

# EVALUATION REPORT

July 2014

## UNICEF's Upstream Work in Basic Education and Gender Equality 2003-2012

COUNTRY CASE STUDY ■ ■ **Afghanistan** ■

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## PREFACE

Over the past decade, UNICEF has placed increased emphasis on upstream support to national policy, capacity and partnerships to underpin and sustain scaled-up programme delivery. UNICEF's work in the education sector has followed this approach, giving increased attention to upstream activities of this kind. Have these efforts been successful? This evaluation set out to provide an answer to this question by examining UNICEF's upstream work in basic education and gender equality in the period 2003 to 2012.

At the global level, UNICEF's upstream education work entails engagement with governments and partner organizations to set the education policy agenda and leverage the resources required to achieve the goals of the Education For All (EFA) initiative and the Millennium Development Goals relating to education (MDGs 2 and 3). At the national level, UNICEF contributes to development of sector policies, strategies and programmes, and facilitates the national dialogue on education policy and priorities. UNICEF also works with government and partners to mobilize funding sources within a sector-wide national programme framework and to strengthen capacities ensure proper allocation and management of budgets.

The purpose of the evaluation was to examine UNICEF's upstream work in education and assess the extent to which UNICEF has engaged strategically in education sector policy articulation and advocacy. It also assessed how far upstream engagement efforts have supported better policy and practice in the education sector and helped to strengthen systems across the sector. The evaluation was executed in three phases: (i) an in-depth desk review of key concepts, trends and issues around 'upstream work' in education, as well as a review of documents from 14 UNICEF Country Offices; (ii) field-based case studies in Afghanistan, Brazil, Cambodia, and Zimbabwe; and, (iii) a survey among UNICEF Country Office staff, key partners and professionals responsible for education programmes.

The evaluation found UNICEF's seriousness and belief in its mandate for children's rights to be its greatest strength, and that the organization continues to be relied on as a trusted partner by the Ministry of Education In Afghanistan. UNICEF's general approach to upstream work in the education sector was internally coherent across the global, regional and country levels. In Afghanistan, UNICEF foresaw the necessary system strengthening by working both in Kabul and in the provinces. UNICEF's advocacy for girls' education and female teachers was effective, as was its policy influence on child-friendly schools, community-based education and cost-effective schools, in spite of patchy mainstreaming in practice. However, the evaluation also found that UNICEF had not effectively communicated its positions on upstream work to other development agencies, and that its earlier role in assisting policy coherence and donor coordination had been overshadowed by some of the larger development agencies. The evaluation concluded also,



that UNICEF has yet to develop the capacity for crafting coordinated policy, involving other development partners and the MoE with shared reporting and quality monitoring if it is to maintain its positioning and influence.

The evaluation was ably conducted by Mokoro Limited. On behalf of the Evaluation Office, I would like to express my appreciation to Alta Folscher for her leadership of the evaluation and to the Mokoro case study team for Afghanistan consisting of Abby Riddell (Case Study Leader), George Taylor (Evaluator). Habiba Wahaj enriched the evaluation team with her extensive knowledge of critical education sector issues and national perspectives, as well as making connections with key institutions and interlocutors in Afghanistan. We are also grateful to colleagues from UNICEF Afghanistan and their government partners provided invaluable support during field visits. As always, their inputs and cooperation are appreciated.

Lastly, I would like to thank my colleagues in the Evaluation Office for their work on this challenging evaluation. Kathleen Letshabo developed and managed the evaluation throughout, bringing her own expertise in education to bear; Tina Tordjman-Nebe also provided technical support in the early stages of the evaluation; and Celeste Lebowitz and Dalma Rivero provided strong administrative support throughout.

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AAA</b>	Accra Agenda for Action	<b>DSA</b>	Daily Subsistence Allowance
<b>ADB</b>	Asian Development Bank	<b>ECC</b>	Education Coordination Committee
<b>ACO</b>	Afghanistan Country Office	<b>ECD</b>	Early Childhood Development
<b>ANPRO</b>	Afghanistan Analysis and Projection Model	<b>ECG</b>	Education Consultative Group
<b>AREU</b>	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit	<b>EDB</b>	Education Development Board
<b>ARTF</b>	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund	<b>EEPCT</b>	Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition
<b>BEGE</b>	Basic Education and Gender Equality	<b>EFA</b>	Education for All
<b>BRAC</b>	Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee	<b>EIP</b>	Education Interim Plan
<b>BTS</b>	Back to School	<b>EMIS</b>	Education Management Information System
<b>CBCD</b>	Changing Behaviour for Communication for Development	<b>EQ</b>	Evaluation Question
<b>CBE</b>	Community Based Education	<b>EQUIP</b>	Education Quality Improvement Program
<b>CBS</b>	Community Based Schooling	<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>CCS</b>	Country Case Study	<b>FTI</b>	FastTrack Initiative
<b>CD</b>	Capacity Development	<b>GoA</b>	Government of Afghanistan
<b>CES</b>	Cost Effective Schools	<b>GMU</b>	Grants Management Unit
<b>CFS</b>	Child-Friendly School	<b>GPE</b>	Global Partnership for Education
<b>CIDA</b>	Canadian International Development Agency	<b>HQ</b>	Headquarters
<b>CNA</b>	Comprehensive Needs Assessment	<b>HRDB</b>	Human Resources Development Board
<b>CO</b>	Country Office	<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>CPD</b>	Country Programme Document	<b>ISD</b>	Infrastructure Development Services Department
<b>CPE</b>	Country Programme Evaluation	<b>JICA</b>	Japan International Cooperation Agency
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee	<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>Danida</b>	Danish International Development Agency	<b>MoE</b>	Ministry of Education
<b>DED</b>	District Education Department	<b>MoF</b>	Ministry of Finance
<b>DoE</b>	District Office of Education	<b>MoH</b>	Ministry of Health
<b>DP</b>	Development Partner	<b>MoRA</b>	Ministry of Religious Affairs



<b>MTR</b>	Mid Term Review	<b>SWAp</b>	Sector Wide Approach
<b>MTSP</b>	Medium Term Strategic Plan	<b>TA</b>	Technical Assistant/Assistance
<b>NFE</b>	Non-Formal Education	<b>TEP</b>	Teacher Education Programme
<b>NTA</b>	National Technical Assistants/ Assistance	<b>TLM</b>	Teaching and Learning Materials
<b>NESP</b>	National Education Strategic Plan	<b>ToC</b>	Theory of Change
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation	<b>TOR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>NORAD</b>	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>PED</b>	Provincial Education Directorate	<b>UNAMA</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
<b>PIU</b>	Project Implementation Unit	<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>PMCU</b>	Programme Management and Coordination Unit	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children’s Fund
<b>PRT</b>	Provincial Reconstruction Team	<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
<b>RALS</b>	Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces	<b>UNOPS</b>	United Nations Office for Project Services
<b>RO</b>	Regional Office	<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>ROSA</b>	Regional Office South Asia (UNICEF)	<b>UWE</b>	Upstream Work in Education
<b>SE</b>	Supervising Entity	<b>WASH</b>	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
<b>Sida</b>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	<b>WB</b>	World Bank
<b>SIP</b>	School Improvement Plan	<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>SP</b>	Strategic Plan		



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The evaluation team would like to thank everyone in the UNICEF ROSA who gave so generously of their time and insights; the BEGE team in the Afghanistan Country Office, and especially Arzhang for her help in arranging our many meetings with different stakeholders, and Pawan and Zulfikur for obtaining much of the requested background documentation. Similarly, we would like to thank the other UNICEF staff with whom we met and the many development agency and partner staff who made themselves available for our lengthy interviews. Thanks also go to Habiba Wahaj for her help not only with logistics and background, but also for her translation, when necessary.

The findings and opinions in this report are those of the evaluation team and should not be ascribed to anyone else.



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

E.1 This report presents one of four country case studies for the evaluation of UNICEF's upstream engagement in education, commissioned by the UNICEF Evaluation Office, and undertaken by Mokoro Limited. The report provides a brief description of the global evaluation as a whole, describes the Afghanistan country context, and provides an overview of UNICEF's upstream education portfolio as illustrated in the three country programme documents (CPDs) which span the period 2003–2012. Findings of the country case study are organized around three mini-case studies selected carefully to examine the follow-through from programme intentions to results. They follow different themes, chosen in part to cover different themes across the four country case studies of the global evaluation.

E.2 The first mini-case study investigates the trajectory of 'building back better' through an examination of UNICEF's involvement in school construction in the period following the Back to School (BTS) campaign. It examines the move from responding immediately to infrastructure needs by getting involved in school construction, toward modelling cost-efficient school designs capable of being replicated by other actors in the education sector. The second mini-case study focuses on UNICEF's involvement in the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), the relatively new role of Supervising Entity (SE) for Afghanistan, compared with UNICEF's involvement in donor coordination earlier in the period under investigation. The third mini-case study focuses on the role of UNICEF's Regional Office for South Asia in Kathmandu, and to the extent possible, makes inferences about UNICEF's Regional Offices and their role in support of upstream work.

E.3 Of the countries selected for this series of case studies, Afghanistan was the closest to the emergency context, situated at the downstream end of the continuum from humanitarian to development assistance. The Bonn Agreement

and the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) Comprehensive Needs Assessment (CNA) recorded a collapse of the education system, and estimated that 25,000 to 30,000 children in Kandahar province alone were identified as having formerly associated with armed forces or armed groups. The assessment reported that there was no unified national curriculum, hence teachers and children returning from camps used whatever education materials they could find. Almost all qualified teachers had fled the country, taken jobs outside of education, were working in refugee camps, or had been killed. The CNA further estimated that nearly 14,000 schools were needed in the country to cater for Afghan children, including an additional 1.8m refugees who had returned to Afghanistan, and identified a critical need for "strategic and efficient use of scarce financial resources, including donor assistance" (ADB, 2002).

E.4 Even within this context, UNICEF has contributed enormously to the rebuilding of an education system, from basic service delivery to policy advocacy and system strengthening. This report provides an analysis of this contribution through three country programme cycles; 2003 to 2005, 2006 to 2009, and 2010 to 2013. Thus the trajectory towards upstream work is encompassed in this study. Though the country office for Afghanistan was based in Islamabad, Pakistan earlier in the evaluation period, UNICEF has had a presence in Afghanistan for over 60 years, and its contribution to the recent huge school enrolment increases, especially for girls, was achieved through "downstream" work with "upstream" characteristics.

E.5 Beginning in the first programming period, critical service delivery was based on cross-sectoral themes, including the establishment of schools as centres for social change, improving the environment for children and protecting them from abuse and exploitation, improving the survival and participation of women, and capacity building. All these efforts



were coordinated with UN agencies and NGO partners. Hence upstream work in education has provided an evidence base for development; leadership and coordination; policies, standards and strategy development; capacity development; legislation; as well as advocacy. UNICEF's involvement in the period under investigation has enabled it to focus on the expanding agenda of education transformation relevant to the country's needs. It dealt first with the immediate service delivery needs, but then focused on addressing issues relating to quality, and to populations who were harder to reach. UNICEF achieved this by moving towards policy support and data gathering and through interventions like Community Based Education (CBE), supporting teacher education, and providing incentives for female teachers, as well as modelling the constituents of child-friendly schools in the Afghan context.

E.6 Increased donor coordination characterised the second phase of UNICEF involvement, with the establishment of the Education Consultative Group (ECG), and subsequently the Human Resource Development Board (HRDB) for the education sector which brought together government representatives and development partners. A focus on a five-year strategic plan for education was supported by the provision by UNICEF of four consultants in this period. UNICEF also provided the Ministry of Education (MoE) with technical assistance (TA) on curriculum, literacy, procurement and communication/media and the development of an Education Management Information System (EMIS).

E.7 In the third programming period, a relative emphasis on upstream policy advocacy continued with key results expected in the following: 1) articulation and securing of UNICEF's inputs into key national processes with a view to positioning children and women at the centre of Afghanistan's development agenda; and, 2) drafting, adoption and operationalization of policies, conventions and legislation to enable fulfilment of children's rights.

E.8 The school construction mini-case study illustrates UNICEF's transition from service delivery to a focus on management and progress monitoring, using on-the-ground implementation for replicable model building. In the period 2010–2013, UNICEF's model for school construction contracts and payments was indicated by the MoE as suitable for other donors, a clear acknowledgement of UNICEF's upstream work in this area. Given the very large number of companies and donor programmes involved, a bewildering number of imported designs and materials with implications for future maintenance, this represented a major advance. Many development partners were also committed to management capacity strengthening of the government procurement and planning offices. However, with ownership by government departments and local District Office of Education (DoE) involvement, it has taken some considerable time for some degree of harmonisation to be achieved.

E.9 The GPE mini-case study presents a more anomalous case specifically with respect to the added value for UNICEF and for Afghanistan of its undertaking the role of Supervising Entity (SE). UNICEF was instrumental in both the development education sector plan, and the design stages of GPE programming. Indeed, all 10 provinces identified by UNICEF in its targeting exercise are included in the 13 provinces in which GPE programmes will operate, and the gender and equity focus of UNICEF programming has been incorporated in the GPE programme design. However, in contrast to the organisation's earlier role as focal point for the Education Consultative Group, documented by itself and others, and its strong participation in the subsequent donor and government coordination bodies, the evaluation found discontent with UNICEF's performance as SE within the GPE structure.

E.10 According to informants, the Government was a strong advocate of UNICEF to act as the SE on the basis of previous staffing and financial management mechanisms. However, possibly because of changed



practices in both areas, the newly hired staff and the creation of a Project Implementation Unit (PIU), albeit located within the Ministry, the added value of taking on the role of SE has not been evident for MoE or for UNICEF. UNICEF is compromised by its SE position and its lack of appropriately qualified staff, and is now having to provide quality assurance for a programme that is less aligned, and less consonant with its own upstream approach. For instance, even though it could have been too early in the process to pass judgement, UNICEF had not acted on the opportunities presented by the role of SE for greater upstream influence and for donor harmonisation and capacity development in the MoE at the time of the evaluation (mid-2013)

E.11 The ROSA mini-case study illustrates that while the regional office has considerable coordinating capacity and can support policy shifts at the country office level, UNICEF's strongly decentralised nature meant that lengthy periods of time elapsed before significant changes could be introduced. While upstream components were included in many of Afghanistan activities, country office staff urgently needed systematic and explicit support for their work. In addition, staff pointed to the need for systematic appraisal and recognition of the extra institutional demands made by this type of work, which requires upgrading of their own skills, as well as development of skills of national counterparts. Wider communication of expected results and outputs from policy initiatives and training was also required.

E.12 UNICEF continued to be a reliable and trusted partner by the Ministry of Education, even as its earlier role in assisting policy coherence and donor coordination it has been overshadowed by some of the larger development agencies. Also, while the evaluation found UNICEF's general approach to upstream work to be internally coherent across the global, regional and country levels, this was not mirrored in UNICEF's communication with other partners due to the fact that UNICEF had

not effectively communicated its positions on upstream work to other development agencies.

E.13 In the earlier periods under investigation, UNICEF did not merely fill gaps in service delivery, though it was heavily involved in downstream work. It also foresaw the necessary system strengthening as it worked both in Kabul and in the provinces. UNICEF's advocacy for girls' education and female teachers was found to be effective, as was its policy influence on child-friendly schools, community-based education and cost-effective schools, in spite of patchy mainstreaming in practice.

E.14 UNICEF's seriousness and belief in its mandate for the child is another great strength in that it obliges larger donors to focus on human rights issues. However, the corollary is that UNICEF has yet to develop the capacity for crafting coordinated policy, involving the MoE and other development partners, and with shared reporting and quality monitoring.

E.15 The sustainability of UNICEF's upstream work in education is in question for the following reasons:

- It lacks an evidence-based, strategic, policy analytic vision for the education sector which can be communicated convincingly to Government, development agencies, NGOs and UNICEF's partners;
- It lacks an appropriate capacity development policy for the Afghanistan country office and its support of the Ministry of Education; and,
- Monitoring of interventions to provide feedback loops for UNICEF, Government and implementing partners has been inadequate thus far.

E.16 In Afghanistan UNICEF works in a high risk environment, and has focused on upstream work for almost the period since the country office relocated from Islamabad back to Kabul. Nonetheless, as the number of agencies and the size of funding available to the sector have grown, UNICEF has not adapted sufficiently to



programming increasingly in the development context, rather than the humanitarian context. UNICEF retains its excellent reputation, but it is in danger of losing its place amongst the development community as the first port of call for education expertise.

E.17 Working on education policy, policy dialogue, capacity development, system strengthening and aid effectiveness is a challenge even in developing countries not faced with conflict. In the high risk environment of Afghanistan characterized by decades of conflict and an uncertain future, UNICEF requires the best strategic analysis possible to ensure that its partnerships with Government, development agencies, and NGOs continue to build sustainable capacities for meeting children's rights. UNICEF has a good reputation in Afghanistan – it must use this position, its partnerships and the evidence it can bring to bear in influencing others to revise and amend its approaches and its policy advocacy.

## Recommendations

E.18 A number of recommendations emerge from this case study of Afghanistan, some of which may have broader significance for UNICEF's policies in upstream work in basic education and gender equality.

1. Given the transitional, post-conflict status of Afghanistan, UNICEF Education should consider investing the expertise and time of ROSA and HQ-based advisors to have them contribute to ongoing strategic analysis of

the education sector and other upstream work.

2. UNICEF Headquarters should craft clear, contextualised policies for Afghanistan's engagement with GPE that marry global with in-country knowledge and can offer guidance to the country office.
3. Elaborate capacity development policies for Afghanistan, including on TA and detailing UNICEF's expectations, accountability structures and exit strategies. Such policies would benefit from guidance by UNICEF Headquarters on approaches to capacity development.
4. Upgrade the hiring of new staff and capacity development of current staff in P4 and higher positions in the Afghanistan CO, to include social, economic and political policy analysis.
5. UNICEF Afghanistan leadership should detail outputs and targets against which to report upstream performance, in order to highlight priorities for upstream work and to be able to assign commensurate responsibilities for staff. Such an exercise would benefit from guidance from Headquarters on how results in upstream work should be measured.
6. Invest UNICEF office time and capacity to dialogue with key development partners -- such as the World Bank which is a key UN but not UNDAF member -- in order to ensure better alignment behind UNICEF upstream priorities and more coherent upstream work. This could contribute to better implementation of policy commitments made by government to which UNICEF contributed.



This case study looks at upstream work carried out by UNICEF Afghanistan in the education sector in 2003 to 2012, and asks whether UNICEF was effective. The study indicates that what was required in the Afghanistan context was for 'downstream' work to show 'upstream' characteristics. Sector teams in UNICEF Afghanistan engaged with line ministries to develop national policies and programmes, and provided technical capacity building amongst various departments and sectoral partners at all levels.



# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 EVALUATION FEATURES

This report presents one of four country case studies for the evaluation of UNICEF's upstream engagement in education commissioned by the UNICEF Evaluation Office and undertaken by Mokoro Limited. Chapter 1 provides a brief description of the global evaluation. Chapter 2, describes the Afghanistan country context and provides an overview of the upstream work in education undertaken over a period of three country programme documents (CPD) in 2003 to 2012. Chapter 3 reports on the findings of the study. It looks at the relevance of UNICEF's upstream engagement in education and gender equality and the results of its work – to the extent that records were available and results reported. Within the results section three mini-case studies are considered in order to examine the follow-through from programme intentions to results. Chapter 3 also addresses the internal and external coherence of UNICEF's upstream engagement; factors uncovered in explaining the results of upstream work, and an assessment of the likely sustainability of the results of upstream work. Chapter 4 presents conclusions about upstream work in Afghanistan, and overall recommendations emerging from the Afghanistan case.

#### Evaluation purpose and scope

Terms of Reference for the evaluation describe the purpose of the evaluation as examining

*"...UNICEF's contribution in "upstream" work in education, to assess the extent to which UNICEF engages strategically in education sector policy articulation and advocacy at the global and regional levels. The evaluation will also determine the extent to which upstream*

*engagement efforts translate to desired transformations in education sector policy and practice, and national systemic strengthening in programme countries." (p5)*

The terms of reference require the evaluation to examine UNICEF's upstream work at the global, regional and country level, in all four BEGE key result areas (KRAs) of school readiness (KRA1), equitable access (KRA2), education quality (KRA3), and education in emergencies (KRA4). The evaluation looked at UNICEF engagement funded through regular and other resources. In addition, it judged the degree to which UNICEF's engagement produced desired results, using OECD DAC criteria of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability, and an additional criterion of coherence. The evaluation did not set out to investigate the impact of UNICEF's upstream engagement on education outcomes, but rather assessed whether the engagement was translating to desired change in education sector policy and practice, and the strengthening of national education systems.

Within this overall scope of the evaluation, six evaluation themes were identified. A protracted evaluation scoping arrived at these themes, believed to be areas in which UNICEF required systematic learning to enhance its effectiveness on upstream work in the education sector, some of which would hopefully apply to other sectors in which the organization works. Hence, the evaluation examined whether there was a shared definition of upstream work within UNICEF; the capacity of UNICEF and its national partners for upstream work; how UNICEF was positioned for upstream work; how well UNICEF utilized external partnerships for its upstream work; UNICEF-wide collaboration; and, upstream work in education in post conflict and emergency situations.



## Defining upstream engagement

Following a desk study of global literature on upstream work in education as well as a comprehensive review of UNICEF documentation of upstream work in 14 country programmes, the evaluation formalised the definition of upstream engagement in education so as to provide clear parameters for identifying UNICEF activities and results that should be included; Hence an operational definition of UNICEF's upstream work that was proffered by the evaluation team reads as follows:

*“UNICEF activities which were intended to have or had a system-wide, sustainable impact on the national capacities of public sector duty bearers in the education sector for fulfilling children’s rights, directly or indirectly.”*

The foundation Theory of Change was developed to unpack this definition by delineating a typology of UNICEF activities and results in terms of national capacities of public sector duty bearers. Directly or indirectly means that the evaluation included instances where the organisation engaged directly with strengthening national capacities, as well as indirectly, such as through its engagement in the sector at supra-national level or national level through partnerships.

## Evaluation instruments

The key task for the evaluation was to assess the extent to which UNICEF's upstream work between 2003 and 2012 had system-wide, sustainable impacts on education sector laws, regulations, policies and standards and/or affected the systemic capacity of the sector, and whether these impacts were relevant, and achieved effectively, efficiently, and coherently.

