the evaluation covers the period January 2006 to December 2007, as the immediate emergency phase was already evaluated.

2.3 Methodology

Key methods for the conduct of the evaluation were:

- a) A comprehensive desk review of relevant external and internal documents (please refer to Annex 4 – List of Documents Consulted);
- b) A review of studies, assessments and evaluations of projects and programmes (please refer to Annex 4 - List of Documents Consulted);
- c) An extensive round of interviews with Government, NGO's, CBOs, UN Agencies at both national and local levels;
- d) Field visits to the selected districts and communities to gain first-hand information of the implementation of projects and programmes;
- e) A survey among UNICEF staff members of CO Indonesia (Jakarta CO, Banda Aceh FO, Meulaboh and Nias sub-Offices) involved in the operation (please refer to Annex 1 – Staff Survey Results);
- f) Organisation of a participatory workshop with staff from Banda Aceh, the Country Office and Regional Office, during which main preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation were discussed, validated and finalized. One of the expected outputs from the workshop was a timetable and road map for action to implement the recommendations (please refer to Annex 3 – Summary of Participatory Workshop Outcomes);
- g) A broad discussion of the draft evaluation report with national authorities and external partners.

3. Current Aceh Context

3. 1 Key Issues Relating to Women and Children in Aceh

Two major events have impacted the lives of many Acehnese since 2004: the tsunami and the Helsinki peace agreement. The conflict was most intense in four districts along the northern coast comprising almost half of all villages and some 40 per cent of the population of NAD, while the areas that suffered the most human casualties from the tsunami were the four districts along the south-east coast and the city of Banda Aceh.

By 2008, the immediate impact of both the disaster and conflict is now history but much remains to be done to ensure the well being of communities, families and individuals. As always the case in these situations, children and women were most negatively impacted. Overall poverty increased slightly in the aftermath of the tsunami but had fallen below pre-tsunami levels by 2006. However, it remains almost double the national average and is predominantly a rural phenomenon with over 30 percent of rural households living below the poverty line compared with less than 15 percent in urban areas.

The quality of public services in Aceh is very poor. For example, in the area of health, many midwives left insecure rural areas for urban centres during the conflict and a major challenge is to provide incentives for them to return to more remote areas. Aceh has one of the highest rates of doctors and nurses in Indonesia, but like midwives, they prefer to live in urban areas. While access to primary health care facilities is generally better in Aceh than elsewhere in Indonesia, a large number of health centres are not functioning due to absenteeism, are in poor condition, and are below minimum acceptable standards. Many health facilities are not in easy reach of communities, for example a BRR project has provided 'Puskesmas plus' (outpatient centres with 24 hour emergency facilities) but they are mostly located along main roads. It is thus not surprising that Aceh's overall health outcome indicators are below the national average. In particular, the status of child nutrition is alarming, with high levels of stunting and underweight (> 40 percent). A survey conducted in March and September 2005 by UNICEF in 18 districts in Aceh province revealed that 44 percent of children in Aceh were underweight, as compared to 26 percent in the rest of Indonesia. The survey also showed that 37 percent of children had suffered from Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI) and 38 percent from fever, while the national averages are 6.3 percent and 20 percent, respectively.

Aceh has a higher school enrolment rate than Indonesia or North Sumatra, its closest neighbour. This holds true across income levels and all types of education, and is partly the result of relatively high education spending (32 percent of total government expenditure in 2004). However, teacher salaries account for 93 percent of all routine spending on education, leaving few resources available to improve the system. Reconstruction has progressed rapidly, and most school facilities have been rehabilitated or are under reconstruction, so basic hardware will not be an issue. Instead, the quality of education remains a concern. Only 37 percent of teachers have the required qualification of a bachelor's degree. Teacher absenteeism is relatively high, and many teachers favour urban areas, obliging the engagement of non-government teachers for rural areas. Indonesia-specific analysis shows a significant negative relationship between poverty, youth employment and education outcomes. Hence, improving the quality of education, through enhancing teaching and learning processes, rather than hiring more teachers, and ensuring a more equitable distribution of funding and materials should be a priority.

Aceh had very low access to clean water and sanitation even before the tsunami. Water was provided to some communities through public and private suppliers using trucks. Where water had once been treated, neglect due to the impact of the conflict meant that many households used shallow wells for drinking water. The close proximity of many water sources to rudimentary basic sanitation resulted in a constant threat of illness and disease. These problems were compounded by the destruction of an estimated 85 per cent of water and sanitation networks in areas directly affected by the tsunami. However, the reconstruction of over 100,000 new houses and hundreds of new schools, health centres and public buildings, has created an opportunity to develop much improved water and sanitation facilities, though clean water and sanitation in non-tsunami affected areas remains a serious concern. In addition, construction and operation of facilities alone will not solve the problems traditionally related to water and sanitation and their impact on public health. Appropriate and innovative systems to fund, manage, and maintain facilities will need to be established, involving participation of communities, as local water supply authorities (PDAM) have rarely managed to create systems that are sustainable.

It is clear that public services in Aceh were in disarray prior to the tsunami, and that the tsunami relief phase is now over. Further analysis needs to be done to determine how Aceh's plentiful

human and financial resources can be best harnessed and applied in an accountable manner in order to achieve sustainable results and improved social outcomes, especially for those most disadvantaged - children and women.

3.2 Decentralisation

Since 2001, Indonesia has been radically decentralising much of its government authority from the national to the provincial and district levels. Exceptions include foreign policy, defence and security, the judiciary, monetary and fiscal matters and religious affairs. In addition to providing much greater authority and development funding, particularly at the district level, decentralisation also introduced a democratic election process for governors and district heads to promote greater accountability. Complex revenue-sharing arrangements are now in place in an attempt to more equitably distribute the nation's wealth among provinces and districts, and Aceh is a major beneficiary of this process.

In practice, the drastic change in responsibilities and lines of control linked to decentralisation and the many revisions of the original plan made to provide a better balance of management responsibility and control at the various levels of government, were not easily understood by all concerned. Recent developments in the ongoing process include standardising the nomenclature of staff in the regional apparatus and limiting the number of administrative units that may exist. This to control the trend of governors or district heads to create more local government units under their authority for political and personal reasons. The implementation of the new Government Regulation No. 41/2007 should eliminate hundreds of structural positions inside the Aceh government.

Further compounding the problems relating to allocation of funding, the budget planning process is complex, not least due to its dependence on central government-determined allocations. For example, the Aceh regional development budget for 2008 is currently being revised for re-submission to the provincial parliament, as central government has lowered the estimated contribution from additional revenue-sharing of oil and gas, due to an expected decline in revenue, and district budgets are being decreased accordingly. In addition to the loss of expected funding, this process will also delay the receipt of funds at the district level for several months, drastically reducing the capacity of the administration to be a reliable service provider.

3.3 Autonomy

The 2006 Aceh Helsinki Peace Agreement granted Aceh wider authority and autonomy to govern including the freedom to form local political parties, nominate individual candidates in provincial governor and district head elections, and formalize Islamic law. It also stipulated that Aceh would receive much larger revenues as a result of increased central funding via the Special Autonomy Fund, and a greater share in its own oil and gas revenues.

The outcome of these changes was that a GAM (Free Aceh movement) candidate was elected as Governor and GAM also won 8 of the 21 district elections. In 2008, Aceh government revenues will increase by USD 500 million to reach a total of approximately USD 1 billion, thanks to the Special Autonomy Fund and additional oil and gas revenue sharing, and the budget for the coming years is expected to increase even more. However, only about 60 percent of this is expected to be allocated to the districts, while 40 percent will remain at the provincial level. The capacity of local government to manage such an enormous increase in funds is limited, and has been aggravated by the loss of a large number of civil servants due to both the conflict and tsunami. Although Aceh ranks third among all provinces in per capita income, poverty levels remain much higher than national levels. So far, little evidence exists to suggest that increased autonomy and associated higher funding will necessarily result in positive change for the poorest, unless the government's capacity to plan and manage funds for the benefit of those most in need is substantially strengthened.

3.4 Prospect of Peace

Peace in Aceh remains fragile and several components of the Helsinki MOU and the subsequent Law on Governing Aceh have not materialized, including trials of human rights abusers and the formation of a truth and reconciliation commission. However, the election of a moderate, civilian, intellectual governor supported by GAM can be regarded positively as a manifestation of the Aceh people's desire for sustainable peace. Governor Irwandi's victory also showed that GAM seriously accepted the Helsinki Memorandum on the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia by abiding by and participating in the political process as regulated in the Law on Governing Aceh.

The Governor has stressed the essential need to improve the economic and social welfare of the poor in Aceh and the eradication of corruption and abuse of power if peace is to be sustainable. In the past, injustice was not only created by the inequitable distribution of revenues from the central to the provincial level but also among groups in the province. Peace and development will depend on reaching all disadvantaged groups, not only those devastated by the tsunami or those bearing the brunt of earlier conflict but also those in remote districts who may feel abandoned. The recent, fortunately thwarted initiative to create further provincial division in the House of Representatives was not only against the Helsinki MOU but also sparked an outcry in Aceh, notably from the Governor himself. The 2009 general elections will be another important factor for the maintenance of peace, and will be a vital test of the leadership and popularity of Governor Irwandi.

3.5 Religion and Sharia Law

Aceh is the only province in Indonesia where Sharia Islam is sanctioned by the central government. Aceh has special status relating to: (i) religious life, (ii) traditional life, (iii) education, and (iv) the roles of *ulama* (religious leaders) in providing advice to the Aceh government on social, cultural and economic development policies, based on the spirit of Islam.

The law of Islam is being introduced gradually. Initially it prohibits the use of alcohol, gambling and "activities leading to adultery" and stipulates whipping as an alternative to fines and imprisonment. Given the mounting reaction to the application of Sharia law (some argue that it is discriminatory and violates women's rights, for example by dictating a strict dress code) other laws will be applied gradually, taking into account public opinion.

The application of Sharia Islam in the education sector includes the development of *dayah* (traditional Islamic education) and modifying the primary public school curriculum to include subjects related to Islamic teachings. The Aceh Governor has established a new government agency, The Office of Development and Guidance of *Dayah* that directly reports to him. Since the application of Sharia Islam, increased attention and time has been given in public schools to Islamic teachings, including reading of the *Quran*, history of Islamic culture, Islamic law, Islamic ethics and moral standards, and liturgy. The main goal is for primary school graduates to be able to read the *Quran* according to required standards.

Thus, Aceh's strong cultural and religious identity and the fragility of peace, along with the government's restricted capacity to manage an important and unprecedented surplus of funds in the coming years, requires the development community to not simply focus on tsunami reconstruction but to contribute to the maintenance of peace in the region by strengthening the government's capacity to provide dividends for its people, in terms of security, income opportunities and access to quality services, especially for children and women.

4. Current Nias Context

Unlike Aceh, the population of Nias, an island belonging to North Sumatra province and located 125 km from the mainland, is largely homogenous, with only 5 percent of inhabitants of non-Nias ethnic background (mostly various *Batak* groups). The predominant religion is Christianity. Both districts in Nias – Nias district and Nias Selatan - have been largely neglected by provincial authorities in North Sumatra, resulting in poor social outcomes.

Nias and Nias Selatan districts have the two highest poverty levels in the province of North Sumatra, well above the Indonesian average. Both districts, but particularly Nias Selatan, lag behind the national averages for most human development indicators. They have the lowest literacy rates in North Sumatra, which can partly be explained by the high percentage of the population aged 15 and over who have never attended school (13.5 percent in Nias district and 39.2 percent in Nias Selatan district). Despite sufficient numbers of schools and teachers in Nias district, large numbers of classrooms are in poor condition, particularly at the elementary level. The remoteness of the Island in addition to its poor infrastructure presents a number of logistical challenges, especially for construction activities. In addition, the quality of education at all levels needs improvement, given the low learning outcomes.

Despite improvements in recent years, health outcomes on Nias Island are still worse than provincial and national averages. The prevalence of poor nutrition in children below five years of age is far higher at 51.8 and 45.8 percent for Nias and Nias Selatan districts, respectively, compared with the provincial and national averages of below 29 percent. A large number of deliveries are attended by traditional birth attendants, rather than skilled midwives. Overall immunization coverage is only 33 percent in Nias district and even lower in Nias Selatan district, at about 16 percent. The shortage of doctors and health workers has been a key problem in both districts, contributing to a lack of health service provision and poor health outcomes. Nias Selatan district has only seven doctors to serve its entire population of almost 290,000, while Nias district has 40 doctors providing healthcare services to more than 440,000 people. This shortage is exacerbated by the unequal distribution of health workers among sub-districts across the island, creating significant gaps in under-developed areas.

In North Sumatra, Nias and Nias Selatan have the third-lowest and lowest access to clean water, respectively, well below the average for Indonesia. While in 2002, over 40 percent of all households on the island had access to clean water, this figure dropped to 15 percent in Nias district and less than 8 percent in Nias Selatan district in 2005, partly as a result of the earthquake, although the worsening trend was already apparent before the earthquake struck.

Data on child protection issues in Nias are scarce. However, it is known that many children are separated from their families for economic or educational reasons. Preliminary results from a recent UNICEF study on violence against children in schools reveal that abuse of children in the classroom is a serious concern.

