

EVALUATION
REPORT

**EVALUATION OF UNICEF
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
EARLY RESPONSE IN IRAQ
(SEPTEMBER 2001—JUNE 2003)**

EVALUATION OFFICE
SEPTEMBER 2004

For every child
Health, Education, Equality, Protection
ADVANCE HUMANITY



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ACRONYMS

CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CCCs	Core Corporate Commitments
CCCU	Community Child Care Unit
CEE/CIS	Central and Eastern Europe/Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltics
CERF	Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CO	Country Office
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DART	Disaster Assessment and Response Team – US government
DFAM	Division of Financial & Administrative Management
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DHR	Division of Human Resources
DSG	United Nations Deputy Secretary General
ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EMOPS	Office of Emergency Programmes
EPF	Emergency Programme Fund
EPRP	Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning
FLS	Financial and Logistics System
HF	High Frequency
HPU	Humanitarian Policy Unit (EMOPS)
HRBAP	Human rights based approach to programming
HQ	Headquarters
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information Communications Technology
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
INGO	International Non Government Organisation
IOM	International Organisation on Migration
IP	International Personnel
IT	Information Technology
ITD	Information Technology Division
JD	Job Description
MENA	Middle East and North Africa region
MENARO	Middle East and North Africa Regional Office
MIST	Minimum Security Telecommunications Standard
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTSP	Medium-Term Strategic Plan
NATCOMS	UNICEF National Committees
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (US government)
OFFP	Oil for Food Programme
OPT	Palestinian Occupied Territories
OR	Other Resources
PBA	Programme Budget Allocation
PD	Programme Division
PFO	Programme Funding Office

PROMS	Programme Management System
RO	Regional Office
RR	Regular Resources
SC	Security Council
SD	Supply Division
SG	Secretary-General
SIAB	School in a Box
Telecoms	Telecommunications technology
TOR	Terms of Reference
TFT	Temporary Fixed-Term
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VHF	Very High Frequency
VSAT	Very Small Aperture Terminals
WES	Water, Environment and Sanitation
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTP	Water Treatment Plant

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation of UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response in Iraq was commissioned by the Iraq Country Office, the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (MENARO), and the Evaluation Office and managed by a team with one representative from each office. The aim of the evaluation was to briefly document UNICEF's experience, assessing the relevance of its preparedness and response, and recording lessons that will strengthen organisational preparedness and response systems. The evaluation was carried out by an external evaluation consultant, assisted by a research consultant, between September 2003 and January 2004.

Purpose

UNICEF decided that it was important to assess its preparedness effort and early response for Iraq with particular attention to preparedness. The Iraq crisis developed at a time when UNICEF's Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning process was becoming more widely used in the organisation, and preparedness in the sub-region received utmost attention. This presented an opportunity to examine the relevance and effectiveness of EPRP. The aim of the evaluation was to provide a critical reference for subsequent evaluations of subsequent stages of the UNICEF response in Iraq.

Objectives

As stated in the Terms of Reference (TOR), the overall objectives of the evaluation were:

- To briefly but systematically document UNICEF's experience in emergency preparedness planning, actual preparedness and early response, situating this in the context as it evolved
- To assess the overall relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of UNICEF preparedness efforts and early response
- To assess the degree to which preparedness and early response in Iraq was specific to that context and correspondingly what enduring lessons and concerns can be carried forward to strengthen organisational preparedness and response systems.

Scope

The evaluation exercise was limited in scope to UNICEF performance in preparedness planning and early response. The TOR recognised that, because of time and security constraints, the assessment of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness would be limited. The evaluation was required to cover all key support functions of UNICEF preparedness and response across UNICEF's decentralised structure, and to address a range of questions under the headings of Coordination, Preparedness Efforts, Actual Preparedness, Early Response, and Putting Iraq Experience into Perspective. The evaluation covered from September 2001, when the sub-regional effort was initiated, to 23 June 2003, the launching of the second UN Inter-Agency Appeal for Iraq drawn up in collaboration with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The evaluation was framed as an internal exercise because a future planned inter-agency evaluation will look more widely at the performance of United Nations agencies.

Methodology

The evaluation was based on more than 80 interviews, an extensive review of UNICEF documentation, a two-day "lessons-learned" workshop in Istanbul that was attended by key staff from relevant Regional and Country Offices and from Headquarters, and on feedback

sessions in Amman and New York. In addition to the limitations in scope mentioned above, the methodology was limited by the fact that no field trip inside Iraq could be included.

Context

UNICEF's emergency preparedness experience for Iraq was unique, not only for the long lead time the context allowed, but also for the scale of attention given by the organisation. The Iraq emergency was highly unusual in several respects in that Iraq has a very high political profile, the war was anticipated but with uncertain timing and unpredictable outcomes, governments both in the region and beyond were reluctant to be seen preparing for the humanitarian consequences of a conflict the UN was trying to head off, and the lead time was unusually long, giving UNICEF almost 18 months to prepare.

Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning

From October 2001, MENARO initiated a sub-regional Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) process including Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and GAO. A sub-regional contingency plan was produced and refined for almost one year, with individual country contingency plans being updated in the process. Of the scenarios considered, a large-scale attack or invasion by foreign countries on Baghdad and oil fields in the North and Southeast was considered most likely. The attack began on 20 March 2003, but the outcomes of the war were different from those anticipated in UNICEF and UN contingency plans. Mass displacement and ethnic conflict did not happen, while the security situation in Iraq after the war was far more difficult than expected, restricting the scope and geographical coverage of UNICEF's assistance to children and women.

UNICEF's sub-regional and country contingency planning was effective. Several factors made this possible, including: leadership of the EPRP process by MENARO; the preparation of detailed "to do" lists for each Country Office (CO); the inclusion of all aspects of operations from the outset; UNICEF's corporate commitment to strengthen its emergency response capability, backed by DFID funding; the presence in the sub-region of a cadre of staff with emergency experience; and, not least, the availability of EPF and CERF funding for preparedness.

Each CO achieved its planned level of standing readiness before the war. The planning processes were productive, but also drawn out and onerous, especially when combined with the effort required to support inter-agency planning.

The scale of UNICEF's emergency preparedness and early response was substantial. UNICEF actions within Iraq since the war, supported by cross-border operations from surrounding countries, have provided direct assistance to at least two million Iraqi children across a number of sectors.

UNICEF took action before the war in Iraq in order to mitigate its possible effects. UNICEF supported the Iraq government in pre-positioning thousands of tonnes of nutritional supplies (therapeutic milk and High Protein Biscuits) at community level. UNICEF intensified its support for the national breast-feeding promotion campaign, supported the health authorities' polio, measles and DTP campaigns for under 5s, and contracted mobile maintenance teams to repair water and sanitation facilities both before and during the war. UNICEF's strategy of placing preparedness supplies at community level in Iraq and in warehouses both inside and outside Iraq's borders not only gave it the flexibility to cope with a range of possible outcomes of the war, but also spread UNICEF's risk with regard to possible losses. The Iraq Country Office took the precaution of sending its better vehicles to neighbouring countries to reduce the risk of their being lost or damaged.

Response

Soon after the war started, UNICEF began tankering drinking water to Basra and surrounding areas from Kuwait. This was later extended to Baghdad. At its peak, UNICEF was supplying 4.5 million litres of water per day, enough for some 300,000 people. At the same time, UNICEF committed \$23 million for six months for spares, chemicals, equipment, and repairs to critical water and sewage systems, while making a one-off salary payment to 15,000 Baghdad Water Authority staff as an incentive to continue working.

UNICEF supported the restoration of the cold chain system for vaccines, rehabilitated hospital generators, supplied fuel and imported and distributed health supplies. In addition to the 3,600 tonnes of HPB purchased before the war, a further 22,000 tonnes were supplied during and immediately after the war.

UNICEF launched a Back to School campaign, building on the pressure from Iraqi families on the authorities to get schools reopened. UNICEF printed 15 million exam booklets to enable 4.5 million children (90% of those eligible) to take end-of-year exams. Damaged school buildings were rehabilitated and School-in-a-Box kits delivered throughout the country.

In Northern Iraq, UNICEF assisted 80% of children in institutions to return to their families before the war. In Baghdad, UNICEF provided material support and vehicles to help find children who were left in orphanages and abducted during the war. UNICEF's post-war Child Protection programme was slow to get off the ground, beyond meeting the basic needs of children in institutions.

UNICEF was one of few agencies to continue working in Iraq throughout the war. This was made possible by careful preparation and training before the evacuation of international personnel, and by the commitment and professionalism of national staff in Iraq, which have been recognised by UNICEF's Executive Director.

The major supply routes for cross-border operations were Turkey, Kuwait and Jordan. The Kuwait supply route proved contentious because it gave the appearance of working in collaboration with the Coalition forces invading Iraq from the south. Logistics and supply seem to have been effective, strengthened by Supply Division support to MENARO.

Funding

UNICEF made use of EPF funding on an unprecedented scale for emergency preparedness and took a calculated risk in borrowing \$5 million of CERF funds. A grant of \$2 million was made from UNICEF Regular Resources for emergency preparedness. By the start of the war, preparedness funding came to more than \$9 million without donor funds, and \$15 million with. The bulk of this funding was used for preparedness supplies. UNICEF used an additional \$5 million to pre-position supplies in northern Iraq, drawing on OFFP funds rather than EPF/CERF. Fundraising against the March Flash Appeal for \$166 million was initially slow, but picked up to 60% funded by the end of June. UNICEF's financial commitment towards preparedness and to early response up to June 2003 amounted to some \$80 million. The primary goal of this assistance was to ensure the protection of children and support their basic rights to access to water and sanitation, health and nutrition, and education.

Human Resources

Sub-regional preparedness depended on the redeployment of the large staff team from Iraq to the smaller UNICEF COs in surrounding countries. If a major IDP and refugee emergency

had occurred as a result of the war, UNICEF might not have had enough human resources available to meet its commitments. The availability of a sizeable team for redeployment from Iraq, and the long lead time for this emergency, masked UNICEF's lack of regional and global surge capacity. UNICEF will need to strengthen its systems if it is to meet its revised Core Corporate Commitments in emergencies.

Media Communications

UNICEF achieved a significant level of media coverage, not least through the News Desk in Amman, a new innovation for this crisis. This probably boosted its fundraising efforts. However, attempts to have an impact on the Arab media were seen as less successful and the Regional Office acknowledges that an improved strategy is required.

There was a general sense amongst staff that UNICEF could have done more to speak out in defence of the rights of women and children in Iraq. At the same time, the constraints on what UNICEF could and could not say within an agreed UN communications strategy were not well understood within the organisation, especially in the field, but also at HQ.

Policy

While the Core Corporate Commitments were influential in the design of both sub-regional and country-level contingency planning, UNICEF's human rights based approach to planning (HRBAP) in programming does not seem to have been. UNICEF acknowledges that it needs to articulate more clearly how HRBAP applies in EPRP and emergency response.

Guidance on civil-military relations needs strengthening as the Iraq experience has highlighted a lack of clarity at some points. More broadly, the challenge of needing security cover from military forces for the conduct of humanitarian operations has called into question the humanitarian principle of neutrality and the idea of "humanitarian space". UNICEF needs to work with UN and other partners to explore how these can be strengthened.

All aspects of operations featured prominently in planning and in detailed preparations by COs. There was a substantial investment in telecommunications equipment. All offices in the region upgraded their systems and met MOSS standards for telecoms. UNICEF was successful in securing telecoms licences for the whole UN system for Jordan and Syria, while VSAT installations were completed in Iraq in record time.

Security

There were no deaths or serious injuries to UNICEF staff during the study period, but security remained a constant concern before, during and after the war. No solutions were on offer in case of biological or chemical attack. UNICEF offices in Baghdad were looted and valuable equipment lost. Across Iraq, the value of UNICEF equipment and supplies lost to looting and other forms of damage is not known, but probably runs to millions of dollars. National staff were involved in security discussions, but UNICEF HQ now considers that security planning for national staff operating during the war was not adequate.

Procedures

Several shortcomings in financial and other procedures complicate and slow down UNICEF's progress in emergency response, authorisation and contract procedures. UNICEF's systems and control mechanisms have been devised for steady state development programming, aspects of which are not appropriate to emergency situations. Although this issue has been understood for some time, there is still no plan of action for addressing it.

Coordination

UNICEF combined well at country, regional, and HQ levels to make both preparedness and response phases successful. As the political profile of Iraq developed, the centre of gravity of UN decision-making moved away from the region, first to Geneva and then to New York. UNICEF put considerable human resources into the New York-based Iraq Support Unit from March 2003 on.

UNICEF made a substantial contribution to inter-agency planning and coordination at country, regional, Geneva, and HQ levels. In Iraq and the surrounding countries, UNICEF took on the coordination of at least one sector per country, usually two or three. UNICEF also provided the inter-agency sub-regional coordination for four sectors: water and sanitation, education, nutrition and child protection. Three out of four coordinators were seconded in from other organisations, an arrangement that generally worked well. In New York, UNICEF was an active member of the Steering Group for Iraq, bringing operational issues to the table and focusing discussions on the humanitarian implications of the decisions under consideration.

Summary of Main Recommendations

Developing Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning. A number of steps are proposed, including: the inclusion of UN and NGO partners into the preparedness planning process; the development of regional and global EPRP processes; the clearer formulation of human rights based approaches to programming in EPRP; greater results orientation; speeding up the process of making EPRP planning formats available on the UNICEF Intranet; and clarifying regional management of regional and sub-regional emergency preparedness and response.

Improving Emergency Human Resource Capacity. UNICEF requires better-developed registers of internal and external expertise for emergency response and proactive management to ensure that the registers are populated and kept up to date, with targets set by EMOPS. As part of this exercise, UNICEF should increase the number of individual secondments and agreements with seconding agencies. UNICEF will need to dedicate resources to achieving revised targets.

Key NGO Partners. It is proposed that sector specialists in UNICEF HQ covering education and nutrition take time to investigate possible key NGO partners and negotiate MOUs with them.

HRBAP in Emergencies. UNICEF is already aware of the need to improve the understanding of HRBAP in emergencies — a consultation process is already under way. UNICEF's initiatives to issue new instructions, guidance, and tools on HRBAP in emergencies are endorsed.

Streamlining ProMS. One or more staff members with emergency programme experience should join the ProMS Reference Group. These staff must be able to give attention to detail, be ready to take part in iterative discussions over a period of months, and be available to test prototypes. DFAM is open to such involvement.

The Wider UN. The following areas are proposed for debate and evaluation within the wider UN family: Coordination. In this evaluation, the performance of Resident Coordinators and OCHA was reported to be patchy. Can the UN Secretariat address long-standing weaknesses in coordination? Neutrality and Humanitarian Space. UNICEF needs to continue to be an active participant in UN and IASC debates, defending humanitarian

principles and finding ways for their integrity to be restored. Working under Occupation. The UN needs to develop guidance on working under military occupation. Human rights based approaches. UNICEF should initiate a debate with other agencies on how best to apply HRBAP in emergencies. CAP. Consideration should be given to funding inter-agency planning and coordination from the Consolidated Appeal Process.

Summary of Other Recommendations

1. *Regional Communications.* UNICEF needs a new communications strategy for addressing the media in Arab countries, taking into account the significance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
2. *Donations-in-Kind.* UNICEF should explore how to increase its donations–in-kind fundraising for emergencies by tapping into the experience of agencies that have developed this area of fundraising.
3. *National Staff Security.* National staff should be more fully involved in security discussions.
4. *Accountability for Security.* UNICEF needs to strengthen RO supervision and CO management accountability for security.
5. *Sector Coordination.* Where UNICEF intends to provide inter-agency sector coordination, it should not assume that the coordinator can provide UNICEF programme management capacity as well.
6. *Warehousing.* Custom-bonded warehouses should be used for shipments expected to be sent on to another country¹.
7. *Tracking System.* The evaluation endorses UNICEF’s plan to develop a corporate commodity tracking by mid-2004.
8. *Local Market Surveys.* The concept of local market surveys should be extended to other potential emergencies as part of future EPRP.

¹ See also Istanbul workshop recommendation 65.

1. INTRODUCTION

The evaluation was commissioned by the Iraq Country Office, the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (MENARO), and the Evaluation Office and managed by a team with one representative from each office. The evaluation was carried out by an external evaluation consultant, assisted by a research consultant, between September 2003 and January 2004.

1.1 Context and Purpose

UNICEF's emergency preparedness experience for Iraq was unique, not only for the long lead time the context allowed, but also for the scale of attention given by the organisation. UNICEF decided that it was important to assess its preparedness effort and early response for Iraq but with particular attention to preparedness. The Iraq crisis developed at a time when UNICEF's Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning process was becoming more widely used in the sub-region and this presented an opportunity to examine the relevance and effectiveness of EPRP. The aim of the evaluation was to provide a critical reference for subsequent evaluations of subsequent stages of the UNICEF response in Iraq. The evaluation was framed as an internal exercise because a future planned inter-agency evaluation will look more widely at the performance of United Nations agencies.

1.2 Objectives

As stated in the Terms of Reference (TOR), the overall objectives of the evaluation were:

- To briefly but systematically document UNICEF's experience in emergency preparedness planning, actual preparedness and early response, situating this in the context as it evolved
- To assess the overall relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of UNICEF preparedness efforts and early response
- To assess the degree to which preparedness and early response in Iraq was specific to that context and correspondingly what enduring lessons and concerns can be carried forward to strengthen organisational preparedness and response systems.

1.3 Scope

The evaluation exercise was limited in scope to UNICEF performance in preparedness planning and early response. The TOR recognised that, because of time and security constraints, the assessment of relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness would be limited.

The evaluation was required to cover all key support functions of UNICEF preparedness and response, including coordination, emergency preparedness planning, human resource management, supply and logistics, external communications/media relations, funding, financial management, ICT, and security of staff and UNICEF assets. The evaluation has examined preparedness and response across UNICEF's decentralised structure, including the part played by headquarters (New York, Copenhagen, and Geneva), the MENA Regional Office, the Iraq Country Office, and the neighbouring country offices: Iran, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, plus GAO and Kuwait.

The evaluation covered from September 2001, when the sub-regional effort was initiated, to 23 June 2003, the launching of the second UN Inter-Agency Appeal for Iraq drawn up in collaboration with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

1.4 Methodology

The evaluation was based on:

1. More than 80 interviews, all except seven of which were internal to UNICEF and drawn from the Amman Regional Office, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Turkey Country Offices and the GAO, EMOPS Geneva, and New York. As this was primarily an internal evaluation, UNICEF decided that interviews with outside informants would be limited. The few external informants included a Resident Coordinator and representatives of the UN Deputy Secretary General's office, OCHA, and UNHCR, plus sector coordinator secondees from other organisations
2. A desk review of a substantial body of documentation provided by UNICEF HQ, MENA Regional Office and relevant Country Offices
3. A two-day lessons-learned workshop held in Istanbul on 2-3 October 2003 (Istanbul workshop), which was attended by those key staff from the Regional Office and Country Offices in the sub-region, and those from CEE/CIS, Geneva, and New York most closely involved in the Iraq crisis preparedness and response²
4. Presentation and discussion with MENARO and a cross-section of staff in UNICEF HQ in New York and Geneva, as part of an effort to verify the evaluation findings and initial recommendations, which proved very helpful in refining the analysis and correcting factual errors
5. Regular consultation with the Division of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) and Programme Division (PD, Field Support and Inter-agency Coordination, FSIAC), as well as other headquarters divisions³ and COs from the sub-region at key stages. Further clarifications were made via e-mail and telephone discussion.

Because of the security situation in Iraq, which was worsening during the field work stage of the evaluation, it was not feasible for the evaluation consultant to visit Iraq. The Istanbul workshop partially compensated for this because individual interviews with key staff were fitted around the workshop sessions. A key missing informant to the evaluation was the former Iraq Programme Coordinator, who was killed in the bombing of the UN offices in Baghdad on 19 August 2003.

The evaluation aims to balance the views of informants, but because no direct observations have been possible, UNICEF perspectives have not, for the most part, been tested against external opinion. As a result, the evaluation relies largely on the observations and views of internal staff. Where the consultant's own assessment differs from this balance of views, this is made clear in the report. The consultant takes full responsibility for the report's analysis and recommendations.

An overall assessment of relevance and efficiency is included in the final section. For reasons set out in the TOR, especially the study period ending only three months after the start of UNICEF's emergency response, the assessment of effectiveness is, at best, tentative.

1.5 Approach

In making a general assessment of the relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness, the evaluation seeks to compare UNICEF emergency preparedness for Iraq with its response to the Iraq crisis. The evaluation has taken this as the only test of preparedness — that is, the

² The Istanbul workshop report 'UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response in the Iraq Crisis — Results of the Iraq sub-regional lessons learned workshop, Istanbul 2-3 October 2003' (undated) is available from MENARO. Findings and recommendations from the workshop report are extensively quoted and referenced here. While a part of the evaluation methodology, the workshop is a stand-alone document due to be reviewed by a UNICEF committee in order to draw appropriate action points from the lessons recorded.

³ DPP, PFO, DOC, SD, DHR, DFAM, ITD.

value of preparedness can only be tested against the quality of response. Because mass population movements within and from Iraq did not take place as envisaged, any such assessment is necessarily limited in its scope.

The evaluation and research consultants attended the two-day sub-regional meeting in Istanbul, October 2003⁴. Although the evaluation report was informed by the workshop, it is quite separate and provides a companion report. The recommendations from the workshop stand alone and require follow-up by UNICEF independently of this evaluation, especially as there is only limited overlap between the recommendations of the two reports.

All informants have acknowledged that the Iraq crisis was extremely unusual, and perhaps never to be repeated. For UNICEF, therefore, the learning from this evaluation relates to those aspects of the crisis that were not unique. To explore the learning potential further, the evaluation considers some emergency outcomes differing from those that actually prevailed.

1.6 The Report

The evaluation report has two parts. The first, this document, briefly summarises UNICEF's preparedness and response for Iraq, and provides observations and recommendations for the future. The second document, the Annex, provides a detailed record of the actions taken by UNICEF in preparedness and response. The Annex is designed as source material for later UNICEF or inter-agency evaluations.

The main report aims to be manageable enough to appeal to a general UNICEF readership without being superficial⁵. The overall goal has been to provide a balanced analysis and a set of recommendations UNICEF can use to build on its experience in Iraq.

Appendix 1 is the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the evaluation, Appendix 2 is a schedule of interviewees/informants, and Appendix 3 is the list of documents consulted.

⁴ UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response in the Iraq crisis — Results of the Iraq Sub-Regional lessons learned exercise, Istanbul, 2-3 October 2003.

⁵ The UNICEF Evaluation Office gave a limit of 50 pages for the main report.

2. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS/RESPONSE⁶ — CONTEXT

2.1 Background

The Gulf War of 1991 and the UN sanctions that followed weakened the infrastructure of Iraq and affected the daily lives of Iraqis. The impact of sanctions on the population led the UN and Iraq to agree to the establishment in 1996 of the humanitarian Oil for Food Programme (OFFP), managed by the UN Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP), with OFFP resources managed by the UN as funds in trust. The OFFP was implemented by the UN in the three Northern governorates of Iraq and by the Iraq government in the south and centre of the country, with the UN acting as observers. Sanctions against Iraq were lifted on the eve of the war (18 March 2003) under Security Council resolution 1472 and the management of OFFP in the south/centre was handed over temporarily to the Secretary General⁷.

UNICEF had been working in Iraq since the 1950s and has had a permanent presence there since 1983. UNICEF regarded the situation in Iraq following the Gulf War as an ongoing emergency based on the deteriorating situation of women and children. UNICEF as part of the UN was involved in implementation of OFFP resources in the three northern governorates. In south/central Iraq, the UNICEF-Iraq country programme provided cash resources and added value to the OFFP, which could only be used for supply contracts administered by the government. Additional resources were raised from humanitarian funders, for example ECHO.

Before the crisis, UNICEF had a substantial team in Iraq. As of January 2003, UNICEF had 38 international personnel (IPs) and 142 national staff in northern Iraq and 20 IPs and 43 national staff in the south/centre. UNICEF had unparalleled base data for emergency planning, drawing on its surveys and assessments (for example mortality and nutrition surveys supported through its country programme). UNICEF's traditional role in supporting data-gathering on the situation of children and women was accentuated by the increased demand and resources for data collection associated with OFFP. It appears that UNICEF had a comparative advantage from its capacity, experience, and information over most other national or international agencies.

The war in Afghanistan showed that military action against other countries in the region was a possibility. Immediately after 11 September 2001, the UNICEF Regional Director initiated a contingency planning process to ensure that UNICEF would be prepared for future crises in the region. By early 2002, it was becoming clear that Iraq was the country most likely to be affected.

Contingency planning for Iraq therefore took place against the highly unusual backdrop of a likely armed conflict for which UNICEF had more than a year to prepare. The outcomes were highly uncertain and included the potential threat of the use of biological and chemical weapons, and possibly a wider regional destabilisation.

The Iraq crisis was, above all, a political emergency of the highest profile to which UNICEF felt bound to pay close attention. To UNICEF's credit, it foresaw the potential scale of the political and humanitarian crisis well before the potential war started making headlines, and mobilised for emergency preparedness before other agencies.

