

INTERNAL EVALUATION OF UNICEF EMERGENCY REPAIREDNESS & EARLY RESPONSE IN IRAQ

(September 2001-June 2003)

ANNEX: NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

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Abbreviations

CCCs	Core Corporate Commitments
CCCU	Community Child Care Units
CCO	Civil Co-ordination Office (of US Military in Iraq)
CEE/CIS	Central and Eastern Europe/Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltics (Regional Office)
CERF	Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CO	Country Office
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CP	Child Protection
CR	Country Representative
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRP	Contract Review Panel
CU	Compact Units
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DHR	Division of Human Resources
ECHA	Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EMOPS	Office of Emergency Programmes
EPF	Emergency Programme Fund
EPI	Expanded Programme of Immunization
EPRP	Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning
FLS	Financial and Logistics System
FSO	Field Security Officer
HF	High Frequency
HPB	High Protein Biscuits
HPU	Humanitarian Policy Unit (EMOPS)
HRU	Humanitarian Response Unit (Policy Division)
HQ	Headquarters
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IEC	
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
INGO	International Non Government Organisation
IOM	International Organisation on Migration
IP	International Personnel
IT	Information Technology
ITD	Information Technology Division
JD	Job Description
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa region
MENARO	Middle East and North Africa Regional Office
MIST	Minimum Security Telecommunications Standard
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTSP	Medium-Term Strategic Plan
NATCOMS	UNICEF National Committees
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (US government)
OFFP	Oil for Food Programme
OIC	Officer in Charge
OIP	Office of the Iraq Programme
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories

ORS	Oral Rehydration Salts
OPSCEN	Operations Centre
OR	Other Resources
PBA	Programme Budget Allocation
PD	Programme Division
PFO	Programme Funding Office
PHC	Primary Health Care
PPP	Programme Policy and Planning
PROMS	Programme Management System
RO	Regional Office
RR	Regular Resources
SC	Security Council
SD	Supply Division
SG	Secretary-General
SIAB	School in a Box
SITA	Society of International Airline Telecommunications
TCA	
TCN	Third Country Nationals
Telecoms	Telecommunications technology
TFT	Temporary Fixed-Term
TNP	Targeted Nutrition Programme
ToT	Training of Trainers
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment Coordination
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VHF	Very High Frequency
VSAT	Very Small Aperture Terminals
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTP	Water Treatment Plant

Note on references used: All documents consulted have been listed in the Bibliography. For each section of the Annex the primary source documents have been listed as footnotes by the title, and other source documents referenced by the individual points.

1 BACKGROUND

1.1 Iraq and UNICEF involvement in Iraq

1.1.1 Iraq

By the early/mid 1980s Iraq's economy had benefited from a dramatic upsurge due largely to the oil boom of the late 1970s. As the consequence, Iraq was a state rapidly approaching the standards of developed countries with an elaborate health care system, modern telecoms network, 24 electrical power generating stations, sophisticated water treatment plants, and potable water provided for the large majority of the population.

The Iran-Iraq War (September 1980 – July 1988) and the Gulf war (January - February 1991) had a crippling effect on the country's economy. The following twelve years of sanctions and bad governance further contributed to a prolonged and intense humanitarian emergency so that by the end of the decade Iraq had slipped down the UNDP Human Development Index from 91/160 (1991) to 126/174 (2000)¹.

By mid-July 2001 UNICEF's Donor Update² reported that the average Iraqi child under-5 (U5) years old suffered 14 episodes of diarrhoea per year; 1/3 of school age children were not attending school due to the poor facilities and the fact that ¼ of children were working to supplement family income. In addition, the decline in water and sanitation facilities was causing serious concern with less than half the rural population having access to safe water.

By November 2002 there were 1.1 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Iraq as a result of government repression over the previous 30 years. In addition there were 100,000 refugees in the country – 62,000 Palestinians, 14,000 Turkish Kurds, 24,000 Iranians and small numbers of urban refugees from Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and Syria³.

Following the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 9/11/2001 the US government made its assumption of Iraq's links to world terrorism clear in President Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech. The US intention to control and curtail Iraq was emphasized with military build ups in Turkey, northern Iraq and Saudi Arabia while US officials toured neighbouring states to build consensus and support (which was not readily forthcoming). At the same time US officials met with Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq and Iraqi opposition leaders abroad to draw up plans for regime change in Iraq.

Coalition forces began their attack on Iraq from the south on March 20th 2003.

1.2 UNICEF Involvement in Iraq

UNICEF has had a presence in Iraq since 1983, supporting humanitarian actions since the early years of the Iran-Iraq War and following the imposition of UN sanctions in 1990. Since 1996 UNICEF has been a key partner in the Oil for Food Programme (OFFP) administered by the United Nation's Office for Iraq Programme (OIP), functioning as the lead agency for observation in the south/centre (S/C) in water and sanitation, education and nutrition sectors, while, in the north, UNICEF was the implementing agency for OFFP, managing, on average, \$90million pa⁴.

¹ UNICEF Iraq, Protecting and Assisting Children and Women in Extraordinary Circumstances: EPRP 2002, 22/9/02

² 11th July 2001

³ UN Interagency Humanitarian Preparedness and Response Framework for Iraq and Neighbouring Countries, November 2002

⁴ UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, Relief Web, 20/3/03

In addition to its role in OFFP, UNICEF Iraq supported a large-scale regular country programme in response to the chronic humanitarian crisis focusing on immunisation, primary health care, nutrition, watsan, education and child protection^{5, 6}. To service these responsibilities, UNICEF had a substantial HR investment in Iraq, with 38 international personnel (IP) and 142 national personnel in the north and 20 IP and 43 national staff in S/C at the start of 2003⁷.

Although the OFFP had succeeded in preventing further deterioration of the humanitarian situation with all households receiving a monthly food ration from the government, much of the population depended on this for survival. By 2002 the country's infrastructure was in a dilapidated state and the significant erosion of household assets over the past decade meant a decreasing capacity to withstand an event of conflict or prolonged instability⁸.

1.2.1 Humanitarian Situation in pre-war Iraq

Education

Primary education was the sector hit hardest as a result of over 12 years of sanctions. 1 in 4 children (1 in 3 girls) no longer attended schools⁹. UNICEF estimates were that about 70% of school buildings were in need of rehabilitation or not fit for teaching and learning, with extreme shortages of basic equipment (textbooks, furniture). This was compounded by lack of investment in teacher training and materials¹⁰. There was also a sharp increase in adult female illiteracy.

Water and Sanitation

Water and sanitation treatments plants were broken down nationally such that an estimated 500,000 tons of raw sewerage was being discharged daily into fresh water bodies, of which 300,000 tons was released into rivers in Baghdad. Only 25% population was served by piped sewerage systems¹¹. Services in this sector were further disrupted by power cuts of up to 12 hours a day¹². An estimated 5 million people (25% of the population) were at risk because of lack of access to safe water and sanitation. Access to safe water in urban areas had dropped from 100% to 94% of the population and in rural areas from 71% to 41%. Between 1990 and 2000 per capital share of clean water decreased from 330 to 218 litres/day in Baghdad, (5.5 million people) and in other urban areas from 270 – 171 litres/day. In the rural areas the situation was much worse with decreases in access to clean water having dropped from 91 to less than 18 litres/day¹³. This situation had been brought about by a chronic lack of maintenance and compounded by three years of drought (1998-2000).

⁵ Country programme budget 2002-2004: \$5,223,000 Regular Resources, /\$30,141,000 Other Resources (Iraq - Recommendation for Funding for a Short Duration Country Programme, 25 Oct 2001)

⁶ UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, Relief Web, 20/3/03

⁷ Presentation on Iraq given by Jacqueline Peters, 18 Jan 2003

⁸ Household income had declined almost 7-fold since 1990 to US\$700. This combined with unemployment (estimated at 60%), and high rates of inflation further depleted the value of assets (UNICEF Iraq, EPRP September 2002)

⁹ Crisis Appeal for Iraq's Children, UNICEF, no date

¹⁰ The mid-80's government allocation to support education of \$230million compared starkly with the annual allocation under the first four phases of OFFP (\$23million). All this combined with the grossly inadequate teachers' salaries (\$3-5 per month) contributed to the high exodus from the profession of teachers (Iraq Donor Update – 7/10/2002)

¹¹ Iraq Donor Update 11/7/01

¹² Power generation needs were almost 2 times operating capacity

¹³ Iraq Donor Update 11/7/01

Health and Nutrition

In the areas of health and nutrition, UNICEF and FAO/WFP surveys revealed that there had been no improvement in the nutritional status of children since the introduction of OFFP in 1996. 18 million people were food insecure, with nearly 60% of the population of 27 million¹⁴ fully dependent on the government food ration¹⁵. 1 in 3 children in the S/C were so malnourished that they needed therapeutic feeding¹⁶. Rates of child sickness were very high. The case fatality rate due to diarrhoeal disease in U5s had remained at 2.4% (since 1996) while the case fatality rate due to acute respiratory infection (ARI) had increased slightly to 1.4% (1.2% 1999)¹⁷. Diarrhoea + ARI accounted for 70% of deaths for children¹⁸. Low exclusive breastfeeding rates, high prevalence of anaemia in women¹⁹ and high incidence of low birth rate²⁰ all contributed to high child mortality rates, which had more than doubled since the previous decade. Maternal mortality more than doubled since 1990 to 294/1000 in S/C and 120/1000 in northern Iraq, accounting for 1/3 of all deaths among women aged between 15 and 49 years²¹. In 2002 U5 mortality in S/C was 136 of 1000 live births, 2.5 times the level recorded in 1990^{22,23}. Major health problems faced by the Iraqi population were: malnutrition, nutritional anaemia, vitamin A deficiency, iodine deficient goitre, malaria, ARI, leishmaniasis and measles²⁴.

Sanctions had severely impacted primary health care. Facilities, operability and supplies of drugs were all badly affected. Routine vaccination had been extremely problematic over the past few years. DPT3 and TT²⁵ vaccination rates were found to be less than 70% and 63% in the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2001, and measles immunity less than 80%²⁶. During the late 1990s, UNICEF, funded mainly by ECHO and the Norwegian and Netherlands governments, supported semi-annual, nationwide immunisation campaigns to eliminate and control the transmission of preventable diseases such as measles and polio²⁷. While Iraq had been free of polio for the three years up to and including 2002, measles continued to be a major concern. Basic drugs and vaccines were being imported by the Government of Iraq (GOI) under OFFP, but not in sufficient volume to cover all the needs. Nearly ½ of district hospitals lacked the operating theatres to install obstetric supplies and equipment which had been ordered under OFFP for emergency obstetric care services²⁸.

¹⁴ 23.3million in S/C, 3.7 million in N Iraq (Donor Update 14/1/03)

¹⁵ Because some households had no additional source of income, some of this ration was sold by some families in need of medicine and clothes further increasing food insecurity (UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, Relief Web, 20/3/03)

¹⁶ In 2001, 240,000 children and 140,000 pregnant women were in need of nutritional supplements (Iraq Donor Update, 14/1/03)

¹⁷ Iraq Donor Update 11/7/01

¹⁸ Prevalence of diarrhoeal disease in U5 increased from 4 bouts/yr in 1990 to almost 15 in 1999 (UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, Relief Web, 20/3/03)

¹⁹ More than 50%

²⁰ 30% of children were born weighing below 2.5kg making them vulnerable to death and under-development (Iraq Donor Update – 7/10/2002)

²¹ Iraq Donor Update – 14.1.03

²² Iraq Donor Update – 14.1.03

²³ U5 mortality for Northern Iraq was 80/1000 in 1984-9 and 72/1000 in 1994-9

²⁴ UNICEF Humanitarian Action, Special Appeal no 1 Emergency Preparedness for Iraq, Dec 13 2002

²⁵ Diphtheria/Pertussis/Tetanus vaccine and Tetanus Toxoid vaccine

²⁶ Iraq crisis preparedness report, 20 Mar 2003

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Iraq Crisis Preparedness Donor Alert, March 20 2003, p5

Child Protection²⁹

Over the previous decade issues of child protection³⁰ had been increasing in magnitude and complexity. As a result of deteriorating socio-economic conditions and serious family impoverishment increasing numbers of children were working and living on the streets. A lack of official recognition of the problem³¹ precluded the gathering of accurate data on the increasing number of children who had dropped out of school and worked full-time or in hazardous income-generating activities, and who were increasingly exposed to delinquency.

Where action was being taken, due to Iraq's isolation, outdated systems of rehabilitation and care prevailed, with the focus on institutionalization. By 2002, there were approximately 2,300 children confined to institutions in Iraq³².

Child Protection (CP) activities were also limited by lack of allocated funds through the OFFP. Not until the second half of 2001 was the GOI able to purchase the humanitarian supply items needed for social protection activities under OFFP. This resulted in a shortage of trained staff at institutions as well as a general shortage of staff³³.

There are still thousands of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) in the country³⁴.

UNICEF Regular Programme 2002-2004^{35, 36}

In addition to their role in the OFFP, by 2002 UNICEF's programme action included:

- Assessment studies³⁷ in different sectors to monitor the impact of sanctions and the OFFP on children
- Advocacy. UNICEF used the results of key studies/assessments to advocate on behalf of children
- The use of resources to complement and supplement OFFP by providing cash for transport and installation of humanitarian goods and supplies
- Support for development of a national multisectoral HIV/AIDS strategy involving key ministries eg education, health and labour, social affairs
- Development of early childhood activities in collaboration with the General Federation of Iraqi Women – better parenting and communication of health and nutrition information
- Introduction of a new intervention in teacher training, using modern methodologies in teaching and education management. Strengthening pilot girls' education project began in 2001 in the Basra governorate. The programme also promoted an integrated approach between health, watsan and education in UNICEF's pilot rehabilitation schools in Basra
- Since 1997 UNICEF had supported the rehabilitation of 35 water treatment plants (WTP), 27 Compact Units (CU), and 12 sewerage facilities,³⁸ including the development of 2 pilot sites to demonstrate the possibility of transforming sewage to high protein animal feed

²⁹ Crisis Appeal for Iraq's Children, UNICEF, no date

³⁰ Children with disabilities, street children, working children, children in conflict with the law and orphans

³¹ Iraq Donor Update 11/7/01

³² Iraq Crisis Preparedness Donor Alert, March 20 2003

³³ Iraq crisis preparedness report, 20 Mar 2003

³⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵ UNICEF Iraq Annual Reports 2001, 2002

³⁶ UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Iraq Donor Update 7/10/02

³⁷ Including the Mortality Survey carried out in 1999 by UNICEF which confirmed that mortality had more than doubled in the previous decade, and the KAP Study (Knowledge, Attitude and Practices) on parenting skills, feeding habits, personal and environmental hygiene and sanitation and attitudes to schools

³⁸ During 2001 the rehabilitation of WTPs and sewerage treatment plants had provided an improved service for 3.1 million people.

- Development of a new approach for water conservation and hygiene promotion campaign to improve sanitation and hygiene practices
- Establishment of partnerships with youth organisations in Iraq to enable them to work as full partners of UNICEF assisted programmes, strengthening the capacity of youth to plan and implement peer education activities
- On-going screening and treating malnourished children through Community child care units (CCCU) including advocating for the removal of infant formula in the food ration distributed to households
- Progress in the Child Protection (CP) programme with a review of Juvenile Law and the capacity building of the national team in charge of policy on street children and orphans
- Working with the Ministry of Health (MOH). The 2002 programme had achieved the elimination of neonatal tetanus and maintained Iraq's polio-free status³⁹. Iraq was moving towards the elimination phase for measles (which had been kept under control during the previous 3 years)
- Support for the MOH enabled the growth in numbers of CCCUs from 600 (1997) to 2,800 (2002). These were the cornerstone of the Targeted Nutrition Programme (TNP), in which all children U5 were screened and health education and counselling provided to mothers of malnourished children. Nutrition treatment⁴⁰ was given to those found to be malnourished in PHCs or, in cases of severe malnutrition, the patient was referred to one of 63 Nutrition Rehabilitation Centres (NRC)⁴¹.
- Provision of food and health supplies to approximately 2,000 institutionalised children

The Country Programme for 2002-4 aimed to focus on the reducing child mortality, morbidity and malnutrition, reducing maternal mortality, improving school enrolment and reducing drop out rates, especially among girls by:

- Training and capacity building of government counterparts and partner organizations to improve service delivery and quality
- Physical rehabilitation of essential infrastructure such as schools, watsan plants and PHCs
- Assessments and studies to support programme monitoring, policy development and advocacy
- Further development of inter-sectoral and geographic convergence of programme interventions at national and local levels

³⁹ Polio – 2 rounds of immunization were conducted each year with WHO. In 2002 the campaigns achieved 95% coverage (Iraq Donor Update – 7/10/2002)

⁴⁰ High Protein Biscuits (HPB) given out by PHC

⁴¹ Despite UNICEF support shortages in numbers and resourcing of CCCUs, HPB and therapeutic milk (THM) limit treatment (Iraq EPRP, Sept 2002)

2 BACKGROUND – NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

2.1 Iran⁴²

UNICEF operations in Iraq were not supported from Iran during the period of UN sanctions, except during the repression and civil conflicts in Kurdistan from 1996-8. However, Iran expected to be directly impacted by any conflict in Iraq because of the countries' historic and religious Shia links, Iran's geographical location (with 1.458 million km of shared borders), and also because of the experience of 1991 (Gulf War) and 1996-8 Kurdish repression. Iran already hosted the world's largest refugee population⁴³, but the country's generous policy towards refugees had become more restrictive over past few years as Iran faced economic problems and budget cuts. In 2002, the large population of Afghan refugees was being encouraged by the Iranian government to go back to Afghanistan, (of which about 2 million did return home), and official government policy was that the borders would remain closed to more refugees, and any who attempted to cross would be stopped in no man's land.

Iran is one of the rare countries in the region with a strong industrial capacity. This gave it the capacity to provide supplies to refugees speedily, and to support any disruption of services in Iraq. In addition, UNICEF had worked with the Government of Iran during the response to the refugee influx during the Afghan crisis. However, limited staff numbers in the Iran CO, a cautious government, the absence of partners with operational capacity, administrative and commercial government limitations, and the closure of the borders with Iraq for a decade were constraints to any response to an emergency in Iraq. In addition, the whole Iranian border remained heavily militarised and mined⁴⁴.

2.2 Jordan⁴⁵

Jordan is a lower middle-income country with segments of the population who live at, or slightly above, the poverty line, and who are therefore vulnerable to any downturn in the economy. Jordan remained socially stable and the economy recovered in 2001-2 from the global downturn following 9/11, despite the regional political crisis; but the economy was still susceptible to external shocks, and vulnerable by its dependence on significant oil concessions from Iraq⁴⁶. The tourist industry had already been significantly impacted by the situation in Iraq and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and any war in Iraq was likely to have a severe economic impact on Jordan.

Jordan has certain social characteristics making it vulnerable to political unrest: the country had, and continued to play host to, one of largest refugee populations in the world. Any reaction among Palestinians, including those of West Bank, to military intervention in Iraq could have had an impact on internal stability in Jordan. There was still a small caseload of refugees and asylum seekers from Iraq in Jordan following the first Gulf War⁴⁷. Uncertainty of their reaction and related security considerations was a serious factor for the Government of Jordan (GOJ) should there be

⁴² UNICEF Iran Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq Synthesis Report Jan 2002-August 2003, Draft; and UNICEF Iran Contingency Plan: Preparedness and Response to a Sub-Regional Refugee Crisis, Draft, November 2002

⁴³ More than 2.5million, of which 2.3 million were Afghans and 200,000 Iraqis, although only 5% live in camps

⁴⁴ In the region of 12 million mines

⁴⁵ Interagency Contingency Plan for Jordan, Draft 1, 2 February 2003

⁴⁶ Before the 2003 war, Iraq was Jordan's largest trade partner

⁴⁷ According to the Jordanian authorities, there were 300,000 Iraqis in Jordan

conflict in Iraq. Jordan has young population, with over 60% under 25, among which there are high levels of unemployment. There are also areas associated with religious fundamentalism.