5. Evaluation Paradigm

Worldwide, UNICEF is committed to a programme approach based on Human Rights, orientated to achieve measurable results, and informed by the latest evidence. In the early phase of a catastrophic event, such as the 2004 tsunami, a full fledged Human Rights Based Approach is often not applied. Instead, the Core Commitments for Children (CCCs), which are meant to address the most acute human rights violations during the early phase of the emergency, are implemented following a rapid assessment of the situation. As the vulnerability of children and women decreases, an in-depth analysis guided by an explicit conceptual framework, is mandated to detect the immediate, underlying, and root causes of human rights violations that were pre-existing or caused by the emergency. Following the identification of the determinants (causality

analysis), the people and institutions responsible for correcting the situation (duty bearers) at household, community, service provider, national and international levels are identified and their capacity to effectively address the violations is assessed (capacity analysis). UNICEF, with others, is then responsible for providing the assistance needed to the various duty bearers when it is not available in the country. UNICEF support could be in terms of knowledge and/or financial, organizational, or human resources, depending on the situation. Capacity building is therefore always the enabling strategy for duty bearers to comply with their responsibilities, particularly when the financial resources are available but not the adequate ability to use them effectively for fulfilling human rights obligations. As the situation requires, UNICEF is also mandated to increase the awareness of rights holders of their rights and of the actions needed to claim them and to contribute to their attainment (advocacy and empowerment).

The Millennium Declaration quantifies the minimum standards of social rights to be achieved universally by 2015. The UNICEF Human Rights Based Approach implies that UNICEF programmes contribute to the awareness, willingness, and capacities of families, service providers, and policy makers in order to achieve the MDGs. On this premise, UNICEF programmes are evaluated not only on the results for children and women but also on the process adopted for achieving them. It is with this official UNICEF paradigm in mind that the Evaluation Team has attempted to assess and analyse UNICEF's activities in Aceh and Nias in accordance with the Terms of Reference.

6. Summary of UNICEF's Achievements, 2006 to 2008

UNICEF's major achievements in the first six months following the tsunami have already been documented in the evaluation report published in 2006, so there is no need to further elaborate on these early accomplishments. Given the unprecedented scale, context, and complexity of this operation, UNICEF should be commended for maintaining its reputation for reliability and efficiency until now. Many of the Organisation's comparators, major international NGOs that have also benefited from an unprecedented amount of donor funds, are presently faced with serious concerns regarding the quality of their constructed facilities as well as serious cases of fiscal mismanagement. Given the early high expectations from Headquarters and donors and pressure to abide by an unrealistic time table, UNICEF staff have managed not only to remain very committed, but to achieve remarkable progress in school construction. This evaluation team would be hard pressed to find any other disaster of this magnitude in industrialized or developing countries where reconstruction has progressed so rapidly and so successfully in only three years. Pending completion of child friendly permanent schools, UNICEF ensured that temporary and then semi permanent schools were timely established so that children continued their education in a safe and conducive learning environment.

Moreover, UNICEF contributed to the rehabilitation of water and sanitation infrastructure and provided essential health inputs, notably measles immunization for over 1,000,000 children, seven rounds of polio immunization and support for neonatal tetanus elimination. In addition training was provided for health staff on malaria diagnosis and essential newborn care, distribution of mosquito nets and micronutrients and re-establishment of cold chain systems, all of which helped to prevent an increase in mortality and morbidity rates post-tsunami.

In the education sector, UNICEF was not only a major contributor to school construction, but also supported the provincial government in the formulation of the 2007-2012 Five Year Strategic Education Plan for Aceh and an accompanying action plan with detailed budget, thereby providing a framework for educational development in the province. Similarly, policy work supported by UNICEF was essential in establishing child protection as a government priority on the legal as well as social welfare agenda.

Overall, UNICEF was a major player in the relatively rapid reconstruction, in the successful effort to avoid post disaster excess mortality, and in establishing a sound basis for sustainable development in education and child protection.

7. Relevance of UNICEF's Programmes to Sustainable Development

The 2006 evaluation report highlighted potential policy implications for the future, and made several programmatic recommendations, for example, addressing the issues of widespread female genital mutilation, lack of birth registration and a preponderance of child marriage and pregnancy. While key recommendations relating to the emergency phase were taken into account, evidence confirming whether the programmatic recommendations were considered was not easily identified. However, the Multi Year Plan 2006-2010, the Country Programme Action Plan 2006-2010, and the report on the meeting for the Mid Term Review (Aceh, October 2007) reflect a concerted effort to realign programme strategies with the shift from recovery and reconstruction to sustainable development.

The Country Programme Action Plan stresses cross-cutting strategies such as a Human Rights Based Approach to Programming, promotion of gender equality, institutional capacity development and full restoration and improvement of social services for children and women in NAD and North Sumatra. Capacity building for sustainable development is recognized as a necessity for strengthening of community health systems and outcomes and building management capacity at district level. Training of government and NGO staff on planning, operation and management of water facilities is also emphasized. It is stated that peace education and life skills education activities will be carried out for junior and secondary school students and the strengthening of policy and legislative frameworks for child protection will be a priority. Improvement of planning and budgeting processes at the district level, in the context of decentralization, is also stressed.

The Multi Year Plan clearly echoes the concepts articulated in the CPAP by laying the framework for programmatic transition from relief assistance to reconstruction, gradually replacing early recovery activities with longer term efforts resulting in sustainable human development and service capacity. It presents fundamental issues affecting children and women in Aceh and Nias, identifies vulnerable groups, and highlights key constraints such as weak capacity of government to plan, implement, manage and monitor local development programmes and strategies. In accordance with the CPAP, a Human Rights Based Approach to Programming, Programme Convergence, and Institutional Development are cited as necessary cross cutting strategies that should be mainstreamed in all interventions. Community empowerment and strengthening the capacity of local district and provincial teams responsible for comprehensive, multi-sectoral services was also stressed.

The report on the Banda Aceh Preparatory Mid Term Review Meeting was produced one year after the CPAP and MYP, and it takes this programmatic transition even further, recommending technical secondment of staff to government in order to build capacity in planning, budgeting, and management, increased strategic partnerships with other organizations, and support to policy development.

Thus, there is no doubt that from 2006 onwards, there was an explicit intention by UNICEF to realign its programme strategies with the programmatic transition to sustainable development. In addition, as confirmed through interviews with UNICEF staff, government counterparts, and bilateral and multilateral donors, there is widespread agreement that absolute priority should be given to capacity building, particularly in light of the expected increase in the government budget.

However, conversations with UNICEF project staff and field visits provided little evidence that activities and their implementation were guided by the overarching strategies of HRBAP, Results Based Management, programme convergence, gender equality, and institutional capacity building as outlined in the MYP. Although positive initiatives related to institutional capacity building have been carried out, such as training of teachers and social workers, support to the Aceh Five Year Education Plan and Action Plan, and capacity building of local government relating to WASH, there is no evidence of sectoral, causality, or capacity analyses which would have helped to identify the capacity building interventions that were needed, despite an abundance of information that would have allowed for such in-depth analysis. In addition, no clear mapping exists of work done by other organizations in each district, or at the provincial level. Without such a comprehensive sectoral analysis, it is not easy to understand the conceptual framework and criteria on which UNICEF selected the specific interventions listed in the MYP Results Matrix for each sector, how strategic these interventions were, and how they complement one another to reach the stated objectives. Rather than grounded in local analyses, projects seem to be a reflection of what UNICEF is doing country wide and elsewhere.

This slow and uneven realignment to the MYP seems to have occurred for a number of reasons. Firstly, commitments made during the relief and recovery phase continued to occupy staff time and creative energy from 2006 onwards, preventing them from fully focusing on the kinds of strategies and partnerships outlined in the CPAP and Multi Year Plan. For example, Education staff were heavily involved in activities relating to school construction, such as site selection, site verification, and resolution of community disputes. The continued emphasis on construction and hardware which characterized the early phase was also carried forward in all other sectors, resulting in new construction commitments that sidetracked the original intent to focus on capacity building and improving the quality of social services. The most notable example of the continued preoccupation with construction activities was the commitment to build 227 community based health facilities (Posyandu Plus) in order to support the Government's policy to reduce maternal mortality through "Making Pregnancy Safer," while also integrating early childhood care and development. This decision was never challenged, despite the lack of in-depth analysis to justify it and the easily verifiable evidence that the major bottlenecks in providing services at the community level are the dysfunctionality of the puskesmas and the unwillingness of midwives to serve in villages. Another example is the semi-permanent Children's Centres, which became the foci for a number of child protection activities. While these centres were useful for registration, tracing and reunification of separated children during the emergency phase, their effectiveness in providing a basis for a sustainable protective environment for children is highly questionable. In an environment where the response to a social problem is often another building and recruitment of more civil servants, UNICEF runs the risk of further delaying the identification of effective solutions by implying that, for example, children need centres to be protected or that mothers need a superstructure to have a safe delivery.

In addition, administrative hurdles such as the short duration of PBAs did not encourage the formulation of long term strategies, thereby restricting space for proper planning and capacity building. Moreover, the tying of donor funds to tsunami affected areas made it difficult for UNICEF to expand activities into more remote and conflict affected areas that were equally, if not more, in need of assistance.

While the CPAP and MYP mention that UNICEF assistance should focus on the district level, a multi-layered government system, comprised of district and provincial sectoral departments, political authorities, and district and provincial planning boards that are responsible for coordinating a very complex planning process, made this difficult in practice.

In addition to a preoccupation with construction, insufficient programme leadership and coordination made it especially challenging for the programmatic vision outlined in the MYP to be translated into practice. Without programme guidance, it is not surprising that the Human Rights Based Approach to Programming and programme convergence were not fully realized.

8. Sectoral Strategies & Analysis

8.1 Health and Nutrition

As stated in the MYP, the intended strategy of UNICEF's Health and Nutrition programme is "supporting health authorities and partners in health to establish an accessible health system that delivers quality health services." However, there is no evidence that an analysis has been carried out to understand why the present health system is not providing quality services, despite the fact that delivery of quality services is mandated by government policy. The functioning, financing and accessibility of current health services, the structural deficiencies of the existing system, such as the real availability and capacity of midwives and why they do not stay at their assigned duty stations, and the condition of puskesmas (including availability of supplies, incentives for health workers, and quality of care) were not adequately examined to determine effective interventions. Instead a limited set of activities was chosen, and it is unclear how these complement one another to achieve the stated outcome in the MYP. Child malnutrition is one of the most striking problems affecting children in Aceh, but UNICEF does not yet have a full fledged strategy on how to address this; instead, activities are often limited to supply of micronutrients and deworming. The weight of previous commitments such as the Posyandu Plus project, adopted, as noted earlier, without a clear sectoral analysis and mapping of interventions by other organisations, has consumed a great amount of staff time and energy. This is not to say that UNICEF supported interventions were not useful or necessary, but they were often not sufficient to produce positive long term outcomes for children, since they did not cover all identified causes linked to child and maternal morbidity and mortality. This absence of a system analysis aimed at identifying capacity gaps at the level of families and service providers severely diminished the effectiveness of UNICEF supported interventions. A wide distribution of mosquito nets in combination with social mobilization was an excellent UNICEF supported initiative in the early phase and is still necessary, but is not sufficient to achieve the outcome stated in the MYP relating to fulfillment of the MDGs.

8.2 Education

The Education programme aims to strengthen the link between educational access and quality over the coming years, with a view to sustained human development and service capacity in Aceh and Nias. It is focusing not only on the school construction project but on systemic issues, such as the quality of education, and community participation in school management to ensure accountability. The Creating Learning Communities for Children (CLCC) project provides training for teachers, principals and communities in order to improve the quality of teaching, introduce new pedagogy, and strengthen school management committees. Moreover, in the area of school reconstruction and CLCC, UNICEF is engaged not only with government schools but with Islamic schools whose curriculum is based on the national curriculum. With partners, UNICEF also supported the government in developing the Aceh Five Year Strategic Education Plan and accompanying action plan. This is a good example of moving from reconstruction towards a sector wide approach, by improving the capacity of local authorities to manage the sector. However, it is still not comprehensive, as the government, for example, stipulates nine years of compulsory education, and the programme does not yet address lower secondary school. Moreover, the quality of education is still poor, and while the CLCC project certainly tries to address this, it is not clear how the improvement of teaching methods is monitored in practice, and the problem of underqualified teachers and unequal distribution of human resources does not seem to be adequately addressed. Students in Aceh also need to be better prepared to compete in a modernized technologically advanced world, especially given the fact that the region is adjacent to countries like Malaysia and Singapore. Thus, modern teaching methods such as the introduction of computers and information technology in classrooms should be seriously considered.

A clear strategy for ECD is yet to be elaborated, either by the government or by UNICEF in Aceh. Some work has been done to train cadres and theoretically, ECD can be combined with health interventions in 'Posyandu Plus'. However, in practice, there is little evidence that ECD links to the posyandu; it is seen as a separate activity and with a very different objective, client base, schedule and staff requirement. So far, most of the support for ECD has been converted into construction or supply when the real need, as articulated by communities, is for skilled teachers. Facilities and play areas can usually be provided by communities. If they are imposed by outsiders, the very concept of community participation is damaged and a dependency culture is encouraged.

8.3 Water, Environment, and Sanitation

The overarching theme for UNICEF's water and sanitation programme is "promoting sustainable solutions for household water security, basic sanitation and improved hygiene." According to the MYP, interventions should focus on capacity development, both at the community level as well as supporting the government to assume its responsibilities in the sector. Major programme components in the 2008 workplan include small town water supply and sanitation construction, rural community WASH, school WASH and advocacy for policy development, coordination, and monitoring and evaluation. It is anticipated that all construction work will be completed in 2008 although some complications have arisen with a contractor which will require reprogramming of this work for two towns.