⁶ Please refer to the Annex for sources for the statistics used in Sections 2 and 3.

⁷ OFFP continued under SCR 1472 and SCR 1483 until 21 November 2003, at which time the UN handed over the programme to the Coalition Provisional Authority.

2.2 Conditions in Pre-War Iraq

Before 2003, the Iraqi population was already in a vulnerable state because of sanctions and its dependence on OFFP. By 2001, child survival rates had declined such that Iraq was bottom of the league of 201 countries in its progress in child survival⁸. Before the war, Iraq had up to 2.5 million displaced people and refugees, and 18 million people were food insecure. Although indicators for malnourishment had shown some improvement in 2002 as a result of nutrition programmes with which UNICEF was engaged, other indicators of well-being for children were in decline. Half of the schools were deemed unfit for teaching, with 5,000 new buildings needed; one in four school-age children were not attending; teachers' salaries had fallen to \$3-5 per month. Access to safe water was at 41% and falling, with 500,000 tons of raw sewage dumped each day. Seven million people were dependent on water treatment powered by the electricity grid without a back-up generator and 5 million people were dependent on sanitation through powered sewage pumping stations.

2.3 The Effects of War

The war had serious negative consequences for children and women. As coalition forces gained control in Iraq, they failed to provide security for institutions and key infrastructure. As the war proceeded, there was substantial destruction and material depletion of institutions, with spare parts, water treatment chemicals, equipment, and service vehicles looted. Government and UN offices, including UNICEF, were burnt and/or looted. Security problems became the overriding limitation on humanitarian work by all agencies. According to UNICEF reports, children reported difficulties for their families to support them and the number of street and working children increased, as did the number of observations of abuse and exploitation of children. It was reported that one third of U5s in hospitals was malnourished.

A nutrition survey conducted in Baghdad in April showed that acute malnutrition rates had risen significantly from 4% pre-war to 7.7%, the number of reported diarrhoea episodes doubled, and the number of severely malnourished in hospitals increased.

Water distribution and sewerage networks were badly damaged by breakages and bombing. Half of water treatment plants were out of action. Power supply was disrupted to 40% of water and sewerage plants, where staff were increasingly unable to work due to lack of safe conditions. The discharge of raw sewage led to cholera outbreaks. In Baghdad, 21% of the schools were damaged and 67% of public health centres were not working after the war, although the health infrastructure recovered relatively quickly.

Northern Iraq was relatively little affected by the conflict. The initial internal displacement of perhaps 50,000 people quickly fell back to 10,000-20,000, the majority of which did not require material assistance because of Iraq's social network. Surrounding countries were little affected by the outcome of the conflict in terms of mass displacements.

⁸ In 2002, U5 mortality in S/C was 136 of 1,000 live births, 2.5 times the level recorded in 1990 – Iraq Donor Update – 14 January 2003. Infant mortality increased from 47 to 108 per 1,000 live births from 1994-1999 – “Iraq surveys show 'humanitarian emergency'”, 12 August 1999.

3. PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE BY COUNTRY

3.1 Iraq

3.1.1 Preparedness and Mitigation Measures

The capacity of individuals and infrastructure to withstand any emergency was enhanced by the pre-delivery of supplies (food, fuel, nutrition and health equipment and supplies, education and WES supplies), and the pre-crisis rehabilitation of critical infrastructure (generators, water and sanitation installations, schools). The pre-war distribution to communities of 155 tonnes of therapeutic milk and 1,575 metric tonnes of HPB by the government with UNICEF support was intended to provide households with an additional two months' supply of food before the war began. This took advantage of the government's highly developed food distribution network. In preparation for a response to the anticipated numbers of IDPs, standing readiness was set up to provide assistance within 48 hours for 550,000 IDPs⁹ for four weeks, with pre-positioned supplies at community level, in the north of Iraq and in the Baghdad warehouse¹⁰.

In addition to the pre-positioning \$10 million worth of supplies in the months before the war, UNICEF:

- Intensified its support for the national breast-feeding promotion campaign and its nutritional programme
- Supported the MOH in its polio and measles vaccination campaigns (achieving 98% and 92% coverage) and a DTP campaign benefiting 4.2 million U5s
- Provided local authorities in North Iraq with ORS, therapeutic milk, emergency health kits blankets, stoves and cooking equipment
- Signed agreements with partners
- Provided training to teachers and medical personnel to sustain services during an emergency
- Revised management and HR systems were instigated and tested to run without IPs. Security of staff was a key consideration.

3.1.2 Evacuation

The last group of IPs left Iraq on 18 March, telecommunications from UNICEF Baghdad were cut from 19 March, and the war began on 20 March. National staff ran the office and UNICEF response during war for all except three days (8 – 10 April) when the office was closed (and looted). In the north of Iraq, all three offices remained functional. The contribution made to UNICEF's response by the national staff and the OIC under exceptionally difficult circumstances was recognised by the Executive Director¹¹. UNICEF's early response took place in the context of a total breakdown of the administrative functions in Iraq, with accompanying lack of human and financial resources to maintain the infrastructure and basic services. In addition the anarchic law and order situation made security an ongoing concern.

⁹ 250,000 in the north, and 300,000 in the S/C.

¹⁰ \$800,000 - \$1 million worth of **supplies** were being held in the UNICEF Baghdad warehouse in case of need by IDPs. The warehouse was hit by a Coalition missile. Some **supplies** had already been removed and the value of the loss is unknown. Further losses of UNICEF purchased supplies and equipment already distributed within Iraq in preparation for the war are unknown.

¹¹ The circumstances in Iraq were unusual but not unique as UNICEF relies on the professionalism of its national staff to continue its programmes whenever IPs have to leave.

3.1.3 National Staff

National staff were paid three months' salary in advance of the war. At the same time, UNICEF emptied its bank accounts in Baghdad before the war broke out, in accordance with UN evacuation procedure, leaving UNICEF with no cash for operations. The commitment of national staff to UNICEF's continuing operations was shown by the Operations Officer being able to accumulate more than \$100,000 in cash lent by national staff. This was used to fund emergency activities and repaid after the war on the strength of IOU's issued by the Baghdad office.

3.1.4 Assessments

The main priorities of early response were to carry out rapid assessments for each sector, assess the scope of the looting, then, based on the assessments, bring in the most critical supplies and re-establish the water and sanitation functions.

3.1.5 Water, Environment and Sanitation

UNICEF considered water, environment and sanitation (WES) to be the most important sector¹². The supply of drinking water, already short before the war, became critical, and the dumping of raw sewage into the Tigris raised fears of a diarrhoea epidemic. A key part of WES preparedness was putting in place mobile teams and pre-paying contractors so that they would be able to keep WES facilities operational after the war began¹³. A regional agreement was drawn up with Oxfam GB as a basis for further country-level agreements to provide services both in Iraq and surrounding countries.

Tankering of fresh water to Baghdad and the S/C of the country began within 10 days of the start of the war. By June the average daily capacity being delivered by tanker to Baghdad was 2 million litres, and in the south, 2.5 million litres. Operations to deal with sewage discharge were begun at hospitals in Baghdad, and garbage collection was supported in three districts of Baghdad.

Fuel and water purification chemicals were supplied to institutions and WTPs. During May UNICEF made a one-off payment to 15,000 Baghdad Water Authority staff as an incentive to continue working, as they had received no salaries for two to three months.

After the war, UNICEF made an initial commitment of \$23 million for a six-month period for spares, chemicals, equipment, and repairs to critical water and sewage systems, and to solid waste management, training, and hygiene promotion¹⁴. In one month, 63 contracts were let for the sewerage sector alone. The progress of the WES response was helped by having both a Country Representative and Head of Basra Sub-Office with a background in water supply.

3.1.6 Health and Nutrition

Health was considered the second most important sector. Frequent power cuts meant that hospitals were reliant on their own generators (often malfunctioning, and with fuel shortages). When power cuts caused a breakdown of the cold chain and all vaccines were lost, UNICEF acted to rehabilitate generators, supply fuel, and, following a rehabilitation of the central vaccine warehouse, brought in supplies of vaccines from Damascus. With

¹² The response was concentrated in the south/centre.

¹³ Some of these contractors offered their assistance as soon as UNICEF reopened its office in Baghdad, three days after the Coalition entered Baghdad.

¹⁴ By comparison, the UNICEF country programme of cooperation budget in Iraq was ~\$8 million per year for 2002-2004 (RR plus OR).

UNICEF support, the MOH launched a routine vaccination programme in mid-June by which time 80% of medical facilities had resumed services. Increases in diarrhoea (including cholera cases) and malnutrition were reported from health centres and hospitals. UNICEF made inventories of supplies needed in hospitals and health centres; drugs, ORS, and other health supplies were imported and distributed. During her visit to Iraq on 17-18 May, the Executive Director toured hospitals and emphasised breastfeeding as a means of preventing widespread infant diarrhoea.

3.1.7 Education

UNICEF did not have a strong education programme in Iraq before the war. A request to the Ministry of Education to cooperate in a study similar to that done on the impact of sanctions on health status of children was declined, partly because they saw the subject as too sensitive. The programme was missing elements of curriculum development and teacher training (apart from a pilot education project started in Basra in 2001) and in practice was confined to the rehabilitation of a few school buildings. During the preparedness phase, education was given a higher priority outside Iraq than inside.

Ministry of Education warehouses were completely looted and destroyed. Some schools were used for accommodation by soldiers or as ammunition dumps, or had been lived in by the few IDPs who left their homes. Iraqi families put pressure on the authorities for schools to resume. Damaged school buildings were rehabilitated, and School in a Box kits delivered throughout the country. UNICEF advocated for a quick return to school, and, in the north, provided transport to and from school as an incentive. By June all schools in the north had resumed. During her May visit, Carol Bellamy emphasised the importance of schooling¹⁵. UNICEF printed 15 million exam booklets to enable approximately 4.5 million children¹⁶ to take their end-of-year exams. This was a major achievement and represented an "academic year saved". However, UNICEF also reported later that school attendance rates were below the pre-war average of 75% — itself an unacceptably low rate.

3.1.8 Child Protection

In pre-war Iraq, UNICEF's child protection programmes differed markedly between the north and south/central Iraq. In general, child abuse is a highly sensitive subject in Iraq (and in the region more widely). In south/centre Iraq, UNICEF had rehabilitated a number of orphanages, but had not been able to work more actively with children and families on protection issues.

Consistent with the Core Corporate Commitments (2000), preparedness focused on separated children¹⁷, although the lack of population movement meant that this was not an issue. Leaflets and radio messages were used to encourage parents to make sure children knew their names and addresses.

Ten days before the war, UNICEF met with the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs in Baghdad to be told of the location of orphans¹⁸ still remaining in orphanages. UNICEF then organized the distribution of supplies to the orphanages that still had children, with the last one served being in Kerabala and reached the day before the arrival of US troops. In the north, 80% of children from institutions were reunited with their families before the war broke out.

¹⁵ For UNICEF, the return to school was not just about education. UNICEF has come to see schools as a key point of protection and normalcy for children. "...school is actually one of the most protective places for children to be...children are safe from exploitation. They are safe from the unexploded ordinance, which litters Iraq's towns. They are learning about mine awareness and hygiene practices...they are provided with positive outlets for their energies, their creativity, and their emotions." From a Submission to the Security Council (undated), following CB visit to Iraq on 17-18 May.

¹⁶ More than 90% of eligible students.

¹⁷ According to the CCCs, the issue of separated children was UNICEF's main commitment (at least before Martigny II).

¹⁸ Many of these children were not in fact orphans but were institutionalised for social reasons; for example because of the remarriage of the mother to a man unwilling to cope with her children.

Many of the children who were left in institutions when the war began were abducted during the chaos that followed. UNICEF and partners attempted to locate these children and managed to help a few to return. Food and non-food supplies were delivered to orphanages. UNICEF also cooperated with the Iraq Media Network to broadcast spots on mine awareness, as children were being injured and killed by UXOs on a daily basis.

Following the war, UNICEF provided offices, vehicles, and personnel for the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare to help locate children from institutions who had run away or been abducted during the emergency. Some children were located, but success in persuading them to return to the institutions was limited.

There was some confusion over the question of child soldiers. While the Saddam Hussein regime had a form of military training for young people, the use of child soldiers was not a significant issue. Nonetheless, certain external bodies and some sections of the media pressured UNICEF HQ to say that this was a significant issue, which UNICEF resisted. Some in the Iraq CO said they felt that HQ was presenting the issue of child soldiers as a priority, while sector specialists in New York said this was not the case.

UNICEF was active in preparedness for Child Protection, but was slow to adjust its response to the actual circumstances following the war (the lack of separated children). UNICEF's own programming for post-war Child Protection in Iraq was delayed and little had been achieved by the end of the study period¹⁹. This partly stemmed from differences of opinion between the Iraq CO on one hand and MENARO and the sector coordinator for Child Protection on the other. The coordinator felt that the CO needed additional professional resources, a view the Iraq Representative did not agree with.

In June 2003, UNICEF commissioned a countrywide child protection assessment, dividing the country into zones to be covered by five partner INGOs²⁰.

3.1.9 Mine Awareness

UNICEF reached an agreement with ICRC on a geographical division of areas of operation with regard to mine awareness and mine risk education. Inside Iraq, the ICRC was already active in the southern governorates in cooperation with the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS). ICRC took responsibility therefore for mine awareness in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Syria, while UNICEF was to take responsibility for Iran (working with ICRC teams in the south), Turkey, and Saudi Arabia²¹.

3.1.10 ICT

Telecommunications from UNICEF Baghdad were cut between 19 March and 13 April. While ICT equipment was looted from the Baghdad office, national staff were able to maintain contact with the sub-regional Iraq Office set up in Amman. The IT Officer and Regional Telecoms Officer MENARO were in the 2nd convoy bringing IP staff back to Baghdad on 15 May. Systems in northern Iraq were unaffected by the war.

¹⁹ It appears to have picked up momentum with a new strategy and NGO partners engaged.

²⁰ This was completed in November.

²¹ As set out in a letter from the Delegate-General for the Middle East and North Africa, ICRC to the UNICEF Regional Director, 19 March 2003, Geneva.

3.1.11 Security

Security for national staff was an issue. The office remained under Phase 5. In early April, the military forces had no orders to recognise the UN or offer protection, but by the end of the month the coalition forces had agreed to provide security for transportation of UNICEF supplies. Immediately after the entry of Coalition forces into Baghdad, UNICEF vehicles were not being used at all as a matter of security. Assessment visits were made in drivers' private cars, and field visits were restricted to within Baghdad. All female members of staff were accompanied on field visits by male members of staff. The arrival of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in June opened the way for increased dialogue between the UN, the Iraqis, and the CPA.

3.2 Iran

Iran was seen as the destination of choice for most refugees from Iraq, should there be an exodus. The government took a strong lead in preparedness activities through the Ministry of the Interior (Bureau of Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs [BAFIA]), considering UN agencies as providers of supplies rather than partners. The government eventually settled on 11 refugee campsites, all located in the militarised zone between Iraq and Iran. The UNICEF investment in preparedness was approximately \$1 million and the Iranian government's was ~\$10 million.

UNICEF Iran CO signed an agreement with the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rather than with the more conservative BAFIA. Reportedly, this gave UNICEF greater flexibility than some agencies to move in the provincial centres near the border with Iraq, saving time and resources, although efforts were made to establish and maintain good working relations with BAFIA.

The Iran CO re-deployed staff members with experience from the Afghan emergency, including a full-time Emergency Coordinator. Standing readiness was established for 100,000 refugees and IDPs with warehouse supplies, including therapeutic feeding, WES, health kits, non-food items, and SIAB kits. UNICEF took the lead role for mine awareness and provided training for over 100 Red Crescent volunteers in preparation for their work at the border and in the refugee camps²². As leader of the Working Group on Health, UNICEF also organised the global plan, and ran an information campaign to allay Iranian fears that Iraqi refugees would bring in measles, anthrax, or smallpox²³.

The Iran UNCT set up the Task Force on Iraq (TFI) in July 2002 under UNHCR leadership. OCHA arrived in January 2003 and struggled to find a role, as did UNJLC. Their performance was considered to be weak. Differences arose between UNICEF and UNHCR because of their contradictory mandates. For UNHCR, preparedness was naturally oriented towards people crossing the border into Iran, at which point their rights to protection would be assured under the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. UNICEF geared up to support refugees, or IDPs stuck at the border, and to execute cross-border operations to support Iraqis in Iraq.

A sub-office was opened in Kermanshah in November 2002 and a second in Ahwaz in March 2003 to support operations into southern Iraq. The Iran CO reported that a few of

²² The militarised zone is said to contain some 12 million land mines.

²³ The last two being associated with biological weapons.

the Iraq IP staff redeployed to these offices did not have the necessary skills for an emergency operation, having formerly been OFFP observers in Iraq²⁴.

Having seen its role at the start of the preparedness exercise as one of providing support to a government-led response, Iran CO later took a more proactive line on child protection and education²⁵ activities. This was based on their interpretation of a human rights based approach to planning, leading to the setting up of schools and safe areas for refugee/IDP children.

UNICEF agreed at regional level that UNICEF Iran would take the lead role for WES, somewhat to the surprise of the Country Office, which had no WES capacity. WES skills came from staff from Iraq and from OXFAM. The MOU with OXFAM also covered nutrition, but differences between the two organisations' understanding of food security led to some difficulty, which needs to be resolved for the future.

As there were very few refugees/IDPs following the invasion of Iraq, response activity focused on cross-border convoys. In total, UNICEF sent 17 convoys into Iraq (but not all by June 23). The Country Office considers that it could have done much more, but was not called upon to do so due, in part, to inadequate communication and coordination between UNICEF in Kuwait and Iran.

When the UNICEF supply line from Kuwait came on stream, Iran was asked to suspend activities. UNICEF's partners were surprised by the change of tack. The CO, having established a response capability, but frustrated because it was not being used, took the initiative by filling 76,000 donated jerry cans with drinking water and shipping them into southern Iraq. Each convoy required multiple authorisations from the Iranian authorities, the first taking "only" five days to be authorised²⁶, while the Coalition demanded at least 48 hours warning. Inside Iraq, the UK military did not provide security cover for convoys, but agreed to increase patrols along the route UNICEF was using²⁷.

Iran CO's foresight in having set up custom-bonded warehouses facilitated the re-export of imported goods, as they did not have to be re-cleared. Warehouse storage was provided for "Iraqi-owned" goods — mainly medical kits — facilitating their export to Iraq, a lesson for future cross-border operations.

UNICEF was commended by the Iranian government as having been effective in both preparedness and response. Despite limited media coverage²⁸, UNICEF enhanced its profile in Iran by lobbying government. In part, influence came from having supplies in the warehouse. As a CO informant put it, "when there is something in the warehouse, people listen".

3.3 Jordan

The Jordanian government was unwilling to discuss preparedness until a very late stage²⁹ and then demanded significant financial assistance from UNHCR, eventually constructing a

²⁴ A disagreement arose at the Istanbul workshop (October 2003) over whether staff from Iraq had appropriate emergency experience. The root of this disagreement was that all OFFP programmes were designated as emergencies and so considered themselves to have emergency experience – but this did not necessarily include being able to deal with a fast-moving, chaotic situation.

²⁵ Other UN agencies interpreted child protection in the light of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, with the emphasis on reuniting separated children with their families. Both UN agencies and the government of Iran did not share UNICEF's emphasis on the need to re-start schooling as soon as possible in an emergency to restore normality to children's lives.

²⁶ Compared with 16 days for convoys during the Afghan crisis.

²⁷ This was seen positively, as convoy escorts were viewed as negative for UNICEF's image and perhaps safety.

²⁸ A short-term media professional was requested by Iran CO, but shortly after arrival was lent to Kuwait and only returned to pack up and leave.

²⁹ Agreement was given by the Government of Jordan to establish two refugee camps in mid-February 2003.

large and sophisticated camp structure near the border with Iraq. This delay in acknowledging the need for emergency preparedness impeded cooperation between the government and the UNCT, and wasted valuable lead time.

UNICEF preparedness activity was designed to meet the emergency needs of 10,000 refugees for two weeks. Health kits, cold chain equipment, water purification, feeding kits, and tents were pre-positioned and six temporary staff were recruited. UNICEF also supported a study of the Ministry of Health capacity to respond to the emergency and prepared to support the establishment of a health clinic within the first 24 hours. As lead agency for Education, UNICEF organised a sector coordination meeting, provided tents, teaching materials, textbooks and education equipment for teachers and children, and provided Ministry of Education staff with training on multi-grade teaching and psychosocial support.

In other sectors, UNICEF identified the gaps in the response capacity of both the government and NGO counterparts. These were addressed in various workshops covering rapid assessment and service delivery, and included the Directorate of Civil Defence, the Ministry of Health, the Jordan Red Crescent Society and private physicians who were trained on trauma in emergencies. As part of operations preparedness, UNICEF rented and equipped a building to serve as sub-office and guesthouse for UNICEF staff in the event of receiving a large number of refugees. In late February, UNICEF was given permission to release information to the press through the Ministry of Information offices. In the end, fewer than 1,000 refugees were registered in Jordan, for which UNICEF provided schooling in the camps. (The above-mentioned building was ultimately used to accommodate Ministry of Education teachers assigned to these schools for refugees.)

The Jordan UNCT had little experience of emergencies but the UNCT Resident Coordinator was seen as effective, with good support from OCHA.

Challenges identified in discussion with the Jordan CO concerning the preparedness process included:

- The Iraq News Desk bypassed the Jordan CO Communications in interacting with Jordanian media
- The Jordan CO felt relatively unsupported by RO/HQ in staffing terms
- UNHCR, ICRC, and UNICEF all had different concepts of “protection”.

3.4 Syria

In April 2002, the collapse of a dam in Syria allowed UNICEF to demonstrate its response capacity and to emphasise to government and other agencies the benefits of developing an emergency contingency plan. Following this, the government and other partners became more willing to prepare for a possible crisis in Iraq, but only at a technical level. For political reasons, the government was reticent to recognise the impending war and delayed their public acknowledgement of the need for emergency preparedness until 4 March, while cooperating informally with UN preparedness activity before that date.

Activities focused on the rehabilitation of two refugee camps that had been set up after the Gulf War: Al-Hol and Al-Haseke. As lead agency for WES, UNICEF built a water supply for 20,000 and sanitation for 5,000 at Al-Hol camp, in partnership with OXFAM. WES supplies were pre-positioned at Al-Hol camp. At Al-Yoroubiya border reception point, water storage equipment and sanitary facilities were installed. A warehouse near Al-Haseke city was used for trans-border supplies. Health and education supplies were pre-positioned and training given on health, nutrition, and education. WFP initially took on the lead role for nutrition in Syria but subsequently handed it back to UNICEF.

A local market survey conducted in advance of the crisis was not used by Copenhagen SD. Much of the effort that went into developing the Syria CO's logistics capacity was wasted because Syria was not used as a supply route (except for some convoys of health and WES supplies) for reasons the CO is still not clear about.

Before the war, some 30,000 - 35,000 Iraqis crossed into Syria looking for sanctuary. They did not need or request asylum because they were either well off or had relatives with which to stay. In any event, very few refugees arrived at Al-Hol camp, perhaps 500. A larger number of Third Country Nationals was held at the transit centre close to the border, which was open for the duration of the conflict, apart from a few days when it was closed by Syria under pressure from the US to prevent Saddam's forces from escaping.

Despite the small number of refugees, the Syrian CO provided health supplies to Al-Hol, paid the health workers at the camp and the Al-Yoroubiya reception centre; supported a camp kindergarten and primary school; provided nutritional supplies to UNHCR and SRCS and assessed the psychosocial status of camp occupants using a questionnaire.

Inter-agency coordination does not seem to have worked well in Syria. Tensions arose when refugees could not understand why supplies were sitting in the warehouse and could not be given out. WFP declined to distribute food, as it does not provide assistance for refugee/IDP camps of fewer than 5,000 persons. This took a week to resolve. Relations with UNHCR were not helped by differences over an agreement with NGOs, which was prepared by UNICEF, but which UNHCR declined to sign. All UN agencies involved opened offices in Al-Haseke, with some 60 foreigners arriving in quick succession, causing embarrassment to the Regional Governor. The UN needs to consider how inter-agency coordination could better manage such an influx.

3.5 Turkey

The Turkish Government was wary of permitting a mass influx of refugees as a result of its experience during the Gulf War. Their public strategy was to create a "safe" zone inside Iraqi territory where assistance would be provided to displaced people. Despite this, 10 refugee camps were prepared by the government for 80,000 people inside Turkey, the locations of which were kept secret from the UN until shortly before the war.

Although the Turkey CO appointed a consultant to cover the coordination role for emergency preparedness, preparedness activities caused some diversion of effort from, and delays to, the regular programme. There was friction in the CO over the appointment of a consultant to act as Emergency Officer (or equivalent), who had limited emergency experience, but who was reported to have learned quickly. The UNHCR preparedness figures for Turkey ultimately proved to be too high but this assisted UNICEF with its fundraising for Turkey.