Jordan's geographic position meant it would be vulnerable to any potential humanitarian crisis triggered by a conflict in Iraq. It could also be affected by any deterioration of the situation in the OPT, perhaps generating an influx of refugees from the West Bank. Also of concern was the fact that Amman might be caught in cross-fire between Iraq and Israel with an unquantified risk of being impacted by biological and chemical weapons.

UN Level 1 Security Phase had been in operation since the start of the second Intifada.

2.3 Syria⁴⁸

About 8,000 refugees were allowed into Syria in 1991 and 1992 following the Gulf War and the subsequent internal disturbances in Iraq. A refugee camp was established at that time in Al Hol in the governorate of Hasake (approximately 700 km north-east of Damascus), but by October 2002 the population of Al Hol camp had dropped to 50 people with about 25 living in the surrounding villages.

Since 1992 there has been a continuous flow of asylum seekers into Syria, mostly from Iraq, but also from Somalia and Yemen, with whom UNHCR have been working. By 2003 Syria hosted about 3000 urban refugees of different nationalities who had been granted refugee status.

Before the war Syria had favourable political and economic relations with Iraq.

The Syrian Government had a positive history of working with UNICEF on emergency response in April 2002 when a dam burst. However, for political reasons, the Syrian government delayed any public endorsement of preparedness until early March 2003.

2.4 Turkey⁴⁹

The Government of Turkey (GOT) considered that the post-Gulf War refugee emergency in 1991 had had dire and long-term consequences for both Turkish national security and the economy and were therefore unwilling to allow any refugees from a crisis in Iraq into the country.

Attached to the UNICEF Ankara Office the Regional Procurement Centre (RPC) was set up to handle supplies for OFFP in northern Iraq, providing an established route through which supplies could be sent to any refugees or IDP's resulting from a crisis in Iraq⁵⁰. During the response 80% of OFFP supplies entered northern Iraq through the RPC.

⁴⁸ UN Interagency Plan for Humanitarian Preparedness and Response on Refugee Influx in Syria, Draft, October 2002

⁴⁹ Protecting and Assisting Children and Women in Extraordinary Circumstances, UNICEF Turkey EPRP, Draft 5, February 2003

⁵⁰ It was because of the existence of the RPC that Turkey CO became the lead agency for procurement

3 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCESS

3.1 Sub-regional preparedness⁵¹

Following the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 9/11/2001, the MENARO Regional Director (RD) initiated the sub-regional preparedness and response planning process (the first of its type in UNICEF). The first of a series of consultation meetings was held on 13th October 2001 with staff from UNICEF offices in Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, the MENA and CEE/CIS Regional Offices, EMOPS, Copenhagen and NYHQ during which possible scenarios, likely humanitarian consequences and implications for preparedness were reviewed. Individual country's existing Contingency Plans were adapted in the light of discussions for a potential Iraq sub-regional crisis, and an initial Sub-Regional Emergency Plan of Action was produced by MENARO in December 2001. Further sub-regional meetings were held in January, February, March, April and September 2002 with Country Contingency plans being updated as the situation evolved.

3.1.1 UNICEF Strategy

UNICEF's overall Contingency Strategy was to assist refugee recipient countries while keeping Iraq as the main focus. Focusing on the pre-conflict period, this would involve the pre-positioning of supplies both inside and outside Iraq; escalating vaccination activity (particularly for polio and measles campaign) within Iraq; establishing new locations in border locations in neighbouring countries and training of staff and counterparts as well as building up staffing numbers where necessary.

UNICEF's strategy during any conflict was to:

- Maintain/rapidly resume essential services
- Maintain UNICEF offices in Iraq, with the support of national staff
- Use ICRC and Iraq Red Crescent networks to report needs
- Mount trans-border (assisting IDP's close to the border) and cross-border (taking supplies into Iraq from other country) operations as possible

In terms of programme objectives these translated into:

Nutrition

1. Regular nutritional assessments to be made (especially IDP children)
2. M & E of nutrition programmes' effectiveness
3. Detection and treatment of severe cases of malnutrition through a Targeted Nutrition Programme (TNP)
4. Promotion of breastfeeding
5. Correction of malnutrition through micronutrient deficiencies

Watsan

1. Assessment of watsan conditions of affected population on time
2. To ensure that affected/displaced people in urban areas had access to minimal potable water (through purification tablets and limited water tankering) – especially IDP and health facilities
3. To ensure that IDPs, especially women and children – had access to facilities, supplies and information contributing to their hygienic status and offering protection from water borne diseases
4. To ensure availability of relevant information on safe water and hygiene related to water
5. To co-ordinate all UN and NGO assistance in watsan

⁵¹ Protecting and Assisting Children and Women in Extraordinary Circumstances, Sub-Regional Plan of Action, October 2002

Health

1. Ensure that a proper assessment of health conditions of affected population is carried out, especially of women and children
2. To prevent outbreaks of measles in IDP settlements and contiguous areas through vaccination of children 6months – 12 years
3. To ensure availability of emergency drugs for PHC facilities, IDP and targeted areas
4. To ensure safe delivery services for women in PHC facilities, IDP and targeted areas
5. To ensure availability of relevant IEC material concerning health, especially care and management of childhood illnesses

Child Protection

1. Rapid assessment of needs of institutionalised children and IDP children with special protection needs
2. To ensure safety and well-being (access to shelter, food and clothing) of institutionalised children during the emergency
3. To ensure safety, psycho-social support and family reunification for unaccompanied children
4. To ensure that refugee and IDP populations settled along borders are aware of risks of mines and UXOs

Primary Education

1. Rapid assessment
2. To ensure resumption of primary education for children and adolescents through the provision of basic education supplies and teaching materials
3. To ensure children in distress receive adequate psycho-social support in schools
4. To ensure safe and adequate learning environment where schools have been severely damaged

3.1.2 Sub-regional Sectoral/Operations Activity

Following the February 2002 sub-regional planning meeting and the receipt of the first Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) grant, individual countries made a start on implementing identified preparedness activities. By the beginning of the war, extensive preparations had been made for rapid emergency response by pre-positioning over US\$14million in emergency supplies and equipment in and around Iraq, and establishing logistics hubs along the border with neighbouring countries. Sub offices were established in Kermanshah and Ahwaz (Iran), Kuwait, Al-Haseke (Syria), Dyrbakir and Silopi (Turkey). A sub-office was also set up in Basra (Iraq).

While MENA and Iraq CO adopted a regional approach to planning and response which helped to clarify concepts, roles and responsibilities among countries and agencies, it was at country level that actual and detailed planning took place, according to the local situation, environment, capacity and threats. Each CO prepared its own Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) setting out details of their proposed preparedness and response activities. These were implemented using funds provided by ERF and CERF loans.

On a sub-regional level HR standby arrangements were established with NGOs (Oxfam and NRC at RO level) preparing for entry into Iraq⁵². Additionally, at the end of January a Senior Logistics Officer was assigned to Amman to support pre-positioning of supplies in the region. Preparedness activities were being undertaken alongside maintenance of the regular country programmes.

⁵² This resulted in particularly successful HR cover for telecoms, WES and education once the emergency happened

Watsan⁵³

- Water equipment for up to 300,000 IDPs in Iraq was pre-positioned in neighbouring countries
- A regional partnership agreement was made with OXFAM (as well as other individual country agreements)

Sectoral Workshops/Training⁵⁴

A series of workshops/training meetings were held in the sub-region as part of the preparedness process.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Venue</i>	<i>Topic</i>	<i>Audience</i>
19/23 November 2000	Amman	Psychosocial programming for children and adolescents in need of special protection	Dohuk and MENARO staff
January 2001		Training of Trainers (ToT) on HR and Humanitarian principles	MENARO
23-29 November 2001	Amman	ToT on HR and Humanitarian principles	Iran, Iraq, MENARO staff
27-31 January 2002	Amman	Monitoring and Evaluation in crisis situations	Sub-regional
April 2002	Sub-regional	Telecoms preparedness workshop – developed and tested office in a box procedures, additional guidelines on MOSS compliance and telecoms	
8-10 April 2002	Amman	MENA workshop on CP in emergencies/separated and unaccompanied children	Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, MENARO staff
16-18 April 2002	Amman	IT/Telecom/Security training	Sub-regional
27 September – 1 October 2002	Khartoum	Stress Management/peer support	Sub-regional
6-8 th November 2002	Geneva	Emergency preparedness and response planning tools	Regional Emergency Focal Points and COs
December 2002		ToT psychosocial support – Education in Emergencies for govt officials, using a consultant from Pakistan.	UNICEF counterparts/Syria 30 + teachers
January 2003	Jordan CO	How to deal with multi-grade classes, psycho-social – children affected by armed conflict	Training for teachers on psycho-social
February 2003	Beirut	UNICEF MENARO led Psycho-social training	
Early February 2003	Beirut	CP training, UNHCR, WHO, ICRC, UNICEF,	Inter-agency
February 2003	Amman	Training in watsan	
February 2003	Cairo	Health	Inter-agency
	Baghdad	4-day workshop on ProMS on manual procedures	
February 4-6 2003	Syria UNICEF	Health and nutritional assessment	

⁵³ UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, Relief Web, 20 March 2003

⁵⁴ List of training events compiled by MENARO for consultant

		for refugees	
February 7-9 2003	Al-Hol camp	Oxfam led watsan training	Syrian counterparts
February 2003	Baghdad	Teacher training in on psychosocial assistance to children	MOE in S/C
February 2003	JCO	Further training on psycho-social	Teachers
	Communications for Development led training	Iraq Planning Officer attended	
	Iran	UNICEF Iran Training on mine awareness	Iranian Red Crescent volunteers
Early March 2003	Turkey CO	Training given using IFRC's manual on Community Services and psychosocial Support. Training with UNICEF leaders will happen in Ankara and Silopi	105 Red Crescent volunteers
5-11 March 2003		Practical training on construction of latrines and baths and installation of water bladder tanks and tap stands by UNICEF	Directorate of Water and local NGOs
Mid-March 2003	Sulimaniyah	Sustaining health services during emergencies	Master trainers for medical personnel
Mid-March 2003	Erbil	Training on psycho-social counselling and crisis related issues	1,120 school headmasters
Mid-March 2003	Kermanshah and Ahwaz	Oxfam (under agreement with UNICEF) doing training on watsan emergency interventions	Iranian Red C, MOH, Water and Sanitation Company
Mid-March 2003	Kermanshah	Training	Indigenous Red C volunteers
March 2003	Beirut	Watsan	Interagency meeting, – key NGOs and UN agencies
	Iran/Iraq border	Programme of nutritional training	
		Sexual abuse and exploitation	MENARO
	UK	RedR training	UK/Iraq + Jordan
	Turkey CO	1-week training for Turkey Office to update EPRP on MTSP, CCCUs and HRs	
	Turkey CO	Workshop in M and E paid for by DfID	Turkey Office
	UNDP/Italy	Logistics	Syrian Supplies Officer

Management

By September 2001 a sub-regional management structure for contingency planning had been agreed by the UNICEF offices:

- During the preparatory phase, the RD was recognised as the principal focal point on matters related to preparedness and response, co-ordinating sub-regional preparedness consultations between COs, HQ, Copenhagen and Geneva. Focal points for sub-regional contingency plans would need to be appointed including in New York, Copenhagen, Geneva

and Amman. Focal points in HQ locations should represent the whole office, not a specific division, so there would be one contact point for all matters

- MENARO agreed to organise monthly meetings to discuss all offices' preparedness status, and allow reporting back to NYHQs on progress made
- Conference call structures were to be tested, among Representatives first and then among focal points
- MENARO should be responsible for fundraising for initial preparatory phase
- Once any emergency broke, MENARO would make recommendations to NY who would decide the management structure for the response
- UNICEF had a presence in the sub-regional co-ordination hub in Cyprus, the Humanitarian Co-ordination Office in Larnaca

IT/Telecommunications

- Based on different scenarios that could evolve in complex emergencies regional and country IT preparedness plans were strengthened and necessary steps taken to meet following challenges:
 1. ICT services for business community in Iraq and neighbouring countries in case of breakdown to regular services
 2. Procedures for evacuation of Iraq office with ProMS, mail and office data
 3. Immediate restoration of data in safe haven and establishment of office communications
 4. Setup of sub-offices in remote/border areas
 5. Vehicle tracking and staff security
- Required facilities for tapes (information) were sent to Amman from the Iraq offices and the integrity of tapes were tested in Amman
- Equipment standards, network design and operating procedures were finalized for the sub-region involving Call Sign, Selcall, distribution of HF and VHF frequencies and usage of common channels in UN system. UNICEF in Jordan and Syria took an interagency lead role as Telecoms Coordinating Agency (TCA) with dedicated staff to support interagency issues.
- UNICEF co-ordinated with WFP and UNHCR for telecoms

Security

- 17 Field Security Officers were deployed to the region at the beginning of March 2003, to be co-ordinated by a regional Field Security Officer attached to the Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq

HR⁵⁵

- Common Services Unit in Jordan co-ordinated the recruitment of 14 general services staff for MENARO Iraq Group annex office (MIG House, set up to accommodate up to 60 personnel) covering finance, administration, transport, reception, funding co-ordination, IT and programme assistance

3.2 Iraq EPRP and Preparedness Activity

EPRP - September 2002

This very comprehensive document set out an analysis of the threats and overarching emergency related management systems and gave a collection of specific plans for key functions. In section 2 (specific plans) the actions to be taken were assigned to particular officers specifying accountability.

The Plan was an attempt by UNICEF staff to anticipate possible threats/needs, establish a basis for standing readiness and define how the team would respond. In line with UNICEF policy,

⁵⁵ MENA Sub-Regional Sitrep #6, 5-11 March 2003

preparedness and response were seen as an integral part of the country programme, and the responsibility of every staff member and section. The scenarios were those of a complex emergency⁵⁶ (rather than natural disaster), and the overall objective of the Plan was, “that children and women’s survival and well-being (fulfilment of their basic rights) are assured in whatever emergency situations develop...according to the UNICEF mandate.”

Planning Assumptions

- 1) Most needs were to be met by households themselves supported by local/national authorities and NGOs. International support would be required given the low coping capacity of families
- 2) UN Security Management Team would monitor the situation weekly, adjusting the UN system Security, Relocation and Evacuation Plan. EPRP was closely linked to security phasing
- 3) UNICEF was to act as part of the co-ordinated UN response, working through government and with NGOs, recognising government responsibility for prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. 4 levels of planning process worked together – in-country, interagency in Iraq (UNDG + HCR and WHO), UNICEF sub-regional, UN sub-regional
- 4) No OFFP resources could be used except for administrative costs. This placed a heavy reliance on regular programme resources and EPF
- 5) At the time of the emergency UNICEF staff were to initiate rapid field assessments within 48 hours of reported incidents if security allowed
- 6) UNICEF was to maintain standing readiness to provide initial assistance according to the Core Corporate Commitments (CCCs) for 550,000 affected people, within 48 hours for 4 weeks
- 7) Additional programmes should be developed to support rehabilitation and recovery at the time of the emergency
- 8) Given that most UN agencies did not have regular programmes in Iraq, UNICEF was likely to carry a heavy burden during any emergency response
- 9) HR management was to link relocation from Iraq to neighbouring countries to address possible refugee challenge and cross-border activities.

Response Strategies

Structures

- Internal Emergency Management Systems – gave responsibility for emergency response to the Country Representative (CR) or, in the event of an evacuation, to the Officer in Charge (OIC) in consultation with the Regional Office (RO) and HQ. In case the OIC was left responsible, they had full authority to initiate and authorise all transactions and release of supplies related to the humanitarian response
- International staff evacuated to Amman would set up a management structure: Sub-Regional Iraq Emergency Response (led by CR Iraq), UNICEF-Iraq Emergency Response (led by the Programme Co-ordinator), Sub-Regional Field Co-ordination and Liaison (led by northern Iraq Co-ordinator) and Sub-Regional Iraq Emergency Response Operations (led by Operations Officer)
- Internal reporting and information management systems for daily meetings, preparation of situation reports (frequency dependent on security phase), and media and donor relations in support of advocacy and resource mobilisation were outlined

Foreign attack or invasion: Military attack by the US and allies to effect regime change possibly involving airstrikes, ground forces, covert actions which disrupt basic services and gov’t ability to provide supplies to population (health, water, food). Military attack could result in widespread displacement of population, and possible refugee movements to neighbouring countries. This might constrain UN’s ability to respond also.

Internal unrest: Civil unrest and instability in-country - both in the North and South/Centre – and the suppression of this dissent resulting in disruptions in the provision of basic services, with possible associated large-scale population displacement and refugee flows. Lack of internal security would seriously affect everyday life, lead to evacuation of IP. Estimated that up to 1 million refugees could cross into neighbouring countries, as well as IDPs within Iraq.

- Emergency Management Team (comprising health and nutrition, education-CP, Watsan, Planning, Communication, Operations, HR, Administration, Budget and finance, Supply and Logistics, IT) were responsible for ensuring adequate preparedness in the office for an emergency response, and for advising the Rep/OIC

Emergency programme objectives

For *acute* phase:

- initial rapid assessments
- ensure continued provision of services, protection etc

For *recovery and rehabilitation phase*:

- ensure proper assessments of each sector, and support restoration of services in each sector
- ensure availability of supplies, IEC material, repair and rehabilitation of infrastructure
- support to Iraqi systems and institutions providing care in each sector

Activities should draw on the comprehensive knowledge, staff experience, partnerships gained through previous work in Iraq (OFFP and Programme) both in initial and longer term phases. Vulnerability analysis, surveys, studies, regular assessments and analysis through programmes and OFFP work should lead to the identification of key areas of needed support. UNICEF was identified as lead agency for Water and Sanitation, Nutrition, Education and Child Protection.

Service Delivery

In the acute phase of an emergency UNICEF would provide relief assistance for up to 550,000 population through key health, nutrition and WES supplies pre-positioned in both the north (N) and S/C Iraq. Pre-positioning of supplies (health, nutrition, watsan) in both N and S/C would follow assessments already made of facilities and sites equipped to provide emergency assistance based on UNICEF and UNOCHI databases. Supplies pre-positioned in N Iraq could be used either to support IDPs from S/C, or to provide relief in the north. UNICEF planned to use local contractors to conduct emergency repairs and rehabilitation activities for water and sanitation. Local staff would continue to plan and monitor the UNICEF response in the event of relocation of the international staff.

In the recovery and rehabilitation period, UNICEF would scale up its immediate response to achieve national scope and coverage. This would be supported through the offices in Baghdad and Amman, and would utilise neighbouring COs and newly established sub-offices in neighbouring countries in the event of a larger response.

Partnerships and Capacity Building

UNICEF would support existing government and local authority partners to ensure sufficient capacity for them to respond effectively to humanitarian needs of an emergency - Commerce and Health ministries in S/C (food assistance), General Corporation of Water and Sewerage, and Iraqi Red Crescent.

Humanitarian UN agencies and the main international NGOs in Iraq agreed to a planning and co-ordination mechanism to ensure efficient and timely response to an emergency.

Advocacy

Advocacy for CP was a high priority, and needed to be based on accurate information of the situation at the time. UNICEF was considering different ways to maintain this flow of information especially in the event of relocation of international staff.

The CR was only staff member authorized to conduct interviews with media and external parties

Technical support and HR management

UNICEF Iraq with MENARO and COs in sub-region prepared a staff evacuation and relocation plan to support the programme objectives and strategies. Most of the HR needs could be met with staff already available in UNICEF-Iraq but there was a need for more clarity on funding sources for HR relocation. Because of the complications of using OFFP funding for emergency staff costs, the HR plan sought to use staff funded by the regular programme and support budgets in an initial emergency response.

S/C Key Functions

For each sector the Plan outlined objectives, planning assumptions, activities in event of emergency, preparedness and capacity-building activities, possible collaborative agreements, strategies, responsibilities, HR requirements, anticipated supply and equipment requirements and other resources requirements for each role. Detailed action plans were set out for each officer.

Activities relating to personnel security were set out.