The results of upstream work are elusive and therefore hard to measure. While upstream work may coincide with changes in measurable education outcomes such as net enrolment rates, proving causality between these outcomes and upstream work is made difficult by many exogenous variables. That however does that changes in education outcome are not measurable, or that links of causality cannot be argued convincingly. The evaluation

methodology sought to identify and measure these interim results, through three related instruments, a theory of change, contribution analysis and an evaluation framework.


*Evaluation theory of change:* Theories of change are models of the micro-linkages or causal path from programme to ultimate outcome, that can be empirically tested (Weiss 1995). The foundation theory of change for the evaluation is provided in Figure 1.1 below. Figure 3.3 provides the theory of change interpreted for Afghanistan. The theory of change includes a categorisation of UNICEF inputs (column 2), actions and outputs (column 3), as well as risks and assumptions. The theory of change applies outcome mapping to enable the measurement of intermediate outcomes through evidence of changes in behaviour, actions and relationships of actors and governments. To systematise this evidence, the evaluation used a typology of the impacts of policy and advocacy work set out in Jones (2011), to consider five types of upstream impact (column 5). That there is an obvious hierarchy between these dimensions of impact is useful, as it allowed the evaluation to rank the effectiveness of different UNICEF upstream interventions.

*Contribution analysis:* Contribution analysis infers causality from the application of a reasoned theory of change verified by evidence. The influence of other factors, exogenous to the programme, is also weighed and considered. This method of analysis was used to assess the degree to which UNICEF inputs (funding, capacities, approaches, strategies, policies) and outputs *contributed* to the achievement of the *intermediate outcomes as evidenced by upstream impact*, through the links or pathways identified in the theory of change.

*The Evaluation Framework:* This framework turned the theory of change into a set of evaluation questions, linked to the evaluation criteria, and defensible judgement criteria, which were to be applied transparently to argue evaluation findings and conclusions. It also set out valid evidence and evidence sources. The evaluation framework questions incorporated the six UNICEF evaluation themes. Annex 6, a matrix of summary findings and conclusions, is structured according to the evaluation framework.



**FIGURE 1.1** Foundation Theory of Change



**Key assumptions / risks**

- A1** The mix of UNICEF inputs is suited to produce quality outputs leading to policy influence, capacity building and upstream impact cost effectively/efficiently.
- A2** If UNICEF has these inputs in place, it will be able to produce some of the outputs. However, it has to go into partnership with boundary partners and education public sector actors to achieve other outputs and the upstream impact. These inputs are in combination sufficient to allow partnerships to occur.
- A3** UNICEF's outputs are sufficiently relevant to its partners and countries to sustain partnership, achieve upstream impacts.
- A4** These UNICEF and partnership outputs, either individually or in combinations, will result in policy influence and capacity for education management.
- A5** UNICEF's approach and outputs internally and with partners are sufficiently coherent to lead to upstream impact.
- A6** UNICEF's outputs are sufficiently relevant to the country context for its policy influence and capacity building to sustainably deliver BEGE impacts.
- A7** UNICEF reacts to changes in the environment and feedback from its engagement to strengthen its inputs and outputs sufficiently to adapt to dynamic situations.
- A8** Public sector duty bearers want BEGE impacts and are willing to change.
- A9** The context is conducive to effective upstream engagement.



## Evaluation process

The overall evaluation occurred in two phases at the global, regional and country level.

- In the inception phase a desk-based a review of UNICEF upstream engagement was undertaken in 14 countries across the seven UNICEF regions, as well as at UNICEF headquarters to understand education upstream work from a global perspective.
- In the field-based data collection phase four country case studies were undertaken in Afghanistan, Brazil, Cambodia and Zimbabwe. Data was also collected at the regional and global levels.

Data collection in case study countries at the field level was built around the selection of two to three mini-case studies per country, utilizing document reviews, semi-structured interviews, focus groups and harvesting of quantitative data from secondary sources. The application of these instruments was country-specific. It is described in Section 1.2 below which provides a detailed account of the methodology used in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan was selected as a country case study from a larger pool of 14 desk review countries, based on initial criteria proffered by the commissioners of the evaluation, and later refined by the evaluation team. Using material collected in the desk review, primary data and secondary data, country case studies provided key evidence on UNICEF's upstream work in the education portfolio at the country level. They afforded the evaluation team the opportunity to examine not only the extent to which UNICEF at a country level has shifted to upstream work, but also how well it has undertaken upstream work and under which circumstances its interventions contributed to the upstream results observed.

## 1.2 METHODOLOGY FOR THE AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY CASE STUDY

This country case study is one of four country case studies in the global evaluation. The overall methodology was the same across all case studies, building on the Inception Report which drew on the discussion and insights of the full team workshop in August 2013. The Evaluation Framework for the evaluation as a whole can be found in Annex 6, as a completed matrix of findings for the Afghanistan case study.

The evaluators began their work in August/September by corresponding with the UNICEF Afghanistan to obtain annual reports, reviews, and evaluations, to update documentation already made available during the inception phase and to prepare for fieldwork. The document review culminated in an Issues Paper which customised the issues to the Afghanistan context, established the timeline for fieldwork (Annex 1), and presented draft interview protocols. Correspondence with the country office led to an initial programme of appointments with UNICEF staff, BEGE in particular, Ministry of Education staff in key positions as well as development agencies, partners and NGOs. The list of interviewees, their designations, and some background information on their roles is presented in Annex 3. The team visited Kathmandu September 15–18, 2013 and Kabul September 19–30, 2013. Further phone interviews were made from home to others suggested to the team, or who were not available in Kabul.

An interview protocol, derived from the Evaluation Framework, was adapted for different categories of informants. For example, questions concerning the internal coherence of UNICEF were not addressed to non-UNICEF staff. Notes from each of the interviews were written up against the responses to the particular evaluation questions, to enable a further scanning of answers by each evaluation question for the case study. The first draft of the country case study was completed in October, for discussion at the second full team workshop. This revised draft has been prepared following receipt of comments on the first draft.



## CHAPTER 2

# UNICEF PROGRAMME IN AFGHANISTAN

“UNICEF has a long history of working here. All children know UNICEF”  
(Afghan informant, September 2013)

This chapter begins with a brief presentation of the national context prior to the period of the evaluation. The rest of the chapter is a discussion of UNICEF's upstream work in the education programme over three Country Programme periods (2003–2005, 2006–2009, and 2010–2012). The discussion is centred around two themes of upstream work; coordination and capacity building, and characteristics that differentiates UNICEF from other agencies that are active the education sector in Afghanistan.

### 2.1 NATIONAL CONTEXT

Of the countries selected for this series of case studies, Afghanistan was the closest to the emergency context, situated at the downstream end of the continuum from humanitarian to development assistance.<sup>1</sup> Its education indicators have always been low, with literacy rates 18 percent for men and only 5 per cent for women in 1979. In the two decades of the Soviet/Afghanistan conflict, an estimated 80 per cent of school buildings were damaged or destroyed. Most qualified teachers left the country, and many other were killed in the conflict. During this period, two education systems operated in Afghanistan: one provided by the Soviets and the other organised by Mujahedeen

groups. During the Taliban years (1996–2001) only around one million children (almost exclusively boys) attended primary schools in Afghanistan. Education was controlled by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA). The Ministry of Education (MoE) barely functioned.

Following the end of the Taliban rule and the Bonn Agreement of 2001, the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) Comprehensive Needs Assessment (CNA) of 2002 recorded a collapsed education system. An estimated 25,000 to 30,000 children in Kandahar province alone, were identified as having formerly associated with armed forces or armed groups. The further assessment reported that there was no unified national curriculum, hence teachers and children returning from camps used whatever education materials they could find. Almost all qualified teachers had fled the country, taken jobs outside of education, were working in refugee camps, or had been killed. The CNA further estimated that nearly 14,000 schools were needed in the country to cater for an estimated 4.5m Afghan children, including an additional 1.8m refugees who had returned to Afghanistan, and identified a critical need for “strategic and efficient use of scarce financial resources, including donor assistance” (ADB, 2002). The timeline in Annex 1 documents major

<sup>1</sup> This suggests an evolution from rapid reaction to immediate needs to a longer-term, less direct planning perspective involving gradual support for the development of host-country institutional capacity, which may be overridden in an emergency. Evidence from planning documents, however, suggests there was considerable attention paid to coordination and “building back better” even during the critical immediate response, though it is not easy to determine how successful this intention was.

<sup>2</sup> It also provides details of what was happening more generally in international aid to education, UNICEF's global work and UNICEF's specific engagement in Afghanistan.



events that occurred of the education sector in Afghanistan in the period 2003 to 2014.<sup>2</sup>

Though the country office for Afghanistan was based in Islamabad, Pakistan earlier in the evaluation period, UNICEF had a presence in Afghanistan for over 60 years. During this period it supported over 90,000 Afghan refugee children in Pakistan alone, in coordination with many other agencies, NGOs and UN offices. UNICEF-supported Back-to-School (BTS) campaign planned to distribute an estimated 4,500 school kits, 21,000 teacher kits and 1.5 million student packets for primary schools (CNA, 2001). Many donors and NGOs did indeed report similar large contributions to the re-establishment of the education system in the immediate BTS period. For example, USAID, provided approximately 100,000 copies of primary and secondary textbooks for all subjects.

UNICEF Afghanistan's Annual Report for 2002 describes "a year of turmoil, change and hope" (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2002: 5). Key priorities for the country office were: "the return of 1.5 million children to school, support for the nation-wide measles and polio campaign; and to assure continued life-saving humanitarian assistance" (Ibid: 4). Girls' education was the number one priority for UNICEF Afghanistan then, and is expected to continue to be so for the immediate future (ibid: 9). Since then, over three million children enrolled in schools, 42 per cent of them in Grade 1. Data from the end of 2002 show that 30 per cent of pupils were girls and 28 per cent of teachers were female.

Enrolments were double the expected number, three times the number enrolled in 2001. These results are credited, in part, to UNICEF's "largest logistical operation globally to provide learning and teaching materials to students, teachers and schools and the provision of temporary schooling" (Ibid: 4). The massive demand for education and a dramatic increase in the number of implementing humanitarian

organisations reinforced the need for better planning, targeting and coordination to reduce duplication and wastage, and mitigate the effect of spreading of resources too thinly. By 2002/3 MoE was preparing a Strategic Plan. This was the situation before 2003, the starting point of this evaluation.

## 2.2 UPSTREAM WORK BY UNICEF IN AFGHANISTAN: THE TRANSFORMATION AGENDA<sup>3</sup>

This section relies predominantly on the three Country Programme Documents (2003–2005, 2006–2009 and 2010–2013) that span the period under evaluation. It focuses specifically on UNICEF's role in capacity development and coordination, as well as describing how different informants viewed UNICEF as differentiated from other agencies. Annex 4 presents a breakdown of UNICEF's upstream activities across the three periods into the following categories: evidence base for development; leadership and coordination; policies, standards and strategy development; capacity development; legislation; and communication and advocacy. Chapter 3 revisits upstream work in terms of its relevance to Afghanistan, illustrating the evolution of UNICEF's approach and how translated in Afghanistan.

Preceding 2003, at the most critical period of emergency rehabilitation in Afghanistan, upstream work in education was a strong focus of UNICEF's approach, at least in intention. The 2002 Annual Report refers to "initial steps ... to develop gender mainstreaming in programming" (p.10) and to establish of sectoral partnerships. Indeed, it was acknowledged by case study informants that the planning horizon in the early days had been shorter – Afghanistan is only now drafting its first five-year CPD – but even in an emergency setting such as existed in Afghanistan, there was a need to take a longer view.

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<sup>3</sup> Annex 4 provides a matrix summarising the main upstream activities of the three CPD periods.



## UNICEF's Country Programme for 2003–2005

For UNICEF the period from 2003–2005 in Afghanistan was characterised as “a transition process from a pioneering role in the aftermath of an acute emergency situation to an equally challenging role of contributor to an increasingly complex and ambitious development process” (UNICEF, 2005a: 6). The BEGE objective was “improved school enrolment with a special focus on girls’ education”. In the Country Programme for 2003–2005 even critical service delivery was to be coordinated with UN agencies and NGO partners and be based on cross-sectoral themes, including the establishment of schools as centres for social change in the community, improving the survival and participation of women, capacity building and improving the environment for children and protecting them from abuse and exploitation. So “downstream” work on the ground was expected to show “upstream” characteristics.

UNICEF’s approach “drew on the strategies of the Government’s National Development Forum, the analysis of the situation of the children and women of Afghanistan, UNICEF organisational priorities as per the Medium-Term Strategic Plan (MTSP) for 2002–2005, and current strategies of the World Bank and major donors for Afghanistan with regard to disparity and poverty reduction through improving access to basic social services” (UNICEF, 2005a: 3). Priority strategies for UNICEF display marked upstream characteristics whether at national, sub-national or community level, though the term was not yet in use.

*“At the national level, the programme aimed to create an enabling environment through (i) policy development and (ii) advocacy, both focusing on raising the profile of children and women rights in the public arena. At sub-national level, the programme was to support (iii) capacity building for quality and sustainable service delivery – emphasising planning, management and implementation,*

*as well as material support, and (iv) capacity development at community level to empower families and communities with knowledge and skills to protect and fulfil children and women’s rights.” (UNICEF, 2005a: 3)*

Research, monitoring and communication, were to support the programme at all levels.

The recommendations of the Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) for 2003–2005 led explicitly to the addition of an upstream focus in the CPD 2006–2008 (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2005). The concern was to maintain and increase primary school enrolment, but also to promote retention and completion. Rather than ‘Back to School’, not the least because so many children had never been to school in the first place, the focus increasingly became “Stay-in-School”. Gender-specific policy analysis studies were added to better understand the different factors at play in decisions of parents and children to persist in schooling (UNICEF, 2005a).

Further, the CPE suggested that UNICEF could focus “on high quality and low-cost solutions both for school buildings and for school water supply and sanitation” (UNICEF, 2005a: 9) rather than trying to encompass all the infrastructural needs – which were overwhelming. Thus, UNICEF could play a role in designing and implementing experimental demonstration projects, and workable solutions could be replicated or mainstreamed in national policies and strategies. As stated, “pilot experiences may result in evidence-based advocacy at the national level” (UNICEF, 2005a: 10). To the recommendation that UNICEF remain involved in teacher training was added the proposal that such training be child-friendly, an approach that was used successfully in other country offices. And, as with UNICEF’s early role in school construction, its involvement in teacher training led to replicable models.

The CPE also emphasised an upstream dimension when it advised on the importance of consolidating “relationships with the new



MoE and to remain involved at the policy level in partnership with other external aid mechanisms” (UNICEF, 2005a: 12). It identified UNICEF’s strengths, as others have done repeatedly during this investigation, as “based on its extensive field experience.” The early decision to appoint staff to the provincial level bears this out.

Adequate legislation and the strengthening of law enforcement were also recommended as further focuses of UNICEF’s support (UNICEF, 2005a: 11). However, the CPE warned, “The simultaneous involvement in implementation and at the policy level may create managerial challenges for UNICEF staff” (ibid).

These precursors of the CPD 2006–2008 (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2005) provide input material for analysis in this evaluation, defining some of the parameters of upstream work before the MTSP 2006–2008. Sector teams in the Afghanistan country office engaged with line ministries to develop national policies and programmes, and provided technical capacity building amongst the counterpart ministries, their various departments, and sectoral partners at all levels of the administration (UNICEF, 2005a: 54-5 referencing the Annual Management Plan for 2004).

### UNICEF’s Country Programme for 2006–2009

During this second period under examination, covered by the CPD 2006–2008, later extended to 2009, many of the recommendations from the earlier stages were carried out as described in Section 3.2, which looks at the results of UNICEF’s upstream work. The Community-Based Schools (CBS) policy, notably, was developed during this period, linking the promotion of girls’ education through community mobilisation with the recruitment, training and provision of incentives for female teachers, and the supply of textbooks.

Increased donor coordination characterised this second phase, with the establishment of the Education Consultative Group (ECG) and

subsequently the Education Development Board (EDB), which included government representatives and development partners. In addition, a technical working group for setting up the Afghan Girls’ Education Initiative was formed, and an application was made to join the Education for All (EFA) Fast Track Initiative (FTI).

A focus on a five-year strategic plan for education was assisted by the provision of four UNICEF consultants in this period, with additional technical assistance provided to the Ministry of Education on curriculum, literacy, procurement and communication/media. The development of an Education Management Information System (EMIS) within MoE, nationally and subsequently extended to provincial level, was a further, important area of UNICEF’s upstream work.

In sum, the Consolidated Results Matrix of the 2006–2008 CPD separates out ‘policy analysis, and advocacy and partnerships for children’s rights’ from the other focal areas, including BEGE. Thus, policy dialogue, advocacy and the leveraging of resources for children are given a special focus, as a cross-cutting component of the CPD. The accountability chain for such results is not clear, however. Indeed, the key results reported for this period are focused more on service delivery and implementation, than on upstream work.

### UNICEF’s Country Programme for 2010–2013

The 2010-2013 CPD (UNICEF, 2009b) also builds on the previous one. The specific separation out of upstream policy advocacy is continued with more directed key results expected, namely, 1) To articulate and secure UNICEF’s inputs into key national processes with a view to positioning children and women at the centre of Afghanistan’s development agenda; and, 2) To draft, adopt and operationalize policies, conventions and legislation that enable fulfilment of children’s rights. Explicit results for upstream work were specified more clearly in this CPD than in



previous ones, namely that BEGE “will contribute to appropriate policy, legislation and budget allocations aimed at universal school readiness and primary school” (ibid, p.7, para. 22).

In this period, UNICEF's model for school construction contracts and payments is proposed by the MoE as suitable for other donors. This is a significant output, though in practice harmonisation remains a challenge. It is also in this period that Afghanistan achieves admission to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and UNICEF becomes the Supervising Entity (SE),<sup>4</sup> following considerable contributions to the sector plan and the development of the Grant Proposal as part of the Local Education Group.

### Coordination and capacity building

Coordination of donor agency initiatives was an early priority during Afghanistan's recovery period. UNICEF Afghanistan's 2003 Annual Report records, that “UNICEF also leads the

Consultative Group for Education and co-ordinates policy discussion” (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2003: 11). Other coordination forums, including the Danida-supported Grants Management Unit (GMU) and the EDB, chaired by MoE representatives, were joined by the Human Resources Development Board (HRDB) in 2008/2009. Opportunities and patterns of donor coordination efforts are discussed in a mini-case study on the GPE. Coming as it did after considerable aid to education by USAID, the World Bank, Sida, CIDA, Danida, Japan, Norway, WFP and UNESCO, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) - multilateral trust fund used by these donors and others - the GPE's strategy for encompassing the coordination needs of the sector required detailed explanation. It should be noted, however, that Strategy 4.3 of the GPE Programme Document which refers to management, coordination and resource mobilization leaves this task to the Programme Management and Coordination Unit (PCMU).

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<sup>4</sup> This was not foreseen, however.

<sup>5</sup> The challenges are to some extent foreseen in the CPE Report for 2003–2005 (Recommendation 6, p.89).



In the period before 2003 to the present, it is clear that UNICEF's intention was to combine programme implementation in an immediate post-conflict environment with attention to longer-term concerns. This has included, among other elements:

- a. Promotion of programme convergence by integrating basic health and nutrition interventions and hygiene interventions in communities;
- b. Reinforcement of government and civil society capacity to ensure responsive service delivery at the national and sub-national levels to address the needs of the most vulnerable women and children;
- c. Advocacy for implementation of child-friendly procedures to prevent rights violations and provide quality responses;
- d. Enhancing effectiveness of third-party monitoring of UNICEF-assisted programmes in insecure areas;
- e. Promotion, in line with the UNDAF approach, of integrated service delivery in selected provinces; and,
- f. Cross-sectoral linkages amongst various programme components (health and nutrition, education, child protection, youth empowerment and WASH) to create synergy and maximize the impact of interventions.

Capacity development is an essential part of all aspects of the upstream work undertaken by UNICEF both in terms of support for sustainable ownership by Afghan institutions, and in terms of UNICEF's own capacity to coordinate, advocate, develop policy, etc. It cannot be taken for granted that UNICEF in fact has the capacity to undertake these upstream tasks.<sup>5</sup>

A number of informants – from Government, agencies and UNICEF itself – repeated the view that implementation, not support for policy development, is UNICEF's strength. In other words it was doubted by these informants that UNICEF was equipped to undertake upstream work at all. However, while there are difficulties relating to performance monitoring capacity at sub-national level in provincial and district education offices (PED, DED),<sup>6</sup> and capacity to manage data collection and evidence-based planning, these capacities are critical to UNICEF's performance and to the performance of the MoE. Donor support to UNICEF depends on its capacity to report results, and this in turn relies on monitoring capacity of the Ministry at all levels since UNICEF is committed to "promoting sustainable national systems" (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2005b, 2005: 5). The need for a more formal delineation of responsibilities between UNICEF and DoE is emphasised in recent studies of support for minorities, (Hennion and Nicolle, 2011: 55).

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<sup>6</sup> E.g., in relation to Community-Based Education (CBE) programmes.



## CHAPTER 3

### EVALUATION FINDINGS

This chapter presents findings on the relevance of UNICEF's upstream work; effectiveness of upstream work by examining results of three mini-case studies, namely "building back better", UNICEF's role as Supervising Entity in the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) as compared with its earlier donor coordination role, and the role of UNICEF ROSA in support of upstream work.

The concluding sections cover the internal and external coherence of UNICEF's upstream portfolio in education, possible factors that explain the results of upstream work, and its sustainability.

#### 3.1 THE RELEVANCE OF UNICEF'S APPROACH TO UPSTREAM WORK

This section discusses the relevance of UNICEF's upstream work in education over the ten-year period 2003–2012. Annex 4 summarises upstream work in education in Afghanistan over the three periods of country programming; namely 2003 to 2005, 2006 to 2009, and 2010 to 2012.

UNICEF had a presence in Afghanistan from 1949. Indeed, as several respondents noted, UNICEF is a known brand: «All children know UNICEF.» A major back-to-school campaign which was initiated in the first country programming period was a great success story, where twice as many students returned to classes as expected. The enrolment increases are shown in Table 3.1.

