

**Strengthening Child Protection Systems:**

# **Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 24 Country Cases**

**Final Report (6 November 2018)**

**As part of: Strengthening Child Protection Systems:  
Evaluation of UNICEF Strategies and Programme Performance**

**Abstract:**

Child Protection (CP) Systems Strengthening has been one of UNICEF's two key approaches to preventing and responding to violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation of children for a decade. The organization has made significant investments in developing, operationalizing and implementing the approach across more than 120 country offices. Through a deep-dive into monitoring and other secondary data from 24 country cases, analysed using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), critical success factors for CP systems strengthening were identified. The QCA identified the most effective combination of UNICEF investments for child protection systems strengthening as policy advocacy and advice; evidence and research; leveraging public financial resources; and not paying for services and infrastructure. Investments in capacity (including social workforce strengthening) make the biggest difference by themselves, as a single investment.

The research concludes that #1: QCA is able to qualitatively assess outcomes based on small number of cases and to identify multiple pathways to achieving change; #2: the data coding and calibration process revealed three different types of CPSS: system building in countries without significant foundations; systems strengthening in countries where the CP systems are not yet working well and are not achieving national coverage; and finally, systems reform in countries with existing child protection systems; #3: UNICEF efforts are tilted towards higher-end systems strengthening and reform; UNICEF's model tends to be less adapted to countries with no or very limited state capacities. Issues for UNICEF's consideration include: Tailor UNICEF's approaches, guidance and support mechanisms to CP systems strengthening to three different types of country contexts. Make greater investments in measuring child protection systems outcomes. Support countries to invest much earlier in information, monitoring and feedback mechanisms to facilitate learning and as drivers of change in attitudes and practices of child protection actors.

## Contents

1. Introduction and rationale.....	3
2. Conceptual framework.....	3
3. Methodology .....	6
4. Child protection systems strengthening outcomes: findings from the QCA coding and calibration process .....	11
5. UNICEF core investments to strengthen child protection systems: findings from the qualitative comparative analysis.....	19
6. Summary findings from the QCA .....	28
7. Conclusions and implications for the work of UNICEF.....	31
8. Issues for UNICEF’s consideration .....	34
Annexes .....	36

### Disclaimer:

This is the final report of a stand-alone research project undertaken by the Evaluation Office as part of an independent corporate evaluation. Its authors are: Tina Tordjman-Nebe, PhD, UNICEF Evaluation Office; Joachim Theis, PhD, Tana Copenhagen; Barbara Befani, PhD, Independent Consultant. The overall evaluation which was informed by this research can be accessed [here](#).

## 1. Introduction and rationale

Child Protection (CP) Systems Strengthening has been one of UNICEF's two key approaches to preventing and responding to violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation of children for a decade (the other is social and behaviour change). The organization has made significant investments in developing, operationalising and implementing the approach across more than 120 country offices. In 2013, a corporate decision was made to evaluate the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of this approach and an evaluation was commissioned in 2017/2018. The evaluation consists of two elements: One comprehensive, big-picture analysis of UNICEF's corporate strategies and overall programme performance and a deeper dive into 24 country cases through a stand-alone research effort using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)<sup>1</sup>. This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations emanating from the latter.

The purpose of the independent corporate evaluation overall is twofold: First, to inform the design and implementation of UNICEF programming in the child protection systems arena, including aspects related to quality and responsiveness. Second, to contribute to improving UNICEF's accountability for its performance and results in strengthening child protection systems, particularly for addressing the protection rights of the most vulnerable children. The QCA is intended to contribute to this overall objective.

QCA is a case-based research method which allows evaluators to identify different combinations of factors that are critical to a given outcome (in this case, child protection systems strengthening), in given contexts<sup>2</sup>. It was selected as a component part for this evaluation for its ability to generate robust findings about the UNICEF inputs that have made a difference in different contexts, and to generalise those findings in conjunction with other theory-based, case-based approaches. Specifically, the aim of the QCA was to identify trajectories towards successful systems strengthening within a set of 24 countries where UNICEF supports such efforts. QCA is not appropriate in all circumstances – it requires theories of change including essential causal factors, clearly defined cases and cannot measure the net effects of an intervention, or provide the same level of precision in that sense as quantitative methods. However, it has certain unique strengths – including qualitatively assessing impact on the basis of a small number of cases and identifying multiple pathways to achieving change which make it suitable for assessing UNICEF's CP systems strengthening efforts.

## 2. Conceptual framework

UNICEF defines Child Protection Systems as follows: *“Certain formal and informal structures, functions and capacities that have been assembled to prevent and respond to violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation of children. A CP system is generally agreed to be comprised of the following components: human resources, finance, laws and policies, governance, monitoring and data collection as well as protection and response services and care management. It also includes different actors – children,*

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<sup>1</sup> Ragin, Charles C. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. University of California Press 1987.

<sup>2</sup> Befani, B (2016) *Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)*, Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA), available at <http://eba.se/en/pathways-to-change-evaluating-development-interventions-with-qualitative-comparative-analysis-qca/>

families, communities, those working at subnational or national level and those working internationally. Most important are the relationships and interactions between and among these components and these actors within the system. It is the outcomes of these interactions that comprise the system".<sup>3</sup> Although the nature and extent of child protection issues vary widely across contexts, there is agreement among UNICEF and key partners that six elements need to be present in a child protection system for it to be fully functional.<sup>4</sup> The first three are core components of the system and the latter three are key requirements for its functioning (see table 1). For the purposes of this analysis, all six are referred to as *outcomes*.

**Table 1: Six essential elements of CP systems**

System Elements ("Outcomes")	Definition
<b>Regulatory framework</b>	A robust legal and regulatory framework and specific policies related to child protection
<b>Continuum of services</b>	A continuum of services and transfers (spanning prevention and response): Social protection; Universal health coverage; Education; Justice; Social welfare
<b>Governance structures</b>	Effective governance structures. Coordination across government departments, between levels of decentralization and between formal and informal actors
<b>Minimum standards and oversight</b>	Minimum standards and oversight: information, monitoring, supervision and accountability mechanisms
<b>Resources</b>	Human, financial and infrastructure resources
<b>Social participation</b>	Social participation, including respect for children's own views, and an aware and supportive public

Among the factors known to influence the presence and functioning of child protection systems are: the programming context (conflict, fragile, least developed, lower middle income, upper middle income, high income); presence of armed conflict, natural disasters and political instability; governance in the country, including transparency and rule of law; strength of education, health, social welfare and anti-poverty policies; beliefs and practices that contradict or support international children's rights; presence of parallel types of child protection systems, including informal and indigenous child protection mechanisms; and size of investments in child protection systems (by donors, international agencies and public sector budgets), among others.<sup>5</sup>

The present analysis focuses on specific drivers for systems strengthening that UNICEF can influence, including: policy dialogue, capacity development, providing or leveraging financial resources, partnerships and others. Table 2 below lists the broad categories of UNICEF investments in CP systems strengthening.<sup>6</sup> For the purposes of this analysis, they are referred to as *conditions*.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Save the Children and World Vision (2013). *Conference Report: 'A Better Way to Protect ALL Children: The theory and practice of child protection systems'*. UNICEF, New York, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Children's Fund – Programme Division (Child Protection Section); Division of Data, Research and Policy (Data and Analytics Section); Evaluation Office; Field Results Group (2015). *Child Protection Resource Pack: How to Plan, Monitor and Evaluate Child Protection Programmes*. UNICEF, New York.

<sup>5</sup> See e.g. United Nations Children's Fund, *Review of Child Protection Systems in Four Countries in South Asia*, UNICEF, Kathmandu, 2018.


<sup>6</sup> To identify these categories, the QCA team compiled a list of UNICEF budget codes and expenditure reports from the 24 countries included in the evaluation. The long list of categories was reduced to nine areas of investments, with more specific items forming the basis for the questions in the data collection protocol (see chapter 3 of this report). In this exercise, the UNICEF EAPRO publication: *Measuring and Monitoring Child Protection Systems: Proposed Core Indicators for the East Asia and Pacific Region, Strengthening Child Protection Series No. 3.*, UNICEF EAPRO, Bangkok, 2012 was a valuable resource. The resulting list was cross-checked with a table devised by UNICEF's CP Section in collaboration with the Evaluation Office during a workshop in May 2018 (see Annex 1).

**Table 2: Ten entry points for UNICEF (UNICEF’s core investments in CP systems strengthening)**

Entry points for UNICEF (“Conditions”)	Definition for this study/Issues covered related to UNICEF investments in a country
<b>1. Policy dialogue and advocacy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy advocacy and technical support for child protection systems</li> <li>• UNICEF’s convening power</li> <li>• Child protection systems mapping and assessment</li> <li>• Support for child protection systems strategy and plans</li> </ul>
<b>2. Evidence and research</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Child protection budget and public expenditure analysis</li> <li>• Research and evidence in support of child protection systems strengthening</li> </ul>
<b>3. Capacity building</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for training workshops and materials for child protection systems actors</li> <li>• Curriculum development for social service workforce</li> <li>• Strengthening the social welfare workforce (beyond curricula)</li> </ul>
<b>4. Coordination and partnerships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for inter-departmental coordination (horizontal)</li> <li>• Partnerships between academia and government</li> <li>• Support for vertical coordination between national, sub-national, district and community</li> <li>• Collaboration between child protection and other UNICEF sections: social protection, education, C4D, ECD, health, etc.</li> <li>• Support for case management system</li> <li>• Support for CPMIS and other administrative data systems</li> </ul>
<b>5. Financial support for services and infrastructure</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct financial support for child protection coordination, services, infrastructure, independent oversight mechanisms</li> <li>• Raising donor funds</li> </ul>
<b>6. Leveraging public resources</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for budget and public expenditure analysis</li> <li>• Leveraging funds from other UNICEF sections for child protection</li> <li>• Leveraging public resources for child protection systems</li> <li>• Leveraging resources from multi-lateral donors (EU, World Bank, etc.)</li> </ul>
<b>7. Service delivery</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for child protection services, coordination, multi-sectoral services</li> <li>• Support referral system with large-scale coverage (nation-wide, state-wide, etc.)</li> <li>• Support modelling of child protection service models</li> <li>• Support for the implementation of child protection laws</li> <li>• Identify children in need of care and protection</li> <li>• Strengthen quality of child protection services</li> <li>• Support engagement of children and adolescents in schools and at community level in child protection work</li> <li>• Support prevention programmes</li> </ul>
<b>8. Minimum standards and quality control mechanisms</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Types of accountability mechanisms supported by UNICEF (national-level, district-level, community and school level)</li> <li>• Strengthen child protection M&amp;E systems, monitoring children’s rights</li> </ul>
<b>9. Children’s participation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for child helplines and other reporting and complaints mechanisms</li> <li>• Support children’s engagement in legislative reforms, systems design, membership in child protection committees</li> </ul>
<b>10. Community-based protection</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support community-based child protection mechanisms</li> <li>• Support for linkages between district and community level</li> <li>• Collaboration with C4D on social and behaviour change interventions</li> <li>• Support for children’s participation in community and district-level child protection committees</li> </ul>

The resulting model to be tested through the QCA approach appears in figure 1, below. It aims at understanding which of UNICEF’s core investments have the greatest impact on systems strengthening (the intermediate outcome), alone or in combination with context factors (enablers). Elements highlighted in red were included only in the second round of analysis.

**Figure 1: QCA Framework/Model for UNICEF’s Contribution to CP Systems Strengthening**



Thus, the overarching research question is: “Which UNICEF investments have contributed to success in systems strengthening within a set of 24 countries?”

### 3. Methodology<sup>7</sup>

#### 3.1. Data Collection and Collation

Based on the above framework, a data collection protocol was developed to standardize data compilation and make country case data comparable. As part of this process, budget codes under the UNICEF conditions (investment categories) were developed into questions for data collection. For the six systems elements, related UNICEF Standard Monitoring Questions (SMQs) were selected, complemented by additional questions related to, among others: governance structures, oversight and accountability mechanisms, availability of human and financial resources for child protection systems, and children’s participation in judicial hearings and their access to helplines and other reporting and complaints mechanisms.<sup>8</sup> In total, the data collection protocol included 146 questions. For a complete list of the questions, see Annex 2. The QCA did not involve primary data collection and/or the use of sensitive secondary data. Therefore, while ethical approval was sought – and granted – for other parts of the evaluation, it was not required for the QCA portion.

The 24 case study countries for both components of this evaluation (global report and QCA) are listed below.

<sup>7</sup> The methodology adopted for this evaluation draws on Befani, B (2016) *Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)*, Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA), available at <http://eba.se/en/pathways-to-change-evaluating-development-interventions-with-qualitative-comparative-analysis-qca/>

<sup>8</sup> Answers to the SMQs are based on country reporting. They are not always adequately quality controlled or triangulated.

