

An Evaluation of the Mine Risk Education Programme in Ethiopia

Final Report



The **Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)** supports the efforts of the international community in reducing the impact of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The Centre provides operational assistance, is active in research and supports the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

For more information, please contact:

the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

7bis, avenue de la Paix
P.O. Box 1300
CH-1211 Geneva 1
Switzerland
Tel. (41 22) 906 16 60
Fax (41 22) 906 16 90
www.gichd.ch
info@gichd.ch

An Evaluation of the Mine Risk Education Programme in Ethiopia, GICHD, Geneva, July 2005.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to pay tribute to the kindness and generosity of the people of Ethiopia and their representatives. This evaluation would not have been possible without them and it was made all the more enjoyable because of them. For its part, the GICHD remains ready to assist the programme in the future in accordance with the wishes of the government of Ethiopia and its partners.

Executive summary

Background to the evaluation

Mine risk education has been undertaken in the northern Tigray region of Ethiopia since 1999 and in the neighbouring Afar region since 2001, primarily by a local non-governmental organisation (NGO), the Rehabilitation and Development Organisation (RaDO). In addition, since 2003 the Ethiopian Mine Action Office has been conducting community liaison in conjunction with its clearance teams in both Afar and Tigray. The majority of funding for the various projects has been contributed through the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

In February 2005, UNICEF requested the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to conduct **an independent evaluation of the mine risk education (MRE) programme in Ethiopia** in consultation with stakeholders (*see Annex 1*). The goal of the evaluation was to help to move the MRE programme forward. The evaluation team was made up of two GICHD consultants: Stuart Maslen and Valérie Quééré. In addition to ongoing support from UNICEF, assistance for field missions was received from the Office of Rehabilitation and Social Affairs (ORSA)¹ in Tigray and from RaDO in Tigray and Afar.

The evaluation began in March 2005 with a review of relevant literature made available to the team by the various stakeholders. Meetings were held with key informants in Addis Ababa, and with representatives from Afar and Tigray regions (*see Annex 2*). Field visits were conducted to affected communities in Afar and Tigray on the basis of recommendations from programme stakeholders (*see Annex 3*). On 1 April 2005, a workshop of key actors was convened to discuss the preliminary conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

On 18 April 2005, the present draft report was submitted to UNICEF Addis Ababa to be further circulated for comments and proposed corrections based on evidence provided; these were received by 18 May 2005 and have been taken into consideration for the revision and completion of the evaluation report. This final report is similarly being circulated to programme stakeholders by UNICEF.

Main conclusions

The evaluation team has concluded that **the mine risk education programme in Ethiopia is one of the world's more mature mine risk education programmes**. It bases this conclusion on four main factors.

First, the programme has successfully moved away from “planned” communication (small media items such as printed T-shirts, posters and cloth banners) to community-based initiatives, in particular through the establishment of local “rehabilitation task forces” or RTFs. These have been set up at district (*woreda*) level² and at sub-district (*tabia*) level and have successfully built social capital at community level.³

Second, a high level of awareness has been created about the danger posed by landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).⁴ Certainly, casualty rates in the areas affected by the war with Eritrea have come down markedly in the last four years. Despite some problems with implementation, especially in Afar region, it is clear that RaDO can claim due credit for this, over and above the innate resourcefulness of the communities at risk.

Third, deliberate efforts have been made to link clearance operations to the needs of the affected communities through the deployment of community liaison officers. These have helped the community to understand the demining process and offered potential for community participation and involvement in priority setting. The Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) has commissioned an evaluation of its collaboration with UNICEF, including the work of the community liaison officers.

Fourth, the projects in Afar and Tigray regions have sought to collect relevant data on victims and contaminated areas and to reorient interventions – notably the messages disseminated – based on analysis of that data. In addition, “anti-mine clubs” and child instructors using peer-to-peer communication were set up within schools to target both schoolchildren and children and youth not attending school, particularly animal herders.

Fifthly, concrete efforts to ensure the long-term sustainability of the programme have been made by the decision to hand over the projects in Afar and Tigray from RaDO to the regional governmental authorities. The effectiveness of this handover is discussed further below.

Moreover, **the Ethiopian mine action programme benefits from some of the world's most experienced mine action professionals in a number of key actors**. These capacities, further enabled by Ethiopia's recent ratification of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, generate exceptional potential and enormous opportunities to deal swiftly with the negative impact of landmines and other ERW in the country.

However, achievements have come at a relatively high price. The evaluation team has calculated that **more than US\$2.5 million has been committed to the programme in various forms since 1999**; the majority through RaDO. In addition, the programme faces a number of significant challenges,⁵ in particular to strengthen programme coordination, project management, and emergency preparedness. These represent substantial opportunities for performance improvements, but will require commitment of additional resources, especially during the coming two years.

Opportunities for programme improvements

Strengthened programme coordination

First and foremost, the MRE programme needs to strengthen overall coordination.⁶

National programme coordination is required:

- to allocate resources effectively to MRE based on an objective assessment of need;
- to ensure high quality interventions through monitoring of activities and changing circumstances;
- to share information on priorities, current activities and future plans, thereby minimising rivalry between key actors; and
- to avoid the risks of duplication or contradictory messages within and across regions.⁷

It is generally accepted within mine action, and constitutes a guiding principle of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) issued by the United Nations, that “*the primary responsibility for mine action lies with the government of the mine-affected State*”,⁸ in this case the government of Ethiopia. Further, the IMAS recommend that, at national level, overall mine action strategy be set by an inter-ministerial body, often known as a national mine action authority. Operational coordination of activities is assured by a national mine action centre working under the authority’s auspices.

In Ethiopia, the key institutions at Federal level are EMAO and its oversight body, the Mine Action Supervisory Board. Yet, EMAO has primarily been given an implementing role by its founding document, Council of Ministers Regulations No. 70/2001, and, despite suggestions to the contrary, has, as of writing, no formal mandate to coordinate mine action, including mine risk education, in Ethiopia. This lacuna has been at the heart of the inter-relational disputes that continue to permeate the mine risk education programme. It has constituted a significant impediment to programme performance. Success in filling the coordination gap would therefore enable significant progress towards the aim of an effective, well-run national mine risk education programme.

Several actors have suggested that the way forward is through the adoption of new legislation clarifying or allocating responsibility for programme coordination to a specific body. However, this may take up to a year, or even more, to achieve. **The evaluation team strongly recommends that key actors, especially those at federal and regional level, agree upon responsibilities for programme and project coordination at the earliest opportunity.** This solution can be endorsed, perhaps through a memorandum of understanding (MoU), and formally legislated at a later date.

Such an MoU would usefully include agreement on responsibility for the following issues:

- conduct of needs assessments;
- conclusion and adoption of national standards for mine risk education;
- monitoring (of the needs of at-risk populations and of management of projects);
- support for capacity development (in project management, including monitoring); and
- management of information (i.e. data gathering, data storage, data analysis, and information dissemination).

However, the evaluation team is *not* convinced of the need for creating an accreditation system for MRE given that the number of actors is so small. Accreditation is valuable in regulating a plethora of actors in a given operational theatre, hardly the case in Ethiopia. It is also not a pre-requisite for conducting quality assurance (monitoring and evaluation) of projects and activities, once the coordination mandate is formally clarified and once national standards, currently in draft form, have been concluded, translated into local languages and widely disseminated.

Project management skills

Second, project management skills for MRE need to be reinforced, in particular the targeting of interventions. These should be based on: objective assessments of the needs for MRE; support for continued building of social capital at community level; and the maintenance of a sustainable surveillance system.

Assessing the need for mine risk education

All assessments of mine risk education in any country should identify first and foremost the needs of the communities who are affected by explosive devices. Successive and sometimes concurrent armed conflicts dating back to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1933 have left a pervasive legacy of mines and ERW that contaminate most of the country's regions, to one degree or another.

It is not yet possible to say with certainty how many Ethiopians are killed and injured each year by these explosive devices. In 2004, RaDO recorded 25 victims in Tigray and three in Afar, the two northern regions in which it was operating.⁹ Indeed, the overwhelming majority of observers agree that the most affected region is that of Tigray – the key battleground of the war with Eritrea in 1998–2000. **A continued MRE project in Tigray appears to be warranted**, and a certain capacity to manage MRE has already been built within ORSA, although more is needed.

Afar has attracted considerable resources since the RaDO programme was initiated there in 2001. Although containing significant mine and UXO contamination, part of which dates back several decades, the at-risk communities appear to have learnt to manage the risk. This is evidenced by RaDO's own recording of the number of victims in the three districts in which it has operated (five in 2002, none in 2003, three in 2004). Moreover, by its own admission, RaDO has failed to achieve a successful handover of the project to the regional authorities, whose capacity to manage an MRE project remains inadequate.

Although the following conclusion is contested by both RaDO and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Food Security Bureau (DPPFSB), **it does not appear warranted, based on existing circumstances, to sustain either a major project of implementation of MRE activities at local level or capacity development at regional level in Afar.** The regional authorities should, however, remain vigilant to any change in the situation in order to alert federal authorities and UNICEF.

Significant levels of ordnance afflict the Somali region of Ethiopia, especially along and close to the border with Somalia, of that there appears to be little doubt. This is due to the Ogaden wars of three decades ago and, reportedly, to ongoing political and tribal violence. Further investigation, not feasible during this evaluation, is needed to

identify the true impact of mines and ERW in this region. **It is recommended that EMAO, with the support and involvement of UNICEF and RaDO,¹⁰ conduct or commission an assessment of the true needs for MRE in the Somali region.**

Community participation and empowerment

The extent to which social capital has been built at local community level is one of the major successes of the mine risk education programme. The “rehabilitation task forces” or RTFs are the primary mechanism for this community participation. Originally set up by RaDO as “mine committees”,¹¹ and bringing together representatives of local authorities, farmers’, youth and women’s associations and other grassroots organisations, they have ensured local involvement in planning and implementing MRE. Some have also effectively monitored the work of local RaDO MRE agents who have worked – and been based – at community level.

For their future work, RTFs might benefit from additional guidance on their particular responsibilities to identify and influence risk-taking behaviour at community level, and then to report on any relevant outcomes.

A sustainable surveillance system

It is an axiom of any humanitarian or development intervention that not everyone is at equal risk – and therefore in equal need. The primary challenge in programme implementation is in targeting those most in need. It is therefore disappointing that despite a broad and positive network of interlocutors down to village level, the evaluation team was not able to access an assessment of ongoing risk-taking – to understand who is truly at risk from mines and ERW, where and why. Such an assessment would enable the development of a coherent communication strategy at regional and, ultimately, federal level.