Similarly, girls' education was, and continues to be a relevant focus for UNICEF, given the enormous disparities nationally which are even more prominent regionally. The UNICEF Afghanistan Country Programme for 2003–2005, signed with the Transitional Government in 2002, focused on "delivering the most

critically needed services to fulfil the rights of Afghan children and women, in co-ordination with UN agencies and NGO partners" (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2002:10). The focus on service delivery included the provision of learning and teaching materials to students, teachers and schools and the provision of temporary schooling, using tents as classrooms, for example (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2002:4).

The focus of the 2003–05 Basic Education Program was considered by respondents and in reports and assessments as highly relevant to the country's needs both from a human rights perspective and as an equity concern, given the previous extremely low levels of access to school especially of girls, and the high level of illiteracy that are reported in Figure 3.1.

Immediate service delivery (e.g. distribution of teaching and learning materials) was complemented by work of a more upstream nature, focusing on developing teacher education curriculum and teaching standards, as well as capacity building for key functions of the Ministry of Education, such as budgeting, policy and planning, both centrally and in the provinces where project officers were appointed. The campaign for girls' education was key, together with national system development and strengthening, including the beginnings of an EMIS.




**TABLE 3.1** Estimated number schools and total enrolment in Afghanistan, 2000-2012

Year	Students		Schools	
	Primary	All	Primary	All
2000		700,000		
2002		3,000,000		5,063
2003	3,900,000	4,400,000		7,000
2004	3,900,000	4,000,000		
2005		5,494,172		
2006	4,669,110	5,675,951		
2007	5,791,973	6,333,648	5,024	9,476
2008	4,260,000	6,236,225	6,087	11,157
2009	5,112,728	6,454,833	5,165	11,480
2010		7,140,033	5,582	13,038
2011	5,422,348	7,697,076	6,024	14,034
2012		8,643,000		

Sources: MoE (EMIS, etc.), CPE 2003–5, CNA 2002, ARTF 2005, etc.

- NB.**
1. Numbers are estimates and sources frequently disagree;
  2. Gaps show unavailability of figures;
  3. Note 2008 drop in enrolments following upsurge in conflict.

**FIGURE 3.1** Total Number of students 2002–2009



Source: From Education Interim Plan 2011–13 Jan 2011, p14



The retrospective view of this first period of immediate service delivery combined with upstream work was that by 2005 UNICEF itself was “engaged in a transition process from a pioneering role in the aftermath of an acute emergency situation, to an equally challenging role of contributor to an increasingly complex and ambitious development process” (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2005: 3). “The country programme of cooperation for 2001–2003 responded to the immediate needs of children and women and «jump-started» national capacities and the machinery of government.” The CPD stated that “support to area-based programmes should continue but should work within sustainable systems and accommodate an increased role of the Government and communities» (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2005: 5). Indeed, the lessons of this earlier period were evidenced in the subsequent CPD 2006–2009.

CPD 2006–2009 drew on these earlier activities and focused on the wider picture of gender disparity in basic education, including strategies to enlarge the pool of female teachers, improvements in the learning environment to reduce attrition rates, initiatives bringing families and schools closer together, and improving management and information systems and a revitalized ECG (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2005: paras. 27-8). UNICEF's Cost-Effective Schools (CES) models, its CBS approach, its development of CFS construction standards and its coordination role were extremely relevant amidst the proliferation of donor agencies and nascent government capacity. What is clear from the trajectory of upstream engagement is that UNICEF moulded its programme both to government and to beneficiary needs, whether in capacity development, replicable model-building or focus, for example, on girls' education and the challenges of attracting and keeping girls in school.

The NORAD/Sida Evaluation of the BEGE 2006–08 programme stated:

*“There is no doubt that the objectives and the main design of the BEGE Programme are as relevant today as when the BEGE Programme*

*was started early in 2006. BEGE has moved a far way towards assisting Afghanistan on quality issues. The relevance of the approach of working through the MoE, may not produce the grandest and most visible results within a short period of time” but it “is the only way to ensure sustainability.” (Wirak and Lexow, 2008: para. 126).*

Section 3.6 on sustainability of upstream work addresses the continuing challenge of working upstream through the MoE, UNICEF's approach to capacity building, and its relationship with other development partners in this regard.

The subsequent and current CPD (2010–14) focuses on “appropriate policy, legislation and budget allocations aimed at universal school readiness and primary school” and goes on to enumerate the targeted enrolment and attainment increases for girls in primary school, the increase in child-friendly schools as well as other targeted results for female literacy, emergency preparedness and the mobilization of communities. The relevance of UNICEF's programmes to Afghanistan's needs was understood by all informants. The only critiques raised by Government informants was that UNICEF's planning formats were more closely aligned with those of UNDAF, rather than with the Ministry of Education's reporting requirements, which was a source of frustration for them.

The mid-term review of the CPD in 2012 brought about a much more equity-oriented focus than had previously characterized UNICEF programming. To that end, the ten most insecure and disadvantaged provinces – from a data analysis of service delivery and gender equity vs. UNICEF finance perspective – were singled out for comprehensive programming, in contrast to the national coverage earlier in the CPD period. Security concerns were noted as a reason for the slow achievement of results in these 10 provinces and thus it could be argued that UNICEF's changed approach was more relevant than its previous programmes. It is worth noting, however, that senior government respondents expressed their disappointment with the



narrowing (in terms of coverage) equity focus of UNICEF programmes.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, the MTR underlined certain principles of UNICEF's work, attempting to move both itself and donors from an 'emergency' to a longer-term 'development' focus, emphasising policy dialogue and influence with government, in particular on human development as the essential foundation for sustainable development and stability (UNICEF, 2012a: 50).

GPE, not having featured in the CPD 2010–2014, appears in post-MTR programming as a "platform for programme synergy and complementarity that enables UNICEF to align its own education support consistent with the four GPE priority areas, and revitalise its focus on teaching quality" (ibid: 38). It was noted from interviews in Afghanistan that UNICEF was extremely active in the run-up and design stages of GPE programming. All 10 provinces identified by UNICEF in its targeting exercise were included in the 13 provinces in which GPE programmes would operate, and the gender and equity focus of UNICEF programming was incorporated in the GPE programme design.

In spite of senior government informants' discomfort with the narrowing of UNICEF programmes, an important question that it raised is whether the Government had also traversed the path from 'emergency' to 'development', and whether the GPE model – based on relatively limited resources (\$55.7m as against nearly three times this amount for EQUIP, for example) was not a donor distortion of national targets as with UNICEF's narrower focus, however relevant. These concerns notwithstanding, UNICEF's involvement through the period under investigation has enabled it to focus on the expanding agenda of education transformation relevant to the country's needs, dealing first with the immediate service

delivery needs, and then focusing on addressing the access and quality issues of the harder-to-reach, moving toward policy support and data gathering, as well as modelling the constituents of CFS schools in the Afghan context. The next section, which focuses on the results of its upstream work, will investigate some of these issues more closely.

### 3.2 THE RESULTS OF UNICEF'S UPSTREAM WORK

In a country such as Afghanistan, emerging from decades of war, UNICEF's own documentation does not reflect all results – either for upstream work or many different contributions UNICEF has made in basic education and gender equality over the period 2003–2012. However, Annex 5 presents some of these results. But as one informant put it: "In a post-conflict situation UNICEF prepares a very flexible short-term CPD as one can't anticipate the changing environment and situation. So one needs flexibility to adapt donors' funds to country requirements"; and: "Since UNICEF's programming claims to be supportive of national interventions, there are no measurable results by UNICEF's own interventions and activities" (Rasmussen et al, 2013: 29). However, those donors who have given thematic support to UNICEF, such as Sida, nonetheless look for direct attribution of the reported results to UNICEF, and regard it as a weakness when these cannot be shown.

However, in order to look more closely at the results of UNICEF's upstream work, three mini-case studies were selected for further investigation, chosen in part to cover a variety of themes across the four country case studies of the global evaluation. The first investigates the trajectory of 'building back better' through an examination of UNICEF's involvement in school

<sup>7</sup> Often 'relevance' is attributed to donor programmes merely if they are aligned with government's plans. With a lack of prioritisation, the term, like 'alignment', can become meaningless, as a development agency can merely pick any area and deem it relevant or aligned. In this case, government's disappointment should not be seen as a reflection of the reduced 'relevance' of UNICEF's programmes. Quite the opposite, as UNICEF was intentionally focusing on the most disadvantaged, hardest to reach areas and so was 'more' relevant than before, on grounds of equity.



construction over the period following the BTS campaign. It examines UNICEF's move from responding immediately to infrastructure needs by engaging in school construction, toward modelling cost-efficient school designs capable of being replicated by others, including CFS guidelines contextualised for Afghanistan. The second mini-case study focuses on UNICEF's involvement in GPE, specifically the relatively new role of Supervising Entity (SE) for the GPE in Afghanistan, as compared with its involvement in donor coordination from the beginning of the period under investigation. The third mini-case study focuses on the role of UNICEF's Regional Office for South Asia in Kathmandu, and to the extent possible, makes inferences about UNICEF's Regional Offices and their role in support of upstream work.<sup>8</sup>

The rationale for choosing the school construction case study was that it was an example of 'building back better' in moving from emergency mode to development programming, building capacity in management, including the move toward replicable models. The GPE mini-case study was selected in view of the relatively new role for UNICEF as SE and to compare its role in Afghanistan with that of managing entity in Zimbabwe. The selection of mini-case studies, however, was also predicated on having a variety of themes across the four country case studies of the global evaluation.

### Mini-Case Study: School Construction 2002–2013

Since 2002 and the BTS campaign, demand for school places has exceeded capacity to accommodate all Afghan students wanting education. The ADB's CNA, conducted in early 2002, estimated that there were 3,600 primary schools in the country (ADB, 2002: 11) and that "in order

to achieve an 85 per cent net enrolment ratio in primary education within 10 years, using a very conservative estimate of a constant primary school age population of 4.5m.... an additional 13,851 schools will need to be constructed" (ADB, 2002: vii), i.e., at least 1,385 new schools each year. In terms of results, usable classrooms were increased from fewer than 1,000 in 2002 to over 71,000 in 2010 (Danida, 2012: 11). By some estimates the number of school-age children is now more than double the above figure and demand continues to outstrip provision. MoE's EMIS reports that the number of classrooms in 2009 was 71,592. The 2009 projected need was 127,253, rising to 144,191 in 2011 (Figure 3.2). School and classroom construction has been a priority throughout the period under evaluation and remains so. It is the largest budget item in the current Education Interim Plan (EIP), but also the most seriously underfunded.<sup>9</sup>

Following the back-to-school campaign in March of 2002, a Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces (RALS) conducted by UNICEF found "three million children attending over 70,000 schools<sup>10</sup> with about 75,000 teachers" (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2002: 14). It also showed that fewer than half of schools had access to safe water and only a quarter had proper latrines. The huge increase in enrolment was accounted for by the large number of re-opened classes despite schools being severely damaged (estimated by ADB at 80 per cent) and by the loose interpretation of what counted as 'a school'. Donors provided 2,500 tents as temporary schools and by the end of the year "rehabilitation and construction had accelerated to a further 174 schools (134 having been completed)" (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2002: 14). The following year's Annual Report refers to UNICEF support to the MoE in constructing and rehabilitating 200 schools in 2003 throughout


<sup>8</sup> The Afghanistan team was tasked with the only Regional Office visit in this evaluation and therefore was asked to develop this mini-case study.

<sup>9</sup> The GPE Programme Document maps donor commitments for construction at an average of 36 per cent p.a. of the needed requirements as shown in the EIP for 2011 to 2013. (MoE Afghanistan, 2011b). However, it is important to note the absence of most budgetary data throughout the evaluation period.

<sup>10</sup> The correct figure must be 7,000



**FIGURE 3.2** Projections of classrooms needed 2009/10 – 2020/21



Source: Afghanistan Analysis & Projection Model (ANPRO), EMIS, MoE, 2009

the country” (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2003: 12), but it is not possible to determine how much of this “support” constituted direct implementation and how much was of a more upstream nature. The report continues,

*“The Department of Construction within the MOE received assistance in identifying schools in need of repair, locating sites for new schools, producing standardized specifications and receiving training and on-going support in project monitoring and construction supervision” (ibid).*

Some of these activities are clearly more upstream than others.

Ideally it would be possible to trace a shift towards upstream work through changes in UNICEF’s budget allocations over the decade. However, Afghanistan has yet to emerge from crisis and early records are less than complete.

UNOPS implemented UNICEF’s construction programme for 200 schools (at higher than average cost according to reports), with UNESCO, WFP, World Bank, USAID, Danida, JICA, EU, ADB and a very large number of NGOs also active. Inputs from ISAF military teams were also beginning. So when the 2005 Annual Report states that 193 schools benefiting 172,910 students were constructed or rehabilitated across the country, it is not possible to identify how much of this was achieved through direct implementation by UNICEF or by development partners. Indirect work through MoE systems or through community contributions to decision-making and construction are both more typical of upstream work, but inevitably make it harder to identify where money was spent or by whom, even when dealing with very visible outputs like school buildings.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> UNICEF continues to face the difficulty of being accountable for tracing use of donor funds while at the same time being required to pool and use host mechanisms (cf. Rasmussen et al, 2013: 20-21).



Security has also restricted UNICEF's direct involvement in the field throughout the period, increasing the need to collaborate with district, provincial and central departments. This has led to some ambivalence about where UNICEF's operational strengths really lie. Some informants pointed to UNICEF's experience in the field, in direct service delivery, while other informants and some reports suggested weaknesses in implementation and monitoring of results which persist to the present. For example, the 2012 Swedish evaluation cited above describes monitoring difficulties but also a mixed picture in terms of sub-national capacity development (Rasmussen et al, 2013: 27–28). The 2005 CPE also mentioned "limited oversight and management" and the contracting out of school and latrine construction, leading to concerns over quality, weak enforcement of design provisions, lack of delegation and centralised management (UNICEF, 2005a: 68).

The emphasis on infrastructure development is indicated by the 2005 CPE as "a fundamental aspect of child-friendly schools" (p.92). It hopefully suggested a "transition from emergency operation to a more developmental programme" (p.89) from 2006 onwards, emphasising the major managerial challenges to come (see Box 3.1 above). This acknowledgement of the demands and practices of upstream work stands out partly because it makes the assumption, despite earlier references to advocacy, coordination and "the more structural and systemic aspects of capacity building" that this is a new development. But also because it is, indeed, the first explicit recognition that this mode of operating requires new skills and

mechanisms that may not previously have been deployed or even available, and it is made in relation to a very concrete aspect of UNICEF's work: building schools.

Informants reported that despite good intentions, there was very little coordination before 2005, with agencies working to different designs. In response to a request from the Minister, the concept of low-cost schools involving the local community was developed by UNICEF. Unfortunately the impression given by the term was "low-quality"; so the terminology was changed to Cost-Effective Schools (CES), consisting of seven standard designs with related bills of quantities being shared with donor partners.

During the period covered by the CPD 2006–2008, later extended to 2009, some aspects of Ministry capacity development were addressed. Consultants were provided to MoE to develop technical and operational guidelines for cost-effective schools with a standardized school design and a comprehensive package of facilities at an affordable cost, incorporating a component of community participation (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2011: 6). Thus, instead of just fulfilling infrastructure requirements, demonstration models that could be replicated – and their guidelines – were developed. Using the new designs and guidelines and in collaboration with partners, 11 schools were constructed by the end of 2006 with 82 schools under construction (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2006a: 19).

**BOX 3.1****UNICEF Country Programme Evaluation, 2005**

"On the one hand, the programme will have to continue to create infrastructure and deliver services ... On the other hand, the programme will have to develop capacities within the Government, especially at the service delivery levels, and in civil society. These are two rather different modes of intervention requiring to a certain extent different staff competencies and managerial practices" (UNICEF, 2005a) p89).



A 2011 report by Article 25 (Article 25, 2011) lists the CFS construction design features. They include provision for separate latrines for girls and boys and a boundary wall, both features repeatedly mentioned during the country case study investigation as essential in Afghanistan as indicated in Table 3.2 below.

However, building on this progress the 2008 evaluation of the BEGE Programme in Afghanistan presents mixed results, at best. The evaluation assessed progress in building MoE capacity in several programme areas and “the capacity of UNICEF Country Office in terms of number of staff, quality of staff, management, financial management systems, monitoring and evaluation systems, capacity to follow up results, accurate reporting systems from provincial offices to the country office” (Wirak and Lexow, 2008, p31). The evaluation concluded that “UNICEF is assisting in building capacity of the MoE in Kabul as well as at the government education offices at Provincial and District levels” (para 90, p.27). It goes on to describe the form of assistance (meetings, provision of computers, technical support, etc.). However, while it lists inputs it does not report the results targeted or achieved. Moreover, specifically in relation to school infrastructure results, it questions “whether UNICEF disposes of adequate competencies to deal with such construction issues” (p.34).

The evaluators’ comments on the issues of UNICEF’s own capacities recommend more attention to finding out “what works and what does not work to achieve quality results of programme activities” (p.33), citing donor concerns about monitoring which appear to anticipate those in the 2012 Swedish evaluation. There can be no doubt that, in terms of UNICEF’s management capacity, the 2005 CPE had something more systematic in mind than staff motivation and participation in e-learning programmes. Indeed, the weakness of UNICEF’s own internal capacity and knowledge of construction work has remained a concern up to the time of the mid-term review. (UNICEF, 2012a: 37), and these concerns illustrate general doubt concerning the organisation’s management and monitoring capacity.

Nevertheless, there have been achievements in upstream work. In the period 2010–2013, UNICEF’s model for school construction contracts and payments was proposed by the MoE as suitable, and was recommended to other donors. This was a clear acknowledgement of UNICEF’s upstream work in school construction. Given the very large number of companies and donor programmes involved, a bewildering number of imported designs and materials with implications for future maintenance, this represented a major advance. Many development partners were also committed to management capacity strengthening of the government procurement and planning offices. However, with ownership by government departments

**TABLE 3.2**

**Basic Planning and Design Standards for Education Facilities**

Toilets/latrines	Separate toilets or latrines should be available for girls and boys. Privacy, cleanliness and safety are major considerations when planning for location and design of facilities.
Protective	The protective element of child-friendly school design has two main aspects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To counteract bullying and abuse, teachers and parents must be trained in non-violent, child-based discipline strategies and interventions. This means no beatings, canings or other humiliating forms of punishment. Designing classrooms and other spaces so that activities are readily visible from the outside can deter child abuse.</li> <li>Depending on location and context, the enclosure and boundaries of schools can vary in form and function. The goal is to find a balance where a fence can provide protection from outside elements (such as traffic, animals), can define boundaries to keep children within the school and can also serve to section off an area for gardening and orchards.</li> </ul>



and local District Office of Education (DoE) involvement, it has taken some considerable time for some degree of harmonisation to be achieved.

The 2010 Annual Report (UNICEF, 2011) also records achievements at the end of the first year of Afghanistan's new 2010–2013 Country Programme including the construction of 75 cost-effective schools, as well as 724 new classrooms in Kabul. This was achieved in the face of "a deteriorating and unstable security situation constrain[ing] programme delivery and flexibility". The Report notably includes effective advocacy, a component of upstream work, and notes that "A commitment was made to reach all schools with WASH by 2015". Since UNICEF was not intending to expand WASH by itself, the intention was to show an agreed target to be achieved in collaboration with partners. However, the country case study found some frustration and confusion on the part of development partners and MoE over the source of contributions to reach this target, suggesting the need for better communication of this more collaborative role.

Regarding UNICEF's own capacity to manage the upstream aspects of construction, there are no reported management areas requiring improvement. The Annual Report states that, "Supply and Logistics conducted an in-house workshop on Supplies Management which was attended by supply staff from both the Kabul office and zone offices". In addition, "several

staff participated in workshops organised by Supply Division on procurement principles and Category Management, construction and contracting" (ibid). These inputs suggest activity to build management skills. Numbers and targets are not given beyond reference to an increased knowledge base. In addition, the BEGE section of the Report identifies a future priority as "proper assessment of land availability for school construction prior to selection" (p.10). Presumably this involves specific assessment skills, which need to be supported and developed, but these are not identified.

Such skills are more useful to UNICEF's in-house capacity than to UNICEF's capacity to strengthen MoE construction management systems. Indeed, if these are parallel systems they could represent a capacity drain where zone and PED/DED staff are responsible for managing donor and government procurement. The extract in Box 3.2 from a 2011 Report on infrastructure development commented on these issues, in relation to collaboration with implementing partners on procurement (Article 25, 2011: 37).

This same report investigated 56 schools including 24 built by UNICEF (23 in Kabul). Others assessed were MoE, Save the Children, BRAC, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), Local Community and Miscellaneous. UNICEF's best performance was in the value-for-money and implementation dimensions, but it was mostly assessed as poor and rarely better than

### BOX 3.2

### Implementing Partners

#### Partnership within MoE

Central to all implementing partners work will be the collaboration with the Ministry of Education. Implementing Partners have a powerful responsibility to support the MoE in its longer term agenda to build the education infrastructure and its own governmental capacity. Some large implementing Partners with well-developed systems of programming and administration may find these challenges by cultural differences and the MoE's comparatively modest capacity. Implementing Partners need to be conscious not to overburden the already stretched MoE with their own administrative expectations.



adequate in all other dimensions (planning and design, community participation, disaster risk reduction, monitoring and quality). Most other implementation partners did rather better, including the Ministry. This was both surprising and worrying. It raises questions about UNICEF's commitments and experience, as well as its reputation for implementation capacity.

In sum, there is scope for UNICEF to contribute to harmonisation and technical policy or guidance in the area of construction. Indeed, the references to land assessment, supply management and capacity development for monitoring, among other things, match UNICEF's priorities, as do promotion of MoE ownership and greater harmonisation.

The mid-term report for the 2010-2013 Country Programme (UNICEF Afghanistan 2012d), provides a good summary of where UNICEF is currently placed on construction and also makes some sensible recommendations.<sup>12</sup> UNICEF is well positioned to harmonise construction arrangements linking the CFS framework, Article 25 recommendations, equitable access priorities and GPE planning, including the standards to be applied for School Improvement Programme (SIP) funded construction. This can be done while increasing classroom numbers and explicitly building MoE Infrastructure Development Services Department (ISD) capacities. The CPD planning process was already making preparations to accommodate these priorities at the time of the evaluation. However, as the mid-term-report indicates, ensuring the availability and development of staff skills in a high-risk environment like Afghanistan is challenging. Training related to school construction has begun, but more support is needed on setting and reporting on explicit targets and indicators. These are needed in order to monitor progress in

capacity and policy development, advocacy for greater harmonisation and alignment, issues which also apply in the next mini-case study on UNICEF undertaking the role of Supervising Entity for GPE in Afghanistan.