**Table 3: 24 countries considered for the QCA**

Region	No. of Countries	Combined with RO visit	Country visit	Desk + Remote	Desk
ECA	4			Romania	Armenia Uzbekistan Moldova
LAC	3		Peru	El Salvador	Guatemala
EAP	4	Thailand CO + EAPRO			Myanmar Fiji Mongolia
ESA	4	ESARO	Zimbabwe	Uganda	Ethiopia South Africa
MENA	3		Lebanon	Sudan	Morocco
SA	3		Sri Lanka	Afghanistan	Pakistan
WCA	3		Cote d'Ivoire	Nigeria	DRC
TOTAL	24	2	6	6	12

The data collection protocol was filled with the following existing data sources:

- Case study reports for all 24 countries included in the evaluation were available at the time the QCA component began. These are of three different levels of depth: full-blown case studies based on a country visit for six countries; desk reviews based on remote interviews and document review for six countries; and desk reviews based only on document review for 12 countries (see table 3).<sup>9</sup>
- Country Office Annual Reports (COARs) and Results Analysis Module (RAM) reports from UNICEF's corporate VISION database.<sup>10</sup>
- UNICEF Strategic Monitoring Questions (SMQs), World Bank World Governance Indicators
- Where necessary, additional web searches were conducted to answer specific questions: country reports produced by UNICEF, governments and other child protection agencies were consulted.

The data collection tool was tested using data from Armenia, Peru and Uganda and subsequently completed with data from the remaining 21 countries.<sup>11</sup>

For the remaining gaps in data, relevant questions were sent to UNICEF Child Protection Regional Advisers in the seven regions, who then contacted the respective country offices to respond to the questions. The answers were added to the country worksheets to complete the data collection phase.

<sup>9</sup> The set of 24 country case studies did not follow the same structure and were of variable quality, which made it difficult to extract the same information for each country. Some case studies included little information about UNICEF investments in child protection systems.

<sup>10</sup> RAM reports and COARs vary greatly from country to country in terms of length/ conciseness and level of clarity/ analytical sharpness. Many reports do not report at outcome level but rather list activities which meant there was considerable room for interpretation of results.

<sup>11</sup> During this phase, references to civil registration and to child protection in emergencies were removed, since they were not considered direct contributions to strengthening national child protection systems as per the QCA model (figure 1, above). Similarly, references to UNICEF's contributions to CRC reporting or the MRM were not considered as contributions to UNICEF's investments in minimum standards and accountability mechanisms as per the QCA model.

### 3.2. Coding and Calibration

Once the data protocol was populated with qualitative information for UNICEF conditions, context conditions, and child protection systems outcomes, qualitative answers were first turned into yes/no, then the average score was calculated across all answers in the different worksheets (conditions, context factors and outcomes) and finally coded as ones (yes) and zeros (no) depending on the level of performance and achievement.

Final coding (or “calibration”) progressed in steps: First the clear, obvious values were identified. These extreme cases on both ends of the spectrum (0 and 1) were usually clear and straightforward. Later the values closer to the middle point were validated by including additional information. When the questions had been coded, the conditions were scored by synthesising the scores taken by the answers relevant to each condition. In some cases, the simple average was used, in other cases a weighted average, depending on what construct seemed more appropriate for the model. These average values, representing the whole condition or outcome, were then again dichotomised so that they could be used with the crisp-set<sup>12</sup> version of QCA.

The dataset was created through an iterative process aimed at reducing uncertainty around the middle values.

### 3.3. Data Analysis

The following analyses were performed:

- Necessity analysis in the R software package, with and without inclusion cuts;
- Subset sufficiency analysis in R, with and without inclusion cuts;
- Boolean minimisations for both positive and negative outcomes, in the following variants:
  - Complex solution;
  - Intermediate solution.

Since the models were extremely complex (the Boolean minimisation algorithm considers all possible combinations of presence and absence of 10 conditions), diversity was very limited and minimal simplification was possible with the complex solution. The results were invariably long combinations too complex to interpret. There was also a very high number of intermediate solutions, so the most useful tool to identify parsimonious significant models was the Prime Implicant (PI) chart. Although long, the PI Chart allows for manual selection of conditions with high coverage. In other words, the objective was to cover the dataset with the smallest number of conditions possible and this was achieved manually by parsing through the PI chart of the intermediate solution, including the conditions identified in a model, and testing the model.


Unfortunately, there is a trade-off in QCA (see figure below) between:

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<sup>12</sup> This is the version of QCA that uses Boolean values, or values that can only be zero or one. In many cases fuzzy set QCA (or the version of QCA that uses multi point scales) requires a lot more work to be set up and leads to the same results. This was deemed to be a case for this project where standard QCA (or crisp set QCA) was more appropriate than fuzzy set QCA.

- Simplicity, which allows the researcher to interpret the configurations easily; a simple combination of 2, 3, or even 4 conditions might not necessarily be easy to interpret, but a 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 condition combination is likely to be even more difficult.
- Consistency, which refers to the frequency with which the combinations are associated with the same outcome (or with which they lead to the same outcome: we usually aim for 100%, which means they always lead to the same outcome in the data and are not “contradictory”). The simpler a combination is, the less likely it is that it will be consistent.
- Coverage, which refers to the number of cases covered by one or more combinations. We usually aim for full coverage of the dataset, that is we want a set of combinations that are able to synthesise the entire set of cases. For the solution to the positive outcomes minimisation, coverage will refer to the proportion of positive cases covered; for the solution to the negative outcomes minimisation, it refers to the proportion of negative cases covered. If some combinations are not consistent and we remove them, we will have perfect consistency but might lose cases that were uniquely covered by the removed combinations. And with regard to simplicity, it might take several combinations to cover all the cases, making the interpretation of the solution more complex than if we had to cover a small amount of cases.

**Figure 2: Trade-Off between Simplicity, Consistency and Coverage in QCA**



The parsimonious models were run in fsQCA and Tosmana.

The supersubset analysis for single conditions was also conducted in Excel using the filter function, as that created two matrices that could be analysed: the average values of outcomes associated with presence of each typology of UNICEF investment, and the same values associated with absence of the same types of investments. The comparison of these matrices (and the creation of two associated matrices, one obtained with differences between the two values and one obtained by calculating ratios) yielded interesting findings that are discussed in the QCA findings section.

### **3.4. Limitations**

#### **Limitations of QCA in general**

QCA is not suitable for use in all evaluative situations and has been subject to critique. One of the most common critiques levied at QCA is that it involves synthesising rich qualitative information into scores, which removes some of the detail and nuance from the qualitative data, and some do not consider it a strictly qualitative method. However, synthesis always involves a form of simplification and – compared to other evaluations using qualitative methods – QCA makes the simplification steps explicit and repeatable / reliable. QCA findings can be challenging to interpret, including for the reasons mentioned above; they merely provide a broad-brush description of a typology or group of cases. This challenge is mitigated by going back to the original qualitative data to interpret the solutions produced by the analysis, thereby re-grounding the QCA findings in the original evidence.

QCA is not appropriate for single case studies; or when the number of cases is very small (less than 4 or 5); or when it is larger but the cases are very diverse and difficult to compare on the factors that potentially explain the outcome of interest. Feasibility starts becoming compromised also when the number of outcomes is very large due to the high number of models that need to be tested. It has been argued that the Boolean minimisation can produce illusory consistencies (or consistencies due to chance) when the number of conditions is too high compared to the number of cases analysed. Significance tables developed by Marx & Dusa (2011) have been taken into account in this study.

Further, QCA is still developing as a methodology for use in the context of evaluations. This means that it is important that QCA analysis is done carefully, and that the analysis process is documented clearly and in detail. Please refer to Annexes 2 to 8 in this regard.

#### **Limitations of this analysis in particular**

The QCA was carried out within a tight (4 months) timeframe. This largely limited the analysis to existing sources of information. Even though some ad hoc primary data collection was conducted, additional primary data collection may have added more depth.

UNICEF does not have a theory of change for CP systems strengthening. Therefore the QCA team constructed its own framework/model (figure 1). This was discussed with stakeholders in a webinar in October 2018 but is not an official agreed UNICEF model.

The QCA captures a snapshot in time and does not take into consideration how long a country has supported child protection systems strengthening.

The conditions (UNICEF investments) were constructed based on actual UNICEF budget codes under the child protection systems strengthening category. In the previous strategic plan, there was a 'General' category and as this was poorly defined in the PIDB codes, it is quite likely that a lot of CP systems costs could have been covered there. Questions under each of the main conditions were formulated on the basis of expenditure and activity codes. While this generated a reasonably robust data collection tool, the actual coding of expenditure data is not accurate or reliable enough to run calculations on how much UNICEF is spending in each country on the different conditions.

The outcome data were based on available SMQs, World Governance Indicators and additional questions. They included some highly relevant questions, while others were only proxies for systems strengthening outcomes. While there were clear gaps in the data, all conditions used in the end were robust enough for the QCA: Several sensitivity tests were conducted, especially with uncertain values, and if a condition was not deemed robust, it was recalibrated or removed. In addition, the average outcome score for each country was vetted by stakeholders.

The operationalization of the outcome on “Governance” used in the first iteration was found to be lacking in robustness. It was replaced by a different set of data points for the second QCA iteration (i.e. “Context Actors”, previously considered a condition).

The first iteration did not include context indicators. These were added to the second round of analysis. QCA is an iterative method and is able to incorporate new evidence as it emerges, as well as test new models as new conditions are discovered to be relevant.

#### 4. Child protection systems strengthening outcomes: findings from the QCA coding and calibration process

During the coding and calibration process, the following findings emerged regarding the 24 case study countries and how they perform on the six CP systems strengthening “outcomes”:

11 out of 24 countries were identified as having had some success at strengthening child protection systems. They can be seen in table 4, below.<sup>13</sup> Four countries (Armenia, Moldova, Romania and South Africa) have a “perfect score” of larger than 0.51 across all outcomes. Another seven countries (El Salvador, Fiji, Mongolia, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Zimbabwe) also received an overall binary score of 1 (or an average score of more than 0.51). Out of this list of eleven countries, Zimbabwe is the only low-income country.<sup>14</sup>

**Table 4: Child protection systems strengthening outcomes for the 24 case study countries**

Countries	Regulatory framework	Governance	Services	Minimum standards	Resources	Participation	Overall score	Binary score
1.Afghanistan	0.13	0.33	0.02	0.33	0.00	0.38	<b>0.20</b>	0
2.Armenia	0.78	0.67	0.70	0.67	0.67	0.69	<b>0.70</b>	1
3.Cote d'Ivoire	0.52	0.00	0.20	0.33	0.00	0.57	<b>0.27</b>	0
4.DRC	0.26	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.43	<b>0.17</b>	0
5.El Salvador	0.82	0.00	0.79	0.33	0.33	0.74	<b>0.51</b>	unclear

<sup>13</sup> To meet the requirements for crisp-set QCA, countries’ scores needed to be rounded up or down to binary ratings, with countries receiving a 1 if the systems elements were found to be closer to ‘present’ or ‘achieved’ and a 0 if closer to ‘absent’ or ‘not achieved’. For the second iteration of this QCA project, seven countries with overall scores between 0.40 and 0.54 were considered “too close to call” because of closeness to the mid-point.

<sup>14</sup> Zimbabwe is a special case, since it received \$30 million for child protection systems strengthening between 2013 and 2017, plus an additional \$50 million for social protection.