UNICEF has been helping to coordinate water supply and sanitation work in Aceh with BRR, which had assumed responsibility for this sector as it is classified as infrastructure. Even prior to the tsunami in Aceh, as elsewhere in Indonesia, water and sanitation coordination was complex since many agencies are involved in the sector, including Public Works, local water authorities and the Departments of Health and Sanitation.

In 2008, in cooperation with Ausaid, UNICEF plans to assist BAPPEDA in taking over the responsibility for coordination from BRR. Inputs to this process include forming a task force and helping local government to operate, maintain and replicate successful models. UNICEF is now working with CARE and the Asian Development Bank to coordinate work in various districts and is already coordinating with the Government on WASH piloting in schools in six districts. Further planning and support is obviously required if UNICEF expects sustainable capacity to be developed in government. What is most striking is that there is no clear mapping of what various actors are doing in the sector, and what the main areas of concern are; it is therefore difficult to determine if current interventions are fully addressing existing capacity gaps.

8.4 Child Protection

The MYP states that the Child Protection Programme will focus on stronger advocacy and support for policy and legal development, as well as institutional strengthening and systems development, strengthening of child participation, and awareness raising and changing negative attitudes and practices towards children. The programme has certainly been successful in placing child protection on the policy agenda, through the formation of a Child Protection Secretariat, as well as on the legal agenda through development of a Child Protection Qanun (local law), which addresses such issues as child abuse, exploitation and trafficking, and stipulates a referral system response for all vulnerable Acehnese children. Progress has also been made to build the capacity of service providers (health, law enforcement, social workers and teachers) on child abuse, violence and exploitation. Referral guidelines and procedures have been developed, community awareness on child protection has been raised, restorative justice for children in conflict with the law has been introduced, and efforts have been made to identify a new role for Children's Centres, which were originally created immediately after the tsunami for tracing and reunification of separated children. However, there remains marked weakness in the coverage of social workers and their role is still unclear. The first priority in Child Protection

should now be to conduct a comprehensive situation analysis of children and women to determine and plot the scope of major violations of children's rights in order to influence district and provincial budgets and action plans to better strengthen the social welfare system, closely monitor the implementation of legislation and continue to advocate for alternative care for children to minimize the role of institutions.

UNICEF has initiated a project to mainstream peace education in high schools, which is an important contribution towards helping to ensure the sustainability of peace in Aceh. Given the fragility of peace in Aceh, a more robust set of initiatives aimed at creating a culture of peace and peaceful conflict resolution need to be urgently identified and implemented, particularly aiming at the youth population.

8.5 Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation

The strategic approach in the area of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation is to improve the analysis of data for effective policy making. One outcome of the enormous response to the tsunami has been the production of a formidable amount of data and information on the situation in the province, and only relatively recently has the analysis and interpretation of this data as a tool to direct development interventions received attention. UNICEF has encouraged and supported UNORC to establish an information and analysis section (IAS) to not only interpret data on reconstruction but also help to identify unmet rights and inequities. The ultimate objective of this strategy is to develop the capacity within government (most likely BAPPEDA) to interpret and apply information for planning and monitoring of development programmes. In addition, the capacity of government officials in six districts is being strengthened through training and providing follow up support on conducting a situation analysis of children and women using a Human Rights Based Approach; this is a promising initiative, providing that a strategy is formulated to ensure that results of the analysis are effectively incorporated into the district planning process. Additional support is also planned to strengthen provincial and district BAPPEDA staff in participatory development planning, monitoring and evaluation methodology and in strengthening the capacity of provincial and district BAPPEDA to manage their relationship with UNICEF. The latter should be carefully reviewed in light of the increasing responsibility that BAPPEDA will have to plan and coordinate the activities of numerous supporters of the social sector and the need for closer coordination among all players. Hence instead of having a forum specifically designed for UNICEF's coordination with BAPPEDA, UNICEF should effectively coordinate with other significant players, and collectively engage BAPPEDA. UNICEF supported the Demographic Health Survey in 2007; results are expected shortly and will be a valuable future baseline. In addition to supporting local government, PME should more aggressively monitor UNICEF's programme achievement and promote an in-house culture of results and of evidence.

9. Coordination with Partners

The Office of the United Nations Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias has been established to facilitate a unified United Nations system approach and to lead cooperation and coordination among UN agencies. While periodic meetings are held, the level of agency staff attending and the content of meeting minutes indicate that this is not a strategic planning or monitoring meeting and issues related to administration or operations dominate the agenda. While cordial relations prevail among UN agencies, the concept of 'one UN' or of specific agencies acting as elements of a unified approach is truly not a reality. Large resources available to a limited number of agencies may be partly to blame for this situation, encouraging independence. This situation in Aceh mirrors that in Jakarta where there is little evidence of the concept of a unified United Nations and agency identities remain strong. Unlike some other countries, the Indonesian government does not itself appear to be applying effective pressure for UN reform at the national level and there is no evidence at all that UN reform is on the agenda sub-nationally. The secondment of a senior UNICEF staff to the Office of the Resident Coordinator in Jakarta does

not seem to have a substantial impact on the level of interagency coordination in operation or in programme.

In Aceh, UNICEF, as previously mentioned, has funded the Information Analysis Section within the Recovery Coordinator's office to collect, analyse and interpret reconstruction and development related data for Aceh and Nias. While this was a positive initiative in UN cooperation and some results have been achieved, its full potential has not been realized due to the failure of UNICEF to fulfill its responsibility to appoint a competent team leader.

BRR acts as the main coordinator for infrastructure-related projects. It will wind down its operations starting in October 2008 and will close in April 2009. BAPPEDA is therefore gradually increasing its role as planner and coordinator. The various agencies and NGOs do their best to coordinate through a variety of organized or ad hoc meetings usually based along sectoral lines. As BRR phases out toward the end of 2008, there will be much greater demand on BAPPEDA at both province and district levels to responsibly coordinate development programmes and planning.

In Nias, UNICEF maintains a close relationship with partner NGOs, as would be expected. Relations are apparently positive with Bupatis and government technical departments. However, during field visits, some frustration was noted from the government administration on the slow pace of school construction. More open lines of communication between UNICEF, the Education Office, and communities, with clear information on reasons for slow progress, might be necessary to maintain positive relations. UNORC has a field office in Nias but coordination among UN agencies does not seem to be substantive.

It can be argued that there is always room for better coordination. Given the enormous confusion and urgency to respond immediately after the tsunami, the outcome is remarkably positive. UNICEF on the whole could be considered to have done a creditable job in coordinating with partners and continues to do so. Certainly, as the number of players reduces and as government structures reassume responsibility for many of the tasks currently carried out by BRR or donors, the need for even closer coordination will become more important in order to identify gaps in coverage and programme synergies, and unify support to strengthen capacity of government and communities.

10. Organisational Structure/Operations Setup

The Banda Aceh office is unique in UNICEF Indonesia. It is the first Field Office to be fully decentralised, and thus while it operates as an integrated part of the Country Programme, it has much greater autonomy than the other Field Offices because of the size, nature and complexity of its operations.

The Chief of Field Office in Banda Aceh is responsible for implementation of all activities that are agreed with the Country Office in Jakarta, and he is under direct supervision of the Director of Emergencies. All Heads of Sections report to him, in addition to the Budget Officer, Administrative Assistant, Field Security Assistant and two Chiefs of Sub-offices.

In order to ensure the effectiveness and timeliness of UNICEF's work, a full Operations section in Banda Aceh was established and headed by an Operations Officer (L4). The Operations section has four units, which cover human resources/administration, finance, supply/logistics and IT/Telecommunication. Each unit is managed by an international officer at either L2 or L3 level. 21 General Service staff are evenly spread over the four units. The sub-offices in Meulaboh and Nias each have a small Operations unit managed by an L2 Operations Officer who is backed up by assistants in the areas of finance, administration/human resources, supply/logistics and IT.

To ensure that the Operations Section in the Jakarta CO could provide efficient operational assistance to the tsunami programme, 18 new posts were created across all units of the Section. In late 2005, the total number of staff employed by tsunami funds reached a total of 250, including UNVs, consultants and back up staff in Jakarta. In early 2008, the total number of staff was 170, including 19 in Jakarta.

The office premises and all related functions in the three locations have expanded rapidly since early 2005. They are now all well designed and fully meet the needs of the operation. In terms of facilities, equipment and transport, the Banda Aceh office is better equipped than the CO and other FOs in Indonesia. The entire structure and operations are MOSS compliant and the office has an Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan. ProMs, UNICEF's corporate programme management system has been operational in Banda Aceh since September 2005 and in late 2006 it was introduced in Nias and Meulaboh.

The Field Office and Sub-offices have been evaluated and audited several times and the management and all staff members should be congratulated for the good performance, including establishment and maintenance of appropriate control systems.

Convergence and coordination of programmes is discussed during a monthly Programme Planning and Coordination Meeting (PPCM). A post of programme coordinator was presented to the PBR in 2006 but was discarded because it would make the accountability structure too top heavy, considering the chain of command starting from the Representative, the Director of Emergency Operations, and the CFO. In principle, the DoE and the CFO were responsible for programme guidance, as mentioned in their Terms of Reference. However, with the DoE based in Jakarta and the CFO responsible for direct management of 13 staff, as well as the large scale construction programme, in practice there was a lack of clarity on who should provide guidance on programme strategy and programme convergence, making it difficult to implement a Human Rights Based Approach to Programming. Until now, this has not been adequately addressed.

The evaluation team was surprised to learn that the status of international UNICEF staff in Aceh has not been regularised with that of their colleagues elsewhere in Indonesia. It is expected that this situation will have a negative impact on the recruitment of new staff who will be required if rotation and recruitment recommendations are to be implemented.

In particular, the issuance of Visas of only three months places several restrictions on staff and families among which:

- Passports are often not with the staff as visas are frequently being renewed; this restricts travel and is a security risk.
- There is no certainty that short term visas will be renewed; thus, staff are unlikely to commit to leases, and since rental subsidies are not applicable, guest houses remain accommodation of choice.
- Very few staff are in Aceh with their families, so the already fragile immunity and residence status is exacerbated, as effectively the family exists in two, often distant, locations.
- Staff without long term visas do not enjoy tax-free status, for example, duty free privileges for purchase of a car.

This Visa issue should be resolved as soon as possible, if the office wants to attract qualified staff in the future.

11. Organisation Wide Support

The scale of the 2004 tsunami disaster prompted the largest operation in UNICEF's history. Headquarters was not prepared for the unprecedented magnitude of resources either received or

required. This triggered intense pressure and anxiety relating to the organization's capacity to use the money quickly and efficiently in an environment of fierce competition and under the close scrutiny of media and public opinion. This apprehension was compounded by the Country Office's relative unpreparedness to provide a rapid initial response. The outcome was several hasty programmatic and managerial decisions which continued to impact operations well beyond the acute phase of emergency relief.

The first decision with long term ramifications was to create top-heavy line management consisting of the Representative in Jakarta, the DoE in Jakarta, and the CFO in Banda Aceh. This later obstructed an attempt to include a Senior Programme Coordinator in Banda Aceh, a vital post given the programme volume, complexity and predictable coordination challenges. As of yet, there is little evidence that support from RO or HQ has translated into programme innovation in terms of design and implementation to move UNICEF Aceh beyond the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase.

The other major, immediate programmatic decision was to identify construction of schools, water systems and health infrastructure as UNICEF's key contribution to the reconstruction effort. While this may have been a rational way to absorb the unexpected volume of resources and can be seen as an appropriate response given the huge damage to infrastructure, it wholly underestimated the time that quality construction would take to absorb such substantial resources. Many organizations, such as OXFAM and Save the Children, similarly assumed that construction would swiftly use up funds and also had to struggle with the unforeseen implications of this early decision.

After the initial recovery phase had passed and numerous audits indicated good managerial capacity, interest and support from HQ declined to the present level of virtually non-existent programmatic and operational support. Particularly striking is the fact that essential staff in Construction, Health, Education, Child Protection and WES completed contracts or left in 2007 or early 2008 without replacement and handover/overlap, which in such a complex and delicate situation would normally be seen as essential. Several senior staff in the Aceh office have served and exceeded the duration of their duty (2 years) but have had no effective support in career planning and have not received any conclusive information regarding their rotation. This unreasonable lack of clarity could compromise their ability to maintain high levels of performance, which are demanded by the complexity of the operation and the programme. It is a tribute to their commitment and integrity that this has not yet happened. In addition, the non-rotation of staff in Aceh could deter other UNICEF staff from applying for positions at emergency duty stations, which would have a grave impact on the Organisation's capacity to respond in emergencies.

On the programmatic side, now that the emergency is over, there is an urgent need to transition to a human rights based approach as described in the Multi Year Plan. In the short term at least, this seems unlikely without genuine support from RO and HQ in rotating staff and ensuring appropriate staff selection.

Concerning relationships with the CO in Jakarta, the perception of Aceh field staff is at odds with that of their Jakarta-based colleagues. Staff in the field are of the opinion that in the programme area, little value-added was provided from Jakarta, while some Jakarta based section heads are under the impression that they were largely excluded or not expected to be involved in the design and implementation of programmes in Aceh and Nias. Similar to the Regional Office and NYHQ, there is little obvious evidence that the Country Office has significantly influenced the direction of programming in Aceh or Nias to transition from an emergency based programme to one that is based on the human rights approach and shifts both financial and implementation responsibility to the local government.