### Mini-Case Study: UNICEF as Supervising Entity for GPE in Afghanistan

In March 2011 Afghanistan was admitted to the GPE on the acceptance of its Education Interim Plan (MoE Afghanistan, 2011a) and UNICEF was asked by Government and donors to be the Supervising Entity (SE) for GPE. This was a new role for UNICEF and in accepting the role, UNICEF made clear that additional funds were required for it to perform effectively. USAID committed \$2.5m for this purpose.<sup>13</sup> A GPE Programme Management and Coordination Unit (PMCU) was established in the MoE for programme management, monitoring, coordination and resource mobilisation; KPMG was hired for financial management; and a new post of Programme Manager for GPE was created, within the UNICEF's BEGE team.

In the context of this evaluation of upstream work in education, the pertinent questions to be asked are: has the partnership enabled or constrained UNICEF in policy, planning, M&E and donor coordination? Specifically, what is the added value for UNICEF in undertaking the role of SE in the GPE? Has the role been good for UNICEF's upstream work?

It is necessary first to consider the background to Afghanistan's admission to the GPE. As explained in Chapter 2, UNICEF played a large role in the establishment of the Ministry of Education and in donor coordination, and together with UNESCO/IIEP, played a key role in education sector development and GPE

<sup>12</sup> However, the language may be opaque for many staff and a clearer summary of recommendations is proposed.

<sup>13</sup> "To defer costs of program supervision, the SE can request and receive from the Trustee a budget of US\$100,000 per year (a supervision allocation). These funds can be used flexibly to fulfil the roles and responsibilities of the SE. In addition, agency fees required by the SE to manage the funds are determined by the SE's internal regulations and financed by the GPE Fund." (GPE Terms of Reference for Supervising Entities; GPE, 2012b)



Programme development. UNICEF was seen as a trusted partner over the period of this evaluation, and also for many years before that. The admission of Afghanistan to the GPE came late in the day relative to existing funding to the sector and institutional development of the MoE. Indeed, some key MoE staff members were promoted to their current positions following employment in UNICEF Afghanistan. Meanwhile, FTI funding of fragile states had been under discussion within FTI and among member agencies for considerable time before Afghanistan's application for GPE membership.

The idea that Afghanistan should apply for admission to the GPE (or FTI as it was then) came from a suggestion of the World Bank to the Minister of Education in 2008 (Shah, 2010: 21). At this time, the World Bank was the supervising and management entity for nearly all FTI-financed programmes, having assumed the due diligence for the FTI Catalytic Fund under the World Bank's trustee fund regulations. Furthermore, the World Bank's EQUIP project was the largest education project in Afghanistan at that time.

The requirements for FTI admission included an appraisal of an updated education sector plan and the existence of a donor coordination body. The MoE began revising its first National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) in connection with the first requirement (Shah, 2010:19), and the Education Development Board (EDB) was established during this same period, to meet the second requirement. Subsequently an Interim Education Sector Plan was produced, NESP II having been found "too ambitious", with the gap between programme requirements and potential donor finance being much too great. Indeed, this gap was part of the reason for the Minister of Education's application for FTI admission in the first place.

The education sector assessment, was carried out by consultants in February 2010 (Packer et al, 2010). The Education Interim Plan (March 2010) was already contained within the NESP II document as a lowest case scenario and

was therefore not a wholly new document. Endorsement of the appraisal and the Education Interim Plan by the local donors' group came in February 2011, and a GPE programme was subsequently designed (MoE Afghanistan, 2011b). A total of \$55.7m over three years was agreed for the Afghanistan GPE Programme.

The Endorsement Letter carries a proviso from the appraisal team:

*"The Low Case Scenario (the number one priorities in Part 2 of The Plan) is achievable by the Ministry, given the anticipated enhancement of its existing capacity. However, the appraisal team would like to emphasize that any scaling up or increased "core budget" activities would require immediate actions in administrative restructuring and strengthening of the MoE."*

This statement illustrates the importance attached by the GPE team to the strengthening of the MoE for the implementation of the Education Interim Plan.

The GPE Programme, including both UNICEF and other development agency priorities, is nonetheless a good reflection of UNICEF policy and programming, focusing on the hardest to reach, most disadvantaged areas – 55 districts in 13 provinces – including all 10 of UNICEF's focal provinces chosen in order to address the areas of greatest inequality, and having a similar thrust as UNICEF, with goals of:

- Strengthening community and social mobilization and governance systems at the local level;
- Expanding and reinforcing multiple pathways to education;
- Increasing the number of qualified female teachers in areas with high gender disparities; and
- Streamlining policy and administrative systems in the Ministry of Education.



The first three goals of the GPE Programme could be seen as a validation of UNICEF and reflect the influence of UNICEF's upstream involvement in participatory programme design consultations. One result of upstream work from the GPE role therefore is that it influenced the use of the GPE funds. However, the final goal is more contentious with respect to the increased role given to UNICEF as the SE.

Section 5.3 of the GPE Programme Document on coordination and alignment refers to three main strategies to be adopted:

*“(i) increased formal interactions and consultations within the Government of Afghanistan...; (ii) the establishment of a specialized unit within the Office of the Minister of Education to coordinate the activities of individual Departments within the MoE with regard to special programmes, including the GPE Programme...; and (iii) strengthened external coordination mechanisms.”*

Footnote 49 specifically states with reference to the above that

*“This will help strengthen the management, coordination and resource mobilization function within the MoE, which is one of the three strategies of the fourth GPE Program Priority.” (MoE Afghanistan, 2011b: 68)*

In spite of the credit given to UNICEF for its role in programme development and the focus of the GPE Programme on the hardest to reach, UNICEF's role as SE would appear to have constrained rather than enhanced its effectiveness in upstream work, especially with respect to UNICEF's past history of similar work in Afghanistan.

First, UNICEF's important donor coordination role has not been enhanced as a result of its having taken on SE responsibility. Whilst the funds are “on budget” and disbursed to government accounts at the central bank, they are nonetheless ‘projectised’ with relaxation in some

reporting rules, for example. A Programme Management and Coordination Unit (PMCU) was formed to speed up implementation, but it sits uncomfortably within the MoE without the coordination authority of the Chief of Staff, to whom all other coordination problems are referred<sup>14</sup>.

Interview reports indicated that UNICEF advocated for the Ministry of Education to assume the role of GPE coordination (which would have facilitated capacity building and influence on government policies more generally), but that the Minister argued for the establishment of the PMCU, given the capacity and time constraints. Despite the emphasis on aid effectiveness by GPE, the GPE Programme is in effect a project with its own coordination unit. Separate reports are still required, not only for GPE, but also for several of the contributing donors. As one informant noted, UNICEF could undertake a greater leadership role on harmonisation, given its SE role, starting with small issues such as DSA harmonisation, and then working up to issues with more widespread significance.

The political importance of a ‘fragile state’ gaining admission to GPE coloured the context of the GPE application and UNICEF's acceptance of the SE role. As a government informant put it: “Applying for GPE is more useful where you don't have donors” and. “GPE is not a useful way” in Afghanistan where there are already so many donors and considerable funding. Indeed, some informants referred to the GPE grant as a “small amount,” “too low” and even went so far as to say that, “It was a mistake for the MoE to apply for GPE funding”. The political importance of a ‘fragile state’ gaining admission to GPE, however, was noted by others, and in Afghanistan's case, this resulted in a seat on the GPE Board of Governors. Therefore, the political importance of UNICEF Afghanistan having accepted the role of SE is significant. However, there is clearly a divide between those in favour of UNICEF having assumed the supervisory role (viz. Government and UNICEF HQ), and those

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<sup>14</sup> This view was held by more than one informant.



doubting whether UNICEF can fulfil the associated expectations.

Some of these expectations relate to the intended capacity building in the role of SE. The GPE Programme Document (MoE Afghanistan, 2011b: 8) states:

*“The MoE will pay particular attention to strengthening capacity in planning, procurement, administration and finance and internal audit at all levels of the education system, with the Supervising Entity playing an important supporting role through extra capacity building and mentoring efforts.” (emphasis added)*

If UNICEF were better able to build systemic capacity in the ministry due to its role in GPE, it would have enhanced UNICEF's upstream work. However, as SE, UNICEF hired coordination and financial management staff as well as a non-educationist programme manager, clearly an acknowledgement that additional capacity was required for it to perform its GPE SE role.

The idea that capacity development will take place via UNICEF's SE role<sup>15</sup> is at least questionable given the UNICEF structures and the staffing of the PMCU. Whilst UNICEF's technical support on the Joint Sector Review was recognised by several informants, it was also stated that “UNICEF needs to provide support on the process and mechanisms for GPE success”. Several informants noted their dissatisfaction with the process of producing the first Semi-Annual Report, which resulted in a task force of donors being drafted to assist in the report writing. The fact that this was necessary calls into question the capacities of those hired for the SE role, and their further attention to capacity building in the Ministry.

Some informants expressed the view that UNICEF should have been providing both the impetus and the quality assurance for the report, making further intervention unnecessary. The fact that the Government of Afghanistan supported having UNICEF rather than the World Bank as SE<sup>16</sup> notwithstanding, other informants were merely surprised that UNICEF had taken on the role of SE to begin with, commenting that this would have been more appropriate for the World Bank, given its expertise in financial management (for capacity building) and fiduciary risk. However, others saw the SE role for UNICEF as an excellent move, given UNICEF's operational experience, which the World Bank lacks.

Informants cited other possible benefits from UNICEF's role, including the expectation to attract more funding to the sector, especially given the ostensible 'catalytic' role expected of GPE funding. However, in the context of a likely reduction of donor support, especially in the selected provinces where bilaterals have been supporting PRTs, attracting additional funds is likely to be more challenging than in earlier times. Furthermore, although the use of government systems by GPE as agreed by UNICEF in the SE/country partner agreement is encouraging, it nonetheless presents the dilemma for GPE that those systems, which have still not been reformed, slows down implementation and reduces timely impact. Country stakeholders do not always make appropriate distinctions between UNICEF's role and the role of the implementation unit, resulting in some concerns about slow programme implementation accruing to UNICEF. At the very least this did not enhance its position for upstream work generally.

Unlike what happened with UNICEF's earlier role as Focal Point for the Education Consultative Group and its strong participation in the

<sup>15</sup> Capacity development within the Ministry more generally – both in terms of the necessary skills and expertise required of UNICEF staff as well as the type of support given to the Ministry – is discussed in section on sustainability.

<sup>16</sup> The timing of UNICEF's undertaking the SE role also needs to be seen in relation to the reforms of FTI following its mid-term evaluation and the critique of the WB as having had undue influence as the Managing Entity of the majority of FTI programmes. (Cambridge Education et al., 2010)



subsequent GMU, EDB and HRDB, a further strengthening of UNICEF's role in upstream work through its position as SE within the relatively new GPE structure was therefore not apparent to the case study team. Indeed, there would seem to have been some confusion in UNICEF over any extra value-added that might have been imputed to the Supervising Entity's role, overlapping, perhaps with that of Danida, the current GPE Coordinating Agency. This may have been due to UNICEF's former, key, role within the group of development agencies supporting the education sector and did not arise from the ToRs for the GPE roles of Supervising Entity and Coordinating Agency which were clearly specified (GPE, 2012b; GPE, 2012c). However, given country circumstances, perhaps because of the additional staff hired as a result rather than existing staff undertaking the new position, and constraints on country office capacity, the added value for UNICEF as an organisation has not been evident. One could perhaps say that it is still early on in the process. However, the next mini-case study, on the Regional Office for South Asia (ROSA), explains what further support might have been given to UNICEF in assuming this new role in Afghanistan.

### Mini-Case Study: Regional Office for South Asia

The Theory of Change for this evaluation (03) makes the assumption that the move towards an upstream approach to education would at least be accompanied by, if not driven by, a number of formal organisational inputs from UNICEF. A key date and document was the MTSP coming into force in 2006. And part of the ToC assumption was that UNICEF work is guided by "cumulative decisions of our Executive Board over the years"<sup>17</sup>

It is a simplification to suggest that the move upstream was a response to centrally decided policy transmitted down through the hierarchy to the field. But the ToC assumes it was an organisational decision to focus increasingly on policy, coordination, host management capacity development, etc. rather than on service delivery. This section of the country case study considers the role of the UNICEF ROSA in realising and supporting this policy in Afghanistan.

ROSA was the only regional office visited by the evaluation. Eight members of staff were interviewed using a similar set of evaluation questions posed to UNICEF Afghanistan staff, MoE personnel, and development partners. In addition to the enquiring about individual awareness of upstream work in education and understanding of UNICEF's distinguishing characteristics, informants were asked about internal coherence within the organisation and the sustainability of initiatives undertaken by UNICEF in countries covered by ROSA. These two questions in particular concerned UNICEF ROSA's capacities for upstream work: whether the organisation has adequate mechanisms for monitoring upstream work for learning. They also concerned UNICEF's internal coherence, and the extent to which relevant advice, methodological support and capacity development have been provided to and between different levels and programme sections in UNICEF ROSA.

In the first place there was a consensus from almost all ROSA informants that the MTSP (2006–2008) came after the upstream work shift had taken place, and to some extent, formalised it. This understanding was also confirmed by UNICEF staff in Afghanistan. The MTSP cannot be said to have driven the policy for upstream work even if guidance has been provided since 1999/2000 through MTSPs and the Strategic Plans<sup>18</sup> (SPs) which have replaced them.

<sup>17</sup> Presentation on MTSP to the Orientation Session for Executive Board Members, January 2011.

<sup>18</sup> A new Strategic Plan was adopted by the Executive Board the week before the country case study visit.



In country all UN organisations make use of a joint, locally developed Situation Analysis (SitAn) on which to base country plans, identifying areas where value can be added to government initiatives. Priorities such as young child survival or emphases on WASH and child protection depend on the possible roles open to UNICEF in an individual country. Education tends to be a core programming area for UNICEF in most countries, and although the education strategy is developed at the HQ level, it is not meant to be prescriptive. Moreover, country plans are only developed every five years, so policy shifts are formalised when a new Country Programme is developed, or after the a mid-term review. At this time a new organisational chart, new staff allocations or a switch of resources may be possible. In between, organisational programming is focused on local realities.

In general, bring about coherence is the task of leadership at country office level, with support from the regional office. Coherence is reinforced by a process of “socialising issues” through webinars, network meetings, sharing materials, and technical support visits from the regional office. Policy shifts, when they do occur, are not top-down, but, it was suggested, often derive from “technical level dialogue, then translated into management level dialogue with ROSA.” In this regard, UNICEF is a strikingly “bottom-up” organisation.

Staff capacity in country, therefore, is the key to achievement of goals. The evaluation team was told that international team members are often (but not always) more tuned into discussion of development issues “in the air” than national colleagues. The latter are more likely to see priorities in terms of direct intervention and service delivery. However, UNICEF is increasingly making use of national staff, whose strengths may derive from length of experience in the field rather than analysis, and who may be less open to change. There are clear implications and challenges here for upstream work. A shift in this direction depends on (and makes increasing demands on) decisions made

at CO level, rather than organisational changes in regional or headquarters level. The role of the latter, as explained by UNICEF Afghanistan leadership, is to provide technical support to help achieve the shift to upstream work.

There was a sentiment that the country office does not have the requisite skills for upstream work, while a number of country office staff felt they were receiving insufficient support in the relevant areas from ROSA and or HQ. Several informants suggested a detailed set of interventions that could be provided by ROSA and HQ, for example, more time in-country from ROSA technical specialists, and closer “scaffolding” support for the Education Chief. This set of observations was reinforced by a number of development partner and MoE informants who felt much more support was needed from ROSA than the country office was getting.

However, recent support from the ROSA was also acknowledged. This included development of guidelines for national staff research and a leadership coaching programme, with second phase aimed at extend this training in negotiation with government. An initiative from HQ is the Advocacy Toolkit, though the use of the toolkit in ROSA was not evident. Other HQ and RO initiatives include a course in changing behaviour for communication for development (CBCD), and training in Dynamic Leadership tailor-made for UNICEF and offered world-wide by the Harvard Business School.

Some informants, however, pointed to the lack of systematic identification of skills and resources needed. Essential ongoing professional development, to develop skills relevant for upstream work, for example, tends to be an individual initiative not reflecting any “organisation-wide push to focus on an area of priority or a vision of where we are trying to go.” Moreover, such initiatives significantly increase staff working hours and stress levels, and may go unsupported or unrecognised by line managers. Post-training appraisal also tends not to be systematic with some senior staff doubting whether the organisation’s job



descriptions, staff appraisals or even budgets would yet reflect or reveal any general support for or movement towards upstream work for UNICEF staff and for national counterparts.

A Regional Meeting taking place at the time of the visit by the evaluation team seemed to respond to the above needs. It included a focus on RO Advisor influence on policy and implementation, and support to the CO in negotiation, advocacy (e.g., promotion of children's rights) and leverage of resources. Another emphasis was on CO technical job descriptions, budgeting for children, building capacity of government for UNICEF's exit and sustainability. However, characteristically, this seems to have been a locally driven initiative with limited organisational implications for staff development. Moreover, the more urgent need is for greater regional office capacity to be utilized and felt at the country level.

Development of institutional capacity (both UNICEF's and that of host institutions) was the focus of the question about sustainability: "Does UNICEF have the mechanisms to learn from experience, and to develop its own capacities for upstream work?" The evaluation noted a distinct difference in capacity between ROSA and UNICEF Afghanistan with ROSA technical staff having the better skill set to carry out upstream work. And yet, the assumption of the GPE SE role has greater demands on country staff. While greater support for development of upstream capacity is urgent, another important view, albeit in the minority, was that a shift in this direction as with the move to SWAp modalities risks crowding out resources needed to ensure access and quality for the most disadvantaged, who may not be catered for by most straightforward mainstream "systemic" programmes. It is therefore essential that country offices receive the necessary support to manage both approaches, and that upstream work does not come at the expense of a focus on minorities and equity, for example.

Therefore, upstream work was not found to be a strategy for doing more with less, as was occasionally argued. Rather, it requires substantial


and effective inputs (training, toolkits, mentoring, etc.). According to informants, upstream work "is not in UNICEF's DNA"; the organisation "does not have a real gut feeling for what it means to be influential at the required level across sectors", for example, to speak to the Ministry of Finance, to develop skills in financial and macro or socio economic analysis, or to engage in management discussion relating to SWAps. Upstream work, in broad terms, may be understood as important for sustainability and government ownership, but all staff urgently need guidance in translating this into changes in how they work on the ground. The Afghanistan country office requires additional or different skills to realise this new approach, and it must be an organisational priority to provide these, whether from ROSA or from HQ.

### Conclusions emanating from the three mini-case studies

The ToC diagram for Afghanistan (0 below) tries to encapsulate what is assumed to be happening across all three mini-case studies. In the case of school construction, success would not only be the Ministry of Education advising other development partners to utilise the models developed by UNICEF, but also, the fact of their use. Thus, as one of our informants put it, "The current use of the term 'mainstreamed' is taken to mean that programmes should be handed over and UNICEF should operate a 'hands off' approach, which is not entirely appropriate." Whilst this interpretation of 'mainstreaming' is by no means universal, it is the realised policy influence that is underlined. Indeed, policy influence and support given to Government may only be realised subsequent to such 'mainstreaming'. If one looks more closely at the ToC diagram, it can be seen that UNICEF's inputs on resources and monitoring and evaluation are not really geared towards upstream work. The strategies are there, but the follow-through is not: neither is the learning plan nor indicator development specifically designed to raise upstream outcomes.



FIGURE 3.3 Afghanistan Theory of Change



SYSTEM IS DYNAMIC: LEARNING TAKES PLACE ON UPSTREAM ENGAGEMENT AND CHANGES UNICEF ACTIVITIES

Key assumptions / risks

- A1** The mix of UNICEF input is suited to production of quality outputs responding to context and leading to policy influence, capacity building and upstream impact cost effectively
- A2** UNICEF's inputs, in partnership with others, are sufficient to produce the expected upstream intermediate outcomes
- A3** UNICEF's outputs, in combination with others', and through strengthened partnerships, will result in policy influence, increased resources and greater MoE capacity for education management
- A4** UNICEF will react to changes in the context and feedback from engagement by strengthening inputs and outputs in response to dynamic situations



In the case of UNICEF's undertaking the role of SE within Afghanistan's GPE programme, it is critical to appreciate that best advantage comes not from the fact of its role but how it is used for policy influence and support to strengthening the Ministry of Education. This includes the choice of most effective approaches, especially for girls' enrolment and retention in quality education settings and the harmonisation of donors' contributions. The creation of a GPE Coordination Unit and the appointment of a non-educationist GPE Programme Manager confirm that UNICEF actions may speed up implementation, but will not necessarily bring about capacity development, and indeed handover to the Ministry, of the coordination functions being carried out by extra National Technical Assistant (NTA) staff under the current arrangement.

In the case of ROSA's support to the Afghanistan country office, this could have taken the form of a more in-depth analysis of the role that UNICEF could play within GPE in-country, together with the necessary skills development for UNICEF and strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Education. Leadership and management training for education chiefs, however necessary, would seem to have taken precedence even in the special situation of UNICEF's SE role and the potential in-house capacity development requirements of this role.

The next section addresses further the issues of capacity development and methodological support for upstream work across UNICEF.

### 3.3 INTERNAL COHERENCE OF UNICEF'S UPSTREAM WORK IN EDUCATION

The evaluation criterion "coherence" was added to the DAC criteria used by this evaluation, to examine "the alignment of UNICEF's upstream work internally, and with the work of its key partners". This section considers coherence internally, within UNICEF at the headquarters, regional and levels to support work at the country level. Conclusions and recommendations reflect those in the mini-case study on

ROSA. The next section deals with coherence externally in terms of UNICEF's working relations with its partners (development partners, MoE, NGOs, etc.).

Both in Afghanistan and ROSA, the main thrust of the enquiry was to examine whether common approaches for upstream work had been applied throughout UNICEF, what steps were taken to achieve this, and to develop the capacity of staff expected to deliver against targets for upstream work. The assumption was that coherence on matters of policy and capacity development within UNICEF, and within the wider UN organisation, would make it more likely that shared objectives would be reached.