6.Ethiopia	0.72	0.33	0.02	0.33	0.33	0.66	<b>0.40</b>	unclear
7.Fiji	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.67	0.67	0.57	<b>0.57</b>	1
8.Guatemala	0.52	0.00	0.55	0.33	0.33	0.74	<b>0.41</b>	unclear
9.Lebanon	0.49	0.00	0.77	0.33	0.33	0.44	<b>0.39</b>	0
10.Moldova	0.76	1.00	0.75	0.67	1.00	0.87	<b>0.84</b>	1
11.Mongolia	0.81	0.33	0.70	0.67	0.33	0.74	<b>0.60</b>	1
12.Morocco	0.66	0.33	0.50	0.00	0.33	0.57	<b>0.40</b>	unclear
13.Myanmar	0.51	0.33	0.14	0.00	0.33	0.26	<b>0.26</b>	0
14.Nigeria	0.42	0.33	0.16	0.67	0.00	0.82	<b>0.40</b>	unclear
15.Pakistan	0.35	0.00	0.77	0.00	0.67	0.31	<b>0.35</b>	0
16.Peru	0.87	0.00	0.68	0.33	0.33	0.44	<b>0.44</b>	unclear
17.Romania	0.84	1.00	0.82	1.00	0.67	0.78	<b>0.85</b>	1
18.South Africa	0.88	0.67	0.61	1.00	1.00	0.78	<b>0.82</b>	1
19.Sri Lanka	0.44	0.33	0.75	0.67	0.33	0.74	<b>0.54</b>	unclear
20.Sudan	0.49	0.00	0.11	0.33	0.33	0.57	<b>0.31</b>	0
21.Thailand	0.83	0.00	0.80	1.00	0.33	0.69	<b>0.61</b>	1
22.Uganda	0.60	0.00	0.27	0.33	0.33	0.78	<b>0.39</b>	0
23.Uzbekistan	0.45	0.00	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.34	<b>0.27</b>	0
24.Zimbabwe	0.48	0.67	0.46	0.67	0.67	0.87	<b>0.64</b>	1

The majority of countries (13 out of 24) have not shown significant success in strengthening child protection systems – based on the SMQ indicators and other qualitative outcome statements based on the COAR/RAM reports and the 24 evaluation case studies. Several of these are conflict-affected countries (DRC, Afghanistan, Sudan, Lebanon, etc.) and others are low-income countries. At the bottom of the list is DRC which scores only zeros across all outcomes. Other countries with low scores related to the child protection systems outcomes are the other conflict-affected countries of Afghanistan and Sudan, but also Uzbekistan. Cote d’Ivoire, Lebanon, Pakistan and Uganda also scored low against the child protection systems outcomes. The low scores of these country cases can – to some extent – be explained by external factors such as economic performance or governance indicators. What is harder to explain are the countries in the middle, with scores between 0.40 and 0.54. Just a slight change in one of the outcomes could lift a country above the 0.51 cut-off, or push a country below the threshold. For the countries just below the middle (Ethiopia, Guatemala, Nigeria,

Peru), the overall score of 0 makes these countries' performance related to child protection systems look more negative than the actual situation. It is not immediately obvious why Guatemala and Peru should be scoring an overall 0, while El Salvador achieved a score of 1. However, to make the QCA computation possible, each country needs to be assigned a binary score. The limitations of the binary scoring were addressed to some extent in interpretation of the second iteration of the QCA by showing a continuum between high and low performing countries. Most importantly, this issue was solved at the root at the end of the second iteration, when all analyses were repeated on the subset of 17 cases with more reliable outcome values.

#### 4.1. Towards a country typology?

This part of the QCA process highlighted the need to look more closely at different clusters of countries, rather than to lump them all together. The distinction between clear success, clear lack of success and unclear middle is a start of a reflection on where different countries are on a continuum between no child protection system and an advanced child protection system that has achieved national coverage. The QCA shows patterns and pathways and raises issues and questions for further reflections and inquiry. This requires going back to the qualitative information about the countries.

A closer look at the **high performing countries** shows that they are mostly middle-income countries with some forms of child protection systems that existed before UNICEF formally adapted a <sup>15</sup>protection systems strengthening approach to child protection: South Africa, Romania, Armenia, Mongolia, Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is the only low-income country in this group. In these countries, UNICEF's investments are often more narrowly focused on systems reform and on strengthening specific components of the child protection systems. At the other end of the spectrum are **conflict-affected countries and low-income countries with very limited child protective services**. In the absence of a functioning national child protection system, people rely mostly on community-based and kinship-based care and protection, or on child protection in emergencies services funded by international donors and implemented mostly by NGOs (Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan. In countries with little or no investments and achievements in child protection systems, UNICEF provides mostly life-saving child protection in emergencies services that are delivered through local NGOs.

**Table 5: Country classification based on overall outcome scores**

Clear success	Unclear middle	Clear lack of success
Armenia, Fiji, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand, Zimbabwe	El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Sri Lanka	Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, Uzbekistan

**Countries in the middle** offer a mixed picture that reflects a wide range of contexts, competing priorities, challenges and capabilities. It is not easy to find clear common patterns and pathways towards systems strengthening for the middle countries, although it is possible to identify some smaller clusters (e.g. large federal states; Latin American countries; etc.). In the "middle countries", UNICEF supports a wide range of child protection work, some related to systems strengthening, other work addressing more specific child protection issues, such as ending violence against children, child

<sup>15</sup> A system was in place in ex-Soviet realm countries, but the outcomes for the system were not positive. The monolithic use of institutional care was a clear example of a high performing harmful child protection system. Reforming those systems was the work of the last 15 years.

marriage or child labour. Each of these areas comes with its own theory of change and partnerships. Sometimes child protection priorities overlap, but they may also compete for donor funding and staff time.<sup>16</sup> In some countries, child protection issues have been used as entry points for child protection systems strengthening. Examples include violence against children in Tanzania, de-institutionalisation and justice reform in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, or services for migrant children in some European countries.

#### **4.2. Interpretation of the emerging three-tiered typology**

The high-performing countries fall squarely into two groups: countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia that were part of the former Soviet bloc: Romania, Armenia, Moldova, Mongolia (only Uzbekistan doesn't do well in this group); and two countries in southern Africa, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Both groups of countries had some forms of child protection systems before UNICEF began its systems strengthening work. These countries started their systems strengthening work at an advanced level compared with countries that had invested very limited state capacities in formal child protection systems. Even in countries that experienced a decline in the child protection and welfare systems, such as Mongolia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe as a result of economic mismanagement, a certain basis and knowledge of a professional child protection system remained. This is not the case in countries that never had a formal child protection system and where ministries in charge of child protection are not staffed by people with a professional background in child protection. Romania and Armenia had pre-existing financing of social welfare programmes that could be reformed and shaped. There was no need to make the case for investment.

UNICEF's efforts to strengthen child protection systems in Eastern Europe and in Southern Africa had a number of common distinctive features: strong strategic leadership for child protection systems strengthening, without getting side-tracked by many other child protection issues; an alignment of key child protection systems actors (government departments, donors, and implementing agencies) around a common strategy; and strong links between child protection and social protection, which addressed the poverty-related causes of child protection. In Eastern Europe, UNICEF focused on deinstitutionalisation and mobilised major funding and political support from the European Union. In Southern Africa, UNICEF formed strong partnerships with PEPFAR, USAID and other donors to address the situation of children affected by HIV/AIDS through an integrated approach to child and social protection. Zimbabwe offers an instructive example of a low-income country, where concerted efforts led to the investment of \$30 million for child protection and an additional \$50 million for social protection between 2014 and 2017.<sup>17</sup> In both Eastern Europe and in Southern Africa, the UNICEF regional offices provided strong strategic leadership and brokered major partnerships and funding support.

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<sup>16</sup> It may not be recorded as such in the financial and reporting system, but, more often than not, issue-based work, at least in part, contributes to system strengthening. And the systems strengthening work is often done consciously, even if it is recorded in the system in a different way, e.g., for convenience for generating donor reports, etc.

<sup>17</sup> Until 2000, Zimbabwe had one of the most well-developed social and child protection systems in Africa, which ensured adequate child and family welfare interventions by the State. However, socio-economic challenges and political instability in the post-2000 era had a negative impact on these systems. But between 1990 and 2010, unremitting economic challenges and the AIDS pandemic reversed most of the earlier gains. The health and education systems struggled to cope with underfunding and the loss of skilled personnel, critical water and sanitation infrastructure fell into disrepair, and social and child protection systems became dysfunctional. When most African countries were registering progress in maternal and child mortality, in Zimbabwe, these were rising.

The same did not happen in West Africa. Cote d'Ivoire has the highest HIV rates in West Africa and a strong USAID and PEPFAR presence. But not the same level of collaboration on Orphans and Vulnerable Children as in East and Southern Africa, no regional partnerships, also no strong social protection programmes or links between social protection and child protection. In addition, there is a divide between Francophone and Anglophone organisations and staff and a lack of the personal connections that were so apparent in East and Southern Africa. Overall the links between agencies, initiatives, sectors, individuals, that are so important for any functioning system, are much weaker than in East and Southern Africa.

The three middle-income countries in Latin America also reflect particular contexts and histories, but have not been able to deliver significant child protection systems results (yet). Like other Latin American countries, Peru, Guatemala and El Salvador promote children's rights more broadly, rather than supporting a more focused child protection systems approach. As a result, the linkages between departments, service providers and different levels are not strong and child protection service delivery is not as effective or efficient as it could be (Morlachetti).<sup>18</sup> This is beginning to change, with major overhauls of legislative frameworks and the realignment of responsibilities for child protection across ministries and departments. UNICEF has been able to play a significant role in this process through advocacy at the central government level, as well as through technical support at municipal and district levels. Thailand is another middle-income country where UNICEF is providing support in restructuring responsibilities to lay the foundations for an effective and efficient child protection system. In all of these cases, entrenched power structures and vested interests often resist change and slow the progress towards strong child protection systems. These examples also show that child protection systems strengthening is not a linear process, but one that is full of challenges as complex systems are adjusting to new realities and opportunities.<sup>19</sup> Newer systems, such as the CP system, are engaging with more evolved systems such as health, education, and justice, on a regular basis, which add to the complexities.

### 4.3. Expenditure analysis for CP systems strengthening

It is interesting to contrast the scores with UNICEF spending in the 24 countries.<sup>20</sup> Figure 4 shows the large differences in UNICEF child protection system spending across the 24 countries, with Zimbabwe at the top and many low-income and also upper-middle income countries spending much less on child protection systems. The percentage of UNICEF CP funds spent on CP systems shows that (not surprisingly) low income, fragile and conflict-affected countries often spend a very small proportion of their CP budgets on child protection systems. On the other hand, many middle-income countries receive very limited child protection funds overall due to the loss of ODA and the presumed increased fiscal space in middle-income countries to finance public services. However, many middle-income countries spend all or large parts of their UNICEF CP budgets on child protection systems. While the *overall* spending towards child protection systems strengthening appears to be broadly in line with the qualitative information available for each country, the coding of expenditures for specific "conditions" or investments in child protection systems (e.g. capacity building, service provision, quality control, etc.) are not always reliable. A spot-check comparison of the expenditure coding of

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<sup>18</sup> Alejandro Morlachetti, *Comprehensive National Child Protection Systems, Legal Basis and Current Practice in Latin America* (CEPAL, 2013),

<sup>19</sup> For a recent discussion of systems change, see United Nations Children's Fund, *Review of Child Protection Systems in Four Countries in South Asia*, UNICEF, Kathmandu, 2018.

<sup>20</sup> Expenditure figures for CP systems strengthening should be seen as approximate at best given limitations in conceptual clarity of the codes and in application/coding by UNICEF offices. Ethiopia CO for instance did not code any expenditures as pertaining to CP systems strengthening.

South Africa and Romania showed that country offices use widely differing interpretations when coding the specific purpose of expenditures. In summary, the expenditure data is a reliable indicator for overall spending on child protection systems, but it is not robust enough for more disaggregated analysis by conditions.

**Figure 3: Proportion of CP funding spent on Child protection systems in 24 countries**




Figure 3 shows that expenditures for child protection systems make up only a small proportion of overall child protection spending in the 24 countries. CPS spending has remained flat between 2015 and 2017, while spending on violence against children has expanded rapidly.<sup>21</sup> Figure 4 shows the two spending patterns more clearly.

<sup>21</sup> Note that in the 2018-2021 strategic plan period the argument is made that violence against children (VAC) is the preferred “vehicle” for systems strengthening. Therefore, a certain amount of systems strengthening expenditures may be hidden under the VAC label.

Figure 4: Expenditures for child protection systems vs. violence against children in 24 countries




Figure 5: UNICEF Expenditures for CP systems as a percentage of overall CP spending





Figure 5 shows the large differences in expenditures coded as child protection systems strengthening spending by country. Countries at the lower end, with no or minimal child protection systems outcomes, spend little on child protection systems both in absolute and in relative terms. At the high end of the spectrum, middle-income countries spend moderate amounts, but a high percentage of their overall child protection budget on CPS.

The scatter plot below (figure 6) shows a weak relationship between overall UNICEF spending on CP systems and systems outcomes.<sup>22</sup> Most of the successful countries spend small or moderate amounts on child protection systems strengthening, while some countries with limited success are spending considerable funds on CPS. Zimbabwe is an exception, being the country that has the highest spending on CPS. It is an example of a low-income country that has been able to achieve considerable success in CPS, but this has come with a steep price tag and large amounts of funding provided by international donor agencies. Could Zimbabwe be a model for other low-income countries, provided funding is not an issue?

**Figure 6: Child protection systems outcomes and UNICEF spending**



<sup>22</sup> The spending figures exclude staff costs, but include technical assistance provided by consultants.

If size of funding per se is not the deciding factor, the QCA is asking: which types of UNICEF investments make more of a difference in terms of CP systems strengthening outcomes than others? What are trajectories or pathways towards successful CP systems strengthening within this set of 24 countries?