UNICEF set up sub-offices at Diyarbakir and Silopi. The Diyarbakir office was set up by UNICEF for all UN agencies, including the installation of computer wiring and office equipment. The UN invested a total of \$400,000 in telecommunications equipment and furniture for Diyarbakir and Silopi. Despite this, UNICEF Silopi was not able to communicate with UNICEF northern Iraq due to the Turkish government's restrictions on HF communications. The sub-offices were staffed mainly by redeployed staff from Iraq, although additional administrative and financial assistants were also recruited.

Health kits, ORS, tents, and school in a box kits were pre-positioned. Health coordination and planning were strengthened by the arrival in February of a health consultant. Training

was given on psychosocial support, and the preparedness benefited from visits by Advisors in Education and Mine Awareness.

A large number of IDPs close to the border with northern Iraq would have presented a challenge for UNICEF, as the government was adamant that the UN would not have been allowed to cross the border to assist IDPs (or "asylum seekers" as they were termed) in northern Iraq. In any event, no refugees or IDPs arrived at the border.

Of the humanitarian corridors supporting Iraq, Turkey transported the largest amount, with 400,000 tonnes shipped to northern Iraq in three months, out of 1 million tonnes shipped regionally.

The inter-agency preparedness process was far from straightforward, according to a UNCT review³⁰. The lack of an MOU for interacting with government during the crisis left the UNCT having to resolve issues on an *ad hoc* basis. It was not clear who the real government decision-maker was: the Turkish Red Crescent, the Ministry of the Interior, or the Military. The local authorities in the field were confused by the multiplicity of UN actors, while late and limited access to information from within Iraq meant weakened contingency planning.

3.6 Kuwait

Kuwait became the key supply route for South/Central Iraq during and after the war. The withholding of permission by the Turkish Parliament for US troops to invade Iraq through Turkey meant that Coalition forces invaded from Kuwait, with humanitarian actors following. UNICEF does not have full representation in Kuwait and did not have an office until February 2003 when the Regional Emergency Officer and the Iraq Supply and Logistics Officer went to Kuwait to establish the sub-office and rent a warehouse. This held \$4 million worth of supplies at one stage.

UNICEF was obliged to work alongside the Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC was under the nascent CPA) but did not share offices with the HOC. In April, the Iraq Deputy Representative took over part of the sectoral coordination from the HOC because he was seen to have the Iraq knowledge and expertise. The Iraq Representative refused to share UNICEF's database on Iraq's children and women with the HOC.

UNICEF started a major water tankering operation into southern Iraq from Kuwait shortly after the start of the war. By the end of June, water was being tankered to 150,000 people south of Basra on a daily basis.

³⁰ Turkey Crisis Management Team: Lessons Learned from the Iraqi Crisis (Aug 2002 – May 2003).

4. EPRP PROCESS

4.1 Background

From October 2001, MENARO initiated an Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (EPRP) process for the sub-region, including Iraq, Iran, Jordan, and Syria, as well as the Gulf Area Office and, at a later stage, Turkey³¹. A series of sub-regional meetings were held between October 2001 and September 2002, at approximately two-month intervals. The planning process resulted in the development of a sub-regional contingency plan, which went through a number of iterations between December 2001 and October 2002. The sub-regional plan informed the further development of Contingency Plans for individual countries.

The standard UNICEF guidance on EPRP is provided in “Protecting and Assisting Children and Women in Extraordinary Circumstances, UNICEF EPRP for year 2003, UNICEF EMOPS, February 2002”³². The sub-regional and the individual country contingency plans used this framework as their starting point.

The sub-regional planning process built on contingency planning³³ exercises already conducted by individual COs during 2000 and 2001. As a result, COs came to the first sub-regional EPRP meeting with existing contingency plans³⁴. The planning process had a head start because the concept of contingency planning was already at least partially understood by the COs³⁵ concerned.

4.2 Scenarios

The five scenarios for Iraq considered within the plan were:³⁶

1. “A confrontation between Iraq and the UN Security Council or a group of countries could result in a general blockade of the country and suspension of OFFP.
2. A move by Iraqi authorities to reinstate their full authority over Northern Iraq could result in large-scale displacement, both internally and cross-border to Iran, Syria and Turkey.
3. An attack or invasion by foreign troops would most likely target Baghdad and oil fields in the North and Southeast in order to control the flow of money to the regime.
4. Foreign countries could try to foment civil disruption by supporting and arming internal opposition groups.
5. An invasion into Northern Iraq by Turkey to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish state.”

³¹ Turkey lies within UNICEF’s CEE/CIS region so sub-regional planning required the involvement of the Geneva-based Regional Office.

³² And updated in the light of “Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning Tools: Workshop to Finalise Guidance and Tools. Recommendations, 6-8 November 2002”.

³³ Preparedness planning *versus* contingency planning: In UNICEF emergency preparedness planning includes the examination of a number of potential emergency scenarios while contingency planning focuses on preparing UNICEF to respond to one particular scenario.

³⁴ Pre-Iraq, preparedness planning in the region tended to use natural disasters as a basis for contingency planning because of political sensitivities over considering conflict scenarios.

³⁵ According to UNICEF’s Geneva based Senior Emergency Officer, one of the key shifts in thinking comes when staff grasp the difference between capacity and preparedness “wrongly assuming that if they had good capacity they were prepared”, from Through the Prism of Preparedness and Response: Summary Comments, E Ressler, EPRP and Inputs for Martigny II.

³⁶ Protecting and Assisting Children and Women in Extraordinary Circumstances, UNICEF Sub-regional Plan of Action (Draft), MENARO, October 2002.

Scenario 3 was considered the most likely, with anticipated outcomes as follows:

Table 1 – Anticipated Outcomes of Most Likely Scenario

Situation	Potential Humanitarian Consequences	Potential Scale	UNICEF Planning Assumptions
Large-scale attack or invasion by foreign countries on Baghdad and oil fields in the north and southeast in order to control the flow of money to the regime	Iraq – North Will receive limited IDPs from South	50,000	Humanitarian assistance would be required. All IPs might be evacuated if scenario 2 to follow
	Iraq – Central/South Large-scale displacement to Iran (most) or Jordan (few)	100,000s to millions	While any emergency response will be an inter-agency response, UNICEF will play a particularly important role. All IPs would be evacuated
	Iran Influx of large numbers of displaced	Max. 200,000	Humanitarian assistance would be required
	Jordan, Syria, Turkey Influx of small numbers of displaced	Max. 50,000 – Jordan Max. 5,000 – Syria Max. 12,000 – Turkey	Humanitarian assistance would be required. In Syria no camps will be established

4.3 Standing Readiness

Each UN agency decided on its levels of standing readiness in response to the agreed UN planning figures. The UNICEF sub-regional preparedness plan sets out the UNICEF level of standing readiness as follows:

Table 2 – UNICEF Standing Readiness

Programme	Estimated Number Of Affected People	UN Planning Figure	Minimum Level of Readiness – UNICEF
Iraq	Up to 9 million	Up to 8.2 million	550,000
Iran	Up to 900,000	150,000	100,000
Jordan	Up to 50,000	20,000	10,000
Kuwait	Up to 200,000	50,000	20,000
Syria	Up to 60,000	20,000	10,000
Turkey	Up to 250,000	80,000	20,000

UNICEF planned for, and achieved, the following levels of standing readiness:

Table 3 – Assessment, Response and Assistance Periods

Country	Number	Rapid Assessment, Days	Response Time, Days	Assistance Period, Weeks
Iraq	550,000*	3	6	6 (s/c), 12 (n)
Iran	100,000	2	2	4
Jordan	10,000	2	2	2
Syria	10,000	2	2	1
Turkey	50,000	2	6	6

*300,000 in south/central Iraq and 250,000 in northern Iraq.

A proportion of the standing readiness for Iraq was comprised of human resource capacity and supplies located near the borders in surrounding countries. Figures for the surrounding countries are for assistance to be given to refugees and so called "stuck" IDPs, those trying to leave Iraq but denied access to a neighbouring country.

A key assumption in sub-regional and country contingency planning was that "...neighbouring governments would allow people to enter their territory, although initially reluctantly and within a limited zone along the border (zero zone / no man's land)."³⁷ This was an unknown in the planning process. All the governments concerned, apart from Syria, initially said that their borders would remain closed in the event of a crisis.

In order to support cross-border operations from neighbouring countries and refugee operations, sub-offices were opened at Kermanshah and Ahwaz (Iran), Basra (Iraq), Kuwait, Al-Haseke (Syria), Diyarbakir and Silopi (Turkey). MIG House was opened in Jordan to accommodate a temporary sub-regional office for Iraq.

4.4 UNICEF Approach to Planning

The planning figures in Table 3 were not derived directly from UNICEF or inter-agency scenario planning. Rather than taking the reductionist route of opting for a particular scenario, UNICEF chose to establish a "minimum standing readiness" approach³⁸.

According to MENARO, many governments wanted the UN to prepare for very large numbers of IDPs/refugees, in order to not be caught unprepared. However, UNICEF took the approach of preparing for a very initial response phase, with further action to be taken as the situation unfolded. UNICEF assumed that the response could be enlarged in the event of a major crisis, as donors released more funds in response to an appeal.

Preparedness had to be based on the realities of the capacity to respond in each country and on the availability of funds. UNICEF built up the scale of its preparedness progressively as funds became available from CO internal funds, the two EPF allocations, CERF, and lastly RR. (See also 6.1-6.3.) If more preparedness funding had been available, UNICEF may well have increased its planning figures for minimum standing readiness.

4.5 Contingency Planning In Iraq

The Iraq contingency plan of September 2002 summarises the planned plan of action for preparedness³⁹.

Table 4 – Plan of Action for Preparedness in Iraq

Programme Response	UNICEF Humanitarian Response to Chronic Crisis
Health	National polio and measles campaign; strengthening of cold chain and training of EPR workers; rehabilitation of PHC centres; training of health workers on reproductive health, CDD/ARI
WES	Rehabilitation of WTPs and compact units; repair and rehabilitation of sewerage pumping stations; development of WES Management Information System

³⁷ Protecting and Assisting Children and Women in Extraordinary Circumstances, UNICEF Sub-regional Plan of Action (Draft), MENARO, October 2002.

³⁸ According to EMOPS Geneva, the approach adopted was to: consider potentialities (scenarios); consider the range of scale of potential humanitarian needs from least to worst case, recognising that various scenarios might unfold; choose a planning level for first response based on a consideration of needs, common sense, and feasibility.

³⁹ Protecting and Assisting Children and Women in Extraordinary Circumstances, UNICEF Iraq, EPRP 2002, 22 Sept 2002, page 22.

Nutrition	Training of volunteers and support to growth monitoring; support to TNP
Education	Rehabilitation of primary schools; introduction of qualitative reforms to education; teacher training; development of Education Management Information System
Child Protection	Development of systems for the de-institutionalisation of children; reform of the juvenile justice system

4.6 EPRP Strengths

The sub-regional and country contingency planning for Iraq is widely considered within UNICEF to have been highly successful. This success was based on a number of factors, all of which are relevant for the future of UNICEF emergency preparedness planning for major crises:

- Leadership and coordination by the Regional Director and the RO in the sub-regional planning process
- The designation of emergency focal points by each CO
- The early inclusion of all operational aspects in the contingency planning
- The preparation of detailed “To Do” action lists for each CO agreed in the sub-regional contingency planning meetings
- The preparation and revision of plans to relocate staff from within Iraq to strengthen the capacity of small UNICEF COs in surrounding countries, and to open additional sub-offices to manage the pre-positioning of emergency supplies
- The availability of EPF and CERF funding for preparedness
- The regional management of preparedness funds allowing allocations to be made to countries less popular with donor governments that would not otherwise have received funding for preparedness, e.g. Syria
- The commitment of different parts of the organisation to work together to make the process work, with HQ being supportive of the regional and in-country efforts
- The corporate commitment of the organisation to strengthening its emergency response capability, emanating from the Martigny process and the CCCs
- The funding by DFID of emergency-related meetings, training, and posts in the RO and New York/Geneva HQ.

Other strengths identified by the Istanbul workshop included⁴⁰:

- UNICEF’s active engagement in inter-agency preparedness planning (See section 12) and preparation of
- Preparation of k. Key partnerships with NGOs were prepared
- A comprehensive EPRP methodology leading to comprehensive CO plans, identification of critical issues and a strategic vision and plan
- The use of CCCs as a basis for planning and programming
- Regular interaction among a core group of staff from countries in the sub-region in sub-regional meetings and good information sharing. The preparedness planning process was participatory, involving all staff at CO level
- Decentralization of preparedness planning left decisions with the RO and the COs
- Quick action on the preparedness planning by COs and ROs, with a rapid upgrade of operational capacity
- The active participation of EMOPS/Geneva and Supply Division’ in the preparedness planning process
- The numbers and emergency experience of Iraq CO staff were critical
- Overall good logistics, pre-positioning of supplies, and pre-stocking of ICT equipment in MENARO and Copenhagen; the Supply Division’s quick response and flexibility in

⁴⁰ See Istanbul workshop report Annex C Strengths and Weaknesses.

receiving requisitions immediately; good prior knowledge of logistics considerations inside and outside Iraq proving a significant strength.

The 18-month lead time gave UNICEF the space to develop and refine preparedness plans and to take a series of preparedness actions. This lead time is unlikely to be repeated in other major emergencies, though complex humanitarian emergencies tend to grow out of emerging political crises rather than erupting overnight.

The bulk of the supplies procured to achieve the agreed levels of standing readiness were either used to meet emergency needs in Iraq or, in the case of northern Iraq, were reabsorbed back into a more "normal" OFFP programming⁴¹.

4.7 EPRP Weaknesses

Many interviewees felt that there had been "over-planning", with a drawn-out process complicated by the regular reworking of scenarios, planning figures, and action plans⁴². Some negative impact on regular country programmes in surrounding countries and other emergencies arose from the focus on Iraq. Much of the workload caused by the planning process was due to inter-agency processes.

As a generalisation, the sub-regional and country level contingency plans are comprehensive and well thought-through. By contrast, outcomes tended to be poorly defined in terms of the expected end result, or how these were to be measured. This generalisation ties in with an observation in the Martigny II paper⁴³: "There is a lack of results-based management indicators for humanitarian response and monitoring at global and regional levels."

Other weakness identified in the Istanbul workshop included:

- The failure to predict the post-war situation, in particular the level and nature of the looting, which appeared to specifically target government institutions and UN facilities
- The risk/threat analysis process placed too strong a focus on refugees
- The focus on the war and its immediate aftermath meant that the UN and UNICEF were relatively unprepared for the medium-term planning
- UNICEF planning processes were constrained by a lack of clarity of roles and communication within UNICEF headquarters (NY, GNV)
- CO capacity in countries surrounding Iraq was weak as offices were small
- The speed of preparedness planning by COs was uneven
- Relations with government posed a problem in a number of countries compounded by an atmosphere of secrecy and sensitivity around preparedness planning
- Lack of flexibility over rules in establishing sub-offices was a constraint
- Inter-agency planning meetings had up to 40 participants but only UNICEF and WFP eventually mounted an early emergency response. Inter-agency planning within Iraq was weak, with the UNCT engaging very late
- Inter-agency sectoral work on health and nutrition lagged behind other sectors
- Planning was weak in terms of fully working out structures for implementation across agencies.

4.8 EPRP Constraints

⁴¹ The provision of contingency supplies for Northern Iraq represented a 'bulge' in OFFP procurement. On the whole, the same items were purchased – just more of them – in the knowledge that they could be reabsorbed back into the OFFP. Additional items such as tents were purchased that would not normally have been procured for OFFP.

⁴² According to the Istanbul workshop report, 'the UN spent much time creating what-if scenarios, entering into "fantasy".'

⁴³ Martigny II: UNICEF's Response to Women and Children in Crisis Situations (Draft), EMOPS, 8 August 2003 (p21).

The very high political profile of the impending crisis meant that UNICEF could not afford to fail in its preparations. The active involvement of the Executive Director in the build-up to the Iraq crisis shows the importance Iraq had assumed.

Emergency preparedness was treated as a “hush-hush” exercise until December 2002 — more than a year after UNICEF started its planning for Iraq. The UN Secretariat was nervous of UN agencies discussing their plans openly. Governments in the region and many of UNICEF’s main donors were in denial, unwilling to take any action that appeared to accept that war would not be avoided. As a result, donors were unwilling to fund preparedness until a late stage. The UN Secretariat did not want a possible war to be openly discussed, or for any visible preparations to be made, at least until late 2002. Senior management in UNICEF and the UN Secretariat recognised the importance of preparedness. However, member states’ concerns meant that UN agencies were not successful in influencing the Secretariat to make a public appeal for preparedness funding.

4.9 Scenarios versus Preparedness Action

Many of the actions required to prepare UNICEF for the crisis were independent of the numbers of people to be assisted inside and outside Iraq. Many of the preparedness actions for HR, finance, telecoms, and security would have been required for any serious emergency. For this reason, one of the least productive aspects of inter-agency contingency planning was the recurrent debates over numbers of people to be assisted. By contrast, agreeing on the levels of standing readiness for the first few weeks of an emergency response was important because they dictated the amounts and costs of the supplies and equipment required.

4.10 Predicted Versus Actual Outcomes

The scenario selected as the most likely, and adopted by the UN as the basis for detailed planning, proved to be very wide of the mark when compared with real events. UNICEF contingency planning was based on jointly agreed assumptions amongst UN agencies at a regional and country level, and later, as agreed between the HQs of the respective agencies.

Assumptions about events post-conflict proved highly inaccurate. The threat to countries neighbouring Iraq did not materialise, there was limited internal displacement within Iraq, only a very small number of refugees sought asylum in neighbouring countries, and there was no ethnic conflict inside Iraq. The extensive and protracted looting and destruction of government, UN, and other facilities was not foreseen.

Within the sub-region, the mass displacement of Iraqis was always seen as unlikely and Iraqis themselves considered it unlikely that there would be large numbers of refugees. How then did UN planning figures for displacement come to be as high as they were? As the centre of gravity for planning moved from the region to Geneva and from there to New York, planning figures were set progressively higher. While New York was the best place from which to understand political developments and the likelihood and nature of the coming war, sources within the region were best placed to understand the impacts of war.

The consultant leans towards the view that the further decision-making moved from the sub-region, the less accurate the scenario planning became. UNICEF managers seem more sanguine, however, tending to pass over the mismatch between predicted and real outcomes by saying that “it was better to over-prepare than under-prepare”.

UNICEF and inter-agency child protection programming was wrong-footed by the outcome of war. A great deal of work went into inter-agency preparations for dealing with separated

children, but there were none. The strength of the social networks within Iraq meant that it was unlikely that there would be large numbers of separated children.

4.11 Enhancing the UNICEF EPRP Processes — Discussion

It may be useful for UNICEF to delineate types of preparedness more clearly, for example:

Table 5 – Types of Emergency Preparedness

Type	Meaning	Resource Requirements
Early warning	Ongoing analysis of social, political, natural, and economic threats	Low
Scenario planning	Mapping the possible outcomes of those threats considered to have reached a level representing a real risk to the rights and well-being of children and women	Low
Contingency planning	Detailed planning for a UNICEF response to a single (normally the most likely) scenario	Low
Preparedness actions	Putting in place the people, systems, and supplies (where appropriate) for UNICEF to mount an emergency response to the contingency identified	Moderate/High
Mitigation actions	UNICEF actions to reduce the impact on children and women	Moderate/High

The last two steps are only possible with funding, which restricts how far UNICEF can go with its EPRP process. It was said that before the sub-regional planning process began, backed by EPF funds, CO contingency plans remained at a theoretical level because of a lack of funds to take action.

Under the current EPRP process, UNICEF does not distinguish between *mitigation* and *preparedness*. It is one thing to establish a response capability and pre-position supplies in advance of an emergency, and another to take advance measures to mitigate the effects of an emergency. In practice, the Iraq CO did take action to mitigate the effects of war through, for example, pre-war vaccination campaigns and the maintenance of generators for pumping water and sewerage. The EPRP guidance could usefully be updated to make disaster mitigation more distinct.

More than once during the evaluation was the need for more NGO partnerships to fill gaps in service provision brought up. Relatively few NGOs were operating in Iraq before the war because of the difficulty of the operating environment. There is also a need for closer partnerships with one or two NGOs per sector (perhaps using different NGOs for different regions). There is already a close-knit working group on separated children, while a global partnership is under consideration with OXFAM GB to cover water and sanitation. Education and nutrition do not yet have such key partners.

UNICEF could further enhance its EPRP process by:

- Including UN and NGO partners in its EPRP processes, as, in effect, they form an important component of UNICEF's response capability
- Speeding up the process of making the EPRP guidelines available on the UNICEF Intranet, with online formats and guidance materials available for completing the planning documents
- Distinguishing between mitigation and emergency preparedness
- Building up regional and global response capacities (discussed further under Human Resources below)

- Providing additional guidance on the outworking of HRBAP and gender considerations in preparedness planning (discussed further under Policy Issues below)
- Providing guidance on how to strengthen results-oriented planning and monitoring and evaluation of the preparedness plans.

4.12 Global EPRP

As noted above, UNICEF's preparedness and response in Iraq provides a good example of emergency preparedness planning and response, in which CO, RO, and HQ all made valuable inputs. However, the evaluation has identified shortcomings in the organisation's systems for readiness and response in emergencies, including in some aspects of human resource planning, regional management of emergency response, and administrative procedures, as discussed below in Sections 5-11. UNICEF appears to be making some progress in its emergency response capacity in almost all areas, but is currently lacking the strategic "glue" to bring these enhancements together.

UNICEF has clearly made progress in recent years in the development and application of its EPRP methodology at country level, at in the Iraq case, at sub-regional and even cross-regional levels. In the consultant's view, there is now potential to apply the same logic at a corporate level and further equip the organisation to draw on its human and financial resources in a coordinated fashion to meet a major humanitarian crisis.

This would require more than synthesising existing departmental plans, it would require setting corporate standards for the speed and scale of response, then determining how each part of the organisation contributes to the whole. This can be informed by the 100+ country contingency plans, building on analyses already undertaken by EMOPS Geneva plans, which should reveal regional patterns for the type and concentration of possible emergencies.

4.13 EPrP – Summary Findings

- EPRP was applied successfully and well led and coordinated by MENARO, building on the contingency planning already carried out by COs in the sub-region before the Iraq crisis arose
- Planned preparedness levels were achieved, in part due to the capacity of Iraq CO staff redeployed around the sub-region
- Many of the operation's preparedness actions were scenario-independent, i.e. they would have been required whichever scenario had played out
- Planning was constrained by the political nature of the preparedness process and especially by donors being willing to fund the process only at a relatively late stage
- Inter-agency planning processes were heavy and complicated by the inclusion of actors that were in a position to make a practical emergency response
- The EPRP process can be enhanced by adding clearer definitions and planning formats and better explaining the application of human-rights based approaches in emergencies
- UNICEF could usefully apply its EPRP process at a global level to develop a strategy for ensuring it will be able to meet its Core Corporate Commitments

5. HUMAN RESOURCES

5.1 Recruitment and Deployment

MENARO and the COs in the sub-region took the initiative in HR planning with the support of a focal point within DHR at HQ for the coordination of recruitment and the further development of surge capacity. All Country Offices recruited one or more temporary staff to assist with emergency preparedness. COs used their own local recruitment mechanisms to find additional staff, while the Regional Office facilitated recruitment from within and outside the sub-region. The Istanbul workshop noted the “continuous dialogue and involvement of COs in the Iraq HR redeployment plan to match neighbouring and internal Iraq CO staffing needs.”⁴⁴

The sub-regional planning process was coordinated by MENARO, in particular by officers holding the two international and one local emergency-related post funded by DFID⁴⁵. In the sub-regional planning process, the staff resources within the sub-region were considered, staff deployments were planned, and these plans were kept up to date.

Staff deployments took place at three levels:

- Staff redeployed from within Iraq to surrounding countries
- Inter-agency sector coordination through seconded personnel in WES, nutrition, and education (child protection coordination was provided via a UNICEF staff member seconded from Sudan⁴⁶) and
- UNICEF staff brought in from outside the sub-region, e.g. for supply and logistics (Copenhagen), and communications (from Egypt).

At HQ, DHR took initiatives to provide additional HR resources for Iraq, primarily for senior leadership positions for WES, health and nutrition, planning, and education. According to DHR, rather than recruiting large number of TFTs, which did not work well for Afghanistan, the focus was on recruiting for lead positions through staff “mission assignments” with later formal longer-term recruitments to these posts. Iraq was declared a corporate priority and the Executive Director was continuously briefed and consulted on the deployment for the senior positions, with the Iraq Representative fully involved in recruitment decisions. An Information Circular signed by the Deputy Executive Director was issued to all Country and Regional Offices requesting offices to release selected staff members for mission assignments to Iraq, while offering the offices the option of “back filling” these vacated positions. Additionally, stand-by arrangements with the United Nations Volunteers programme were activated through DHR. However, these arrangements were not put to the test.

5.2 Training

Several training courses were provided sub-regionally and within countries for UNICEF staff, partners and government counterparts⁴⁷. Training included Psychosocial programming, Monitoring and Evaluation in Crisis Situations, Telecoms Preparedness, Child Protection (including separated and unaccompanied children and sexual abuse and exploitation),

⁴⁴ Istanbul workshop report Annex C Section 6.