Sector Objectives:

Health/Nutrition: 1) support emergency and basic primary health care and nutrition services for 100,000 people unreached through government services in initial phase, including IDPs, 2) further support to another population of 300,000 in remote areas for 1 month within 1 week including IDPs

Watsan: 1) prevent mortality and morbidity from drinking unclean water for up to 300,000 in S/C, especially IDPs, and 2) during recovery and rehabilitation phase, supporting restoration of regular potable water supply and sanitary services to affected population

Child Protection: 1) support efforts to protect children, both those who were vulnerable before the emergency, and those who become so. Ensure information and systems are available for identifying those most at risk

Education: 1) early identification of psycho-social and educational needs of affected children relevant to their ages; provide some sense of normality and temporary education opportunities for IDP children up to a maximum of 300,000 people; 2) provide support to government to ensure all primary age children have access to quality primary education; 3) during the rehabilitation stage provide safe, appropriate environment for children to return to school. Identify emergency problems affecting children resulting from conflict, help children (especially those in need of special protection) to regain sense of daily normality.

North Iraq Key Functions

Core Planning Commitment: Assessment within 48 hours, standing readiness to assist 250,000 persons within 6 days, for 4 weeks

Overall objective – To ensure the identification of the number of people affected and their needs, some of this in partnership with the government and UN agencies.

Sector Objectives:

Health and Nutrition: 1) ensure access of affected women/child populations to health and nutrition care by immunisation, distribution of nutritional supplements, delivery of appropriate health care and drugs in collaboration with WHO⁵⁷

Watsan: 1) ensure accessibility to safe drinking water and sanitation in agreement with minimum SPHERE standards for quality and quantity

Education: 1) ensure that all children at evacuation stage have continued access and attendance to learning facilities, especially girls; 2) ensure educational opportunities provided for the community at large, especially women

Child Protection: 1) ensure optimal protection for women and children in emergency situations in line with established humanitarian principals including reunification of separated children, psycho-social support, humanitarian assistance given with a gender perspective, the establishment of child-friendly spaces

Estimated budgets were given for the pre-positioning of stocks for 300,000 people in S/C and 250,000 people in the north.

South/Centre

Sector	Budget
Health and nutrition	\$483,274
Education	\$372,729.40
Child protection	\$28,014
Water and sanitation	\$399,780
Total =	\$1,283,797.40

North Iraq

Sector	Budget
Health	\$26,734.35
Nutrition:	\$35,551.06
Education:	\$308,584
Water and sanitation:	\$1,084,810.10
Total = \$1	\$1,455,680.08

Iraq CO Preparedness Activities (as at 20 March 2003)⁵⁸

Nutrition⁵⁹

- UNICEF contributed to the Iraq governments' efforts in the last weeks before the war to distribute nutritional items throughout the country, including High Protein Biscuits (HPB)⁶⁰ and therapeutic milk powder. The success of this distribution relied on the governments' highly developed food distribution network⁶¹. The nutrition stocks were sent to Nutritional Rehabilitation Centres (NRCs) in hospitals, Public Health Centres, and to the network of

⁵⁷ The Plan gives a specific outline for action for preparedness and response to cholera, measles, typhoid outbreaks

⁵⁸ Information for this preparedness activities section taken from UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, Relief Web, 20 March 2003. Where additional sources are used these are indicated

⁵⁹ All families in Iraq received a monthly food ration which was distributed by the government. Between August 2002 and March 2003, the government had been providing two months of additional rations to build up a stock of basic food items. However in cases where families had to sell part of the ration to get other basic necessities, this was expected to last only 6 weeks once distribution was interrupted

⁶⁰ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #6, 5-11 March 2003

⁶¹ which relied on 44,226 ration agents

some 2800 plus Community Child Care Units (CCCs). 155 tons of therapeutic milk and 1,575 metric tons of HPB were distributed to 68 paediatric hospitals, 560 PHCs and 2,800 CCCUs in Iraq S/C and N, to support the nutritional rehabilitation programme which was launched on March 8th

- In northern Iraq, supplies to establish 30 additional therapeutic feeding centres were stored including weighing scales, measuring boards, cooking pots, stoves and other equipment⁶².
- 100,000 water bags and hygiene kits were pre-positioned in NRCs across the country
- Intensification of national breastfeeding promotion programme
- Supplies to establish 30 therapeutic feeding centres were stored in the north
- Screening of U5 children for malnutrition was on-going⁶³
- 10 national and international staff had received emergency nutrition training
- Stationery and photocopying equipment had been distributed to the Department of Health
- Equipment for establishing 10 Therapeutic Feeding Centres was distributed in the three northern governorships
- As lead agency for the nutritional sector in Iraq, UNICEF supported a sub-regional sectoral co-ordination unit headed by a UNOCHI seconded staff member, which convened two sub-regional inter-agency co-ordination meetings to establish co-ordination mechanisms, to agree on supplies and programme standards and ensure appropriate geographical coverage. (In this sector the main counterparts were WFP, WHO, CARE)

Water and Sanitation

Most of the planned locations for IDP camps were not equipped with an appropriate water supply or waste and sanitation equipment and structure. UNICEF, as the lead agency for watsan, planned assessments (with partners) to determine the immediate requirements for emergency interventions to provide safe water and ensure ongoing sanitation.

Preparedness activities undertaken included:

- The overhaul and repair of backup generators for over 100 water and sewerage facilities in Baghdad and surrounding governorates, based on discussions with Baghdad Water Authority
- 5 mobile electrical/mechanical engineering teams (with over 60 members of staff) were on 24-hour standby in strategic locations in Baghdad to ensure the continuing function of a sewerage service and a partial water supply. Contractors had been used before the war for watsan rehabilitation, and these were contracted and pre-paid to continue working during the war⁶⁴
- Fuel storage tanks for generators in the city were also set up
- A water tankering operation was put in place for 100,000 people in Baghdad
- 15 metric tons (MT) of chlorine and 90MT of aluminium sulphate was delivered to Ifraz WTP (supplying Erbil)⁶⁵ and 8MT chlorine gas and 1MT chlorine powder were delivered to sites near Dohuk⁶⁶
- 16 fuel tanks were installed in Erbil for critical fuel storage and 240,000 litres of emergency fuels to be stored at water projects were delivered⁶⁷
- Cooking pots and washing basins were stored at the warehouse in Erbil⁶⁸
- 1MT chlorine and 33MT of aluminium sulphate was delivered to sites around Sulaymaniyah⁶⁹
- 40 fuel storage tanks were manufactured in Sulaymaniyah to store fuel for critical WTP⁷⁰, of which 28 fuel tanks were already delivered and installed to sites in Sulaymaniyah

⁶² MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #2, 4-10 February 2003

⁶³ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #3, 10-17 February 2003

⁶⁴ Sitrep (Hatim George) 19 March 2003

⁶⁵ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #3, 10-17 February 2003

⁶⁶ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #4, 18-27 February 2003

⁶⁷ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #7, 12-18 March 2003

⁶⁸ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #3, 10-17 February 2003

⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰ Ibid

governorship⁷¹. 355,000 litres of emergency fuel was delivered and stored at water projects and repairs to generators supplying water in Sulaymaniyah were carried out

- A Letter of Understanding was signed with Save the Children (SCF) for implementing WES activities in Sulaymaniyah governorship if necessary
- 12 fuel tanks were manufactured in Dohuk to store fuel for critical WTP and 270,000 litres of emergency fuels to be stored at water projects at Dohuk was completed⁷²
- 100,000 water bladder bags were distributed to NRC in S/C
- Practical training on construction of latrines and baths, and installation of water bladder tanks and tap stands given by UNICEF to the Directorate of Water and local NGOs
- Hygiene kits for 70,000 families were pre-positioned in PHC and NTC and additional hygiene supplies for 300,000 were pre-positioned

Health

- Successful nationwide vaccination campaigns for polio,⁷³ a “mop-up” campaign for measles⁷⁴ and a DTP campaign benefiting 4.2million U5s were carried out together with the GOI. Combined Diphtheria-Tetanus-Polio vaccination was given to 4.2 million children in N Iraq
- During February, medical equipment and supplies was distributed to PHCs, with priority given to those near IDP sites. Additionally, 1 million sachets of Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS) were distributed to all the PHCs in the country. This meant that before the war, emergency health kits, consumables and ORS had been pre-positioned for up to 1.8million children in S/C, and up to 250,000 IDP in the north
- Safe birthing kits for 100,000 women were pre-positioned
- Drugs to fight black fever were ordered. (64 children had recently died of this in the south)
- 1,030 first aid kits arrived in Erbil on March 1st
- Tents and blankets had been pre-positioned in Iraqi Red Crescent (IRCS) warehouses in S/C to support IDPs
- Local authorities in North Iraq received emergency supplies from UNICEF to be distributed to facilities and local warehouses, including 30,000 sachets of ORS, 550kg of therapeutic milk, 6 emergency health kits for 60,000 people for 3 months, 20,000 blankets, kerosene stoves and 10,000 sets of cooking equipment⁷⁵
- In the week before the conflict started, training was started in Sulaymaniyah. Master trainers for medical personnel were given training on sustaining health services during an emergency⁷⁶

Child Protection⁷⁷

- In the north, UNICEF supported the Iraqi authorities in their relocation of children away from institutions back to their families, (both “orphans” and reformatories) for their protection. By contrast, in the S/C, although the government followed the same policy, they only informed UNICEF 10 days before war started of the numbers of children still left in institutions⁷⁸
- Distribution of food and non-food items for 2,300 institutionalised children and an additional 100,000 IDP children in Iraq were undertaken
- Mobile psycho-social care teams were established and trained in northern Iraq

⁷¹ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #6, 4-11 March 2003

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ which took place during January and February 2003, and achieved 98% coverage (MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #5, 28 Feb-4 Mar 2003)

⁷⁴ which took place from mid February/early March 2003 and reached 92% coverage in the S/C for U5s (MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #5, 28 Feb-4 Mar 2003), but the war started before the 5-12 year old cohort could be vaccinated. A defaulter tracer campaign ongoing during March in the 3 northern governorships

⁷⁵ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #7, 12-18 March 2003

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ UNICEF anticipated up to 5% of IDP/refugee children becoming separated from their families in an emergency

⁷⁸ Interview notes with consultant

- 44 local NGO volunteers in Dohuk were trained in psychosocial and humanitarian principles. 7 contingency response teams were set up in Dohuk to provide medical and psychosocial support to vulnerable children affected by an emergency⁷⁹
- Training was given to teachers in S/C on psycho-social interventions in schools
- Meetings with ICRC on child tracing were held as well as co-ordination meetings with other partners during February⁸⁰
- 33,000 brochures were produced in Sulaymaniyah on mine awareness in co-operation with Mine Action Group in the local language. TV spots were aired in the same region with more planned dealing with landmine and UXO awareness, and other health issues⁸¹
- A total of 30,000 litres of fuel were provided to child institutions in the 3 northern governorships⁸²

Education

UNICEF considered that reactivating the primary education system was a top priority in the event of an emergency, as a powerful means of “returning to normality” for affected children.

Preparedness activities undertaken:

- School-in-a-box and recreational kits for 100,000 children were pre-positioned to restart schools, and address psycho-social needs
- Tents to be used for schools were prepositioned in warehouses, with textbooks in both Kurdish and Arabic⁸³
- With their partners, UNICEF set up committees of teachers and administrative staff at schools to protect school property in the event of war
- 55,000 litres of fuel were delivered to critical educational facilities in Erbil and Dohuk⁸⁴
- Training for 1,210 school headmasters on psycho-social counselling and crisis related issues was carried out in Erbil⁸⁵
- 70 volunteers were trained on psychosocial support for children in emergencies in N Iraq⁸⁶

Management systems⁸⁷

By January 2003 management systems/ProMS had been put in place to cover the evacuation of International Personnel (IP). Under the existing system the 2 major centres of operation, Baghdad and Erbil were both configured in ProMS. Data from Erbil would be replicated to Baghdad, then data from both offices consolidated and replicated to NYHQ via the internet.

In case of an attack it would be necessary to ensure that both offices would be able to communicate with each other, and that the Baghdad Office would be able to communicate with NYHQ. So both offices had Mini-M satellite phone, M-4 World Communicator Satellite Phone and Inmarsat phones, and both had HF and VHF radios for voice co-ordination and communication.

Procedures were agreed in the event of the Baghdad Office being relocated with data being uploaded to Amman. MENARO had a powerful stand-by server, at least 8 ProMS computers, and a wireless network with the capacity of networking 15 additional computers. MENARO also had SITA IP-connect, Voice over IP, a 64K Internet leased line with firewall and several contingency devices like Satellite Mini-M and M-4, HF radio and VHF. Procedures for relocation of Erbil were agreed. A weekly back up from both offices would be sent to MENARO in case of loss or non-

⁷⁹ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #4, 18-27 February 2003

⁸⁰ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #2, 4-10 February 2003

⁸¹ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #4, 18-27 February 2003

⁸² MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #7, 12-18 March 2003

⁸³ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #2, 4-10 February 2003

⁸⁴ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #7, 12-18 March 2003

⁸⁵ Ibid

⁸⁶ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #5, 28 Feb-4 Mar 2003

⁸⁷ Emergency ProMS Operation in Iraq, (no date)

availability of recent data. Disaster Recovery procedure would be used to synchronise the data with the hub in NYHQ. A Remote Access Tool called Citrix would be installed in Baghdad, Amman and Erbil in case of evacuation of authorisation staff from these locations.

Paper based manual procedures which could be operated without computers were also developed.

By the outbreak of war management preparedness activities had included:

- Opening a new liaison office in Basra to be managed by one national officer
- The implementation of a system N Iraq whereby the national (OIC)⁸⁸ was to replace section heads and liaison officers in Dohuk and Aulay
- Assessment missions were sent to Kuwait: 1 Supply Officer (from Baghdad), 1 Liaison officer (from Sulaimaniya), 1 IT Officer (from Baghdad) and 1 Logistics Officer

HR

- UNICEF arranged a 3-month salary advance to national staff to help them prepare for the emergency⁸⁹
- On the 13th March, 2 staff from Baghdad were transferred to Basra to run the sub-office. An additional assistant was also hired for the Basra sub-office
- By mid-February there were 4 IP in the North and 7 IP in S/C. 40 IP had already been evaluated and were outside Iraq. At the same time 1 SSA journalist and 1 General Service Assistant had been recruited
- By March 11, there were 4 IP in north and 6 in the S/C. The remaining IPs were due to stay in Baghdad until security phase 5 was declared⁹⁰

Security

- At the end of January 2003 the UN Security Management Team established a group to further operationalise the UN's security plan, including the evacuation of IPs and the national warden system for national staff⁹¹
- At the same time window blast film was installed in the Baghdad CO and the offices in North Iraq⁹²
- Vehicles were equipped with HF communications
- At the end of February, it was agreed that, in the event of conflict, it was up to the discretion of the national staff when and how they would make contact with IP outside the country, in the light of their direct assessment of the situation. On re-entry of evacuated IPs into Iraq, it was envisaged that 5 area offices (Erbil, Mossul, Baghdad, Babil, Basra) would be established which would be led by senior officials (D-1 level)
- In northern Iraq, all communications equipment and systems including MINI-Ms, Thurayas, CHF, Codan, local lines and cc-mail were reported functional the week before hostilities commenced
- All remaining UN international staff (10) were evacuated from Iraq on March 18th when Phase 5 was declared⁹³

Media/Communications

⁸⁸ The OIC in Baghdad was Hatim George, and in Northern Iraq was Dr Paula Abdulkader (MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #7, 12-18 March 2003)

⁸⁹ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #1, 29 Jan-4 Feb 2003

⁹⁰ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #6, 5-11 March 2003

⁹¹ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #1, 29 Jan-4 Feb 2003

⁹² Ibid

⁹³ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #7, 12-18 March 2003

- 1 press conference and 7 interviews were given in Iraq between 29th January and 4th February⁹⁴
- In mid February Carol Bellamy released a statement on UNICEF's national polio and measles immunization campaigns and UNICEF's role in emergency preparedness. This received good worldwide coverage⁹⁵
- At the same time media coverage was also given to UNICEF's information and education campaign on health and hygiene in the north⁹⁶
- There was considerable media interest in Iraq on UNICEF's polio campaign (32 interviews were given⁹⁷), as well as their emergency preparedness activities which had focused on bolstering the strength of malnourished children to withstand the forthcoming conflict
- In the week before they were evacuated the CR and Communications Officer gave a total of 31 interviews to the media

Interagency

- In February, UNICEF agreed with ICRC to produce 100,000 water bags for use by the NRC
- A meeting with S/C partners (CARE, ICRC) was held in late February to discuss emergency watsan activities, focusing on emergency plans for Baghdad. At the same time in N Iraq, meetings with NGO partners (SCF UK, Quandil) were held to exchange information and discuss areas of possible collaboration
- In early March, UNICEF's emergency proposals to ensure the functioning of basic health services for the 3 northern governorships were approved by UNOCHI. These were to be funded under OFFP for a total \$8million

Funding⁹⁸

- Iraq received \$10,745,003⁹⁹ for preparedness activities

3.3 Iran EPRP¹⁰⁰ and Preparedness Activity

Apart from small scale support to Iranian civil society organisations in case of natural disasters, the Iran CO programme does not include a plan for field operations. But UNICEF Iran had faced several emergencies in the past years (floods/earthquakes/Afghan support), and preparedness and response were seen as an integral part of the country programme, with preparedness and response being the responsibility of every member of staff. During the Iraq crisis Iran CO was able to establish a substantial emergency response capacity.

UNICEF Iran planning focused initially on supporting the government and international response to the anticipated refugee crisis. Later in the planning process, due to disagreements over the interpretation of child protection, the CO decided on a more pro-active approach¹⁰¹.

⁹⁴ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #1, 29 Jan-4 Feb 2003

⁹⁵ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #3, 10-17 February 2003

⁹⁶ Ibid

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ Figures for each countries' preparedness funding provided by Programme Funding Office, UNICEF HQNY and compared with status reports provided by the Iraq Country Team

⁹⁹ \$5,640,000 from EPR 1,2 & CERF and \$5,105,003 from ORDA, RR, CIDA, UK, New Zealand

¹⁰⁰ Draft UNICEF Iran Contingency Plan: Preparedness and Response to a Sub-Regional Refugee Crisis, November 2002

¹⁰¹ UNICEF concerns over Child Protection were not taken into account by other UN agencies who understood the concept as it was used in the Geneva Convention. Consequently the role of education, safe places to play and children with special needs were absent from discussions. UNICEF's emphasis on human rights based approach planning (HRBAP) was not comfortable either for other UN agencies or the government. Consequently, UNICEF's priorities altered: the CO was happy to support other UN agencies but decided to take a more proactive approach to uphold UNICEF's mandate and the CCCs as regards Child Protection. This revised strategy of "concrete involvement" had consequences in terms of the need for more personnel to enable direct involvement at camps

Planning was based on the assumption that the response capacity of the Government of Iran was strong, and that they would meet most of the basic medical, food and water and shelter needs. The Iranian government was expected to take the lead through both Ministerial action (for appropriate sectors) and the Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS). The coordinating Ministry would be the Ministry of Interior's Office of Aliens and Migrants (BAFIA) who were responsible, with UNHCR, for setting up refugee camps¹⁰² and crossing points.

The Task Force on Iraq (TFI) was set up by UNCT in July 2002 under HCR leadership. All CRs of resident UN agencies, ICRC and IOM attended weekly meetings, and 12 sub-groups met weekly or more for technical and implementation discussions. OCHA arrived at the beginning of the war, and took the co-lead with HCR. Discussions focused on issues around the safety and protection of refugees. In November 2002, UNICEF introduced the concept of cross and trans-border operations to the TFI. (This caused some complications with UNHCR's role and policy which insisted on the right for refugees to be welcomed into Iran). A sub-group on trans-border operations was established under the co-ordination of OCHA.

EPRP – November 2002

The EPRP was written in 3 parts: Part 1 provided a background rationale, discussed the scenarios considered most likely to happen and outlined planning assumptions. (Initial plans were based on 150,000, later revised down to 100,000, people for 1 month). Part 2 was followed by a description of the proposed refugee sites, of which there were 10, detailing assessments of location; existing infrastructure, environment and security; existing supply capacity; and other services in the vicinity. Part 3 outlined UNICEF's response detailing for each sector/operation the overall and specific objectives and ensuring activities required; the rationale and plans; terms of reference; availability and requirements. No specific actions were detailed and no accountability proscribed. The EPRP assumed that between 100,000 and 700,000 Iraqi people would try to take refuge in Iran of which 12-15% would be children U5, 48-50% would be children U18 and 22% would be women of child bearing age.