The mine risk education programme in Ethiopia would benefit greatly from an effective and efficient victim surveillance system, however basic, and an understanding of risk-taking through ongoing monitoring of knowledge, attitudes and practices. The mechanism for data collection, analysis, storage and dissemination currently proposed does not meet those criteria. It is complex, cumbersome and inappropriate to the realities of Ethiopia and should be reviewed and amended as quickly as possible.

ORSA staff have successfully taken on many of the tasks previously accomplished by RaDO, based on training provided by that organisation, in particular support to the RTFs. However, it remains unclear to the evaluation team:

- Who is primarily responsible for collecting and transcribing victim data;
- Who is responsible for analysing that data;
- Who is responsible for storing that data;
- Who is responsible for responding to identified changes in the situation, for instance by re-orienting project messages and communication channels.

These information management responsibilities should be clarified as soon as possible, and an individual focal point for MRE within ORSA nominated.¹² This clarification should take into account the reality that data quality will inevitably degrade, the greater the number of actors who are involved in collecting it. One possibility

would be to engage community liaison officers in data collection and dissemination, as long as clear terms of reference were set out for their work. This could usefully link in to the work of future “rapid response” explosive ordnance disposal teams. Again, any decisions could usefully be included in an MoU between the key actors.

In addition, data on risk-taking – and the community response to that risk-taking – does not appear to be collected systematically by anyone. This needs to be rectified as a matter of urgency. Thus, reporting from the village RTFs and upwards should focus on *outcomes* as well as on outputs (e.g. the number and types of activities). This means identifying and reporting on how the RTFs (and other actors) have managed to bring about real changes in behaviour by community members through individual and social interventions.

Emergency preparedness

Third, existing efforts to prepare for possible emergencies should be stepped up. For whatever future programme orientation is decided on by Ethiopia, it is clear that contingency planning should play an important part. The possibility of new contamination and increased numbers of victims would clearly result in additional and greater needs for mine risk education.

Thus, **a collaborative planning process for any future emergency should be further engaged between EMAO, ORSA, RaDO,¹³ UNICEF and other relevant actors as a matter of some urgency.** Roles and responsibilities, possible messages, and communication channels to be used should be clarified in advance.

Future international support and assistance for capacity development

UNICEF has the primary responsibility among UN agencies to support actors in developing the capacities of the mine risk education programme in Ethiopia. EMAO and ORSA, in particular, have requested that UNICEF continue to support their work. In addition, if and when a national coordination body for mine action is created, helping to develop its capacities to coordinate MRE would constitute a relevant and appropriate role for UNICEF.

Despite the allocation of very significant resources directly to RaDO since 1999, UNICEF has not provided adequate support to the organisation’s management of mine risk education. For instance, complaints about the timeliness and quality of its reporting date back to 2000, yet UNICEF has done little to correct them. Nonetheless, RaDO has been the organisation chosen by UNICEF that has largely sought to develop the capacity of ORSA to manage mine risk education. UNICEF should therefore seek to provide direct support to ORSA to ensure a high quality of project management, for at least the coming 12 to 24 months, unless and until a national coordinating body with the requisite mandate and training and technical assistance capacity is established.

UNICEF should also continue its efforts to mobilise resources for mine risk education in Ethiopia – extremely successful to date; these should have been greatly facilitated by Ethiopia’s welcome ratification of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

Finally, **if and when** a national coordinating body is created and mandated, it is recommended that the UNICEF Mine Risk Education Project Officer should be located, at least part of the time, within that body. This would ensure appropriate priority be given to helping to develop national MRE coordination capacities, while at the same time ensuring coherence of project approach within UNICEF (mainstreaming mine action internally and sharing lessons and experiences with similar projects, especially HIV/AIDS awareness).

South-South capacity development

It is sometimes claimed that we learn more from our successes than we do from our failures. Accordingly, Ethiopia should not be shy in sharing its successes in mine risk education with others, in particular by passing on its experience to other States and regions affected by mines and ERW. With this in mind, the GICHD requests that the results of this evaluation, once the report has been finalised and accepted, be made freely available to all concerned parties within and outside the country. It further suggests that the results be presented formally by key actors from the MRE programme to the forthcoming Annual Meeting of Mine Action Programme Managers in Geneva in September 2005.

Endnotes

1. ORSA is a regional governmental body charged with overseeing rehabilitation efforts in Tigray.
2. Ethiopia is heavily decentralised down from the Federal level to the nine regions. In turn, within each region, services and development activities are further decentralised to *woreda* (district) level. A *woreda* comprises *tabia/kebele* (groups of villages) and *kushet* (villages).
3. There are many definitions of social capital, what is undisputed is that, in the words of The World Bank (1999), “social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable”. See Smith (2001).
4. The Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey carried out in the summer of 2004 on behalf of EMAO and UNICEF, any perceived flaws notwithstanding, has identified high levels of awareness and practice of safe behaviour among many communities, and tied some of that knowledge to the work of, primarily, RaDO.
5. Several of these were already identified by an international evaluation of the RaDO projects in Afar and Tigray completed in 2003 but do not appear to have been sufficiently addressed. See McClure (2003).
6. This was also the conclusion of an interagency assessment within the project carried out in 2004. See for instance Yihdego et al. (2004: 7).
7. *Ibid.*: 5.
8. IMAS 01.10, Second Edition, 1 January 2003, p. 3.
9. These figures differ significantly from those recorded by the national Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), which are far higher, but the results of the LIS are contested by the key actors and the LIS has not been accepted by EMAO nor has it been certified by the UN.
10. RaDO has stated that it would like “to have the opportunity to contribute to this assessment, given its extensive knowledge and experience in MRE activity”. Comments on the draft evaluation report, submitted by RaDO on 13 May 2005.
11. The mine committees were later subsumed into broader RTFs, which have in turn contributed to integration of MRE within broader rehabilitation and development initiatives.
12. According to ORSA, the focal “body” for MRE is its Planning and Programme Unit. Comments on the draft evaluation report, submitted by RaDO on 18 May 2005.
13. RaDO has stated that it would like “to share its experience with the relevant actors and contribute to the collaborative planning process”. Comments on the draft evaluation report, submitted by RaDO on 13 May 2005.

Introduction

Background

Ethiopia is afflicted by significant contamination from landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)¹ resulting from a series of internal and international armed conflicts dating back to the Italian invasion in 1933. In October 1999, following the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea the previous year, mine risk education² (MRE) was initiated in the northern region of Tigray by the Rehabilitation and Development Organization (RaDO).³

In 2001, RaDO expanded the project into the neighbouring region of Afar, also affected by the conflict with Eritrea. (Handicap International has conducted limited MRE among refugees in the Somali region of Ethiopia.) In February 2001, the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) was set up by Council of Ministers Regulations N° 70/2001 as an autonomous legal entity accountable to the Prime Minister. One of EMAO's specific powers and duties was to *“educate the public in order to enable them [to] acquire the necessary awareness about damages that could be caused by such explosives thereby helping them to take all such necessary protective measures”*⁴

In accordance with an agreement reached in September 2003 between RaDO, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the regional governmental authorities in Afar and Tigray, RaDO is in the process of handing over responsibility for MRE to the respective governmental authorities. According to the relevant *“Tripartite Project Cooperation Agreement”*, this handover project was due to be completed by August 2005.

It was decided on the initiation of the handover project that it would be important to evaluate the project halfway through the process to see if the plan of action for the handover was actually working. Based on the results of the process evaluation, the regional government, RaDO and UNICEF will review their plan and make the necessary changes. Although many internal evaluations of RaDO have been conducted, there has never been an external evaluation. Therefore, after five years of implementation, it was considered necessary to evaluate the project at its present phase.

In January 2005, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was requested to submit a proposal to conduct an evaluation of the mine risk education programme in Ethiopia. The proposal is set out in full in Annex 1 to the present evaluation report.

Terms of reference

The primary goal of the evaluation is to provide an independent and impartial assessment of the status of the MRE programme in Ethiopia, especially its effectiveness in responding to the needs of affected communities. Using a standard results-based approach to evaluation adapted for mine action, the evaluation has sought to assess the rationale, impacts, effectiveness, outputs and efficiency of the programme.

In accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) as well as the current draft of the Ethiopian National Standards for Mine Risk Education, the evaluation covers the following issues: stakeholder involvement; coordination; integration with other mine action, humanitarian and development activities; community participation and empowerment; information management and exchange; appropriate targeting; communication and education methodologies and tools; and training needs. The evaluation also looks at allied issues of programme structure, and contingency planning for MRE in the event of a resumption of hostilities.

The evaluation presents recommendations to UNICEF and other key programme stakeholders for future programme design, funding, implementation and coordination.

Methodology

The evaluation was conducted by the GICHD, with the help of UNICEF, using two international consultants: Stuart Maslen and Valérie Quéré. Additional support for field missions was provided by RaDO and the Office of Rehabilitation and Social Affairs (ORSA). In addition to the use of the results-based matrix and a review of relevant literature, three field missions were conducted as part of the evaluation. The first mission was to Addis Ababa on 27 February–6 March 2005 and was conducted jointly by Stuart Maslen and Valérie Quéré. The second mission was to Tigray and Afar regions on 8–15 March 2005 and was conducted by Valérie Quéré, with the support of ORSA. The third mission was to Addis (20 March) and then to Tigray and Afar regions on 21–31 March 2005 and was conducted by Stuart Maslen with the support of ORSA and additional assistance from RaDO.

Initial conclusions, findings and recommendations from the evaluation were discussed at a workshop held in Mekele on 1 April 2005. The present draft was submitted for comment and review by the key programme stakeholders. Comments were received from EMAO, the regional authorities in Afar and Tigray, RaDO, and UNICEF and were all taken into account in the revision and finalisation of the evaluation report.


Report layout

Section 1 of this report reviews overall programme structure, including key milestones in the programme and programme and project coordination mechanisms. Section 2 addresses stakeholder involvement, in particular community participation and

empowerment. Section 3 considers the targeting of mine risk education, including information management and exchange. Section 4 looks at communication and education methodologies and tools. Section 5 assesses the level of integration with other mine action, humanitarian and development activities. Section 6 discusses the level of capacity development, including contingency planning for MRE in the event of future armed conflict. Finally, section 7 sets out the main conclusions, findings and recommendations of the evaluation, as described in the Executive Summary above.

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to thank all their interlocutors in Ethiopia for their openness and generosity. This evaluation would not have been possible without their readiness to give of their time and insights.