⁴⁵ The Regional Emergency Officer post is due to be absorbed into the regular RO budget in 2004.

⁴⁶ Sudan is within the MENA region.

⁴⁷ A schedule of these training exercises is included in the Annex. The effectiveness of training provided in the lead-up to the Iraq crisis has not been assessed by this evaluation nor has any other assessment been made by UNICEF, so there is currently no indication of how useful this type of training may be for future emergency preparedness exercises.

IT/Telecom/Security, Stress Management/Peer Support, EPRP, WES, Health and Nutrition, ProMS and manual procedures, Communications, Mine Awareness, and Logistics.

MENARO had two training-of-trainers courses on human rights and humanitarian principles during 2001. It is not clear whether those trained have themselves trained others, but there are no other records of such training at country level, apart from training provided by Geneva CEE/CIS RO in Turkey as part of a one-week workshop related to Iraq. In the light of ongoing discussion about the application of human rights based programming to emergencies, this lack of training may be significant. The Istanbul workshop noted: “there was no push to raise staff awareness on humanitarian principles, the code of conduct on prevention of sexual abuse and exploitation”. (See also section 14.1 Humanitarian Principles.)

5.3 Seconding Agencies

UNICEF has good relations with seconding organisations, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, Swiss Rescue Services Agency, RedR, etc. but, according to UNICEF Geneva, the system for these partnerships lacks leadership and coordination.

5.4 National Staff Evacuation

UNICEF facilitated self- or voluntary evacuation from Iraq for national staff under discretionary provisions for exceptional cases as outlined in the Field Security Manual. Relocation inside the country was also offered. Only a few staff took up these offers. Some staff relocated to Amman where they were required to work voluntarily. Others were employed in, for example, the Syria Country Office. Self-evacuated staff can present the receiving office with something of a dilemma, as they may not have a role for them and may not be able to afford the additional allowances these staff may claim.

Some IPs were concerned that it was unethical to evacuate international personnel but not Iraqi national staff. Such concerns are not unique to the Iraq context or to UNICEF, as the same challenge was faced by all operational UN agencies⁴⁸.

5.5 Psychological Support

Not surprisingly, many of the staff involved with this crisis experienced stress, particularly those evacuated from and who later returned to Iraq. Some interviewees felt that staff did not receive adequate psychological support, yet UNICEF HQ made several offers of support, most of which were not taken up.

All staff evacuated from Baghdad were offered a counselling session, but no feedback is available on whether these were useful⁴⁹. It is not clear if this counselling session was mandatory⁵⁰. According to the Istanbul workshop, insufficient attention was paid to psychological needs. “A perception existed of insufficient/no support network for national staff in Iraq or evacuated/redeployed internationals”⁵¹. It would still be useful for UNICEF to assess the availability and value of psychological support. This might best be done by gaining staff feedback on counselling provided from March 2003 to the present.

⁴⁸ The UNICEF Field Security Manual seeks to address this point: “Those provisions of the United Nations Field Security Handbook which relate to relocation/evacuation from the host country for security reasons apply only in the most exceptional cases to local staff...decisions in this regard can only be made by the Secretary-General, as recommended by the UNSECOORD, based on a recommendation by the Designated Official.” (chapter 3, section 4).

⁴⁹ Counselling sessions are organised via a UN network of counsellors from UN agencies based in the country concerned.

⁵⁰ The WFP counsellor hired to provide counselling services for UN agencies involved in the Iraq operation was contacted by the consultant, but was not able to provide any feedback on counselling provided before the August bombing in Baghdad.

⁵¹ Istanbul workshop report Annex C Section 6.

5.6 Improving HR Systems — Discussion

5.6.1 Corporate HR Systems

Based on the Iraq experience, the following HR related weaknesses in UNICEF's emergency response capabilities have been noted:

- There is no global response system for “surge capacity” that makes emergency response both quick and assured. When country level contingency planning is being conducted, the CO should know what regional or global UNICEF capacity they can draw on and in what time frame. This is not clear enough.
- The current over-reliance on Country Representatives for releasing personnel to temporary emergency assignments in other countries is inappropriate for major emergencies.
- The idea that all staff have a part to play in emergencies is holding the organisation back from identifying a cadre of experienced emergency managers who can be quickly re-deployed to manage the early phases of response to major emergencies.

5.6.2 Surge Capacity

UNICEF now has two HR registers available on the Intranet⁵² and so in one sense DHR is justified in stating “systems are in place”. DHR did take initiatives to locate additional suitable personnel to increase UNICEF's capacity, but alongside rather than on the basis of the corporate rosters, which did not provide an adequate basis for surge capacity for the Iraq crisis because they are not yet well enough populated.

UNICEF systems for emergency deployment appear to have a number of shortcomings:

- Staff are able to register their interest in working in emergencies. This is good as far as it goes, but provides no guarantee of having adequate numbers of staff with the appropriate skills on stand-by
- Emergency deployments are dependent on representatives' responding to the Executive Director's call to release appropriate staff, as made in the Iraq case
- The involvement of the Executive Director was required to identify and mobilise staff skilled in emergency response at short notice. If a corporate surge capacity system was adequately developed, this would be unnecessary.

UNICEF should act to provide adequate numbers of personnel for surge capacity. A global EPRP exercise would help to identify the numbers and types of personnel required (see 3.11). DHR, working with EMOPS, could then be charged with ensuring that targets are met for internal, external, and externally seconded candidates.

Reportedly, UNICEF has reviewed other organisations' response mechanisms. Not all are comparable, as UNICEF does not want to have separate emergency and development staff cadres. UNHCR has considerable experience with internal and external stand-by registers. IFRC has devised ways of making use of national and regional resources in emergency response⁵³ without creating permanent emergency teams. In the same way, UNICEF can build a global response capacity using both IP and national staff for regional surge capacity, and then combining regional capacities with HQ capacity to meet the needs for the largest emergencies. In this way, surge capacity can reflect UNICEF's decentralised culture and management practice.

⁵² The Human Resources Information System (webHRIS), in which IPs, national staff and general service staff records can be included, plus a separate web-roster for external candidates.

⁵³ Albeit still evolving.

While UNICEF corporate policy remains that emergencies should be the work of everyone, the consensus from informants in this evaluation is that a certain background and approach is required for staff working in emergencies. This is supported by a UNICEF review of HR capacity⁵⁴, which states: “Human rights-based programming and the application of humanitarian principles in complex emergencies require a different set of skills and different types of leadership.”

UNICEF has delineated the competencies for staff working in emergencies⁵⁵, which are already quite comprehensive. The challenge is to find and screen sufficient staff and external candidates who meet the criteria for emergency deployment and to maintain the associated personnel registers regularly.

5.6.3 Human Resources and the Core Corporate Commitments

The Iraq experience highlights some lessons for human resources at country and regional level in relation to the CCCs.

The positive experience with the appointment of Emergency Officers in this crisis shows this could be a good model required for countries with an impending or probable crisis

- WES was a critical element of UNICEF’s work in Iraq, yet there is no Regional WES Advisor post. If WES is to assume the same level of importance as in Iraq in other emergencies, this may need to be reviewed. (WES is not supported by DFID funding to emergency preparedness)
- Where regional offices have no Regional Nutrition Advisor, this is supposed to be covered by the Regional Health Advisor. The effectiveness of this arrangement depends on the knowledge and focus of the health advisor.

5.6.4 Country Office HR Requirements

The Iraq CO turned down a number of proposals for additional assistance from HQ and the Regional Office. In the consultant’s view, decisions on staffing should remain with the CO to determine its HR needs and imposing advisors should be avoided as far as possible.

However, there is a balance to be struck and in this case some extra resources might well have improved aspects of UNICEF’s planning and response. For example, UNICEF HQ considers that there should have been an extra person assigned to support WES coordination and programming, but the CO did not agree to this. Donor reporting, especially to USAID, was said to have suffered as a result of inadequate staffing. Additional temporary resources for Child Protection would probably have improved planning and response in this sector⁵⁶.

⁵⁴ Desk Review on UNICEF Humanitarian Response, J Freedman, 2001.

⁵⁵ <http://www.intranet.unicef.org/dhr/learning.nsf/Content/338E66DB51D873C585256DB80056AB8F?OpenForm&Lang=en>

⁵⁶ Two temporary Child Protection experts arrived in Baghdad in June 2003 and, reportedly, were effective in supporting the CP programme.

5.7 Human Resources – Summary Findings

HR was carefully planned and, in general, staff deployments worked well and were effective in providing appropriate levels of human resource to country offices, to newly established sub-offices, and to MIG House⁵⁷ and the News Desk in Amman. The appointment of a single focal point in DHR was a positive initiative. According to the Istanbul workshop findings, “The single point of contact in DHR was considered very effective”⁵⁸

COs that employed an Emergency Officer (or equivalent) to deal with the preparations for Iraq, reduced (but did not eliminate) the disruption to their regular programmes

- UNICEF’s move to improve the effectiveness of emergency response, backed by DFID funding to HQ and RO emergency-related posts, made a significant difference to the effectiveness of emergency preparedness in this case

There is potential for more partnerships with seconding agencies should there be a corporate policy to do so as part of UNICEF’s enhancement of its global emergency response capacity

Secondments from partner INGOs proved useful in this emergency, especially for sector coordination

- Even with the human resource capacity available in the sub-region prior to the Iraq war, it is probable that UNICEF would not have had sufficient human resources available quickly enough in the event of a major IDP and refugee emergency on the scale predicted by inter-agency contingency planning
- Some staff see HR as an area with intractable problems, and feel that establishing a reliable form of emergency surge capacity is not an issue likely to be resolved in the near future. MENARO is making it a priority for 2004 to establish a regional capacity, partly because of a lack of confidence in central support systems

UNICEF requires better-managed registers of internal and external expertise for emergency response. Software applications are now available on the Intranet, but proactive management to ensure that the registers are populated and kept up to date is lacking

In major emergencies, regional directors may need to be more assertive in requiring additional resources be brought in where the CO is not adequately prepared or where it is under-resourced

⁵⁷ The Amman base for evacuated members of the Iraq CO.

⁵⁸ Istanbul workshop report Annex Section 6.

6. FUNDING

6.1 Preparedness Loans

In February 2002, NYHQ facilitated a non-repayable contribution of US \$380,000 from the Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) to MENARO, with which individual countries began building their preparedness capability and upgrading their communications equipment. The initial request for \$1.2 million was reduced to \$380K once preparedness supplies were removed. The level of funds that could be given to country offices for preparedness activities was limited by their absorption capacity. Even if EPF1 had been larger, there is no guarantee that the funding could have been used effectively at that stage.

In December 2002, a second EPF loan was received for \$2,000,900⁵⁹. In the same month, a Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF⁶⁰) loan was received for \$5 million, against a request to OCHA for \$7.5 million. In January 2003, an additional grant was made for \$2 million from UNICEF Regular Resources (RR), in place of a third request from the region for EPF funding. Funding received for preparedness (excluding donors) before the war started was \$9,380,900.

The second EPF loan and the loan from CERF were used for procuring and pre-positioning humanitarian supplies in Iraq and the surrounding countries. Of the CERF loan, \$4.2 million was used to procure supplies for Iraq, half of which were pre-positioned inside Iraq, and half in Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey. Seventy-five percent of the funds were earmarked for the purchase of additional nutrition supplies, 10% for health supplies, 10% for child protection supplies and 5% for cross-sectoral purposes. Additional supplies and equipment were purchased for refugees. Some of the CERF balance was combined with other preparedness funds to fund the opening of new sub-offices.

Preparedness funding is considered to have arrived somewhat late, resulting in rushed activity to spend some \$15 million within two months. As the war did not begin until late March, there was time to allocate all the preparedness funds, but not to receive all the supplies. If the war had started earlier, UNICEF would have been unprepared, which would have been greatly reduced the impact of its preparedness efforts⁶¹.

6.2 Preparedness Appeal

In December 2002, UNICEF launched an appeal for preparedness funds to donors and NATCOMS for \$14,080,900. It raised \$9.7 million (69%); a further \$2.7 million was raised for the replenishment of CERF. Excluding this repayment sum, but including EPF, CERF, and RR, the total funding for preparedness was \$15,935,003, of which \$10,745,003 was used for Iraq. An additional \$5 million in cash was used from OFFP in northern Iraq, mostly for pre-positioning of supplies for IDPs who were expected to move north from south/central Iraq.

From January- to March 2003, both the US (OFDA⁶²) and UK (DFID) contributed to the preparedness appeal. Some staff, including the Iraq Representative, tried to have these contributions turned down, but were overruled. The PFO has an established policy that UNICEF will not refuse such funds. Fortunately, other donors also gave both to the preparedness and the later Flash appeal, thus balancing out the US/UK contributions.

⁵⁹ EPF2 was triggered within 72 hours of request.

⁶⁰ Only a portion of CERF had been repaid by the time of the consultant's September 2003 visit to Amman. The repayment period for CERF is normally six months but can be set at up to one year.

⁶¹ Not to mention being somewhat ironic given that UNICEF has had more than a year to prepare.

⁶² OFDA funding of \$2 million could not be used for Iran or Syria.

The preparedness appeal document had to be shared selectively with donors, as, at that stage, it was still a very sensitive topic. Some donors refused to fund preparedness activities right up to the start of the war.

In February, USAID approached UNICEF to discuss a one-year \$50 million multisector programme (March 2003-March 2004)⁶³. There was a major difference of opinion over the revision of school textbooks, with UNICEF insisting that Iraqis should control any changes. UNICEF was ready to say no to the whole sum if the US insisted on its own way, and this in the context of 30% of all UNICEF funds coming from the US. Eventually USAID agreed to the UNICEF approach.

6.3 Flash Appeal

On March 28, UNICEF launched a Flash Appeal for \$166 million as part of a wider UN appeal for \$2.2 billion, the largest-ever UN appeal of its type⁶⁴. Initially, funding was slow to come in. In a press release of 9 April 2003, UNICEF expressed concern that only one fifth of the Iraq appeal was funded. However, by the end of June, the appeal was 60% funded, which was more than adequate given that the emergency did not turn out as expected and there were limitations to how quickly funds could be used because of the worsening security situation in Iraq. In the consultant's view, the success of UNICEF's fundraising against the Flash Appeal was based on:

The high profile of the crisis

UNICEF's track record in Iraq and baseline data on indicators for children and women

A good stream of information from Sitreps and media reports generated in Amman

The Iraq Representative's visit to capital cities in Europe, the Far East and North America, which secured additional funding, including donations from governments that might not otherwise have been given to the Appeal⁶⁵

The professionalism of the sub-regional preparedness planning process helped HQ to take the preparedness effort seriously and to give it financial backing.

6.4 Donations-In-Kind

Various non-cash donations were offered to UNICEF for use in Iraq, as listed in Table 6⁶⁶. The volume was small compared with other major emergencies⁶⁷. As a matter of policy, UNICEF discourages donations in kind in favour of cash contributions. As UNICEF was offered a number of inappropriate gifts for Iraq, it may be valuable for NATCOMS to be clearer with potential donors about what is appropriate. At the moment, the value of donations-in-kind is not included in the value of the appeal, which reduces the incentive to improve in this area.

⁶³ USAID having first tried to get UNESCO to take on the project.

⁶⁴ In parallel with the UN Appeal, Security Council Resolutions 1472 and 1476 changed the provisions of OFFP to allow some contracts to be reused for humanitarian relief. Supplies for water and sanitation, nutrition and education were to have been obtained from 19 priority contracts, with a total value of US \$40.4 million. However, UNICEF did not anticipate that these changes to OFFP provisions would make a contribution to UNICEF's emergency relief effort, as these supplies were largely for rehabilitation.

⁶⁵ This visit was coordinated by PFO and UNICEF Geneva and attracted media attention.

⁶⁶ The consultant requested but did not receive confirmation that this list was complete.

⁶⁷ Guidelines on in-kind donations were requested from UNICEF but not received.

Table 6 – Donations In Kind Offered For Iraq⁶⁸

By	Offer	Result/Reason ⁶⁹
Belgian Government	Offer of military planes	Turned down on basis of transportation principles – and adherence to CIMIC asset guidelines
Bulgarian Government	Drugs	Turned down for non-adherence to WHO policy
Danish Government	Field hospital	Turned down considering preference for rehabilitation of existing hospitals and health centres
Municipality of Athens (Greece)	Proposal for collecting in-kind items	Turned down for lack of information
Association of Italian municipalities	Proposal for collecting in-kind items	Turned down for lack of information
Republic of Korea	Double cabin trucks	Accepted
Norwegian Government	Water supply	Accepted
Russian Federation	Field hospital	Turned down considering preference for rehabilitation of existing hospitals and health centres
Government of Slovenia	Drugs	Turned down for non-adherence to WHO policy
Regional Government of Balears (Spain)	Drugs	Turned down for non-adherence to WHO policy
Vietnamese Government	Food and medical	Turned down supplies
The French and Norwegian Governments	Free secondees to work with UNICEF in the water sector	Success

EMOPS Geneva is responsible for deciding whether to accept donations in consultation with the CO. According to an interviewee in EMOPS Geneva, the current guidelines on donations-in-kind are unclear. By contrast, PFO in New York considers the guidance to be quite clear and well established.

In the consultant's view, the scale of donations-in-kind received by some other agencies indicates that there may be more potential in this area, especially the possibilities for raising cash donations from donors that start by making donations-in-kind.

⁶⁸ Information provided by EMOPS Geneva.

⁶⁹ As given by UNICEF Geneva.

6.5 Funding – Summary Findings

- EPF and CERF funding were used by UNICEF on an unprecedented scale and proved to be critical in the success of UNICEF preparedness for the Iraq crisis. Without these funds, UNICEF CO preparedness plans could not have been implemented on any significant scale
- Regional coordination of EPF/CERF by MENARO provides an example for other regional crises

UNICEF held to a principled position over the reprinting of school textbooks in the face of US pressure

UNICEF was successful in fundraising for Iraq because of the high profile of the crisis, its track record in Iraq, good information flow and media reports from Amman; the Representative's tour of capital and the professionalism of the sub-regional preparedness planning process

- If Iraq is a representative example, UNICEF may not be making the most of the potential contribution donations–in-kind can make in emergency response

7. Financial Procedures

7.1 Preparedness

Development of financial procedures to fit the Iraq emergency context was an important element of UNICEF's preparedness. Planning included, for example, linking emergency phases to revised cash requirements, signatory panel, cheque limits, etc. Manual approval procedures were developed and simulated in case computers were not available — exactly as happened after the Baghdad office was looted. Paper-based manual procedures were also used in Kuwait.

At New York HQ, additional finance capacity was planned, with an extra four finance posts approved and staff identified, drawing on the team supporting OFFP, to handle the additional transactions coming from a large-scale emergency response. In the end, this capacity was not needed.

A contribution management system was implemented in Amman, building on previous emergency experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo, to track commitments and spend against PBAs. Within PFS, a coding scheme was used to allow the tracking of funding and commitments for multiple countries against the Iraq preparedness and flash appeals, something not previously possible.

7.2 Contract Procedures

Informants made multiple complaints about slow, cumbersome, and rigid financial and contract bidding procedures, which led to frustration and occasionally to UNICEF having to go back on its commitments to partners and communities. It was explained to the consultant more than once that, on occasion, the only option is to break the financial rules and document the reasons for doing so clearly on file, so that auditors will later be able to see why exceptions to normal procedures had to be made.

In Kuwait, NCA, a UNICEF partner, became so frustrated over delays to the contracting of water tankering that it threatened to withdraw. Eventually NCA used its own funds to keep the operation running, which was not part of their agreement with UNICEF⁷⁰. On at least one occasion, an individual used their own funds to keep WES contracts alive. In emergency situations, flexible approaches are required to keep life-saving services going, but staff using their own money to do so is not sound practice⁷¹. In this case there seems to have been no alternative when faced with bureaucratic delays⁷². It was reported that rigid administrative procedures led to UNICEF accumulating a backlog of unauthorised WES-related contracts in Baghdad, leading to delays for which UNICEF was criticized both by its contractors and by the water authority.

7.3 ProMS and Related Financial Controls

The Istanbul workshop noted that COs needed more training to make good use of ProMS. Further, "Financial administrative systems still presented problems. Managing multi-country funds with a single PBA was the preferred option based on the Afghanistan experience but it

⁷⁰ In the UN system, it is not unusual for NGOs to find themselves pre-funding work before being reimbursed by UN partners once their bureaucracies have caught up, but there should be clarity with the NGO as to when or whether this is required, as not all NGOs can manage this.

⁷¹ As technically the contractor is then working for, and obliged to, the staff member, not UNICEF.

⁷² A specific issue raised was the contract limit of \$20,000 on local contracts. The large sums required for the maintenance of capital works for the repair of urban water/sewerage systems means that \$20K can be used for the repairs of one part of one pumping station. This limit for locally agreed contracting was said to be too low for this situation.

is still not easily done in ProMS. Also, Intranet financial reports are not refreshed often enough, being one week back-dated⁷³. During and after the war there were delays in getting the right authorisations into the system, especially when officers were travelling. As noted elsewhere, "ProMS remains a challenge: authorisation of transactions is too often dependent on the same people already occupied with the emergency response (and therefore not in the office)."⁷⁴

The design of ProMS version 6 is being managed through the ProMS Reference Group that reports via the OGM. DFAM and ITA are aware of the need for simplification and are keen that EMOPS should actively engage with the revision process.

According to the Iraq CO, the complexity of UNICEF systems means that additional staffing is required to maintain them. The rapid growth of the Iraq programme meant a corresponding significant growth in the administration structure.

Discussions at all levels revealed a sense of resignation that the control environment in UNICEF is so rigid that it may not be possible to make procedures flexible enough for emergency situations, where quick decisions made locally are necessary for a rapid emergency response.

7.4 Financial Procedures – Summary Findings

- UNICEF was successful in developing and applying manual procedures and in updating Iraq ProMS systems in Amman from the manual records
- In the case of financial procedures, limits for local procurement and especially WES contracts were set too low, leading to delays in rehabilitating water and sewerage systems. This situation may recur in other major emergencies involving capital works
- Rigidity in the procedures for authorisation, certification, approval and payment means delays when key staff are on mission or leave
- A good knowledge of the management systems, including ProMS, is an advantage in emergency situations but too few staff have a good understanding of ProMS. This is indicative of a training need, which DFAM and ITD are both aware of. In the longer term, simplification of the system for use in emergencies is of equal or greater importance
- Contracts with NGO partners should specify whether they are required to pre-finance UNICEF contracts
- Staff should not use their own funds to keep projects going and UNICEF should not put them into a position where they need to

⁷³ Istanbul workshop report Annex C Section 7.

⁷⁴ Martigny II: UNICEF's Response to Women and Children in Crisis Situations (Draft), EMOPS, 8 August 2003, (p9).

8. SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS

8.1 Supply Division

Both emergency preparedness and emergency response were heavily dependent on supply, an area seen to have been generally successful. Recent performance improvements made by the Copenhagen SD were recognised⁷⁵. SD built on the capacity they had developed with OFFP to support the sub-regional preparedness and response, providing a dedicated team to handle supplies for the Iraq crisis. Crucial logistics support was provided from Copenhagen SD to MENARO via the secondment of two logistics officers to Amman⁷⁶.

8.2 Market Surveys

Local market surveys were undertaken in Jordan, Syria, and Iran whereby local suppliers were contacted to check the availability and price of specific items and storage, and transport facilities were assessed. This seems to have been an innovative approach to testing how far products and services could be obtained locally.

8.3 Supply Routes

The Regional Logistics Coordinator in Amman reported that "Iran is probably the best set up that we have in the neighbouring countries, due mainly to their involvement in the Afghanistan operation...However, indications are that the US will not be supportive of humanitarian actors using Iran as a corridor into Iraq and it is likely that Iranian trucks will not be permitted into Iraq..." "The US authorities are saying they will guarantee a humanitarian corridor from Kuwait into Iraq...Kuwait is going to be an important logistics hub, and we need a logistics officer there..."⁷⁷ UNICEF acknowledges that it should have sent a logistics officer to Kuwait sooner than it did.

The Iraq Representative would have preferred east/west corridors to be used (Iran⁷⁸, Syria) but security clearance and an SD preference for well-established routes dictated the use of North-South routes (Turkey and Jordan), which were not necessarily the most cost effective. Kuwait was added because the Coalition was offering safe passage into southern Iraq from there. Before the war, UNICEF said it would use humanitarian corridors only. In practice, the Kuwait route could be said to have compromised this principle. Syria and Iran were excluded because of their association with the "Axis of Evil" and, and more practically, because SD were concerned about problems with border crossings from these countries.

Additional warehousing was rented in all surrounding countries and sometimes shared with UN partners.

8.4 Pre-Positioning

UNICEF pursued a multi-level strategy for placing supplies in advance of the Iraq war both within and outside Iraq's borders for use in cross-border operations and for refugees and

⁷⁵ It is reported that the Copenhagen warehouse now has a 24- to 48-hour response capacity and is increasing the total global inventory of supplies from US \$600,000 to US \$2.5 million.