The EPRP was accompanied by a Plan of Action which identified 4 phases of response: 1) pre-influx; 2) up to 10,000; 3) up to 50,000; 4) over 50,000. (It was acknowledged that the response might have to move straight from 1 – 4). Activities were specified for each phase in the Plan of Action including co-operation agreements with partners, mobilising supplies and establishing procedures/government permission for cross-and trans-border operations appropriate to each phase. UNICEF was lead agent for watsan, health and education.

The EPRP sectoral/operations objectives were:

Relief: 1) prevent morbidity and mortality among the affected populations as a result of exposure to difficult climatic conditions. This was to be achieved by supporting women and children's access to shelter; the provision of basic necessities; and by re-establishing community support

Nutrition: 1) prevent morbidity and mortality among women and children as a result of malnutrition by ensuring the availability of supplementary and therapeutic nutritional services; quick detection of people in need and ensuring that women were aware of the benefits of breastfeeding

Health: 1) prevent morbidity and mortality among women and children through the provision of drugs and health services; immunization; and adequate obstetric services for pregnant women

WES: 1) prevent morbidity and mortality among affected populations by ensuring a minimum safe water supply and contributing to sanitation services

Education: 1) ensuring that children have access to basic educational and group activities including in informal settings by the provision of adequate teachers and basic materials and supporting children's involvement in these activities

¹⁰² Camp sites tended to be chosen for political reasons rather than suitability of the site

Child Protection: 1) identifying and addressing protection issues for women and children through advocacy and monitoring and interagency work; 2) develop, provide and strengthen psycho-social support services for children and their care-givers by supporting access to humanitarian assistance; the protection of children from further harm; necessary care and counselling; and support to family reunification

Iran CO Preparedness Activities¹⁰³

Between October 2002 and March 2003 assessment visits were made (either interagency or by UNICEF alone) to proposed camps along the whole border in order to: 1) identify possible crossing points and refugee camps (BAFIA role); 2) identify sub-offices and advanced points for intervention; 3) identify logistical capacity and hubs to deliver aid; 4) start developing contacts with the local authority; 5) update contingency plan, especially the budget.

Other preparedness activities undertaken by 20th March 2003:

Nutrition

- Stores to establish 4 therapeutic feeding centres in Iran were stored including weighing scales, measuring boards, cooking pots, stoves and other equipment¹⁰⁴
- 4 tons of therapeutic milk and 25 tons of UNIMIX were pre-positioned in Ahwaz and Kermanshah complete with the necessary micro-nutrients¹⁰⁵
- By mid February 500 MT of HPB were stored in warehouses at Kermanshah

Health

UNICEF was leader of the Working group on Health and organised the global plan¹⁰⁶.

- Iran CO ran a campaign of information directed towards the local authorities on the status of Iraqi children. Iranians believed that the endemic nature of measles and contagious diseases could harm their people. They also believed that refugees could bring biological and chemical warfare (anthrax/smallpox) with them. UNICEF publicized the real status and needs of children with information from the Iraq CO
- Emergency health kits, consumables and ORS were pre-positioned for 50,000 children¹⁰⁷
- 10 obstetric kits were delivered to Kermanshah¹⁰⁸
- Winter clothes for children and 16,000 blankets were pre-positioned in Kermanshah

Child Protection

- Non-food items including tents and clothes were pre-positioned for refugee children¹⁰⁹
- In early February the design of the landmines programme was completed¹¹⁰. Training was given to 40 IRCS relief workers and Literacy Movement Organisation teachers from Kermanshah and Ilam provinces on mine risk education. Materials were printed in the local languages
- In early February the CP Officer attended a workshop in Beirut¹¹¹

¹⁰³ Information for this section taken from UNICEF Iran Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq: Synthesis Report Jan 2002- Aug 2003, Draft, 10 June 2003; Plan of Action for the Iraqi Contingency Plan. Other sources footnoted

¹⁰⁴ UNICEF Humanitarian Action Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, 20 March 2003

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

¹⁰⁶ However the government never shared this planning or response capacity, and saw other agencies as means of supply for their own operation

¹⁰⁷ UNICEF Humanitarian Action Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, 20 March 2003

¹⁰⁸ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #3, 10-17 February 2003

¹⁰⁹ UNICEF Humanitarian Action Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, 20 March 2003

¹¹⁰ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #1, 29 Jan-4 Feb 2003

¹¹¹ Ibid

Education¹¹²

- School-in-a-box and recreational kits were pre-positioned for up to 10,000 children¹¹³
- By early February 2003, school books designed by Relief International were already being used in existing refugee camps inside Iran
- Technical support was provided for the training of local and refugee teachers on how to respond to emergency educational demands
- 1. Partnerships were established with IRAC (an education NGO) implementing education programmes for Iraqi refugees remaining from 1991, and the Literacy Movement Organisation (a former partner in a project for Afghan refugees in Iran in Afghanistan)

Watsan

- During February, preparedness works were started on sanitation facilities with partners
- 6 WES engineers relocated from Iraq carried out assessments to identify existing water sources and facilitated the design of watsan systems¹¹⁴
- 40,000 jerry cans had been pre-positioned in Ahwaz and Kermanshah¹¹⁵, together with 310,000 litres capacity of water bladders (for up to 200,000 people)¹¹⁶
- UNICEF had procured 46 collapsible water tanks (10,000 and 5,000 litres) and water purification tablets

HR

- An Emergency Officer was recruited for the Iran CO in August 2002 keeping the logistics capacity intact from Afghanistan and providing the CO with a full-time Emergency Officer for preparedness
- A Letter of Understanding was exchanged with Oxfam for the secondment of 1 WES support person
- In early February the finalization of HR requirements for Kermanshah office was sent to RO and HQ. 3 IP relocated from Iraq arrived on 18th February and went to Kermanshah to staff emergency preparedness there. In early March an Emergency Officer from UNICEF West & Central Africa RO was identified to head the Kermanshah sub-office
- Visas were obtained for 11 IP relocating to Iran from Iraq in early February¹¹⁷
- A Mine Awareness Advisor from Geneva visited between February 13-24, and visited Kermanshah¹¹⁸
- An International Mines Consultant arrived in Tehran on 21st February to begin the implementation of the Mine Risk Education programme¹¹⁹
- 4 staff relocated from the Iraq CO arrived in Tehran on the 22nd and 23rd February¹²⁰
- UNICEF Staff Security Officer arrived 1st March
- A Communication Officer from Geneva RO was deployed in Iran from March 15th for 1 month
- A temporary CP officer was recruited
- The need for technical support staff was emphasized by Iran CO, and MENARO was again asked for CVs in early March. Urgent requests were made to MENARO¹²¹ for education,

¹¹² Education was not considered a priority during preparedness or response by GOI or other UN agencies. UNICEF therefore decided to “do its own thing” in these sectors

¹¹³ UNICEF Humanitarian Action Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, 20 March 2003

¹¹⁴ The proposed refugee camps were sited far away - in one case 32 km - from the closest water sources

¹¹⁵ Ibid

¹¹⁶ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #3, 10-17 February 2003

¹¹⁷ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #1, 29 Jan-4 Feb 2003

¹¹⁸ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #3, 10-17 February 2003

¹¹⁹ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #4, 18-27 February 2003

¹²⁰ Ibid

nutrition, communications officers and a watsan officer for emergency support. (Iran CO considered that at least 8 IP were required to run the operation)

- In mid-March 2 more Iraq staff were relocated to Kermanshah (WES officer, and Nutrition officer)¹²². In total 11 staff - 3 Health/Nutrition, 1 Education/CP, 6 WES and 1 Communication officer - were sent to Iran and integrated well despite difficult living conditions

Logistics and Supplies

Preparedness in Iran built on the emergency supplies (telecoms, vehicles, other supplies) which had been purchased for the Afghan emergency¹²³

- By early February 2 large warehouses had been identified in Kermanshah and 1 in Ahwaz¹²⁴. Both were custom-bonded to avoid delays getting supplies across the Iraqi border
- By 4th March, all designated supplies had reached Kermanshah, including supplies sourced locally for 100,000 children
- The preparedness period was used to improve on the regional level of supply tracking capacity. UNICEF Amman launched a tracking system, which was followed up on a weekly basis¹²⁵
- All UNICEF equipment was kept under UNICEF guard

Management

- Sub-offices in Kermanshah¹²⁶ and Ahwaz were established and operationalised in November 2002 and March 2003 respectively¹²⁷. These were staffed mostly by relocated Iraq CO staff and by some redeployed ex-Iran support to Afghanistan staff
- UNICEF signed an agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (rather than the Ministry of the Interior – BAFIA, who were much more conservative¹²⁸.)
- Based on their experience during the Afghan response Iran CO pushed for the adoption at regional level of a common ProMS programme structure which they had created (MI009) to facilitate resource allocations, programme monitoring and donor reporting. Pre-positioned supplies were registered on the tracking system
- In early March, 7 cars sent from UNICEF Baghdad had to be rerouted via Amman
- On 10th –12th March UNICEF Iran sent a mission to Ahwaz to open the sub-office and hold technical discussions with partners there. 3 refugee camps were to be served from Ahwaz
- Implementing partners were identified and regular channels of contact with the authorities were established¹²⁹

¹²¹ Good technical support and co-ordination from RO thanks to rapid deployment of additional technical support to MENARO

¹²² MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #7, 12-18 March 2003

¹²³ Capacity established during the Afghan crisis was very useful and was built on for Iraq crisis preparedness (UNICEF Iran Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq, Jan 2002-Aug 2003)

¹²⁴ In Ahwaz 1,000sm warehousing was contracted, and in Kermanshah 1,300sm (MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #6, 5-11 March 2003)

¹²⁵ It took a few months for UNICEF Iran to be able to issue a complete and regular system of vouchers/receipts/tracking

¹²⁶ By building on the Afghan response, Iran CO was able to be the first CO to open a sub-office – Kermanshah in November 2002

¹²⁷ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #6, 5-11 March 2003

¹²⁸ This had implications for freedom of transporting goods into Iraq, as the Ministry of Interior – BAFIA – was strongly conservative. By signing with the MOFA UNICEF was freer (not having to request prior authorisation from BAFIA) to visit provincial centres, to open sub-offices and having facilities in clearing items from customs. At provincial level, particularly on the Iraqi border the role of BAFIA was unavoidable, but UNICEF “did its best during the entire crisis to maintain a maximal distance with BAFIA local authorities, in order to keep its ability to act in accordance with its mandate.” (UNICEF Iran Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq – Draft Synthesis Report Jan 2002 – Aug 2003 pp12)

¹²⁹ Despite trying to keep a distance between themselves and BAFIA, UNICEF recognised that BAFIA had the leading role in the co-ordination of the Iranian response to the Iraqi crisis, and good relationships were maintained with them, especially in Kermanshah

IT¹³⁰

- On 27th February UNICEF moved to new offices where VHF/HF equipment had been re-installed. PTT granted permission to UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, WFP to use HF/VHF
- The IT equipment in the Kermanshah sub-office was functional from 15th March with a network, email, HF, VHF stations and functional radio room
- The Iranian government forbade the use of HF equipment in the western provinces (before April 2003) so initially was by satphone to sub-offices, cars and key staff members. An HF license was granted to Kermanshah sub-office eventually
- A radio room was made available in Tehran and Kermanshah with a specified operator. A SITA connection was established

Security

- At the onset of the Iraq crisis the Iran CO was 95% MOSS compliant, and 100% MIST compliant thanks to large investments in equipment, staff training and recruitment during the Afghan emergency

Interagency

- Joint UNHCR/UNICEF assessments of the 10 designated refugee sites were made starting on February 20th
- UNICEF entered agreements with WFP and UNHCR to share current warehousing space and expand warehousing capacity
- By mid-February, INGOs were increasingly unprepared to accept UNICEF's co-ordination of emergency preparedness, and wanted to deal directly with BAFIA. Tension with UNHCR emerged over their insistence that refugees should be allowed into Iran, and UNICEF's readiness to assist them with cross-border programmes. But by 18th February, field co-ordination had improved between the 2 agencies. Further complications arose with co-ordination when, in late February/early March, OCHA wanted to take the lead in trans-border preparedness operations, which had already been worked out between HCR, WFP, UNICEF
- UNICEF provided support to MSF to visit Ahwaz and Kermanshah
- In early March, the Iranian government asked UNICEF and other UN agencies for help with training (rapid assessment, child feeding practices)
- On March 6th an OXFAM staff member, working under the regional OXFAM-UNICEF agreement, arrived in Kermanshah to prepare training on hygiene promotion
- Between the 12th and 18th March Oxfam (under common agreement with UNICEF) led trainings on watsan emergency interventions for IRCS, the MOH and the Water and Sanitation Company in Kermanshah and Ahwaz
- During the same week, the first training for indigenous IRCS volunteers in Kermanshah took place

Funding

- Iran CO received \$914,000 for preparedness: \$464,000 from EPF 2 and CERF, and \$450,000 from RR
- For internal political reasons, Iran CO was not permitted to begin fundraising before the outbreak of war¹³¹

¹³⁰ UNICEF Iran IT status was said to be "pathetic" before the Afghan crisis. By contrast, during the Iraq crisis UNICEF was first UN agency to have operational HF and satellite links in the Kermanshah sub-office (March 2003)

¹³¹ UNICEF Iran Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq, Synthesis Report, Jan 02 – Aug 03

3.4 Jordan EPRP and Preparedness Activity¹³²

In 1992 the Government of Jordan (GOJ) received thousands of refugees, most of which were third country nations (TCN). Although the government insisted that the border would stay closed for the Iraq emergency, UN agencies in Jordan thought that if a crisis arose, Jordan would open its borders and welcome refugees¹³³ on humanitarian grounds. The GOJ was concerned about funding a large influx of refugees as had happened in 1991-2, and asked for pledges of financial support from other countries should this happen again. It was assumed that the majority of refugees arriving in Jordan would have private transportation as the population centres in Iraq are a long way from Jordan. Refugees were to be accommodated in camp sites originally established for refugees from Iraq during the Gulf War.

GOJ's insistence that the border would remain closed to all refugees not assured entry into another country impeded co-operation between them and the UNCT and wasted valuable preparedness lead time although, in February 2002, while the official line was that the border would not be open to refugees, UNHCR was already planning with the Ministry of the Interior to provide services for asylum seekers at the border, and for TCNs to be registered and provided with onward transport. In mid February, agreement was given by the GOJ for sites for 2 refugee camps and administering agencies (UNHCR + Hashemite Charity Foundation, and IOM and JRCS).

Months before the UNRC took charge, HCR, WFP and UNICEF had reached a common understanding of the expected emergency and produced an operations plan which was used as a basis for the UNCT plan. UNICEF linked their internal preparedness to the existing response capacity of their counterparts in GOJ, building the capacity of counterpart ministries in psycho-social needs in emergencies.

EPRP

The UN Inter-Agency¹³⁴ Contingency Plan used a planning figure of 20,000 refugees, and 60,000 TCNs crossing into Jordan en route for their home countries. Original GOJ estimates were 1 million refugees, but they ended up with a planning figure of 40,000. The JCO planning figure was 10,000 refugees and 500,000 affected Jordanians.

The Inter-Agency plan identified four target groups for humanitarian assistance and mitigation measures: refugees from Iraq, refugees from Palestine, TCN and Jordanians. The Plan outlined overall management and co-ordination arrangements; and set out lead agency responsibilities. UNICEF was lead agency for education.

The UNICEF sub-regional planning process guided JCO's development of an individual operations plan¹³⁵. In line with UNICEF CCCs, contingency planning is integral part of country plan, and all staff members took part in its development.

The Plan was in 3 parts:

Part 1 – Analysis of the threat and overreaching emergency related management systems and UNICEF response

Part 2 – Collection of specific preparedness and response plans

Part 3 – Summary of key functions drawn from part 2

¹³² Information taken from: Interagency Contingency Plan for Jordan for January – June 2003, Draft 1, 2nd February 2003; JCO Contingency Plan for Iraqi Refugees 2002; Jordan Annual Report 2002; Humanitarian Preparedness for a Potential Crisis in Iraq, 20 March 2003

¹³³ The country has a history of hospitality to refugees

¹³⁴ Participants: UNHCR, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNDP, WHO, UNESCO, UNU-LA, UNIFEM, IOM, UNJLC, UNSECOORD

¹³⁵ Apart from UNICEF, only 2 other agencies did internal planning early on and pre-positioned supplies

The Core Planning Commitment was: Assessment within 48 hours, standing readiness to assist 10,000 persons within 48 hours for one week.

Overall objectives were the assurance of their survival and well-being (ie fulfilment of their basic rights) to affected populations in emergency scenarios as the situation develops. The plan focused on the standing of office readiness to the sudden development of an emergency situation (as opposed to an on-going emergency situation).

Sector objectives were:

Health and nutrition: 1) minimize the risk of disease as a consequence of the emergency; 2) ensure the availability of medical supplies and services (immunization, supplementary feeding, special care for women)

Watsan: 1) ensure that the risk of disease as a result of poor hygiene/sanitation is minimized; 2) ensure that affected families have essential knowledge about proper hygiene/sanitation practices in temporary basic living conditions, and the provision of water containers, water purification tables etc

Child Protection: 1) ensure that affected children live in a safe and protected environment with their families; 2) ensure that all affected children have psycho-social support

Education: 1) ensure that children in the camp have access to education in a safe, protected environment; 2) ensure all children have access to safe play areas and are involved in educational group activities

Jordan CO Preparedness Activities¹³⁶

JCO "allocated considerable financial and human resources to emergency preparedness and prepositioning of supplies" to meet the emergency needs of 10,000 people. Stocks were pre-positioned at the UNRWA warehouse

Nutrition

- Equipment for identifying and measuring malnourished children was pre-positioned: 6 electronic scales, 3 infant measuring boards, 3 PAC (for measuring mid-arm circumference)
- 8MT HPB and 4 therapeutic feeding kits each serving 100 children were pre-positioned

Health

- A fully equipped clinic was set up with 3 emergency health kits, 50 nebulizers, 1,000 ORS, 4,000 STs, vaccines for 6 antigens, anti scorpion, DT and cold chain equipment
- 1 tent to serve as health clinic equipped with 6 beds and laboratory equipment was pre-positioned

Watsan

- 5,000 IEC leaflets on sanitation were pre-positioned
- 2,000 jerry cans and water purification equipment were pre-positioned

Education

- 6 tents to hold 2 classes simultaneously for 2-3 shifts were pre-positioned in the camp, and equipped with material (stationery etc) for 2000 children 6-13 yrs, teachers' material for 100 teachers, classroom teaching aid and equipment, educational and recreational toys for 2,500 children, UNICEF T-shirts and cap for 3,000 children for sports activities; Jordanian curriculum textbooks for 4000

¹³⁶ Humanitarian Preparedness for a Potential Crisis in Iraq, 20 March 2003

- Training was given to MOE staff on multi-grade teaching and psycho-social support to children
- A Manual on Life Healthy Skills was produced
- On February 3rd an education sector meeting was organised to co-ordinate educational and psycho-social emergency response

Child Protection

- In April 2002 JCO participated in a MENARO workshop on Child Protection
- JCO prepared project plans ensuring psycho-social wellbeing for affected children with an international consultant from Centre for Crisis Psychology, Norway.¹³⁷ 7 manuals were developed, and a 3-day workshop held in June 2002 for national counterparts
- IEC materials – brochures and leaflets – for 4000 children were produced
- A digital camera and diskettes for tracing/reunification were pre-positioned
- Training was given on psycho-social support to government staff and NGOs
- A psycho-social support centre was established in the refugee camp (ie 1 tent and the provision of all relevant supplies - recreational toys, library, cassette player, hygiene kit) to service 6000 people

Interagency

- In June 2002 UNICEF led a Workshop on Rapid Assessment in Emergencies in co-operation with JRCS for staff from Ministries and NGOs and UNICEF staff. Beneficiaries included the Directorate of Civil Defence, MOH & E, JRCS, and some private doctors trained on trauma in emergencies
- New partnerships were entered into with JRCS, the Directorate of Civil Defence and other partners
- Partner NGOs were briefed by UNICEF on the UN health contingency plan, and committed to different contributions
- In late February, meetings were held to discuss preparedness activities between the GOJ, NGOs and UN agencies
- In February an UNMAS deployed mine action advisor arrived to spend 3 months in the region
- In late February, UNICEF was given permission to use the Ministry of Information offices to disseminate information (ie press releases). At the same time, the Humanitarian Information Centre was being established in Amman (by UNIC_Beirut and UNOCHI) for daily briefing on UN activities during the crisis, representing UNICEF, WFP, HCR, OIM, OCHA, UNIC

Logistics & Supplies

- Common Services Unit Supply Section procured telecoms and computer equipment
- UNICEF entered agreements with WFP and UNHCR to share existing warehousing space and to expand warehousing capacity
- In early March, 4 vehicles were sent to Amman from Iraq¹³⁸

IT

- 2 laptops and 1 Thuraya satphone were procured

HR

- In mid-February, 2 members of the Iraq education team joined JCO for emergency preparedness support
- In late-February an Iraq Communication Officer was joined in Amman by the Regional Communication Officer to set up an emergency communication centre

¹³⁷ Consultant developed conceptual framework for range of activities for programming including playgroup to school activities

¹³⁸ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #6, 5-11 March 2003

- At the same time temporary full-time (TFT) posts were filled at JCO – Programme Assistants for CP, M&E, Administration/Security Assistant and an Assistant Communications Officer. 2 General Service 6 and 1 NOB level post were also filled¹³⁹

Media/Communications

- At the beginning of March, UNICEF MIG communications team established a newsroom
- Interviews with the international media were being held in early March by JCO¹⁴⁰

Security

- In early March protective window screens were installed in all offices¹⁴¹

Funding

Jordan was allocated \$210,400 for preparedness activity. \$150,400 from EPF 2 and CERF, and \$60,000 from donors.