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Endnotes

1. In strict legal terms, “explosive remnants of war” are defined as encompassing unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance, but excluding all landmines and booby-traps. Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4, Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V adopted on 28 November 2003) to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
2. At that time, the intervention was called *mine awareness* in accordance with common practice in mine action.
3. RaDO is an Ethiopian non-governmental organisation previously specialising in physical and psychosocial rehabilitation. Its MRE project was supported initially by The World Bank and then by the United Nations Children’s Fund.
4. Section 5, paragraph 4 of Council of Ministers Regulations N° 70/2001, *Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*, Addis Ababa, 5 February 2001.

1. The structure of the mine risk education programme

1.1 Key milestones in the development of the programme

1998

A three-year armed conflict broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia leading to, among other things, civilian victims from landmines and UXO and displacement of civilians from conflict-affected areas.

1999

In May, the Rehabilitation and Development Organization (RaDO), a local NGO, with support from The World Bank, submitted a proposal to the regional authorities in Tigray in the north of Ethiopia to carry out a six-month pilot project on mine awareness.

In August, the Emergency Section of UNICEF headquarters in New York conducted a mine awareness feasibility mission at the request of the UNICEF Ethiopia Office. The mission team concluded that mine awareness was *“essential for the prevention of the further loss of innocent lives”* and recommended that UNICEF support RaDO financially and technically to carry out mine awareness.¹

In October, a project of “mine awareness” (the term has now generally been replaced by “mine risk education”) was initiated in the north of the Tigray region by RaDO. UNICEF subsequently stepped in to support the programme.

The same month, initial training in mine awareness reporting and monitoring was provided to RaDO staff and other stakeholders at a workshop facilitated by UNICEF HQ.

2000

In July, liberation of the occupied areas in Ethiopia is followed by return of internally displaced persons (IDPs); a number are killed or injured by landmines or items of unexploded ordnance.

In December, UNICEF completes an evaluation of the RaDO mine awareness project. It recommends setting up an MRE project in the Afar region.

2001

In February, the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) was established following the adoption of Council of Ministers Regulations No. 70/2001.

In August, RaDO initiates an MRE project in the Afar region, again with financial support from UNICEF.

2002

In February, EMAO sets up a Mine Risk Education Department.

In October the UNICEF project Officer is recruited to work on the MRE programme in Ethiopia and provide technical support to all MRE actors.

In December, an initial training in basic MRE is carried out for community liaison officers hired by EMAO to support its demining operations.

2003

In January 2003, UNICEF authored and edited the report of a joint evaluation of the RaDO MRE project in Afar and Tigray regions with RaDO, ORSA, DPPC of Tigray and DPPFSB in Afar.

In March, UNICEF with EMAO and RaDO conduct training in community liaison and other MRE topics to MRE actors from Tigray, Afar and at Federal level.

In April, UNICEF provides funding for the EMAO MRE project.

In September, ORSA, RaDO and UNICEF sign a Tripartite Project Cooperation Agreement on the handover of the RaDO MRE project in Tigray to the regional authorities. The project objectives are *“to minimize the level of accidents and incidents involving landmines and UXO on the civilian population by developing a sustainable mine risk education programme, based on international standards, that effectively responds to the needs of identified target groups, and is fully integrated with other mine action initiatives”*. EMAO and UNICEF also sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to build the capacity of the MRE department in EMAO, based on a joint plan of action.

An MoU is also signed between UNICEF and the regional authorities in Afar for the handover of the RaDO MRE project to the authorities, although RaDO believes that it is not realistic to hand over the project in the same timeframe.²

2004

In March, a coordination meeting for mine risk education is held in Mekele, the capital of the Tigray region. The meeting centres on a dispute as to who is responsible for coordinating MRE activities. A follow-up meeting is held at EMAO between EMAO and UNICEF senior management to address EMAO concerns about UNICEF's approach to the mine risk education programme.

In April, the GICHD facilitates introductory training workshop on the management of mine risk education projects in Mekele, capital of Tigray region.

In June, a survey of knowledge, attitudes and practices (a “KAP” Survey) is conducted jointly by EMAO and UNICEF using an international consultant. The process and some aspects of the final report are criticised by a number of stakeholders.

2005

In January, GICHD facilitates a training workshop in Addis Ababa on the development of national standards for MRE and strategic planning of mine risk education.

In February, the GICHD is contracted by UNICEF to evaluate the mine risk education programme in Ethiopia.

In June, the final draft of the evaluation is submitted to UNICEF for its approval.

Following further consultations with RaDO, the final report was submitted to UNICEF in July 2005.

1.2 An overview of the mine action programme in Ethiopia

Existing mine action structure and capacity

The structure of the mine action programme in Ethiopia is unusual. It is generally accepted within mine action, and constitutes a guiding principle of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), that “*the primary responsibility for mine action lies with the government of the mine-affected State*”,³ in this case the government of Ethiopia. Indeed, in contrast to many other affected countries, the Ethiopian government has used a World Bank loan to fund demining activities. The key institutions at Federal level are EMAO and its oversight body, the Mine Action Supervisory Board.

Yet, EMAO has primarily been given an implementing role by its founding document, Council of Ministers Regulations No. 70/2001, and, despite suggestions by various parties to the contrary, has, as of writing, no formal mandate to coordinate mine action, including mine risk education, in Ethiopia. This lacuna has been at the heart of the persistent inter-relational disputes that continue to impede the performance of the mine risk education programme. Success in filling that gap would therefore enable significant progress towards the aim of an even more effective and well-run national programme.

In accordance with its mandate, EMAO is carrying out demining operations in Afar and Tigray regions using four demining companies, deployed initially to Zalanbesa, Gerhu Sernay, Badme and Burie (though some are currently in the process of being redeployed). These are due to be increased by three to seven during the course of 2005 and demining capacity will be further buttressed by the addition of “rapid response teams” with a focus on spot tasks of explosive ordnance disposal.⁴ No other demining bodies or organisations are currently operating in Ethiopia, although discussions have been entertained with Norwegian People’s Aid as to a possible future role for this international NGO.

Laws and administrative regulations

Ethiopia signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention on 3 December 1997 but did not ratify it until 17 December 2004, following the First Review Conference of the Convention in Nairobi. It therefore becomes a full State Party on 1 June 2005. It is not believed that Ethiopia has adopted national implementing measures in accordance with Article 9 of the Convention, including any laws that specifically prohibit civilians from stockpiling, selling or using landmines and UXO.

It is understood from discussions with EMAO that Ethiopia is actively considering adherence to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its protocols, especially Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

1.3 The composition and structure of the mine risk education programme in Ethiopia

This section sets out the existing mine risk education programme composition and structure.

1.3.1 What is mine risk education?

According to the IMAS:

“The term ‘mine risk education’ (MRE) refers to educational activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and UXO by raising awareness and promoting behavioural change, including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.

MRE aims to ensure that communities are aware of the risks from mines, UXO and/or abandoned munitions and are encouraged to behave in a way which reduces the risk to people, property and the environment. The objective is to reduce the risk to a level where people can live safely; to recreate an environment where economic and social development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination.”⁵

Thus, MRE has three main components:

- one-way communication, primarily through the mass media;
- participatory education and training, whether formal or non-formal; and
- community mine action liaison.

All three of these components are present in the Ethiopian MRE programme.

1.3.2 Roles and responsibilities

The lack of unanimity – and therefore overall clarity and coherence – as to the roles and responsibilities for mine risk education in Ethiopia is disturbing. It is also, unsurprisingly, at the root of systemic conflicts between the key actors that have plagued the programme over the past three years in particular. There follows, to the best knowledge and understanding of the evaluation team, the current status of these roles and responsibilities, as generally understood by the relevant players.

EMAO

EMAO is mandated, by the Council of Ministers Regulations, to **conduct** mine risk education, including community mine action liaison. No hard evidence has been found to sustain claims made verbally by a number of interlocutors that EMAO is currently mandated to direct, manage or coordinate mine risk education, however appropriate or desirable that may be. Thus, for example, EMAO sought to establish and manage an accreditation system for MRE operators but found that it did not have the mandate to do so.

RaDO

RaDO is a national NGO set up in 1997 to provide rehabilitation services. In 1999, it set up a mine risk education project, initially with World Bank funding and subsequently with direct funding support from UNICEF. It has operated in Tigray and Afar regions and, to a limited extent, in the Somali Regional State.

Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs (ORSA)

ORSA was established in 2001 with *“the responsibility for overseeing all aspects of reconstruction and rehabilitation in Tigray”*,⁶ in particular the return and reintegration of the IDPs following the armed conflict with Eritrea. The structure of public service provision in Ethiopia is highly decentralised, especially, since 2002, down to *woreda* (district) level,⁷ though it has not been possible to access the specific legislative provisions that specify the precise nature and extent of this decentralisation.⁸ With respect to MRE, ORSA has claimed as its mandate the coordination, facilitation, monitoring and evaluation and management of MRE activities in Tigray. EMAO has accepted ORSA’s responsibility for coordination within the Tigray region,⁹ although feels that the EMAO Regional Office in Mekele could play a useful role in facilitating more effective coordination at field level.

Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Food Security Bureau (DPPFSB) in Afar region

The DPPFSB is responsible for managing an early warning system in the region focused on food security and coordinating NGO aid efforts in the region. It is, so far, played a limited role in managing or implementing MRE activities.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDP provides technical advice to the government of Ethiopia, in particular through EMAO, on the conduct of, primarily, demining activities. The UNDP Mine Action Team for Ethiopia includes a Senior Technical Advisor, a Mine Action Operations Specialist, a Quality Assurance Advisor, and an IMSMA/Information Adviser.

UNICEF

The role of UNICEF, and the MRE Project Officer in particular, is to assist and advise its mine risk education counterparts in Ethiopia and to build relevant capacity at national and regional level. The MRE Project Officer is based within the UNICEF office in Addis Ababa, which has been a subject of contention with EMAO, who would prefer her to be located within EMAO offices.

For UNICEF, the main priorities for the mine risk education programme are the effective establishment of a victim data surveillance system, and full integration of mine risk education within mine action.

1.4 Resource allocations to mine risk education 1999–2005

Based on the available information, the evaluation team finds that more than US\$2.5 million has been expended on the mine risk education programme in Ethiopia in the period from 1999 to early February 2005; the majority of these funds have been directed to RaDO. All UNICEF funding for the RaDO MRE project is due to end in August 2005.