⁷⁶ The first from late January 2003 until end April, with visits to Turkey, Qatar, and Syria, and the second from late April to end June.

⁷⁷ Report from John Flanagan to MENARO, Iraq CR, January 2003.

⁷⁸ According to the "UNICEF Kuwait-Iran joint cross border support operation into Iraq, Suggested plan of action", the rationale for an Iran-Iraq **WHAT???:? MISSING WORD???** to be pursued was:

- Iran is the only country in the region (with Syria) not having cooperated with the coalition forces
- Iran's proximity to Iraqi main cities, its excellent network of road, its fuel capacity, and its supply component make her an advantageous choice for logistical operations
- Iran staff is available, with long experience of cross-border operations during Afghan crisis.

IDPs at or close to the border⁷⁹. By the time the second tranche of EPF funding and the CERF loan became available, the SD, RO, and COs had only two months to get supplies into place.

8.5 Tracking System

It emerged in the Istanbul workshop that, as yet, UNICEF does not have a corporate supply-tracking system and relies on its main distributor for its tracking. Local purchases and tracking beyond the warehouse are not currently included in the system. For the Iraq crisis, SD further developed an SQL database system first used in Afghanistan, and applied it in the sub-region. SD has now developed a plan for a corporate system based on this model, with field tests planned for December 2003 and implementation by June 2004.

8.6 Supply and Logistics – Summary Findings

- Supply Division was effective in providing support through its dedicated team in Copenhagen and in strengthening MENARO regional logistics capacity
- UNICEF's multi-level strategy for pre-positioning supplies gave UNICEF flexibility to use them in the most appropriate way
- The relatively late arrival of EPF and CERF funds meant a rush to obtain contingency supplies
- Local market surveys were a useful innovation in providing detail on local purchase and supply options
- UNICEF requires a commodity tracking system that can track items beyond the warehouse to final distribution
- UNICEF had the advantage of multiple entry points for supplies into Iraq, though for political reasons some were not used or used to a limited extent. Using Kuwait as the main supply route raised concerns about humanitarian principles being compromised by UNICEF appearing to work closely with the Coalition (See also Humanitarian Principles, 14.1)

⁷⁹ However, if borders had remained closed and cross-border shipments into Iraq had been blocked for an extended period, the cross-border element of the strategy would have been ineffectual. However, by having multiple potential entry points, this risk was reduced.

9. SECURITY

9.1 Planning

Following 11 September 2001, UNICEF began to take steps to increase security in UNICEF MENA offices even before the Iraq crisis arose. The preparedness process for Iraq benefited from a general increase in security awareness, and security professionals were involved in emergency preparedness from an early stage.

The contingency planning for Iraq assumed there would be evacuation of all IPs from Iraq at the start of hostilities. The evacuation on 18 March 2003 went smoothly, though it was said to have been difficult for IPs to leave their national colleagues to face the conflict⁸⁰.

Planning was conducted against a highly uncertain backdrop. The real concerns about the deployment of weapons of biological and chemical weapons within and beyond Iraq were not helped by UNSECOORD having no solution to offer for protection against biological weapons attack⁸¹.

9.2 National Staff

Before the war, national staff were involved in discussions on security, both in Baghdad and Erbil (northern Iraq). They were provided with first aid kits and VHF radios, and the security warden system was strengthened. While national staff had access to both satellite phones and VHF radios as part of the security system, they elected not to use them during the war because of government threats that anyone found using such equipment would be arrested, as well as concerns that radio transmissions might attract Coalition air attacks. UNICEF security advisors now consider that the situation of national staff in Iraq was not fully taken into account by UNICEF.

The OIC took a cautious approach to security, which was frustrating for some of his colleagues, but which probably added to their safety. National staff received security training before the conflict, but also relied on their common sense and local knowledge, for example, choosing to travel in unmarked cars. No national staff were seriously injured or killed in the war.

9.3 Return of IPs to Iraq

UNICEF was under pressure to return to Iraq as soon as possible after May when major hostilities were declared over. However, according to UNICEF security coordinators, after their return to Baghdad in mid- /late May some staff felt insecure and unsure what they could achieve because of poor security. The recent UN review of security in Iraq concluded that international UN staff returned to the country too soon, illustrating the tension between the UN's humanitarian and security goals. Several staff members expressed the hope that the security apparatus would shift focus to enable them meet UNICEF's humanitarian goals. However, given recent events in Iraq, decisions on security are likely to become more restrictive, not less. UN security clearance restricted UNICEF's operations on the entry into Basra, with NGOs gaining access several days before UNICEF. Under contract to UNICEF,

⁸⁰ The declaration of Phase V by the UN Secretary General meant that all international personnel were required to evacuate. Some UNICEF IPs would have been willing to stay on in Baghdad during the war. In the view of UNICEF security officers, this would not be a viable option in such a situation. During the evaluation, the suggestion was made that IPs could be given the option to stay on if they are prepared to sign away UNICEF's responsibility to protect them. However, in the consultant's view, this would not be realistic as such responsibility could probably only be derogated by the staff member resigning completely from the UN, which would defeat the purpose.

⁸¹ Guidance was offered on dealing with chemical attack.

NCA was amongst the first agencies to start tankering water from Kuwait into southern Iraq⁸².

9.4 Security of Assets

The UNICEF country team took common sense actions ahead of the war to minimise damage to assets. Newer vehicles and trucks were dispersed to surrounding countries (Jordan, Syria, and Turkey) and were returned to Baghdad after the conflict. This prevented loss and damage to the better portion of the UNICEF Iraq fleet. With the approval of the Humanitarian Coordinator, UNICEF used the remaining new vehicles in Iraq to evacuate to Jordan rather than using the UN plane from Baghdad.

The decision to distribute as much as possible of the preparedness supplies within Iraq before the crisis broke out was seen as a way of reducing the risk of losses of bulk supplies held in warehouses. This was a sound strategy. There was a debate about the best location of supplies. One view was that UNICEF should ship as much as possible into Iraq and locate supplies as close to beneficiaries as possible, even though some might be lost during the conflict. The counter view favoured a more cautious approach, with a higher proportion of supplies held outside Iraq and brought across the border as needed; the risk here being that borders might be sealed. The sub-regional planning meeting decided on a 75:25 inside: outside ratio, but the Regional Director overruled in favour of a 50:50 split.

The decision to keep equipment and computers in the Baghdad office rather than staff taking them home turned out to be unfortunate because the office was looted and computers, office furniture, and education supplies were taken⁸³. It should be noted that most UNICEF equipment was old and had not been replaced in the 18 months before the war because of the risk of loss during a war.

9.5 Security as a Constraint

Because the security situation deteriorated rather than improved after the war, UNICEF was only able to gain access to Baghdad, Basra and its surroundings, Nasiriyah, and Um Qasr in south/central Iraq. Access to the countryside was strictly limited. UNICEF had no option but to work within the US/UK security umbrella however informal and unclear security arrangements were. "In Iraq, there was no formal agreement on the security arrangements between the UN and CPA or Coalition Forces..."⁸⁴

9.6 Security and the UN's Image

Security was perceived as being tied to the UN's image. The Istanbul workshop concluded that "Staff safety was ultimately put at risk by political considerations at the level of the UN", while "The image of UNICEF and UN position vis-à-vis the Occupying Powers was/is a security risk. For example, meetings with US/CPA held in the UNICEF office created an image problem and a security risk. The SG/UN positioning vis-à-vis the Coalition was unclear to the public"⁸⁵.

9.7 Security UN-Wide

Security, more than any other aspect of operations has to be managed UN-wide. Security within the UN system is coordinated by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network

⁸² Whatever the frustrations, UNICEF should make use of the flexibility of NGOs to go places it cannot.

⁸³ After the looting, staff demanded and obtained some of the stolen items from buildings neighbouring the UNICEF office.

⁸⁴ "Report of The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq, 20 October 2003" (p5).

⁸⁵ Istanbul workshop report Annex C Section 8.

(IASMN) and managed by the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM). The work of the IASMN and the HLCM led to the adoption of a Resolution by the General Assembly in 2002 that “created a comprehensive system of accountability for the UN Security Management System”⁸⁶. However, UNICEF security coordinators consider that a lack of accountability for security is still a major issue and that coordination between the UN security management system and humanitarian actors needs improvement. One limitation noted was that UNSECOORD still has a country-by-country focus and does not allow for a multi-country approach.

9.8 Security – Summary Findings

- Security was the number one limitation to humanitarian work during and after the war
- Security planning helped to ensure that no UNICEF personnel were killed or injured during the war, although UNICEF acknowledges that the security situation of national staff in Iraq was not fully taken into account
- In general, the Representatives in the sub-region took their responsibility as security managers seriously
- It was not a realistic option to allow international personnel to volunteer to stay in Iraq after the declaration of Phase V on 18 March 2003
- Measures taken to minimise losses of assets by pre-distributing supplies, dispersing vehicles to neighbouring countries, and warehousing were generally successful
- Security concerns can only be resolved at the UN level, not by UNICEF acting alone
- UNICEF now needs to consider what additional support Representatives need to fulfil this role and to strengthen RO supervision and CO management accountability for security

⁸⁶ UNICEF Security Policy, Carol Bellamy, 21 January 2003.

10. INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY

10.1 Preparedness and Response

The need for additional telecommunications equipment was partly driven by the need to achieve MOSS, though in financial terms, MOSS-level communications represented less than a third of the spend on telecoms equipment.

After the war, in order to strengthen telecommunications within and with Iraq, UNICEF deployed three “flyaway” VSATs in a period of 20 days in Basra, Baghdad, and Erbil⁸⁷. This is considered a major achievement as standard VSAT installations can require several weeks to complete⁸⁸. As many other agencies were installing satellite equipment, UNICEF took the precaution of reserving bandwidth in advance of the VSAT installations⁸⁹.

In the preparedness phase, UNICEF fulfilled the telecoms coordination role in Jordan and Syria, and succeeded in obtaining licences from the two governments for the whole UN system. This required careful negotiation as governments in the region tend to be highly sensitive about telecommunications. . It was also time-consuming, with Turkey the most difficult case, involving a delay of some five months from mid- to late 2002.

ITD has identified a number of reasons why ICT responses to emergencies have not always been successful in the past. These include⁹⁰: “No concept of the scale required, starting the effort too late, lack of resources (people, supplies, and money), no concept of lead times, limited capacity building and no proactive investment”. These failings do not appear to have recurred in the Iraq case, probably because of proactive preparedness planning, early inclusion of ICT in planning, and the availability of preparedness funding.

EPF and CERF allowed all UNICEF COs in the sub-region to obtain upgraded telecommunications equipment. This is unusual. It is pertinent to consider how telecoms can be properly funded without a major crisis against which to fundraise.

⁸⁷ VSAT terminals cost \$50,000 each, plus \$1,000 - \$1,500 per month running cost. The running costs are far lower than other forms of satellite communication. UNICEF keeps VSATs in stock in Copenhagen because of the long lead time in obtaining the equipment from UNICEF’s telecom partners, Nortel, while all other equipment is purchased on demand to avoid it going out of date while being stored.

⁸⁸ As a rule, UNICEF no longer stockpiles ICT equipment as it quickly becomes redundant with advances in technology. However, VSATs are an exception, as they have to be built in advance for UNICEF. The long lead time allowed UNICEF to obtain the VSATs for Iraq in time but resources had not previously been set aside for the pre-purchase of these terminals for rapid deployment.

⁸⁹ VSAT can be set up with sufficient bandwidth to provide full functionality for UNICEF office systems.

⁹⁰ From an ITD paper “Building ICT Emergency Capacity” (Draft), May 2003.

10.2 ICT – Summary Findings

- Overall, ICT provision in the preparedness and response phases was successful, with many of the pitfalls affecting past emergencies being avoided
- UNICEF was successful in obtaining telecoms licences for the UN in both Jordan and Syria
- UNICEF was able to rapidly deploy three flyway VSAT installations in a period of 20 days, illustrating how quickly this equipment can be set up in comparison with the standard VSAT
- UNICEF needs ways of funding investments in ICT in potential emergency situations other than EPF and CERF

11. MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS

11.1 News Desk

The idea for UNICEF to set up an Iraq News Desk based in Amman came out of a meeting of communications officers in Cairo in February 2003 and proved to be a successful innovation, providing a regular stream of information for journalists, donors, and NATCOMS. The desk was staffed by media professionals on short assignments from Geneva HQ and elsewhere⁹¹. Communications specialists were dedicated just to media work and were not required to do internal reporting as well.

UNICEF made a good decision in choosing Amman as the location for the news desk because this is where the international media congregated (with up to 1,500 journalists). The News Desk was up and running before the war, allowing interviews to begin immediately after the evacuation from Baghdad. It was equipped and staffed using the preparedness funds managed by the Regional Office. Its performance was considered to have faded towards the end of the war, partly because there were no refugee stories to tell. In parallel with the News Desk, a UN Briefing Centre was established in Amman from which daily briefings were given to the world media on the activities of all the UN agencies involved⁹².

11.2 Staffing

In support of surrounding countries, additional communications staff were deployed to Syria, Kuwait, and Iran (albeit very briefly).

11.3 Arab Media

In order to get communications messages through to the Arab media, consultants and UNICEF staff were recruited or redeployed to cover the key Arabic media hubs: Cairo, Beirut, and Dubai. This again was an innovation, building on UNICEF's knowledge of the media in the region and its connections with media professionals. UNICEF recognises that it paid more attention to "big" international media and did not succeed in influencing Arab popular opinion through its additional links to the Arab media. The simultaneous translations provided during press briefings in Amman were not adequate for this purpose.

The lesson UNICEF has drawn from this is: for communications officers to be effective in the region, they must know UNICEF well and must speak Arabic. MENARO is aware of the need to develop further its Regional Communications Strategy to address the continuing negative image of the UN in the Middle East and position UNICEF as a respected and impartial humanitarian organisation.

11.4 UNICEF Position

Due to the high political profile of the Iraq crisis, media statements on Iraq were seen as being of the highest importance, with the Executive Director directly involved in UNICEF communications, including personally clearing all press releases.

⁹¹ While a plan was drawn up before the war for a number of short-term assignments to staff the news desk, it was reported not all of these commitments were honoured, leaving less experienced staff to carry the responsibility.

⁹² UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, OIM, OCHA, UNIC.

Contrary to the impression of some staff, UNICEF issued a series of press releases highlighting the likely, and later the actual, humanitarian consequences of war⁹³. Some of these messages were reportedly well covered in the western media, but much less so in the region. In 1999, UNICEF attracted attention when it spoke out vigorously about the impact of sanctions on the children of Iraq. By contrast, the communications messages with regard to this crisis look somewhat tame — at least many UNICEF staff found them to be so.

UNICEF also released public statements on the importance of security for humanitarian assistance⁹⁴. Given that this was the overriding problem constraining the delivery of assistance and a wider return to normalcy in Iraq, the statements seem rather mild. On the ground, UNICEF lobbied the occupying powers on security issues, but was more muted in its public criticism of their failure to secure public utilities, the protection of which would have made a significant difference to the welfare of Iraqi children. (See also under Civil Military Relations below.)

11.5 Defending Rights

The Executive Director is satisfied that UNICEF spoke out as much as it could in defence of the rights of women and children. By contrast, senior informants from both inside and outside the organisation consider that the organisation missed an opportunity to communicate effectively in defence of the rights of children affected by the war in Iraq. Some staff remain upset about what they perceive as the organisation's communications failure over Iraq, all the more so when compared with UNICEF's outspoken stand on the impact of sanctions in Iraqi children in the late 1990s.

UNICEF was in a difficult position with regard to its public statements. The highly politicised nature of the crisis, especially as played out in New York, was a serious constraint to the application of a human rights based approach. Even so, the balance of opinion within the organisation is that UNICEF erred on the side of caution in this case.

Some staff seem to have expected UNICEF to have spoken out against the war itself. The Executive Director is clear that UNICEF is not a "super-NGO" and cannot take such a stand. UNICEF's position has been clearly set out by HPU: "UNICEF does not take any position on the rights of States to take military action against others within the limits of the UN Charter and international law."⁹⁵

⁹³ Relevant extracts from UNICEF press releases:

- I "If there was an exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, this could seriously affect the distribution of food, leaving children at risk of severe malnutrition once again" (21 November 2002)
- I "The situation of Iraqi children has been very difficult for more than 15 years, said Carol Bellamy, Executive Director of UNICEF, No matter what the global situation, we cannot shrink from the ongoing work of reaching out to help them." (18 February 2003)
- I "But war adds displacement, interruption of food and water supplies, and outbreaks of disease. Combined, these events would strike a heavy blow to a population of children who are already struggling to survive..." "The real issue is what we do to protect children in times of war..." (11 March 2003)
- I "Conflict could very well have disastrous consequences for Iraqi children..." (no date)
- I "Children will die in this war. That's a fact. The question is how many children we can protect. That has got to be a priority for all of us now." "Conflict could cause a major deterioration in their already poor living conditions, with devastating results." (19 March 2003)
- I "Iraq has been in a crisis for more than 15 years. People have nothing to fall back on. A major war is engulfing them. These are the facts. We have to act now to prevent needless deaths and suffering, and to provide some hope for Iraqi children. That's what this appeal is about." (on the launch of the Flash Appeal, 28 March 2003)
- I "Iraq's future depends on the health and well-being of its children. At the moment we are failing them. They should be our first priority – not only in words, but in action. And frankly I'm not seeing nearly enough action for children." (2 May 2003)

⁹⁴ Including "Even conflicts are guided by rules and humanitarian conventions. It is the responsibility of those who retain effective control of a territory to ensure that there is order and that there is secure access for the delivery of life-saving humanitarian aid, said Bellamy." (April 9); "I urge the parties to this conflict to abide by their international humanitarian obligations.": "Secure aid delivery equals effective aid delivery. Weeks later, we are still calling on somebody to deliver that security." (May 14)

⁹⁵ "Legal and ethical position of meeting humanitarian needs in an "invasion" context", Notes drafted by Iain Levine, compiled by Sherazade Boualia.

11.6 Strategy Constraints

UNICEF senior management does not appear to have made it clear to staff, either in HQ or in the region, the degree to which UNICEF was constrained by the communications strategy agreed by the Steering Group on Iraq. Heads of agencies were obliged to stick to an agreed line. Some staff, even at quite senior levels, do not seem to have understood this. This points to a failure of internal communications, and to an inadequate understanding of UNICEF's place in the UN system and the types of advocacy messages it can adopt.

11.7 Wider UN

At the New York level, it was reported that there is an ongoing, heated debate within the UN communications group with regard to how/whether the UN uses its voice on behalf of the its humanitarian agencies, a debate UNICEF needs to influence in favour of the UN's humanitarian voice.

11.8 Media Coverage

Overall, UNICEF was successful in getting media coverage during and immediately after the war, in large measure due to use of experienced media professionals and the quality of information generated by UNICEF. Some media coverage was fortuitous, for example, in Turkey, TV footage of UNICEF trucks crossing into northern Iraq was widely shown, while the trucks in question were carrying routine OFFP supplies. A minority of informants felt that the RO and Iraq CO were under pressure from HQ to be seen to perform and, on occasion, were too keen to take fast and visible action to gain media coverage.

Information campaigns in Iraq included radio and TV broadcasts preparing children for possible separation from their families⁹⁶ and the Back to School campaign after the war. These were seen as successful.

11.9 Media Statements by the Coalition

Some statements from the US and the UK were unhelpful to UNICEF. For example, the DART teams announcing that US funding had gone to UNICEF had negative consequences, by associating UNICEF with the US and also causing some agencies not funded by the US to conclude that UNICEF had struck some form of behind-the-scenes deal. The UK's ambassador to the Security Council included UNICEF water tankering under the UK's: "achievements", creating the impression of a close link between the military and UNICEF.

11.10 Perceptions of UNICEF

UNICEF's emergency response was perceived differently in the Arab and western media. Again using the example of water tankering into Basra, this was portrayed by western media as a significant life-saving contribution, while the same images created anger within Iraq and elsewhere in the region because of the close association of UN actions with the military invasion⁹⁷.

⁹⁶ For example, ensuring children knew their own names and addresses.

⁹⁷ UNICEF moved to using the Arabic version of its logo on water tankers to avoid having the words UN or United Nations on the vehicles, thereby decreasing the likelihood of their being attacked.

The UN is not perceived as having been even-handed towards the Palestinians and, in Iraq, has implemented sanctions and the Oil for Food Programme. Although UNICEF was viewed more positively than some agencies, against this backdrop it was always going to be an uphill battle for UNICEF to continue to portray itself as the friend of Iraqi mothers and children.

11.11 Media and Communications — Summary Findings

- UNICEF's media work and communications proved to be one of the most contentious aspects of the evaluation
- UNICEF achieved considerable media coverage for its humanitarian work during and after the war. As noted by the Istanbul workshop, UNICEF's "good image stemmed from UNICEF's programme presence on the ground before and during the war, as well as by a prompt, coherent communication response within UNICEF, including in the quality way the communication officers and representatives addressed the media"⁹⁸
- UNICEF issued a series of press releases clearly highlighting the likely and the actual humanitarian consequences of the war in Iraq
- A high proportion of the staff interviewed considered that UNICEF could have done more to speak out for the rights of women and children in Iraq. At the same time, the limitations placed on UNICEF by the communication strategy agreed by SGI were poorly understood, even in HQ. Internal communication was inadequate to ensure a clear understanding of why UNICEF was or was not making certain public statements
- The Amman News Desk was a successful initiative that could provide a model for future emergencies
- UNICEF information campaigns in Iraq were successful
- UNICEF's initiatives to create better links with the Arab media were innovative, but had limited success because of the negative impression of "UNICEF being too close to the Occupying Powers"⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Istanbul workshop report Annex C Section 3.

⁹⁹ Istanbul workshop report Annex C Section 3.

12. UNICEF STRUCTURES

12.1 Regional Office

The Regional Director and his staff led and oversaw the sub-regional coordination of emergency preparedness and contingency planning. Initially, the Regional Planning Officer led the planning and coordination, and, from March 2002, the Regional Emergency Officer. These appointments were made by the Regional Director in line with a corporate move to strengthen the UNICEF Regional Offices support role.

Initially Regional Advisors took part in the preparedness planning meetings but found they were giving too much time to Iraq at the expense of other countries, and from March 2002 did not attend the planning meetings but continued to offer support to individual COs on request.

At one stage, MENARO considered relocating to another centre. Options in Amman and elsewhere in the region were considered, but the final solution was to hire the MIG House from where the Iraq programme could be run. The office was occupied by members of the Iraq team evacuated to Amman from Baghdad and was retained, initially until September¹⁰⁰.

In the contingency plan, it had been agreed that once the emergency began, the coordination role would be handed to the Iraq Country Representative after the evacuation from Baghdad to Amman. In the consultant's view, the decision made in advance of the crisis to turn the sub-regional coordination over to the Iraq Representative is questionable. If the anticipated refugee/IDP emergency had happened, regional emergency management of the crisis would have been required, yet such a structure was not anticipated in the planning phase¹⁰¹. As the anticipated regional refugee crisis did not happen, when UNICEF actually made the shift to coordination by the CO, this decision was consistent with the UN decision to move control back to the Iraq UNCT. It is acknowledged by regional staff that the shift may have been made a few months too early, especially for coordination of human resources and logistics.

After the war began, the coordination of activities between COs appears to have broken down; "...for some reasons, the UNICEF regional coordination mechanism suddenly collapsed around mid-April"^{102,103}. The Istanbul workshop report also makes reference to "unclear coordination mechanisms at UNICEF sub-regional level once the conflict started"¹⁰⁴.

12.2 Geneva

The Senior Emergency Officer based in EMOPS Geneva¹⁰⁵ assisted the Iraq CO and the RO with contingency planning at an early stage in the preparations for the crisis and attended most of the sub-regional planning workshops. EMOPS Geneva also played a role in fundraising and in the secondments of senior staff from other agencies for inter-agency coordination.

¹⁰⁰ And subsequently re-rented after the increasing withdrawal of IPs from Baghdad in September/October.

¹⁰¹ It was reported that there is a document in draft that describes the newly defined responsibilities of the regional offices, but this was not available to the consultant. However, according to "Martigny II – Where are we now? A Review of UNICEF Humanitarian Response Capacity, May 2003," "...in the newly proposed accountabilities for RO, as with the CCCs, there is an explicit accountability of ROs for ensuring human resources support to COs in unstable and crisis contexts."

¹⁰² This coincided with the Regional Emergency Officer going to open the UNICEF office in Basra.

¹⁰³ Lessons learned from the Iraq Emergency: A Personal Perspective Gained in Iran (Former Programme Officer, UNICEF, Iran (Jan 2000 – June 2003).

¹⁰⁴ Istanbul workshop report Annex B Section 2.

¹⁰⁵ EMOPS is divided between New York and Geneva.

As events unfolded, EMOPS Geneva increasingly found itself excluded from the preparedness process, especially after October 2002 when the centre of decision-making moved to New York. Other Geneva-based humanitarian actors and permanent missions found themselves in the unaccustomed position of being out of the decision-making loop on humanitarian action. The Swiss government convened two conferences on Iraq, partly in an effort to have Geneva re-established as the humanitarian focus in the run-up to the war, but with limited success, in spite of the high quality of debate at these meetings.