As the theory of change in 0 above indicates, there was also an assumption that appreciation of various aspects of the country context and of UNICEF's position, as well as agreement on appropriate strategies (e.g., the use of government systems and the balancing of service delivery and system development) would need to be common at all levels to ensure success. Coherence on inputs for upstream work, from adoption of strategic positions such as the leadership of EDB and UNICEF's participation in policy forums, to the deployment and development of staff and other resources, would indicate that everyone was working towards the same goals.

In fact, while there was a common understanding of the meaning of upstream work, there was less agreement on skills or capacity needs for upstream work, or ways in which performance in upstream work could be measured. In the meantime, UNICEF did make a strong commitment in relation to MTSP 2006–2009

*"to ensuring that its staff have the necessary skills and the supply, information and communication technology, and financial and administrative systems for effective fulfilment of their roles at the country, regional and global levels." (UNICEF, 2005b: 39, para. 137)*



Measurement of upstream work relating to quality and capacity development is indeed difficult, and yet country office staff have to report on performance to donors on precisely these aspects of their work if they are to leverage funding for upstream work. The only indicators cited were on the inputs side, mainly training, and much of this seems to be identified on an individual basis. It would be useful, for example, for staff contributing to workshops on policy development to refer to sets of common milestones or a menu of outputs or targets against which to report positive performance. And while mechanisms such as “webinars” and training courses were cited as ways to develop staff capacity, it was not possible to explore the content or outputs of training, or its relevance to particular challenges in country.

The evaluation found that Education Chiefs do have a common understanding of the ways in which upstream work is to be applied (though the term is not generally used) and also of the necessary balance between upstream work and the field. Some of this derives from individual professional awareness and reading, “technical level dialogue”, which is then taken to “management level dialogue with ROSA”. Clearly, transmitting this understanding to country offices teams, national and international, and permanent and short-term technical staff is a major challenge. Not only was there evidence that contract or national staff frequently lack an appreciation for priorities for upstream work, but also that the particular indicators that apply, for example, to stages of policy development or capacity building, are not obvious or commonly recognised.

The evaluation included discussion with informants of cross-sectoral collaboration between the education and sanitation and health programmes. There was general agreement on the potential effectiveness and efficiency of integrated programming. Development partner and NGO informants reported interest in

adopting similar approaches. However, MoE informants reported confusion and disappointment over responsibility for achieving “WASH in schools” programme targets. The perception is that greater coordination would be possible and welcome, but doesn’t yet happen.

### 3.4 EXTERNAL COHERENCE OF UNICEF'S UPSTREAM WORK IN EDUCATION


Looking across the whole period from 2003–2012, it can be seen that UNICEF's role amongst its partners has changed since the early days. UNICEF was the lead in education policy development and the focal point for the Education Consultative Group since 2002, and assisted the Government greatly in the establishment of a Ministry of Education where none had existed previously.<sup>19</sup> Thus the question that might have been asked at this earlier stage was whether other development partners' work was coherent with UNICEF's, because of its close involvement with the MoE.

To that end, UNICEF did not merely fill gaps in service delivery though it was heavily involved in downstream work. It also foresaw the necessary system strengthening as it worked both in Kabul and in the provinces. Since the early days, the involvement of other development agencies in education has increased enormously, including through the ARTF. The thrust of most other agencies was considered to be coherent with UNICEF's upstream work, in the uptake of CBE policy, cost-effective schools and child-friendly schools; the Teacher Education Programme (TEP) comprised a coordinated approach to teacher education; and most development partners are today supporting the MoE's recurrent costs through national technical assistants. There is an NTA policy, which is an attempt at coherence, even if not a resolution of what is in effect a shadow ministry.

<sup>19</sup> “Donors, particularly Denmark, and UNICEF, have invested in capacity building within the MoE to enhance its ability to direct and develop the education sector.” (Danida, 2005: 107).



**FIGURE 3.4** Main contributors to education – 2009 (in USD)



Source: *Identification Report for Danish Support to Education, 2009, p. 31.*

There are also challenges in keeping different ministries and local authorities informed and engaged over developments, and working together across sectors. For example, MoE and MoH use very different modalities – UNICEF is working through MoE departmental counterparts, while almost all MoH programmes are contracted out to NGOs – so crafting harmonised implementation arrangements is a demanding task involving pro-active communication skills. The big donor programmes in education include those of CIDA, Danida, Norway, Sida, USAID and the World Bank, among others, as indicated in Figure 3.4.

There is also a heavy reliance on NGOs within the provinces. Most agencies of countries with a military presence in Afghanistan have focused their education sector work geographically, linking it with the Provisional Reconstruction

Teams (PRTs) in the area. If external coherence is akin to alignment, then the geographical focus of such sector work could be seen as lacking coherence prioritising regions militarily rather than according to education needs.<sup>20</sup>

Although UNICEF continues to be relied on as a trusted partner by the Ministry of Education, its earlier role of assisting with policy coherence and donor coordination has been overshadowed by some of the larger development agencies with much larger funds for education because of the size of their programmes. UNICEF’s budget for BEGE in the current CPD comes to \$120.4m for the five-year period 2010–2014. The World Bank (and ARTF’s) EQUIP II project has a budget of \$438m for six years for 2008–2014, for example (WB, 2012).

<sup>20</sup> “All donor evaluations consider their respective activities to have been relevant or highly relevant based on their alignment with the government’s plans and priorities. The government and civil society, on the other hand, give low to moderate scores to alignment based on the view that the development plan is by its nature all-encompassing and thus any donor initiative can be considered aligned to it. It concludes that ‘many donors continue to follow their own agendas while claiming they are aligned with Afghan government priorities!’” (GoA, 2010, 16; quoted in Sud, 2012: 3).



Even if the education policies behind some of the large donor programmes have been coherent with UNICEF's upstream work, their roll-out has by no means been uniform. This is, of course, not directly attributable to UNICEF. However, it does indicate less policy influence by UNICEF in its support of the MoE. For instance, the CFS standards were meant to have been observed by development agencies involved in school construction. Indeed, the standards relate directly to girls' enrolment and attainment in the Afghan context, yet it was reported that 82 per cent of the schools built under the World Bank's EQUIP projects appeared to be without boundary walls, 20 per cent without electricity and 50 per cent without latrines, which is inconsistent with CFS standards.<sup>21</sup>

Similarly, the GPE Programme, in spite of its close coherence to UNICEF's focus areas, is implemented in a parallel fashion and has had to create its own coordination unit, albeit within the MoE. This also indicates a lack of coherence, with overall coordination within the Ministry resting on a few individuals and not yet having been institutionalised. As one informant noted, the monies could have been put into EQUIP, rather than another 'project' being created. This observation is in contrast with the recognition shown UNICEF for the technical support given both to the consultation process surrounding GPE programme design and to the more recent Joint Sector Review. However, it is consistent with another observation made by several informants that the role of SE was not as clear to UNICEF as to others. Indeed, if GPE was to contribute to donor coordination in the education sector, common monitoring and reporting should have been set up for MoE, GPE, UNICEF, donor agencies, and all implementing partners.

Finally, the evaluation found that UNICEF has not effectively communicated its positions on upstream work to other development agencies. Not only were none of the case study

informants aware of any 'shift' to an upstream focus of UNICEF's education work, they had also not been made aware – by UNICEF itself – of the decision made in the current CPD MTR to focus on the 10 most disadvantaged provinces. The next two sections draw together, first, some of the factors that have been uncovered in this investigation of UNICEF's upstream work to explain its successes and challenges, and second, the likelihood of its sustainability.

### UNICEF – differentiation from others

UNICEF not only has a longer history in Afghanistan than any other development agency, it is also differentiated from its partners in Afghanistan in a number of ways. For this study informants were asked about UNICEF's strengths and other characteristics. Some of the responses are reported below.

UNICEF has "good ideas, money and experience of field level activity"; others have the first and second but not the last. Indeed, it is UNICEF's field presence which sets it apart from other agencies with more money and larger education projects, such as the World Bank (WB). One respondent stated the need to combine field experience with policy work, emphasising that "In conflict countries it is necessary to stay involved in service delivery." And another underlined the importance of knowing that UNICEF will stay, regardless of the country's situation, unlike other development partners.

Further, UNICEF's ability to work in insecure and remote areas was emphasised, though it may do this through national staff, whose understanding of and capacity for upstream work may, it was pointed out, be different from that of international staff. UNICEF's involvement in sub-national training also sets it apart from other development agencies as does the fact that it uses government's own systems, though this is a double-edged sword. On the one hand,

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<sup>21</sup> NORAD, 2012: 57 quoting Mid-Term Evaluation (MTR) of July 2011: 81 Second Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP II) Grant H354-AF and ARTF 93962 Mid-term Review July 17 – 31, 2011 Aide Memoire.



government capacity can thereby be strengthened, but on the other hand, especially in emergency education, such reliance on still nascent government capacities can slow down implementation considerably and therefore delay service delivery.

Other respondents singled out UNICEF's strength in that its role is not limited to education. It deals with other sectors, so has a broader perspective, and moreover, its child protection role helps it to look at education from a violence-reduction perspective and therefore consider how to ensure the safety of girls going to school.

In comparing UNICEF to UNESCO in Afghanistan, one informant referred to expecting delivery from UNICEF but brains from UNESCO and said that planning and management, for instance, were not UNICEF's expertise. Just the same, another respondent compared their global knowledge by comparison with others and thus the ability of UNICEF and UNESCO to bring lessons from other countries to the Afghan context.

Probably the most complimentary comment, repeated by several respondents and pertinent for upstream work, was that UNICEF has a strong relationship with government as a partner with the mentality of a servant not a boss. As it was put by one UNICEF staff member, "Partnership means working with you, planning with you, monitoring with you. We do not behave like a donor." This neutrality was mentioned as a strength in UNICEF's CPE 2006–2008, "no hidden political, cultural or economic motives" (UNICEF Afghanistan, 2005b, p.7).

In summary, it is evident that, despite UNICEF's reputation for field-work and service delivery, the perspective of its own staff and of many other informants was that UNICEF's upstream work did not begin in 2006, but had a prior history. The following chapter will present an analysis of the results achieved over the evaluation period, making use of internal and external documents and comments from respondents from UNICEF in country and at the Regional

Office, and from respondents in the Ministry, and with development partners and NGO partners.

### 3.5 FACTORS EXPLAINING THE RESULTS OF UNICEF'S UPSTREAM WORK

Previous sections have argued that UNICEF's work has been extremely relevant to the immediate education service delivery needs in Afghanistan and for policy development for education transformation and system strengthening, both in Kabul and in the provinces. The Norad/Sida evaluation of the BEGE 2006–2008 programme (Wirak and Lexow, 2008) is extremely positive, for instance, pointing to several important factors, most of which have been the bedrock of UNICEF's programming throughout the three CPD periods covered in this evaluation: working through the government and not in parallel structures; having no hidden political, cultural or economic motives; being a credible and strategic partner; and demonstrating a reasonable balance between access and quality issues (Wirak and Lexow, 2008: 7). It also points to a nation-wide perspective as having been very important. This has changed since the MTR in 2012 as UNICEF chose to utilising resources strategically in support of the equity agenda.

If the theory of change is considered in relation to the three mini-case studies, a conclusion can be made that there are very few outputs associated with upstream work, almost no tangible outcomes, and even fewer outcomes where UNICEF has been the sole contributor. While the evaluation found UNICEF's general approach to upstream work to be internally coherent across its three levels, this has not been mirrored in UNICEF's communication with its partners. Indeed, the current CPD is more geared toward upstream work, focusing upfront on policy, legislative change and budget leverage for universal school readiness and primary school enrolment. However,



several of the assumptions that underlie a theory of change for success in such upstream work would appear to be unwarranted.

The first assumption is that the mix of UNICEF inputs is suited to producing quality outputs leading to policy influence, capacity building and upstream impact cost-effectively. In spite of the history of UNICEF involvement in Afghanistan, the current mix of staff capacities and the approach to capacity building are inadequate for this purpose. The close partnership with government has made it more difficult for UNICEF to be clear about the strategies necessary to strengthen the system and not merely the individuals being supported. Similarly, UNICEF assumed the SE role for GPE, but had to hire coordination staff, financial management staff and a non-educationist programme manager, all for a parallel GPE programme, even if embedded in the MoE. These choices should have been interrogated more rigorously by UNICEF and partners.

The second assumption is that UNICEF's inputs, in partnership with others, will result in intermediate outcomes upstream. As was seen in the construction mini-case study, the benefits from harmonising policies were less than they might have been because of issues with monitoring. Thus, whilst Government wanted support on monitoring, UNICEF was not effective as it had previously been (Rasmussen et al, 2013). With GPE, UNICEF is compromised by its SE position and its lack of appropriately qualified staff, but still has to provide quality assurance for a programme that is less aligned, and less consonant with its own upstream approach than earlier involvement with the MoE. These factors are also likely to undermine other partnerships with UNICEF.

The Ministry of Education was restructured in line with the five priority areas of NESP II, but the procedural changes from a continuous reform of the Ministry have not been forthcoming. In spite of a national, cross-sector NTA policy having been agreed (GoA, 2013), the policy is not based on a capacity building

approach, nor is there an exit strategy even if UNICEF support is of relatively fewer individual staff in the MoE than other development partners (i.e., World Bank, Danida). Neither is UNICEF presenting a strong capacity development and management reform strategy. Thus, UNICEF currently is not living up to the third assumption in the ToC, namely that its inputs, in combination with those of others, including partnerships, will result in policy influence and capacity for education management.

The fourth assumption, that UNICEF reacts to changes in the environment and feedback from its engagement to strengthen its inputs and outputs sufficiently to adapt to dynamic situations, is not currently being borne out, as evidenced in the ROSA mini-case study. The regional office has not addressed the human resource needs in the Afghanistan country office urgently enough to enable the office to engage more effectively in the transition to development from emergency education. However, UNICEF has yet to develop the capacity for crafting coordinated policy, involving other development partners and the MoE with shared reporting and quality monitoring. This jeopardises its positioning and influence.

UNICEF performed well in the very difficult, early emergency situation during the 2003-2005 CPD. It coordinated development partners, built schools, printed books, among others. UNICEF's resolve and belief in its mandate for children is a great strength. It obliges larger donors to focus on human issues. There is general trust in the UNICEF 'brand', and the length of its experience in Afghanistan has been another strength.

However, the situation in Afghanistan has changed; it is now a chronic, long-term problem environment in which local drivers of conflict are taking over from the earlier emergency setting. These include lack of justice systems; the need for land reform and titles; employment issues; and large family and tribal loyalties. Such a changed environment requires a modification of approaches.



### 3.6 THE SUSTAINABILITY OF UPSTREAM WORK

The sustainability of UNICEF's upstream work is in question for the following reasons:

- It lacks an evidence-based, strategic, policy analytic vision for the education sector which can be communicated convincingly to Government, development agencies, NGOs and UNICEF's partners;
- It lacks an appropriate capacity development policy for UNICEF Afghanistan and its support of the MoE; and
- There has been inadequate development of indicators and monitoring of interventions to provide feedback loops for UNICEF and its partners, including Government.

At the time when the evaluation was being conducted, UNICEF was working in a high risk environment and having to focus on upstream work from the resumption of its in-country presence. Nonetheless, as the number of agencies and the size of funding available to the sector have grown, UNICEF has not adapted sufficiently to an increasingly development, rather than emergency education, environment. UNICEF retains its excellent reputation, but it is in danger of increasingly losing its place amongst the development community as the first port of call for education expertise. Although partners relied on UNICEF for support in re-establishing a Ministry of Education that barely existed, it is not ensuring the necessary institutional and organisational capacity development in the Ministry. This now rests on the expertise of very capable but skeletal staff, several of whom were, incidentally, themselves UNICEF former staff members and who continue to receive salary supplementation as key National Technical Assistance (NTA) within the Ministry.

There is no specific, in-country, professional education expertise among the large donors. One could argue that this is as a result of on-budget financing of the education sector by

the main donors, whether USAID or the other bilaterals through the ARTF. DFID advises from HQ as does the World Bank. The education advisors of Sida, CIDA and Danida are either in their HQs or have been or are being replaced by generalists. Afghanistan is no different from so many other countries in this respect, but the opportunity for UNICEF to fill this gap in the way it clearly did in the early days was not evident. Rather, effort is focused on finding appropriately qualified staff for the UNICEF Afghanistan, when UNICEF's high calibre education staff in ROSA and at UNICEF Headquarters could be used to provide targeted support for the Afghanistan country office. Furthermore, as aid to the education sector may be reduced following the end of the war in Afghanistan, the need for high quality professional education expertise is all the greater.

Capacity development for leadership and management is being addressed by the courses on offer to senior staff, and we learned of one of the national BEGE staff having returned from completing a Master's degree in the UK. However, at this stage in Afghanistan requires a much more concerted approach that can provide the best strategic and policy analytic support for the MoE, support for the development of a comprehensive institutional and organisational capacity development policy in the MoE and at the same time, monitoring indicators which can be used by UNICEF and by the MoE and its partners.

*As one informant put it, "Upstream work has not been easy for UNICEF. The focus has traditionally been on service delivery. The more you move upstream the more you need to change the skills profile required. Macroeconomic analysis has been added to the social policy set of skills needed. In many countries this role is played by the Representative but not in all. The more you go upstream, the more you have to be an expert in education but also manage macroeconomic and cost analysis."*



UN agencies and other partners expressed discomfort at UNICEF's ability to continue to be an honest broker when the SE role puts the organization in such a close relationship with the Ministry of Education. Thus, guidance is needed from the ROSA and at UNICEF Headquarters on how to negotiate appropriate roles, especially given UNICEF's history in the education sector in Afghanistan. While the situation may be different in the Kabul office than in the provinces or districts, inadequate monitoring arrangements by UNICEF – some of which is related to the security situation – have resulted in less than sufficient government involvement, even at the decentralised levels (Rasmussen et al, 2013: 27). The opportunity has presented itself for UNICEF to improve such relationships through the quality assurance role it plays as GPE Supervising Entity, but this could be affected by UNICEF's unclear division of labour with NGOs on which other development partners and UNICEF have relied, especially in the hardest to reach areas. This observation applies both to GPE and UNICEF programmes alike.

UNICEF's ability to continue to receive support from development partners for upstream work is a further potential weakness. UNICEF's lack of strategic policy analysis diminishes its role; and its lack of engagement with the MoE's overall capacity development strategy contributes to a weaker position amongst development partners. For instance, the evaluators were informed of infrequent coordination meetings between the GPE Unit and other partners, including other MoE departments, UNICEF, and Danida. Such meetings would be a key means of influencing and handing over MoE coordination across the departments, the ostensible aim of the Unit.

Similarly, informants noted the fragmentation and duplication of EMIS, notwithstanding UNICEF's key involvement in the development of the first surveys. For instance, UNICEF was called into question for not preventing even through UNDAF the introduction of an additional EMIS for non-formal education, when CBE, which is already a key strategy for non-formal education is, a key component of Afghanistan's education strategy. Evaluators also heard of additional, difficult to collect data requirements made by the World Bank of an already weak EMIS system.

There are other areas about which evaluators received less information, but which give further indication that UNICEF's policy influence may be declining rather than increasing. This includes the important introduction of cohort tracking; it is not clear whether there has been any coordination between this and the learning assessments recently introduced by the World Bank. And finally, there was no information from UNICEF about utilising its role in GPE as a catalyst for increasing aid. All of these elements are important building blocks for policy analysis and dialogue, and for upstream work in general.



For UNICEF Afghanistan, the need to strike a balance between immediate service delivery and upstream work around policy influence, advocacy and system strengthening was present from early on. For instance, 'back-to-school' which featured advocacy and service delivery was soon married to evidence-gathering for policy development, such as incentivizing of female teachers and the 'accelerated learning' initiative for girls. The evaluation found, however, that UNICEF no longer seems able to exercise the same level of influence in policy analysis and system strengthening.



## CHAPTER 4

# CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 4.1 OVERALL ASSESSMENT

This chapter presents the conclusions and lessons learned from this case study of UNICEF's approach to upstream work in education in Afghanistan over the period 2003–2012.

First, the need to strike a balance between immediate service delivery and upstream work around policy influence, advocacy and system strengthening was present from early on. There was no 'shift' as such from one approach to the other. Indeed, with the poor provision of education for girls, and not much of an education system in Afghanistan in 2001, policy influence surrounding the many key factors relating to girls' access to education and their retention in school was foremost in UNICEF's approach. Thus, the 'back-to-school' programme which featured advocacy and service delivery side by side was soon married to the evidence-gathering needed to craft further policies, such as community-based education and the related training and incentivising of female teachers, curriculum development, cost-effective schools, and Accelerated Learning. As was said to us so many times, "muddy boots gave UNICEF a place at the policy table." UNICEF's work in service delivery gave it credibility and ability to respond, important to its ability to influence policy.

The move toward piloting and modelling community-based education and cost-effective schools emerged from the experiences of rapid enrolment increases, the arrival of many development agencies with significant funding, and awareness that the MoE required assistance in coordinating the huge efforts of maintaining and increasing enrolments through a range of improvements, both physical, involving infrastructure, textbooks, and teaching and learning

materials, as well as human, involving teacher education, providing incentives for female teachers, and community social mobilisation.

UNICEF's involvement in the re-establishment and capacity development of the MoE was key in the early days, not least through funding of international and national technical assistance, of which the latter has become a pattern amongst all the development agencies. Indeed, two key senior staff members of the MoE not only continue to be financed by UNICEF, but are themselves former UNICEF staff members. These are the Director General of Finance and Administration and the Chief of Staff who is also the Chair of the HRDB. However, UNICEF no longer seems able to exercise the same level of influence in policy analysis and system strengthening. One senior informant asked: "Why isn't it [UNICEF] using its global knowledge and expertise to advise the MoE and give technical support in policy formulation and planning?" But this informant also stated in response to the issue being raised of the shift to upstream work: "We need a combination, not cutting implementation and moving to policy."

The continual feedback from implementation to policy advocacy, which according to several informants existed in the early days, has declined. The MoE no longer has to rely on huge numbers of international technical assistants, given the considerable capabilities of its national staff. This expertise, however, is arguably only made available through donor support in the form of NTA salary supplementation, which in effect, makes for a shadow MoE. The resolution of this unwieldy system, which ought to be a policy priority, does not appear as a key area of UNICEF's involvement.



Coordination across departments, especially in their partnerships with development agencies funding their operations, also remains a challenge, though the official donor view is different from the Ministry's, who attested to seeing advantages in maintaining distinctions in capacity and funding mechanisms between development partners (as has been seen in many other Asian countries, e.g., Indonesia, Lao PDR, and India). Nonetheless, the opportunity for dialogue on policy alignment, which ought to be strengthened by the GPE mechanisms, may increasingly be reduced by the use of what is in effect a separate UNICEF-backed Project Implementation Unit.