3.5 Syria EPRP¹⁴² and Preparedness Activity

In 2000 the UN interagency contingency plan¹⁴³ was developed. The original intention was to update this on an annual basis, but from 2002 it was updated monthly. By mid 2001 Syria had a general contingency plan in place - a blue print for any potential crisis whether political, natural or humanitarian. The Syrian contingency plan included preparedness both for a refugee influx and for establishing a cross-border corridor via Syria to Iraq for trans-border¹⁴⁴ activities. UNICEF Syrian Country Office (SCO)'s major input was in watsan, education, health and nutrition and psycho-social counselling.

The position of the Government of Syria (GOS) hampered emergency preparedness. The GOS took no part until March 2003, wanting to give the message that war would not happen. By 4th March GOS had given permission for UN agencies to engage openly in preparedness activities.

UNICEF preparedness objectives were to ensure admission, protection and security to refugees; meet their essential assistance/protection needs and help to restore their dignity with particular focus on the needs of the most vulnerable groups (women, children, elderly). Respect for family and community group unity was an objective; as was seeking an appropriate longer term solution, preferably voluntary repatriation to their places of origin.

EPRP – October 2002

The EPRP assumed that preparedness and response activity would involve inter-agency coordination within the UN (primarily UNHCR and WFP) and other partners, primarily the local authorities. It was assumed that Al-Hol camp would be prepared to receive 10,000 refugees, and another 10,000 could be accommodated in Sahlet Al Jarwa camp (64 km east of Damascus). The plan assumed a readiness to help 10,000 externally displaced people¹⁴⁵ within 2 days for 7

¹³⁹ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #4, 18-27 February 2003

¹⁴⁰ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #7, 12-18 March 2003

¹⁴¹ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #6, 5-11 March 2003

¹⁴² EPRP for Potential Influxes of Iraqi Refugees into Syria, Parts I and II, October 2002; Draft UN Inter-Agency Plan for Humanitarian Preparedness and Response on Refugee Influx in Syria, October 2002; Atfaluna Newsletter August 2003; Lessons Learned Workshop 23 July 2003; Emergency Report, 2nd Draft, 22 July 2003

¹⁴³ Core agencies at the beginning of the planning process were UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP. (Later SARC/IFRC were also involved).

¹⁴⁴ Cross-border activities referred to taking supplies into Iraq from neighbouring countries, while trans-border referred to helping people on the border

¹⁴⁵ The assumption that there would be 1,700 children in this total

days with education, health and nutrition. UNICEF responsibilities were to ensure provision of counselling and addressing special needs of vulnerable groups.¹⁴⁶ Programmes to support humanitarian action in the event of an on-going emergency were to be developed as necessary.

Existing programme and partner experience would be drawn on. Activities were designed to improve sectoral preparedness arrangements for rapid response, and ensure effective co-operation between authorities and UN agencies, with clear, shared objectives and continuous monitoring. This was to be achieved by conducting rapid assessments and on-going monitoring to ensure appropriateness of response and support and capacity building to service providers to ensure appropriate technical ability and availability of services to affected refugees. Preparedness and response actions were detailed and accountability of staff members noted for emergency activities.

UNICEF already had some pre-positioned stocks in the UNHCR warehouse in Hasake in October 2002.

Sectoral/Operations objectives of EPRP:

Health and Nutrition: 1) ensure that the risk of mortality, morbidity and injuries is reduced among 1700 children in Al-Hol camp

Water and Sanitation: 1) ensure adequate water and sanitation facilities are properly installed and functioning at Al-Hol camp

Education: 1) ensure initiation of temporary educational services

Child Protection: 1) ensure that all children with special needs receive appropriate care; 2) ensure that children, families and teachers have access to psycho-social counselling; 3) ensure availability of psycho-social support to cope with stress, trauma and grief

Syria CO Preparedness Activities¹⁴⁷

A sub-office was established at Al-Hasake. By mid-March Al-Hasake camp was in a position to receive up to 13,000 refugees, and Al-Hol camp up to 12,000 immediately, rising to 20,000.

*Preparedness activities:*¹⁴⁸

Nutrition

- A nutritional assessment was conducted in the area surrounding the camp

Water and Sanitation¹⁴⁹

- UNICEF was the lead agency for watsan¹⁵⁰. Watsan was the largest sector in which UNICEF was involved in terms of funding, workload, and the number of staff involved. SCO already had 2 in-house watsan experts (CR and Programme Co-ordinator) who planned and co-ordinated the watsan issues and monitored the progress of work in the camp. A re-deployed watsan engineer from Iraq also supervised the construction work. An Oxfam consultant participated in the design and planning phase and another supported the construction phase. 2 local engineers were engaged to assist for shorter periods of time
- Rehabilitation of the water systems in Al-Hol camp was undertaken with UNHCR. The water supply and storage network, and latrine construction were constructed to cater for 12,000 refugees¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ Unaccompanied minors, single women, elderly or disabled people

¹⁴⁷ Emergency Report, 2nd Draft, 22 July 2003

¹⁴⁸ The plan had been to upgrade occupancy capacity of Al Hol camp, but as the anticipated numbers of refugees changed, so did level of planning and work

¹⁴⁹ Oxfam was the major partner in watsan

¹⁵⁰ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #2, 4-10 February

¹⁵¹ UNICEF Humanitarian Actions Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, Relief Web, 20 March 2003

- 25,000 water purification tablets and 8,260 kg of chlorine granulars were pre-positioned in Al-Hol camp warehouse. Also a tarpaulin, plastic rolls and 2,000 x 10 litre collapsible water containers
- At Yarubia reception area on the border, 2 tanks and 1 bladder were installed for water storage, 4 latrines built and garbage collection bins built
- Oxfam led training on “Planning for Water and Sanitation Facilities in an Emergency Situation” for UNICEF Syria staff
- An additional warehouse 5 km from Al-Haseke city was used for trans-border stocks

Health and Nutrition¹⁵²

- 2 emergency health kits (for 20,000 refugees for 3 months), consumables and ORS were pre-positioned for 20,000 children¹⁵³
- 200 mosquito nets, measles vaccines for 4,500 refugees, TT vaccines for 2,000 people, 2 fridges to store vaccines, IEC materials were pre-positioned
- Training on health and nutritional assessment for refugees was given on 4-6 February in Al-Haseke and Der Azzor
- 5 health trainers were given training on rapid health assessment in Amman in a workshop jointly run with WHO
- In mid March, UNICEF agreed with MOH on the salaries to be paid to local health support staff

Education

- In conjunction with the RO, SCO organised training for 46 teachers on education in emergencies and the use of School-in-a-Box kits
- With Movimondo¹⁵⁴, UNICEF conducted a psycho-social counselling training course for 8 trainers from the Directorates of Health and Education and the Women’s General Union
- 36 School-in-a-Box kits were pre-positioned at Al-Hol camp (for 2,880 children)
- 3 tents were allocated for education, and a kindergarten established in the camp

Security

- An HF solar mobile power system was received and an HF radio for the sub-office in Al-Haseke was installed
- UNSECOORD were responsible for any evacuation of staff from Syria through Aleppo and Latakia¹⁵⁵
- In its role as lead agency for telecoms, assistance was given to other UN agencies to be fully MOSS compliant
- A communications room was set up in Damascus and Al-Haseke including HF, VHF, satellite phones and other telecoms equipment for the safety of staff

HR

- A Field Emergency Officer joined the team stationed at Al-Haseke on February 6th¹⁵⁶. A Radio Operator and Nutritionist also joined the office, and a secretary and driver¹⁵⁷
- 1 Watsan Officer was deployed to help with watsan preparedness in Al-Hol camp¹⁵⁸
- In the second half of February, 2 UNICEF staff went to supervise the establishment of the sub-office at Al-Haseke¹⁵⁹

¹⁵² MSF and Medicos du Mundu were partners in the health sector

¹⁵³ Ibid

¹⁵⁴ NGO partner for psycho-social activities

¹⁵⁵ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #3, 10-17 February 2003

¹⁵⁶ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #1, 29 Jan-4 Feb 2003

¹⁵⁷ Ibid

¹⁵⁸ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #2, 4-10 February 2003

¹⁵⁹ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #7, 12-18 March 2003

- In mid-March, 3 national Iraqi staff who self-evacuated from Baghdad were hired as drivers and administrative staff¹⁶⁰
- HR lists were updated and circulated
- Iraq IP re-located to Syria: Liaison officer (from Dohuk), Assistant Logistics Officer (from Sulaimaniyah), Assistant Supply Officer and WES Officer (both from Erbil)

Interagency

- UNICEF entered agreements with WFP and UNHCR to share current warehousing space, and expand warehousing capacity
- The Deputy Co-ordinator of OCHA visited Syria on February 5th to discuss emergency preparedness with UN agencies
- UNICEF worked with Oxfam on the construction of the watsan units in Al-Hol camp
- In mid-February a Technical Core Group (UN health and nutrition group) was formed to develop an operational plan for the 3 designated camps (Al-Hol, al-Haseke, al-Boukamal)
- In mid-February partnership arrangements were made with Medecins du Monde, and Oxfam for co-ordinating medical support to refugees
- In mid-February, 2 UN inter-agency working groups were formed to coordinate inter-agency emergency preparedness for refugees and cross/trans-border operations¹⁶¹
- UN agencies met with the MOH to discuss preparedness activities in February. A draft operation plan for Al-Hol camp was distributed to the UN agencies and MOH for revision, (although at this stage, the GOS was not actively involved in preparedness activities)
- In early March, HCR cleared an office room in the camp office at Al-Hol which was to be shared with WFP and UNICEF

Management/Office communications

- Communications equipment had been obtained including HF equipment, VHF handsets, an additional telephone and mobile lines and extra laptops
- In mid-February, an additional floor of office premises was acquired in Damascus to accommodate new staff recruited locally or re-deployed from UNICEF/UN offices¹⁶²
- Phone lines and equipment were installed. An OCHA Telecoms Officer seconded to UNICEF was designated to take the lead in telecoms
- In March UNICEF obtained government approval for HF/VHF licenses¹⁶³
- A sub-office was established and operationalized in Al-Haseke. This was fully operational by mid-March, with all necessary office equipment, telecoms and IT equipment installed
- 4 vehicles from northern Iraq were sent to Syria in early March

IT

- A sub-office was set up in Al-Hasake with full connectivity and a radio room. Wireless LAN was used in the office to avoid cabling. Staff based in Al-Hasake were using cc:Mail mobile accounts hosted in the Damascus office.
- SCO played the lead role in telecoms co-ordination acting as TCA. UNICEF managed to obtain a combined license for the entire UN system on HF and VHF systems and a large quantity of equipment which was used for the Iraq response. This was major achievement as it was nearly impossible to obtain license for radio equipment in Syria. In this role UNICEF also established a UN Syria Telecom Working Group
- UNICEF Damascus office was upgraded with a functional radio room and fleet vehicles equipped with HF and VHF stations. The exercise has made the office MOSS compliant in telecoms.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid

¹⁶¹ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #3, 10-17 February 2003

¹⁶² Ibid

¹⁶³ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #6, 5-11 March 2003

Administration/Finance

- Contacts with local banks had been established 1 year before the war to determine best local practice of transferring funds
- Permission to establish a new petty cash system for Al-Haseke was obtained 1 year before the war

Logistics/Supplies

- A comprehensive market survey was carried out 1 year before the war to assess local capacity for supplies and logistics
- Contracts were also made with local shipping and forwarding companies
- Fuel was stored for the office generator
- A supply and logistics cell was set up to operate from Amman to track supplies and their delivery. This unit worked closely with the UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC)
- The Senior Supply Assistant attended a special workshop on logistics and warehousing in Brindisi

Funding

- Syria CO received \$537,100 for preparedness, \$157,100 from EPF 2 and CERF and \$380,000 from OFDA

3.6 Turkey EPRP and Preparedness Activity¹⁶⁴

Wishing to avoid a repeat of the negative effects of the refugee crisis in 1991, the GOT did not want another mass influx of refugees. Their expressed strategy was to establish control over and preserve the integrity of a “safe” zone of undetermined width inside Iraqi territory, where assistance and essential services would be provided (by the government in co-operation with the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS)), with the aim of containing the displacement within Iraq. Despite this 10 refugee camps were established by the government at secret locations until just before the war.

Although the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Centre acted as co-ordinating body for the emergency response and UNCT’s main point of contact was the MOFA, the GOT’s planning process was carried out in parallel to the UN process. The GOT designated Gaziantep as the main humanitarian logistics base and Van as the alternative base. The TRCS established a forward logistics base at Haj Camp, Silopi.

EPRP

UNICEF participated in preparedness activities both on an interagency and sole agency level.

The UN Resident Co-ordinator (UNRC) established an Inter-Agency Working group (IAWG) within the UNCT on emergency preparedness and contingency planning for a possible refugee influx into Turkey from Iraq. UNHCR was designated as the Focal Point and convenor of IAWG (which was comprised of staff from IFRC, IOM, UNFPA, UNDP, UNIC, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO).

UN planning figures in November 2002 were for 136,000 camp residents for 6 months – 80,000 refugees and 56,000 asylum seekers at the border. (This figure was roughly half that of 276,000 being used by the GOT.) The GOT’s ambiguity on whether NGOs would be allowed to operate in

¹⁶⁴ Protecting and Assisting Children and Women in Extraordinary Circumstances – UNICEF Turkey EPRP for Iraqi Crisis – Draft, February 2003; United Nations Inter-Agency Contingency Plan for a Refugee Influx from Iraq to Turkey, 7 November 2002; Final Mission Report: Christina Roccella, Project Consultant in Emergency Response

Turkey or cross-border in northern Iraq complicated UN planning, as a ban would significantly hinder any humanitarian response (not allowing UN agencies to rely on long-standing partners)¹⁶⁵.

The Inter-Agency Contingency Plan, updated in November 2002, identified lead agencies and set out common objectives, standards and sector response plans. UNICEF was the lead agency for education, health and nutrition and procurement. For these sectors the objectives were:

Health and Nutrition: 1) primary health care should be integrated with other sectors; 2) health screening should be provided on arrival, and regularly thereafter to identify nutritional deficiencies and health risks; 3) speedy identification and treatment of health problems; 4) priority should be given to preventative and basic curative health services to benefit the majority; 5) the vulnerability of U5s should be central with priority given to immunizations, feeding programmes for the acutely malnourished, ORT, Vitamin A prophylaxis as well as diarrhoea and ARI management; 6) all newly arrived refugees should be vaccinated against measles and those between 6 months and 12 years also be given vitamin A

Education: 1) primary schooling to be available to all with an emphasis on girls' education; 2) pre-school education should be provided for children between 3-6 years and recreational activities should be available to children aged 6-18 years; 3) sufficient education resources and teachers should be provided; 4) free access to organised activities and basic education should be provided for all refugee children; 5) informal schools started by the refugee community should be supported; 6) the curriculum should be based on that of the country of origin to facilitate reintegration on repatriation; 7) schooling should include survival and life skills messages on health, sanitation, nutrition, landmine awareness, mitigation of environmental degradation and HIV/AIDS prevention

The Turkey Country Office (TCO) EPRP, following the standard format, consisted of 2 parts. Part I outlined the analysis of the threats and summaries of UNICEF's response plans, and Part II the specific preparedness and response plans for each sector.

An Internal Emergency Management System was outlined identifying lines of responsibility, decision making and reporting systems, and standing procedures for ensuring preparedness and managing staff in the field. The procedures for first the 12 hours of an emergency were detailed.

Planning was based on the assumption that UNICEF staff in Turkey would respond to an emergency situation with rapid field assessments within 48-72 hours of reported incidents. Further response would be in collaboration with other agencies within 6 days for 6 months.

Part 2 of the plan outlines the action plans for senior staff and programme sectors, giving detailed plans and allocating accountability to staff members. Sector objectives were:

Health & Nutrition and Watsan: 1) support GOT in providing access to health and nutritional care for women and children; 2) support GOT provision of safe drinking water and sanitation according to minimum Sphere standards

Child Protection: 1) ensure safety and protection of all affected women and children, decreasing the negative psychological impact of war

Education: 1) ensure continued access to learning opportunities for all affected women and children

¹⁶⁵ With the exception of the TRCS and a very few others, national NGOs lacked the expertise and capacity to be able to make a significant contribution to a major humanitarian operation.

Turkey CO Preparedness Activities¹⁶⁶

Health and Nutrition

- Emergency health kits, consumables and ORS were pre-positioned for 90,000 children
- UNICEF consultant carried out training for 20 health staff
- On March 1st UNICEF delivered 20 emergency health kits to the MOH¹⁶⁷
- Winter clothes and boots for 3,000 were pre-positioned at Gaziantep
- Clothing was pre-positioned for 36,000 0-18 year olds
- UNICEF initiated interagency meetings to co-ordinate action on health and nutrition with the MOH, Turkish Red Crescent, IFRC, UNHCR and WHO

Child Protection

- Non-food items for refugee children were pre-positioned
- Tents for unaccompanied children were pre-positioned
- UNICEF chaired the first meeting of the Education and Mine Awareness sector with MOE, IFRC, UNDP, Social Services, CP Agency, and TRCS

Primary Education

- School-in-a-box and recreational kits were pre-positioned for up to 8,000 children (to restart schools, and address psycho-social needs)
- 100 winter compatible tents for education and CP arrived in Gaziantep warehouse on February 24th with other supplies

HR

- On February 15th an International Health Consultant arrived to strengthen health co-ordination and planning¹⁶⁸
- In mid February administrative and finance assistants arrived
- On February 14th a new Interim Field Security Co-Coordinator Officer arrived and a full time WFP security officer was deployed to Ankara
- In February training was given to the refugee camp staff using IFRC's manual on Community Services and Psychosocial Support. UNICEF led training in Ankara and Silopi
- The UNICEF Programme Co-ordinator for northern Iraq + 6 others arrived in Ankara on February 21st for re-deployment¹⁶⁹
- A temporary Humanitarian Information Centre officer was employed
- On 24th February the UNICEF Advisor on Mine Awareness was in Ankara to finalise the mine awareness strategy¹⁷⁰
- On 25th February the CEE/CIS and Baltics Regional Education Adviser was in Ankara for 3 days to review the educational component of the contingency plan
- In early March, permanent staff were sent to Silopi and Diyarbakir sub-offices. A Logistics Assistant was hired with funding from northern Iraq
- In March a UNICEF consultant for psycho-social interventions was posted to Silopi
- 1 Supply Officer was sent on assessment mission to Kuwait
- Re-located IP from Iraq: Co-ordinator (N Iraq), Supply officer (Erbil), Assistant Finance Officer (Erbil), Contracts Officer (Erbil), CP (Erbil), Assistant Logistics officer (Dohuk)

Media/Communications

¹⁶⁶ UNICEF Humanitarian Actions Iraq Crisis Preparedness Report, 20 March 2003

¹⁶⁷ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #2, 4-10 February 2003

¹⁶⁸ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #1, 29 Jan-4 Feb 2003

¹⁶⁹ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #4, 18-27 February 2003

¹⁷⁰ Ibid

- 4 interviews were given to the local media in January and February, and one in March to the Egyptian media
- Satellite telephone equipment was installed in the Ankara office in early March

Interagency

- UNICEF entered an agreement with WFP and UNHCR to share current warehousing space and expand warehousing capacity in Turkey
- A draft MOU between the UN and GOT was drawn up
- The UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner visited Turkey on February 18th and 19th
- In early March, UNICEF organised an inter-agency meeting on mine risk education. Training was given to 105 TRCS staff on community services and psycho-social support

IT

Staff from northern Iraq were re-located to Diyarbakir. A sub-office established with a network and connectivity with the help of ICT staff in Turkey. There was a good leased line between Diyarbakir and Ankara for cc: Mail communications. Staff were provided with cellular phones. Initially Turkish authorities refused to provide a license to the UN system for the radio network, but eventually UNICEF and UNCT got a license for equipment import and the operation of UHF and HF network in Ankara and Diyarbakir. With the help of a NRC seconded technician HF base stations were established in Ankara and Diyarbakir for vehicle tracking and security communications. This enabled MOSS compliance for the TCO.