12.3 New York HQ

Coordination for Iraq in UNICEF New York was led by the relevant Field Support and Inter-Agency Collaboration Section in the Programme Division (PD). The Iraq Support Unit (ISU) was located in the MENA section of PD, led by its Deputy Director¹⁰⁶. The unit included up to five staff members between March and September 2003, including the former Deputy Representative in Iraq reporting to the Deputy Director, herself a former UNICEF Representative in Iraq.

The link between the Regional Office and the Iraq Support Unit (ISU) seems to have worked well with regular communication, including conference calls, and engagement with the Programme Funding Office in New York. However, there were also a number of concerns raised in association with the Unit:

- Discussions within the inter-agency Steering Group on Iraq were confidential and UNICEF staff in New York were kept informed on a need-to-know basis. This led to a number of HQ technical clusters feeling (and being) excluded. These clusters were concerned by the contrast with the normally consultative style adopted for emergencies in UNICEF New York. This is somewhat ironic, given that the Executive Director was trying to protect other programmes by limiting the number of people involved with Iraq.
- The Humanitarian Response Unit is now located in Programme Division but was not directly involved in the Iraq preparedness or response, though others in UNICEF assumed, perhaps understandably, that it was. The decision to have the ISU as the focal point rather than HRU was taken in consultation with the MENA Regional Director.
- MENARO and CO staff noted that preparedness planning efforts undertaken before the ISU was established as focal point were not sufficiently known or acknowledged in headquarters.

Discussions in the Istanbul workshop pointed to "...a lack of clarity in headquarters coordination, a tendency towards micro-management and corresponding elevated stress due to NYHQ pressure."¹⁰⁷

The traditional distinction between Geneva as the humanitarian centre versus New York as the political centre broke down in this crisis, particularly with the establishment of the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) and the knock-on effect on the role of the Geneva-based Inter-Agency Standing Committee. UNICEF and other UN agencies may need to think through whether this blurring was temporary, may recur, or if there has been a permanent shift in roles, and then adjust to suit.

Because of the intensity of the consultation process in New York, and the engagement of the Security Council with the issue of Iraq, UNICEF New York was well placed compared with other UN agencies that have their HQ elsewhere, for example WFP (Rome) and UNHCR

¹⁰⁶ The Deputy Director reported that roughly 90% of her time in 2003 has been dedicated to Iraq. This included senior working level inter-agency discussions on the future of the OFFP, working on an inter-departmental committee that was charged with coming up with a paper on possible UN roles in Iraq for the SGI; similar consultation on reconstruction and planning and preparatory meetings for the reconstruction conference in Madrid.

¹⁰⁷ Istanbul workshop report, Annex C, section 2 Coordination.

(Geneva). To some extent, UNICEF found itself acting as an informal information channel to these agencies¹⁰⁸.

The question was raised in the evaluation as to whether UNICEF HQ should have dedicated so much human resource to Iraq, a country with relatively good human development indicators in comparison with other developing countries. There are three reasons why such an investment was justified. First, there might have been a very severe humanitarian crisis in Iraq¹⁰⁹ and secondly, given its political importance, UNICEF had no alternative but to ensure it could and did mount as effective a response as possible. Thirdly, the ISU was partly instituted so that any other emergency responses could be managed by HRU and EMOPS. UNICEF would probably need to make the same decision again about human resources should such a situation occur elsewhere.

12.4 UNICEF Structures – Summary Findings

- It was appropriate for the RO to take a coordinating role in sub-regional EPRP and it seems to have been both effective and valued. The prior regional and emergency experience of both the Regional Director and the Regional Emergency Officer was important in the success of sub-regional coordination of EPRP
- EMOPS Geneva played a key role, via the Senior Emergency Officer (SEO), in the development and rollout of the EPRP process within the sub-region
- Setting up and maintaining the Iraq Support Unit was a sensible way of limiting the impact of the Iraq crisis on other teams in HQ. Communication between the RO and ISU was good but information sharing within HQ on New York developments on Iraq was probably too restricted, leaving some technical staff inadequately informed
- In any future multi-country emergency response, regional management may be necessary, and the EPRP guidelines could usefully be updated to take this into account

¹⁰⁸ In response to the New York focus, the Head of OCHA Geneva relocated there for the duration.

¹⁰⁹ Especially given that the entire population was dependent on a state subsidy system at the outset of the war.

13. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

13.1 Contingency Planning

EMOPS Geneva helped the IASC to develop its inter-agency preparedness planning guidelines before the Iraq crisis emerged, and initiated and co-chaired the Inter-agency Planning Group on Iraq in Geneva with WFP, a contribution acknowledged by other UN agencies in Geneva.

13.2 UN Country Teams

UN Country Teams were the primary axis of coordination in individual countries. UNCTs were active in coordination in the lead up to the Iraq war, though some with more success than others. The multi-country nature and high profile of the crisis obliged UN agencies to work together for an extended planning period at country, regional and HQ levels. Coordination was less obvious and, perhaps, less necessary in the response phase. Informants described how, once the war began, each agency tended to operate on its own.

In agreement with UN regional directors and UNCTs, UNICEF took lead roles in country-level sector coordination, as follows:

Table 7 – UNICEF In-Country Sector Lead Roles

	Iraq	Iran	Jordan	Syria	Turkey	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia
Health		✓			✓		
Nutrition	✓			✓	✓		
WES	✓	✓		✓			
Education	✓	✓	✓		✓		
CP	✓			✓			
Mine awareness						✓	

In several cases, COs relied on the additional capacity from redeployed staff from Iraq and NGO partnerships to perform these roles.

13.3 Sub-Regional Sector Coordination

13.3.1 Sector Coordinators

UNICEF provided sub-regional coordination for WES, Nutrition, Education and Child Protection, bringing in seconded personnel from other organisations to fill the coordinator role for three out of four sectors. From February 2003, sector coordinators were provided by:

Table 8 – Sector Coordinators Secondments

Seconding Organisation	Sector	Period
OXFAM GB	WES	February – end study period
UNOCHI	Nutrition	February – end study period
Education	NRC	2 secondments March and April/May
Child Protectio	UNICEF	Senior Protection Officer from Sudan March 6 - May 9

UNICEF recruited high-level specialists into the inter-agency coordinating roles. In general, the expertise of the individuals concerned was appreciated and was seen to have added credibility to UNICEF's role in inter-agency preparedness and emergency response in Iraq. The coordinators were located in the Coordination Unit, housed within and supported by MIG House. From February 2003, they reported to the Humanitarian Coordinator located in Larnaca, Cyprus.

Through its leadership of inter-agency sector coordination, UNICEF was probably in a position to exert influence over the analysis and agenda of the inter-agency effort in specific sectors, although it has not been possible to assess to what extent. Some sector coordinators reported that UNICEF staff did not understand that the coordinator's job was first and foremost to fulfil the coordination function and only secondarily to support UNICEF or promote its interests. While there may be benefits to UNICEF in providing the sector coordinator in terms of influence, this does not mean that UNICEF can expect them to be partial in UNICEF's favour. In the consultant's view, UNICEF cannot assume that the sector coordinator will double as the manager of UNICEF's sectoral programmes.

Some of the sector coordinators were quite clear that reporting to the Humanitarian Coordinator was nominal and unsatisfactory, as the HC was almost never available. The Humanitarian Coordinator made one visit to Amman in early March, facilitated by the UNICEF Regional Director, which proved helpful in clarifying responsibilities¹¹⁰. Given that the HC was seldom in Larnaca, let alone Amman, the coordinators lost little by being based in Amman. On the other hand, they gained from the support systems provided by UNICEF in MIG House, and from Amman being a base for NGOs working, or planning to work, in Iraq.

UNICEF clearly went to some lengths to ensure that it was seen as an active leader of inter-agency collaboration. Several informants from the sub-region considered that UNICEF put too much effort into sector coordination at the expense of its own programmes. The Istanbul workshop concluded that "UNICEF took on the coordination role in too many sectors"¹¹¹. Whether UNICEF programmes were materially undermined by its taking on the leadership of sectoral coordination cannot be further assessed here.

During the conflict, NGOs started to arrive in Amman in large numbers, in readiness for entry to Iraq once hostilities were over. Most of these NGOs had no background in Iraq and their presence complicated sector coordination. UNICEF coordinators invested heavily in briefing and coordinating NGOs – an important but time-consuming contribution.

13.3.2 Water and Sanitation

UNICEF provided effective inter-agency coordination at sub-regional level with other agencies working in the sector, including ICRC, WHO, WFP, UNDP, CARE, and OXFAM¹¹². Reportedly, the close coordination between agencies was a factor in obtaining funding from ECHO. The coordinator's dealings with the CPA in Iraq reportedly worked well because of good personal contacts with key officials in the authority.

¹¹⁰ Unfortunately, it was not possible to interview Ramiro da Silva, the Humanitarian Coordinator.

¹¹¹ Istanbul workshop report, Annex C, Section 2, Coordination.

¹¹² Operational partners included OXFAM, NCA, CARE, and ICRC.

13.3.3 Nutrition

At a joint meeting with WHO in Cairo in February 2003, it was agreed that WHO would undertake the sub-regional coordination role for health, while UNICEF would lead on nutrition. UNICEF recruited an officer from UNOHC1 to cover this role. A UNICEF Health Advisor was involved in preparedness activities and was located in Basra during and after the war, but then was transferred, leaving a gap until a new officer arrived. There were some differences between WFP and UNICEF over WFP's role in supplementary feeding versus UNICEF's role in therapeutic feeding. Agencies did coordinate their nutrition programmes and the coordination was reported by some UNICEF staff to have worked well, among other things, to resolve differences. However, some NGO partners reported to UNICEF that they consider coordination to have been ineffective. According to the sector coordinator, UNICEF responded well to the Iraq crisis, but could have brought more NGOs competent in nutrition on board at the preparedness stage, so as to be better prepared for the post-war phase.

13.3.4 Education

Overall, sectoral coordination in education seems to have been productive. Initially, a Task Force on Education was established between the UN agencies and NGOs, plus ICRC and IOM. This structure was changed when the new structure of Sector Coordinators reporting to the Humanitarian Coordinator came into force. Relationships between UNICEF and UNESCO were not always good, though the sector coordinator succeeded in bringing UNESCO into a joint planning process. The sector coordinator reported receiving good support from MENARO¹¹³.

In Iraq, there was no inter-agency coordination in Iraq before the war, and no UNICEF partners in education. Any dealings with government were carried out by the Iraq Programme Coordinator. After the war, an Education Forum was formed with the Programme Coordinator as Chair.

It was reported that UNICEF is increasingly appointed as the lead agency on education in emergencies¹¹⁴. Having a secondment to cover education such as those from NRC is unusual. Unlike WES or Health, there is no obvious NGO partner for UNICEF that can provide education programmes for emergencies or sector coordination. UNICEF should work to find such partners. UNICEF is already a member of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, a grouping that should allow such partnerships to be explored.

13.3.5 Child Protection

The inter-agency coordination of Child Protection is reported to have been very productive. The Inter-agency Working Group on Separated Children was sequestered as the planning group for Iraq. The six member agencies¹¹⁵, while having differing concepts of protection, worked together closely to formulate policy and agree common procedures relating to, for example, registering and referring separate children and child prisoners of war. In practice, there were no separated children in Iraq, so the mechanisms were not required, but coordination continued at all levels, with UNICEF playing a leadership role.

¹¹³ Only one of the two NRC seconded staff has provided feedback.

¹¹⁴ The only other UN option being UNESCO, which is not seen as having the operational capacity to fulfil this role.

¹¹⁵ UNICEF, UNHCR, ICRC, IRC, Save the Children, World Vision International. One of the benefits of the group has proven to be a growing understanding of each agencies differing understandings of "protection".

This collaboration is important for UNICEF, partly because Child Protection is a relatively new area for all agencies and child protection in emergencies is not yet clearly defined. UNICEF can share learning with partners in the inter-agency working group with a view to improving practice and guidelines together and allowing UNICEF to build on its guidance materials, which currently tend to focus on orphans, tracing¹¹⁶, and child combatants.

13.3.6 ICT

UNICEF was an active player in the Working Group on Emergency Telecommunications (WGET). A working core group of the WGET was established with participation of UNICEF, OCHA, WFP, WHO, UNHCR and UNDP. From this group, coordination for the countries in the sub-region (including Iraq) was established. UNICEF had the telecoms coordination role for Jordan and Syria. In late 2002, the IASC group assigned WFP the task of coordinating a common preparedness plan for the region for ITC. There were some frustrations with a lag in internal communications within UNICEF (to ITC) regarding this IASC decision. There were reportedly some delays and frustration for all agencies stemming from differences between WFP and other WGET members over an initial proposal.

13.4 Sub-Regional UN Coordination

At a sub-regional level, the three main operational UN agencies (UNICEF, WFP, and UNHCR) took a lead in sub-regional coordination through their respective regional directors. This was an unprecedented step. As the profile of the crisis grew, the coordination focus moved first to the Head of OCHA in Geneva for the last quarter of 2002 and subsequently to the Humanitarian Coordinator, from early 2003. The HC established a coordination centre in Larnaca, Cyprus¹¹⁷ while UNICEF kept its coordination unit in Amman, unlike WHO and WFP, which maintained regional coordination bases in Larnaca.

Weekly phone calls from October 2002 between Resident Coordinators, OCHA, and Regional Directors (WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR) were seen as effective by the UNICEF Regional Director, both for coordination and for teambuilding in the sub-region.

13.5 Headquarters

Inter-agency preparedness planning for Iraq began in April/May 2002. In October, an inter-agency meeting was organised by the IASC and hosted by ICRC. The so-called Versoix 1st meeting was designated as a non-meeting, where non-delegates just happened to be in the same place at the same time. The meeting came close to be vetoed by the UN Secretariat because of the sensitivity of the UN being seen to prepare for conflict¹¹⁸. This was the first inter-agency planning meeting outside MENA and was said to have achieved a high level of consensus on scenarios and the respective role of the agencies, acting as a catalyst for further in-region coordination. UNDP Resident Coordinators were not invited to Versoix 1, but were present at a second Geneva meeting, held on 12-13 January 2003.

UNICEF was an active member of the New York-based Steering Group on Iraq (SGI). Remarkably, as originally constituted, the SGI did not include UNICEF or WFP in its membership! Once this was remedied, UNICEF was successful in bringing operational issues to the table, focusing discussions on the humanitarian implications of the scenarios under consideration. UNICEF was vocal and effective in bringing the issue of the role and security of UN national staff to the table, which apparently was not being considered by other

¹¹⁶ Separated children is one of the CCCs for Child Protection.

¹¹⁷ Selected because of its relative proximity to Iraq but in a location outside the Arab world.

¹¹⁸ UNSECOORD went to the meeting to say it should not be happening.

agencies. UNICEF contributed to the Humanitarian Coordinator being given a key role in influencing the discussions and the agendas of the SGI.

For its part, the UNICEF benefited from its participation in SGI through its “direct access to the dynamics and processes of the thinking and debate on policy issues”¹¹⁹. A drawback of being part of the SGI, as with some other aspects of coordination, was the time input required, especially for senior managers. The SGI itself was later criticised for becoming a decision-making group rather than an advisory one and for being out of touch with regional and country decision-making. For example, “...there was a lack of vertical information flow between the Steering Committee...and the field...The Turkey country team felt second-guessed throughout.”

It is debatable whether UN planning was helped or hindered by the New York focus and this could usefully be considered by an inter-agency evaluation. According to the Istanbul workshop report, “It is felt that UN and UNICEF headquarters lack an understanding of the region. Specific mention was made of lack of understanding of Middle East politics and the “Arab street dynamic”.¹²⁰

13.6 Partnerships¹²¹

Feedback collected on UNICEF’s UN partners was as follows:

Table 9 – Feedback on UN Partnerships

Agency	Performance/Relationship
UNHCR	Determined not to be caught off guard as in Kosovo, it made ambitious plans for all surrounding countries to receive large numbers of refugees. There were some clashes with UNICEF over differences of mandate. Generally good cooperation, except with less experienced UNHCR staff. The Iraq crisis came at a time when UNHCR was very short of funds.
WFP	WFP were well prepared. Good cooperation overall. In Iraq, WFP was said not to have fully cooperated with nutrition coordination.
OCHA	Mixed messages; OCHA role in Jordan positive, especially in helping to coordinate incoming NGOs. Weekly regional teleconference and information coordination in Iraq appreciated. Negative feedback normally related to OCHA’s late arrival and subsequent search for, or attempted imposition, of a coordinating role after other mechanisms were already in place.
UN Country Team Coordination	UNCT worked well in Jordan, and to some extent in Iran. In Iraq, coordination worked within the UNDG, but its effectiveness was diluted by non-operational agencies as the crisis approached. Coordination was less satisfactory in Syria and Turkey due to disputes over mandate or personality, or inexperience of some agency heads.
Resident Coordinators	Mixed feedback on role of Resident Coordinators. Some very active, others hostile and/or out of their depth.
UNJLC	The UNJLC provided a very useful role in cross-border operations by providing free air cargo services into Iraq. UNICEF benefited from direct flights including from Copenhagen as well as Jordan-Baghdad and Jordan-Basra regional cargo. The UNJLC contribution to overland cargo was less useful. They were a useful forum for inter-agency logistics discussions with the Jordanian authorities and the Coalition. Negative feedback was received on their contribution in Iran.

¹¹⁹ Steering Group on Iraq, Email from Anupama Rao Singh, 11 November 2003.

¹²⁰ Istanbul workshop report, Annex C, Section 3.

¹²¹ Other partnerships not covered here: comments on individual governments as UNICEF partners are omitted; there is insufficient information to provide a sensible comment on each NGO partner.

The Red Cross Red Crescent Movement is an important partner in the sub-region. In Iraq, ICRC has been a key partner, sharing responsibilities in water and sanitation, child protection and mine awareness. Most COs have dealt with their respective Red Crescent national societies over Iraq. Sometimes this relationship has been productive, other times not. COs tended to describe the RC as somewhat secretive and very close to government. Given the breadth of the RCRC network, and the chances of it being a partner in almost every country in the region, any general concerns could usefully be taken up with the IFRC in Geneva to address any common issues and improve the working relationship.

13.7 Improving Coordination

Making inter-agency coordination work at country, regional, Geneva, and New York levels is clearly a challenge. It is acknowledged that inter-agency coordination is essential, though it was frustrating for some UNICEF managers to work with agencies that only arrived when it was clear funding would be available, insisted on being included, required orientation, and then produced no tangible response to the emergency.

As noted above, there were also frustrations over the UNDP Resident Coordinators, some of whom were said to have performed well in their role as Humanitarian Coordination while others showed a lack of skill and inclination. In the same way, OCHA was seen as making a valuable contribution in some places and as an obstacle in others. As long as the role and resourcing of OCHA remains weak, the frustrations and inefficiencies in inter-agency coordination are likely to continue. The Iraq case shows that UNCTs can be an effective coordination forum and that UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP acting together at regional and country level can improve operational coordination. Ideally, decisions taken at regional level on sectoral leadership or overall leadership of coordination should match the competence of the agencies in the country. For example, coordination in Saudi Arabia was assigned to UNDP, while UNHCR clearly had more capacity to lead the coordination.

13.8 UNICEF Contribution to Coordination

Apart from its own response capability and its mandate for mothers and children, UNICEF has other distinctive contributions to make to inter-agency coordination. UNICEF played a role in linking government capacities to UN contingency planning in all countries. In Iran, UNICEF found itself having to champion a human rights approach that other agencies, despite lip service, were not taking seriously. If the Iraq experience is anything to judge by, and as HRBAP is applied increasingly to emergency contexts, UNICEF is likely to find itself acting as an advocate for human rights based approaches in future UN coordination fora.

13.9 Inter-Agency Coordination – Summary Findings

The role of EMOPS Geneva in the leadership of inter-agency contingency planning for Iraq was acknowledged by other UN agencies.

UNICEF played an active role in UN coordination at country, regional and HQ levels and made a substantial contribution to sector coordination in the sub-region, while perhaps taking on too many sectors. UNICEF could not be said to have worked in isolation.¹²²

Inter-agency sub-regional sector coordination was an innovation for this crisis and the UNICEF experience indicates that this could well be a useful model for the future. The use of seconded experts for sectoral coordination worked well.

- The increasing emphasis on New York as the locus of decision making as the Iraq crisis drew closer was probably inevitable given the political nature of the crisis but it did not necessarily improve the quality of contingency planning as sub-regional political and programme perspectives became increasingly remote.
- The Red Cross Red Crescent Movement is an important partner in the sub-region. Any general concerns UNICEF has about its relationship with RC national societies should be taken up with the IFRC in Geneva.
- UNICEF was in danger of compromising the quality of its own sector programmes in Iraq by assuming the inter-agency sector coordinator would double as the UNICEF sector programme manager and not recognising that these are separate functions.

UNICEF should seek to establish key NGO partnerships for Education and Nutrition

An inter-agency evaluation could usefully consider how the lead agency for any country and emergency is chosen and further clarify the lead role vis-à-vis the Resident Representative role and the task and resourcing of OCHA.

- An inter-agency evaluation could usefully consider whether there should be funding within the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) to support inter-agency coordination and for the establishment of robust UN telecommunications and logistics.

¹²² It emerged during the evaluation that UNICEF has been stung by past criticisms that it was not adequately involved in inter-agency coordination, and is trying hard to correct this impression.

14. POLICY ISSUES

14.1 Humanitarian Principles

Humanitarian action is based on three universally recognized humanitarian principles: the humanitarian imperative, neutrality, and impartiality. The ability of UNICEF and the UN to hold to these principles was tested before and during the Iraq war. From well before the war began, the UN faced more than one dilemma — whether to be seen to prepare for a crisis that the Security Council was working to avoid, whether to work with or around the Coalition’s offer of security cover for humanitarian relief through Kuwait, and whether to accept funding from belligerent nations that are also prominent donors to UNICEF and permanent members of the UN Security Council.

While UNICEF appears to have strived to act in line with its espoused humanitarian principles, all these issues had the potential to compromise its neutrality, and several interviewees felt that these principles were in fact compromised. UNICEF did work under the Coalition’s security cover and did take funding from the belligerents. The Istanbul workshop concluded: “UNICEF advocacy for, and respect and defense of humanitarian law and principles was considered weak”^{123,124}.

As part of the UN family, UNICEF is associated with the actions of other member agencies, including those that take more expedient solutions to the delivery of aid. In the case of Kuwait, the supply route proved contentious because agreeing to its use was seen by some agencies as an alignment with the Coalition. WFP was the first to agree to use this route, which some in UNICEF felt was regrettable, making it much harder for other agencies to hold out for separate humanitarian entry points.

The UN now finds itself in a very difficult position with the breakdown of the concept of “humanitarian space” arising from its compromised position vis-à-vis the military in Iraq (and perhaps Afghanistan). Informants both inside and outside UNICEF raised the question of whether the inter-agency preparedness process had helped politicians and the military in the US and UK to make the final decision to go to war, on an assumption that that the emergency needs of civilians would be answered.

Again, as raised in relation to media communications, the level of concern at different levels within the organisation suggests that UNICEF has not adequately addressed establishing and communicating a policy position to its staff.

14.2 Civil/Military Relations

Determining how closely to deal with occupying powers was a dilemma for UNICEF management¹²⁵. UNICEF and the CPA attended meetings on a variety of subjects. On occasion, military/CPA attended the UNICEF Baghdad office carrying guns¹²⁶, which made staff very uncomfortable, but this was still seen as preferable to having to go to the CPA office.

¹²³ Istanbul workshop report, Annex C, Section 3.

¹²⁴ it is worth noting that the UNICEF EMOPS post of Chief of Humanitarian Policy (P5) was vacant from January to June 2003, a critical period requiring senior-level policy articulation and advocacy.

¹²⁵ The UNICEF Iraq OIC, who acted as representative for the UN during the war, is concerned that he should not have had contact with the CPA, despite assurances from management that he had little choice.

¹²⁶ They were asked to leave their guns at reception and retrieve them after the meeting.

The US and UK, as the Occupying Power, had legal responsibilities under international law that they failed to meet by not providing an adequate security umbrella for humanitarian operations, something they were capable of doing.

Before March 2003, there was no open discussion with the military. The level of behind-the-scenes discussion between the UN and the military is unknown but it did not result in a clear understanding between the two parties as to how humanitarian assistance could be provided and protected. As a UNICEF submission to the UK House of Commons stated:

“The confusion of roles between these two major stakeholders has significantly and negatively impacted on the support and assistance provided to the civilian population in the immediate aftermath of the conflict...it is clear by now that the time and energy spent on both sides in order to achieve this could surely have been put to better use would the roles of the respective stakeholders not have been unnecessarily blurred and better planned.”¹²⁷

The UN guidance on civil-military relations¹²⁸ does not seem to be sufficiently clear. For example, it states: “Agencies must ensure that their operational independence is guaranteed at all times...” (p1). This begs the question of operational independence according to whom? A proportion of the Iraqi population did not see the UN as being operationally independent, even if the UN did. UNICEF did not have an agreed approach on how to maintain a separate identity. “For UNICEF, both the Iraq Representative and I (the Iran Representative) wanted Iran to be used to avoid UNICEF being identified with the occupying forces, but we did not succeed to establish this as a common approach.”¹²⁹ “A perception of too close an affiliation with the operations or objectives of any military forces or other representatives of the belligerent parties may impact negatively on the security environment...”(p2) – and indeed it did. “Maintain a clear UN identity at all times e.g. only travel in clearly marked UN vehicles, clearly mark offices and relief supplies.” (p6). During and after the war, national staff in Baghdad opted not to use UN marked vehicles, as they felt safer being more anonymous.