12. Proposed Strategic Programme Vision and Framework for Aceh

While UNICEF has clearly recognized in principle that the recovery and reconstruction phase is over, this now needs to be translated into practice. Construction has absorbed approximately half of UNICEF's financial resources and much more of its human resources. Tireless efforts to advance school construction in Aceh over the past year are now paying off, and it is predicted that the commitment to build 346 schools will be fulfilled in approximately 18 months. In order to ensure that programme staff will have the time to dedicate to strategic programme design and implementation relating to accompanying software components of Education (CLCC, support to parent-teacher committees, and school maintenance), school construction will have to be the sole responsibility of the Construction Unit, which implies that the Head of Construction position, which has been vacant since July 2007, must be immediately filled.

All other construction projects should be reassessed to determine whether they will truly meet UNICEF's programmatic objectives, and are still relevant to a rapidly evolving situation. It is particularly important to review the cost-effectiveness and functionality of Posyandu Plus centres, given that such an analysis has not yet been carried out. This is extremely urgent, as designing, tendering and construction is already underway and can only be halted by a management decision to use the substantive resources not for construction of buildings of dubious utility but for profoundly improving the quality of health services for children and women. If it is decided to halt construction of Posyandu Plus centers, this decision will have to be agreed with donors and the communities. While this seems like a disagreeable task, it is certainly preferable to building expensive structures that will have little programmatic impact.

Thus, UNICEF must finally stop looking back at the impact of the tsunami, and instead focus on securing the future of Aceh, which is still uncertain due to the high prevalence of poverty and the fragility of peace. As already stated in the MYP and in the Country Programme Action Plan, 2006-2010, the role of UNICEF should be to ensure that children's rights are embedded not only in national and provincial policies, but particularly in district action plans and budgets. This requires a phasing out of UNICEF projects and the mechanisms that were established to coordinate them. It also requires comprehensive sectoral reviews, in order to identify bottlenecks and develop strategic sectoral plans which would guide resource allocation and set measurable targets. UNICEF should then work in close collaboration with provincial and district government in order to influence district medium term and annual plans so that strategies and resources are in place to advance progress towards the MDGs. UNICEF is already supporting six districts in Aceh to carry out a situation analysis of children and women using a human rights based approach, which is a step in the right direction, provided that the results are effectively used in the planning process.

However, UNICEF will not be able to help the government advance progress towards the MDGs in isolation, and the present level of UN cooperation and coordination is most likely inadequate to ensure a UN-wide effort to support MDG achievement. Aceh presents a unique opportunity whereby all major development actors are already present and financial resources are abundant; if this opportunity is not seized, not only will the UN, and other major players such as the World Bank, the European Union, and bilateral partners, miss the chance to consolidate peace, and advance humanity through the MDGs, but the hard won credibility on the reconstruction front will be forfeited.

Thus, as all major development actors in Aceh, including UNICEF, are prioritizing capacity building of local government now and in the future, it is recommended to establish an operational team in Aceh, composed of UNICEF, UNDP, and other major players that will have a long term presence, such as the World Bank, in close consultation with the Asian Development Bank, European Union, USAID, and AusAid. This team would support district and provincial governments in planning and budgeting for achieving the MDGs and ensuring accessible,

adequate, affordable and sustainable social services.¹ Importantly, membership of such a team would enhance UNICEF's policy space and provide additional leverage to advocate budgeting for children's and women's rights. Moreover, in the context of UN reform, such an attempt would represent an initiative to "deliver as One," through a Human Rights Based Approach, not just in lofty documents, but in a local context, where coordinated and complementary efforts and expertise can be capitalized on in order to deliver real results for children and women. If successful, such a model can be applied to other areas of Indonesia, with similar socio-economic contexts, in the course of the next country programme. The resources saved could be used to tackle high priority areas that have not received adequate attention, for example, maternal and neonatal mortality, under 5 malnutrition, peace consolidation, and community development.

13. Proposed Operational Strategy for Aceh

If this programmatic approach is adopted, the operational, financial, and administrative apparatus in Aceh can be rapidly downsized as the construction nears completion. However, it should be ensured that all staff required for smooth running of the school Construction programme are maintained. Any operations requirements not related to the Construction programme can be carried out by the Jakarta office.

If construction is well managed, it is projected that UNICEF will have several million dollars remaining. A small part of these funds can be utilized to hire a team of three or four experienced planners conversant with a Human Rights Based Approach to Programming, who would be members of the joint Aceh capacity building team. Since projects would no longer exist in the present form, programme sections in Aceh would be phased out and the role of Jakarta staff would be to provide sectoral technical support and knowledge transfer to the Aceh based team. In case there is specific need for sectoral expertise that cannot be provided by the UNICEF Country Office, Regional Office, or Headquarters, short term technical assistance can be contracted from universities, institutions, or the private sector. The Head of Office in Banda Aceh would still be responsible for ensuring a high level of emergency preparedness, as natural and human made disasters are still serious and continuous threats.

It is important to underline that immediate attention from the Jakarta office and NYHQ is needed to fulfill previous commitments in Aceh and ensure successful transition towards capacity building and community empowerment. The present staffing situation is particularly worrying because staff who have served for an extensive period in Aceh are not being rotated and are in danger of burning out, and the strategic position of Head of Construction has been vacant since July. Though the Organisation may feel that the danger of failure has passed, experience shows that construction in such a fragile environment is fraught with unforeseen risks, and if these risks are not properly managed and issues of concern are not promptly addressed, the whole construction project could grind to a halt and result in the loss of UNICEF's hard won credibility.

The non-rotation of staff in Aceh also has grave organization wide implications. Qualified UNICEF staff who observe the lack of a clear exit path from emergency postings will undoubtedly prefer to deal with a dysfunctional organization-wide rotation system from a good duty station at the end of an expected tour of duty, rather than having to double or triple the duration of stay in hardship duty stations, or be faced with losing their job when the emergency funds expire.

¹ It is possible that team members could be directly embedded in government departments on the condition that this would not diminish their ability to be a constructive and critical partner and will not jeopardize their mission to ensure that Human Rights and the MDGs are streamlined in government planning and policy implementation.

An additional obstacle to transition that requires the support of the Jakarta office and HQ is the rigidity of funding of posts (PBAs) that obstructs the provision of two year contracts in Aceh. Unless a solution to this is found, it will be extremely difficult – perhaps even impossible - to attract highly qualified candidates for the positions described above. Furthermore, immediate action must be taken to ensure that international staff members stationed in Banda Aceh and Nias are granted the same status and privileges as those stationed in Jakarta, in order to ensure that staff members and their families are no longer put at risk.

14. Proposed Action for Nias

In Nias, it is estimated that school construction will take an additional 18 months to be completed, and therefore UNICEF will need to maintain an appropriate presence to fulfill this commitment, as well as the accompanying software components of school maintenance and improving the quality education through such initiatives as CLCC. All other activities which can be completed should be carried out with the objective of totally closing the office by the end of 2009. Future assistance to Nias after 2009 should be seen in the context of a broad strategy that will be developed to provide support to the many pockets of poverty throughout Indonesia. A mapping exercise should be done to pinpoint the most neglected areas in order to develop a strategy for assistance, which could be in the form of advocacy with provincial governments to allocate more resources to these areas, and through provision of UNICEF resources.

If this programmatic approach is adopted, the operational, financial, and administrative apparatus in Nias can be rapidly downsized. It is estimated that in 2009, in addition to the Chief of Sub-office, 10 persons working in the area of construction, seven staff in Operations, and three in Education will be needed in order to ensure smooth running of the school Construction programme. The office would then be closed at the end of 2009.

15. Implications for Country Programme

With the recent increase in Indonesia's national budget, UNICEF has to face the challenges presented by poor quality essential services and the resulting persistent poverty in a more strategic way, including redefining its role in the context of the wider UN. The current Country Programme is not in alignment with the rapidly evolving decentralization process in Indonesia and does not consider marked differences or inequalities between provinces, districts, and sub-districts. Instead, a standardized approach is used whereby all programmes are centrally planned.

In order to be more effective and adapt to local contexts, the Country Programme needs to be restructured to respond to at least two kinds of programme typologies:

- capacity building for provincial governments with adequate resources; and
- assistance to neglected areas throughout Indonesia, through advocating provincial governments for allocating adequate resources to these areas, and provision of UNICEF financial and technical support. A comprehensive country-wide mapping of neglected areas will constitute the basis for formulating the most effective and appropriate strategy to assist them. If sub-offices are still perceived as useful within these two programme typologies, their location and role would need to be reviewed in accordance with a clear set of criteria defined in consultation with the government and the other UN agencies in order to guarantee convergency of efforts. Every effort should be made to operate as the UN and not just UNICEF. The Jakarta office should be responsible for national level coordination, policy and advocacy, and provision of high quality sectoral technical support to the sub offices, including quality assurance.

16. Recommendations/Action Points

16.1 Aceh

The reconstruction phase is virtually over, and there is wide consensus that capacity building at all levels is a priority for the coming years. Thus, now is the opportune time to accelerate implementation of the vision outlined in the Multi Year Plan for NAD and Nias and to focus on achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. A close partnership with other major development actors that will remain in Aceh for several years, such as the World Bank, USAID, AusAid, and UNDP, will optimize chances for success. The transition from current activities to future strategies that are grounded in a Human Rights Based Approach to Programming should be rapid and will require a profound revision of present staffing and office structure to be presented at the next PBR.

- 1) No recruitment of programme sectoral experts should take place in the immediate future, except for the Head of the Construction Unit, as school construction remains a highly visible corporate priority and UNICEF must fulfill its commitments as quickly as possible.

In order to guarantee the required competencies and technical skills to fulfill the commitments and needs of the transition phase, (i.e. Education programme, sectoral reviews and situation analysis), a comprehensive assessment of capacity in Jakarta and in Aceh should be done, and any identified gaps should be addressed with short term contracted expertise.

- 2) Issues regarding staff status, especially related to visas and diplomatic privileges, must be immediately resolved in order to provide equity and appropriate protection to all existing international staff and to attract new high level staff by the end of 2008.
- 3) Staff who have been in Aceh for more than two years should be immediately rotated, including the Chief of Field Office, and replaced where required. The new CFO should have the competencies and skills needed for the rapid conclusion of school construction and the smooth operational and programmatic transition.
- 4) All unfinished commitments should be reviewed for effectiveness and relevance to sustainable development, notably the Posyandu Plus project. Money should be reallocated with donor agreement to a Nutrition Fund/Community Development Fund/Peace Consolidation Fund/Maternal and Neonatal Mortality Reduction Fund.
- 5) The new office structure, including an 18 month closing phase and downsizing strategy, as well as plans for a new capacity building unit for Aceh, should be finalized and presented to the PBR.
- 6) Programme staff in Jakarta should become responsible for quality assurance of programmes in Aceh. The responsibility for programme management should remain with Banda Aceh.
- 7) The Education Programme should continue with software components (CLCC, policy development, etc.) until completion of school construction project, in order to ensure delivery of a full package.
- 8) A situation analysis of children and women in Aceh, including sector wide reviews, should begin for all sectors, in order to implement a Human Rights Based Approach to Programming and Results Based Management, as outlined in the Multi Year Plan.

These analyses will also provide necessary ground work for the Aceh capacity building team.

- 9) After the PBR, one L-5 officer, one L-4 officer, and one NOD officer with experience in Human Rights Based Approach to Programming and institutional development should be recruited to form a capacity building team consisting of UNICEF, the World Bank and UNDP. Additional staff requirements and profiles should be determined on the basis of the decision taken regarding the use of the remaining funds (peace consolidation, malnutrition, community development, maternal and neonatal mortality).

16.2 Nias

Future support to Nias has to be seen in the broader context of UNICEF's strategies for neglected areas and not as post earthquake recovery.

- 1) No recruitment should take place, except for the Construction Officer.
- 2) The office should be phased out by the end of 2009. Education activities (hardware and software components) should continue until 2009.
- 3) All other commitments in relation to the MYP should be reviewed and all activities should be phased out by the end of 2008.
- 4) The CO should advocate with the provincial government for more resources to be allocated to Nias.

16.3 Jakarta CO

The Jakarta Country Office does not yet reflect today the changes in Indonesian society which have taken place over the past ten years. There is need for a profound restructuring of UNICEF's presence in Indonesia, mainly to be able to respond to the need of capacity building for resource rich provinces, as well as to identify, advocate, and support neglected and extremely disadvantaged areas. This will require significant changes to the role, staffing and central office structure, as well as the number, location and roles of the field offices.

- 1) The Country Office should develop a strategy to provide assistance and capacity building to provinces that have adequate financial resources, for example Aceh and Papua.
- 2) A mapping of neglected and extremely disadvantaged areas should be carried out and a support and development strategy devised consisting of technical assistance, field assistance, and advocacy.
- 3) The roles and locations of field and sub offices should be reviewed on the basis of these two models.
- 4) The role of the Jakarta office should be to provide quality assurance of programmes, central policy, advocacy, and coordination. Staff in Jakarta should be sectoral experts, Human Rights Based Approach to Programming experts, and policy research experts. This implies a smaller and more technical office.
- 5) The Aceh model of capacity building should be implemented for two years and take on a new configuration within the 2011-2015 Country Programme.

- 6) Joint offices or programmes with UNDP, the World Bank, and other major development actors in the region should be implemented where possible.

16.4 NYHQ and RO

UNICEF's credibility in Aceh is still in jeopardy, so NYHQ should continue to support the office.

- 1) NYHQ should help with resolving issues relating to staff status in Aceh (visas, diplomatic privileges, etc.) to ensure equal status for all staff, and recruit highly skilled staff for Aceh capacity building team.
- 2) NYHQ should actively manage the rotation of staff in Aceh who are overdue.
- 3) The Regional Office, Programme Division and Division of Policy and Planning should be closely involved in selecting and supporting the staff who will work on Human Rights Based Approach to Programming and capacity building, as this constitutes a unique and momentous opportunity for UNICEF to translate policy into practice.