1.5 Main programme achievements and challenges

The establishment of, and support to, the Rehabilitation Task Forces (RTFs – *described overleaf*) at *woreda* (district) and *tabia* (sub-district) level represent one of the main programme achievements. These participatory bodies are a genuine attempt to make the project community based and based on field research by the evaluation team they are both mobilised effectively and clear as to their roles and responsibilities. In the future, the challenge will be to support them where necessary (not harass them to conduct unnecessary MRE activities), and to channel their efforts towards identifying and addressing any incidents of risk-taking behaviour.

There is also a perception among a number of key actors that there has been a welcome change in the mindset of some of EMAO's personnel over time, from a somewhat dismissive attitude towards MRE in general, and community liaison in particular, to a more positive attitude. Although the definition of community liaison used in Ethiopia is quite narrow when compared to that set down in the IMAS, there is now a widespread understanding that community liaison can play an important role in making demining more effective and more efficient.

By its own admission, the RaDO project in Afar has been less successful than the project in Tigray. Part of the problem it ascribes to a lack of commitment on the part of the regional authorities to assume responsibility for the project. It also claims that it has been more difficult to recruit appropriately educated agents in Afar, though acknowledges that there have been management difficulties on the part of RaDO itself.¹⁰ The RaDO project was extended for six months beyond the timeframe foreseen in the tripartite agreement with the DPPFSB and UNICEF, but funding has now been suspended by UNICEF, pending the outcome of the present evaluation.

Little MRE has been conducted in the Somali region, although there is already considerable contamination and, reportedly, new laying of mines and use of ordnance in ongoing tribal or political conflicts. Given the instability prevalent in the area, a key challenge for the future will be to conduct a genuine assessment of MRE needs among the civilian population. The feasibility study for the Somali region and the KAP survey in Afar, Tigray and Somali regions conducted by EMAO and UNICEF in 2004 represent a laudable start, but are not sufficient.

Endnotes

1. Dastoor and Filippino (1999).
2. Information provided by Ambachew Negusa, National Mine Risk Education Coordinator, RaDO, Addis Ababa, 3 March 2005.
3. IMAS 01.10, Second Edition, 1 January 2003, p. 3.
4. Information provided by Jeffrey Pilkington, UNDP Senior Technical Adviser, Addis Ababa, 1 March 2005.
5. United Nations Mine Action: a Strategy for 2001/2005, Assistance in Mine Action, Report of the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly A/56/448/Add 1, New York, 16 October 2001.
- 6 UNICEF and ORSA (2003).
7. See for instance the revised Regional State Constitution for Tigray.
8. It is suggested by one observer that the situation is actually quite complex both in theory and in practice.
9. See for instance EMAO (2003).
10. Information provided by Ambachew Negusa, National Mine Risk Education Coordinator, RaDO, Addis Ababa, 3 March 2005. RaDO stresses, however, that the effectiveness of the project improved following a decision to replace the former project manager.

2. Stakeholder involvement in the MRE programme in Ethiopia

2.1 Rehabilitation task forces

The rehabilitation task forces (RTFs), which are set up both at *woreda* and *tabia* level, are a distinct innovation of the Ethiopia MRE programme. They represent a valuable effort to make the programme both community-based and sustainable, as well as integrated with other rehabilitation activities. They also mark a welcome departure from the prevailing tendency in MRE to engage in primarily planned communication through the production of expensive and largely ineffective materials. Thus, they seem worthy of continued support by the Ethiopia programme (and even replication in other national programmes).

The RTFs comprise key stakeholders at community level, namely the local education and health representatives, as well as members of youth, farmers and women's associations. They are chaired by the relevant local governmental representative. The roles of the RTFs, both at *woreda* and *tabia* level, appear to be generally clear, namely:

- to develop plans for MRE,
- to provide MRE directly,
- to monitor MRE activities,
- to prioritise areas for clearance,
- and to provide regular reports to ORSA.

There is also a focus on community involvement in priority setting by the RTFs, but it is unclear to the evaluation team to what extent their identified priorities are followed in practice. However, in general there is broad agreement that the RTFs have been far more successful in building social capital in Tigray than in Afar.

3. Targeting mine risk education in Ethiopia

3.1 The importance of targeting in MRE

Effective targeting of interventions is critical to effective MRE. Such targeting is dependent on understanding and monitoring the interaction between people and the mine and UXO contamination in and around their communities. The level of risk faced by individuals or groups is a variable of:

- the level of knowledge of that individual or group about the hazard;
- their ability and determination to conduct their livelihoods in safety notwithstanding the existence of that hazard; and
- the variety of individual and social pressures that will influence their behaviour.

3.2 The effectiveness of targeting in the Ethiopia MRE project in Tigray

One of the project objectives set down in the MoU between UNICEF and ORSA¹ of providing MRE “*that effectively responds to the needs of identified target groups*” is both legitimate and welcome. A worthwhile attempt to identify these needs was made through the KAP survey carried out in summer 2004 by EMAO and UNICEF. However, the survey is stronger on knowledge and attitudes than it is on practices, and falls short of identifying the true needs of the civilian population in the three regions covered: Afar, Somali and Tigray. Indeed, it was not possible for the evaluation team to identify and access a comprehensive assessment of risk-taking anywhere in Ethiopia.²

This appears to be the most significant failure in the project handover from RaDO to ORSA, and one that needs to be corrected as a matter of some urgency through technical advice and retraining for ORSA staff. UNICEF appears well placed to provide this support. This issue links in directly with the challenges of establishing a sustainable and effective victim surveillance system, and any training provided should normally combine these two aspects of targeting.

Yet, RaDO points out that it has addressed risk-taking in a number of instances.³ For instance, it notes that RaDO learnt from the victim data collected from Zalanbesa

town, Aferom and Tahtay Adiabo *woredas* that most of the victims registered were newcomers to the areas. In response to this, the organisation designed a strategy with the RTF members to address these risk-takers. The first step was all newcomers should be registered at the nearby police station through their hosts and then MRE was provided through the RaDO Agents and the RTF. These newcomers were from the central part of Tigray coming to these areas to work as daily labourers in the post-conflict reconstruction and cultivation activities.

The other groups of newcomers were people coming in search of grass and water for their animals, as these areas have potentially better grazing lands and water. This group of people are also registered by the local administration and then provided MRE through the RaDO agents and by the RTF members.

The other initiatives are addressing the out-of-school children through the child instructors and creating awareness through mass media and interpersonal communication on the common causes of casualty like that of the cactus fruit. In Aferom Woreda, for example, a child put a bullet into the fire where, as a consequence, two people were injured. The information was disseminated through the radio programme and to the RTF members in order to incorporate this particular incident in the MRE lessons.

Endnotes

1. UNICEF and ORSA (2003).
2. EMAO (2003) and ORSA (2003) both make general assertions as to who might be most at risk from mines and UXO but there is a notable lack of evidence – and detail – to justify these assertions.
3. E-mail from Yiberta Tadesse and Ambachew Negus, RaDO, 17 July 2005.

4. Communication and education methodologies and tools

4.1 Communication strategy

No communication strategy has been formally drafted and adopted by the MRE programme in Ethiopia with the result that efforts appear too *ad hoc* and sometimes lack coherence.

A communication strategy for mine risk education, as for any communication programme, has six major stages:

- needs analysis and research for strategy selection;
- developing messages and materials and testing;
- selection of communication channels;
- implementation;
- evaluating effectiveness; and
- feedback.

Communication strategies should therefore be based on a general understanding of how to bring about behavioural change together with a detailed understanding of the local context. The future of the communication and educational approaches is therefore dependent on addressing the targeting issues reviewed in Section 3 above.

4.2 Communication and education tools and techniques

The Ethiopia programme has used a wide range of communication and educational tools and techniques. Initially, there was an excessive reliance on “planned” communication products (banners, T-shirts, posters and the like), though this tendency has since abated in favour of a more community-based approach. RTFs now use interpersonal approaches to communication as the most effective – and sustainable – way to conduct MRE.¹

One of the other educational tools intended to ensure future sustainability of the MRE programme are student and teacher handbooks for schools in the Afar and Tigray

regions. These have been in production by RaDO since the organisation received funding for them in November 2002, but are still not complete. This issue should be resolved before the end of the handover agreement in August 2005.

Endnote

1. Thus, for example, ORSA has determined that radio programmes and supporting “listening groups” may be discontinued because of the prohibitive costs. Successive internal monitoring and evaluation has determined their limited effectiveness in the Afar region.

5. Integration with other mine action, humanitarian and development activities

5.1 Integration of MRE with other mine action

5.1.1 Integration with mine clearance

As noted elsewhere in this report, community liaison has been a welcome effort to integrate MRE with demining operations. This is a success, both of EMAO and UNICEF, which effectively promoted the importance of community liaison. Based on experiences and lessons already learned, this aspect of MRE appears likely to further strengthen over the coming year, by selecting and training individuals more suited to community liaison work and by training company commanders in the benefits to their own work of the community liaison officers.¹

Yet, coordination clearly needs to be strengthened between ORSA and EMAO on the work of the community liaison officers: this requires more goodwill on both sides in order for this to happen.

5.1.2 Integration with victim assistance

RaDO agents provided psycho-social counselling in Tigray and are proud of this aspect of the project. In other respects, a key issue is access to physical rehabilitation for landmine survivors. The facilities at the Mekele Orthopaedic and Physiotherapy Centre (an Ethiopian NGO) are, in the experience of the evaluation team, second to none and yet operate under capacity, primarily for financial reasons.

The head of the Mekele Centre (which covers Afar as well as Tigray) was positive about the existing referral system, praising the work of ORSA in particular, although in a small number of instances at woreda level, there appeared to be unmet needs among the physically disabled and a reactive rather than a proactive stance from the local ORSA representative. In general, there should be a standardised link at woreda and zonal² to promoting the physical rehabilitation of the disabled, including amputees (e.g. through referral to the Mekele Centre for provision of a prosthesis and supporting physiotherapy).

In addition, RaDO have noted that they responded to the continued casualties in Tigray, in collaboration with the regional Health Bureau and hospital administration, by establishing a physiotherapy unit and orthopaedic workshop in Akum and Shire hospitals. They also trained nurses and technicians on basic physiotherapy and orthopaedics techniques. A number of mine victims benefited from these services. RaDO also transported 11 mine victims from Afar to Dessie Orthopaedic Workshop and facilitated the provision of prosthesis fittings and other appliances to the mine victims.³

5.2 Integration of mine risk education with other development interventions

For much of its lifetime, the MRE programme has largely stood alone and outside other emergency or development interventions. Thus, to the extent that “forced” risk-taking exists, i.e. situations where community members knowingly adopt high-risk behaviour because of survival pressures, it does not appear to have been addressed by any specific coordination or linkages with development bodies and organisations.