Other areas are clearer. Guidelines stated: “No UN staff to be physically collocated or to establish offices within HOC facilities” (p3). The UN ensured this was the case. They similarly state: “...too close an affiliation with the DART teams may undermine the perception of the UN’s neutrality and impartiality...UN agencies should establish a “principled yet pragmatic” relationship with the DART teams.” (p5). UNICEF kept the DART teams somewhat at arm’s length and did not undertake joint assessment missions. The presence of the DART teams operating from Kuwait was felt to have further blurred the line between the armed forces and the humanitarian agencies.

The IASC guidelines on use of military/civil assets were respected by UNICEF — at least in refusing an offer of military transports¹³⁰. A revised set of guidelines was issued for Iraq, but only in April 2003 after the start of the conflict. Based on a comparison between the standard and revised guidelines, EMOPS concluded that the Iraq set pushed the guidance further towards accepting the use of military assets.

The UN needs, but does not have, guidelines for working under occupation. In developing such guidance, it may be able to draw on its experience in the OPT. If UNICEF has to work again under an occupation, it needs to consider further how national staff can be trained to take on more responsibilities.

¹²⁷ UNICEF Input to House of Commons International Development Committee Hearing on Iraq, 10 June 2003.

¹²⁸ General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and other Representatives of the Belligerent Parties in the Context of the Crisis in Iraq, 9 April 2003.

¹²⁹ Paper prepared for 2nd Global Consultation on the Application of the Human Rights Based Approach to Programming. “UNICEF Iran’s Experience in respect of preparing for the Iraq War”, Kari Egge, (p6).

¹³⁰ Although UNICEF did use military transports indirectly, as they were part of the cargo fleet used by UNJLC to move supplies from Jordan into Iraq.

14.3 Human Rights and HRBAP

As a matter of policy, UNICEF has been working to apply the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child to its work for children and mothers. "UNICEF has worked to identify and promote ways in which normative processes of international human rights law can inform and guide practical actions in favour of children and women."¹³¹

Human rights based approaches to programming (HRBAP) were mentioned very little by interviewees, other than those in Geneva/New York HQ. In the sub-region, the language of HRBAP does not feature strongly in contingency planning documents (with exceptions), leaving the impression that HRBAP was not a strong factor in preparedness planning.

The Jordan CO's contingency plan 2002 cites a set of "common principles" for UNICEF EPRP¹³². On the whole, these principles were adhered to in contingency planning and in emergency response. For example, UNICEF acted to support and enhance the capacity of host governments through their contingency planning and training. UNICEF acted in collaboration with other UN agencies. Links between emergency and development programming were considered. However, UNICEF's role in strengthening "the capacities of rights-holders to make claims and uphold their rights in emergency situations" was less well articulated.

The initial phase of the response in Iraq was a humanitarian effort to meet basic needs and save lives. According to a recent UNICEF discussion document, "The majority of children who die as a result of armed conflict do so because of lack of access to basic social services, including health, nutrition, water and environmental sanitation, and basic education."¹³³ With regard to Iraq, the UNICEF analysis was that "...the level of poverty, food dependence, and conditions of the basic services creates a vulnerability in which disruption could precipitate exceptional emergency conditions, particularly if basic service systems collapsed..."¹³⁴

The Iraq EPRP plan prepared in September 2002 made reference to rights. It states: "The overall objective of UNICEF's emergency planning is that children and women's survival and well-being (fulfilment of their basic rights) are assured in whatever emergency situations develop"¹³⁵. The key words here are "basic rights".

¹³¹ "Programme Co-operation for Children and Women from a Human Rights Perspective, 5 April 1999".

¹³² Principles cited were:

- Rights based approach
- Humanitarian principles – humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, empowerment, protection and accountability. Staff are expected to act accordingly.
- Emergencies are inseparably linked to development, and are, therefore, part of UNICEF Country programmes.
- Governments are responsible for any emergency response for their citizens, and are therefore partners in emergency preparedness and response. UNICEF's role is to support their capacity to do this, and to respect, protect and realise universal rights of children, and strengthen capacities of rights-holders to make claims and uphold their rights in emergency situations.
- Particular attention is given to the most vulnerable and disadvantaged people in an emergency.
- In assessing local vulnerabilities and needs, any response must take cognisance of local wishes, skills and resources.
- Response activities should strengthen the capacities of communities to analyse, assess, set priorities, take action and monitor outcomes at a local level, giving special attention to participation by youth.
- UNICEF aims to plan and act collaboratively with other UN agencies, local and international NGOs and civil society groups, evolving common strategies and coordinating action.
- Humanitarian response must be appropriate to the level of need.
- Everything possible should be done to ensure the safety of UNICEF staff.

¹³³ "A Human Rights-based Approach to Programming in Humanitarian Crises: Is UNICEF up for the Challenge?" Draft, Humanitarian Policy Unit/EMOPS, 3 September 2003 (p5).

¹³⁴ E-mail from Everett Ressler, 29 October 2002.

¹³⁵ "Protecting and Assisting Children and Women in Extraordinary Circumstances, UNICEF Iraq, EPRP 2002", 22 Sept 2002, (p3).

The opening of the Flash Appeal for Iraq of March 28 2003 states, “Without rapid humanitarian assistance in health, nutrition, water and sanitation and primary education, child and maternal deaths are likely to increase sharply”. The emphasis here is on a life-saving rather than a human rights discourse, which does not appear in the Appeal document. Instead the document focuses on the reduction of risk through the maintenance of services. A comparison of the EPRP document and the Appeal illustrates an important policy issue — is UNICEF aiming to fulfil rights other than “basic” rights in emergencies?

It was reported from Geneva that some humanitarian agencies are finding it difficult to apply a rights-based framework to humanitarian response, and one agency has said that it may stop using it. UNICEF may find itself having to coordinate with other UN and non-UN agencies that do not see HRBAP as part of humanitarian programming (as reported from Iran). If so, this would not accord with recent UN reforms that take human rights as the basis for its agencies’ mandates, including UNICEF with its emphasis on the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

In Iran, UNICEF advocated for the human rights of potential refugees with the Iranian government. The CO noted a number of areas of disagreement that illustrate well some of the challenges to going beyond the meeting of basic needs to fulfil human rights in refugee/IDP situations:¹³⁶

- “Accountability — children were to be considered recipients of aid in the same way as adults, and no special focus on their rights to protection was accepted
- Universality — the painful aspect of girls’ segregation
- Indivisibility — only basic survival rights were considered, in an “army-like” camp configuration within humanitarian access.”

From EMOPS perspective human rights based approaches were not sufficiently clearly expressed in the sub-regional and some country contingency plans and are frustrated by responses such as, “I can’t talk about human rights now, I have an emergency to deal with”. Is this just about language, or is there a justifiable concern about substance? While the EPRP guidelines and the Iraq and sub-regional preparedness plans do not contain any significant dialogue on human rights, this does not mean they are inconsistent with HRBAP. On the other hand, it does indicate that the EPRP process needs strengthening to include a clearer rights analysis within contingency plans.

Existing policy on HRBAP clearly establishes that there is no hierarchy of rights, yet the concept had currency in the Iraq EPRP process. UNICEF is aware of the need to explain further how HRBAP applies to emergencies and to clarify the difference between a rights-based and a needs-based approach to emergencies. “Although UNICEF has adopted the HRBAP in all its work, there still seems to be a general lack of understanding and/or capacity on this approach in the organisation...UNICEF needs to continue to familiarise staff with this approach, to de-mystify it, while also promoting its applicability in humanitarian crises.”¹³⁷ There is no shortage of conceptual assertions around the import of HRBAP¹³⁸. According to EMOPS New York, the discussion paper on the application of HRBAP in emergencies developed for the September 2003 consultation in Quito is being finalised. A forthcoming Executive Directive on HRBAP will aim to ensure its application in humanitarian contexts,

¹³⁶ 2nd Global Consultation on the Application of the Human Rights Based Approach to Programming. UNICEF Iran’s Experience in respect of preparing for the Iraq War, Kari Egge, p5.

¹³⁷ Ibid, p12.

¹³⁸ For example, from the Medium-term strategic plan for the period 2002-2005, “The rights-based approach to programming ...entails the application of child and human rights principles, such as universality and non-discrimination, the best interest of the child, indivisibility and interdependence of rights, to all areas of programming for children and women”, and “An important component of rights-based programming is the right to participation.” (p33). Also “A Human Rights Based Approach to Programming places equal emphasis on outcomes and the process by which outcomes for children and women are achieved. Participation, local ownership, capacity development and sustainability are essential characteristics of a human rights-based process.” Martigny II, EMOPS (p2).

and this will be supported by new methodologies and tools for HRBAP due for release in 2004.

14.4 Core Corporate Commitments

UNICEF introduced the Core Corporate Commitments (CCCs) to improve its dependability in emergency response. The CCCs were widely used in preparedness planning for Iraq by all Country Offices involved. (They were the only corporate policy to make a prominent appearance in the planning process.)

To what extent were the CCCs met in this case?

- Rapid assessment was not required for preparedness because of the long lead time and the body of information already available on women and children in Iraq before the war. Rapid assessments were undertaken during and after war, though with limited geographical coverage.
- Coordination was attempted in all countries and at all levels by UNICEF and was performed well in most cases.
- UNICEF's programme commitments followed on from prior experience in Iraq.
- Operational commitments — the development of detailed mechanisms and action plans for all aspects of operations meant that these commitments were well covered in general.

UNICEF HQ acknowledges that the CCCs are still too broad and work is ongoing to refine them. The lack of performance indicators for CCCs is also being addressed. As of November 2003, a new draft of the CCCs was available.

One external informant with an overview of the Iraq emergency wanted to see further clarity from UNICEF not so much on how UNICEF would respond to an emergency but on whether it would respond — "How do we know UNICEF will be there (and, by implication, would it be there in time)?"

14.5 Policy Issues – Summary Findings

- UNICEF staff perceive that the organisation's neutrality was undermined by the collaboration between the UN and the Coalition of military forces invading Iraq without UN Security Council sanction
- UNICEF needs to work with other UN partners on how the integrity of the notion of humanitarian space can be revived, for the sake of its neutrality, its continued work in conflict zones, and the safety of its staff¹³⁹
- The Iraq experience illustrates the need for UNICEF to clarify the application of Human Rights Based Programming Approach to emergencies. The evaluation supports UNICEF's ongoing efforts to devise relevant instructions, guidelines and tools
- The Core Corporate Commitments were used as a basis for the EPRP process and early indications are that they were being met by UNICEF's response. Concern over the breadth of the CCCs was raised in the Istanbul workshop which concluded that "UNICEF willingness to intervene in all programme areas was seen as stretching capacity beyond what was effective, particularly in the early response"¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ It is reported (as of January 2004) that UNICEF will be taking part in an ICRC-initiated process to clarify what humanitarian space is and how to preserve it.

¹⁴⁰ See Istanbul workshop report, Annex C, Section 4.

15. ASSESSMENT AGAINST EVALUATION CRITERIA

The TOR requires that UNICEF's preparedness and response in Iraq be assessed against three criteria, relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness, while recognising that the early end date for the study period makes any judgements in this regard tentative. These criteria have been used implicitly in much of the analysis above. Additional comment is offered on each criterion below.

15.1 Relevance

UNICEF's pre-war experience and databases of information from its monitoring role in Iraq meant that it was well informed about needs in Iraq. UNICEF adopted a range of practical measures to:

- Mitigate the effects of war, including vaccination and information campaigns, placing children from institutions with families and pre-positioning of WES equipment and teams
- Prepare in the event of a crisis, including comprehensive and integrated UNICEF and UN planning and preparedness actions to locate staff, adapt systems, pre-position supplies and upgrade ICT
- Respond in a timely fashion, including provision of water, hospital and school rehabilitation, back to school campaign, and assistance to orphanages,

These measures appear to have been wholly relevant to the situation. Some interviewees questioned the relevance of more marginal activities — garbage collection for example — but even here, a case could have been made for UNICEF's involvement given the health risks.

UNICEF may be able to sharpen the relevance of its interventions by better interpreting human rights based approaches to emergency response and thereby more fully address a wider range of human rights considerations than were encompassed under the Iraq preparedness planning concept of "basic rights".

15.2 Efficiency

Good use was made of human resources from within the sub-region. UNICEF's flexible design for cross-border operations meant that supplies could be shipped into Iraq when no longer required at the border, assisting an efficient use of resources. Logistics appears to have been efficiently handled in general, though some shipments were said to have taken longer than they should. UNICEF established multiple supply routes into Iraq and was therefore in a position to choose the most cost-effective supply route, but did not always do so for a mixture of practical and political reasons, as explored in the report.

UNICEF's authorisation and contract procedures diminished the efficiency of its operations by causing delays. UNICEF staff were not familiar enough with ProMS and finance and administrative systems in general.

The sub-regional EPRP process was costly because groups of people were travelling to different cities within the sub-region for meetings every 6-8 weeks. Given the scale of the funding for preparedness and response, this was a reasonable cost, although with the benefit of hindsight, the repetitive nature of these meetings may have been somewhat wasteful. This level of investment could only be justified for a potential major multi-country emergency.

15.3 Effectiveness

UNICEF was able to take a number of steps to substantially alleviate the suffering of people in Iraq during and after the war. UNICEF worked in the same sectors during and after the war as it had done before, thus making the most of its expertise, contacts, and partnerships.

It is likely that UNICEF made a significant contribution to keeping water and sewerage systems operational before, during and after the war. By inference, it is also likely that the level of water-borne disease was reduced by UNICEF's support to the water and sanitation sector, and it is possible that lives were saved. Provisions made before the war allowed UNICEF contractors to respond quickly to water and sewerage system breakdowns resulting from the war.

In the same way, interventions in health and nutrition are likely to have made a significant contribution to the health and well-being of a portion of the population of Iraq, perhaps as much as 10%. Several million children were vaccinated against polio, measles, and DTP. UNICEF's contribution to the maintenance of hospitals may have saved lives. With UNICEF assistance and using pre-positioned supplies, therapeutic feeding programmes were progressively restarted after the war and very likely reduced malnutrition.

Through the Back to School Campaign and the provision of School in a Box, the printing of exam booklets and the rehabilitation of schools, UNICEF has helped get the education system back to normal, which UNICEF sees as a key protection strategy for children.

Media coverage was substantial, though its effectiveness cannot be assessed here. It is likely that it strengthened UNICEF's fundraising for Iraq because high-quality and timely information was available on the situation in and around Iraq.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of recommendations follow from the analysis presented in the report. Footnotes show the links to parallel recommendations from the Istanbul workshop.

16.1 Improving EPRP

A number of steps are proposed for the further development of EPRP.

Guidelines

- Update the guidelines to distinguish more clearly between early warning, scenario planning, contingency planning, preparedness actions, and mitigation actions.
- Include HRBAP and humanitarian principles more clearly into EPRP guidelines once their application to emergencies has been more clearly articulated. (See HRBAP recommendation below).
- Modify guidance and EPRP planning formats to include more elements from logframe-type planning, in particular to allow for further definition of the intended outcomes from emergency responses and means of verification, i.e. how these outcomes are to be assessed.
- Regional and sub-regional EPRP exercises should set out the arrangement for regional management of emergency preparedness and response, where the geographical scope of a crisis requires it.

Partners. Under the CCCs, UNICEF is committed to ensuring that an appropriate emergency response is made to emergencies, but not necessarily to delivering the response itself, which is sometimes beyond UNICEF's capacity in any case. It is therefore important to bring the principal UN and NGO partners in that country into the preparedness planning process, so that their knowledge and capacities can be taken into account and they can be included in detailed planning¹⁴¹.

Regional EPRP. It is proposed that an EPRP exercise is conducted at regional level. This will be similar to a country-based planning exercise — looking at regional context, assessing risks and scenarios at regional level. The difference would then be in determining what capacity the regional office needs in order to support one or more COs in responding to certain scenarios.

Global EPRP. In order for UNICEF to develop its global preparedness and emergency response capabilities, and to develop a corporate strategic plan for meeting the CCCs, it is proposed that a Global EPRP exercise is undertaken. As well as country and regional level EPRP, the organisation requires mechanisms for emergency response to which all parts of the organisation contribute. A global EPRP exercise would not consider the consequences of any one emergency, but consider the likely types of emergencies, where they might occur, and how UNICEF can respond. A global EPRP exercise should also lead to the development of a set of performance targets for emergency response, for example for recruitment, supply of equipment, and response times for administrative approvals required to achieve the CCCs¹⁴².

Intranet. Speed up the process of making the EPRP guidelines available on the UNICEF Intranet, with online forms and guidance materials available for completing the planning documents.

¹⁴¹ See Istanbul workshop report recommendation 38, 39 and 42.

¹⁴² See also the discussion in 3.11.

16.2 Improving Human Resource Systems

Surge Capacity. UNICEF requires better-managed registers of internal and external expertise for emergency response. The following are proposed:

- From a Global EPRP exercise, UNICEF to determine the numbers, types, and locations of personnel to support countries and regions, taking into account any regional preparedness capacity already developed.

Proactive management at HQ and regional levels to ensure that the registers are populated and kept up to date

DHR and EMOPS to agree how targets for surge capacity are to be met. (Given that this represents a departure from the way surge capacity has been provided up to now, senior management backing will be required for such an initiative to be successful¹⁴³).

Secondments. As part of its upgrading of its emergency response capacity, UNICEF has the potential to increase the number of individual secondments and agreements with seconding agencies. UNICEF already has standby agreements with NRC, DRC, SRSA, and RedR. It is reported that these arrangements are in the process of being enhanced. UNICEF should dedicate resources to exploiting the potential of such agreements and set clear targets for numbers and types of external stand-by personnel.

Psychological Support. It is recommended that psychological support to staff involved with Iraq is reviewed by contacting individual members of staff for non-attributable feedback on the quality of the services received, on whether counselling was available and, if so, why offers of counselling offered were or were not taken up.

16.3 Media Communications

The Iraq experience has shown that UNICEF staff did not understand why UNICEF was constrained in the types of public messages it could put out in defence of the rights of children in Iraq. It is recommended that further guidance or briefing material be prepared to inform staff members of what messages UNICEF can communicate and in what ways. Areas covered should include: The constraints of being part of the UN; why anti-war messages are inappropriate; why UNICEF must avoid conjecture and hyperbole; and, more positively, how UNICEF seeks to advocate through its public communication.

16.4 Key NGO Partners

UNICEF Education and Nutrition sector do not have key NGO partners, though there are suitable candidates for both sectors: CARE, WVI, Save the Children, etc. It is recommended that the relevant sector specialists in UNICEF HQ take time to investigate possible key partners and negotiate MOUs with them.

16.5 Clarifying HRBAP In Emergencies

UNICEF is already aware of the need to improve the understanding of HRBAP in emergencies. A consultation process including policy advisers and staff with current or recent emergency field experience is already under way. UNICEF's initiatives to issue new instructions, guidance and tools on HRBAP in emergencies are endorsed. Any new guidance must be rooted in practical programme considerations, with examples. As part of the same initiative, UNICEF should clarify rights-based versus needs-based approaches to emergencies.

¹⁴³ See also Istanbul workshop recommendations 43, 45, 47.

16.6 Streamlining ProMS

UNICEF's management of finances in the Iraq crisis indicates that the system needs to be both simpler and more flexible for use in rapidly changing emergency situations where quick decisions are needed. In order for ProMS procedures to become more streamlined, one or more staff members from EMOPS with practical emergency management experience should join the ProMS Reference Group. These staff must be able to give attention to detail, be ready to take part in iterative discussions over a period of months, and be available to test prototypes. In addition, EMOPS should attend the OGM. Programme staff have an open invitation to join these consultations and the opportunity should be grasped. EMOPS should consult COs working in emergencies about how ProMS needs to be modified.

16.7 The Wider UN

Areas for further debate and evaluation within the wider UN family include:

1. *Coordination.* Both good and bad examples of inter-agency coordination were identified in this evaluation. In some countries, the performance of both Resident Coordinators and OCHA was well received. In others, lack of skill or interest was reported on the part of UNDP Resident Coordinators, while lack of funding, late arrival and an unclear mandate undermined OCHA's performance. These failings are not new. A wider inter-agency evaluation could make use of the Iraq experience to further explore continuing weaknesses in UN coordination and propose further improvements, including a clarification of how the lead agency for any country and emergency is chosen and how the agency lead role fits with the Resident Representative role and the task of OCHA¹⁴⁴.
2. *Neutrality and Humanitarian Space.* Recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have undermined the concepts of the neutrality of humanitarian agencies and "humanitarian space", whereby humanitarian assistance can be provided in a safe, impartial environment. UNICEF needs to continue to be an active participant in UN and IASC debates, defending humanitarian principles and finding ways for their integrity to be restored. UNICEF participation in ICRC's recent initiative to clarify "what humanitarian space is and how to preserve it" is encouraged¹⁴⁵.
3. *Working under Occupation.* The UN needs to develop guidance on working under military occupation. This will need to cover, amongst other topics, how to maintain neutrality, and how to manage security considerations.
4. *Human rights based approaches.* It was reported that some agencies are not finding it easy to apply human rights based approaches to emergencies. While clarifying its own guidance, UNICEF should initiate a debate with other agencies on how they apply HRBAP in emergencies. If human rights based approaches are abandoned by some agencies, or given only lip service by others, UNICEF will face an uphill battle when working closely with UN or other partners in emergency situations.
5. *Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP).* There is an argument for funding within the CAP to support both inter-agency coordination and the establishment of robust telecommunications networks.

¹⁴⁴ See also Istanbul workshop recommendations 9 and 13.

¹⁴⁵ See also Istanbul workshop recommendation 76.

16.8 Other Recommendations

Regional Communications. UNICEF needs a new communications strategy for addressing the media in Arab countries, taking into account the significance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict¹⁴⁶.

Regional Emergencies. For emergencies with regional or sub-regional scope, Regional Directors should play a stronger role in ensuring the appropriate staff capacity is in place in each CO.

Donations-in-Kind. UNICEF should explore how to increase its fund-raising for emergencies through donations-in-kind, by tapping the experience those agencies already successful in this area.

National Staff Security. National staff should be more fully involved in security discussions¹⁴⁷.

Accountability for Security. UNICEF should consider what additional support Representatives need to fulfil their role as security managers and to strengthen RO supervision and CO management accountability for security¹⁴⁸.

Sector Coordination. Where UNICEF intends to provide inter-agency sector coordination, it must ensure that its own sector programmes have adequate programme management capacity. It should not assume that the coordinator can provide UNICEF programme management capacity as well, especially where the coordination role is demanding, for example where there are multiple agencies to coordinate.

Warehousing. Custom-bonded warehouses should be used for shipments all or part of which are expected to be sent on to another country¹⁴⁹.

Tracking System. The evaluation endorses UNICEF's plan to develop a corporate commodity tracking by mid-2004. This system should include the capability to track items beyond the warehouse to final distribution¹⁵⁰.

Local Market Surveys. The concept of local market surveys should be extended to other potential emergencies as part of future EPRP.

ICT Funding. UNICEF was only able to install adequate ICT equipment for the sub-region because of EPF and CERF funding. Other crises may not have the same scale of funding available, but will still need adequate equipment to meet MOSS and operational requirements. Alternative funding mechanisms should be explored as part of EPRP exercises.

¹⁴⁶ The Istanbul workshop reached the same conclusion – see recommendation 21 and 25 of the workshop report.

¹⁴⁷ See also Istanbul workshop recommendation 73.

¹⁴⁸ See also Istanbul workshop recommendation 77.

¹⁴⁹ See also Istanbul workshop recommendation 65.

¹⁵⁰ See also Istanbul workshop recommendation 57.

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE

Internal Evaluation of UNICEF Emergency Preparedness and Early Response in Iraq

Background

UNICEF's emergency preparedness experience for Iraq is unique, not only for the long lead time the context allowed but also for the scale of attention given by the organisation. It started in 2001, when the situation in Iraq became more uncertain due to rising international tensions over sanctions imposed on the country, potential changes in the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP) that was being reviewed every six months, and the ongoing threats that existed between Central/South and Northern Iraq. Although Iraq's linkage to the 11 of September 2001 attack had not been established, the US claimed linkage between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. Hence, considerable fear existed across the region that the situation could become more directly confrontational and precipitate a further crisis in Iraq. This apprehension arose from statements by government officials from US and countries in the MENA region, as well as from other reports.