17. Conclusion

The tsunami response was relatively effective, as mortality and morbidity rates remained the same before and after the disaster. The reconstruction phase is now virtually over, and the ample opportunities provided by major infrastructure reconstruction, peace, decentralization, autonomy and the massive increase in 'fiscal space' should be exploited to improve the situation of the Acehnese people. Adequate assistance should be provided on an urgent basis to local administration and communities to ensure that the available human and financial resources are harnessed and applied in an accountable manner to achieve improved and sustainable social outcomes. The shift from reconstruction to sustainable development will require profound restructuring of the Country Office, Field Office, and Sub Offices. Close coordination with the World Bank, UN agencies and other major development partners will minimize the risk of failure, and help to ensure that the strategic vision that UNICEF originally laid out in the Multi Year Plan and in the Country Programme Action Plan is finally realized. Headquarters and the Regional Office should actively reengage in the support of this endeavor and play a meaningful role in facilitating the transition from an effective and successful emergency operation towards a similarly effective UN wide initiative to achieve the MDGs in all of Indonesia and particularly in Aceh and Nias.

Annex 1 — Staff Survey Results

A. Questionnaire on the Tsunami and Earthquake Response in Aceh & Nias for UNICEF Aceh staff (including Meulaboh)

This form provides an opportunity for you to contribute to the current evaluation exercise on the tsunami response. The objective is to obtain the widest possible advice and opinions on the work undertaken to date. You do not need to provide your name. Please be assured that all results will be combined and will remain anonymous. Underline the answer you think is most appropriate from your point of view.

1) I am a:

General Service Staff (GSS)	n = 19
National Officer Outside Aceh (NOOA)	n = 20
National Officer Acehese (NOA)	n = 8
International Officer (IO)	n = 19
Total Respondents	n = 66

2) **Immediately after the tsunami**, do you think that UNICEF concentrated on the kind of **programmes** in which it had a comparative advantage (i.e. those it had the most expertise/experience in and could carry out most effectively)?

	Yes	Partly	No	N/A
GSS	11	8	0	0
NOOA	10	8	1	1
NOA	5	3	0	0
IO	11	6	1	1
Total	37 (56%)	25 (38%)	2 (3%)	2 (3%)

3) **Today**, do you think that UNICEF is concentrating on the kind of **programmes** in which it has a comparative advantage (i.e. those it has the most expertise/experience in and can carry out most effectively)?

	Yes	Partly	No
GSS	10	7	2
NOOA	12	7	1
NOA	5	3	0
IO	9	10	0
Total	36 (55%)	27 (41%)	3 (4%)

4) **Today**, do you think that UNICEF's programmes are relevant to the current situation of children and women in NAD and Nias?

	Yes	Partly	No
GSS	8	9	2
NOOA	14	6	0
NOA	5	3	0
IO	14	5	0
Total	41 (62%)	23 (35%)	2 (3%)

5) Do you think that UNICEF's programmes are currently in line with the transition from recovery to development in NAD and Nias?

	Yes	Partly	No	N/A
GSS	10	9	0	0
NOOA	12	6	2	0
NOA	6		2	0
IO	11	6	1	1
Total	39 (59%)	23 (5%)	3 (4%)	1 (2%)

6) The current poor quality of public services in Aceh has **mostly** been the result of the impact of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami.

	True	False	N /A
GSS	5	12	2
NOOA	5	15	0
NOA	4	4	0
IO	3	16	0
Total	17 (26%)	47 (71%)	2 (3%)

7) The current poor quality of public services in Nias has **mostly** been the result of the impact of the 2005 earthquake.

	True	False	N/A
GSS	5	11	3
NOOA	3	15	2
NOA	4	4	0
IO	3	14	2
Total	15 (23%)	44 (67%)	7 (10%)

8) At which level of government do you think UNICEF Aceh should currently direct the majority of its assistance in order to improve social outcomes for children and women?

	Provincial	District	Sub-district	National	N/A
GSS	6	7	6	2	0
NOOA	15	4	0	0	1
NOA	2	3	3	0	0
IO	2	13	4	0	0
Total	25 (37%)	27 (40%)	13 (19%)	2 (3%)	1 (1%)

9) Do you think that UNICEF's activities and results in the following areas are sustainable?

Education	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	9	6	2	1	1
NOOA	12	5	2	0	1
NOA	4	2	1	0	1
IO	8	9	1	1	0
Total	33 (50%)	22 (33%)	6 (9%)	2 (3%)	3 (5%)

Health & Nutrition	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	7	7	2	2	1
NOOA	12	7	0	1	0
NOA	2	3	2	1	0
IO	6	10	1	1	1
Total	27 (41%)	27 (41%)	5 (8%)	3 (4%)	4 (6%)

Water & Sanitation	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	9	6	2	1	1
NOOA	4	14	1	1	0
NOA	1	3	1	1	2
IO	5	10	2	2	0
Total	19 (29%)	33 (50%)	6 (9%)	5 (8%)	3 (4%)

Child Protection	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	7	6	3	1	2
NOOA	5	12	1	1	1
NOA	2	2	1	1	2
IO	5	7	5	0	2
Total	19 (29%)	27 (41%)	10 (15%)	3 (4%)	7 (11%)

10) In general, do you think that UNICEF's projects and programmes are evolving towards progressive ownership by local/national partners?

	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	5	7	6	1	0
NOOA	9	6	4	1	0
NOA	4	2	0	1	1
IO	5	11	1	2	0
Total	23 (35%)	26 (39%)	11 (16%)	5 (8%)	1 (2%)

11) Do you think that the **activities** being carried out by UNICEF in the following areas make the most efficient use of financial and human resources?

Education

	Yes	Partly	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	6	8	2	0	3
NOOA	9	4	3	2	2
NOA	3	3	2	0	0
IO	7	10	2	0	0
Total	25 (38%)	25 (38%)	9 (13%)	2 (3%)	5 (8%)

Health & Nutrition

	Yes	Partly	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	5	7	4	1	2
NOOA	12	7	1	0	0
NOA	2	3	3	0	0
IO	6	5	5	0	3
Total	25 (38%)	22 (33%)	13 (20%)	1 (1%)	5 (8%)

Water & Sanitation

	Yes	Partly	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	9	6	2	1	1
NOOA	8	8	2	2	0
NOA	1	3	2	1	1
IO	6	8	3	0	2
Total	24 (36%)	25 (38%)	9 (14%)	4 (6%)	4 (6%)

Child Protection

	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	5	7	1	3	3
NOOA	7	6	3	2	2
NOA	2	2	2	1	1
IO	6	5	5	0	3
Total	20 (30%)	20 (30%)	11 (17%)	6 (9%)	9 (14%)

12) How would you rate collaboration between your office and: (if you don't know, don't answer)

a) Government counterparts at province level

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	N/A
GSS	4	7	2	6
NOOA	6	5	3	6
NOA	6	1	0	1
IO	7	5	5	2
Total	23 (35%)	18 (27%)	10 (15%)	15 (23%)

b) Government counterparts at district level

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	N/A
GSS	2	6	6	5
NOOA	7	5	4	4
NOA	3	2	2	1
IO	2	16	1	0
Total	14 (21%)	29 (44%)	13 (20%)	10 (15%)

c) Other UN agencies

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	N/A
GSS	2	4	3	10
NOOA	5	10	1	
NOA	2	3	0	3
IO	3	9	3	4
Total	12 (18%)	26 (39%)	7 (11%)	21 (32%)

d) UNICEF Jakarta

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	N/A
GSS	4	7	3	5
NOOA	5	10	2	3
NOA	3	2	0	3
IO	1	10	4	4
Total	13 (19%)	29 (44%)	9 (14%)	15 (23%)

e) Other partners/NGOs

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	N/A
GSS	1	7	6	5
NOOA	4	10	4	2
NOA	1	5	1	1
IO	2	11	3	3
Total	8 (12%)	33 (50%)	14 (21%)	11 (17%)

f) The private sector (contractors/suppliers etc)

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	N/A
GSS	1	7	3	9
NOOA	0	10	3	7
NOA	2	3	1	2
IO	1	9	4	5
Total	4 (6%)	29 (44%)	11 (17%)	22 (33%)

13) Do you think UNICEF has formed **strategic** partnerships with the following, to the best of its ability (excluding construction)?:

UN agencies?

	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	7	4	3	3	2
NOOA	5	10	2	3	0
NOA	4	2	1	0	1
IO	5	5	6	2	1
Total	21 (32%)	21 (32%)	12 (18%)	5 (8%)	7 (11%)

International NGOs?

	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	2	9	3	0	5
NOOA	5	7	4	3	1
NOA	3	1	4	0	0
IO	4	8	5	1	1
Total	14 (21%)	25 (38%)	16 (24%)	4 (6%)	7 (11%)

National/local NGOs?

	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	3	6	6	2	2
NOOA	4	5	8	0	3
NOA	3	2	3	0	0
IO	2	9	5	2	1
Total	12 (18%)	22 (33%)	22 (33%)	4 (6%)	6 (9%)

14) Is programming based on an objective assessment of needs, rights and capacity gaps

	Yes	Partly	A little	Not at all	N/A
GSS	4	5	8	1	1
NOOA	9	8	2	1	0
NOA	2	4	2	0	0
IO	4	9	4	0	2
Total	19 (28%)	26 (39%)	16 (24%)	2 (3%)	3 (6%)

15) To what extent is programming driven by funding opportunities?

	Greatly	Partly	Not at all	N/A
GSS	7	7	2	3
NOOA	7	11	1	1
NOA	5	3	0	0
IO	5	7	3	4
Total	24 (36%)	28 (43%)	6 (9%)	8 (12%)

16) Upon assuming your post in UNICEF Aceh, did you receive sufficient information/guidance to effectively carry out the tasks assigned to you?

Greatly	Partly	No	N/A	
GSS	8	10	1	0
NOOA	6	11	2	1
NOA	4	3	1	0
IO	3	10	3	3
Total	21 (32%)	34 (51%)	7 (11%)	4 (6%)

17) How would you rate your working relationship with your colleagues in the Aceh office?

	Excellent	Satisfactory	Poor	N/A
GSS	8	9	2	0
NOOA	5	13	1	1
NOA	7	0	1	0
IO	10	9	0	0
Total	30 (45%)	31 (47%)	4 (6%)	1 (2%)

18) How would you rate working relations with your supervisor?

	Excellent	Satisfactory	Difficult at times	N/A
GSS	6	5	7	1
NOOA	5	13	2	0
NOA	7	0	1	0
IO	12	6	1	0
Total	30 (45%)	24 (36%)	11 (17%)	1 (2%)

19) **Immediately after the tsunami**, was the technical capacity and competencies of UNICEF staff in Aceh sufficient for effective implementation of UNICEF programmes?

	Yes	Partly	Not really	Not at all	N/A
GSS	4	10	4	0	1
NOOA	3	10	5	1	1
NOA	2	3	3	0	0
IO	5	3	3	2	6
Total	14 (21%)	26 (39%)	15 (23%)	3 (5%)	8 (12%)

20) Are staff currently in UNICEF Aceh equipped with the technical capacity and competencies needed for effective implementation of UNICEF programmes?

Yes	Partly	Not really	No	N/A	
GSS	6	7	5	0	1
NOOA	6	10	3	0	1
NOA	2	4	2	0	0
IO	5	10	2	1	1
Total	19(29%)	31 (47%)	12 (18%)	1 (1%)	3 (5%)

21) What is the role of UNICEF Jakarta in relation to UNICEF Aceh?

	Technical Assistance (TA)	Supervision	Super. & TA	Not clear	N/A
GSS	8	1	3	7	0
NOOA	9	2	3	4	2

NOA	2	2	3	1	0
IO	4	0	8	7	0
Total	23 (35%)	5 (7%)	17 (26%)	19 (29%)	2(3%)

22) What is the role of UNICEF Banda Aceh in relation to sub-offices?

	TA	Supervision	Super. & TA	Not clear	N/A
GSS	0	0	12	6	1
NOOA	7	1	8	2	2
NOA	2	0	4	2	0
IO	5	0	13	1	0
Total	14 (21%)	1 (1%)	37 (56%)	11 (17%)	3 (5%)

23) The amount of money that UNICEF has to effectively carry out its programmes in Aceh and Nias is:

	Too much	Sufficient	Not enough	Do not know	N/A
GSS	3	11	4	0	1
NOOA	6	11	1	0	2
NOA	2	4	2	0	0
IO	6	7	3	1	2
Total	17 (26%)	33 (50%)	10 (15%)	1 (1%)	5 (8%)

24) Do you feel that decision-making processes related to the future of the UNICEF Aceh office have been communicated in a transparent manner

	Yes	No	N/A
GSS	9	10	0
NOOA	9	9	2
NOA	4	2	2
IO	6	12	1
Total	28 (42%)	33 (50%)	5 (8%)

25) How satisfied are you with the benefits you are receiving as a UNICEF staff member in Aceh?

	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Unsatisfied	N/A
GSS	3	14	2	0
NOOA	1	17	1	1
NOA	5	2	1	0
IO	2	10	7	0
Total	11 (17%)	43 (65%)	11 (17%)	1 (1%)

26) Do you feel that the benefits you are receiving correspond to the **current** living situation in Aceh?

	Yes	No	N/A
GSS	11	7	1
NOOA	14	4	2
NOA	5	2	1
IO	7	12	0
Total	37 (56%)	25 (38%)	4 (6%)

27) How do you feel about your current workload?