However, ORSA has readily understood that the primary networks at community level in Tigray originally created by RaDO – the “taskforces” – had a potential that could be exploited far beyond mine action. The decision to merge these committees within the broader RTFs was undoubtedly the correct one. Moreover, ORSA is currently exploring the possible use of the RTFs for future child protection issues and, among other things, to assist in addressing future cases of displacement.

For its part, UNICEF recognises that, in future, MRE should be better linked to other issues within its own programming framework, although it has not yet taken a decision on the appropriate place for MRE.⁴ For instance, there are many similarities between MRE and HIV/AIDS awareness; to date, however, there has been little if any cross-fertilisation between these two public health education interventions. The organisation should address this internal issue in the coming year within the Addis office.

Endnotes

1. EMAO’s MRE Department is planning to conduct a training workshop for company commanders. Information provided by Ato Berhane, Head, MRE Department, Addis Ababa, 18 March 2005.
2. An administrative area comprising several districts; a region in turn comprises several zones.
3. E-mail from Yiberta Tadesse and Ambachew Negus, RaDO, 17 July 2005.
4. Information provided by Marc Rubin, UNICEF, 4 March 2005.

6. An assessment of existing mine risk education capacities

6.1 Capacity development

A number of capacity development activities¹ have been undertaken at national, regional and local level by a variety of MRE actors, including EMAO, ORSA, RaDO and UNICEF. These activities include formal workshops and informal trainings and demonstrate a valid commitment to project and programme sustainability. They have addressed various aspects of project and programme planning, management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation.

6.2 Planning and managerial capacities

6.2.1 EMAO

Currently, EMAO has one head and one deputy head of MRE section and two community liaison officers (CLOs), although it is in the process of recruiting three more. Previously, it had also hired 12 assistant CLOs using funding from UNICEF but their contracts were terminated and not renewed.

EMAO has understood that appropriate profiles for CLOs to support the demining process are not educators but individuals with the ability to make the link between demining and the affected communities, in particular through the existing RTFs. Training for future CLOs should focus on building those community development skills rather than on developing an ability to provide MRE.

6.2.2 RaDO

Despite the allocation of very significant resources directly to RaDO since 1999, UNICEF has not provided adequate support to the organisation's management of mine risk education projects. This covers issues such as project planning, systematic monitoring of MRE activities and risk-taking behaviour, coordination with other actors, and the mobilisation of resources for future project interventions. In addition, complaints about

the timeliness and quality of its reporting date back to 2000,² yet UNICEF has done little, in concrete terms, to correct them. RaDO has been the organisation chosen by UNICEF to develop the capacity of ORSA to manage mine risk education.³

Particular concerns centre on the analysis of data in general, not just the reporting of activities, and the apparent general failure to gather and analyse data on risk-taking in any systematic fashion. This demands a thorough understanding of who is coming into contact with mines or UXO and why (e.g. ignorance of the threat or safe behaviour, recklessness, or forced by survival pressures). That is not to say that valuable efforts have not been made – for instance, RaDO deserves special praise for their efforts to target out-of-school children using child-to-child approaches, and to deliver specific messages to reduce casualties, such as from collecting fruits from cactus trees. But these efforts appear to have been largely *ad hoc* when they should have been systematic.

6.2.3 ORSA

Guidance on “monitoring and implementing” MRE activities is given to ORSA by RaDO in its 2003 *MRE Project Guideline on Implementation and Monitoring*. Yet, doubts were expressed by several interlocutors as to RaDO’s own managerial capacities,⁴ in particular with regard to resource mobilisation and planning, for example through a failure to verify contradictory LIS data and insufficient analysis of RaDO’s own data, leading to possible changes in the shape and focus of projects. Nonetheless, ORSA staff have successfully taken on many of the tasks previously accomplished by RaDO, based on training provided by RaDO, in particular through support to the RTFs.

However, it remains unclear to the evaluation team within ORSA:

- Who is primarily responsible for collecting and transcribing victim data;
- Who is responsible for analysing that data (a specific enabling objective in ORSA’s own project proposal for MRE in Tigray);⁵
- Who is responsible for storing that data;
- Who is responsible for responding to identified changes in the situation (i.e. planning and implementing these changes), for instance by re-orienting project messages and communication channels.⁶ Indeed, according to the agreement between UNICEF and ORSA, ORSA was to “designate a person who will be given authority for overseeing the Project on its behalf.”⁷ A number of actors questioned whether an individual had indeed been mandated by ORSA to oversee MRE and, if so, who that person is.

These management responsibilities should be clarified as soon as possible, and a single focal point for MRE within ORSA nominated. This clarification should take into account the reality that data quality will inevitably degrade, the greater the number of actors who are involved in collecting it. One possibility would be to engage community liaison officers in data collection and dissemination, as long as clear terms of reference were set out for their work. This could usefully link in to the work of future “rapid response” explosive ordnance disposal teams. Again, any decisions could usefully be included in an MoU between the key actors.

In addition, data on risk-taking – and the community response to that risk-taking – does not appear to be collected systematically by anyone. This needs to be rectified as a matter of urgency. Thus, reporting from the village RTFs and upwards should focus on *outcomes* as well as on outputs (e.g. the number and types of activities). This means identifying and reporting on how the RTFs (and other actors) have managed to

bring about real changes in behaviour by community members through individual and social interventions.

UNICEF should therefore seek to provide direct support to ORSA to ensure a high quality of project management, for at least the coming 12 to 24 months.

6.2.4 DPPFSB

By its own admission, the DPPFSB currently has little capacity to manage an MRE project in Afar, although it ascribes part of the problem to a failure by RaDO to provide adequate management training.⁸ It is expecting financial and in-kind support from UNICEF, and has submitted a proposal to that effect, but in the view of a number of stakeholders has not demonstrated the same willingness as ORSA to take over responsibility for MRE in its own region.⁹

6.3 Data gathering, sharing and analysis capacities

There is, quite simply, no effective victim surveillance system in place in Ethiopia. RaDO collected certain data on victims; this represents the best information available, but is insufficient. Little to no data has been collected on risk-taking.

The proposed Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) victim data forms are far too complicated in the view of the overwhelming majority of programme stakeholders and, in the view of the evaluation team, will simply not be used as the system is too complex¹⁰ and devolves responsibility to far down the programme hierarchy for it to be effective.

Moreover, there is little guarantee that data, even if it is successfully gathered, will actually be analysed, disseminated/shared and then used for planning and evaluation purposes. This issue needs to be addressed as a matter of some urgency. The main actors – EMAO, ORSA, RaDO and UNICEF in particular – should sit down together to develop a workable system that collects victim data on a straightforward and standardised form.¹¹ Given the relatively small number of victims, for the immediate future, EMAO or ORSA could identify one focal point to collect the data at zonal level, conduct a preliminary analysis, and then forward the information for entry on a simple database at regional level.

In addition, a proposed village risk-taking form used by the GICHD in a number of other countries (*see Annex 4*) might assist in generating a system of prioritising highly impacted villages for MRE and potentially also demining.

6.4 Coordination capacities

6.4.1 The role of UNICEF in developing coordination capacities

UNICEF has a critical role to play in developing the coordination capacities of a future federal coordinating body. Despite tensions between the two bodies over the past two years, the support provided by UNICEF to the work of EMAO has been greatly appreciated. EMAO is currently engaged in evaluating the collaboration between EMAO and UNICEF, including the work of the community liaison officers.

To date, MRE has not been formally been a part of UNICEF's country programme for Ethiopia¹² (it is not included in the Master Plan of Operations agreed between the organisation and the Government of Ethiopia). In December 2004, however, at the mid-term review of UNICEF's country programme in Ethiopia, the head of the MRE Department at EMAO formally called on UNICEF to include MRE within the next country programme (beginning in January 2007) and to further support capacity development of EMAO.¹³

In addition to such capacity development, UNICEF should also continue its efforts to mobilise resources for mine risk education in Ethiopia – extremely successful to date; access to donor funding should have been greatly facilitated by Ethiopia's welcome ratification of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

6.5 Emergency preparedness

Any future armed conflict involving Ethiopia, however short-lived, would be highly likely to generate new contamination and therefore probably new victims, resulting in renewed and greater needs for mine risk education. Thus, a collaborative planning process for MRE in any future emergency should be engaged between all relevant actors as a matter of some urgency. In the case of Tigray, this should build on efforts already undertaken by ORSA.

Endnotes

1. According to one understanding, capacity development entails augmenting human, organisational or national capabilities by some combination of:
 - Education and training to acquire new knowledge and skills;
 - Acquiring additional or improved resources (money, equipment, labour);
 - Creating the right incentives for people to use their new knowledge/skills and resources; and
 - Learning from experience to improve performance in the same or a similar task.
2. See for instance Lark (2000). This issue was raised as “*still the weakest aspect of the project*” by a UNICEF assessment of the project in December 2001. Prevost (2001).
 - Psycho-social counselling training to health personnel (Tigray);
 - Village volunteers training (Afar);
 - Monitoring and Evaluation training for RTF, ORSA and DPPFSB staff (Afar and Tigray);
 - TOT workshop for School teachers (Tigray and Afar);
 - Surveillance system training (Tigray and Afar);
 - Imams training on MRE facilitation (Afar); and
 - Training on Monitoring and Implementation guideline to RTF at all levels.
3. RaDO points out that it has conducted many trainings for the stakeholders. It provided the following list in an email on 17 July 2005:
 - RTF training on facilitation of MRE to adults and children (Afar and Tigray);
 - TOT training to RTF, ORSA, DPPFSB staff (Afar and Tigray);
 - Psycho-social counselling training to health personnel (Tigray);
 - Village volunteers training (Afar);
 - Monitoring and Evaluation training for RTF, ORSA and DPPFSB staff (Afar and Tigray);
 - TOT workshop for School teachers (Tigray and Afar);
 - Surveillance system training (Tigray and Afar);
 - Imams training on MRE facilitation (Afar); and
 - Training on Monitoring and Implementation guideline to RTF at all levels.
4. RaDO is currently benefiting from managerial advice and support from a VSO volunteer, so the situation could be expected to improve significantly over the coming year.
5. See ORSA (2003).
6. Again, this issue, “*developing strategies to address behavioural change needs*”, is a specific enabling objective in ORSA’s own project proposal for MRE in Tigray. ORSA (2003).
7. UNICEF and ORSA (2003).
8. RaDO forcefully rejects this claim.
9. For instance, the DPPFSB was seeking to receive, among other things, computers for the office, but was not explicit as to how they would be necessary for the project.
10. As the evaluation team understands the proposed system, the following should occur. Once an RTF learns of a victim at *tabia* level, it should record the information and pass it on to the RTF at *woreda* level. The *woreda* RTF members will either fill in the form themselves (if the *tabia* has not done so) or contact the ORSA representative at *woreda* level. That representative will, despite complaints of limited transport, come to fill in form, pass it on to the Zonal ORSA staff member then on to ORSA HQ then to the EMAO Tigray office and on to EMAO Addis to the IMSMA Section where it is then analysed and the information passed back to ORSA through the same convoluted chain and then back to the communities.
11. ORSA had previously proposed that victim data collection would be incorporated into early warning systems: it is unclear what concrete efforts have been made in this regard. See for instance ORSA (2003).
12. Funding was provided through emergency budgeting.
13. Thus, for example, the agreement between ORSA and UNICEF signed in September 2003 explicitly recognises that “*the development and capacity building of the mine risk education component within EMAO is the primary responsibility of UNICEF*”. UNICEF and ORSA (2003).