## **5. UNICEF core investments to strengthen child protection systems: findings from the qualitative comparative analysis**

### **5.1. First iteration**

The intermediate outcomes were tested one by one but most of the findings cannot be reported here for reasons of space: this report will only cover the analysis of the overall outcome with one exception (the supersubset analysis of single conditions, identified here as “analysis by entry point”).

The supersubset analysis was conducted on 11 single conditions (the different types of UNICEF investments plus context actors, initially considered a factor) and six outcomes. The results can be seen in section 5.1.1 and in Annex 7.

Subsequently, each of the specific outcomes was tested against the same 11 conditions with the two-stage Boolean minimisation outlined in the methodology section (3.3). Finally, an overall outcome (obtained as explained in section 3.2) was tested against the same conditions using the same procedure.

#### **5.1.1. Analysis by entry point**

The first iteration of the QCA yielded some indications on which types of UNICEF investments are more often associated with positive systems strengthening outcomes than others.

**Figure 7: Odds ratios of success in CP systems strengthening with and without ten types of UNICEF investments (1=no difference; >1=better outcome; <1=worse outcome)<sup>23</sup>**



Figure 7 tells us that some investments seem to perform better than others. In particular, investments in **capacity building** (including workforce strengthening) seem to make the biggest difference, on average (it is an average of averages, across countries and across specific outcomes). They increase the potential of success five times compared to situations where UNICEF does not invest in capacity building. Investments in **minimum standards and quality control mechanisms** also seem to be effective, raising the chances of success almost 4 times; next in line are investments in **evidence and research**. Some investments seem to actually reduce the chances of success, in particular financial support for services and infrastructure which is associated with countries that, on average, perform three times worse than countries where UNICEF is not making this kind of investment. To turn the argument around, in countries where UNICEF continues to provide direct financial support for child protection services and infrastructure – rather than supporting more systemic investments – child protection systems are not strengthened.

### 5.1.2 Analysis by pathway

Further analysis<sup>24</sup> generated a 4-condition model that has perfect consistency and coverage. **Capacity building, financial support, minimum standards, and community protection** are able to synthesise the overall dataset of 24 cases by isolating a handful of pathways consistently leading to a positive overall outcome, and a few other pathways consistently leading to a negative outcome. The following table provides a synthesis of the most important positive and negative pathways.

<sup>23</sup> The “presence divided by absence” table presents the ratio of the *chance of success with the condition*, divided by *chance of success without the condition*. If these two values are the same, the condition does not influence chances of success, and the ratio is one. If the ratio is higher than one, the presence of the condition increases the chance of success (chance with presence is higher than chance with absence); if the ratio is lower than one, the condition decreases the chance of success (chance with presence is lower than chance with absence). If the ratio is 4, the condition increases the chance of success for that outcome by a factor of four, etc.

<sup>24</sup> The overall outcome was tested against 11 conditions, including 10 Context Actors which in this iteration was considered a causal factor.

**Table 6: Pathways to child protection systems outcomes**

Countries	Capacity building	Quality control	Community protection	Financial support	# of cases
<b>Positive pathways to child protection systems:</b>					
Mongolia, Armenia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand	+	+		-	5
Mongolia, Fiji, Moldova	+		+	-	3
Mongolia, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe	+	+	+		4
Morocco	-	-	-	-	1
<b>Negative pathways to child protection systems:</b>					
Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda	-	-	+	+	4
Afghanistan	-	-		+	1
Pakistan	-	-	+		1
Guatemala, Lebanon, Myanmar		-	+	+	3
Ethiopia	-		+	+	1

The following table only presents the positive pathways by country clusters. It excludes those countries that had pathways that did not result in strong child protection systems.

**Table 7: Pathways to child protection systems outcomes**

Countries	Armenia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand	Mongolia	Fiji, Moldova	El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe	Morocco
Capacity building	+	+	+	+	-
Quality control	+	+		+	-
Community protection		+	+	+	-
Financial support	-	-	-		-

The analysis identifies five different scenarios for strengthening child protection systems. The pathways are as parsimonious as possible and these parsimonious solutions reduce the causal recipes to the smallest number of conditions possible.<sup>25</sup> The following interpretations of the pathways have to be tested further.

All of the countries, with the exception of Zimbabwe, that show some significant results in child protection systems strengthening are middle-income countries. Investments in **capacity building, minimum standards and quality control, and in community-based child protection mechanisms** are associated with positive child protection systems results. Capacity building is an almost necessary condition: without this type of investment, success in CP systems strengthening seems very unlikely. The **absence of provision of direct financial support for child protection services and infrastructure** in most of the countries is also correlated with strengthened child protection systems. Of course, the obvious explanation is that in many middle-income countries UNICEF's direct financial support is no longer needed and the agency's focus has moved to more upstream forms of support. Zimbabwe is an outlier as the only low-income country in this group, a country where UNICEF and other agencies and donors provide a great deal of support to a wide range of initiatives to strengthen child protection systems. Morocco is another outlier. Much of UNICEF's work there is upstream child rights work, without specific child protection interventions, possibly reflecting both the capacities of Moroccan child protection systems actors and the limited human and financial resources of UNICEF in Morocco.

<sup>25</sup> Nicolas Legewie (2013) An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). FORUM: QUALITATIVE SOCIAL RESEARCH SOZIALFORSCHUNG Volume 14, No. 3, Art. 15 September 2013

These are examples where QCA identifies issues that then need interpretation drawing on the qualitative data from the 24 case studies

Detailed comments on the five pathways: Among the successful countries, Morocco is an outlier that does not require any investments for a successful CPS outcome. The following comments exclude Morocco in order to highlight common patterns across the remaining countries. All other countries require capacity building for success. The most advanced countries, Armenia, Romania, South Africa and Thailand, where UNICEF works mostly at the upstream level and invests in quality control mechanism, rather than in downstream and community-based child protection or service delivery. All other remaining countries, Mongolia, Fiji, Moldova, El Salvador, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe, require support for investments at national (macro), district (meso) and community-based child protection (micro) for a successful CPS outcome. In Fiji and Moldova, it does not matter whether UNICEF invests in quality control mechanisms or not, the outcome is positive regardless. Most countries are successful if they do not provide direct financial support for child protection services and infrastructure. In El Salvador, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe it does not matter whether UNICEF provides this kind of support or not. The outcome is still positive.

## 5.2. Second QCA iteration

In QCA, the purpose of further iterations is to find clearer models, or models that identify clearer and better sets of pathways (according to the triangular logic of simplicity, consistency and coverage). For the second iteration of the QCA, three new conditions were added to the existing ten conditions to create a 10+3-condition model: a context condition was added, based on an average of governance (World Governance Indicators), human development (HDI rank), and wealth (GNI per capita) (see annex 9); case management was taken out of the broader coordination condition as a specific intervention to see whether this investment has any bearings on the outcomes; workforce strengthening was taken out of capacity building as the most systemic approach to capacity development to gauge whether this affects the results. For the full dataset, please see annex 11.

Four analytical stages followed:

Stage 1: Supersubset analysis of the 11 single conditions against the set of outcomes. This is called “analysis by entry point” in this report (see below).

Stage 2: Boolean minimisation with all 24 countries: For this analysis, the three new conditions (workforce, case management and context) were added to the previous 10 conditions.

Stage 3: This was followed by an analysis of three subsets of countries: clear success, clear lack of success and unclear countries in the middle, as per below:

- **Eight countries which have formal child protection systems, according to the outcome coding** (countries assigned a “1” on the left-hand column of table 4): Armenia, Fiji, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand and Zimbabwe.
- **Nine countries with a clear negative outcome:** Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda and Uzbekistan.

- **Seven countries presenting uncertain outcomes:** El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru and Sri Lanka.

Stage 4: Finally, an analysis was done of a new dataset of 17 cases of clear success/no success countries. Countries with unclear outcomes were excluded from this analysis. (This is the equivalent of a fuzzy set analysis where the outcome is considered fuzzy and the conditions crisp).

The second QCA iteration thus honed in on the countries that most clearly do/do not have functioning child protection systems. This also addressed any data quality issues that may have existed. Following this logic, the results from the analysis of the clearer 17 cases should be considered more credible than the results for the whole set of 24 cases.

### 5.2.1. Analysis by entry point

Table 8 tells us that some conditions, when looked at in isolation, are more important than others for positive child protection systems outcomes. It is an update of the analysis carried out in the first iteration with the addition of the new conditions and outcomes described on the previous page. The overall **country context** in terms of governance, human development and per capita income has major implications for the chance of success of child protection systems strengthening efforts – greater predictive power, not surprisingly, than specific UNICEF investments in child protection systems. For comments on specific conditions, please see figure 6 above.

The following table presents the odds ratios of success in child protection systems strengthening with and without the twelve types of UNICEF investments plus the favourable/unfavourable context condition. A score of one means that there is no difference in CP systems outcomes, greater than one indicates a better outcome, while a score of less than one shows a worse outcome in terms of child protection systems.

In Table 8, the 13 (12 plus 1) conditions are arranged in order of their highest overall score, with context scoring highest and financing services lowest. The conditions reflect UNICEF investments, while the outcomes (columns) reflect all investments in child protection systems, not only those made by UNICEF.

**Table 8: Odds ratios of success in child protection system strengthening (all 24 cases)**

Conditions (UNICEF investments)	Context actors <sup>26</sup>	Regulatory framework	Governance structures	Services	Quality control	Resources	Participation	All outcomes
Context (WGI, HDI, GNI)	1.55	2.33	3.38	<b>11.00</b>	3.38	2.12	1.55	<b>8.46</b>
Capacity building	1.63	1.38	0.00	<b>6.50</b>	0.00	3.00	1.20	<b>5.00</b>
Quality control	1.58	1.23	<b>5.60</b>	1.87	3.27	1.87	1.58	<b>3.73</b>
Evidence and research	1.71	1.07	0.00	2.62	0.00	<b>4.29</b>	1.31	<b>3.21</b>
Case management	1.71	1.43	0.00	1.79	<b>6.43</b>	4.29	1.71	<b>3.21</b>
Coordination	1.43	2.00	0.00	1.80	2.33	<b>6.00</b>	1.43	<b>2.67</b>
Workforce strengthening	1.64	1.09	<b>12.00</b>	1.20	4.50	4.00	1.64	<b>2.50</b>
Leveraging public resources	1.78	1.33	0.00	1.50	4.67	<b>5.00</b>	1.40	<b>2.40</b>
Policy advocacy	1.21	1.69	3.38	1.52	3.38	2.12	2.03	<b>2.26</b>
Community-based protection	0.68	0.90	0.40	0.60	0.60	0.80	1.10	0.72
Children's participation	0.63	1.05	0.39	0.66	0.61	0.35	1.23	0.70
Service delivery	0.61	1.33	0.50	0.83	0.50	0.25	0.80	0.58
Financing services	0.46	0.74	0.21	0.47	0.21	0.14	0.75	0.32

The following table presents the same dataset (presence divided by absence) as table 8, but only for the 17 clear cases (clear success and clear lack of success), excluding the seven unclear countries in the middle.

**Table 9: Odds ratios of success in CP systems strengthening (17 clear cases)**

Conditions	Context actors	Regulatory framework	Governance structures	Services	Quality control	Resources	Participation	All outcomes
Evidence and research	3.15	1.63	0.00	5.60	0.00	4.20	1.87	<b>Infinite</b>
Capacity building	2.45	2.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.27	1.45	<b>Infinite</b>
Context (WGI, HDI, GNI)	1.97	2.63	4.50	9.00	7.88	2.81	1.97	<b>7.88</b>
Policy advocacy	1.56	2.07	3.56	3.11	6.22	2.22	2.37	<b>6.22</b>
Coordination	2.37	2.07	0.00	3.11	6.22	5.33	1.56	<b>6.22</b>
Case management	2.37	2.07	0.00	3.11	6.22	5.33	1.56	<b>6.22</b>
Leveraging public resources	2.20	1.83	0.00	2.29	5.50	4.58	2.20	<b>5.50</b>
Quality control	1.71	1.43	5.71	2.86	4.29	1.90	1.71	<b>4.29</b>
Workforce strengthening	2.00	1.60	9.60	1.92	4.00	3.20	2.00	<b>4.00</b>
Community-based protection	0.65	0.82	0.36	0.44	0.55	0.73	0.95	0.55
Service delivery	0.54	1.23	0.46	0.62	0.51	0.23	0.82	0.51
Children's participation	0.54	1.23	0.46	0.62	0.51	0.41	0.82	0.51
Financing services	0.33	0.59	0.22	0.25	0.13	0.15	0.51	0.13

The 24-country analysis shows a different order and different magnitudes of high-scoring conditions than the 17-country analysis, because the 24-country analysis includes middle-ranking countries with some CPS success, while the 17-country analysis has a narrower focus on the most successful and the least successful countries, as noted above. When comparing only the 17 most successful and most unsuccessful countries, the UNICEF investments appear more effective than the scores for all 24 countries.