Security

- UNICEF was lead agency for trans-border operations¹⁷¹

Management

- Sub-offices in Silopi and Dyarbakir were established and operationalised by UNICEF. The sub-office at Diyarbakir hosted the Emergency Co-ordinator, UNICEF sector co-ordinators and any staff re-deployed from Iraq to Turkey. The office was shared with other UN agencies
- In February a guesthouse was rented in Silopi for UNICEF personnel
- Office IT equipment for Diyarbakir arrived on February 24th
- Turkey CO received 3 vehicles from Kosovo and 3 vehicles from Macedonia for emergency preparation and 6 vehicles came from Northern Iraq for programmes and safe keeping. They were all cleared by the Turkish Government

Funding

Turkey was allocated \$596,000 for preparedness - \$136,000 from EPF 2 and CERF and \$460,000 from OFDA

3.7 Kuwait Preparedness Activity¹⁷²

There was no UNICEF office in Kuwait prior to February 2003. Once WFP agreed to use Kuwait as the main humanitarian entry point, other UN agencies followed suit.

Kuwait sub-office Preparedness Activities

Up to \$4 million worth of supplies were pre-positioned in Kuwait, including 960MT of HPB, 20,000 blankets, 20 health kits, 10 mobile purification units, watertanks and jerrycans¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #5, 28 Feb-4 Mar 2003

¹⁷² Interview with consultant

Management

- In mid February, the Supply and Logistics officer from Baghdad was sent to Kuwait to set up an office, telecoms systems, warehousing and identify logistics
- By the second week of March the Kuwait sub-office was functional and equipped with IT equipment. 3000 Sq m of warehousing had been secured in Kuwait for trans-border operations¹⁷⁴

Security

- By early March Security Phase 3 had been declared
-

3.8 Gulf States Preparedness Activity

Security phase 1 was announced in mid February

- The lack of clarity of government positions left contingency planning unspecific, a situation which was compounded by a lack of resources available to the UN
- In mid February the government of Saudi Arabia granted licenses for the use of HF and VHF frequencies¹⁷⁵
- A WFP staff member arrived on February 16th to finalise the design of telecom contingency preparedness¹⁷⁶

3.9 Interagency Planning Process¹⁷⁷

All field offices shared their plans within their respective UNCT to further strengthen co-ordination and co-operation. In addition, several interagency meetings were held at regional/global level to discuss scenarios, humanitarian consequences and co-ordination and co-operation between the different agencies in relation to preparedness and response. IASC, ICRC, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOIP, OCHA, WHO and WFP attended these meetings. The first interagency preparedness planning meeting took place in Baghdad on April 22nd 2002 during the regular programme UN Agency Heads Contingency Planning Meeting. This was attended by UNDP, WHO, HCR, WFP, UNICEF. Interagency Contingency Plans were prepared for each country, including Saudi Arabia and the Lebanon.

Early planning was undertaken on the basis of what was considered the most likely scenario. Although the perceived likelihood of different scenarios changed at different stages during the planning process, the most likely was agreed to be that a confrontation between the GOI and Security Council (SC) or a group of countries would lead to a general blockade of the country and suspension of OFFP. This could result in sizeable destruction of infrastructure and internal and external population movements. Further displacement might follow a foreign invasion targeting Baghdad and the oilfields (N and SE). The crisis planned for was multi-country, involving up to 2 million refugees and over 1 million IDPs.

There was collaboration in the assessment missions and follow-up meetings to establish a number of common UN regional services, eg UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and an interagency international media UN briefing centre which was established in Amman from which daily briefings were given on behalf of the UN agencies involved in preparedness (and later response). A sub-regional ICT preparedness exercise began in March 2002 with an assessment

¹⁷³ Iraq Presentation, Jacqueline Peters, no date

¹⁷⁴ MENA Sub-regional sitrep #6, 5-11 March 2003

¹⁷⁵ MENA Sub-regional Sitrep #3, 10-17 February 2003

¹⁷⁶ Ibid

¹⁷⁷ Notes from sub-regional contingency meetings: Sub-Regional Contingency Planning for Iraq 15-17 September 2002; Iraq Contingency Planning Meeting Beirut 27-28 Oct 2002; Sub-Regional Contingency Planning for Iraq 28 December 2002; ; Sub-Regional Contingency Planning for Iraq 26-27 January 2003

mission to Turkey, a sub-regional preparedness workshop in April and a Telecoms assessment mission in Iraq.

From January 2003 the Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq established a base in Larnaca, Cyprus. Larnaca was chosen because it was not located in the Middle East but was reasonably close to Iraq. The Regional Emergency Officer and a colleague from Iraq made two visits to Larnaca for co-ordination meetings but UNICEF decided to locate its four sub-regional sector co-ordinators¹⁷⁸ in Amman rather than Larnaca.

¹⁷⁸ Water and Sanitation, Nutrition, Education and Child Protection

4 EARLY RESPONSE (MARCH 20TH TO APRIL 30TH)

4.1 Iraq

4.1.1 Early Response (20th March – 31st March)¹⁷⁹

All remaining IP were evacuated on March 18th, telecommunications cut off on March 19th (until April 13th) and the war started on March 20th. The national staff continued to come to the office, although, under Phase 5 security there was no obligation for them to do so. UNICEF, through the dedication of its national staff, continued to operate throughout the war in Iraq in health, watsan, nutrition, education and CP. All 3 offices in northern Iraq remained functional.

Watsan

- 280 first aid kits were cleared and arrived in the Baghdad office. Another 100 first aid kits were given to Baghdad Water Authority (BWA), and were distributed to water projects in Baghdad
- 36,000 packs of water purification tablets were received, of which 26,000 were given to BWA
- 11,500 litres of petrol were delivered to Nissan and Al-Wathba water treatment plant (WTP) storage containers
- Payments were made to contractors for rehabilitation/repairs to generators, and school rehabilitation work, and also for supplies (petrol, moving supplies from warehouse to office)
- WES teams supervised the installation of water bladders in Mansour, Rasheed, and Kadhimiya municipalities and Karkh centre. They also supervised the overhaul and provision of spare parts for generators. Generator repairs for sewerage pumping station B-2 in Al-Mansour area were also carried out

Child Protection

- Food and other supplies were delivered to Alwiya orphanage, and Adhamiya in Baghdad for the elderly, and Al-Hanan centre for profoundly disabled children in Kerbala

Security

- Staff opted not to use vehicles or satellite phones for security reasons

Management

- MOFA asked all OICs to provide them with a letter with a complete inventory of all assets (all UN Agencies) in office and warehouse, with the emphasis on vehicles and IT equipment
- 5 Traditional Birth Attendants kits and screen for CSO in Baghdad office

Inter-agency

- Co-ordination meetings took place with both NGO and UN partners to co-ordinate activities and share information (PU, ICRC, Islamic Relief) on WTPs and hospitals (WFP, UNOHCI, HCR, UNDP, WHO), and exchange information on activities and staff security
- National staff met with GOI officials (Technical Affairs, Education, MOLSA, GFIW) and offered help and supplies. MOH initially refused to co-operate with UN agencies because of the Secretary General's position on the war, but later (28th March) they asked for a meeting with UNICEF, UNDP and WHO

HR

The HR situation on 26th March 2003 was as follows:

¹⁷⁹ Information taken from Sitreps, Hatim George, 19 March 2003, 19-23 March 2003, 23 March 2003

All Iraq CO staff had been relocated from Baghdad (22), Erbil (22), Sulimaniyah (3), Dohuk (2), and were now in:
Amman (17), Kermanshah (11), Kuwait (5), Al-Hasakeh (4), Ankara (4), Diyarbakir (4), Silopi (1), Damascus (1), Larnaca (1)

4.1.2 Early Response during April¹⁸⁰

During April the Baghdad office remained open apart from 3 days – 8-10 April – at the time of the invasion of Baghdad, during which time it was completely looted¹⁸¹. During April, the administrative structure of Iraq was in total collapse, with frequent power cuts and security issues (the Coalition was advising the public to remain inside after 8pm). Government and UN buildings were comprehensively looted and burned - in some cases more than once¹⁸², almost all economic activity was at a standstill, and shooting was heard in Baghdad day and night. The security situation remained highly volatile, negatively impacting humanitarian operations.

The initial response concentrated on assessing the situation in each sector. Initial rapid assessments were made of hospitals, water and sanitation projects, orphanages, and CP institutions to assess the scope of the looting affecting the function of the sector starting with Baghdad and then covering the rest of the country. Following assessments, rebuilding the administration and bringing in the most urgent supplies remained critical.

By the end of April the non-payment of civil service salaries (on which people totally depended to live) was causing problems - an issue which UNICEF brought to the Civil Coordination Officer's (CCO) attention. Lack of salaries affected all sectors and all levels.

Daily requests for supplies from all sectors were received.

Watsan

UNICEF considered that WES was the most important sector, (an opinion shared by ICRC and CARE International). By the end of April, it had become impossible to restore some water plants in Baghdad as security was not guaranteed. As a result, untreated sewerage produced by approximately 3 million people continued to be pumped into the Tigris River which served as a fresh water source for populations further south. Stocks of water treatment chemicals were low, and an epidemic of diarrhoeal disease was feared unless chemicals became available urgently. In addition, people were tapping into water networks illegally, increasing leakage and cross contamination. In Basra water supplies could produce only 20-30 litres of water/day/person as the main water plant was working at 50% capacity. Following the invasion of Baghdad, the humanitarian response for Iraq in the watsan and CP sectors was being co-ordinated from Kuwait and Amman.

- WES teams undertook assessments of all water and sanitation facilities in Baghdad, also repair work to damages and breaks of water network. Assessments were also made of watsan facilities in Basra and northern Iraq
- There was a dire need of fuel for generators for water and sanitation stations to keep them going. WES teams oversaw contractors' rehabilitation of generators and installation of bladders at different sites. Work was hampered by shortages in fuel and staff as well as by security issues and prevention of access by military
- On 23rd April 10 tankers distributed fuel to hospitals, water projects, and PHCs.

¹⁸⁰ Information taken from UNICEF Crisis Appeal for Iraq's Children: Action Update 22 April-4 May 2003; UNICEF Baghdad Situation Updates nos: 1 (16/4/03), 2 (18/4/03), 3 (20/4/03), 4 (22/4/03), 5 (24/4/03), 6 (26-27/4/03)

¹⁸¹ Some office equipment was retrieved, but at some danger to staff, and it was felt that retrieval was not safe to continue

¹⁸² eg Al-Rashad psychiatric hospital and al-Rustumiya water treatment plant in Baghdad having been repaired and re-equipped from first looting

- UNICEF distributed water by tankers through contractors with additional help from office drivers helping. By the 23rd April there were 12/13 trucks making 2 trips daily. By the last week of April water was being tankered to hospitals and communities in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, Kirkuk and al-Fao
- Between the initiation of trans-border operations on March 29th and May 4th UNICEF sent 364 tankers into southern Iraq (12,234,530 litres water), in particular into the towns south of Basra and Basra itself, benefiting tens of thousands of people
- On 24th April sewerage discharge trucks started operating to Abu Ghraib Hospital. In some parts of Baghdad, problems of sewerage flooding became an issue as systems couldn't cope with supply
- UNICEF undertook mass garbage collection, with the number of trucks increasing to 19 by April 23rd in Baghdad. Garbage collection was supported by UNICEF in Mosul and Kirkuk as well as Baghdad
- Water purification supplies (chlorine, bleaching powder, aluminium sulphate, chlorinators, tablets) to the value of \$3.8million were procured, sufficient to cover 2 months needs in the S/C
- UNICEF engaged engineering teams to repair water and sewerage plants in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk
- Co-ordination meetings were held with ICRC to avoid duplication of activities, and ensure co-ordination
- Discussions were held with civil servants returning to health, water, sanitation facilities which resulted in common definitions of priorities and targeted emergency response
- Between 28th March and the end of April, OFFP supplies (watsan and shelter) worth \$2million had reached northern Iraq since via Turkey

Health

Health was considered the second most important sector, (a view shared by WHO, MSF and Merlin). Some but not all hospitals were looted¹⁸³. Some had no water supply and were using reserve supplies, and all were reliant on electrical generators for power (many of which needed repairing), for which they needed fuel. Hospitals also had issues of safety, overcrowding and disposal of garbage. A supply of fresh food was also an issue for some. The majority of PHCs were also closed, many having been looted, and some medical labs sabotaged. By mid April, almost all MOH staff had returned to work. UNICEF's support to hospitals was based on their assessments.

Compounding the health hazards related to water and sewage treatment, power cuts led to a breakdown in the cold chain, with the consequent loss of all vaccines by the end of the month. Much of the population had difficulty getting to hospitals and clinics. Among those who did there was a sharp increase in diarrhoeal disease among the young (eg a ten-fold increase was recorded in Zubayr in S Iraq compared with last year); in Nassiriyah 3-5 children with typhoid were seen every day; and there was an increase in the number of cases of endemic black fever (leishmaniasis). Children weighed and measured in Basra showed 60% incidence of malnourishment reflecting both lack of food available and an increase in the incidence of diarrhoea.

- Assessments were made of health facilities. Almost all hospitals and health institutes in Baghdad were visited and initial rapid assessments made for supplies needed by the end of April. A list of drugs and medical supplies required in Baghdad was compiled– drugs, oxygen, IV fluids, anaesthetics etc. At the early stages of the response MOH warehouses in Baghdad had sufficient drugs for hospitals, but they had not the funds to purchase them. By the end of April the MOH had agreed to distribute supplies as needed

¹⁸³ Some (eg Al-Chewader Hospital) were being guarded by religious people to prevent looting

- The MOH asked UNICEF for help to repair and maintain hospital and PHC generators, restore cold chain activities, and boost PHC vaccination services and medicine supplies¹⁸⁴. Vaccines were transferred to Baghdad Al-Jadida 2 PHC on 24th April; Al-Mansour Paediatric Hospital was given a health kit and in Baghdad, health kits for 100,000 were delivered
- Vaccines to the value of \$3.8 million were procured to cover the 3 northern governorates and Basra and Baghdad for 3-6 months. Priority was given to diarrhoeal drugs and leishmaniasis, but ORS supplies benefiting 10,000 U5s in Basra and ThiQar, and 200,000 in Baghdad were also procured. Polio, BCG, DPT, Tetanus, Hepatitis B, and measles vaccines were administered to 510,000 U5 in Basrah and ThiQar. Vaccines for 150,000 pregnant women, emergency health kits for 100,000 people, were delivered to facilities in the south
- 4 mobile teams vaccinated school children against measles, mumps, rubella in Suleymaniya
- Outside Baghdad, lists of supplies required were drawn up in Erbil and Kermanshah and needs assessment were carried out for health institutions in Basrah and Nassiriyah. Drugs, medical supplies and equipment were delivered to hospitals in Basra, Nassiriyah, Mosul and Kirkuk including cold chain equipment, health kits, and supplementary nutrition
- Assessments were undertaken of PHCs – supplies, attendance and equipment
- A big increase in diarrhoea cases was noted (in 90% of the children visiting hospital) at Central Children's hospital (which dealt with 2000 patients/day)
- The WES team checked the sewage system and water chlorination process of Al-Qadissiya Hospital
- UNICEF (and WHO) provided, ORS, water purification tablets and HPB, also health education materials
- Meetings took place between UNICEF, the MOH and the US military about re-vitalizing the established health system¹⁸⁵
- UNICEF cleared heaps of garbage from 2 hospitals
- Fresh meat and vegetables were provided to the Central Paediatric Hospital, Baghdad
- There were also shortages in cleaning materials. A list of supplies required was prepared and sent to Amman, and local procurement of supplies organised

Nutrition¹⁸⁶

The disruption of power and water supplies following the war had a negative impact on nutritional status of Iraqi children.

- Between 29th April and 3rd May a Nutritional survey was conducted by staff from the Nutritional Research Institute with UNICEF support. The survey aimed to discover the prevalence of the various types of malnutrition in U5s, the incidence rate of diarrhoea, dehydration, and nutritional oedema in U5s, and establish a starting point from which to address malnutrition. The sample was taken from rural and urban areas within Baghdad governorate. 7.7% of children were found to have acute malnutrition, a significant public health concern. The survey also found that 7/10 children reported having diarrhoea during previous 5 weeks. (Diarrhoea is a major cause in malnutrition)
- HPB were delivered to facilities in the south

Child Protection

- UNICEF carried out initial assessments at the Al-Rahma Centre for Abandoned Street Children. They found that only 31 children remained at the centre compared with 160 pre-war, and that no staff had remained. Pressing needs were for water, food (fresh fruit and vegetables) and clothing. The generator needed repairing as well as fuel to keep it going
- Towards the end of April, UNICEF provided a vehicle to search for missing children. Some had returned to their families, who wished them to stay, others were persuaded to return to

¹⁸⁴ At the end of April, the MOH had medicine supplies for 3-4 months. Their warehouses were full and had a large reserve of medicines, but the hospitals and PHCs had no way to communicate with them. Funds with which they had previously used to pay for the drugs/we are no longer available

¹⁸⁵ Iraq's health service was recognised as one of the best in the Middle East

¹⁸⁶ Nutrition Status Survey of Under Five Children in Baghdad, 29 April-3 May 2003

the centre, while other children again would not return despite being in a bad condition. (Religious leaders in Saddam City had taken in some of the girls.) Members of the search team (school headmaster, children from the homes and a representative from the Mosque) continued looking in the streets for children, but with limited success in persuading them to return to the home¹⁸⁷. There were many children, not originally from al-Rahma Centre also living on the streets. Intensive follow up on 26 children thought to have been abducted was carried out

- The State Home for Orphans was visited and although the building was in good condition, UNICEF help was requested to provide an electric generator, water reserve tank, food items, and kitchen equipment
- Other supplies (food, generator fuel, cleaning materials, potable water) were given to Al-Waziriya Orphanage
- In Sulaymaniyah UNICEF organised a children's painting contest to help overcome trauma and stress
- In Basra a Mine Action Team was set up

Education

- Meetings were held with the MOE to discuss the massive destruction in the educational system. MOE warehouses were completely looted and destroyed, including all text book stocks. At the same time there was huge pressure from families for school to resume quickly as a indication of peace
- The MOE presented a proposal to the Military Command/Civil Administration for an plan of action including re-structuring of the MOE, an assessment of the condition and needs of schools and a resumption of educational activities throughout Iraq which would be achieved in collaboration with UNESCO and UNICEF
- At the end of April assessments were made of schools in Baghdad. Several had been occupied by coalition forces, political parties, or used as weapons stores while others were found to be in working order and hadn't been looted or damaged. 4,700 SIAB kits were procured for 350,000 children
- In northern Iraq, damages to 198 schools occupied by IDPs during the conflict were assessed. 10% needed repairs. A start was made with the watsan facilities
- Distribution plans were prepared for educational materials in Kirkuk and Khanaqin districts to support the resumption of schooling
- 80 SIAB kits for 3,200 children were distributed in towns south of Basra

Office Administration

During April national staff began rehabilitating the office, repairing and replacing broken equipment. Some Islamic communities had returned looted equipment to UNICEF office of their own accord. The financial records had survived intact.