	Sometimes frustrated	Usually frustrated	Satisfied	Indifferent	N/A
GSS	10	3	6	0	0
NOOA	9	2	8	0	1
NOA	4	0	3	0	1
IO	4	4	10	1	0

Total	27 (41%)	9 (14%)	27 (41%)	1 (1%)	2 (3%)
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28) In your current position, how often do you feel you have the opportunity to apply your knowledge and skills?

	Always	Usually	Rarely	Never	N/A
GSS	3	11	3	1	1
NOOA	3	10	4	0	3
NOA	3	3	1	0	1
IO	7	8	3	0	1
Total	16 (24%)	32 (48%)	11 (17%)	1 (2%)	6 (9%)

29) Are you currently looking for a job with:

	UNICEF	UN agency	NGO	Private sector	Not looking
GSS	9	4	3	2	7
NOOA	9	4	4	0	9
NOA	2	1	1	1	3
IO	13	6	2	0	1
Total	33 (41%)	15 (19%)	10 (12%)	3 (4%)	20 (25%)

Respondents chose more than one answer, so percentage is out of total number of answers, not of respondents.

30) Do you expect support from UNICEF in finding another job?

	Yes	No	N/A
GSS	18	1	0
NOOA	16	3	1
NOA	6	0	2
IO	18	1	0
Total	58 (88%)	5 (8%)	3 (4%)

31) If you answered "yes" to the above question, do you think that UNICEF will provide this support?

	Yes	No	N/A
GSS	12	6	0
NOOA	10	4	2
NOA	4	2	0
IO	6	12	0
Total	32 (55%)	24 (42%)	2 (3%)

32) If you are looking for a position in another UNICEF office, do you think how you perform in your current position (i.e. your professional performance) is related to your chances of obtaining another position with the Organisation?

	Definitely	Somewhat	Not really	No	N/A
GSS	17	1	1	0	
NOOA	7	11	1	1	
NOA	4	0	3	1	
IO	6	12	0	1	
Total	34 (51%)	24 (36%)	5 (8%)	1 (2%)	2 (3%)

B. Questionnaire on the Tsunami and Earthquake Response in Aceh and Nias for UNICEF Jakarta staff

This form provides an opportunity for you to contribute to the current evaluation exercise on the tsunami response. The objective is to obtain the widest possible advice and opinions on the work undertaken to date. You do not need to provide your name. All results will be combined and will remain anonymous. Underline the answer you think is most appropriate from your point of view.

N = 35

1) **Immediately after the tsunami**, do you think that UNICEF concentrated on the kind of **programmes** in which it had a comparative advantage (i.e. those it had the most expertise/experience in and could carry out most effectively)?

Yes **16 (46%)** Partly **16 (46%)** No **2 (5%)** NA **1 (3%)**

2) **Today**, do you think that UNICEF is concentrating on the kind of **programmes** in which it has a comparative advantage (i.e. those it has the most expertise/experience in and can carry out most effectively)?

Yes **12 (34%)** Partly **19 (54%)** No **3 (9%)** NA **1 (3%)**

3) **Today**, do you think that UNICEF's programmes are relevant to the current situation of children and women in NAD and Nias?

Yes **16 (46%)** Partly **18 (51%)** No **1 (3%)**

4) Do you think that UNICEF's programmes are currently in line with the transition from recovery to development in NAD and Nias?

Yes **11 (31%)** Partly **17 (49%)** No **6 (17%)** NA **1 (3%)**

5) The current poor quality of public services in Aceh has **mostly** been the result of the impact of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami.

True **15 (43%)** False **19 (54%)** NA **1 (3%)**

6) The current poor quality of public services in Nias has **mostly** been the result of the impact of the 2005 earthquake.

True **16 (46%)** False **16 (46%)** NA **3 (8%)**

7) At which level of government do you think UNICEF Aceh should **currently** direct the majority of its assistance in order to improve social outcomes for children and women?

Provincial **7 (20%)** District **23 (66%)** Sub-district **3 (8%)** National **2 (6%)**

8) Do you think that UNICEF's activities and results in the following areas are sustainable?

	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	NA
Education	12 (34%)	14 (40%)	6 (17%)	1 (3%)	2 (6%)
Health	11 (31%)	15 (43%)	6 (17%)	1 (3%)	2 (6%)
Water/sanitation	7 (20%)	14 (40%)	6 (17%)	2 (6%)	6 (17%)
Child protection	10 (29%)	10 (29%)	9 (26%)	1 (3%)	5 (14%)

9) In general, do you think that UNICEF's projects and programmes are evolving towards progressive ownership by local/national partners?

Yes **3 (8%)** Somewhat **22 (63%)** Not really **8 (23%)** No **1 (3%)** NA **1 (3%)**

10) Do you think that the **activities** being carried out by UNICEF in the following areas make the most efficient use of financial and human resources?

	Yes	Partly	Not really	No	NA
Education	11 (31%)	11 (31%)	6 (17%)	2 (6%)	5 (14%)
Health	6 (17%)	14 (40%)	7 (20%)	2 (6%)	6 (17%)
Water and sanitation	4 (11%)	16 (46%)	6 (17%)	2 (6%)	7 (20%)
Child protection	9 (26%)	9 (26%)	9 (26%)	2 (6%)	6 (17%)

11) How would you rate collaboration between UNICEF Banda Aceh and: (if you don't know, don't answer)

a) Government counterparts at province level

Excellent **4 (11%)** Adequate **11 (31%)** Poor **6 (17%)** NA **14 (40%)**

b) Government counterparts at district level

Excellent **1 (3%)** Adequate **10 (28%)** Poor **7 (20%)** NA **18 (51%)**

c) Other UN agencies

Excellent **2 (6%)** Adequate **10 (28%)** Poor **7 (20%)** NA **16 (46%)**

d) UNICEF Jakarta

Excellent **0 (0%)** Adequate **14 (40%)** Poor **11 (31%)** NA **10 (28%)**

e) Other partners/NGOs

Excellent **1 (3%)** Adequate **14 (40%)** Poor **4 (11%)** NA **16 (46%)**

f) The private sector (contractors/suppliers etc)

Excellent **0 (0%)** Adequate **10 (28%)** Poor **7 (20%)** NA **18 (51%)**

12) Do you think UNICEF has formed **strategic** partnerships with the following, to the best of its ability (excluding construction)?:

UN agencies?

Yes **4 (11%)** Somewhat **8 (23%)** Not really **10 (28%)** No **2 (6%)** NA **11 (31%)**

International NGOs?

Yes **4 (11%)** Somewhat **10 (28%)** Not really **9 (26%)** No **1 (3%)** NA **11 (31%)**

National/local NGOs?

Yes **1 (3%)** Somewhat **13 (37%)** Not really **9 (26%)** No **1 (3%)** NA **11 (31%)**

13) Is programming based on an objective assessment of needs, rights and capacity gaps?

Yes **5 (14%)** Partly **14 (40%)** A little **12 (34%)** Not at all **2 (6%)** NA **2 (6%)**

14) To what extent is programming driven by funding opportunities?

Greatly **22 (63%)** Partly **7 (20%)** A little **4 (11%)** Not at all **0 (0%)** NA **2 (6%)**

15) How would you rate your working relationship with your colleagues in the Banda Aceh office?

Excellent **2 (6%)** Satisfactory **21 (60%)** Poor **11 (31%)** NA **1 (3%)**

16) **Immediately after the tsunami**, was the technical capacity and competencies of UNICEF staff in Aceh sufficient for effective implementation of UNICEF programmes?

Yes **4 (11%)** Partly **12 (34%)** Not really **12 (34%)** No **5 (14%)** NA **2 (6%)**

17) Are staff currently in UNICEF Banda Aceh equipped with the technical capacity and competencies needed for effective implementation of UNICEF programmes?

Yes **6 (17%)** Partly **16 (46%)** Not really **8 (23%)** No **4 (11%)** NA **1 (3%)**

18) What is the role of UNICEF Jakarta in relation to UNICEF Banda Aceh?

Technical advice **8 (23%)** Supervision **0 (0%)**

Supervision and technical advice **17 (49%)** Not clear to me **10 (29%)**

19) The amount of money that UNICEF has to effectively carry out its programmes in Aceh and Nias is:

Too much **22 (63%)** Sufficient **13 (37%)** Not enough **0**

20) Do you feel that decision-making processes related to the future of the UNICEF Aceh office have been communicated in a transparent manner?

Yes **12 (34%)** No **23 (66%)**

C. Questionnaire on the Tsunami and Earthquake Response in Aceh & Nias for UNICEF Nias staff

This form provides an opportunity for you to contribute to the current evaluation exercise on the tsunami response. The objective is to obtain the widest possible advice and opinions on the work undertaken to date. You do not need to provide your name. Please be assured that all results will be combined and will remain anonymous. Underline the answer you think is most appropriate from your point of view.

1) I am a:

National Officer	8
International Officer	6
General Service Staff	4
Total	18

2) **Immediately after the tsunami**, do you think that UNICEF concentrated on the kind of programmes in which it had a comparative advantage (i.e. those it had the most expertise/experience in and could carry out most effectively)?

	Yes	Partly	No	NA
NO	2	1	1	4
IO	2	3	0	1
GS	0	1	1	2
Total	4 (22%)	5 (28%)	2 (11%)	7 (39%)

3) **Today**, do you think that UNICEF is concentrating on the kind of programmes in which it has a comparative advantage (i.e. those it has the most expertise/experience in and can carry out most effectively)?

	Yes	Partly	No
NO	2	5	1
IO	3	3	0
GS	2	2	0
Total	7 (39%)	10 (55%)	1 (6%)

4) **Today**, do you think that UNICEF's programmes are relevant to the current situation of children and women in NAD and Nias?

	Yes	Partly	No
NO	4	3	1
IO	5	1	0
GS	2	2	0
Total	11 (61%)	6 (33%)	1 (6%)

5) Do you think that UNICEF's programmes are currently in line with the transition from recovery to development in NAD and Nias?

	Yes	Partly	No
NO	1	6	1
IO	1	5	0
GS	3	1	0
Total	5 (28%)	12 (66%)	1 (6%)

6) The **current** poor quality of public services in Nias has mostly been the result of the impact of the 2005 earthquake.

	True	False	NA
NO	4	3	1
IO	1	5	0
GS	0	4	0
Total	5 (28%)	12 (66%)	1 (6%)

7) At which level of government do you think UNICEF Aceh should **currently** direct the majority of its assistance in order to improve social outcomes for children and women?

	Provincial	District	Sub-district	National
NO	7	0	2	0
IO	1	4	1	0
GS	7	2	2	0
Total	15 (56%)	6 (22%)	6 (22%)	0 (0%)

(Respondents chose more than one answer, so % is of total # of responses, not respondents.)

8) Do you think that UNICEF's activities and results in the following areas are sustainable?

	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	NA
Education					
NO	5	1	1	1	0
IO	3	2	0	0	1
GS	2	1	1	0	0
Total	10 (55%)	4 (22%)	2 (11%)	1 (6%)	1 (6%)
Health & Nutrition					
NO	4	2	0	1	1
IO	3	3	0	0	0
GS	2	2	0	0	0
Total	9 (50%)	7 (38%)	0 (0%)	1 (6%)	1 (6%)
Water and sanitation					
NO	1	4	2	1	0
IO	3	2	1	0	0
GS	1	3	0	0	0
Total	5 (28%)	9 (50%)	3 (16%)	1 (6%)	0 (0%)
Child protection					
NO	0	4	2	2	0
IO	3	1	1	0	1
GS	0	1	3	0	0
Total	3 (16%)	6 (33%)	6 (33%)	2 (11%)	1 (6%)

9) In general, do you think that UNICEF's projects and programmes are evolving towards progressive ownership by local/national partners?

	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No	NA
NO	3	0	4	0	1
IO	3	3	0	0	0
GS	3	1	0	0	0
Total	9 (50%)	4 (22%)	4 (22%)	0 (0%)	1 (6%)

10) Do you think that the **activities** being carried out by UNICEF in the following areas make the most efficient use of financial and human resources?

	Yes	Partly	Not really	No	NA
Education					
NO	3	1	4	0	0
IO	4	1	1	0	0
GS	2	1	1	0	0
Total	9 (50%)	3 (17%)	6 (33%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Health & Nutrition					
NO	4	3	1	0	0
IO	4	1	1	0	0
GS	2	2	0	0	0
Total	10 (56%)	6 (33%)	2 (11%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Water and sanitation					
NO	2	4	2	0	0
IO	3	2	1	0	0
GS	1	3	0	0	0
Total	6 (33%)	10 (56%)	2 (11%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Child protection					
NO	2	2	3	1	0
IO	2	3	1	0	0
GS	0	1	3	0	0
Total	4 (22%)	6 (33%)	7 (39%)	1 (6%)	0 (0%)

11) How would you rate collaboration between UNICEF Nias and: (if you don't know, don't answer)

a) Government counterparts at province level

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	NA
NO	1	4	3	0
IO	0	3	3	0
GS	2	1	1	0
Total	3 (17%)	8 (44%)	7 (39%)	0 (0%)

b) Government counterparts at district level

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	NA
NO	0	4	1	3
IO	1	3	1	1
GS	1	2	0	1
Total	2 (11%)	9 (50%)	2 (11%)	5 (28%)

c) Other UN agencies

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	NA
NO	2	2	0	4
IO	0	4	2	0
GS	2	1	0	1
Total	4 (22%)	7 (39%)	2 (11%)	5 (28%)

d) UNICEF Banda Aceh

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	NA
NO	1	4	0	3
IO	0	4	2	0
GS	1	1	0	2
Total	2 (11%)	9 (50%)	2 (11%)	5 (28%)

e) UNICEF Jakarta

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	NA
NO	1	1	3	3
IO	0	2	4	0
GS	0	1	1	2
Total	1 (6%)	4 (22%)	8 (44%)	5 (28%)

f) Other partners/NGOs

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	NA
NO	1	4	0	3
IO	0	5	1	0
GS	1	1	0	2
Total	2 (11%)	10 (56%)	1 (5%)	5 (28%)

g) The private sector (contractors/suppliers etc)

	Excellent	Adequate	Poor	NA
NO	0	2	1	5
IO	0	3	3	0
GS	1	0	1	2
Total	1 (6%)	5 (28%)	5 (28%)	7 (39%)

12) Do you think UNICEF has formed **strategic** partnerships with the following, to the best of its ability (excluding construction)?:
UN agencies?