<sup>26</sup> For the first QCA iteration, "context actors" was considered a condition (an explanatory factor). For the second QCA iteration, "context actors" was added to the list of outcomes with the assumption, that "context actors" would represent "governance structures", because the questions and indicators for both outcomes overlapped. However, as the second iteration showed, these two outcomes have quite different values, so they are not actually describing the same thing.

**Table 10: Conditions necessary and sufficient for success (necessary conditions in bold font)**

Cases	Necessity – necessary conditions	Sufficiency – sufficient conditions
All cases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Favourable context (91%)</li> <li>• Case management (82%)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No single condition is sufficient by itself</li> <li>• Workforce strengthening (83%)</li> <li>• Quality control (80%)</li> </ul>
Subgroup of “safest” cases (those with the lower uncertainty on the outcome value)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Evidence and research</b></li> <li>• <b>Capacity building</b></li> <li>• Policy advocacy</li> <li>• Coordination and partnerships</li> <li>• Favourable context indicators</li> <li>• Lack of financing services</li> <li>• Case management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Leveraging financial resources sufficient as a single condition</b></li> <li>• <b>Workforce Strengthening sufficient as single condition</b></li> <li>• Evidence and research (80%)</li> <li>• Quality control (85%)</li> <li>• Favourable context indicators (88%)</li> <li>• Lack of financing services (88%)</li> </ul>

The same type of analysis (called the supersubset analysis) produced table 10. It shows the UNICEF investments necessary or sufficient for successful systems strengthening and highlights the role of the country context. In the analysis involving 24 countries, favourable context indicators (governance, human development, income) are present in 91% of successful cases and are therefore “almost necessary”, or almost always required (with one exception: Zimbabwe). Similarly, case management is present in 82% of successful countries. No single condition is sufficient by itself, meaning it can single-handedly bring about success in systems strengthening. However, the chances of success are particularly high (but not sufficient) when UNICEF engages in workforce strengthening (83% success), or invests in minimum standards and quality control (80% success).

When looking at the 17 countries that were clearly successful/not successful (i.e. deleting countries that clustered in the middle), the QCA identified **evidence and capacity building as two necessary conditions for success**. Notice how these were not strictly necessary for the broader analysis on 24 cases, where the definition of success was looser. But if we want to be more confident of reaching success then we need these factors.

Five more conditions are present in 88% of successful countries: presence of policy advocacy, presence of coordination and partnerships, presence of favourable context indicators, case management, and absence of financing services and infrastructure. Compared to the same analysis on 24 cases, in addition to context and case management, we have 5 new conditions that are either strictly or mostly necessary to achieve more certainty of success.

**Leveraging public financial resources appears to be sufficient** for success as a single condition for those 17 countries, so whenever UNICEF engages in this kind of work, a successful outcome is observed. The same happens for **workforce strengthening**.

Notice that we didn’t have any sufficient condition on the analysis over 24 cases: the effectiveness of leveraging resources was obfuscated by two cases (Nigeria and Peru) identified as not successful that have been removed (because of lower confidence on their outcome value). And the effectiveness of workforce strengthening was reduced by Nigeria, which presents the condition and is also coded as unsuccessful. Other single conditions that appear to be strong triggers of success for this subgroup and the effectiveness of which has benefited from the removal of uncertain cases include evidence and research (80% success); absence of financing services (88% success); presence of investments in quality control mechanisms (86% success); and favourable context indicators (88% success).

## 5.2.2. Analysis by pathway

The following section is a very condensed summary of a large number of calculations and pathways.

**11 condition model:** The outcome (CP systems strengthening) was retested against the new 11-condition model, which included the original ten conditions plus context indicators. The simplest model found was a 5-condition-model including: context indicators, quality control, leveraging financial resources, policy advocacy, and financing services.<sup>27</sup> We find that the addition of the context variable makes the result harder to interpret in terms of what UNICEF's contribution has been (compare to table 6). Clearly, context plays a very important role overall.

**Table 11: Pathways to child protection systems outcomes (second iteration, all 24 cases)**

Countries	Context indicators (WGI, HDI, GNI)	Quality control	Leveraging public resources	Policy advocacy	Financing services	# of cases
<b>Positive pathways to child protection systems</b>						
Thailand, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Fiji, Moldova	+			+	-	6
Armenia, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa	+	+	+		-	4
Sri Lanka, El Salvador	+	+	-		+	2
Morocco, Moldova	+	-	-		-	2
Zimbabwe	-	+	+	+	+	1
<b>Negative pathways to child protection systems</b>						
Uzbekistan, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Myanmar, Sudan, Uganda	-		-		+	8
Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Myanmar, Sudan, Pakistan	-	-	-	-		6
Guatemala, Lebanon, Uganda		-	-	+	+	3
Nigeria	-	-	+	+	-	1
Peru	+	-	+	-	-	1

**Subset analysis for countries with clear success in CP systems strengthening, clear lack of success and unclear countries in the middle:** The analysis of three subsets of countries helps understand the issue of context. In the successful countries, context is favourable and UNICEF invests in policy advocacy, evidence and research, capacity building and coordination and does not finance service delivery. In the unsuccessful countries, context is not favourable and UNICEF does not invest in leveraging public financial resources for child protection systems. While the model for the 17 successful and unsuccessful countries is clear, the Boolean minimisation did not generate a common model for the countries in the middle. This reflects the fact that the middle group pools countries with highly different contexts that do not display common patterns and resist efforts to identify a coherent explanation for this group.

<sup>27</sup> As in the first iteration, no condition was found to be necessary, but context indicators joined evidence and capacity building in a group of "almost" necessary conditions for success: 91% of successful cases present a positive value of context indicators, 91% of successful cases present UNICEF investments in capacity building and 82% in evidence and research.

**Table 12: Subset analysis for countries with a clear positive/negative outcome**

Conditions	Clear success	Unclear middle	Clear lack of success
<b>Countries</b>	Armenia, Fiji, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand, Zimbabwe	El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Sri Lanka	Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, Uzbekistan
Favourable context indicators	+		-
Policy advocacy	+		
Evidence and research	+		
Capacity building	+		
Coordination	+		
Financing services	-		+
Service delivery			+
Leveraging resources			-

**Analysis of the most certain cases (clear success in CP systems strengthening, clear lack of success in CP systems strengthening):** The dataset of cases presenting the outcome clearly, with little uncertainty, included 17 countries, i.e. eight with positive and nine with negative outcomes. The uncertain cases were not included in this analysis. This analysis yielded seven extremely simple models of three conditions each. For a summary of the seven models, see the following table.

**Table 13: Seven models of the clearer cases (n=17)**

Conditions	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F	Model G
Context indicators (WGI, HDI, GNI)			+	-			+
Capacity building						+	-
Evidence and research	+	-	+	-		+	-
Leveraging public resources			+	-	+	-	+
Policy advocacy	+	-	+	-	+	-	
Financing services	-	+			-	+	+

The seven models were then synthesised to a model that includes the conditions that recur across the seven models, one including the context variable (not shown) and one excluding it (table 14). The table presents the analysis by pathway, rather than by country. One country can therefore appear in more than one pathway. For a better visualisation, please refer to the Venn diagrams in the annex.

**Table 14: Pathways to child protection systems outcomes when only UNICEF contributions are considered, not including context factors (second iteration, clearer 17 cases)**

Countries	Policy advocacy	Evidence and research	Financing services	Leveraging resources	# of cases
<b>Positive pathways to child protection systems</b>					
Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Fiji, Thailand	+	+	-		6
Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Armenia		+	-	+	5
Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Zimbabwe	+	+		+	5
<b>Negative pathways to child protection systems</b>					
Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Myanmar, Uzbekistan	-		+	-	6
Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Pakistan	-	-		-	5
Lebanon, Uganda	+	-	+	-	2

The second iteration showed the important role that country context plays in creating favourable or unfavourable conditions for child protection systems strengthening. This is coming out clearly in the new 11-condition model and in the 10+3 model. **Country context has significant implications for the success or failure of efforts to strengthen child protection systems. However, when a combination of UNICEF initiatives is present, cases can be successful even in unfavourable contexts** (e.g. Zimbabwe). In addition, context is not enough: there are three unsuccessful countries with favourable context, one of which is Lebanon with few UNICEF investments in evidence and research, workforce strengthening, leveraging resources, and initiatives for minimum standards and quality control. The other two countries sometimes implement these interventions and sometimes not, but neither of them invests significantly in quality control and workforce strengthening.

Thus, the second iteration returned much clearer solutions, i.e. seven solutions of three conditions each (see table 13), synthesised by two models (see table 14 for one of these). The four-condition model shows clearly what has to be done to be successful which is also what has to be done to avoid failure in terms of child protection systems strengthening.

Juxtaposing the most successful and the least successful countries allows to see clear and **distinct patterns and pathways to success as well as to failure**. Some conditions are strongly associated with success, while others are equally strongly associated with failure in strengthening child protection systems. Conditions associated with success include, in addition to favourable country context, issues around **advocacy and evidence** (investing in ‘policy advocacy’ and ‘evidence and research’) and around **financing** (not ‘financing services’ but ‘leveraging resources’).

## 6. Summary findings from the QCA

To assess the potential for success in strengthening child protection systems, the QCA produced the following calculations: the computations of single conditions of success generated lists of odds ratios, necessary and sufficient conditions. The single condition analysis identifies the overall importance of certain conditions, seen as isolated and independent from others, for systems success. The calculations of pathways identify combinations of conditions that are associated with success in strengthening child protection systems. Together, these calculations present a clear picture of the factors that contribute to success in child protection systems strengthening and those that do not contribute significantly to systems strengthening.

### Analysis by entry point (single UNICEF investment)

**Table 15: Odds ratios of success in child protection systems strengthening (17 clearer cases)**

Conditions	All outcomes
Capacity building	Infinite
Evidence and research	Infinite
Country context (WGI, HDI, GNI)	7.88
Policy advocacy	6.22
Coordination	6.22
Case management	6.22
Leveraging public resources	5.50
Quality control	4.29
Workforce strengthening	4.00

Community-based protection	0.55
Service delivery	0.51
Children's participation	0.51
Financing services	0.13

The findings from the single condition analysis of the 17-case subset show a clear split between conditions associated with success in strengthening child protection systems and investments that fail to contribute to systems strengthening. In order of their highest score, the highest success ratios are in capacity building, evidence, favourable country context (that is beyond UNICEF's influence), advocacy, coordination and case management, leveraging public resources, strengthening quality control mechanisms and workforce strengthening. Among this group of countries, conditions associated with lack of success in child protection systems strengthening are support for community-based child protection mechanisms, direct financial support for child protection services and physical infrastructure, and children's participation. These are the findings of the QCA calculations and should not be interpreted out of context.

**Table 16: Necessary and sufficient conditions for success (17 cases)**

Necessary conditions		Sufficient single conditions	
Capacity building	100%	Workforce strengthening	100%
Evidence and research	100%	Leveraging financial resources	100%
Favourable country context	88%	Lack of financing services	88%
Lack of financing services	88%	Favourable country context	88%
Policy advocacy	88%	Quality control	86%
Coordination	88%	Evidence and research	80%

### Analysis by pathway

The following three tables present the pathways from three models in the approximate form of a sequencing from less developed systems to more developed systems. We can explain the differences in successful UNICEF investments by the differences in the models. We can see clear patterns of variation between the pathways of the higher-performing countries compared to the countries at the lower end of the success spectrum. All three tables present four-condition models to child protection systems success. Table 17 is based on the first iteration of the QCA, while tables 18 and 19 are based on the second iteration of the analysis.

Table 17 shows trajectories from less advanced countries to more advanced countries in terms of child protection systems strengthening. Countries with pathways that lie between the most successful and the less successful trajectories were placed in the middle rows of the table. This generated some fairly clear patterns that illustrate how sequencing of child protection systems investments looks in practice and how efforts to strengthen child protection systems are adapted to specific country contexts. While it is clear which conditions contribute to systems strengthening, this is not prescriptive, since country contexts vary greatly. The best performing countries indicate what systems strengthening efforts should aim towards in the long run. The lower ranking countries show what kinds of investments are needed in less affluent countries with weaker child protection systems; this may include paying for services or supporting community-based protection mechanisms, and not (yet) leveraging public financial resources.