By initiating a contingency planning exercise in the sub-region, UNICEF aimed to ensure that, should there be a sudden need for humanitarian assistance for children and women, UNICEF offices were in readiness to respond to those needs. The need for readiness was evermore important because the situation of children and women in Iraq remained fragile and any deterioration in the situation could be expected to create even more acute humanitarian needs.

In consideration of the tense situation, the MENA Regional Office held a series of consultations starting October 2001 during which staff from UNICEF offices in Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, the MENA and CEE/CIS Regional Offices, EMOPS, Copenhagen and NYHQ reviewed jointly possible scenarios, likely humanitarian consequences and implications for preparedness. The UNICEF offices of Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Erbil, Damascus and Tehran adapted their existing contingency plan for a potential Iraq sub-regional crisis. The plans were updated as the situation evolved and identified preparedness activities were being implemented. Critical outcomes of the meetings and key elements of the individual country contingency plans were reflected in the sub-regional contingency plan of action. To enable the offices in the sub-region to undertake critical preparedness activities, NYHQ facilitated a contribution of US \$2,350,900 from EPF.

All field offices shared their plans within their respective UNCT in order to further strengthen coordination and cooperation. In addition, several inter-agency meetings were held at regional/global level to discuss likely scenarios, humanitarian consequences, and coordination and cooperation between the different agencies in relation to preparedness and response. IASC/RG-PCP, ICRC, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOIP, OCHA, WHO, and WFP attended the meetings. An inter-agency contingency plan was prepared. To enable the offices in the sub-region to undertake critical preparedness activities UN facilitated a contribution of US \$5,000,000 from CERF.

As part of the inter-agency preparedness, UNICEF adopted the scenario on which consensus had emerged (medium impact with sizeable destruction of infrastructure and internal and external population movements). While the consequences of the war itself fell more in line with the low-impact scenario, the ensuing breakdown of law and order, as well as looting, created a complex humanitarian situation that requires a larger-scale response than was anticipated for the post-war situation.

When the actual war finally broke out, the situation evolved differently from that anticipated in preparedness plans. There was an initial phase of response after the start of the war when UNICEF international staff had been evacuated to Amman. However, even during the height of war, UNICEF sustained humanitarian operations with the dedication of its national staff, ensuring some key life-saving assistance to the most vulnerable segments of the population. UNICEF launched its first appeal on 1 March. This covered an early phase of response to the effects of the war and was developed in the context of UN coordination. With the return of international staff on 1 May, UNICEF has increased its emergency assistance activities. In its early response, UNICEF priority areas are: the provision of potable water and safe sanitation, care for unaccompanied and traumatized children and children living in institutions, child immunisation, the provision of safe birthing equipment for pregnant women, the feeding of malnourished children and pregnant women, and the mobilization and return of primary-aged school children to school as soon as possible. On 23 June, UNICEF launched a revised appeal developed in wider collaboration. With the Coalition Provisional Authority, it detailed a longer-term humanitarian response, with attention to programming for transition towards greater stability. For the purposes of this Evaluation, the early response will be considered up to the launching of this second appeal.

Purpose

Given that a larger review of the UN-wide experience is being planned for later this year with a particular focus on inter-agency contingency planning, this evaluation is proposed in part as a preparatory exercise. At the same time, it is considered important by all offices involved for UNICEF to draw lessons and recommendations in terms of its internal preparedness planning processes, as well as its humanitarian response capacity. Eventually, this evaluation should provide a critical reference for subsequent evaluations of the response in Iraq as it evolves.

Objectives

Within the limitations of narrowed scope and methodology detailed below:

- To briefly but systematically document UNICEF's experience in emergency preparedness planning, actual preparedness and early response, situating this in the context as it evolved.
- To assess the overall relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of UNICEF preparedness efforts and early response.
- To assess the degree to which preparedness and early response in Iraq was specific to that context and correspondingly what enduring lessons and concerns can be carried forward to strengthen organisational preparedness and response systems.

Scope and Framework

As mentioned above, this evaluation exercise is preparatory, and thus limited in scope to focus on UNICEF performance in preparedness planning and early response. The inter-agency evaluation is expected to deepen analysis on a number of issues that will only be partially covered in this evaluation. The UNICEF evaluation will be further limited by security and time constraints given the ongoing context in Iraq, all of which have shaped decisions on methodology detailed below. In particular, this evaluation is taking place after the bombing of UN headquarters in Baghdad 19 August in which the UNICEF Iraq Programme Coordinator was killed and was initiated in a period in which all but a few international staff in Iraq had been evacuated to Amman. This will undoubtedly have an impact on staff perspectives and must be taken into consideration.

For the above reasons, the scope of the assessment of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness in particular will be limited. The assessment of relevance will be limited to

relevance vis-à-vis organisational policy and vis-à-vis the human rights situation of the population as best as can be determined from existing data. Similarly, assessment of efficiency will be limited to stakeholders' perceptions of how timeliness, quality, and cost were balanced in preparedness planning and in the highest cost areas of early response. Finally, assessment of effectiveness will be the most limited, in particular for the assessment of the early response where it is expected that the evaluation can only analyse data on inputs and outputs and plausible outcomes as compared with the broad standards of the Core Corporate Commitments and any stated objectives in early plans. (See below references on performance.)

Examining UNICEF preparedness and early response in Iraq necessarily involves several dimensions of analysis. The evaluation will cover all key support functions of UNICEF preparedness and response, including:

- coordination
- emergency preparedness planning
- human resource management, including staffing options (recruitment, internal and external surge capacity) as well as training, staff support and stress management interventions,
- supply and logistics
- external communications/media relations,
- funding
- financial management (including provisions for cash support during crisis)
- IT/telecommunications
- security of staff and UNICEF assets.

The evaluation will examine the preparedness and response across a fairly decentralised organisational structure, distinguishing the respective roles of headquarters (New York, Copenhagen, Geneva), the MENA Regional Office, the Iraq Country Office and the neighbouring country offices — Iran, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Kuwait. (Analysis of roles of the neighbouring countries will focus primarily on preparedness efforts given the very limited impact in terms of refugee influx, insecurity of the war in Iraq.)

Finally, the evaluation will examine UNICEF preparedness and response in the context of partnerships with UN agencies, governments in the countries involved and NGOs. It is recognised that this partnership dimension can only be partially explored in this UNICEF-focused evaluation exercise. It is expected that related questions will be further explored in the forthcoming inter-agency exercise.

Evaluation questions

The following questions must be analysed with reference to the above dimensions: the key preparedness and response functions, the HQ-RO-sub-regional-CO accountability structures and the context of working with inter-agency, NGO and national partners. Note that the questions and groupings of questions inevitably overlap to some extent.

Coordination

- How effective was the coordination within UNICEF at and between headquarters, regional, sub-regional, CO levels, during preparedness and eventual response and what were the facilitating/constraining factors in this? Consider among others, the degree of clarity that existed regarding accountabilities, how well these were understood and eventually applied.
- How did UNICEF contribute to and benefit from inter-agency coordination in both preparedness and early response? Consider, among others, Iraq Steering Group, IASC Reference Group on Preparedness and Contingency Planning, UN Country Teams both for preparedness and response, sectoral coordination mechanisms at regional and

country levels and NGO partnerships (the latter especially during early response). How well did UNICEF fulfil its commitments and how well were UNICEF undertakings complemented by fulfilment of commitments by other partners?

- In view of UNICEF commitment to humanitarian principles and protecting human rights, how appropriately and effectively did the organisation engage with the wide range of external actors and fora involved in preparedness and early response (i.e. Security Council, IASC, donor networks, UN partners, warring states and their military)?

Preparedness efforts

- What were the salient features of preparedness planning at different levels — process and content — and how relevant are they for other contexts? What were the key factors shaping the direction of preparedness plans? In particular, what significance did the Oil-for-Food Programme have for overall preparedness in terms of policy, resources (financial and human) and other support functions?
- How relevant were preparedness plans with respect to policy and guidance (inter-agency and UNICEF) and the eventual realities of the context and situation of the population?
- How well were preparedness activities implemented and what factors facilitated and/or constrained this? Consider availability of funds, staffing, support to COs (HQ, RO, external) among others.
- How well did UNICEF coordinate with and/or involve national governments in preparedness planning given the sensitivities of the context and how did this affect preparedness plans?
- How costly were preparedness efforts (preparedness planning and preparedness activities) for COs, RO and HQ offices in terms of time and financial resources and how replicable are such efforts? What was the impact on other ongoing work, including programme implementation for COs involved? Consider among others the efficiency and usefulness of regular sub-regional meetings.
- What does all of the above suggest for the value of inter-agency and UNICEF guidance and tools on preparedness planning in the case of Iraq and to what degree would such an assessment be specific to the Iraq case?

Actual preparedness

- What were the effects of the above UNICEF preparedness efforts on the eventual response? How significant was it that planning assumptions were proven to be incorrect?
- How well did preparedness efforts address the eventuality of an evacuation of international staff leaving national staff in country? Consider development of capacities of national staff, protection of national staff and support to staff.
- How adequately were the core functions for the eventual emergency response covered?
- How adequate and useful were the special provisions made for emergency preparedness and response? These include for example, the inter-agency regional hub in Cyprus, the UNICEF newsroom established in Amman, and the MENA Iraq Group (MIG) Office (established for staff evacuated from Iraq, now closed) and headquarters arrangements.
- What was the contribution of preparedness activities designed to mitigate effects of the eventual war?

Early response

- What has been the actual programme and advocacy response during and after the war and how relevant has it been with reference to UNICEF policy and to the context as it has evolved?
- What results can be measured or are suggested (outputs, outcomes where possible, any unplanned and/or negative effects) and how do they compare to UNICEF Core Corporate Commitments and any specific objectives in early response plans?

- How was the Iraq response supported in terms of:
 - having the right people in place including through external and internal surge capacity
 - logistics and supply arrangements inside/outside Iraq
 - handling of external relations and the media
 - the availability of funds (including fundraising and the efficiency of financial management, e.g. cash support during the crisis)
 - IT/telecommunications provisions
 - security arrangements, including staff security awareness and evacuation procedures, with particular attention to the safety of both international and national staff, as well as protection of UNICEF assets
 - staff support and stress management interventions for both national and international staff?
- How efficiently and effectively did the organisation mobilise support from neighbouring COs, regional offices and headquarters (New York, Geneva, and Copenhagen)?
- Are there any questions in terms of efficiencies that merit further exploration (focusing on the highest cost programme components and aspects of operational support)?

Putting the Iraq experience in perspective

- To what degree were UNICEF preparedness and response in Iraq context-specific and/or could they be expected again in another context? What external and internal factors facilitated and/or constrained preparedness and response?
- To what degree does it appear that preparedness and response was the result of or influenced by efforts under the DFID-UNICEF Phase II Programme of Cooperation to Strengthen UNICEF Humanitarian Response Capacity?
- To what degree were preparedness and response in Iraq the result of lessons learned from the organisation's experience in Afghanistan?
- To what extent did preparedness efforts for Iraq and the eventual response affect preparedness and response outside the sub-region?

References on performance

In exploring the above evaluation questions, the evaluation of preparedness and response must also balance broader inter-agency and internal references on performance.

UNICEF performance references include policy guidance on programme and operational response as contained in the Core Corporate Commitments (1999). This should be the reference in terms of the content of UNICEF humanitarian response as traced out in preparedness plans and as played out in the actual early response. As this is now being revised, it may perhaps be beneficial to determine what lessons can be distilled from the Iraq experience. A process for UNICEF Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning has been articulated in the UNICEF Programme Policy and Procedures Manual since 2001, though the practical guidance supporting this has evolved since then.

Inter-agency guidance on preparedness planning is also a key reference as are Inter-agency Contingency Planning Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance (November 2001).

References on the content of humanitarian response include:

- IASC "Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action" (September 2002), which provides guidelines on the interaction between humanitarian action and human rights
- IASC "Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (March 2003)
- IASC "General Guidance for Interaction Between United Nations Personnel and Military Actors in the Context of the Crisis in Iraq" (May 2003)

- IASC “Report of the Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crisis” (June 2002), including the proposed action plan.

All of the above IASC documents are available on www.reliefweb.org.

Methodology

The evaluation methodology will include:

- A desk review of existing documentation and data from information systems (see below)
- Key informant interviews, primarily internal staff with some selected external key informants
- A two-day sub-regional meeting involving key CO, RO and headquarters staff to carry out analysis of specific questions on preparedness (the meeting will be informed by the review but at the same time the deliberations will also feed into the review)
- Debriefing meetings in Iraq, MENARO and NY to cross-check and further refine initial findings and conclusions and discuss possible recommendations.

The flow of the evaluation should allow for:

Stage	Timing
A preliminary phase of documentary review and interviews focusing on RO and CO staff	15-30 September
The sub-regional workshop, including some interviews	2-3 October
A phase of further documentary review and interviews, covering remaining RO and CO as well as HQ key informants	1-31 October
Drafting including final debriefing	1-14 November (revised 17 November)
Circulation of a preliminary draft to an internal reference group	15-21 November (revised to 12 December)
Finalisation of internal evaluation report	26 November (revised to February)

Data collection is expected to include actual visits to Jordan, Syria, and Turkey, to the regional office in Amman, and to headquarters offices in NY and Geneva. Key informants from the Iraq CO will be interviewed in Amman, whether already evacuated to that location or brought to Amman for interviews. Similarly, key informants from Iran will be interviewed at the sub-regional workshop in Turkey. Teleconferencing and e-mail will be used to reach key informants in Copenhagen and Kuwait, as well as any other key informants who have moved on to other locations.

Existing Documentation

Regional office and country offices will gather relevant data and documents together based on key questions identified. This will include:

- Sub-regional and CO preparedness plans as they evolved from December 2001 to the beginning of the war
- Sub-regional and CO workplans and meeting minutes detailing implementation of preparedness activities and assessments of preparedness
- Headquarters, RO and CO budget implementation data detailing financial implementation for preparedness activities
- RO and CO data on early response, including programme implementation, finance and administration, staffing and staff support
- Headquarters information systems and key documents on global funding, staffing, supplies and security provisions where necessary for comparison
- Reviews and documentation on the DFID-UNICEF Phase II Programme of Cooperation to Strengthen UNICEF Humanitarian Response Capacity.

Stakeholder Involvement

Given the anticipated inter-agency evaluation, it is important to avoid duplication and burdening of UN, NGO and national partners in an internally focused evaluation of UNICEF performance. Involvement of partners will therefore be limited to interviews with selected key informants. Due to the security situation in Iraq, interviews with national partners there will not be possible.

Accountabilities

An Evaluation Management Team will be comprised of one representative from headquarters (Evaluation Office, represented by Kate Alley), the MENA regional office (represented by Krishna Belbase) and the Iraq Country Office (represented by Sherhazade Boulia). The Evaluation Management Team will:

- Take any decisions on adjustment to the TORs in course
- Ensure input to the briefing of the evaluation team from headquarters, the RO and COs
- Coordinate provision of a core round of existing information sources to the evaluation team (additional documentation will likely be provided in the course of field visits and interviews)
- Identify a preliminary listing of key informants
- Facilitate access to key informants at each level, headquarters, regional and CO
- Work with the evaluator/team on shaping the design of the two-day sub-regional meeting, drawing from preliminary analysis
- Facilitate interaction with Reference Groups
- Approve structure of final report
- Consolidate comments on the preliminary draft report
- Approve the final draft as meeting the TORs.

MENA will in addition ensure the organisation of the two-day sub-regional meeting and with support from headquarters as necessary will ensure facilitation of the meeting.

Each of the COs involved in the preparedness efforts including the Iraq CO will be responsible for providing existing information sources as indicated above and basic logistics support for the evaluators' visits in-country. They will also provide consolidated comment (for each CO) on the preliminary draft report.

The Iraq Country Office will in addition be responsible for funding the evaluation exercise.

An Internal Reference Group will be loosely comprised of representatives of each of the headquarters divisions/offices involved, the MENA Regional Office and six COs, to be identified by each office. The Internal Reference Group will be responsible for reading and providing comment on a preliminary draft report.

The Evaluation team, specifically the senior evaluation consultant, is responsible for:

- Design and management of a process of data collection and analysis that adequately meets the requirements of the Terms of Reference
- Contributing to the design of and analysis from the two-day sub-regional meeting so as to draw from preliminary analysis and feed further into the evaluation, including working closely with MENARO/HQ team at all stages in preparation and facilitation of the workshop (UNICEF will lead on facilitation with the evaluator facilitating selected sessions)
- Managing the process and in particular facilitate debriefing sessions in such a way as to validate findings and conclusions, engage key actors in the analysis and draw out recommendations that effectively address key issues identified, are realistic in the organisational context and for which there is ownership

- Clearly identifying any implications of the findings and conclusions to which agreed recommendations do not respond and possibly making additional recommendations by the team where appropriate
- Identifying issues and questions that evaluators consider should be included in the inter-agency evaluation of preparedness planning
- Producing a final report meeting the requirements of the Terms of Reference and specifications below.

Evaluation Team

The evaluation team will be comprised of one senior evaluator and one mid-level researcher. The senior evaluator will have established experience in evaluation in the humanitarian sector with at least some experience with sister UN agencies. The senior evaluator will have excellent facilitation skills since much emphasis is placed on a process of analysis with key staff in the two-day sub-regional meeting. Knowledge of UNICEF is an advantage. The mid-level researcher will have some research/evaluation experience in the humanitarian sector, quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis skills and excellent writing skills.

APPENDIX 2 – SCHEDULE OF INFORMANTS

IRAQ COUNTRY TEAM

Carel de Rooy	Representative
Sherazade Boualia	Senior Planning Officer
Tibebu Haile Selassie	Programme Officer, OIC Erbil
Hatim George	Planning Officer (OIC in Iraq during evacuation)
Bakary Kone	Operations Officer
Abimbola Odumosu	WES Officer
Ghassan Khalil	Project Officer, Education/Child Protection
Momtazul Karim	Supply Officer
Samuel Sawa	Logistics Officer
Geeta Verma	Senior Project Officer, Education
Ben Lark	Former Project Officer Mine Action

IRAN COUNTRY OFFICE

Kari Egge	Representative
Jean Benoit Manhes	Former Emergency Officer

JORDAN COUNTRY OFFICE

Anne Skatvedt	Representative
Nasser Moeini	Programme Officer
Hind Mango	Communications Officer
Muna Idris	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
Maha Homsy	Project Officer, Protection and IECD

SYRIA COUNTRY OFFICE

Mohammed Bendriss Alami	Representative
Narinder Sharma	Programme Officer

TURKEY COUNTRY OFFICE

Peter Chen	Programme Co-ordinator
Basil Ammari	Operations Officer
Muhammed Parvez	Head, Regional Procurement Centre
Edmund McLoughney	Representative

GULF AREA OFFICE

Stefan Toma	Representative, GAO
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COPENHAGEN SUPPLY DIVISION

Jette Knudsen	Transaction Officer, OFFP, Copenhagen
Einar Syvertsen	

GENEVA

Hanaa Singer	Regional Emergency Officer, CEE/CIS
Everett Ressler	Senior Emergency Officer
Sikander Khan	Project Officer Emergencies
Olivier Degreef	Head of Donor Relations and Resource Mobilization
Eric Laroche	Deputy Director EMOPS
Nils Kastberg	Former head of EMOPS

MENARO

Thomas McDermott	Regional Director
Naheed Aziz	Deputy Regional Director
Jacqueline Peters	Regional Humanitarian Response Officer
Anis Salem	Regional Communication Officer
Deepak Bhaskaran	Telecommunication Officer
Razan Azoka	Assistant Project Officer
Krishna Belbase	Regional M & E Advisor

Thomas Davin	Project Officer, Humanitarian Response
Jan van Manen	Regional Programme & Planning Officer
Staneala Beckley	Regional Education Advisor
Qussay Al-Nahi	Regional Health Advisor
Geert Cappelaere	Senior Project Advisor (Child Protection)
Azimur Rahman	Regional HR Officer
Majed Akkoub	Assistant Supply Officer
Mohammed Awad	Senior Supply/Shipping Assistant
Anis Salem	Regional Communication Officer
Raul Castillo	Regional IT Officer
Nageeb Khalifa Mahgoub	Regional Operations Officer
Hasan Abu Rous	Assistant Finance Officer, Common Services Unit

NEW YORK

Kate Alley	Evaluation Officer
Carol Bellamy	Executive Director
Dan Rohrmann	Deputy Director, PFO
Runar Holen	IT Telecommunications, ITD
Alfred Ironside	Chief, Media Relations, DOC
Jose Banda	Finance Officer, DFAM
Julianna Lindsey	Programme Officer, HRU
Mark Henderson	Senior Advisor, WES, PD
Manuel Fontaine	Senior Advisor, Child Protection
Peter Crowley	Principal Officer EMOPS
Geeta Narayan	Project Officer, Humanitarian Policy Unit, EMOPS
Saad Houry	Director, DPP
Anupama Rao-Singh	Deputy Director, PD
Karin Sham Poo	Deputy Executive Director
Bill Gent	Security Co-ordinator
Marjatta Tolvanen	Project Officer, Nutrition in Emergencies, PD
Chris Maxfield	Deputy Security Co-ordinator/OPSCEN, EMOPS
Marta Mauras	Office of the Deputy Secretary General, UN Secretariat
Dushyant Joshi	HR Officer, DHR

**INTER-AGENCY SUB-REGIONAL SECTOR
COORDINATION – UNOCHI**

Andrew Mawson	Inter-agency sector coordinator for Child protection (seconded from UNICEF Sudan)
Paul Sherlock	Inter-agency sector coordinator for Water And Sanitation, (seconded from Oxfam GB)
John Egbuta	Inter-agency sector coordinator for Nutrition (seconded from UNOCHI)
Eldrid Kvamen Midttun	Inter-agency sector coordinator for Education (seconded from Norwegian Refugee Council)

OTHER AGENCIES

William Lee	Director, UNRWA Operations, Jordan
Christine McNab	UNDP Representative, Jordan
Jamie McGoldrick	Chief, Asia, the Pacific and Middle East Section, Response Co-ordination Branch, OCHA, Geneva
Alan Vernon	Emergencies Department, UNHCR, Geneva

APPENDIX 3 – DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

TITLE	AUTHOR	DATE
Preparedness documents		
Planning Figures Etc	Fax to Kate Alley from Everett Ressler	18 Nov 2003
Protecting And Assisting Children And Women In Extraordinary Circumstances, UNICEF Iraq, EPRP 2002		22 Sep 2002
Protecting And Assisting Children And Women In Extraordinary Circumstances, UNICEF Sub-Regional Plan Of Action (Draft) MENARO		Oct 2002
Letter About Inter-Agency CP (Mine Awareness Etc.)	Balthasar Staehelin – ICRC to Tom McDermott	19 Mar 2003
Through The Prism Of Preparedness/Response: Summary Contents, EPRP And Inputs For Martigny II	Comments from Everett Ressler	
A Human-Rights Based Approach To Programming In Humanitarian Crises: Is UNICEF Up For The Challenge? (Draft)	Humanitarian Policy Unit/ EMOPS	3 Sep 2003
Protecting And Assisting Children And Women In Extraordinary Circumstance, UNICEF EPRP For Year 2003	UNICEF EMOPS	Feb 2002
Building ICT Emergency Capacity (Draft)		May 2003
Overview Of Current UN Preparedness For A Humanitarian Crisis In Iraq		Oct 2002
Note To The File: Preparedness Review For A Possible Humanitarian Crisis In Iraq (Larnaca, Cyprus), 3-4 March 2003	OCHA	8 Mar 2003
Regular Programme Un Agency Heads Contingency Planning Meeting, Baghdad		22 Apr 2002
ICT Preparedness And Response Iraq Emergency		
UNICEF Preparedness And Response In The 1999 Kosovo Refugee Emergency: A Joint UNICEF/DFID Evaluation	Greene, Stevens, Madi, Telford	2000
MENA Sub-Regional Emergency Plan Of Action		
Sub-Regional Contingency Planning For Iraq: Meeting 26-27 January 2003, Damascus		26-27 Jan2003
Iraq Contingency Planning Meeting, Beirut, 27-28 October 2002		27-28 Oct2002
Sub-Regional Contingency Planning For Iraq: Meeting 18 December 2002, Amman		18 Dec 2002
Sub-Regional Contingency Planning For Iraq: Meeting 27 October 2002, Beirut		27 Oct 2002
Sub-Regional Contingency Planning For Iraq: Meeting 15-17 September 2002, Amman		15-17 Sep 2002
Sub-Regional Contingency Planning For Iraq: Amman, 14-15 January 2002		14-15 Jan 2002

TITLE	AUTHOR	DATE
Protecting And Assisting Children And Women In Extraordinary Circumstances. UNICEF EPRP For Year 2003 – Draft		
Operations Scenarios/Implications		
To Do's For Sub-Regional Contingency Plan		21 Oct 2002
Sub-Regional Contingency Plan For Iraq: Preparation For Follow-Up Meeting 14-15 January 2002		1 Jan 2002
Anticipated Staff Mobilisation/Requirements		23 Oct 2001
Additional Scenarios For Sub-Regional Contingency Planning In MENA Region		
Preparedness For Biological And Chemical Threats		
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