- Transportation needs were addressed by the rent of 2 mini-buses and other vehicles for daily field visits
- Batteries were obtained for the office generator
- The possibility of renting trucks to provide water and fuel to different locations was investigated
- A stock-taking was carried out for supplies stored in the office
- An IT connection was established, and telephones were made operative¹⁸⁸
- Office systems were reactivated as quickly as possible. Manual ProMS transactions started again on 21st /22nd April

¹⁸⁷ 34 children were brought back to the centre

¹⁸⁸ Initially the only source of communication with Amman was via satphone, but in late April, a HF (Codan) base was requested from Amman to re-establish HF communication

Media/Communications

- Water tankers and trucks carried the UNICEF logo
- Meetings to co-ordinate publicity work on mine awareness were held with the Civil Defence
- In the field when filming was proposed, communities (particularly more conservative ones) were consulted one day in advance if they minded being filmed
- UNICEF advocated strongly for a focus on the vulnerabilities and needs of children during and after the war, with an emphasis on the dangers of contaminated water, urging stakeholders to address this as fast and effectively as possible. The risks of large depots of ammunition unaccounted for and UXOs were pointed out. There was also advocacy for fast resumption of education to bring back sense of normalcy to children's lives
- With Video Cairo Company, UNICEF shot footage of the condition of street children, orphans, and severely disabled. Feature stories, including interviews with UNICEF staff, and photos also made

Security

The office remained under Phase 5 security, but many staff still reported for work. Meetings were held between different agencies, and departments of the GOI and military representatives and the CCO, also with religious and community representatives requesting security, sharing information, and co-ordinating activities. The situation changed between discussions held early April, in which the military forces had no orders to recognise the UN or offer protection, and those held in the last week of April, when UNICEF was given permission to take oil and fuel directly from Al-Dora refinery (rather than paying for it all themselves and bringing it in), providing only transport for distribution. By the end of the month the coalition forces had also agreed to provide security for transportation of UNICEF supplies.

- UNICEF vehicles were not used at all. Assessment visits were made in the drivers' private cars with field visits being restricted to within Baghdad
- All female staff members were accompanied by male staff on field visits, and were advised to respect the attitudes and traditions of the more conservative communities when making field visits.
- All staff wore UNICEF jackets, and carried UN ID cards as well as UNICEF cards
- The presence of numbers of media personnel carried its own dangers. On one occasion (23/24 April) when UNICEF water distribution teams were out with a foreign media team with cameras, people became suspicious that the water was contaminated, and the team (UNICEF and media) were attacked. Only by drinking the water publicly were the people persuaded that it was not poisoned. This was the only incident of its type, and was due to the presence of the media, alerting UNICEF staff to the potential dangers of media presence

HR

Staff deployment as of 30th April 2003:

From Northern Iraq:

- Of 4 staff originally from Erbil evacuated to Amman, 3 remained in Amman, 1 went back to Erbil
- The 8 staff from Erbil and 1 from Dohuk who were evacuated to Turkey returned to Erbil in two groups, on 23rd and 29th April
- Of those evacuated to Iran (4 from Erbil, 1 from Suleimanya, 1 from Dohuk) 1 returned to Erbil on 23rd April, 1 was reassigned to Baghdad and 2 remained in Iran. The staff member from Dohuk went to Erbil, and the staff member from Suleimaniyah returned there on 16th May, after leave
- 2 staff were evacuated to Kuwait, 1 from Suleimaniyah and 1 Erbil while 1 stayed in Kuwait and then moved on to Basra the other took leave

- Of the 2 staff members evacuated to Syria from Erbil, 1 returned to Erbil on 24th May (after leave), and the other stayed in Syria. 1 staff member who had gone from Suleimanyah to Syria returned there on 30th April

From Baghdad

- Of the 13 staff evacuated to Kuwait, the Programme Officer returned first to Baghdad followed by 4 other staff members who returned on 1st May. The remaining 8 were to stay in Kuwait until permission had been granted to go to Basra
- Of the 6 evacuated to Amman, 1 returned to Baghdad in the first group on 1st May, 4 were in the 2nd group, 1 returned after home leave on 12th May. 1 staff member returned following a mission to Teheran
- The 1 member of staff evacuated to Larnaca was rotated to NY
- 2 Staff members were evacuated to Iran. 1 was to remain in Iran and then go back to Baghdad while the other returned to Baghdad following home leave on 17th May
- 1 staff member was evacuated to Syria, and was given extended home leave

IT¹⁸⁹

Regular contact was maintained with national staff during the war to check on safety. The looting of office and ICT equipment limited both vocal/data communication and out of the office equipment was used as well as that of some NGOs. National staff continued to send situation reports using backup satellite through an account hosted by MENARO

- The cc:mail PO was restored within hours after the reception of a server, network switches and an INMARSAT terminal
- A needs assessment was carried out to cover restoration of ICT services in the event of the worst case scenario of complete looting, the establishment of new offices at Basra and Mosul and the upgrading of the northern offices. A budget estimate was made to cover computer, networking, radio and satellite equipment together with a deployment plan. A Purchase Order of c \$1.4million was raised to cover all the needs and positioned in the supply division on 30th April 2003
- During the war Prestock equipment in Copenhagen was dispatched to Kuwait for re-entry into Basra, loaned for a rapid response
- By the end of April, HF Base station Bravo Charlie Base was back on air

4.2 Iran¹⁹⁰

Only 45 IDP families needed assistance near the Khoshravi border post from Karla, Tami governorate. There were some cases of diarrhoea among them. There were no refugees on the Iranian border. Security at Ahwaz Province remained at Phase 3. Despite compelling geographical reasons for using Iran as a primary route, for political reasons the major trans-border operation was not carried out from Iran, but from Kuwait.

Watsan

After the invasion in Iraq it was clear that water provision was going to be the main immediate need, particularly with the high summer temperatures. The Iranian border is only 18km from Basra.

- Drinking water convoys were sent into Iraq with water pre-packed in UNICEF-branded jerrycans. 76,000 collapsible 10 litre jerry cans were trucked to Basra province
- Water purification tablets were sent
- 16 water tankering operations were conducted in the immediate aftermath of conflict from Ahwaz to Al-Fao peninsular and Basra

¹⁸⁹ ICT Preparedness and Response Iraq Emergency, no date

¹⁹⁰ Lessons Learned from the Iraq Emergency: A Personal Perspective Gained in Iran, Luc Chauvin, no date; UNICEF Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq: Synthesis Report, Jan 02 – Aug 03

Child Protection

- On 24th April UNICEF organised a ½ day orientation for IRCS social workers in the refugee camps

HR

- 2 new staff joined the UNICEF team in Ahwaz on March 24th

Interagency

- Co-ordination meetings with partners were on-going

Supply/Logistics

- The airlift capacity to Kermanshah was swiftly used
- The organization of the first 2-3 convoys to Basra and Baghdad faced tremendous lack of co-operation from the MOFA. Additionally the plurality of government partners involved initially caused havoc and delays
- At the on-set of the crisis, trans-border movement was seriously constrained by the lack of co-operation from the Iranian provincial authorities and the military. Thanks to a strong push from the CR, Iran CO progressively gained the confidence of the Government of Iran to facilitate trans-border movements into Iraq, and with improving co-operation the convoys became faster
- New supplies from Tehran and Kermanshah were received on the 26th ,27th ,28th March (water bladder, jerry cans, health kits, medicine kits)
- Truck movements to Iraq picked up from the end May once co-operation had been secured from the MOI provincial branches

Management

The co-ordination with MENARO and other COs involved in the Iraq crisis was very good until about 2-3 weeks after war started.

IT¹⁹¹

- Vehicle tracking and maintaining radio checks with the sub-regional station was carried out from the Radio Room
- UNICEF established a VHF repeater network which used by other UN agencies in area
- Most of the co-ordination was done on telecoms related to standard SELCALL, CALLSIGN and frequencies as a lot of radio equipment was being used by NGOs. (Co-ordination was needed to avoid the confusion of security and talk channels, to facilitate identification of users making emergency calls, intruder/nuisance deletion, and vehicle tracking for common UN convoys)

4.3 Jordan

During the emergency, Jordan received a total of 2059 Third Country Nationals (TCN) and 1200 refugees. Of the 2059 TCNs, 1,876 were assisted to continue with their journey to their home countries and the remainder managed to stay by seeking political asylum. The early response plan of UNICEF was to ensure assistance to the refugees within the first 48 hours.

¹⁹¹ ICT Preparedness and Response Iraq Emergency, no date

Health

Within the first 24 hours, UNICEF assisted the Ministry of Health to establish a health clinic in the refugees camp. UNICEF supplied from its stock already placed in Jordan, all necessary medical equipment, drugs and furniture. The MOH staff who were assigned to manage the clinic were able to serve refugees as they reached the camp. Some 40 patients visited the clinic on daily basis to receive medical assistance. The clinic provided primary health care and referral services, monitored the health and nutrition status of refugees specially children . During this period, UNICEF attended all meetings of the health committee to review and assess the health situation of the refugees, and provided additional supplies as needed. UNICEF also assisted in the immunization programme for the refugee children and distributed IEC materials produced to guide parents on health issues.

Nutrition

On March, 3 UNICEF assisted the medical team attached to UNICEF/MOH clinic to carry out a nutritional survey to identify and detect malnourished children in the refugee camp. The result of the survey did not show any serious nutritional problems among the refugee children. The pre-positioned HPB, OXFAM kits and F-100 therapeutic milk were shipped to Iraq as a result.

Watsan

Water containers (10 lit) and water purification tablets were distributed together with IEC materials on hygienes and sanitation.

Education

Initially two tents were set up to provide primary education for the children of the TCN camp, but after the war when the refugees began to arrive, two additional tents were set up. For the first 30 days some 500 children aged 6-12 were served in the the TNC and 300 refugee students wee provided with primary education upon arrival. UNICEF provided:

--Text books for Arabic, mathematics and sciences fro grades 1-6.

--Covered certain cost related to transportation, accommodation of 8 MOE teachers assigned to the camp (these teachers were trained by UNICEF on multi-grade teaching and psycho-social needs of refugee students).

--Provided all such supply items as educational materials, classroom furniture, educational games, blackboards, and materials related to psycho-social activities.

Advocacy and Communication

Commissioned a consultant to develop two human interest stories on the basis of the situation of the children in the camp for advocacy purposes.

IT¹⁹²

MIG office (Amman) hosted the ICT platform for the Iraq office in exile involving computer equipment, network, PABX and lease line IP connect for running a parallel office in Amman with support staff. Declaration of security Phase 5 in Iraq meant the evacuation of Baghdad to Amman and Erbil to Diyarbakir with the ICT staff in last convoy. Vehicle tracking was done from the Evan team conducted from the MENARO radio room, with the security officer constantly being kept updated with the tracking data. The Radio Room turned into a 24/7 operation, having daily radio checks in Amman, and vehicle tracking and checks with stations in the sub-region.

¹⁹² ICT Preparedness and Response Iraq Emergency, no date

- MIG house was established with the restoration of ProMS and email within 24 hrs. ProMS for the northern Iraq and Baghdad offices were located in the same physical network which was not foreseen in the scenarios and so required additional fine tuning of the procedures
- Replacement vehicles (for the ones which were looted) were equipped with HF, VHF, and Thuraya Docking adapter in Amman covering 18 mobiles for Baghdad, 11 for Basra and 10 for interagency convoys. Around 100 VHF handsets were programmed and distributed to staff for use in Iraq and the sub-region
- Equipment in stock in MENARO was procured for a rapid response such as VHF handsets, Mobile, Thuraya handsets and INMARSAT which was immediately deployed for urgent needs

TCA Role in Jordan activities included:

1. Identifying repeater site for common security channel and providing technical details for ordering radios from UN system
2. Assistance with form filling and radio equipment necessary for MOSS compliance
3. Installation and programming for radios in UN vehicles (16 units). Assist with installation of radio in convoy vehicles for Iraq re-entry (c. 20 units)
4. Programmed handsets for individual agencies and common system (c. 200 units) to be used on security channel
5. Allocated call sign to UN staff in Amman and inputs to SMT on radio checks and procedures. Assisted in recruitment of radio operators for crisis communications centre at UN house
6. Assist FCSO in establish common license for UN agencies on radio frequencies
7. Establishment of interagency working group on ICT related to Iraq Emergency and arranged training for ICT staff
8. Provided technical guidance to individual agencies requirements of radio and sat equipment

4.4 Kuwait

The water tankering operation into south Iraq took place from Kuwait.

IT¹⁹³

ICT support was provided to the logistics operations in Kuwait

- UNICEF provided and assisted in the installation of an HF base station at the common UN premises
- The office was also provided with M4, Thuraya and VHF mobiles for communication from border areas
- With the declaration of Phase 4 in Kuwait, UNICEF staff were testing the emergency communications system as part of MOSS compliance, including radio checks with staff and vehicles. Staff using cc:Mobile from their account hosted in Amman with connectivity provided by ISP in Kuwait
- HF, VHF equipment and solar panels were positioned in Kuwait for deployment in Basra.

4.5 Syria¹⁹⁴

Approximately 30,000 Iraqis crossed into Syria before the war looking for sanctuary. They did not need or request asylum because they were either well-off or had relatives with which to stay.

Following the Allied entry into Iraq, a few refugees –500 maximum - arrived at Al-Hol camp. Approximately 1000 TCNs arrived, and were held at the transit centre at Al Yaroubiya close to the border. UNHCR refused to accept TCNs as refugees (IOM took responsibility).

The border was open for the duration of the conflict, apart from a few days when Syria was pressured by the US to close the border to prevent Saddam's forces from escaping

¹⁹³ Ibid

¹⁹⁴ Interview with consultant

4.6 Turkey

No information on the TCO response to the Iraq crisis was found.

5 POST-WAR RESPONSE (MAY 1ST TO JUNE 23RD)

5.1 Iraq¹⁹⁵

Lack of security was recognised as the main factor hindering both the resumption of basic social services to civilians and humanitarian improvement. During May daily lootings, shootings and carjackings created a climate of fear, and restricted humanitarian workers' actions. While the arrival of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (Sergio Vieira de Mello) and his team in June opened the way for increased dialogue between the UN, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqis, attacks on UN agencies and NGOs continued. Key obstacles remained the security of staff and facilities, lack of operational mechanisms and replacement of looted items, lack of norms with regard to management and financing of facilities operations, lack of resources, fuel shortages, no telecoms and co-ordination within Baghdad, lack of staff salaries, unconventional repair methods and shortages in spare parts. There was also potential for disaster the longer civil servants' payments were delayed.

Children were killed almost daily by UXO¹⁹⁶. In Baghdad, it was estimated that there were 800 hazardous sites (mostly cluster bombs and ammo dumps). This also affected garbage collection in the city.

Security in the northern governorships was good, with the basic services functioning at pre-war levels.

40 IPs had returned to Iraq by the middle of May together with a full corps of national staff, and UNICEF offices were operating at full pre-war capacity in Baghdad, Basrah, and in northern Iraq. Carol Bellamy toured Iraq on 18th and 19th May. During her visit she thanked staff and toured hospitals and schools in Sadr City¹⁹⁷ where she delivered SIAB, and talked to teachers and students.

UNICEF embarked on a series of assessments of the Extended Programme of Immunization (EPI), and nutrition, education, watsan sectors. All assessments were made in full collaboration with partners, including Iraqi reps, INGOS, UN agencies. On 29th–30th May a meeting was held in Erbil to initiate a nationwide assessment in the area of CP.

Cross border operations bringing supplies into Iraq operated daily from Jordan, Iran, Kuwait, Syria and Turkey.

Watsan

Sewerage treatment plants in Basra were dysfunctional with sewerage leading into irrigation channels where children were swimming. There was a similar situation in Baghdad, with the al-Hurriya sewerage/treatment plant out of work, and sewage floating into surrounding residential areas. Garbage collection system was still only partially in place in the cities.

There was a continuing problem of drinking water supply in southern Iraq and some suburbs of Baghdad. People, desperate for more drinking water, made holes in water pipes creating cross-contamination with sewerage and reducing water pressure in pipes. Collected water (often of dubious quality) was being sold in markets.

- Water tankering continued in Baghdad to locations where WTPs were not working. Water was delivered to hospitals, child institutions and residential areas. In May, 28 tankers

¹⁹⁵ UNICEF Crisis Appeal for Iraqi Children: Action Update 5-17 May; Update on Iraq Crisis 1-15 June, 16-30 June 2003

¹⁹⁶ Contamination of Iraq by UXO is among the worst in world

¹⁹⁷ now Sadr City – one of hardest hit areas in terms of humanitarian need

provided 510,000 litres/day. By June the average daily capacity being delivered by tanker in Baghdad had risen to 2 million litres

- In Baghdad an assessment of the complete water distribution network (including 9 WTP, 53 Compact Units (CU), and 4 boosting stations) was carried out by the Mayoralty of Baghdad Water Authorities with the support of UNICEF. 40% of the system was broken with over 500 separate breaks being located leading to a loss of 50% of the city's water. UNICEF awarded the contract to a company for repair
- UNICEF continued to overhaul generators and supply and transport fuel to the city's generators at water projects, an operation which, during June, meant a daily distribution of more than 120,000 litres of fuel to 231 water and sanitation pumping stations in Baghdad
- As a one-off measure during May UNICEF paid \$46,000 to 15,000 Baghdad Water Authority staff to keep working. (OCPA took over paying civil servants following this)
- Assessment and rehabilitation of Baghdad's sewerage systems was continued
- In Baghdad, UNICEF supported vehicles to clear drains and sewerage spills. 26 trucks were hired to collect garbage. A contractor was hired to clear garbage from 3 hospitals and some residential areas with a larger campaign planned for Sadr City. By June garbage from 11 hospitals had been cleared
- 44,700 litres of cooking gas were delivered per day during May
- UNICEF took over the water distribution from the pipeline from Kuwait to Um Qasr. Tankering increased from 20-30 tankers/day to 49 (May 5), and 67 (May 11) – ie 2,010,000 litres/day, 79 tankers (by the end of May) rising to 100 tankers a day during June brought water to 150,000 people in areas south of Basra daily. By June, an average of 2.5 million litres of water daily were being tankered to ensure a supply of clean water to hospitals and communities in the southern governorates
- In Safwan and surroundings, 50,000 people were totally dependent on UNICEF for water
- With ICRC, UNICEF undertook a leak-detection project in southern Iraq
- During June UNICEF took over the monitoring of the water network in Basra for 3 months, with chlorine testing at over 200 points in Basra
- As part of the cholera monitoring team in Basra, UNICEF and the local authority set up a distribution plan for chlorine in the city. 130 MT of chlorine gas was delivered to Basra from Iran. The convoys collected 200 empty chlorine cylinders of 100kg each to be refilled in Kuwait. As of May 13 there was enough chlorine for the affected areas. (Together, UNICEF, ICRC and the Coalition brought in over 300 tons of chlorine)
- UNICEF monitored the functioning (or not) of 2 major sewerage treatment plants in Basra and Baghdad, providing follow-up and repair activities. Elsewhere in S/C UNICEF supported the General Corporation of Water and Sewerage in making assessments
- Transport of 25,000 chlorine tablets and 9,000 kg of chlorine granular powder + 89 water containers was arranged to Mosul
- In the 3 northern governorships UNICEF initiated the rehabilitation of 52 rural water projects
- UNICEF worked with local authorities to establish lists of water and sanitation staff formerly on the payroll to get the HR capacity to repair and operate facilities
- UNICEF also provided trucks for garbage collection in Kirkuk

Health

In Erbil, Carol Bellamy toured the maternity hospital, and promoted exclusive breastfeeding as a means of preventing the high rates of diarrhoea in young children. As of May 13th there were 24 confirmed cholera cases in children in Basra and the rate of watery diarrhoea was twice the average for this time of year¹⁹⁸. An interagency cholera monitoring group (including local government officials) was formed to address the issue quickly. There was an urgent need for pentostam (for visceral leishmaniasis/black fever). WHO working with government on provision of drugs for this.