**Table 17: First iteration: pathways to CPS success, 24 countries (based on table 6 data)**

	Countries	Capacity building	Quality control	Community-based protection	Financing services
More systems outcomes	Armenia, Romania, South Africa and Thailand	Yes	Yes	No	No
	Mongolia	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	Fiji, Moldova	Yes	No matter	Yes	No
	El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	Yes	No matter
	Morocco	No	No	No	No
	Uzbekistan	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	Nigeria, Peru	Yes	No	No matter	No
	Guatemala, Lebanon, Myanmar	No matter	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Pakistan	No	No	Yes	No matter
	Ethiopia	No	No matter	Yes	Yes
Fewer systems outcomes	Afghanistan	No	No	No matter	Yes
	Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda	No	No	Yes	Yes

The table shows that **capacity building** is an important condition across all successful countries and **quality control** is nearly as important. **Not providing financial support for child protection services and infrastructure** is also important. Countries at the top end of the systems strengthening continuum do not support community-based child protection mechanisms because the focus is clearly on formal, statutory child protection systems and much of UNICEF’s work is focused on upstream, high level policy advice. All other countries continue to support community-based protection mechanisms to ensure that child protection services actually do reach children. This shows that in these countries child protection systems are not yet strong enough to ensure children are reached at the community level.

The following two depictions of pathways only look at countries that were identified as having a functioning child protection system (see table 4). This means there is little we are able to say about the types of positive systems-strengthening investments that less successful countries are making, i.e. countries in the middle that did not make it into the group of successful systems strengtheners.

**Table 18: Second iteration, four pathways to CPS success, 24 countries (based on table 10)**

Conditions	Less systems outcomes					More systems outcomes
	Sri Lanka, El Salvador	Zimbabwe	Thailand Fiji	Moldova	Armenia	Mongolia, Romania, South Africa
Quality control	Yes	Yes	No matter	No	Yes	Yes
Leveraging public resources	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Policy advocacy	No matter	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Financing services	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No

Table 18 is derived from the second QCA iteration of the entire 24 country dataset. The most successful countries invest in **quality control, leveraging public resources, policy advocacy and not paying for services**. The rest of the countries show a range of different patterns.

**Table 19: Second iteration, four pathways to CPS success, 17 countries (based on table 13)**

Conditions	Less systems outcomes			More systems outcomes
	Zimbabwe	Thailand Fiji	Armenia	Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa
Evidence and research	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Leveraging public resources	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Policy advocacy	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Financing services	Yes	No	No	No

Table 19 is based on an analysis of only the 17 most and least successful countries (i.e. leaving out countries where some elements of a child protection system exist) and presents a clearer picture than table 18. All countries invest in **evidence and research**. The findings for leveraging public resources, policy advocacy, and financing services are roughly the same as in the table above. In Armenia, success in systems strengthening does not depend on policy advocacy and in Thailand and Fiji, success does not depend on leveraging public resources. Finally, Zimbabwe has to continue to provide direct support for child protection services and infrastructure to ensure success in child protection systems.

## 7. Conclusions and implications for the work of UNICEF

The following section draws conclusions from the qualitative comparative analysis and explores the implications of the QCA for UNICEF’s child protection systems strengthening work.

### Conclusion #1: Clarity on priority investments for child protection systems strengthening

The QCA allowed to look at the data from different angles and through a variety of lenses and **identified the most effective areas of UNICEF investment for child protection systems strengthening: policy advocacy and advice; evidence and research; leveraging public financial resources; and not paying for services and infrastructure**. This is the main recurring message across the different analyses, but is most clear at the end of the second iteration. Investments in **capacity** do not come out as strongly in the pathways, but, as a single condition, they make the biggest difference by themselves. Of somewhat less importance are support for quality control, coordination and case management. It has to be kept in mind that QCA aims to identify the most parsimonious model and that countries at different stages of the child protection strengthening process may have to address different priorities.

See Annexes 9/10 for complete tables of country context indicators and factors.

### Conclusion #2: Potential for testing which sequencing of interventions leads to success

The QCA analysis also hints at the need to pay greater attention to the sequencing or phasing of interventions to strengthen child protection systems. For example, the differences in pathways between different successful countries show that some (e.g. Zimbabwe) require continued financial support from UNICEF and other child protection agencies, while others (e.g. middle-income countries with more advanced child protection systems and greater fiscal space) are no longer in need of direct financial support. Here are some other examples. The data gathered for the QCA shows that capacity building often follows a trajectory from training workshops to curriculum development and finally to a comprehensive workforce strengthening strategy. A further breakdown of capacity building into different conditions (or ‘UNICEF investments’ to be included in the QCA model) would be necessary

to demonstrate the relative contribution of different forms of capacity building. Support for legislative reforms and investments in child protective service models and case management, including community-based child protection mechanisms, tend to be made relatively early in the systems strengthening enterprise, while support for accountability mechanisms, information systems and monitoring systems tend to come later. Investments in data and accountability systems tend to be much stronger in already mature child protection systems than in contexts where the primary focus is on the development of service models. The analysis of public expenditure and budgets is largely limited to middle-income countries with greater fiscal space, while some of the larger federal countries tend to focus their efforts largely at the upstream level. **With better data and more time, it should be possible to use QCA to further unpack these sequences.**

### Conclusion #3: UNICEF efforts are tilted towards higher-end systems strengthening and reform

The table below proposes three different types of CPSS: **system building** in countries without significant foundations for a child protection system (Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, etc.); **systems strengthening** in countries with certain foundations, but where the CPS is not yet working well and is not achieving national coverage (Peru, Thailand, Sri Lanka, etc.); and finally, **systems reform** in countries with existing child protection systems (Romania, South Africa, etc.). The table attempts to capture the ideas generated through the QCA and put them together in a single framework. This exercise has also been inspired by five of the WHO’s six health systems strengthening building blocks:<sup>28</sup> service delivery, health workforce, health information systems, health financing, and leadership and governance.

**Table 20: Child protection systems strengthening framework (illustrative)**

CPS building blocks	10 UNICEF conditions	Interventions and results	Laying the foundations for systems building	Systems strengthening and scale-up	Systems reform (quality)
Leadership and governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy advocacy</li> </ul>	Harmonise legislation			
		Build consensus around child protection systems mapping and assessment			
		Build ownership around a common child protection systems strategy			
		Advocate for the allocation of adequate resources for a sustainable child protection system at scale			
Continuum of preventive and protective services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Service delivery</li> <li>Community-based protection</li> <li>Financing services and infrastructure</li> <li>Children’s participation</li> </ul>	Fund child protection services			
		Establish community-based child protection structures <sup>29</sup>			
		Develop and test service delivery models			
		Roll out case management and referral systems			
		Support a continuum of services that goes beyond child protective and welfare services: health, education, social protection, etc.			

<sup>28</sup> WHO 2010: Monitoring the Building Blocks of Health Systems: A handbook of indicators and their measurement strategies. Geneva. Also see references to health systems in the CP Resource Pack and the CP e-learning course.

<sup>29</sup> The fact that functioning child protection systems included in the evaluation do not invest heavily in community-based child protection mechanisms does not mean that this is unimportant. It could very well be that investments in community-based child protection mechanisms are an important earlier step towards CPSS. But since the QCA is not designed to plot CPSS trajectories over time, this dimension is lost.

CPS building blocks	10 UNICEF conditions	Interventions and results	Laying the foundations for systems building	Systems strengthening and scale-up	Systems reform (quality)
Child protection workforce	• Capacity building	Training workshops for child protection service providers			
		Social work curriculum development			
		Comprehensive social service workforce strengthening			
Child protection information systems (coordination, quality control, accountability, data systems)	• Evidence and research • Coordination and partnerships • Quality control, minimum standards and accountability mechanisms	Child protection systems mapping			
		Child protection data and analytics (VAC surveys, MICS, etc.)			
		Horizontal and vertical linkages between systems actors			
		Public finance analysis and budget tracking (data and evidence component)			
		Management information systems			
		Administrative data systems			
		M&E systems and other accountability and quality control mechanisms			
Child protection financing	• Leverage public financial resources for scale and sustainability	Mobilise donor funding			
		Mobilise other sectors			
		Public finance and budget reviews			
		Leverage national public finances for child protection systems			

Note: UNICEF's current global priorities for child protection systems strengthening (as per OMP 2018-2021 and 2016/2017 Regional Advisers Network Meeting minutes) are highlighted.

The QCA has been effective at highlighting the priority investments for systems strengthening in successful, mostly middle-income countries. **Many of these investments are already global priorities for UNICEF's work to strengthen child protection systems** (see highlighted text in the table above). UNICEF's global priorities for child protection systems strengthening are also **tilted towards the higher-end systems strengthening and reform efforts**, rather than towards building child protection systems in low-income, conflict-affected and fragile states. Crossing the QCA evidence with the Baastel evaluation report, it appears that while UNICEF's approach to child protection systems strengthening has shown some positive results, especially in relation to systems reforms, the track record is patchier at the lower end of the systems strengthening spectrum.

As the QCA shows, many of the countries included in the evaluation have had little success in strengthening child protection systems. The QCA confirms some of the findings of the Baastel evaluation and also of other systems strengthening reviews commissioned by UNICEF (e.g. in ROSA). **UNICEF's model for child protection systems strengthening tends to be less adapted to countries with no or very limited state capacities, where child and social protection mostly consist of informal, community mechanisms, kinship support and mutual help between members of geographic or professional groupings.** The financial analysis presented above also shows that many low-income and fragile countries spend little or no funds on child protection systems strengthening. While there may be some coding errors, most of the figures are robust and match the case study reports. This leads us to the hypothesis that at least **some low-income countries consider child protection systems strengthening as a process that is too long, too complex and too expensive** – and they therefore continue to focus on addressing different child protection issues in isolation, rather than in a more

systemic way. This hypothesis should be corroborated drawing on the CO and partner surveys conducted for this evaluation.

The QCA did not provide any evidence that community-based child protection mechanisms or children's participation positively contribute to child protection systems. While UNICEF supports **community-based child protection mechanisms** in at least half of the 24 countries, they were rarely critical for the pathways to successful child protection systems as identified through QCA. This does not match what other data sources suggest (e.g. case and desk studies conducted by Baastel); namely that in many low- and middle-income countries community-based protection mechanisms are essential to ensure that child protection interventions reach children. It is also true that UNICEF generally does not invest in community-based structures in middle-income countries with fully functioning child protection systems. The conclusion here is that the QCA has been effective at identifying functioning child protection systems and the conditions that make the greatest contributions to systems strengthening. However, **the QCA has been less successful to tease out the less visible results in countries with a fledgling child protection system**. As far as **children's participation** is concerned, this condition did not appear in any pathways. This may be because some forms of children's participation are much less apparent in formal professional child protection systems than in more informal community-based protection structures, or because children's participation is inadequately defined, operationalised, measured and reported in some child protection systems. The other reason is that social/children's participation in CPSS **has not been conceptualised by UNICEF with the same clarity or rigour as other child protection conditions or components**. This lack of rigour means that countries may report a wide range of activities under this heading. Moreover, there is an inherent tension between children's participation and child protection, and some forms of participation may expose children to certain protection risks. These conceptual, methodological and political considerations go of course beyond the scope of the QCA. However, they highlight the need to **articulate much more clearly the role children should play in their own protection**, as well as in the functioning of a child protection system. When governments are designing or reforming their systems, legislation, policies, and training professionals, appropriate children's participation (in court hearings, in decisions around alternative care, in decisions about determining drivers of violence in a household by a social worker, etc.) have to be ensured. This is about how UNICEF embeds children's participation in the child protection system in a way that honours the importance and limits of children's participation around protection issues.

## **8. Issues for UNICEF's consideration**

There is a need for UNICEF to rethink its approaches to child protection systems strengthening to ensure that they are tailored to different country contexts, and not just to middle-income countries with existing child protection systems. The following considerations may be useful:

**Develop three systems strengthening approaches:** Review successful country examples for system building, system strengthening and system reform. Much of the documentation for this exercise may already be available and won't require additional primary data collection. Based on these reviews, tailor UNICEF's approaches to child protection systems strengthening to three different types of country contexts. Develop guidance and support mechanisms especially for countries that have so far not been able to make significant strides towards building child protection systems. Support learning

between countries with similar profiles and challenges, e.g. Peru and Thailand, Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire, etc.<sup>30</sup>

**Make greater investments in measuring child protection systems outcomes** through, for example expenditure tracking, financial benchmarking, CP systems scorecard, child protection information systems, etc. Draw inspiration from countries that have already developed tools for tracking child protection systems (e.g. scorecard and child protection information systems in India); and from the child protection governance indicators developed by EAPRO and applied in Fiji and other Pacific Island countries. Support countries to invest much earlier in information, monitoring and feedback mechanisms to facilitate learning and as drivers of change in attitudes and practices of child protection actors (at all levels). Invest in information systems earlier than is the case now.