7. Conclusions, findings and recommendations

7.1 Coordination

First and foremost, the MRE programme needs to strengthen overall coordination.

National programme coordination is required:

- to allocate resources effectively to MRE based on an objective assessment of need;
- to ensure high quality of interventions through monitoring of activities and changing circumstances;
- to share information on priorities, current activities and future plans, thereby minimising rivalry between key actors; and
- to avoid the risks of duplication or contradictory messages across regions.

The lack of programme coordination at federal level remains a significant impediment – arguably the main impediment – to improved programme performance. Several actors have suggested that the way forward is through the adoption of new legislation clarifying or allocating responsibility for programme coordination to a specific body. However, this may take up to a year, or even more, to achieve. **The evaluation team strongly recommends that key actors, especially those at federal and regional level, agree upon responsibilities for programme and project coordination at the earliest opportunity.** This solution can be endorsed, perhaps through a memorandum of understanding, and formally legislated at a later date.

Such an MoU would usefully include agreement on responsibility for the following issues:

- conduct of needs assessments;
- conclusion and adoption of national standards for mine risk education;
- monitoring (of the needs of at-risk populations and of management of projects);
- support for capacity development (in project management, including monitoring); and
- management of information (i.e. data gathering, data storage, data analysis, and information dissemination).

However, the evaluation team is *not* convinced of the need for creating an accreditation system for MRE given that the number of actors is so small.¹ Accreditation is valuable

in regulating a plethora of actors in a given operational theatre, hardly the case in Ethiopia. It is also not a pre-requisite for conducting quality assurance (monitoring and evaluation) of projects and activities, once the coordination mandate is formally clarified and once national standards, currently in draft form, have been concluded, translated into local languages and widely disseminated.

7.2 Project management skills

Second, project management skills for MRE need to be reinforced for EMAO and ORSA, in particular with respect to the targeting of interventions. These should be based on: objective assessments of the needs for MRE; support for continued building of social capital at community level; and the maintenance of a sustainable surveillance system.

7.2.1 Assessing the need for mine risk education

All assessments of mine risk education in any country should identify first and foremost the needs of the communities who are affected by explosive devices. Successive and sometimes concurrent armed conflicts dating back to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1933 have left a pervasive legacy of mines and ERW that contaminate most of the country's regions, to one degree or another.

It is not yet possible to say with certainty how many Ethiopians are killed and injured each year by these explosive devices. In 2004, RaDO recorded 25 victims in Tigray and three in Afar, the two northern regions in which it was operating.² Indeed, the overwhelming majority of observers agree that the most affected region is that of Tigray – the key battleground of the war with Eritrea in 1998–2000. **A continued MRE project in Tigray appears to be warranted**, and a certain capacity to manage MRE has already been built within ORSA, although more is needed.

Afar has attracted considerable resources since the RaDO programme was initiated there in 2001. Although containing significant mine and UXO contamination, part of which dates back several decades, the at-risk communities appear to have learnt to manage the risk. This is evidenced by RaDO's own recording of the number of victims in the three districts in which it has operated (five in 2002, none in 2003, three in 2004). Moreover, by its own admission, RaDO did not achieve a successful handover of the project to the regional authorities,³ whose capacity to manage an MRE project remains inadequate.

Although the following conclusion is contested by EMAO, RaDO and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Food Security Bureau, **it does not appear warranted, based on existing circumstances, to pursue either a programme of implementation at local level or capacity development at regional level in Afar.** The regional authorities should, however, remain vigilant to any change in the situation in order to alert federal authorities and UNICEF.

Significant levels of ordnance afflict the Somali region, especially along and close to the border with Somalia, of that there appears to be little doubt. This is due to the Ogaden wars of three decades ago and, reportedly, to ongoing political and tribal violence. Further investigation, not feasible during this evaluation, is needed to identify the true impact of mines and ERW in this region. **It is recommended that EMAO,**

with the support and involvement of UNICEF and RaDO, conduct or commission an assessment of the true needs for MRE in the Somali region.

7.2.2 Community participation and empowerment

The extent to which social capital has been built at local community level is one of the major successes of the mine risk education programme. The “rehabilitation task forces” or RTFs are the primary mechanism for this community participation. Originally set up by RaDO as “task forces”,⁴ and bringing together representatives of local authorities, farmers’, youth and women’s associations and other grassroots organisations, they have ensured local involvement in planning and implementing MRE. Some have also effectively monitored the work of local RaDO MRE agents who have worked – and been based – at community level.

For their future work, RTFs might benefit from the revision and dissemination of appropriate terms of reference, setting out clearly their responsibilities, in particular, to identify and influence risk-taking behaviour at community level.

7.2.3 A sustainable surveillance system

It is an axiom of any humanitarian or development intervention that not everyone is at equal risk – and therefore in equal need. The primary challenge in programme implementation is in targeting those most in need. It is therefore disappointing that despite a broad and positive network of interlocutors down to village level, the evaluation team was not able to access an assessment of ongoing risk-taking – to understand who is truly at risk from mines and ERW, where and why. Such an assessment would enable the development of a coherent communication strategy at regional and, ultimately, federal level.

The mine risk education programme in Ethiopia would benefit greatly from an effective and efficient victim surveillance system, however basic, and an understanding of risk-taking through ongoing monitoring of knowledge, attitudes and practices. The mechanism for data collection, analysis, storage and dissemination currently proposed does not meet those criteria. It is complex, cumbersome and inappropriate to the realities of Ethiopia and should be reviewed and amended as quickly as possible.

ORSA staff have successfully taken on many of the tasks previously accomplished by RaDO, based on training provided by that organisation, in particular support to the RTFs. However, it remains unclear to the evaluation team:

- Who is primarily responsible for collecting and transcribing victim data;
- Who is responsible for analysing that data;
- Who is responsible for storing that data;
- Who is responsible for responding to identified changes in the situation, for instance by re-orienting project messages and communication channels.

These information management responsibilities should be clarified as soon as possible, and an individual who will serve as focal point for MRE within ORSA nominated.⁵ This clarification should take into account the reality that data quality will inevitably degrade, the greater the number of actors who are involved in collecting it. One possibility would be to engage community liaison officers in data collection and dissemination, as long as clear terms of reference were set out for their work. This

could usefully link in to the work of future “rapid response” explosive ordnance disposal teams. Again, any decisions could usefully be included in an MoU between the key actors.

In addition, data on risk-taking – and the community response to that risk-taking – does not appear to be collected systematically by anyone. This needs to be rectified as a matter of urgency. Thus, reporting from the village RTFs and upwards should focus on *outcomes* as well as on outputs (e.g. the number and types of activities). This means identifying and reporting on how the RTFs (and other actors) have managed to bring about real changes in behaviour by community members through individual and social interventions.

7.3 Emergency preparedness

Third, existing efforts to prepare for possible emergencies should be stepped up. For whatever future programme orientation is decided on by Ethiopia, it is clear that contingency planning should play an important part. The possibility of new contamination and increased numbers of victims would clearly result in additional and greater needs for mine risk education.

Thus, **a collaborative planning process for any future emergency should be further engaged between EMAO, ORSA, RaDO, UNICEF and other relevant actors as a matter of some urgency.** Roles and responsibilities, possible messages, and communication channels to be used should be clarified in advance.

7.4 Future international support and assistance for capacity development

UNICEF has the primary responsibility among UN agencies to support actors in developing the capacities of the mine risk education programme in Ethiopia. EMAO and ORSA, in particular, have requested that UNICEF continue to support their work. In addition, if and when a national coordination body for mine action is created, helping to develop its capacities to coordinate MRE would constitute a relevant and appropriate role for UNICEF.

Despite the allocation of very significant resources directly to RaDO since 1999, UNICEF has not provided adequate support to the organisation’s management of mine risk education. For instance, complaints about the timeliness and quality of its reporting date back to 2000, yet UNICEF has done little to correct them. RaDO has been the organisation funded by UNICEF that has largely sought to develop the capacity of ORSA to manage mine risk education. UNICEF should therefore seek to provide direct support to ORSA to ensure a high quality of project management, for at least the coming 12 to 24 months, unless and until a national coordinating body with the requisite mandate and training and technical assistance capacity is established.

UNICEF should also continue its efforts to mobilise resources for mine risk education in Ethiopia – extremely successful to date; these should have been greatly facilitated by Ethiopia’s welcome ratification of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

Finally, **if and when** a national coordinating body is created and mandated, it is recommended that the UNICEF Mine Risk Education Project Officer should be located,

at least part of the time, within that body. This would ensure appropriate priority be given to helping to develop national coordination capacities, while at the same time ensuring coherence of project approach within UNICEF (mainstreaming mine action internally and sharing lessons and experiences with similar projects, especially HIV/AIDS awareness).

7.5 South-to-South capacity development

It is sometimes claimed that we learn more from our successes than we do from our failures. Accordingly, Ethiopia should not be shy in sharing its successes in mine risk education with others, in particular by passing on its experience to other States and regions affected by mines and ERW. With this in mind, the GICHD requests that the results of this evaluation, once the report has been finalised and accepted, be made freely available to all concerned parties within and outside the country. It further suggests that the results be presented formally by key actors from the MRE programme to the forthcoming Annual Meeting of Mine Action Programme Managers in Geneva in September 2005.