Working on education policy, policy dialogue, capacity development, system strengthening and aid effectiveness is a challenge even in developing countries not faced with conflict. In the high risk environment of Afghanistan, with decades of conflict behind it and an uncertain future, UNICEF requires the best strategic analysis possible to ensure that its partnerships with Government, development agencies, and NGOs continue to build sustainable capacities for the fulfilment of children's rights. UNICEF is still in a favoured position in Afghanistan. It must use this position, feeding in information from its field work, its pilots, and its partnerships, to revise and amend its approaches, its policy advocacy, and the evidence it can bring to bear in influencing others.

## 4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of recommendations emerge from this case study of Afghanistan, some of which may have broader significance for UNICEF's policies in upstream work in basic education and gender equality.

1. Given the transitional, post-conflict status of Afghanistan, UNICEF Education should consider investing the expertise and time of ROSA and HQ-based advisors to have them contribute to ongoing strategic analysis of the education sector and other upstream work.

2. UNICEF Headquarters should craft clear, contextualised policies for Afghanistan's engagement with GPE that marry global with in-country knowledge and can offer guidance to the country office.
3. Elaborate capacity development policies for Afghanistan, detailing UNICEF's expectations, accountability structures and exit strategies. Such policies would benefit from guidance by UNICEF Headquarters on approaches to capacity development.
4. Upgrade the hiring of new staff and capacity development of current staff in P4 and higher positions in the Afghanistan CO, to include social, economic and political policy analysis.
5. UNICEF Afghanistan leadership should detail outputs and targets against which to report upstream performance, in order to highlight priorities for upstream work and to be able to assign commensurate responsibilities for staff. Such an exercise would benefit from guidance from Headquarters on how results in upstream work should be measured.
6. Invest UNICEF office time and capacity to dialogue with key development partners -- such as the World Bank which is a key UN but not UNDAF member -- in order to ensure better alignment behind UNICEF upstream priorities and more coherent upstream work. This could contribute to better implementation of policy commitments made by government to which UNICEF contributed.



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# ANNEXES

## ANNEX 1: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS 2003–2014

Date	International Aid	UNICEF Global	Afghanistan Education	UNICEF in Afghanistan
1979	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted by UN General Assembly.		Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Literacy rate 18% for males, 5% for females.	
1980	UN World Conference on Women identified equal access to education as fundamental to women's rights.	UNICEF launches Women in Development Programme.		
1989	Convention on Rights of the Child endorsed at UN		End of Soviet occupation, fighting between Mujahedeen parties delayed reconstruction.	
1990	Education For All (EFA) Goals adopted in Jomtien, Thailand.	UNICEF founds the Education for All Movement with four partners, including UNESCO and the World Bank.		
1993			NGOs assisting 1000 of the 2,200 estimated schools. 90,000 Afghan children in refugee camps in Pakistan.	
1995	Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action formed at the UN 4th World Conference of Women. Equal access to education and eradication of women's illiteracy key strategic objectives.			
1996			Taliban take control. Female education banned. Limited services provided by MoE.	



## Annex 1 (cont'd)

Date	International Aid	UNICEF Global	Afghanistan Education	UNICEF in Afghanistan
1999			Estimated gross enrolment rate in primary education: 3% for girls, 38% for boys (UNESCO, EFA report).	
2000	<p>i. Dakar World Education Forum confirmed commitment to UPE by 2015.</p> <p>ii. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted. Education targets consistent with Dakar confirmed.</p>	<p>UNICEF's: "The State of the World's Children 2000" published.</p> <p>UNICEF becomes Secretariat for CES.</p>		
2001	G8 meeting in Italy establishes EFA Task Force led by Canada.	<p>UNICEF MTSP 2002–5 states aims to influence larger group of actors for children, through its alliances, partnerships, advocacy, monitoring, research, and policy analysis at all levels.</p> <p>Girls' Education becomes UNICEF's "Organisational Priority No. 1"</p>	<p>i. End of Taliban rule; Bonn Agreement; MoE rebuilding begins.</p> <p>ii. No unified curriculum.</p>	Sub-regional emergency programme established by UNICEF Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, CARK and ROSA.



Annex 1 (cont'd )

Date	International Aid	UNICEF Global	Afghanistan Education	UNICEF in Afghanistan
2002	<p>i. EFA FastTrack Initiative (FTI) launched</p> <p>ii. Monterrey Consensus at International Finance and Development Conference, Mexico.</p>	<p>EFA Global Monitoring Report established in UNESCO to monitor progress towards EFA goals.</p> <p>2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of High-Level Group on EFA, Abuja, Nigeria 19–20 November 2002.</p>	<p>i. Fewer than 1000 useable classrooms nationally estimated by MoE, 3,400 schools in MoE ownership.</p> <p>ii. ADB's Comprehensive Needs Assessment (CNA) estimated 3,600 primary schools in the country, "to achieve an 85% net enrolment ratio in primary education within 10 years ... primary school age population of 4.5 million ... an additional 13,851 schools will need to be constructed" i.e. 1,385 new schools p.a.</p> <p>iii. MoE's Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education in Afghanistan stressed need for a policy and strategic framework to address long-term and immediate goals, "Lack of coordination between the objectives and the system will lead to failure in achieving educational goals."</p> <p>iv. MoE initial strategy note includes commitment to expand access, reduce gender gap, work in partnership with communities, religious groups and other civil society organizations, and develop capacity of system.</p> <p>v. 1.8m refugees returned from Pakistan, Iran, etc.</p>	<p>i. UNICEF CO moved from Islamabad to Kabul with increased staffing in insecure environment; In a highly unstable and fluid situation, the office did not adequately plan for annual activities and events (no Annual Management Plan-AMP).</p> <p>ii. Increased funds (\$120m) through Immediate Transitional Assistance Programme (ITAP); UNICEF Afghanistan finalized the Country Programme of Co-operation 2003–2005 with the Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA).</p> <p>iii. Over 3m children enrolled in school (30% girls), double target, through Back to School campaign; Girls' ed. is No. 1 priority for UNICEF including gender mainstreaming with special attention to the right to education of IDP children, girls and other hard-to-reach children.</p> <p>iv. UNESCO &amp; UNICEF support New Curriculum Framework development.</p> <p>v. UNICEF support syllabi for grades 1 to 6.</p> <p>vi. UNICEF distributed 4,500 school kits, 21,000 teacher kits &amp; 1.5m student packets for Primary schools; 40,000 teachers orientated to new materials under co-ordination of UNICEF Afghanistan and neighbouring offices, ROSA and Copenhagen.</p> <p>vii. Strengthening MoE through TA for policy/guidelines/ systems development and programme planning, distribution and monitoring was "operational success and major change" in UNICEF's work with counterparts; coordination between govt and interagency collaboration improved after uneven start.</p> <p>viii. Sector strategic plans prepared in Ed sector with UNICEF support.</p>



Annex 1 (cont'd )

Date	International Aid	UNICEF Global	Afghanistan Education	UNICEF in Afghanistan
2003	<p>Rome Declaration on harmonisation of aid. Development community committed to aligning and harmonising assistance round a country's development priorities and systems.</p>	<p>3<sup>rd</sup> Meeting of High-Level Group on EFA, New Delhi, India.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Changed focus to provinces not regions to increase presence in the field.</li> <li>ii. Improve synergies between actions. Use programme themes not traditional sectors.</li> <li>iii. Focus on partnerships not in-house capacity for service delivery and monitoring; use technology to reduce access problems (difficult terrain, cost and insecurity).</li> <li>iv. UNESCO &amp; UNICEF support revision of New gender-sensitive Curriculum Framework and textbook.</li> <li>v. Target: 50% increase in girls' enrolment, (450,000 more girls in school, esp. IDPs), all primary teachers trained by end 2003.</li> <li>vi. Provided teaching-learning materials to 4.2 million children and 82,000 teachers.</li> <li>vii. Started Accelerated Learning Programme for 75,000 girls; national communication campaign for girls education.</li> <li>viii. Rehabilitated/constructed 200 schools (mainly girls); provided over 2,000 tents for girls in schools.</li> <li>ix. Supported Dept of Literacy textbooks and facilitators guide.</li> <li>x. 99% estimated children under 1 yr. registered</li> <li>xi. Early learning materials developed for MoE and UNESCO.</li> </ul>



Annex 1 (cont'd)

Date	International Aid	UNICEF Global	Afghanistan Education	UNICEF in Afghanistan
2004	Marrakech Round Table on Results, Morocco: Development agencies endorsed five core principles on managing for development results (MfDR).	Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) established under FTI to help low income countries improve quality and sustainability of sector planning and programme development.	<p>i. Article 43 of Afghan constitution (adopted January 2004) states that education is the right of all citizens (both men and women), and up to BA level, is free of charge.</p> <p>ii. Grants Management Unit (GMU) established in MoE with Danida help to assist coordination of development funds to the Ministry.</p>	<p>i. Supported MoE initiative (with WB, USAID, JICA and Afghanistan Primary Education Program (APEP), for Teacher Education Programme (TEP) to raise coordination, teaching/learning quality, and number of qualified teachers, particularly females.</p> <p>ii. 306,000 girls newly enrolled: 231,000 in regular government primary, 75,000 in UNICEF assisted CBE schools. 1,794 CBE schools set up where girls' enrolment rates are low.</p> <p>iii. Over 29,000 teachers trained, Teaching/learning materials provided to 81,000 teachers and 4.4m children. 127,000 IDP children provided with supplies and information.</p> <p>iv. MoE and other partners (WB, DANIDA, USAID, JICA &amp; GTZ, have formulated a Teacher Education Project (TEP), to provide a coordinated long-term plan for teacher education, including pre-service training. A 1 month training package for 105,525 teachers will be used.</p> <p>vii. No assessment of student learning achievements (primary leaving result trends) yet conducted.</p>
2005	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness endorsed by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials.	Upstream work becomes an area of explicit organisational focus as one of UNICEF's five focus areas in medium-term strategic plan (MTSP) 2006–09.	New curriculum books for grades 1 to 4 were finalised by 2005.	



Annex 1 (cont'd)

Date	International Aid	UNICEF Global	Afghanistan Education	UNICEF in Afghanistan
2006		<p>CIDA, DFID, et al. recognise UNICEF's strategy to reposition itself within the international aid system and strengthen its role as the global leader on policy and advocacy for children and their rights.</p>	<p>i. USAID (largest donor) contributed US\$96.9m to education between 2006 – 2013. Gradually shifting to capacity development and using govt. systems.</p> <p>ii. WB EQUIP (largest programme in MoE); WB manages Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust fund (ARTF) covering EQUIP &amp; 10 donor programmes (\$88m 2006–2013), DFID, CIDA, Norway, etc.</p> <p>iii. Textbook distribution mechanism proposed and piloted.</p> <p>iv. Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) &amp; Afghanistan Compact (London Conference on Afghanistan) formed framework for new Education Programme: Five Year Strategy 2006–10 (NESP).</p> <p>v. MoE established 2,399 new community-based schools (CBS) trained 3,996 CBS teachers, and provided teaching-learning materials including textbooks for CBS children.</p> <p>vi. MoE trained 614 trainers and recruited 8,110 female teachers.</p> <p>vii. International Literacy Day celebrated to increase public awareness. MoE organized seminars and media spots. 1,782 adult learning centres established in 17 provinces. 48,009 illiterate women enrolled.</p>	<p>i. UNCT shared premises and met weekly.</p> <p>ii. Armoured vehicles increasingly necessary for UNICEF work as security situation deteriorating.</p> <p>iii. 4.89m children enrolled (192,535 previously out-of school), 4.25m in primary 1–6; 402,427 new girls (primary GER=100.03%); 47,808 in UNICEF-assisted CBE, 354,619 in regular government primary schools.</p> <p>iv. 57,766 teachers oriented to new G2 &amp; 5 textbooks. 40,000 trained in pedagogy under TEP; trainers' manuals, and teachers' guides provided.</p> <p>v. UNICEF installed 1,000 classroom tents for over 60,00 children in remote areas.</p> <p>vi. Technical and operational guidelines developed for construction of cost effective schools involving local community. 11 schools constructed, 82 under way. 42,985 desk/chair sets procured and/or repaired. Other supplies provided.</p> <p>vii. MoE's EMIS upgraded for expansion to provincial level from 2007.</p> <p>viii. Education consultative group (ECG), Govt. &amp; DPs active with UNICEF support. 4 consultants provided to MoE to develop policy documents and MoE five-year strategic plan. Worked on (i) construction of cost-effective schools, (ii) Mainstreaming of community-based schools established by various agencies, (iii) developing a national programme for literacy, and (iv) preparation of five-year strategic plan MoE.</p>



Annex 1 (cont'd)

Date	International Aid	UNICEF Global	Afghanistan Education	UNICEF in Afghanistan
2007	7 <sup>th</sup> meeting of High-Level Group on EFA – Dakar, Senegal.	UNICEF's Executive Board endorsed the Education Strategy, as a long-term framework for interpretation and implementation of (MTSP).	<p>i. First EMIS School Survey records 5,024 primary schools (up from 3,600 in 2002), and a total of 9,476 schools.</p> <p>ii. MoE procured teaching-learning stationary materials for projected 5.6m children and 98,000 teachers.</p>	<p>i. Primary NER 53 % for urban children but only 6% for Nomad children; Total 4.77 m enrolled (1.78m girls in Grades 1–6; About 339,672 girls in Grade 1.</p> <p>ii. 25,435 female teachers trained during 2006–2008, 13,285 of them deployed in rural schools.</p> <p>iii. Over 70% girls got pass marks in Grade 3 exams; 212,896 girls (50.6% of those who enrolled in 2003) reached in Grade 6.</p> <p>iv. Construction of 3,370 cost effective classrooms; furniture provided for 269,600 students. Access increased by 160,809 children in remote areas through CBS; 161 of 651 schools are reopened and operational with teaching-learning materials and necessary supply items.</p>
2008	<p>i. Accra summit on aid effectiveness, donor commitment on end to aid fragmentation.</p> <p>ii. Mid-Term Evaluation of FTI began.</p>	<p>i. Evaluation of the Child-Friendly Schools Initiative.</p> <p>ii. MTSP 2006–2009 extended to 2011.</p>	<p>i. NER estimated (by 2007–08 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment) at 52%.</p> <p>ii. CIA estimates 11m Afghans are illiterate.</p> <p>iii. Process begun to produce report on Rights of the Child.</p>	<p>i. Change of guard in MoE; new Minister of Education installed in October.</p> <p>ii. Donor coordination increased through 1st meeting of the Education Development Board (EDB) with MoE and donor representatives (CIDA, UNICEF, USAID, JICA, WB and Sida) December 2008.</p>
2009		UNICEF MTSP 2006 to 2009 (11) extended for a further 2 years to 2013.	Revision of NESP begun ahead of schedule.	<p>WB presentation on FTI made to EDB (February).</p> <p>Donors support 1,157TA working in MoE (WB –475, USAID – 275, Danida – 155, UNICEF – 4).</p> <p>Application made to join FTI. (May).</p>



Annex 1 (cont'd)

Date	International Aid	UNICEF Global	Afghanistan Education	UNICEF in Afghanistan
2010	International aid to Afghanistan estimated at US \$15.7billion.		<p>i. MoE estimate over 71,000 useable classrooms nationally. MoE owns 13,363 schools (12,421 general education, 626 Islamic education).</p> <p>ii. Since 2001 an eight-fold increase in teacher numbers; over 8,500 school Shuras (community education committees) established, and Provincial Education Department (PED) in each of the 34 provinces; 93,000 new teachers recruited and trained.</p>	<p>i. Use of UNICEF's model for school construction contracts and payments proposed for other donors.</p> <p>ii. HRDB took over donor coordination from EDB in April.</p> <p>Consultancy for FTI assessment begun, paid for by Danida, CIDA and USAID. (February).</p> <p>Draft NESPII (March).</p> <p>iii. Report on education support to minority groups through CBE noted: "the division of responsibilities between UNICEF and DoE is not formally delineated". This threatens sustainability. In addition project support remains informal and poorly documented. Capacity development for DoE monitoring of minority CBE initiatives recommended.</p>
2011	<p>i. EFA – FTI changes name to Global Partnership for Education (GPE).</p> <p>ii. Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation signed by ministers of developed and developing nations, emerging economies, providers of South-South and triangular co-operation and civil society.</p>		<p>i. 72,500 women attending 2,900 literacy centres. Education is a basic right for all children. Country is committed to EFA and MDGs, with revised target date of 2020.</p> <p>ii. 5 m children (42% of total) not in school due to vulnerability and poverty.</p> <p>iii. March: Admission of Afghanistan to GPE.</p>	<p>FTI Appraisal and Endorsement of Education Interim Plan (February).</p>



## Annex 1 (cont'd)

Date	International Aid	UNICEF Global	Afghanistan Education	UNICEF in Afghanistan
2012	i. World Bank's Report on Gender Equality and Development noted 31 million girls are still out of school. ii. Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation jointly supported by OECD and UNDP.			UNICEF report several instances where local communities in Taliban led areas requested support for education.  April: MTR of 2010–12 CPD.
2013	UNICEF named Interim Chair of GPE.	June: Evaluation of Upstream engagement in BEGE begins.  MTSP extended to 2013.		
2014			Main ISAF forces withdraw, including PRTs.	



## ANNEX 2: SUMMARY OF UNICEF BUDGETS AND AID FLOWS 2003-10

**TABLE A2.1 UNICEF Budgets 2003–2010**

Year	Approved Budget	Funds Available	Donors
2003	\$51.5m	\$30.5m	AusAID, Austria, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Denmark, Finland, Germany Permanent Mission, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, USA/ BPRM, USAID, UK and Northern Ireland, and UNICEF Committee for Belgian, Canada, German, Japan, Korea, Norway, Sweden, and UK
2004	\$34.2m	\$27.1m	Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Sweden, USA/ Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM), and UNICEF National Committees including Belgium, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, Sweden and the UK
2005	N/A	\$17.5m	N/A
2006	\$21.98m	\$21.5m	Government of Sweden, Norway, Japan, and UNICEF National Committees of Germany, Netherlands, and the US (US Fund)
2010	\$26.75m	\$46.77	N/A



## ANNEX 3: MAPPING OF STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED

UNICEF, ROSA			
Stephen Adkisson	<i>Dep. Regional Director</i>	Urs Nagel	<i>Regional Evaluation Adviser</i>
Leotes Lugo Helin	<i>Education Specialist</i>	Ron Pouwels	<i>Regional Child Support Adviser</i>
Karin Hulshof	<i>Regional Director</i>	Andreas Rossi	<i>Regional Adviser Social Policy</i>
Louise Kagabo	<i>Regional Chief of Human Resources</i>	Lieke Van de Wiel	<i>Regional Education Adviser</i>
UNICEF, Afghanistan Country Office			
Zabiulla Amiri	Engineer, <i>BEGE</i>	Esmaeil Ibrahim	Chief of WASH Section
Khadija Bahram	Education Officer, <i>BEGE</i> , Curriculum	Ahmad Fawad Jamshid	Program Assistant, <i>BEGE</i> , Education
Cristina Brugiolo	Education Specialist, <i>BEGE</i> , Access and Retention	Mohammad Zulfikur Ali Khan	Programme Specialist, <i>BEGE</i> , Education, GPE
Catherine Panji Chamdimba	Education Specialist, <i>BEGE</i> , (CFS)	Nasreen Jamal Khan	Health Specialist
Rose Clynick	Human Resources Manager	Pawan Kucita	Chief of Education Section, <i>BEGE</i>
Mirwais Fahez	Program Assistant Education, <i>BEGE</i>	Siping Wang	Chief, Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation
Vidhya Ganesh	Deputy Country Rep/ Acting in Charge	Arzhang Yusefi	National Education Officer, <i>BEGE</i>
Lailoma Hassani	Education Officer, <i>BEGE</i>		
Other UNICEF			
Eva Ahlen	<i>Chief of Education, Nepal</i>	Fazlul Haque <i>Former Chief of Education, Afghanistan</i>	Deputy Rep Liberia
Nabendra Dahal	<i>Chief of Education, Indonesia (former Chief of Education Bangladesh)</i>		
Ministry of Education			
Samir Amiri <i>Adviser to Minister for Grants Management and Donor Coordination (GMU)</i>	Coordinator for UN orgs incl UNICEF + Danida	Author Abdul Zahir <i>Gulistani General Director of Curriculum Development and Compilation of Textbooks</i>	



### Annex 3 (cont'd )

Ministry of Education (cont'd)			
Abdul Wassay Arian <i>General Director Policy and Planning</i>	Also Senior Advisor to the Minister	Naseem Planning and Evaluation Coordinator, GPE Coordination Team	For AWP for districts
Jalaludin Atayee <i>Research and Evaluation Manager, Planning Dept</i>	Former manager donor coordination	Farid Tanai <i>GPE Programme Coordinator</i>	Former Danida+aid coordination unit+MoF
Sarwar Azizi <i>Director General, Finance &amp; Admin</i>	Also Senior Technical Advisor to the Minister; chaired GMU; former UNICEF	Attaullah Wahidyar <i>Chief of Staff, and Chair of HRDB</i>	Also Senior Policy Programme Adviser; former UNICEF
Prof M. Naeem Baheen <i>Director General, General Education</i>	Former Acting Deputy Minister		
DONORS			
Aaru Bhatnagar <i>Gender and Education Specialist, WB</i>		Siawash Payab <i>Project Manager/ Coordinator, JICA</i>	Co-chair WG on Special Needs, Child Friendly Ed Coord Group, MoE
Rebecca Haines <i>Gender Specialist, WB</i>	Former AKF	Deirdre Watson <i>Education Advisor, DFID</i>	Former UNICEF
Mohammad Iqbal Halimi <i>Development Officer – Education, Canadian Embassy</i>	UNICEF partner	Sue Wiebe <i>First Secretary (Development), Canadian Embassy</i>	UNICEF partner
Rasheena Harris <i>Education Development Officer, USAID</i>	UNICEF partner	Ahmad Parwiz Yosufzai <i>Programme Officer, Danish Embassy</i>	Former MoE; DANIDA is Coordinating Agency, GPE
Nasrin Hoseini <i>Program Manager, Education and Gender, Second Secretary Swedish Embassy</i>	UNICEF partner		
NGO			
Aminulhaq Mayel <i>Head of Education Programme, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan</i>	Not a UNICEF partner		
UN			
Yukiko Matsuyoshi <i>Chief of Ed. Unit, UNESCO</i>	Senior Project Officer; former UNICEF		