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<sup>30</sup> Connolly, Marie et al. (2014) Towards A Typology For Child Protection Systems. Final report to UNICEF and Save the Children UK. University of Melbourne.

## Annexes

### Annex 1: Key UNICEF interventions to strengthen CP systems by CP system element (Source: CP Section/EO workshop 15 May 2018)

Essential CP systems element	Key UNICEF interventions to strengthen the systems element
<b>A robust legal and regulatory framework, as well as specific policies related to child protection</b>	Advocacy and strategic/technical guidance towards national laws, regulations and policies that are <b>compliant with the CRC and other HR instruments, evidence based, and informed by international good practices.</b>
<b>Effective governance structures, including coordination across government departments, between levels of decentralization and between formal and informal actors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advocacy and technical support for setting up and running <b>national CP coordination structures</b> (e.g. inter-ministerial committees); ensuring the participation of the <b>justice and law enforcement sectors</b> in those structures and ensuing actions.</li> <li>• Advocacy and technical support for incorporating <b>systems strengthening interventions within “issue-driven” coordination bodies.</b></li> <li>• Technical and financial support to set up <b>case management and information management systems</b>, for use by all systems actors regardless of degree of formality and centralization/decentralization.</li> </ul>
<b>A continuum of services (spanning prevention and response)</b>	<p><b>Support to specific tertiary (and secondary) government prevention and response services for children who have experienced (or at risk of) violence, exploitation or abuse and those without parental care, depending on context:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to Response Services (delivery structures and capacities): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Institutions: Shelters, daycares, etc.</li> <li>○ Processes: SOPs, referral mechanisms</li> <li>○ People: capacity development for CP professionals</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Support to Prevention Services: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Parenting programmes</li> <li>○ Communication for behaviour change</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Minimum standards and oversight (information, monitoring and accountability mechanisms)</b>	<p><b>Advocacy and technical assistance to</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>setting up independent oversight and accountability structures and mechanisms</b>, e.g. national ombudspersons, human rights/child rights tribunals</li> <li>• governments to establish clear accountability and oversight systems <b>within their own system</b>, e.g. through hiring child protection experts, setting up inspection units, Management Information Systems and Quality Assurance Systems</li> </ul>
<b>Human, financial and infrastructure resources</b>	<p><b>Advocacy, technical and financial assistance to establish CP cadres/posts that require professionals with certain qualification</b> (social service workforce strengthening), e.g. through</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• operational guidance to legislation which specifies the roles of personnel, and associated qualifications;</li> <li>• direct capacity development actions such as CP curriculum development for police academies, JD development for MI/MJ, in-service training for social service workforce and parapsychologists, etc.</li> </ul> <p><b>Advocating for donor support for CP systems strengthening.</b></p>
<b>Social participation, including respect for children’s own views, and an aware and supportive public</b>	<p><b>Advocacy and technical support for ensuring participation of children and adolescents</b> based on evolving capacities and age – particularly from the point of seeking children’s own views (GC 14), e.g.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• policy, legal development,</li> <li>• case management practices/protocols</li> <li>• management of own case (best interest determination)</li> </ul> <p>Promoting <b>community engagement</b> to protect children from violence, exploitation and abuse (link with prevention, outcome 3) Justice for children.</p>

## Annex 2: Data collection protocol

### 0 Background and backstory

#### Conditions: UNICEF investments

#### 1. Policy Dialogue and Advocacy

- 1.1a What types of policy advocacy for CP systems does UNICEF carry out in your country?
- 1.1b Why? Can you provide some examples or details?
- 1.2a How would you rate UNICEF's power to convene a broad range of child protection systems actors at national level?
- 1.2b Why? Can you provide some examples or details?
- 1.3a Does UNICEF conduct system mapping in your country?
- 1.3b Explain or clarify the above answer:
- 1.4a Is UNICEF generating public discussions on highly sensitive child protection issues in your country?
- 1.4b Why? Can you provide examples?
- 1.5a Does UNICEF strongly support a national plan of action for children in your country?
- 1.5b Why? Can you provide examples or clarify?
- 1.6a Does UNICEF conduct legal reviews and analyses?
- 1.6b To what extent? How? Can you provide examples?
- 1.7a Is UNICEF developing a strategy to strengthen CP systems?
- 1.7b Is it advanced or not? Please clarify
- 1.8a Is UNICEF developing costed national action plans for children?
- 1.8b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?

#### 2. Expertise technical assistance

In your country:

- 2.1a What types of advice is UNICEF providing on legislative reform? E.g. very broad, or highly specific and technical, etc.
- 2.1b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 2.2a What is the level of policy advice UNICEF is providing? E.g. High / low
- 2.2b Can you provide some examples? (e.g. on child care, child justice, etc.) Why is it high or low?

#### 3. Evidence generation and research

In your country:

- 3.1a What types of child protection data collection and analysis does UNICEF support?
- 3.1b To what extent? How? Can you provide examples?
- 3.2a Does UNICEF support child protection budget and/or public expenditure analysis and tracking?
- 3.2b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 3.3a What types of child protection studies and research does UNICEF support? (for example, scoping studies on emerging issues, online child sexual exploitation, etc.)
- 3.3b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?

#### 4 Capacity

In your country:

- 4.1a Is UNICEF conducting capacity development initiatives for CP systems actors?
- 4.1b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 4.2a Is UNICEF designing social work curricula?
- 4.2b To what extent? How? Can you provide examples?
- 4.3a Is UNICEF supporting knowledge exchange between key systems actors?
- 4.3b To what extent? How? Can you provide examples?
- 4.4a Is UNICEF developing the capacity of system actors at national and district levels?
- 4.4b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples? Any comments or clarifications?
- 4.5a Is UNICEF developing training manuals?
- 4.5b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 4.6a Is UNICEF strengthening the social workforce? For example, does it train social service workforce on CP, organise exchange visits, provide technical assistance, etc.
- 4.6b What is the level and ambition of the support of the social welfare workforce? Can you provide some examples?

#### 5. Coordination partnerships

In your country:

- 5.1a What types of coordination mechanisms is UNICEF developing?
- 5.1b What is the level of support? Can you provide examples?
- 5.2a What kind of linkages has UNICEF supported between departments and ministries?
- 5.2b To what extent has it done so? How? Can you provide some examples?

- 5.4a What is the level of collaboration between UNICEF sections on child protection: social protection, education, ECD, C4D, health?
- 5.4b Why? Can you clarify and / or provide some examples?
- 5.5a Does UNICEF support the strengthening of CPMIS and other administrative data systems?
- 5.5b To what extent? In what ways? Can you provide some examples and / or expand
- 5.7a Is UNICEF designing a case management system?
- 5.7b How? Can you clarify?

#### **6a. Financial support for services and infrastructure**

In your country:

- 6.2a Is UNICEF funding coordination mechanisms?
- 6.2b To what extent? How? Please clarify
- 6.3a Is UNICEF providing financial support to specific initiatives, such as child helplines? [ALSO IN SERVICE DELIVERY??]
- 6.3b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 6.4a Is UNICEF funding infrastructure that ensures children have the right to be heard in judicial and administrative proceedings?
- 6.4b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 6.5a Is UNICEF funding independent oversight mechanisms?
- 6.5b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 6.6a Is UNICEF raising funds from other donors for child protection systems strengthening?
- 6.6b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?

#### **6b. Leveraging public resources**

In your country, is UNICEF leveraging public resources for child protection systems?

- 6.1a Is UNICEF conducting budget and public expenditure analysis?
- 6.1b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 6.7a Is UNICEF leveraging funds from other UNICEF sections for child protection (e.g. for prevention)?
- 6.7b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?

#### **7. Service delivery**

In your country:

- 7.1a Is UNICEF supporting Child protection services at local level?
- 7.1b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 7.2a Is UNICEF supporting District-level programme coordination and administration?
- 7.2b To what extent? How? Can you provide examples?
- 7.3a Is UNICEF supporting implementation of CP laws?
- 7.3b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 7.4a Is UNICEF supporting districts in the process of identifying children in need of care and protection?
- 7.4b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 7.5a Is UNICEF strengthening quality of CP services?
- 7.5b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 7.7a Is UNICEF supporting a system of multi-sectorial service offer?
- 7.7b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 7.8a Is UNICEF supporting a nationwide referral system?
- 7.8b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 7.9a Is UNICEF supporting a coordination structure for VACW?
- 7.9b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 7.10a Is UNICEF supporting modelling of child care systems, for example identifying bottlenecks?
- 7.10b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?

#### **8 Minimum Standards and Quality Control**

In your country:

- 8.1a What types of accountability mechanisms is UNICEF supporting? (eg high level / low level)
- 8.1b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?
- 8.2a Is UNICEF strengthening M&E, monitoring of child rights?
- 8.2b To what extent? How? Can you provide examples?
- 8.3a Does UNICEF commission social audit?
- 8.3b How? When? Can you add anything?

#### **9 Children's Participation**

In your country:

- 9.1a Does UNICEF support and / or has established child helplines?
- 9.1b Can you provide some details? For example, do they include M&E?

9.2a Does UNICEF support children's engagement at various levels? For example, legislative reform, systems design, membership in committees, etc.

9.2b To what extent? Can you provide some details or examples?

#### **X. Community-based protection**

5.3a What kinds of linkages has UNICEF supported between the formal, district-level child protection system and community-based child protection structures?

5.3b Are these linkages strong? How has UNICEF developed them? Can you provide some examples and expand?

5.6a Is UNICEF collaborating with C4D for social and behaviour change interventions?

5.6b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?

7.6a Is UNICEF supporting community-based child protection programmes?

7.6b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?

7.11a Is UNICEF supporting the engagement of children and adolescents at the community level and in schools?

7.11b To what extent? How? Can you provide some examples?

### **Enablers and explanatory factors: Context indicators**

#### **10 Context Actors**

In your country:

10.1a Are there bodies that are able to lobby for greater investments in child protection systems? For example, departments and associations of social work, lawyers' associations and human rights bodies, etc.

10.1b To what extent? Who are they? Can you expand / provide some details?

10.2a Are there strong horizontal linkages between child protection, social protection, education, health, law enforcement and justice sectors? Or just among some of these?

10.2b Why? Can you explain or provide some details?

10.3a Are there strong vertical linkages between formal CPS, community protection mechanisms and interventions for social and behaviour change?

10.3b Why? Can you explain or provide some details?

10.4a Is there an independent human rights commission (or similar oversight body). (Source: Source: OHCHR website, CO information)

10.4b Please specify which body / bodies:

#### **11 Context Indicators**

11.1 Government Effectiveness – WGI

11.2 Regulatory Quality – WGI

11.3 Control of Corruption – WGI

11.4 Voice and Accountability – WGI

HDI and GNI were added later

### **Outcomes: Country-level child protection systems components**

#### **12 Regulatory framework**

12.1 PR28. Does the justice system comply with the minimum standards laid down in the Beijing Rules of Justice?

12.2 PR29. Does the country have an alternative care policy in line with the 2009 Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children which would include all of the elements listed in [Footnote 11]?

12.3 PR30. Does the country have legislation that recognizes children's right to be heard in judicial and administrative proceedings (both criminal and non-criminal) affecting the child, either directly or through a representative or an appropriate body (in line with Art. 12, paragraph 2 of the CRC)?

12.4 SI30. Does the country have laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, ethnicity, disability and/or religious affiliation? If yes, list all that apply in remarks column.

#### **13 Governance structures**

13.1a Does the lead Ministry have a HIGH/LOW status?

13.1b Why? Can you explain or provide some details?

13.2a Are there power struggles between different child protection departments and actors?

13.2b To what extent? Why? Can you clarify or provide some examples?

13.3a Are there SOPs and referral mechanisms?

13.3b To what extent? Why? Can you clarify or provide some examples?

#### **14 Services**

14.1 PR15. Has the country identified and acted during the year on areas requiring strengthening in national child protection systems [as reflected in State budgets, policy papers or legislation or/and in systems mapping]? (If yes, specify area in remarks column.)

14.2 PR17. Which of the statements on the Child Protection System in your country is most likely true? Option 1 - Child protection system has either preventive or response service; Option 2 - Child protection system has both preventive and response services but do not work well together; Option 3 - Child Protection system has both preventive and responsive services and there is a framework for coordination; Option 4 - Child Protection system has both preventive and responsive services that are fully aligned and complementary

14.3 SI2. Does the country have a social protection system?

14.4 PR22. Is the system biased towards detention and other custodial remedies? (This is irrespective of whether diversion and non-custodial options exist in the country.)

### **15 Minimum standards**

15.1 SI29. Does the country have legal and paralegal services available to support children in claiming redress to violation of their rights?

15.2a Are there bodies providing independent oversight and accountability mechanisms for quality control of child protection systems (e.g. child ombudsman, human rights commission, supreme court, etc.)?