	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No
NO	1	3	4	0
IO	3	2	1	0
GS	3	0	1	0
Total	7 (39%)	5 (28%)	6 (33%)	0 (0%)

International NGOs?

	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No
NO	2	3	2	1
IO	1	5	0	0
GS	2	2	0	0
Total	5 (28%)	10 (55%)	2 (11%)	1 (6%)

National/local NGOs?

	Yes	Somewhat	Not really	No
NO	2	4	1	1
IO	0	1	4	1
GS	2	2	0	0
Total	4 (22%)	7 (39%)	5 (28%)	2 (11%)

13) Is programming based on an objective assessment of needs, rights and capacity gaps?

	Yes	Partly	A little	Not at all
NO	4	3	1	0
IO	2	4	0	0
GS	2	2	0	0
Total	8 (44%)	9 (50%)	1 (6%)	0 (0%)

14) To what extent is programming driven by funding opportunities?

	Greatly	Partly	A little	Not at all	NA
NO	5	1	1	0	1
IO	2	3	0	0	1
GS	4	0	0	0	0
Total	11 (61%)	4 (22%)	1 (6%)	0 (0%)	2 (11%)

15) Upon assuming your post in UNICEF Aceh, did you receive sufficient information/guidance to effectively carry out the tasks assigned to you?

	Yes	Partly	No
NO	3	5	0
IO	2	4	0
GS	3	0	1
Total	8 (44%)	9 (50%)	1 (6%)

16) How would you rate your working relationship with your colleagues in the Aceh office?

	Excellent	Satisfactory	Poor
NO	5	3	0
IO	4	2	0
GS	4	0	0
Total	13 (72%)	5 (28%)	0 (0%)

17) How would you rate working relations with your supervisor?

	Excellent	Satisfactory	Difficult at times	NA
NO	3	1	3	1
IO	4	2	0	0
GS	3	1	0	0
Total	10 (55%)	4 (22%)	3 (17%)	1 (6%)

18) **Immediately after 2005 earthquake**, was the technical capacity and competencies of UNICEF staff in Aceh sufficient for effective implementation of UNICEF programmes?

	Yes	Partly	Not really	No	NA
NO	1	2	2	0	3
IO	1	1	0	0	4
GS	2	1	1	0	0
Total	4 (22%)	4 (22%)	3 (17%)	0 (0%)	7 (39%)

19) Are staff currently in UNICEF Nias equipped with the technical capacity and competencies needed for effective implementation of UNICEF programmes?

	Yes	Partly	Not really	No	NA
NO	5	1	1	1	0
IO	1	4	0	0	1
GS	2	2	0	0	0
Total	8 (44%)	7 (39%)	1(6%)	1 (6%)	1 (6%)

20) What is the role of UNICEF Banda Aceh in relation to UNICEF Nias?

	Tech Advice (TA)	Supervision(S)	S &TA	Not clear
NO	0	3	3	2
IO	3	0	1	2
GS	1	0	2	1
Total	4 (22%)	3 (17%)	6 (33%)	5 (28%)

21) What is the role of UNICEF Jakarta in relation to UNICEF Nias?

	Tech Advice (TA)	Supervision(S)	S &TA	Not clear
NO	2	1	2	3
IO	2	2	0	2
GS	0	1	1	2
Total	4 (22%)	4 (22%)	3 (17%)	7 (39%)

22) The amount of money that UNICEF has to effectively carry out its programmes in Aceh and Nias is:

	Too much	Sufficient	Not enough	Don't Know	NA
NO	1	4	2	0	1
IO	0	2	3	0	1
GS	0	4	0	0	0
Total	1 (6%)	10 (55%)	5 (28%)	0 (0%)	2 (11%)

23) Do you feel that decision-making processes related to the future of the UNICEF Aceh office have been communicated in a transparent manner?

	Yes	No	NA
NO	1	6	1
IO	2	4	0
GS	2	1	1
Total	5 (28%)	11 (61%)	2 (11%)

24) How satisfied are you with the benefits you are receiving as a UNICEF staff member in Nias?

	Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Unsatisfied
NO	2	3	3
IO	0	6	0
GS	1	2	1
Total	3 (17%)	11 (61%)	4 (22%)

25) Do you feel that the benefits you are receiving correspond to the **current** living situation in Nias?

	Yes	No
NO	4	4
IO	2	4
GS	2	2
Total	8 (44%)	10 (56%)

26) How do you feel about your current workload?

	Sometimes Frustrated	Usually Frustrated	Satisfied	Indifferent	NA
NO	5	1	1	0	1
IO	2	0	4	0	0
GS	2	0	1	1	0
Total	9 (50%)	1 (6%)	6 (33%)	1 (6%)	1(6%)

27) In your current position, how often do you feel you have the opportunity to apply your knowledge and skills?

	Always	Usually	Rarely	Never
NO	4	2	2	0
IO	1	4	1	0
GS	2	0	1	1
Total	7 (39%)	6 (33%)	4 (22%)	1 (6%)

28) Are you currently looking for a job with:

	Another UNICEF Office	UN Agency	NGO	Private Sector	Not Looking
NO	3	4	3	1	2
IO	2	2	2	3	3
GS	3	1	0	1	0
Total	8	7	5	5	5

28 % of staff are looking for another job.

29) Do you expect support from UNICEF in finding another job?

	Yes	No	NA
NO	8	0	0
IO	2	2	2
GS	3	1	0
Total	13 (72%)	3 (17%)	2 (11%)

30) If you answered "yes" to the above question, do you think that UNICEF will provide this support?

	Yes	No
NO	5	3
IO	1	1
GS	3	0
Total	9 (69%)	4 (31%)

31) If you are looking for a position in another UNICEF office, do you think how you perform in your current position (i.e. your professional performance) is related to your chances of obtaining another position with the Organisation?

	Definitely	Somewhat	Not really	No
NO	3	2	2	0
IO	3	0	2	0
GS	4	0	0	0
Total	10 (63%)	2 (12%)	4 (25%)	0 (0%)

Annex 2 – Terms of Reference for Interim Evaluation in the Tsunami Affected Areas of Indonesia

1. Background

The tsunami and earthquake which hit the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and the island of Nias (North Sumatra Province) in December 2004 and March 2005 respectively have left an unenviable heritage. Not only was much of the physical and social infrastructure destroyed, but also the institutional and human resource base, on which sustainable development and nation building is dependent, was totally disrupted.

Until the tsunami in December 2004, UNICEF had a limited presence in those areas. Country Programme (CP) interventions were implemented by the local authorities and supported through UNICEF Field Office (FO) in Banda Aceh staffed with one national officer and one support staff. Support was exclusively focused on responding to the emergency situation caused by the political instability of the area through provision of essential services in health, nutrition, and basic education.

The size and scope of the December 2004 and March 2005 tsunami and earthquake in terms of number of people whose lives were impacted; the Indonesian Government's Master Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for the two Provinces; the formation of the Government's Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) for the two Provinces in May 2005; the volume of international donations for relief and recovery; as well as the number of United Nations (UN) agencies active in NAD and Nias, were all unprecedented and warranted large scale support. Further to humanitarian relief efforts, UNICEF in consultation with the BRR, the UN system and the donors developed a "Multi Year Plan for NAD and Nias" to directly support the Government of Indonesia's (Gol) efforts in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected areas with the full participation of communities in the process.

Over the last three years, UNICEF-assisted operation in the tsunami and earthquake-affected areas has operated in a rapidly changing environment. The initial limited human resources capacity, the need for ensuring transparency and the pressure to deliver while meeting the Organization's quality standards have been major factors in the implementation of the operation.

UNICEF has struggled to move rapidly to not only cover emergency and relief responses following the tsunami and earthquake, but also to redefine its role and strategies towards sustainable development of the affected areas, in geographic locations and amongst population groups not previously reachable because of the security conditions prevailing in the area.

The strategies have ranged from directly working with communities; implementing programmes through local and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs); contracting activities through private enterprises and working in collaboration with different kinds of local authorities and government structures. This in turn has led UNICEF to work on different levels of programming e.g. delivery of services at the community level, system rehabilitation, and systemic issues of policy formulation. Recently, interventions have started reflecting a Human Rights Based Approach to Programming (HRBAP) while having a greater gender focus to address more adequately issues related of capacity gaps and forms of discrimination.

This has created new challenges and opportunities for the Country Office that need to be analyzed along with UNICEF current strengths and weaknesses in order to define the scope and the nature of its assistance in NAD and Nias for the coming years.

The Country Office (CO) and the Eastern Asia and Pacific Regional Office (EAPRO) agreed that UNICEF future strategy and interventions in the affected areas be supported by an interim evaluation of the MYP.

The evaluation will be a major input to the CO submission to the Regional Programme Budget Review (PBR) for the tsunami operation scheduled for March 2008. It will also feed into the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the current CP 2006-2010 planned for the first half of 2008. By linking the evaluation to the CP MTR, UNICEF, the GoI and its partners will have the opportunity to fully realign the tsunami operation with the CP.

Moreover, the evaluation will provide inputs to the on going efforts of the Organization in a) documenting lessons learnt and new knowledge on linking initial emergency response to the recovery and long-term development efforts; and b) in translating that knowledge into better programme design and practise.

Draft findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation should be available to the CO and RO by mid-February 2008 and the full report should be ready by the second week of March 2008.

The exercise will benefit from support from the UNICEF RO and New York Headquarters (NYHQ).

2. Purpose and scope of the Evaluation

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to conduct an interim assessment of UNICEF's programme strategy and MYP for the Tsunami response in NAD and Nias and to recommend a well articulated strategic plan to integrate the UNICEF's assistance in the tsunami affected area with the Country Programme of Cooperation 2006-2010 at the mid-term of the programme cycle.

In particular, the purpose of the evaluation is four-fold:

- To determine why and the extent to which UNICEF's commitment and expected results as described in the MYP for NAD and Nias has been met;
- To provide source of evidence of the achievement of the results and UNICEF performance;
- To provide recommendations for the future role, design, focus, strategy and human resources needed for UNICEF's support in NAD and Nias;
- To contribute to building knowledge and to organizational learning on linking emergency response to recovery and long-term development efforts.

The scope of the evaluation covers the period 2004-2007.

3. Objectives of the Evaluation

The *objectives* of the evaluation are the following:

- a) To assess the *relevance* and *appropriateness* of the tsunami operation as elaborated in the MYP (i) as to the situation of children and women in the context of NAD and Nias, (ii) in the context of national policies and strategies and (iii) as a reflection of international norms and standards concerning children's rights (especially CRC and CEDAW);
- b) To analyse to what extent activities and results are *sustainable* at their respective levels (e.g. communities, intermediate or higher level institutions) and *connected* to local and national capacities and/or other forms of external support in the rapidly changing context of NAD and Nias;

- c) To assess *design, coherence, focus* of the UNICEF supported-tsunami operation, i.e. the realism and quality of the formulation of results and strategies, their adaptation in the NAD and Nias environment as well as scope, coherence and focus of the interventions given the local context and the future funding opportunities;
- d) To assess UNICEF *comparative advantage, roles and coordination mechanisms* in relation to strategies and activities of other national and external partners, especially the UN agencies and the World Bank as well as bilateral partners that contribute to the realisation of children's and women's rights;
- e) To assess the *human resource capacity* in terms of type, number, structure, competency available to UNICEF in support to the MYP;
- f) To contribute to the *lessons learnt* for the Organization in responding to emergency and linking humanitarian assistance to recovery and long-term development.

N.B. The dimensions of effectiveness and efficiency will be assessed during this fast-track evaluation only to a limited extent due to lack of time.