## ANNEX 4: UPSTREAM WORK IN EDUCATION 2003–2012

2003–2005	2006–2009	2010–2012
<b>Evidence Base for Development</b>		
MICS	MICS 2009	Establishment of the first Afghan socio-economic database using DevInfo
Needs Assessment and Costing	EMIS made ready for expansion to provincial level	Cohort Tracking System
	Impact assessment on sanitation and school attendance	Developing multi-lateral support to GoA monitoring and evaluation units and promotion of greater coordination with other UN agencies (Eval 2012)
	Learning Achievement Assessment for Grade 4 Completers	
<b>Leadership, Coordination</b>		
Lead, Consultative Group on Education	AGEI Technical Working Group established	Lead in Cluster on Nutrition, Wash and Co-Lead on Education
<b>Policies, Standards and Strategy Development</b>		
Back to School Policy	Model for Cost-Effective Schools (CES) and policy framework	Aim: appropriate policy, legislation and budget allocations aimed at universal school readiness and primary school
National Campaign for Girls Education and communication strategy	Community-Based Schools (CBS) Initiative	Uniform monitoring form for CBS
National systems and approaches for improved learning outcomes	Revise student achievement assessment and develop textbooks for primary and lower-secondary education	Afghanistan Girls Education Initiative (AGEI) and recommendations to revise curriculum framework
Development of standards for primary school teachers leading to national curriculum and long term plan for teacher education	Support the Government to develop a comprehensive teacher- training system in primary education	Establishment of Cohort Tracking System in Schools
Strategy planning on ECD	Create a policy framework for child-friendly schools	Use innovative approaches to increase access and enhance effectiveness of third party monitoring of UNICEF-assisted programmes in insecure areas



**Annex 4 (cont'd )**

2003–2005	2006–2009	2010–2012
	Support the Government in developing sector policies and strategies for community-based operation and maintenance.	Development of a policy, curriculum and teacher training package for early childhood education will be supported. (CPD 2010–13)
	Healthy School Initiative Policy and a School Health Strategy.	Revised education curriculum, incorporating key guiding principles, including CFS and gender mainstreaming.
<b>Capacity Development</b>		
Placed national project officer in each province to coordinate planning, implementation, monitoring.	Policy-level support, advocacy and technical support for planning, monitoring and evaluation in all programmes.	Reinforce the capacity of the Government and civil society to ensure responsive service delivery at the national and subnational levels to address the most vulnerable women and children.
CD in Programme Management, establishment of Grants Management Unit, MoE.	Technical experts (5) in MoE on curriculum, literacy, procurement and communication/media	Cascade training in CFS to shuras.
CD in Materials Distribution.	TA to develop procurement procedures in line with Government policy and to train staff at central, provincial and district level. Staff recruited to serve as a liaison between line ministries and MoF.	Training on the Inter-agency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE) as a cluster approach.
CD Dept. of Literacy.	Four consultants provided to MoE to develop policy documents and contribute to the five-year strategic plan for MoE – helped develop policy/ position papers for MoE on (i) construction of cost-effective schools, (ii) Mainstreaming of community-based schools established by various agencies, (iii) developing a national programme for literacy, and (iv) preparation of five-year strategic plan for the Ministry of Education with support from UNESCO.	



**Annex 4 (cont'd )**

2003–2005	2006–2009	2010–2012
TA to MoE in Budgeting, Policy & Planning		
Support in establishment of Academic Council on Education		
CD to Provincial and District Staff		
Support in establishment of EMIS		
CD for Media on CRC		
<b>Legislation</b>		
Juvenile Justice Code		
CEDAW ratified		
Optional protocol on CRC ratified (child soldiers)		
<b>Upstream Extracts from UNICEF Reports</b>		
To expand education programme focus away from only increasing access and quality in education, UNICEF worked to place schools as a center for change. (UNICEF Annual Report 2003)(AR 2003)	Technical and operational guidelines were developed for construction of cost effective schools involving local community. These guidelines have reduced the cost of construction from an average of around \$150,000 to around \$45,000 per school of 8 classrooms with water and sanitation facilities.(AR 2006)	Promote, in line with the UNDAF approach of integrated service delivery in selected provinces, cross-sectoral linkages amongst various programme components (health and nutrition, education, child protection, youth empowerment and WASH) to create synergy and maximize the impact of interventions. (CPD 2010–13)
The programme supported the development and strengthening of child-friendly and child-centred policies in various ministries through the Programme Secretariat in Education and participation in Consultative Groups in the relevant ministries. (AR 2003)	A 2-year curriculum framework and syllabi for teacher education was developed in collaboration with USAID and GTZ. Three different varieties of syllabi have been developed for three different levels of teachers' training (grade one to three, grade four to six and grade seven to nine).(AR 2006)	Results: establishment of a cohort tracking system in schools, to strengthen monitoring of school drop-outs, retention and completion, thus enabling the Ministry of Education to collect data on these three key indicators for girls and boys; (b) increased enrolment and retention of girls through (i) increased opportunities for female teachers, including training and recruitment; (ii) establishment of appropriate learning spaces, which include the construction of boundary walls and water and sanitation facilities, to attract and retain girls in school (CPD 2010–13)



**Annex 4 (cont'd)**

2003–2005	2006–2009	2010–2012
<p>The main objective of the “Quality of Education” project was to develop national systems and approaches leading to improved learning outcomes. (AR 2004)</p>	<p>Communities will be supported to protect schools and to establish community based schools. The programme will aim to contribute in achieving 80% girls’ enrolment in one hard-to-reach province to create a successful model for other partners to follow (CPD 2009)</p>	<p>Approach: linkages with the health and nutrition, WASH and child protection programmes, to prevent children’s rights violations, particularly against girls, who are the most vulnerable. (CPD 2010–13)</p>
		<p>(a) re-orienting UNICEF programmes from ‘emergency’ to ‘development’, albeit in what is expected to continue to be a high-risk environment (b) engaging donors to shift the nature of their funding from short-term emergency funds to medium/ long term development funds and (c) move towards a stronger emphasis on policy dialogue and influence with government and other partners to focus on human development as the essential foundation for sustainable development and stability post-Transition (MTR 2012)</p>



## ANNEX 5: EXPECTED AND ACTUAL RESULTS REPORTED OF UNICEF BEGE PROGRAMMING 2003–2013

Year/ CPD	Expected Results/Targets	Actual Results
<b>ACCESS AND QUALITY</b>		
2003	Provide <i>3 million children with access</i> to high quality education, especially for girls and hard-to-reach children (CPE 2003–5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>4.4m children gained access</i></li> </ul> Quality: curriculum development, TT, information systems, MICS (CPE2003–5)
2005		Net enrolment rates, especially for girls, have increased: some 67 per cent of boys, and 40 per cent of girls, aged 7 to 12 are in school, compared with 41 per cent of boys and 13 per cent of girls in 2002. Yet 45 per cent of all primary school-age children – 2 million children – are not yet enrolled.(CPD2006–2008) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>4.26m in primary school 2005</i> (CPD 2010–13)</li> </ul>
2006–8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improve the quality of education for all children, including those with disabilities;</li> <li>• Revise the way student achievement is assessed;</li> <li>• Develop textbooks for primary and lower-secondary education (CPD 2006–8)</li> </ul>	781 CBSs established, and 2,992 already established CBSs were operationalized. Both enabled 33,712 new students to enjoy education in addition to 115,489 students who continued their education from previous year. (871 CBS teachers and 33 provincial focal points received 3 days training. Provision of monthly incentive for CBS teachers insured.) <p><i>Printing:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 51,000 of G3 and G6 new textbooks</li> <li>- 140,000 teaching learning material</li> <li>- 100,000 inset I and 200,000 inset II printed</li> </ul> <p><i>Supplies</i> to schools throughout the country:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TLM to G1–G6 students and teachers: 5,160,000 and 96,428 respectively</li> <li>- 4,313 blackboards, 3,155 floor mats and 530 tents</li> <li>- Emergency TLM for 8,561 for teachers and students               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Out of 246 cost-effective schools, construction of 110 schools completed and additional 184 schools are on-going under different stages of construction. (does not add up).(2007 EYR)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>4.77m in primary school 2008</i> (CPD 2010–13)</li> </ul>



**Annex 5 (cont'd )**

Year/ CPD	Expected Results/Targets	Actual Results
2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish 1,493 CBS for 48,790 out-of-school children</li> <li>• Support 75,202 children in 1973 existing CBSs</li> <li>• Provide TLM to 2.6 million grade 1–3 students and 115,000 teachers of primary school</li> <li>• Construction of 108 CES carry-over from 2008 and 74 new ones</li> <li>• Distribution of emergency supplies</li> <li>• Provide psychosocial support for students in 13 first-phase provinces trained on psycho social support</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1,347 CBSs for 43,620 out-of-school children (26,026 girls) established</li> <li>• 71,502 children of existing CBSs (31,560 girls) supported with TLM and teachers' incentive</li> <li>• TLM distributed to 2.57 million students and 114,569 teachers of primary schools</li> <li>• Construction of 67 schools completed and remaining 101 schools at different stages.</li> <li>• Emergency supplies distributed to different schools for more than 43,000 children</li> <li>• 383 master trainers, 2,564 teachers</li> <li>• 2,611 recreation kits distributed (2009EYR)</li> </ul>



Annex 5 (cont'd )

Year/ CPD	Expected Results/Targets	Actual Results
2010–13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least 30 per cent of primary schools are child-friendly</li> <li>• Emergency response is provided to ensure continuity of schooling, including protection of schools against attacks, through the following interventions: (i) gather data on school incidents and respond immediately for the reactivation of the school through provision of supplies and rehabilitation of the school buildings or provision of school tents, as needed; (ii) mobilize local communities through school management shura (committees), community elders and religious leaders to prevent future attacks; (iii) encourage communities in the conflict-prone zones to sign memorandums and commitments to protect schools in their areas. (CPD 2010–13)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>School enrolment increased from about 7.1 million in 2009/10 to 7.8 million in 2010/11, including a 40.3 per cent increase of girls in school. Out of 5.1 million children currently enrolled in primary school, 2 million are girls</i></li> <li>• 4.2 million (34 per cent) children are not enrolled in school (NRVA 2007/8). The majority (60 per cent) of out-of-school children are girls (EMIS 2011)</li> <li>• A review of teacher quality and status in Afghanistan shows that the majority of teachers (70 per cent of the 186,864) do not meet the minimum requirement (grade 14) to be classified as a fully qualified teacher.</li> <li>• 90 per cent of all qualified female teachers are only located in 9 major urban centres</li> <li>• Approximately 50 per cent of 12,740 formal schools are without usable buildings, boundary walls, safe drinking water or adequate sanitation facilities and students walk long distances to school</li> <li>• Only 4 per cent of schools have hand washing facilities; only 9 per cent have facilities for disabled children; and the new school EcoSan latrines are not functioning properly due to poor maintenance.</li> <li>• The number of girl students, incl those in CBS increased from 1,857,817 in 2009 (baseline) to 1,963,282 (6 per cent increase) and 2,113,360 (14 per cent increase) in 2011</li> <li>• 3,492 CBS with 118,072 students, incl 67,796 girls; 28,596 students joining formal classes incl 16,594 girls (2010)</li> <li>• 3,843 CBS with 124,699 students, incl 66,047 girls (2011)</li> <li>• In 2010, a total of 4.2 million children (grade 1–6) and 98,487 teachers received TLM. In 2011, due to funding limitations, the distribution of TLM was reduced to the first three grades (1–3), but still covered 2.7 million children and 53,889 teachers.</li> <li>• 38 high quality buildings were constructed in Kabul City (=additional 822 classrooms – access for 237,403 students 2010–11)</li> </ul>



## Annex 5 (cont'd )

Year/ CPD	Expected Results/Targets	Actual Results
(cont'd) 2010–13		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 13 schools under construction in Kabul and 95 CES constructed in provinces for 60,000 students</li> <li>• During 2010–2011, 374 schools in 21 provinces (3 per cent of the total number of schools) have introduced the CFS approach. All the target schools were coordinated with the WASH programme.</li> <li>• 2500 schools targeted of which 1077 schools (43 per cent) provided with WASH services(9% of the total (12,421) formal primary schools in the country)</li> </ul>
<b>CAPACITY, POLICY AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT</b>		
2003	While meeting the immediate needs of children through service delivery, each programme would <i>build national capacity</i> , including that of the private sector, so that the Government, private sector and civil society can eventually take over specific programmes and activities, allowing UNICEF support to be shifted to other areas.(CPE2003–5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 500 MoE staff trained;</li> <li>• GMU established;</li> <li>• UNICEF: focal point for Education Consultative Group:</li> <li>• Support to MoE to formulate national education budget (CPE2003–5)</li> </ul>



Annex 5 (cont'd )

Year/ CPD	Expected Results/Targets	Actual Results
2006–8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create a policy framework for child-friendly schools</li> <li>• Strengthen <i>monitoring and evaluation systems at national, provincial and community levels</i> to better target interventions and measure the effectiveness of the programme, particularly through its provincial presence</li> <li>• Support the Government to build its capacity in monitoring progress on the MDGs and for <i>policy analysis at all levels</i>, emphasizing “Issue and Policy Impact Analysis”, an initiative supported by UNICEF</li> <li>• Support the Government to enhance <i>policy-making regarding girl’s education, the reduction of gender disparities and the promotion of child-friendly approaches.</i></li> <li>• Improvements in the <i>learning environment</i>, and support for initiatives such as <i>Parent Teacher Associations</i> that bring families and schools closer together</li> <li>• Support to improve <i>management and information systems</i></li> <li>• Support to revitalise the Education Consultative Group with Government and partners</li> <li>• 1.8 million girls’ enjoying child-friendly schools</li> <li>• Policy dialogue, advocacy and leveraging of resources for children increased.(CPD 2006–8)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Science, math, and language text books for grade 7–9, revision of inset I &amp; II, development of a two-year teacher training curriculum and instructional material for semester one of the Teacher Training Courses (TTCs), development of the literacy newsletter for learners, development of learning achievement assessment package, teacher training package of grade 3 and 6, and Healthy School Initiative (HSI) training package</li> <li>• Eighty teachers received training in Inset II, 14,285 teachers in inset I, and one week workshop for 68 central and provincial literacy staff took place. In addition 68 provincial master trainers for literacy program and 80 master trainers for G3–G6 got training. (2007 EYR)</li> </ul>



Annex 5 (cont'd )

Year/ CPD	Expected Results/Targets	Actual Results
2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implement Girls' Education Initiative</li> <li>• Development of textbooks for grade 1–9 and curriculum/syllabi for pre-school</li> <li>• Development of textbooks for 2-year pre /in-service teacher education and curriculum framework for pre-school teacher education programme</li> <li>• Orientation of 1,500 TTC lecturers on new curriculum and provision of supplementary TLM for TTCs.</li> <li>• Field testing of the 2-year pre-service curriculum.</li> <li>• Support child-friendly school (CFS) interventions in schools with other partners and communities.(2009EYR)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 100 MoE officials, 100 TTC lecturers and 31 AGEI members trained on gender dimensions in education.</li> <li>• 108 teachers trained to field test new textbooks of grade 7–9 (grade 7–9 textbooks completed)</li> <li>• 94 textbooks completed, 36 translated and 45 edited (Drafting of 12 additional titles in progress)</li> <li>• 900 lecturers trained. Supplementary materials for 10,000 primary schools procured</li> <li>• Field test designed, training manual developed and translated in Pashto and Dari, and researchers identified.</li> <li>• Provincial and District MoE staff oriented on CFS; Developed 10 CFS manuals/documents for training of trainers, teachers and community members</li> <li>• Implementation of CFS initiated in 3 zones</li> <li>• 1,887 teachers trained on Healthy School Initiative (HSI) and 200 schools provided first aid kits(2009EYR)</li> </ul>
2010–13	<p>Appropriate policy, legislation and budget allocations aimed at universal school readiness and primary school(CPD 2010–13)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A cohort tracking system to monitor school enrolment and attendance initiated and tools for the system were developed in 2011.</li> <li>• 43 provincial EMIS staff members have been trained in cohort tracking</li> <li>• Cascade training at provincial and district levels (2011) resulted in approximately 200 trainers, 1700 teachers, 700 students and 400 representatives of School Management Shuras (SMS) oriented on the CFS concept and the child-centred teaching and learning approach. As a result, 374 schools conducted self-assessment and developed school improvement plans to introduce CFS programme.</li> <li>• Education curriculum framework revised, incorporating key guiding principles, including the CFS approach and gender mainstreaming.</li> <li>• Field testing and orientation of new textbooks for grades 7–9 and third official languages for master trainers in 34 provinces undertaken to verify the relevance of the textbooks and promote inclusiveness.</li> <li>• In teacher education, 83 titles of pre- and in-service instructional materials were developed, and incorporated CFS principles, for teacher training and capacity development.</li> </ul>



Annex 5 (cont'd )

Year/ CPD	Expected Results/Targets	Actual Results
(cont'd) 2010-13		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 600 educators of Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs) were oriented on instructional materials in 34 provinces.</li> <li>• The development of ECE policy started in 2010; progress has been slow.</li> <li>• Development of a prototype to manage menstruation in the school setting and development of proper hygiene guidelines</li> <li>• Advocacy materials developed for schools to orient/mobilize communities on improving the school environment to address students' hygiene needs, especially girls, to encourage their education.</li> <li>• UNICEF promoted strategic and action-oriented cluster coordination through effective leadership and facilitated the development of a strategic vision and operational response plan. This led to the roll-out of the education cluster at the national level and in three regions paving the way for more strategic and coordinated programme planning and implementation at the sub-national level.</li> <li>• 876 out of 921 education cluster members received training on the Inter-agency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE) as a cluster approach under the leadership of CARE International and facilitated by the education cluster co-leads.</li> <li>• 2,126 school teachers trained in psychosocial support, by 120 trained master trainers in Kandahar city, and 674 teachers currently receiving the training.</li> <li>• Over 3,000 recreational kits distributed and training for effective interventions took place country wide.</li> <li>• 4,000 community shuras, mobilized to improve school security and protection against attacks and monthly reports compiled on school incidents for tracking and appropriate response. 300 schools re-opened and a nationwide workshop held for influential leaders from the 17 most insecure provinces.</li> <li>• Over 1,500 school tents and TLM distributed to ensure continued schooling. (MTR 2012)</li> </ul>



## Annex 5 (cont'd )

Year/ CPD	Expected Results/Targets	Actual Results
<b>GENDER</b>		
2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gender would be mainstreamed within all programmes</li> <li>• Increasing the enrolment of girls</li> <li>• Increasing the recruitment of women teachers</li> </ul> (CPE2003–5)	40% of enrolment increase=girls(CPE2003–5)
2005		In nine provinces, girls' non-enrolment stands at more than 80 per cent, and at an alarming 99 per cent in two provinces.
2006–8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aims to reduce gender disparity in basic education</li> <li>• Strategies for enlarging the pool of female teachers, through advocacy to promote the recruitment, career development and remuneration of women teachers</li> <li>• The new system will also ensure that girls have access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene education.</li> <li>• Education supplies will be provided to students in primary schools, with an emphasis on reaching girls.</li> <li>• 50% girls' completed grade three attained acceptable level of basic competencies.</li> </ul>	From 402,427 girls in 2006 to 1.78 girls in 2008: 37% of total primary enrolment (37%)(CPD2010–13)
2010–13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least 20 per cent increase in primary school enrolment for girls</li> <li>• Over 60 per cent of girls enrolled in grade one reach grade 5 in year five of the education cycle (CPD 2010–13)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enrolment rates for girls aged 6 to 9 are considerably lower than for boys (girls' enrolment rate is 31 per cent while boys' enrolment rate is 43 per cent). (MTR 2012)</li> <li>• Developed a set of recommendations to revise the curriculum framework and conducted a number of training sessions in the areas of curriculum and gender, diversity in terms of learning abilities, and language for members of the curriculum development group.</li> <li>• As a participant in deliberations for the GPE submission by the Government, UNICEF also contributed to formulating programmes to address additional barriers that girls face in their pursuit of education.</li> </ul>



## ANNEX 6: SUMMARY MATRIX FOR AFGHANISTAN CCS REPORT AND EVALUATION BRIEF

Findings	Sources of evidence	Conclusions	Lessons learned/ Recommendations
<i>Responding to detailed questions in the Evaluation matrix, what are the most salient facts established?</i>		<i>(Following the analysis and judgment criteria proposed in the Evaluation Matrix, what are the most important inferences drawn by the evaluation team?)</i>	(if applicable) <i>Use this column if the country case study relevant to the EQ offers lessons or recommendations relevant to the evaluation overall.</i>
<b>EQ1. What has been the context for UNICEF's education work?</b>			
<b>Sub-question 1.1</b> <b>Who are the major players, alongside UNICEF, concerned with basic education? What differentiates UNICEF and its positioning from the other players (as perceived by UNICEF and by others)?</b>			
Major Players: USAID, WB, CIDA, Danida, Sida, ARTF  Differentiation: longer history; good ideas, money and experience at field level; stays involved in service delivery (as conflict country); stays; ability to work in insecure and remote areas; uses govt systems; broader perspective as not only in education; child protection – safety of girls; global knowledge	Documents, evaluations, interviews	<i>In danger of losing significant role in Afghanistan</i>	
<b>Sub-question 1.2</b> <b>What have been the key developments in the country aid environment during the evaluation period?</b>			
End of Taliban rule and entry of foreign military accompanied by massive increase in DP and NGO inputs. Initial emergency responses to ongoing conflict, return and shifting of refugee populations, uncoordinated initiatives and absence of government/ministry lead evolved into greater coordination and prioritization. Hugely expanded demand for classrooms, books, teachers, management, etc. partly met, but uncertain sustainability of supply, resources and management capacity.	Plans, Needs assessments, Annual reports, evaluations, etc.	<i>Handled early engagement reasonably well, but less capacity to cover upstream work and stay effective on implementation</i>	
<b>Sub-question 1.3</b> <b>What have been the key partnerships concerned with basic education, and how has UNICEF featured in these?</b>			
ECG: focal point; GMU; member ECC and HRDB; SE GPE; Co-chair AGEI; Co-chair Education Cluster	Documents, evaluations, interviews	<i>Very effective in early days, and continued good participation in ECC and HRDB; confused role currently in GPE</i>	