¹⁹⁸ Between 28th May and 4th June WHO recorded 73 cases of cholera (more than 10x the number WHO recorded for 2002)

- Assessments of PHCs were made with NGOs including 15 in the S/C governorships
- Volunteer health workers were trained in the basics of child health care in Baghdad
- 2 health kits (20,000 people) and 1,000 doses of pentostam were airlifted to Kuwait for distribution to southern Iraq during May
- 78,000 sachets of ORS arrived in Basra for distribution
- An additional 10 tons of ORS were sent to Baghdad from Kuwait; also 90,000 doses of measles and rubella vaccines and 150,000 doses of DPT, to go to PHCs and the paediatric hospital in Basra where the cold rooms had been repaired
- During June health supplies delivered to PHCs included 100% of ORS supplies needed. Health supplies for 150,000 people were also delivered to 6 health centres in Al-Thawra City, emergency obstetrics supplies for 200,000 women to Diala and primary health care and emergency obstetrics for 250,000 to Kirkuk
- A needs assessment of the Baghdad Institute of Sera and Vaccines and the Central Health Laboratories was conducted to determine the follow-up needs for cold chain equipment, and an inventory was prepared of what was needed in the administration sections of the MOH to resume this programme. The central vaccine warehouse was rehabilitated, ready to receive vaccines.¹⁹⁹ All 18 governorships were provided with 3 months supply of BCG, Polio, DPT, Measles, TT and Hepatitis vaccines. UNICEF provided support to the MOH to launch routine immunization programmes on 14th June²⁰⁰, with approximately 80% of facilities capable of resuming their services²⁰¹
- 10,000 litres of kerosene was provided to the health department to run kerosene refrigerators for vaccines
- UNICEF distributed 1,000 cartons of ferro-folic acid to antenatal care units in N Iraq
- Health sentinel sites set up to gather health information from hospital and health centre patients

Nutrition

- 4 tons of HPB and ORS were trucked in from Iran
- Nutritional assessments were made at CCCUs, PHC, Nutritional Rehabilitation Centres (NRC) to re-establish the of Targeted Nutrition Programme (TNP), which was reactivated during June. Training courses/refresher workshops were planned for PHC directors and staff, and CCCU (Community Child Care Units) volunteers
- 14,000 cartons HPBs (112,000kg) were delivered for 56,000 children
- 2MT THM was delivered to the paediatric hospital in Baghdad, in addition to 167MT previously pre-positioned

Child Protection

Among street children, drug use was reported – a new phenomenon in Iraq. UNICEF, as lead agency for CP, co-ordinated a country-wide protection assessment with 5 INGOs for which the initial planning meeting took place in Erbil at the end of May.

- During May UNICEF and Enfants du Monde provided counselling for children at al-Rahma institution in Baghdad. Food, toiletries and other necessary items were given to the institution
- The 220 children of 1,025 Palestinian refugees living in a camp in the Baladiyat area of Baghdad were supplied with HPB, milk, diapers, 3 school kits, tents and STs
- In the north, all child care institutions were now functioning as pre-war. UNICEF continued to monitor the status of children who were reintegrated with their families. WES supplies were delivered to orphanages
- During June the National Protection Working Group was created in Baghdad to facilitate the exchange of information relating to protection issues and to systematise the identification of

¹⁹⁹ The rehabilitation of Iraq's cold chain system was covered by \$1.85million funding from DFID

²⁰⁰ WHO, CPA, Iraqi counterparts and UNICEF focused on efforts to re-establish the country's immunization system as a main priority for protecting children's health. A grant was received for this from USAID

²⁰¹ More than 220,000 children born during the conflict needed vaccination

needs and the development of appropriate responses²⁰². UNICEF chaired the weekly meetings

- UNICEF prepared for the creation of child-friendly spaces in Baghdad and elsewhere to provide recreational activities and counselling for children, with the promotion of health/hygiene practices
- UNICEF co-operated with the Iraq Media Network to broadcast additional spots on mine awareness

Education

According to initial assessments in Basra and Thi Qar governorships 20% of schools had been looted. New Director Generals (DG) for Education had been appointed in Basra and Nassiriya. UNICEF established close working relationships with both. The Directorate in Basra had been completely looted.

- During May a total of 370 SIAB kids were delivered to schools in the south (each with materials for 80 children and their teachers). An additional 500 SIAB kits benefiting 40,000 students and 1,000 teachers were distributed during June
- During May, UNICEF asked the LEAs in Basra and Nassiriyah to prepare budgets for office and school furniture
- A total of 58 schools in Baghdad were supplied with fans, light bulbs and electrical fittings after having been looted, benefiting 120,000 children
- During May in the north, UNICEF initiated a “back to school” campaign by facilitating the transport of 2,000 children to school. Primary teachers attended a psycho-social evening. By June this strategy had paid off with all schools in the north having fully resumed. By June in southern Iraq, 80% of schools were functioning
- Teachers having partially received their March salaries
- Apart from getting children back to school UNICEF’s education priority was to help with the end of year exams. UNICEF supported the printing of 15million exam booklets for all primary and secondary schools by providing computers and photocopiers to the MOE, and provided 20,000 ballpoint pens for use during exams. UNICEF also launched a social mobilisation campaign to advertise the exams to parents. Approximately 4.5 million children took their school exams, and the remaining 1 million were to do so during July²⁰³
- Materials were also supplied for 20,000 children to Sulimaniyah governorship, where a 4-colour offset printing machine for textbooks was also installed in the press

Child Protection

- UNICEF continued to supply food, basic hygiene, SIAB and recreation kits to children in institutions. Generators in orphanages were also repaired, and fuel provided. Orphanage staff were supported with a \$1/day incentive²⁰⁴
- UNICEF collected information on children newly orphaned by the war in conjunction with communities, institution staff and religious leaders
- With Enfants du Monde, assessments were completed of all 29 institutions for children in need of protection in the country
- UNICEF and Enfants du Monde established projects for street children – a care centre for children to stay, medical checks and information gathering on street children
- Materials for mine awareness were developed and tested, and awareness sessions conducted in schools

²⁰² The assessment and study was important because it collected information from the children themselves. Partners were 5 INGOS including SCF UK and US

²⁰³ This was a major achievement reflecting UNICEF’s considerable contribution

²⁰⁴ From June 1 UNICEF partner Enfants du Monde continued to provide direct support to children in institutions while UNICEF focused on co-ordination and facilitation

IT²⁰⁵

Baghdad

The first convoy reached Baghdad on May 1st. Vehicle tracking and monitoring was done by the radio room in Larnaca. The vehicles were equipped with HF, VHF and Thuraya docking units. On 8th May Basic IT/Telecom equipment was sent to Baghdad (servers, communications equipment, desktops, laptops, printers etc) and part of office LAN was functional. The 2nd re-entry on 15th May included 4 mobiles of UNICEF among 20 UN vehicles. The mission included the IT Officer Iraq and the Regional Telecoms Officer MENARO; also a considerable amount of telecoms equipment. Over the next few weeks internet services, ProMS, PABX, and VSAT were resumed; VHF handsets were distributed to all staff; UNICEF VHF network (Channel 15) in Baghdad covered the airport and most of city. PTT numbers were obtained for all 3 offices in Iraq. Other tasks such as the installation of additional mobiles, new PABX and shifting of server room, radio room, distribution of Thuraya handsets continued

Basra

During May, temporary voice and data connectivity from Joundian Hotel with Thuraya Globe connect and Inmarsat M4 was established; VHF sets were reprogrammed and 3 HF and VHF mobiles installed. In June the VSAT terminal was installed with full data and voice connectivity, installation was completed for 12 HF and VHF mobiles; set up servers and workstations were completely installed; PABX was connected to VSAT and the network cabling completed. The deployment mission completed, a local consultant was hired in the first week of July.

Erbil

The war did not affect the ICT equipment in the north so there was no need for immediate ICT action, but there was an immediate need to set up VSAT for the office to be on same network. On the 8th June VSAT was commissioned with the office IP net migrated to UNICEF private addresses and PABX connected to VSAT and in July a new HF base station was installed, and new HF mobiles were installed in 15 vehicles making the northern offices MOSS compliant.

Funding

During June UNICEF was involved in the preparation of the revised Humanitarian Appeal for Iraq involving stocktaking on key achievements and gaps, and strategizing and planning for further management of humanitarian aid

5.2 Iran²⁰⁶

Iran sent a total of 17 convoys into Iraq, not all by the end of June (when this evaluation period ends).

Health

UNICEF was lead agency for health.

Response objectives were to:

- Ensure that basic drugs and health services were provided to women and children
 - Ensure that an immunization service was immediately available
 - Ensure that pregnant women were provided with obstetric services
 - 2 health kits given to MOH to assist 1,000 Iraqi IDPs on border in Kermanshah province
- UNICEF was not targeting only refugees

Response Activities included the:

- Provision of emergency health kits
- Provision of emergency immunisation equipment and training
- Provision of emergency obstetric equipment and training

²⁰⁵ ICT Preparedness and Response Iraq Emergency, no date

²⁰⁶ UNICEF Iran Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq: Synthesis Report, Jan 02 – Aug 03

The first cross-border operations took place via NGOs as UN Security Rules did not allow UN agencies to enter Basra. Medicin du Monde opened a clinic in Basra, took in medical kits, ORS, and provided logistical support. When telecoms links were re-established with CO Baghdad Iran CO sent in the first convoy to Baghdad.

In their cross-border operations Iran sent in: 10 emergency health kits (to support 100,000 people for 3 months), 4 midwifery kits, 4 obstetric/surgical kits, 4 resuscitation kits and boxes for used syringes

Nutrition

There was little if any malnutrition in Iran. No partner was willing/able to help in supplementary/therapeutic feeding

- UNICEF Iran launched a programme of training in Iraqi border provinces and developed a comprehensive nutritional response plan (with help from Iraq CO staff)
- Later nutrition supplies were sent to UNICEF warehouses in Baghdad for distribution there. 56 MT HPB, 1.5MT THM, ferrous salt, and other micronutrient were sent for TNP

WES

- UNICEF was the lead agency, and developed close links with HCR, MSF-France, and Oxfam-UK
- 130 metric tonnes of chlorine was sent to Basra

Education

- 25 SIAB and 25 Recreational kits were sent to Baghdad

Security

- The security phase was exaggerated in Iran, which was a political decision. Phase 3 at border hampered activities and made procedures more complex (because security clearance was required for convoys to cities more than 250 km from Iraqi border)
- UNICEF Iran convoys were not escorted by any guard. This gave a clear message that UNICEF did not support any member of the Coalition. This may have increased their security

Administration

- Through close collaboration standard procedures were finally established with BAFIA, customs, and MFA enabling rapid response to Iraqi needs. UNICEF was a determining actor, and other UN agencies benefited
- Partnership agreements were signed with each implementing partner

Media

- Having learned from Afghanistan, ICO planned well ahead (Nov 2002) to have support from an international Communication Officer. However, they arrived in mid-March and shortly after being deployed in Kermanshah they were sent to Kuwait!
- UNICEF Iran gave a few interviews to Iranian and international media, but with few refugees there was little media attention

5.3 Syria²⁰⁷

Refugees arrived at Al Yaroubiya cross point.

Watsan

The objective for watsan during the post-war response was to keep the systems going. This meant prepositioning fuel stocks, rehabilitation of equipment both before and after war, trucking in supplies for people around country, and developing health related information programmes about clean water and hygiene.

On May 8th the first convoy left Damascus for Mosul carrying chlorine granules, tablets, floaters, emergency health kits, plastic water containers and a UNFPA HR kit

Health

The objective for the post-war response in the health sector was to get supplies to the PHCs, hospitals, CCCU and MOH, and to prepare a rapid assessment checklist

Activities included:

- The provision of supplies to the health centre at Al-Hol
- Remuneration for the health workers (3 doctors, 3 nurses, 1 pharmacist-assistant, 4 vaccinators and also the vaccination nurse operating at Al Yaroubiya reception centre)
- Provision of a public health promoter who supported health education and monitored camp hygiene
- UNICEF supply division channelled all vaccine shipments to northern Iraq through Syria²⁰⁸. The first shipment contained: TT 10 dose – 75,000 vials, DPT – 75,000 vials, Measles 10 dose – 90,000 vials, Hep B10 dose – 90,000 vials, OPV 10 dose – 150,000 vials, BCG 20 dose 45,000 vials)
- Daily surveillance forms for close monitoring and follow-up with MOH were prepared
- The Assistant Project Officer was a medical doctor, and so provided in-house full-time technical support
- 1 Oxfam Public Health Advisor supported construction and service delivery phases of UNICEF's work in Al-Hass

Education

Post-war objectives were to get children back to school as soon as possible; the provision of materials; rehabilitation of buildings; security; enabling exams to go ahead; pre-training of teachers and volunteers on psycho-social counselling. Educational services operated for 1 month.

Activities included:

- Training for 13 refugee women on instructing and running the camp kindergarten. (6 refugees operated it when it opened). UNICEF funded and supplied the kindergarten
- 3 (out of 46 trained) teachers were chosen and paid to run the primary classes in the refugee camp. Secondary age children were hosted in Al-Hol village school
- UNICEF contributed 3 recreational kits and organised a sports club in the camp

Nutrition:

Post-war objectives were to build on the pre-war "feeding up" campaign, and the pre-positioning of supplies both inside and outside Iraq to cope with lack of food after the war. However, no signs of malnutrition were observed among the refugees.

²⁰⁷ Emergency Report, 22 July 2003

²⁰⁸ Refrigerated trucks from Damascus International Airport to Erbil through Yaroubia crossing point took 18 hours

Activities included:

- The arrival of a Nutritionist
- Nutritional screening and assessment
- Advice on the food rations to provide optimal nutrition
- Responding to a request from SRCS, UNICEF transferred 400kg HPB from Al Hol to Al-Bukamal reception area
- Following a request from HCR, SCO provided 1.2 tonnes of HPB

CP

Post-war objectives built on the pre-positioning of supplies and training people in protection; co-interagency co-ordination for tracing lost or separated children; and following accurate assessment of institutional needs, support to CP institutions.

Activities:

- UNICEF and Movimondo held Psycho-social training in Al Hol camp
- All camp families were visited with a questionnaire. The results were analysed by Movimondo to assess the psycho-social status of camp occupants

HR

- 6 new posts²⁰⁹ were created in addition to the extra 5²¹⁰ which had been planned for, but the staff was reduced in March 2003 because of the course of war. The re-deployed staff included: Administrator/Finance, Secretary, Watsan engineer, 3 Drivers.
- The re-deployed staff filled the following posts: 2 Watsan Engineers (Al Hasake), 2 Supplies and Logistics Officers (Al-Hass and Damascus), 1 Cross border Co-ordinator (Damascus)
- Seconded staff from outside agencies: Watsan Engineer (Oxfam – Al Hass), Public Health Advisor (Oxfam – Al Hass), Telecoms Officer (OCHA – Damascus), responsible for telecoms support and co-ordination between UN agencies
- Logistics staff attended training on dealing with emergencies, and logistics and supply section hired 1 supply clerk

Security (MOSS compliance)

- The Radio room was equipped with HF Codan station, Satellite Thuraya Dock Station and individual staff provided with effective and reliable communication. Selected staff were equipped with NHF handsets, and others with Satellite communication handsets. Re-deployed vehicles from Iraq were equipped with NHF radios but these were not licensed for UNICEF Syria

Management

- Money Transfer arrangements were set up
- A position of Emergency Focal Point was established so that SCO had a continuous local presence on ground from the beginning of the execution phase, which gave the authorities one contact person locally available. The Emergency Focal Point was initially designated as the Alternate Area Security Co-ordinator. They conducted regular security meetings (mini SMT); disseminated information, briefings and updates; updated the UN Staff Location and contact information lists weekly; conducted 2 security assessment trips with the UNICEF Security Officer from NY and later with the Designated Officer

²⁰⁹ Administration/Finance, 3 drivers, Janitor/Messenger (Al-Hassakeh), Supply clerk

²¹⁰ Co-ordinator (Al-Hassakeh), Nutritionist. Radio operator, Secretary, Driver (Damascus)

- The sub-office got administrative and financial support from the Damascus office as well as by hiring extra staff. Apart from the operating staff, the office also hosted a number of consultants from different fields and organisations²¹¹

Telecoms

- An independent power source for the sub-office was put in place
- The Radio Room supplied with a HF base station, Thuraya docking station and fax
- The mast for the HF antenna was installed on the roof and small pipe for Thuraya docking station also was installed on the roof
- Internet access was installed. All sub-office staff had email accounts replicated by dial-up connection to the Damascus office
- 2 telephoned lines were installed

Supplies/Logistics

These were greatly facilitated by the co-operation of GOS who granted UNICEF exemption from all duties, taxes, and dues regarding humanitarian convoys to Iraq. Three crossing points were available with good access to northern and central Iraq. Shipments sent from abroad were channelled through Syria, ie decisions made by Copenhagen with SCO assisting and facilitating shipments initiated in Syria were decided on and co-ordinated in Syria and Iraq

Security

MOSS Security Plan was affected. The mechanisms of co-ordination were SMT and DO. In Al Hol special arrangements carried out. The office was sited in a well guarded governmental compound, so didn't require local police guarding. The hotel occupied by all UNICEF staff was also in safe area, within proximity of 2 security intelligence establishments.

Funding

The Project support budget constituted about 25% of total emergency funds received, which was mostly spent on salaries of emergency staff and on emergency IT equipment for and attaining compliance with MOSS.

5.4 Turkey

Of the 5 humanitarian corridors supporting Iraq, Turkey was the largest, with 400,000 tons shipped to northern Iraq out of the total of 1million tons shipped regionally²¹².

TCO closed the sub-office at Dyabakir the end of May 2003.

5.5 Jordan

Of 1200 refugees, 670 remained in the UNHCR camp in Al Rwedshed. The majority of these refugees were the Palestinians who had been living in Iraq for many years before being forced to leave due to hostile environment of post-Sadam Iraq. After the war the TCN camp was closed and some 200 TCN were transferred to the UNHCR camp. It was expected that the refugees would be staying in the refugee camp for a long time given the deteriorating situation in Iraq and the reluctance of the government official to allow them to join other Palestinian population in Jordan. At this time Jordan decided to close the border to new refugees. A number of refugees were kept at the no-man's land.

²¹¹ Watsan staff from UNICEF, Oxfam, local watsan staff; Health staff from UNICEF and the Directorate of Health; Public Health staff from Oxfam and Directorate of Health; Education staff from the Directorate of Education, Pioneer Organisation, General Women's Union; Psycho-social staff from Movimondo, the Directorate of Health and local staff; Nutrition staff from UNICEF; Media staff from the RO; Security staff from HQNY, UNHCR, UNDOR; IT staff from UNICEF, OCHA, HCR

²¹² UNCT Meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Lessons Learned from the Iraq Crisis 8 July 2003

Education

As the lead agency for the education UNICEF continued supporting the school education for 300 students. During this period 10 refugees volunteers and 6 volunteers from Red Crescent staff were trained on educational and psychosocial services for children to assume teaching responsibility and run the schools during the summer. Meanwhile, NGOs were approached to help in the management of the school beyond the Summer. The objective was to ensure refugee students continue to receive education should UNICEF decide to wind up operation in the camp.

Health

UNICEF covered the maintenance cost of the clinic and provided fans and a water cooler in view of increasing therapeutic.

Nutrition

5,350 kg of F-100 therapeutic milk and 45 ctns of HBP were sent to Iraq since the refugee population plunged to few hundred and there was no need for them.

5.6 Kuwait²¹³

- By 13th May, UNICEF was sending in about 67 tankers a day from Kuwait to Iraq, with more than 2 million litres/day
- 100 MT of chlorine was procured through Kuwait

²¹³ Brief on Iraq – internal briefing Pierrette Vu Thi, 13 May 2003