Endnotes

1. EMAO disputes this recommendation and strongly advocates an accreditation system as it *“helps organisations to be competent and work as to the set national standards. If not, organizations can waste the scarce resources for mine risk education.”* Comments on the draft evaluation report, submitted by EMAO on 14 May 2005.
2. These figures differ significantly from those recorded by the national Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), which are far higher, but the results of the LIS are contested by the key actors and the LIS has not been accepted by EMAO nor has it been certified by the UN.
3. RaDO had expressed reservations about the handover process in Afar before entering into the handover agreement with UNICEF. From the beginning it expected that the handover process from RaDO to the DPPFSB would not be completely successful and these concerns were raised at the time of signing the agreement.
4. The taskforces were later subsumed into broader RTFs, which have in turn contributed to integration of MRE within broader rehabilitation and development initiatives.
5. ORSA has nominated the Planning and Programme Unit as its focal “body” for MRE.

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Abbreviations, acronyms and definitions

CLO	community liaison officer
DPPFSB	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Food Security Bureau
EMAO	Ethiopian Mine Action Office
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
IDP	internally displaced person
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices
MRE	mine risk education
NGO	non-governmental organisation
ORSA	Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs
RaDO	Rehabilitation and Development Organization
RTF	rehabilitation task force
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UXO	unexploded ordnance

Definitions

<i>Kushet</i>	equivalent to a hamlet
<i>Tabia</i>	equivalent to a village or cluster of villages
<i>Woreda</i>	an administrative district in Ethiopia
Zone	an administrative grouping of woreda
Region	largest administrative authority below federal level

Annex 1.

GICHD project proposal for an evaluation of the MRE programme in Ethiopia

Introduction

Background

For several years, UNICEF has been supporting mine risk education (MRE) in Ethiopia. In particular, it has undertaken capacity building and provided funding and technical assistance to a local non-governmental organisation (NGO), RaDO, and the national Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO). RaDO is in the process of handing over its work in the Afar and Tigray regions to the regional authorities.

UNICEF Ethiopia is now seeking an evaluation of the MRE programme in Ethiopia. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), which has specific expertise both in mine action evaluations and in MRE, is proposing to conduct the evaluation on its behalf. Previously, on behalf of UNICEF, the GICHD has conducted training for Ethiopian mine action personnel in mine risk education.

The role of the GICHD

The overall objective of the Centre is the promotion of international cooperation in mine action. More explicitly, the aims of the Centre are:

- to strengthen the role of the United Nations in mine action;
- to support and enhance the expertise of all bodies and organisations working in mine action; and
- to contribute to the formulation of coherent and comprehensive mine action strategies.

In order to achieve these objectives, the GICHD serves the wider mine action community via the following core activities:

- the preparation of studies, assessments of needs and evaluations of mine action;
- technical assistance to mine action programmes and capacity building of local personnel engaged directly or indirectly in mine action;

- the development, implementation and maintenance of an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA); and
- support for the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, including hosting the treaty's Implementation Support Unit.

The GICHD employs experts in the various disciplines of mine action and enjoys strong credibility in this regard. Among others, it has separate sections devoted to the socio-economic aspects of mine action and to mine action evaluation. The Socio-Economic Section is headed by a professional with more than 12 years experience in mine action, supported by an international consultant with more than a decade of mine action experience. The Evaluation Section is headed by a development economist with 20 years experience in evaluations of humanitarian and development programming, including five years' experience in mine action. A separate section is engaged in drafting the International Mine Action Standards on behalf of the United Nations Mine Action Service.

Consequently, the GICHD believes it is ideally positioned to engage in the evaluation of MRE in Ethiopia. In addition, since the GICHD is independently funded and, by virtue of its unique position, does not require any contribution towards its own operating costs, it can thus be considered highly cost-effective.

Evaluation goal and objectives

The primary goal of the evaluation is to provide an independent and impartial assessment of the status of the MRE programme in Ethiopia, especially its effectiveness in responding to the needs of affected communities. Using a standard results-based approach to evaluation adapted for mine action, the evaluation will seek to assess the rationale, impacts, outcomes, outputs, efficiency and safety of the programme.

In accordance with the International Mine Action Standards as well as the current draft of the Ethiopian National Standards for Mine Risk Education, the evaluation will cover issues of stakeholder involvement; coordination; integration with other mine action, humanitarian and development activities; community participation and empowerment; information management and exchange; appropriate targeting; communication and education methodologies and tools; and training needs. The evaluation should also look at allied issues of programme structure, and contingency planning for MRE in the event of a resumption of hostilities.

The evaluation will present recommendations to UNICEF and other key programme stakeholders for future programme design, funding, implementation and coordination.

Evaluation budget

A budget for the evaluation is attached as Annex A to this proposal. It details the maximum costs to be recovered from UNICEF and the expected financial contribution of the GICHD to the project.

Intended beneficiaries of the evaluation

The evaluation will provide guidance and focus primarily to programme planners and managers, giving them the basis, and support, for more effective planning of MRE

activities and coordination structures. In accordance with the Terms of Reference, the GICHD hopes to provide an evaluation that adds to the existing body of knowledge in Ethiopia. Further, it is hoped that through the evaluation process, local capacity will be enhanced, thereby leading to improved programming.

The ultimate beneficiaries of the needs assessment should of course be the affected communities themselves who will benefit from the improved delivery of mine risk education services.

Proposed methodology

The evaluation team will consist of two international consultants hired by the GICHD, one recruited internationally and one locally, and, if possible, a national consultant to be hired by UNICEF. The team will be back-stopped by the respective heads of the Socio-Economic and Evaluation Sections.

The evaluation will begin with a review of existing literature on the mine and UXO situation in Ethiopia and the mine action programme, including MRE. This literature review will be fed into the results-based evaluation matrix used by the GICHD for its mine action evaluations. This matrix not only identifies the major questions to be answered by the evaluation, it also forms the basis for the development of interview and survey protocols.

The first mission from the GICHD's international consultant to Addis Ababa will seek to interview key programme stakeholders in the capital and to agree with them on the timing and location of the field visits to be conducted. If possible, a national consultant should be hired by UNICEF to work side-by-side with the international evaluation team so that capacity is built for future programme and project evaluations.

In-country verification of existing data on mine and UXO impact, including victim data, will then be conducted by the locally-recruited international consultant, as agreed on with key programme stakeholders both in the capital and in affected regions. This verification will include an initial examination of mine risk education initiatives, both past and present. Local enumerators will be used in the verification as agreed with their managers, and the requisite training for the enumerators will be provided by the GICHD.

The second mission from the GICHD's international consultant will focus on discussions with communities and community representatives in affected regions of Ethiopia, regional governmental authorities, as well as project managers and other project staff.

The initial results of the evaluation should be presented to a workshop of key programme stakeholders and discussed as a draft to elicit feedback and to build consensus around an assessment of needs and necessary responses. Recommendations can only be developed in close consultation with local partners and adequate time during the mission should be allotted for this. Following the workshop, the draft evaluation report should be revised, finalised and submitted to UNICEF for its approval.

Following the conclusion of the evaluation, and on the basis of its conclusions, findings and recommendations, the GICHD proposes to return to Ethiopia to conduct a further planning workshop for the future of the MRE programme.

Assessment team

The GICHD proposes to contribute the following consulting expertise:

- Stuart Maslen – internationally-recruited consultant specialist, and
- Valerie Quéré – locally-recruited consultant specialist.

The CVs of the consultants are annexed to this proposal as Annex B and Annex C.

Implementation schedule

February 2005

- Conclusion of agreement with GICHD to conduct programme evaluation on behalf of UNICEF;
- Literature review and elaboration of results-based evaluation matrix for MRE in Ethiopia;
- Initiation of first mission by international consultant to Addis Ababa. Briefings for the evaluation team, planning meetings and interviews with key programme personnel.

March 2005

- Completion of first mission by international consultant to Addis Ababa;
- Field trip by locally-recruited consultant to verify impact data and observe programme implementation;
- Second mission by international consultant to Ethiopia. Field trips by evaluation team to exchange views with communities and community representatives in affected regions of Ethiopia, regional governmental authorities, as well as project managers and other project staff.
- Workshop to review initial evaluation conclusions, findings and recommendations.

April 2005

- Submission of draft evaluation report;
- Revision and completion of evaluation report following the receipt of comments and feedback.

Date tbc 2005

- Planning workshop based on the results of the evaluation, supported by the GICHD.

Evaluation outputs

The initial outputs of the evaluation will be a detailed report with programmatic recommendations as well a workshop to review initial findings. Once accepted, the GICHD will return to conduct a planning workshop for programme stakeholders.

Annex 2.

List of key interviewees

Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Food Security Bureau (Afar)

- Adunya, DPPFSB

Ethiopian Mine Action Office

- Etsay Gebre Selaissie, Head of Operations
- Berhane Achame, Head of Mine Risk Education Department
- Temesgen Abraha, Regional MRE Advisor, Mekele Regional Office

Landmine Survivors Network

- Bekele Gonfa, Head

Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs (Tigray)

- Zermichael Gebremedhin, Head, ORSA
- Waldegabriel, Head, Planning and Programming Department
- Teshale Yihdego, Planning and Programming Department

Rehabilitation and Development Organization

- Yiberta Taddesse, Executive Director
- Ambachew Negusa, National Mine Risk Education Coordinator
- Esayas Thaimanot, Tigray MRE Project Officer

United Nations Children's Fund

- Bjorn Ljunqvist, UNICEF Representative, UNICEF, Addis Ababa
- Bruno Maes, Senior Programme Officer, UNICEF, Addis Ababa
- Marc Rubin, Head, Early Warning and Disaster Preparedness Section, UNICEF, Addis Ababa
- Orlaith Gallagher, Mine Risk Project Officer, UNICEF, Addis Ababa

United Nations Development Fund

- Timur Obukhov, IMSMA/Information Adviser
- Jeffrey S. Pilkington, Senior Technical Adviser, UNDP Mine Action Advisory Team
- Vic Thackwray, Operations Specialist, UNDP Mine Action Advisory Team

Annex 3.

Community visit protocols

Key Informants (chiefs/local leaders, church workers, local authorities)

NB This is a reminder of questions to ask. You need to formulate and order the questions in a way that you consider appropriate. You do not necessarily have to ask all these questions – decide which are the most appropriate in the situation.

COMMUNITY COMPOSITION

- What is it like living here? Has it got better or worse in recent years?
- Where are most of the returnees in this area from originally?
- What tribes are represented in this community?
- How many IDP or returnee households have been registered?
- How many of the households are headed by a female?
- Who are the main leaders of this community?
- How is land allocated to new arrivals for accommodation/agriculture/grazing?
- What do you feel are the main priorities for this community?