**Annex 6 (cont'd )**

<b>Findings</b>	<b>Sources of evidence</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>Lessons learned/ Recommendations</b>
<i>Responding to detailed questions in the Evaluation matrix, what are the most salient facts established?)</i>		<i>(Following the analysis and judgment criteria proposed in the Evaluation Matrix, what are the most important inferences drawn by the evaluation team?)</i>	(if applicable) <i>Use this column if the country case study relevant to the EQ offers lessons or recommendations relevant to the evaluation overall.</i>
<b>Sub-question 1.4</b> <b>What have been the principal international trends in regard to basic education and gender equality? What issues have been the focus of international debate and action?</b>			
MDGs and EFA; Girls' education; Rights-based approach to protection, access, etc.; long-term focus on host capacity and ownership, alignment and harmonization, results, etc.; FTI becoming GPE	Dakar accord (following Jomtien); Paris Declaration; GPE AE	<i>UNICEF well placed to lead on many of the international priorities globally and in Afghanistan in particular. However, opportunity not capitalized on and very piecemeal response to development/attraction of capacity to assume this role.</i>	
<b>EQ2. What upstream work has UNICEF undertaken?</b>			
<b>Sub-question 2.1</b> <b>What is meant by "upstream work" and how can it be distinguished in practice from other types of intervention?</b>			
Influencing policies, programmes, evaluations and working with partners in and outside government; moving from hands-on to working through government systems; scalability and sustainable capacity; avoidance of being distracted by emergency situations	Interview notes	<i>upstream work as a term is not used or familiar, however there is an almost universal appreciation of what is involved and how DPs including UNICEF need to respond. Absence of detailed, measurable specification of outputs for this work</i>	
<b>Sub-question 2.2</b> <b>In what ways has "upstream work" been defined by UNICEF and incorporated in its strategies and policies? What was the rationale for emphasis on upstream work in education? Has UNICEF (explicitly or implicitly) spelt out a theory (or theories) of change for upstream work?</b>			
Girls education; female teachers; MoE CD; provincial and district CD; model CES; CBE policy; curriculum development (and gender); teacher education and standards; donor coordination and dialogue; accelerated learning; EMIS; ECD; M&E of govt systems	Documents, evaluations, interviews	<i>The need to strike a balance between immediate service delivery and upstream work around policy influence, advocacy and system strengthening was present from early on. There was no 'shift' as such from one approach to the other.</i>	



**Annex 6 (cont'd )**

Findings	Sources of evidence	Conclusions	Lessons learned/ Recommendations
<p><i>Responding to detailed questions in the Evaluation matrix, what are the most salient facts established?)</i></p>		<p><i>(Following the analysis and judgment criteria proposed in the Evaluation Matrix, what are the most important inferences drawn by the evaluation team?)</i></p>	<p>(if applicable)  <i>Use this column if the country case study relevant to the EQ offers lessons or recommendations relevant to the evaluation overall.</i></p>
<p><b>Sub-question 2.3</b>  <b>What measures has UNICEF taken to prioritise upstream work in education? e.g.:</b>  <b>a. strategic plans and policy guidance (including KRAs etc.)?</b>  <b>b. tools, methodologies, capacity development?</b>  <b>c. M&amp;E mechanisms to support emphasis on upstream work (how have targets been set and achievements measured)?</b>  <b>d. Other measures?</b></p>			
<p>MTSP 2006 seemed to many to respond to international appreciation of aid effectiveness priorities already well understood within UNICEF. To some extent early optimism was disappointed in 2005 by further failure of political environment and increased insecurity. UNICEF recognized importance of harmonized approaches to CBE, construction, etc. through lead ECG, HRDB and establishment of policies on CBE, CES, etc. Follow through with detailed target outputs and development of monitoring capacity has been lacking; no specific CD for UNICEF</p>	<p>Policy documents, interview notes, meeting minutes and records</p>	<p><i>Absence of recognized and agreed indicators for upstream work with reduced capacity for (or engagement in) monitoring has reduced DP and MoE confidence</i></p>	
<p><b>Sub-question 2.4</b>  <b>Have shifts to upstream work been reflected in UNICEF budgets and UNICEF's portfolios of activities?</b></p>			
<p>Can't see shifts by budget analysis; can see more focus on upstream work in CPD 2010-14 but lack of congruence between expected and actual results in reporting, together with lack of categorized financial data makes impossible judgement of trend.</p>	<p>Annual reports, CPDs, interviews</p>	<p><i>Accountabilities unclear for upstream work especially with singling out Social Policy Advisor's work; lack of financial management and cost analysis no use in BEGE house</i></p>	



**Annex 6 (cont'd )**

<b>Findings</b>	<b>Sources of evidence</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>Lessons learned/ Recommendations</b>
<i>Responding to detailed questions in the Evaluation matrix, what are the most salient facts established?)</i>		<i>(Following the analysis and judgment criteria proposed in the Evaluation Matrix, what are the most important inferences drawn by the evaluation team?)</i>	(if applicable) <i>Use this column if the country case study relevant to the EQ offers lessons or recommendations relevant to the evaluation overall.</i>
<b>EQ3. How relevant has UNICEF's (approach to) upstream work been?</b>			
<b>Sub-question 3.1</b> <b>Is UNICEF's approach to upstream work aligned with its mandate and objectives?</b>			
Yes, entirely consistent, CRC, CEDAW, EFA, child protection, girls' education, equity, supporting govt systems; can see a very clear connection in balance between in-service delivery and upstream work from an early stage, especially as feedback from field and data emphasized need for particular approaches to girls' enrolment for instance	Documents, evaluations, interviews	<i>UNICEF's involvement through the period under investigation has enabled it to focus relevantly on the expanding agenda of education transformation, dealing first with the immediate service delivery needs but then focusing on addressing the harder to reach access and quality issues, moving toward policy support and data gathering, just as in the move toward CBE and teacher's education and female teachers' incentives, as well as modeling the constituents of CFS schools in the Afghan context.</i>	
<b>Sub-question 3.2</b> <b>Do UNICEF's priorities align with emerging priorities for education?</b>			
Yes, have done, but have lost way currently as overtaken by other donors, implementation fragmentation rather than coordination and lack of CD policy; thus the need for MoE to develop its own organizational and institutional rules for policy analysis, refinement, advocacy and budget leverage (itself) not aided by UNICEF. Thus aligned ostensibly but not sustainably.	Documents, evaluations, interviews		
<b>Sub-question 3.3</b> <b>How well aligned are UNICEF's policy positions and outputs to regional and national priorities?</b>			
Very well aligned up till GPE role then political importance of GPE for Minister put UNICEF in bind re SE role and clouded understanding of appropriate GPE policies, viz. parallel coordination unit, most aligned modality, donor harmonization rather than fragmentation, individual reporting, etc.	Documents and interviews		



**Annex 6 (cont'd )**

Findings	Sources of evidence	Conclusions	Lessons learned/ Recommendations
<p><i>Responding to detailed questions in the Evaluation matrix, what are the most salient facts established?)</i></p>		<p><i>(Following the analysis and judgment criteria proposed in the Evaluation Matrix, what are the most important inferences drawn by the evaluation team?)</i></p>	<p>(if applicable) Use this column if the country case study relevant to the EQ offers lessons or recommendations relevant to the evaluation overall.</p>
<p><b>EQ4. What are the identifiable results of UNICEF's (shift towards) upstream work? Are there discernible patterns in these results?</b></p>			
<p><b>Sub-question 4.1 ... in terms of UNICEF participation in global and regional education partnerships (from the country perspective)?</b></p>			
<p>Weakening role in general compared to earlier days; GPE role anomalous; UNDAF? (UNESCO NFEMIS: how can this be separate from EMIS when CBE is so important?) and WB/EQUIP overshadowing without sufficient policy follow through by UNICEF (so CFS adopted but often not observed)</p>	<p>Documents, evaluations and interviews</p>	<p><i>The creation of a GPE Coordination Unit and a non-educationist GPE Program Manager confirm UNICEF's position for potentially speeding up implementation, but not necessarily for the CD and indeed, handover to the Ministry of the coordination functions being carried out by extra NTA staff under the current arrangement.</i></p>	
<p><b>Sub-question 4.2 ... in terms of UNICEF activities at country level?</b></p>			
<p>CBS, CES, CFS, female teachers and incentives, integration of WASH, ECG, EMIS, cohort tracking, emergency preparedness, WASH in schools : excellent identification and advocacy with govt for adoption of national policies but without adequate monitoring by UNICEF or support of MoE for follow through</p>	<p>Annual reports, MTRs, evaluations</p>	<p><i>UNICEF's inputs on resources and monitoring and evaluation are not really geared toward upstream work. The strategies are there, but the follow through is not: neither the learning plan nor indicator development is specifically designed to raise outcomes of upstream work.</i></p>	
<p><b>Sub-question 4.3 ... in terms of different Key Result Areas (KRAs)? viz:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Early Childhood Development (ECD) and school readiness;</li> <li>• Equitable access;</li> <li>• Quality and Child Friendly Schools; and</li> <li>• Education in Emergencies. (including "building back better")</li> </ul>			
<p>- lack of progress on ECD - access improvements incl girls - quality inputs (texts, TLM, construc, TT, CFS uptake but not seen through comprehensively) - emergency preparedness, community involvement</p>	<p>Documents, evaluations, interviews</p>		



## Annex 6 (cont'd )

Findings	Sources of evidence	Conclusions	Lessons learned/ Recommendations
<i>Responding to detailed questions in the Evaluation matrix, what are the most salient facts established?)</i>		<i>(Following the analysis and judgment criteria proposed in the Evaluation Matrix, what are the most important inferences drawn by the evaluation team?)</i>	(if applicable) <i>Use this column if the country case study relevant to the EQ offers lessons or recommendations relevant to the evaluation overall.</i>
<b>EQ5. How coherent have approaches to upstream work been within UNICEF?</b>			
<b>Subquestion 5.1</b> <b>Is there is a shared understanding of what constitutes 'upstream' work in BEGE? How well is it understood by Education program staff at all levels?</b>			
Although the term is unfamiliar the approach is well understood and accepted as, in general terms, a priority. How UNICEF should balance hands off with ensuring results, mainstreaming with implementation of policy, is not established, especially in an ongoing conflict situation.	Interview notes	<i>Upstream work is in danger of being seen as a shell or a fashion. Exactly how to apply and measure performance on upstream work needs critical attention</i>	
<b>Sub-question 5.2</b> <b>To what extent is there collaboration on upstream work across units at UNICEF HQ?</b>			
WASH in schools, earlier health in schools; difficulty of working with other ministries beside MoE, viz MRRD, MoH, but working on it.	Interview with Chief, WASH, ACO, documents	<i>Crafting harmonised implementation arrangements is a demanding task involving pro-active communication skills. Similarly MoE informants reported confusion and disappointment over responsibility for achieving "WASH in schools" programme targets. The perception is that greater coordination would be possible and welcome, but doesn't yet happen.</i>	
<b>Sub-question 5.3</b> <b>To what extent is there collaboration on upstream work across HQ, regional and country levels of UNICEF?</b>			
Good understanding and impressive professional initiatives and capacity at RO level need to be translated urgently to far greater support at CO level	Interview notes, lack of hard evidence of newly introduced management mechanisms despite requests	<i>Healthy and dynamic support mechanisms at Regional level not yet translated into urgently needed capacity and guidance and advocacy (with partners) in country.</i>	



**Annex 6 (cont'd )**

Findings	Sources of evidence	Conclusions	Lessons learned/ Recommendations
<p><i>Responding to detailed questions in the Evaluation matrix, what are the most salient facts established?)</i></p>		<p><i>(Following the analysis and judgment criteria proposed in the Evaluation Matrix, what are the most important inferences drawn by the evaluation team?)</i></p>	<p>(if applicable)  <i>Use this column if the country case study relevant to the EQ offers lessons or recommendations relevant to the evaluation overall.</i></p>
<p><b>Sub-question 5.4</b>  <b>To what extent has relevant advice, methodological support and capacity development been provided between different levels and departments of UNICEF?</b></p>			
<p>Insufficient – on SWAps and GPE specifically, FM, education expertise, M&amp;E, negotiation with govt, cd policy</p>	<p>Documents and interviews, mainly</p>	<p>In the case of ROSA's support to the Afghanistan country office, it would seem that this could have taken the form of both a more in depth analysis of the role that UNICEF could play within GPE in-country, together with the necessary skills development for UNICEF as well as in Ministry of Education strengthening at the same time.</p>	
<p><b>EQ 6. Has UNICEF's upstream work in education been coherent with that of major external partners?</b></p>			
<p><b>Sub-question 6.1</b>  <b>Has UNICEF communicated clearly its upstream approaches and the policy positions it seeks to promote through upstream work?</b></p>			
<p>No in terms of upstream work in general and also in terms of focus on 10 provinces (following MTR of current CPD); yes, in terms of the policies it has promoted from the early days, many of which have been mainstreamed.</p>	<p>Interviews</p>		



**Annex 6 (cont'd )**

Findings	Sources of evidence	Conclusions	Lessons learned/ Recommendations
<p><i>Responding to detailed questions in the Evaluation matrix, what are the most salient facts established?)</i></p>		<p><i>(Following the analysis and judgment criteria proposed in the Evaluation Matrix, what are the most important inferences drawn by the evaluation team?)</i></p>	<p><i>(If applicable) Use this column if the country case study relevant to the EQ offers lessons or recommendations relevant to the evaluation overall.</i></p>
<p><b>Sub-question 6.2</b> <b>Has there been effective coordination and has UNICEF’s upstream work been complementary with that of other UN and/or international partners?</b></p>			
<p>In past, but less so now and waning. Complementary in terms of generally being aligned with the MoE’s plans and fitting in with others’, but with waning influence over the MoE’s coordination of the same, and certainly the prioritization of different programmes, approaches, etc. Concern over duplication of social mobilization by GPE with that of WB. UNICEF’s involvement with the MoE could be made more congruent with UNESCO’s (IIEP) CD in planning, and NFEMIS seems a peculiar ‘addition’ to an EMIS that should incorporate NFE efforts via CBE. Other unwieldy EMIS ‘additions’ by WB similarly uncriticised. And reporting on UNDAF format rather than MoE’s questioned.</p>	<p>Interviews mainly. Some documents</p>		<p>Elicit more coherent relationships amongst key UN, non-UNDAF members such as the WB, if necessary at HQ level to guide partnerships and cooperation at country level where such agencies are heavily involved in basic education and gender equality. This is likely to entail dialogue concerning the financial feasibility and requirements for programming of human rights based approaches to children’s needs. (This should include multi-donor trust funds for which the WB, for example, is the managing entity.)</p>
<p><b>Sub-question 6.3</b> <b>Have UNICEF’s resources for upstream work been applied where they can make the most difference? (complementarity and comparative advantage)</b></p>			
<p>Not really, given current dearth of education expertise and opportunity for UNICEF. Yes in past. And can’t tell in terms of financial resources – no trail.</p>			



**Annex 6 (cont'd )**

Findings	Sources of evidence	Conclusions	Lessons learned/ Recommendations
<i>Responding to detailed questions in the Evaluation matrix, what are the most salient facts established?)</i>	<i>Reference to correct part of the CCS report.</i>	<i>(Following the analysis and judgment criteria proposed in the Evaluation Matrix, what are the most important inferences drawn by the evaluation team?)</i>	<i>(If applicable) use this column if the country case study relevant to the EQ offers lessons or recommendations relevant to the evaluation overall.</i>
<b>EQ7. What factors account for the success (or not) of UNICEF's upstream work?</b>			
<b>Sub-question 7.1</b>			
<b>Has UNICEF allocated resources efficiently to upstream work?</b>			
Can't ascertain, and informants doubted it would be possible. Organisation doesn't have capacity to monitor this.	Interviews, UNICEF documents.		
<b>Sub-question 7.2</b>			
<b>Have UNICEF's partners been willing to support and to fund upstream work in education?</b>			
Yes, but Sida has moved to project support from thematic and smaller budget and decreasing likely. Case not made for upstream work in education.	Documents, evaluations, interviews		
<b>Sub-question 7.3</b>			
<b>Has UNICEF been effective in dialogue with partners at different levels? How effective have global, regional and country partnerships been?</b>			
UNICEF has been effective in the various donor coordination groups, viz. ECC, HRDB and earlier ECG and GMU. Also effective in JSR for GPE as well as in program design of GPE. Effectiveness in GPE somewhat compromised by SE role. Chief of Education's accompanying Minister to NYC in September, a part of political role of GPE.	Documents, evaluations, interviews		Craft clear, contextualised policies for engagement with GPE that marry global with in-country knowledge and can offer guidance to COs.
<b>Sub-question 7.4</b>			
<b>Have UNICEF and its partners had the necessary capacities for effective upstream work? (cf. also EQ 8 below)</b>			
No, there has not been the targeted CD of UNICEF staff especially for its GPE role, but more generally for ed expertise expected of UNICEF in policy dialogue and support for MoE in its management and coordination of donor inputs – and FM.	Interviews	Specific attention has not been addressed to the ACO's human resource needs to enable it to engage more effectively in the transition to development from emergency education.	



Annex 6 (cont'd )

Findings	Sources of evidence	Conclusions	Lessons learned/ Recommendations
<i>Responding to detailed questions in the Evaluation matrix, what are the most salient facts established?)</i>	<i>Reference to correct part of the CCS report.</i>	<i>(Following the analysis and judgment criteria proposed in the Evaluation Matrix, what are the most important inferences drawn by the evaluation team?)</i>	<i>(If applicable) use this column if the country case study relevant to the EQ offers lessons or recommendations relevant to the evaluation overall.</i>
<b>EQ8. To what extent is UNICEF's upstream work sustainable?</b>			
<b>Sub-question 8.1</b>			
<b>Are the results to date of upstream work(cf. EQ4 above) likely to be sustained?</b>			
Yes and no. The thrust of the policies are likely to be sustained, but the implementation is questionable, given the lack of adequate monitoring and feedback as well as prioritization. And, of course, the security situation and the choice of UNICEF and GPE both to go to the most difficult areas. Focus on equity is likely to slow down overall results – not sure this is understood nor accepted by all.	Documents, evaluations, interviews		
<b>Sub-question 8.2</b>			
<b>Does UNICEF have/is it effectively developing the necessary capacities for continued upstream work?</b>			
No. The difficulty of attracting high caliber ed staff has not led to alternative means of upping UNICEF's capacity for upstream work nor does the CD provided UNICEF address the specific professional expertise required to play a more technical role in strategic planning and policy dialogue.	Documents, interviews	<i>The mix of UNICEF inputs is not suited to produce quality outputs leading to policy influence, capacity building and upstream impact cost effectively. In spite of the history of UNICEF involvement in Afghanistan, the current mix of staff capacities, and the approach to capacity building are inadequate for this purpose. The close partnership with government has blinded UNICEF somewhat to the strategies necessary to strengthen the system and not merely the individuals supported, especially through NTA.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In emergency education countries or post-conflict, transitional countries where attracting the best in-country education specialists may be difficult, consider prioritising RO and HQ advisors' time – as well as RO and HQ knowledge – (and that of other partners) in contributing to ongoing strategic analysis of the education sector and the ways forward.</li> <li>- Upgrade new hire staffing and CD of current staff in P4 and higher positions to include social, economic and political policy analysis.</li> </ul>

Annex 6 (cont'd )

Findings	Sources of evidence	Conclusions	Lessons learned/ Recommendations
<i>Responding to detailed questions in the Evaluation matrix, what are the most salient facts established?)</i>	<i>Reference to correct part of the CCS report.</i>	<i>(Following the analysis and judgment criteria proposed in the Evaluation Matrix, what are the most important inferences drawn by the evaluation team?)</i>	<i>(If applicable) use this column if the country case study relevant to the EQ offers lessons or recommendations relevant to the evaluation overall.</i>
<p><b>Sub-question 8.3</b>  <b>Are appropriate capacities being developed amongst governments and other partners at country level?</b></p>			
<p>No. A capable if skeletal staff coordinate and manage without the institutional and organizational CD to create a MoE that is in effect a shadow MoE, for its dependence on NTA. Such CD has not been prioritized in UNICEF's programmes, and UNICEF's leverage on such issues seems to be waning.</p>	<p>Interviews, documents.</p>	<p><i>-Monitoring has let down the quality emphasis in spite of the harmonising policies, so whilst Government wanted a 'third eye' UNICEF has not been as effective as previously.</i></p> <p><i>-UNICEF is compromised by its SE position, its lack of appropriately qualified staff, and is now having to provide quality assurance of a programme that is less aligned, and less consonant with its own approach to upstream work than its earlier involvement with the MoE.</i></p>	<p>Develop CD policies for the organisation, giving guidance for CO contextualisation, regarding TA, detailing UNICEF's expectations, the accountability structures, and exit strategies.</p>
<p><b>Sub-question 8.4</b>  <b>Does UNICEF have adequate mechanisms for monitoring its upstream work and learning from experience?</b></p>			
<p>No – neither the financial categorisation nor the professional accountabilities would seem to have been written in as indicators in the programme documents. Generally, the monitoring does not make traceable the effectiveness and efficiency – nor the learning needed – from UNICEF's programme roll out.</p>	<p>Documents, evaluations, interviews</p>	<p><i>The length of UNICEF's experience in country has been a great strength as well as the general trust in the UNICEF 'brand'. However, UNICEF is currently at risk of squandering this advantage.</i></p>	<p>Detail accountabilities and indicators for staff in upstream work in BEGE and of Social Policy Advisors. Where there are no SPA posts, ensure responsibility for outcomes amongst senior staff with developed capabilities in social, economic and political analysis at national level.</p>



#### **PHOTO CREDIT AND CAPTION:**

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A girl reads aloud at the front of a class in Bam Sarai Government Primary School in Bam Sarai Village, in the central Bamyan Province. More than 650 children, many of them ethnic Hazara, attend the UNICEF-supported school in two shifts.

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Standing in her class in a cost effective government primary school, Shukria Mohammad Hussain (10 years old), shows a picture of herself when she used to attend a tented school in 2007. A new government primary school in Burshasoon Village in the central Bamyan Province. Students at the school previously attended classes in a tent. The new building is centrally located, which reduces the children's travel time. UNICEF supported construction and rehabilitation of the school building and sanitation facilities and provides school supplies and teacher-training.