4. Key questions

a) *Relevance and appropriateness*

- i. How adequate and comprehensive is the knowledge as to the situation of children and women in the current context of NAD and Nias?
- ii. Does UNICEF-supported operation in the tsunami-affected areas address major issues of non-realization of children's and women's rights?
- iii. How are the Government priorities and strategies for the tsunami-affected areas reflected in the programme interventions?
- iv. How are recovery and long-term interventions described in the MYP being re-aligned with the GoI/UNICEF CP 2006-2010? In particular, has there been any step to replicate in the tsunami-affected locations successful models being supported/implemented by UNICEF and its partners in other parts of the Country?

b) *Design, coherence and focus*

- i. To what extent is programming based on an objective assessment of needs, rights and capacity gaps or is programming more driven by funding opportunities with a risk of lack of coherence and relevance? How realistic is programme design given the environment?
- ii. How is the dimension of exclusion on the basis of gender, group and geography addressed in the various programmes?
- iii. How does the current operation address i.e. the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the two provinces, the organisational priorities of the MTSP, CCCs, and the World Fit for Children agenda?
- iv. Is the current Programme well focused, coherent and logic? Does it respond to the challenges of local capacities and does it evolve towards a progressive ownership of projects and programmes by the local/national partners? Does it offer opportunities for partnerships and linkages with other development agencies?
- v. Is UNICEF's assistance in the tsunami-affected area planned and implemented in coordination with other UN agencies as well as the World Bank and bilateral development programmes? In which areas are there opportunities for joint programmes with other UN agencies?

c) CCC, HRBAP and RBM

- i. How UNICEF and its partners could more adequately operationalize *HRBAP*?
- ii. What examples are there for strengthening of capacities of rights-holders and duty bearers at different levels?
- iii. In what ways the programme is results oriented?

c) Gender focus

- i. How is the concept of gender reflected in the MYP? To what extent and how does the MYP pay special attention to girls and women's rights?
- ii. To what extent is the gender dimension included in the situation analysis and other forms of data collection? Are there qualitative and quantitative gender desegregated data which could be better used?
- iii. Does the MYP address adequately forms of discrimination and exclusion experienced by girls and women in the tsunami-affected area? What contribution is made to the progressive realization of gender parity and gender equality?

c) UNICEF comparative advantage, roles and coordination mechanisms

- i. How have the niche and the comparative advantages of UNICEF in the tsunami-affected areas been identified?
- ii. What has been the role of UNICEF over the last three years? Does it play substitutive, facilitator and/or innovative roles?
- iii. How good a partner is UNICEF for national institutions and in the context of external support?
- iv. To what extent is UNICEF's support integrated in local planning and coordinated with other external assistance (especially with UN partners, but also with bilateral and other forms of multilateral aid)?
- v. The local governments are supported by other external partners. Does UNICEF have a clear strategy on how to relate to the other partners?
- vi. To what extent and how is the current programme integrated in the "UN Recovery Framework for Aceh and Nias" (UNRFAN)? How are complementarity and synergy assured with the programmes supported by other UN agencies? Are there opportunities for joint programmes with other UN agencies and/or other development partners (e.g. bilateral or other multilateral organizations, e.g. World Bank)?

h) Sustainability

- i. To what extent are activities and results supported by the MYP *sustainable* at their respective levels (communities, intermediate or higher level institutions)
- ii. How are they *connected* to local (district and provincial) and national capacities and/or other forms of external support?

g) Human resource

- i. How well is the UNICEF human resource basis (e.g. availability, type of contracts, technical capacity and competency, reporting structure) linked to the MYP?
- ii. Is UNICEF through its human resource availability supporting the capacity development of the local authorities and institutions contributing to systemic development? or is UNICEF rather still playing a substitutive role?
- iii. Is the CO human resource strategy in support to the tsunami operation appropriate? Is human resource basis available to UNICEF still justified by the scale and scope of the operation?

- iv. What type and mix of human resources would be needed by the CO in the coming three years (2008-2010)? How could the human resources be more effectively and efficiently organized to better support the operationalization of the future strategy and programme interventions? What would be the advantage or disadvantage of e.g. a vertical programme approach vis-à-vis a cluster and/or a life cycle approach?

l) Lessons learnt

- i. Is there any lessons learnt and best practices which could contribute to building the Organization learning and knowledge on linking humanitarian assistance to recovery and long-term development? Could and/or to which extent these lessons learnt and best practices be translated into policy by the Organization?

5. Methods

The evaluation will take into consideration commonly agreed evaluation norms and standards (OECD/DAC) to ensure *utility* (ownership by stakeholders), *feasibility* (political viability and cost-effectiveness), *propriety* (impartiality, respect of rights of stakeholders, cultural sensitivity) and *accuracy* (adequate information). UNICEF's *evaluation report standards* and *style guide* will be followed when preparing the evaluation report.

Key methods for the conduct of the evaluation will be the following:

- h) A comprehensive desk review of external and internal documents that are relevant;
- i) A review of studies, reviews and evaluations of projects and programmes;
- j) An extensive round of interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders (Government, NGO's, CBOs, UN Agencies, opinion leaders, children and young people etc. at both national and local levels);
- k) Field visits to the selected districts and communities to gain first-hand information of the implementation of projects and programmes;
- l) A synthesis of reviews, interviews and field visits and a annotated outline of the report containing major lines of analysis;
- m) A survey among UNICEF staff members of CO Indonesia (Jakarta CO, Banda Aceh FO, Meulaboh and Nias sub-Offices) involved in the operation;
- n) Organisation of a participatory workshop, during which main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation will be discussed, validated and finalised.
- o) A broad discussion of the draft evaluation report with national, external partners and the Regional Office.

The evaluation will be a participatory process that will give due importance to self-assessment by staff and partners involved in the programme design and implementation. All information will to the largest possible extent be triangulated (use of three or more sources of information to verify and substantiate an assessment) and validated. Findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned should clearly be user-oriented and feed into major decision-making during strategy development for the future operation.

The selection of sites for field visits will be inspired by one or more of the following criteria:

- a) the maturity of the programme, project or activity within the overall operation;

- b) the wealth of experiences and the chances of their generating interesting lessons;
- c) strategic interest of the programme, project or activity for the whole operation;
- d) Interest of the experiences in the context of the inter-agency collaboration of the UN.

6. Organisation and Management

Under the overall guidance of the Director, Emergency Operations, and in close consultation with the Indonesian Government authorities, in particular the BRR, the evaluation will be jointly overseen by the UNICEF Jakarta CO and Banda Aceh FO.

The evaluation will be carried out by a technical team of international and national consultants. This Evaluation Team will be composed of:

- a) A senior former international UNICEF staff member with at least 10 years of experience and strong analytical skills and strategic thinking will act as team leader;
- b) A former international UNICEF staff member with at least 10 years of experience in programming in humanitarian action and development context covering the areas of (girls') education, child protection, gender issues, health and nutrition as well as water and sanitation;
- c) A national programme evaluation specialist with 5 years of experience and knowledge of national policies and frameworks;
- d) A former international UNICEF staff member with at least 10 years of experience in Operations and in particular in managing human resources.

Good knowledge of evaluation standards and methodologies and previous experience in evaluation is required for all team members. All members of the team should be highly gender-sensitive. None of the team members should have had recent involvement with the current tsunami operation or should be eligible to play a role in the remainder of the current operation or the next one.

Support and technical guidance will be provided to the Evaluation Team by: the Chief of Field Office and Chief of Planning in Banda Aceh, the Senior Programme and Planning Specialist and the Evaluation Specialist in UNICEF Jakarta. The Tsunami Unit and the Evaluation Office in New York as well as the Regional Evaluation Specialist in EAPRO will also provide support to the exercise to the extent of their availability.

The Evaluation Team will also benefit from the support of a Reference Group composed of representatives of major governmental and non-governmental organisations as well as UN agencies and bilateral and multilateral partners associated with UNICEF-supported programme in NAD and Nias. The Reference Group will meet in the beginning of the exercise (mid-January 2008) and at the stage of the formulation of conclusions and recommendations (beginning of March 2008). Specific tasks include the following:

- a) Advise on scope and content of the evaluation, as stated in the TOR, and the role that can be played by this exercise for strategy development in view of the future implementation of the MYP/CP in the tsunami-affected areas and in relation to the Gol and local priorities;
- b) Make suggestions on ways and means to implement the evaluation, e.g. for the document review, rounds of interviews and focus group discussions, possible field visits, validation of findings and conclusions etc.

- c) Once draft findings, conclusions and recommendations have been formulated, provide feedback and contribute to their validation and formulation.

The UNICEF Indonesia Country Office (Jakarta and Banda Aceh) will assume responsibility for all aspects related to relations with host country authorities and UN security arrangements where and if needed.

7. Timeframe and deliverables

Major milestones and deliverables of the evaluation process will be the following:

- a) The Evaluation Team will work in Indonesia between 10 January and 8 February 2008 for extensive document review, interviews and focus group discussions among staff and partners (national and external), field visits as well as the preparation of the draft report (including a summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations) and powerpoint presentation for the evaluation workshop (8 February).
- b) At the beginning of the evaluation and no later than one week into the exercise, the Evaluation Team will submit an *Inception Report* defining the approaches and methods chosen for the evaluation. Most notably, this report will contain information about the selection of programmes and projects to be assessed more closely as well as the geographical areas to be covered. The Inception Report will also include a timetable of activities to be undertaken by the Evaluation Team and a draft annotated outline of the evaluation report.
- c) *Findings, conclusions, recommendations* as well as a *draft report* must be available for an evaluation workshop, which will be organised by the second week of February 2008, so as to allow the CO and the RO to examine the implications of conclusions and recommendations for the future presence and programme interventions of the Organization in the tsunami-affected areas, and to set a timetable for implementation.
- d) The *full draft report* will thereafter be finalized in the respective home countries of the consultants by the end of March 2008. The final report will be of high quality standard and it will have to clearly recommend the strategic position UNICEF should take on the short and medium term programme perspectives for NAD and Nias. The report will outline strategic choices for a comprehensive development assistance package (in line with the current CP) including resources and investment requirements; it will outline the actions required to develop sector specific strategies and harvest opportunities for mobilization of resources. In addition, the report will recommend a sound human resources strategy and action plan in support to the above.

Activity	Timeframe										
	January			February				March			
	2 nd week	3 rd week	4 th week	1 st week	2 nd week	3 rd week	4 th week	1 st week	2 nd week	3 rd week	4 th week
Meeting with CO senior management											
Submission of inception report											
Field work											
Submission of draft report											
Evaluation workshop											
Submission of final evaluation report											

17 December 2007

Annex 3 – Summary of Participatory Workshop Outcomes

An evaluation was commissioned to assess UNICEF's programme strategies in Aceh and Nias from 2006-2008, and to recommend a programme strategy for the future that will realign tsunami operations with the rest of the Country Programme. The evaluation report will be an input to the upcoming Mid Term Review and Regional Programme Budget Review. The purpose of this workshop was for the evaluation team to disseminate preliminary findings to UNICEF staff from the Banda Aceh Field Office, Meulaboh and Nias Sub-offices, the Jakarta Office, the Regional Office, and NYHQ and receive feedback from participants, which could then be incorporated into the final report.

Participants strongly agreed that the Organisation does not realize how much has been achieved in Aceh and Nias, and how much embarrassment has been avoided. The achievements of UNICEF staff in Aceh and Nias and their commitment to maintaining the positive reputation of the Organisation should be recognized, and staff who have served longer than their required tour of duty should be immediately rotated.

The results of the survey on staff perceptions of UNICEF programmes, staff relationships, and staff welfare sparked discussion about the relationship between Jakarta office and field office staff. The rapid decentralisation of the Aceh office without time for reform in Jakarta, unclear roles and responsibilities of Jakarta staff in relation to field offices, lack of communication, and differing office environments (sense of urgency in Aceh vs. business as usual in Jakarta) could have contributed to perceived negative relations between Country Office and field office staff. It was widely agreed that there is a need to keep staff morale in Aceh high and to assist both international and national staff as they search for other positions. It should be clearly communicated that UNICEF Indonesia does not have the capacity to absorb all national staff whose posts will be abolished.

There was general consensus with the evaluation team's analysis of UNICEF programme strategies and the reasons for slow alignment to the Multi Year Plan. It was agreed that programmes were largely donor driven and it should have been UNICEF's responsibility to assert that development is not only hardware but software. The short duration of PBAs and the resulting pressure to spend funds quickly, as well as time spent by programme staff on fulfilling construction commitments made during the relief and recovery phase, left less time for understanding sector needs and implementing the kinds of strategies and partnerships outlined in the CPAP and Multi Year Plan. It was also agreed that programme coordination was severely lacking and UN coordination was weak. The emergency is over, but now there needs to be a clear strategic programmatic vision for the future, as UNICEF's reputation in Aceh and Nias is still in jeopardy.

Participants agreed with the overall programmatic vision presented by the evaluation team. UNICEF's focus in the future should be on developing the capacity of both local communities and the government to fulfill human rights and the MDGs, in collaboration with other major development organisations. Given the future influx of money in Aceh, 60% of which will be channeled to districts, UNICEF assistance should focus on helping district governments plan and budget for children's and women's rights. In accordance with a Human Rights Based Approach, support should also be provided to build the capacity of communities to claim their rights. While it was generally agreed that a joint capacity building team with the World Bank and other major development actors should be established to assist the government with planning and budgeting, a number of participants felt that residual programmes are also required to address current needs, such as training of service providers to improve the quality of social services, and that pilot projects are needed to provide evidence for changing policies. All agreed that it is vital to conduct a situation analysis and sectoral analysis for all sectors in order to identify needs and capacity gaps. It is especially urgent to assess the effectiveness of Posyandu Plus in reducing maternal

mortality and to make a decision about its continuation, as a new batch of contracts are planned to be tendered shortly.

It was widely agreed that commitment from NYHQ and the RO is essential for effective implementation of a future strategy. Grave concern was expressed about the difficulty of attracting new and qualified staff in Aceh due to expiring PBAs and visa issues; the Organisation needs to take urgent action to resolve these problems, and ensure that crucial posts, such as the CFO and Head of Construction, are immediately filled.

There was slight disagreement about the timeframe for deciding on a future strategy. The Regional Office expressed concern that decisions which are taken too quickly might not be in accordance with long term needs in Aceh. However, the evaluation team and the field offices feel that there is a real urgency to make decisions about UNICEF's strategy in Aceh in the future, otherwise opportunities for 2009 and maybe even 2010 will be lost. Further maintaining the present programme and staffing structure will be delaying change and opportunity. A dialogue will soon begin among senior staff on how to proceed with the recommendations presented in the evaluation report, taking into account discussions held during this workshop, so that practical steps needed to transform the programmatic vision into reality can be identified and acted upon.

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