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- Where do most people in this community get their information from? (*probe – before they get here, when they first arrive, after they started living here*)

If not mentioned by participants remember to prompt them – asking about

- Posters
- Leaflets
- Meetings called by community leaders
- Religious leaders or events
- Friends /family
- NGOs

- Can most adults in your village read? *if yes – remember to find out which languages are most common*
- Of all the things that you've mentioned – which do you think is the most important to you? Which are the least useful/effective?
- Do most people have the chance to listen to radio?
(note – do not ask if they own radios – but whether they can regularly hear one – possibly at a friend or family members house for example)

Try to find out how often people listen and what they like to listen to – also WHICH language they listen in and WHICH stations

- Which methods do you think are the best ways of informing children about important information?
(if school is mentioned ask what about those children who do not go to school, do most children attend school or only a few – is there a difference between boys and girls, etc.?)

SECURITY SITUATION

- What are the main security threats for this group of people? *(probe – civilian disputes, military, inter tribe/clan disputes, domestic violence, weapons, landmines/UXO)*
- Are there civilian children/young people who have small arms & light weapons in the community?

MINE KNOWLEDGE

- Have any new arrivals asked you about previous fighting in this area?
- Have any of the people in this group asked you about landmines and UXO in this area? *(probe – how many, what did they ask, what could you tell them)*
- Do people know what mines are?
- Do people know what UXO are?
- Which are the more dangerous (i.e. the biggest problem) for you in this area... mines or UXO? Why?

IMPACT

- Are there any sections of the community you feel may be at risk from a landmine/UXO injury? *(probe – who, why, activities of these people)*
- Are there any landmines/UXO here?
- What impact does it have on their daily lives?
- Do they stop you doing things you used to do in this area?
- How does the community reduce the risks?
- Is there a committee within the community or one of the leaders that has tried to address the problem?

- If so, how did the committee come together? Did it exist already? What success has it had? (*Please elicit specific examples*)
- Is the committee used for other issues?

PRACTICE

- How much local knowledge is there about landmines/UXO/previous fighting in this area?
- How does this information get passed on?
- How can we ensure that returnees are also given this information?
- What happens if mines or items of UXO are reported?
- What do you do if you come across a UXO or a mine when you are travelling or working?
- Have you or your friends received information about landmines and UXO and how you can be safer from these?

If the answer is yes try and find out how they have received the information, what they have seen, where, etc.

If people have seen information on mines it is important to find out if they thought it was useful or not. Try asking questions such as:

- Which information do you remember best? Why?
- Which way of delivering mine information is the most effective do you think – why?

Ask about specific means of information delivery such as posters or radio, leaflets, etc. and ask people whether they thought it was memorable, interesting, attractive, clearly understandable or not

- Have you changed what you do or how you do it because of the advice or information you have received about mines and UXO? If so, why? If not, why not?

MINE VICTIMS

- Have many people in this area been hurt or killed due to mines or UXO – how many of you know people who have been hurt?
- What were they doing at the time they were hurt?
- Do you think they knew they were in a dangerous area or doing something that was risky?
- Why did they go to that area/take risks?
- Where were they treated?
- If someone is killed by a mine or UXO, who is informed?

Semi-structured interviews for health workers/NGOs working in health

- What is the outreach of this health facility?

- Is there a health education programme here? If yes, how do you organise health education? How motivated are the community to listen to health education?
- What kind of injuries do you see in the health facility?
- What are the major causes of injuries?
- If someone was badly injured how would they get to the health centre?
- Have you ever seen someone injured from a landmine or UXO? If **yes**, can you tell me what happened?
- Can you recognise mine/UXO injuries?
- Describe what you would be able to do if there was a landmine/UXO incident (can you give an IV? Can you stop the bleeding? If yes, how would you stop the bleeding? Can you give painkillers? Can you give antibiotics? Can you give anti-tetanus? Do you have the necessary drugs?)
- Where is the nearest hospital you can refer the patient to? (*probe – how long would it take to get there/how a patient would get there/cost, etc.*)
- Who would you report the incident to?
- What would you do to try and stop a similar incident from happening again?
- If you were able to talk to an adult/child about preventing a landmine/UXO incident, what would you tell them?
- How do people in your area manage the landmine/UXO threat?
- What do you feel is the best way to inform people in the community of the dangers of landmines/UXO?

Semi-structured interviews for teachers/youth workers

- How many households headed by people under 18 years old?
- What do youth in this community do during the day?
- Is there any difference between the work female and male children do?
- Are there any schools in the area for children in the community to attend? If yes, what percentage of the children attend school? To what age, normally?
- Are there any youth groups in the area? (*probe – what, who organises them, who attends*)
- How many children are there in your school?
- How many are boys/girls?
- What curriculum do you use?
- Do you have any health education in the curriculum?
- Have any of the children here ever spoken to you about mines or UXO?
- Have you ever spoken to the children about mines and UXO? If yes, what did you say? How do the children react when you talk about mines and UXO?
- Has anyone ever spoken to you or come to your class to talk about the dangers of landmines/UXO? If yes, who? When did they come? What did they say?
- What do you feel is the best way to inform youth in the community of the dangers of landmines/UXO?

Semi-structured interviews for military/police

- What are the biggest security threats for people living in this area?
- Do you know of any areas that have landmines or UXO? If yes, how do people here manage the threat?
- Has anybody ever reported landmines/UXO to you?
- If yes, what did you do? What did you say to the person?
- If no, what would you do? What would you say?

Semi-structured interviews for survivors of a mine/UXO incident

- Can you tell me what happened?
- Do you think the accident could have been prevented (*probe – if yes, how?/if no, why not?*)
- Were you able to get to a health facility? (*if yes, probe – where/what did they do/did they talk to you about how to prevent landmine/UXO injuries*)
- What do you feel is the best way to inform people in the community of the dangers of landmines/UXO?

Annex 4.

Village risk-taking forms

Region:

District:

Village:

Population:

Name of interviewer _____ Date and time of interview _____

How was the information collected? (*you may tick more than one box*):Individual interviews Group discussion Observation Community mapping Other? (*Please specify*) _____1. Are there mines in or around the village? Yes No

2. Have people been entering suspected mined areas in or around the village?

Yes No *If yes, go to question 3. If no, go to question 6.*3. Who have been entering suspected mined areas? (*you may tick more than one box*)Men Women Girls Boys Animals 4. Why have people been entering suspected mined areas? (*you may tick more than one box*)Collecting water Collecting firewood Collecting herbs Grazing cattle To clear mines Ignorance of the danger Hunting/fishing To rescue victims Collecting building materials

Cultivating crops To lay mines Other (*please specify*) _____

5. How many people were killed or injured by mines in the village in the last 12 months? _____

6. Are there items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in or around the village?
Yes No

7. Have people been touching or collecting UXO in or around the village?

Yes No *If yes, go to question 8. If no, go to 11.*

8. Who have been touching or collecting UXO? (*you may tick more than one box*)

Men Women Girls Boys

9. Why are people touching or collecting UXO?

To sell/use as scrap metal Ignorance of the danger To use the metal as a resource

For fun/curiosity To extract the explosives To clear land Other (*please specify*) _____

10. How many people were killed or injured by UXO in the village in the last 12 months? _____

11. Please add any additional important information below about the problem in the village. Then ask the villagers if they wish to add any information. Please write down anything they say. If not, please thank them for their time and finish the interview.

Annex 5.

Basic results-based Evaluation Matrix for MRE Programme in Ethiopia

Focus	Major questions	Objectively verifiable indicators	Sources of data	Data collection methods
Relevance	<p>How many people in Ethiopia are at risk from mines and explosive remnants of war? Where?</p> <p>How are they affected?</p> <p>What does mine risk education provide to those at risk?</p> <p>How is MRE integrated into mine action?</p> <p>How is MRE integrated into development?</p>	<p>Reports of contamination.</p> <p>Assessments of impact of contamination.</p> <p>Numbers of killed and injured each year.</p> <p>Impact on risk-taking behaviour.</p> <p>Response to community requests for assistance/prioritisation.</p> <p>Response to community requests for assistance.</p>	<p>Existing surveys</p> <p>Interviews with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EMAO • UNDP • RaDO • UNICEF • ORSA <p>Victim data collection (including IMSMA).</p> <p>Survey data.</p>	<p>Document review.</p> <p>Interviews.</p> <p>Analysis of records in databases.</p>
Impacts	<p>What are the planned impacts?</p> <p>Are the planned impacts achieved (or likely to be)?</p> <p>How many people have benefited and in what way?</p> <p>Unintended impacts (positive or negative)?</p>	<p>Goals stated for programme.</p> <p>Assessments of people affected by contamination.</p> <p>Numbers and types of beneficiaries.</p> <p>Reports of unintended impacts.</p>	<p>Project agreements.</p> <p>Annual work plans.</p> <p>Strategic plan.</p> <p>Community visits and interviews with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORSA • Rehabilitation Task Forces (RTFs) 	<p>Document review.</p> <p>Interviews.</p> <p>Field visits.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>Were the at-risk people targeted as a priority?</p> <p>How were priorities defined?</p>	<p>Choice of data being collected.</p> <p>Monitoring system.</p> <p>Criteria for prioritisation.</p> <p>Data analysis capacity.</p>	<p>Monitoring reports.</p> <p>IMSMA Interviews with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Affected communities • ORSA • RTFs • RaDO • UNICEF • EMAO/UNDP KAP survey 	<p>Document review.</p> <p>Interviews.</p> <p>Field visits.</p>

Outputs	<p>What percentage of at-risk population has been reached? What managerial/ coordination/ implementation capacity has been created? Emergency preparedness? Have materials been appropriate to the needs?</p>	<p>Assessment of at-risk population. Identification of capacity development needs. Details of assistance provided. Existence of emergency plan and capacity Existence of communication strategy.</p>	<p>Monitoring system data Interviews with: • ORSA • RTFs • RaDO • UNICEF • EMAO/UNDP Assessments of capacity development needs.</p>	<p>Progress reports, interviews, field visits.</p>
Efficiency	<p>How is the programme managed? How are priorities set? (Process) How is the programme coordinated? Is the programme structure logical? Have resources been used efficiently?</p>	<p>Existence of priority setting criteria. Existence of formal coordination mechanism. Allocation of resources to MRE.</p>	<p>Policy documents. National legislation/decrees. Interviews with: • ORSA • UNICEF • EMAO/UNDP</p>	<p>Interviews, assessment of management systems and procedures. Assessment of financial expenditure.</p>