15.2b If yes, which ones?

15.3a Are there systems for supervision and monitoring of child protection systems?

15.3b Can you clarify and provide some details?

### **16 Resources**

16.1 PR16. Did the public expenditure for child protection, as indicated in the State budget, change from two years prior? Indicate in remarks column the expenditure for child protection and the total public expenditure in the State's currency.

Option 1 - Increased; Option 2 - Maintained; Option 3 - Decreased; Option 4-Not Available

16.2 SI8. Rate the country capacity to develop, implement and finance integrated social protection systems on a scale of 1 (lack of capacity) to 5 (very strong capacity). (Capacities should be considered at both national and sub-national levels.)

16.3a Are there adequate numbers of skilled social service workforce?

16.3b Why? Can you explain or provide some details?

16.4a Is the allocation of public resources for Child Protection HIGH / LOW?

16.4b Why? Can you explain or provide some details?

### **17 Participation**

In your country:

17.2a Is there child participation in CP committees at community and / or district level?

17.2b To what extent? Why? Can you clarify or provide some examples?

17.3a Does the law recognise children's right to be heard in judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child?

17.3b To what extent? Why? Can you clarify or provide some examples?

17.4a Are admin procedures child-friendly, for example police- or court-related?

17.4b To what extent? Why? Can you clarify or provide some examples?

17.5a Are there functioning child helplines and complaints mechanisms that are accessible to children?

17.5b To what extent? Why? Can you clarify or provide some examples?

17.6a Do children meet in the community and/or at school to address child protection issues?

17.6b To what extent? Why? Can you clarify or provide some examples?

17.7 SI15. Are strong efforts being made by government counterparts/UNICEF partners to ensure children/adolescents define issues and priorities to feed into the development agendas at local, subnational or national levels.

17.8 SI16. Does the country have mechanisms for public engagement to influence development agendas in the local, sub-national or national plans?

17.9 PR21. Is the country using child-friendly procedures and approaches for dealing with justice for children (both the criminal and administrative justice activities, including investigative and court procedures)?

17.10 Functioning and accessible child helpline (source? Check with CO)

## **Annex 3: Dataset presenting all values of all conditions analysed**

(available on request: see first worksheet of Excel file named "ALL")

## **Annex 4: Truth Tables and Prime Implicants Chart of the initial long models**

(available on request: see last 4 worksheets of Excel file named "ALL")

## Annex 5: Solutions of the Boolean minimisations for the short models in algebra form

### a) First analysis of overall outcome tested on all cases, against 11 conditions (leading to 4, 6a, 8, X).

POSITIVE OUTCOME (11 cases):

4CAP\*6afindown\*8MINSTQLTCTRL (101- 45% of 11 cases = 5 countries: Mongolia, Armenia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand)

4CAP\*6afindown\*XCOMMPART (10-1 27% of 11 cases = 3 countries: Mongolia, Fiji, Moldova)

4CAP\*8MINSTQLTCTRL\*XCOMMPART (1-11 36% of 11 cases = 4 countries: Mongolia, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe)

4cap\*6afindown\*8minstqltctrl\*xcommpart (0000 10% of 11 cases = 1 country: Morocco)

NEGATIVE OUTCOME (13 cases):

4cap\*6AFINDOWN\*8minstqltctrl (010- 5 cases: Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan)

4cap\*8minstqltctrl\*XCOMMPART (0-01 5 cases: Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda, Pakistan)

6AFINDOWN\*8minstqltctrl\*XCOMMPART (-101 7 cases: Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda, Guatemala, Lebanon, Myanmar)

4cap\*6AFINDOWN\*XCOMMPART (01-1 5 cases: Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia)

4CAP\*6afindown\*8minstqltctrl\*xcommpart (1000 2 cases: Nigeria, Peru)

4CAP\*6AFINDOWN\*8MINSTQLTCTRL\*xcommpart (1110 1 case: Uzbekistan)

### b) Second "4+3" analysis, tested on all cases (4, 4.6, 5.7, 6a, 8, X, 11)

POSITIVE OUTCOME, complex solution:

4CAP\*5.7CASEMG\*6afindown\*11CTXINDS (110-1 6 cases: Armenia, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Fiji, Moldova)

4CAP\*6afindown\*8MINSTQLTCTRL\*11CTXINDS (1-011 5 cases: Armenia, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand)

4CAP\*5.7CASEMG\*6AFINDOWN\*8MINSTQLTCTRL (1111- 3 cases: El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe)

4cap\*5.7casemg\*6afindown\*8minstqltctrl\*11CTXINDS (00001 1 case: Morocco)

POSITIVE OUTCOME, intermediate solution:

11CTXINDS\*4cap (0---1 1 case: Morocco)

11CTXINDS\*8MINSTQLTCTRL (---11 7 cases: Thailand, Armenia, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, El Salvador, Sri Lanka)

11CTXINDS\*6afindown\*5.7CASEMG (-10-1 6 cases: Armenia, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Fiji, Moldova)

8MINSTQLTCTRL\*6AFINDOWN\*5.7CASEMG\*4CAP (1111- 3 cases: El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe)

NEGATIVE OUTCOME, intermediate solution:

11ctxinds\*4cap (0---0 7 cases: Pakistan, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda)

11ctxinds\*5.7casemg (-0---0 7 cases: Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda)

11ctxinds\*8minstqltctrl (---00 8 cases: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda, Myanmar, Nigeria)

8minstqltctrl\*6AFINDOWN (--10- 8 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda, Myanmar, Guatemala, Lebanon)

8minstqltctrl\*5.7casemg\*4CAP (10-0- 1 case: Peru)

### c) New 11 condition-model tested on all cases (leading to 1, 6a, 6b, 8, 11)

POSITIVE OUTCOME, complex solution:

1POLDADV\*6afindown\*11CTXINDS (10---1 6 cases: Thailand, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Fiji, Moldova)

6afindown\*6bfinup\*8minstqltctrl\*11CTXINDS (-0001 2 cases: Morocco, Moldova)

6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup\*8MINSTQLTCTRL\*11CTXINDS (-1011 2 cases: Sri Lanka, El Salvador)

6afindown\*6BFINUP\*8MINSTQLTCTRL\*11CTXINDS (-0111 4 cases: Armenia, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa)

1POLDADV\*6AFINDOWN\*6BFINUP\*8MINSTQLTCTRL\*11ctxinds (11110 1 case: Zimbabwe)

POSITIVE OUTCOME, intermediate solution:

11CTXINDS\*8MINSTQLTCTRL (---11 7 cases: Thailand, Armenia, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, El Salvador)

11CTXINDS\*6bfinup\*6afindown (-00-1 3 cases: Morocco, Thailand, Fiji)

11CTXINDS\*6afindown\*1POLDADV (10—1 6 cases: Thailand, Fiji, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Moldova)

8MINSTQLTCTRL\*6BFINUP\*6AFINDOWN\*1POLDADV (1111- 1 case: Zimbabwe)

NEGATIVE OUTCOME, complex solution:

6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup\*11ctxinds (-10-0 8 cases: Uzbekistan, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Myanmar, Sudan, Uganda)

1poldadv\*6bfinup\*8minstqltctrl\*11ctxinds (0-000 6 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Myanmar, Sudan, Pakistan)

1POLDADV\*6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup\*8minstqltctrl (1100- 3 cases: Guatemala, Lebanon, Uganda)

1POLDADV\*6afindown\*6BFINUP\*8minstqltctrl\*11ctxinds (10100 1 case: Nigeria)

1poldadv\*6afindown\*6BFINUP\*8minstqltctrl\*11CTXINDS (00101 1 case: Peru)

NEGATIVE OUTCOME, intermediate solution:

11ctxinds\*6bfinup (-0-0 9 cases: Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Myanmar, Sudan, Uganda)

11ctxinds\*8minstqltctrl\*6afindown (-0-00 2 cases: Pakistan, Nigeria)

8minstqltctrl\*6bfinup\*6AFINDOWN (-100- 8 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Myanmar, Sudan, Uganda, Guatemala, Lebanon)

8minstqltctrl\*6BFINUP\*6afindown\*1poldadv (0010- 1 case: Peru)

**d) Analysis of 11 condition-model tested on subset of 17 "safe" cases, leading to seven simple models of 3 conditions each, with roots 1 & 3 (advocacy & evidence) and 6a & 6b (the two types of financial resources):**

### **1 3 6a**

8 Successful cases:

3EVIDRES\*6afindown (-10 7 cases: Armenia, **Fiji, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand**)

1POLDADV\*3EVIDRES (11- 7 cases: Zimbabwe, Fiji, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand)

9 Unsuccessful cases:

1poldadv\*3evidres (00- 5 cases: Pakistan, **Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan**)

3evidres\*6AFINDOWN (-01 6 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Lebanon, Uganda)

1poldadv\*6AFINDOWN (0-1 6 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Myanmar, Uzbekistan)

### **1 3 6b**

Explanations of positive outcome:

1POLDADV\*3EVIDRES (11- 7 cases: **Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Zimbabwe**, Fiji, Thailand)

3EVIDRES\*6BFINUP (-11 6 cases: Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Armenia)

Pathways to negative outcome:

3evidres\*6bfinup (-00 7 cases: **Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Pakistan, Sudan**, Lebanon, Uganda)

1poldadv\*6bfinup (0-0 7 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Pakistan, Sudan, Myanmar, Uzbekistan)

### **1 3 11**

Success:

1POLDADV\*3EVIDRES (11- 7 cases: **Fiji, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand**, Zimbabwe)

3EVIDRES\*11CTXINDS (-11 7 cases: Fiji, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand, Armenia)

Lack of success:

1poldadv\*11ctxinds (0-0 7 cases: **Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Pakistan, Sudan**, Myanmar, Uzbekistan)

1POLDADV\*3evidres (10- 2 cases: Uganda, Lebanon)

## 1 6a 6b

Pathways to success:

1POLDADV\*6afindown (10- 6 cases: **Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa**, Fiji, Thailand)

6afindown\*6BFINUP (-01 5 cases: Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Armenia)

1POLDADV\*6BFINUP (1-1 5 cases: Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Zimbabwe)

Pathways to lack of success:

1poldadv\*6bfinup (0-0 7 cases: **Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Myanmar, Sudan, Uzbekistan**, Pakistan)

6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup (-10 8 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Myanmar, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Lebanon, Uganda)

## 3 6a 6b

Positive cases:

3EVIDRES\*6afindown (10- 7 cases: **Armenia, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa**, Fiji, Thailand)

3EVIDRES\*6BFINUP (1-1 6 cases: Armenia, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Zimbabwe)

Negative cases:

3evidres\*6bfinup (0-0 7 cases: **Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Lebanon, Sudan, Uganda**, Pakistan)

6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup (-10 8 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Lebanon, Sudan, Uganda, Myanmar, Uzbekistan).

## 4 6a 6b

This model is basically identical to the previous one. Success is explained by:

4CAP\*6afindown (10- 7 cases: **Armenia, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa**, Fiji, Thailand)

4CAP\*6BFINUP (1-1 6 cases: Armenia, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Zimbabwe)

Lack of success is explained by:

4cap\*6bfinup (0-0 6 cases: **Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda**, Pakistan)

6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup (-10 8 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda, Lebanon, Myanmar, Uzbekistan)

## 6a 6b 11

Success:

6afindown\*11CTXINDS (0-1 7 cases: **Armenia, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa**, Fiji, Thailand)

6AFINDOWN\*6BFINUP\*11ctxinds (110 1 case: Zimbabwe)

Lack of success:

6bfinup\*11ctxinds (-00 8 cases: Pakistan, **Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Myanmar, Sudan, Uganda, Uzbekistan**)

6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup (10- 8 cases: Lebanon, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Myanmar, Sudan, Uganda, Uzbekistan)

e) **Analysis of 6 condition model synthesising the above** 1 (advocacy) 3 (evidence) 4 (capacity) 6a (financial resources bottom up) 6b (financial resources top down) 11 (context indicators):

Success:

1POLDADV\*3EVIDRES\*4CAP\*6afindown\*11CTXINDS (1110-1 6 cases Fiji, **Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa**, Thailand)

3EVIDRES\*4CAP\*6afindown\*6BFINUP\*11CTXINDS (-11011 5 cases Armenia, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa)

1POLDADV\*3EVIDRES\*4CAP\*6AFINDOWN\*6BFINUP\*11ctxinds (111110 1 case: Zimbabwe)

Lack of success:

1poldadv\*3evidres\*4cap\*6bfinup\*11ctxinds (000-00 5 cases: **Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Pakistan**)

3evidres\*4cap\*6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup\*11ctxinds (-00100 5 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Uganda)

1poldadv\*3EVIDRES\*4CAP\*6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup\*11ctxinds (011100 2 cases: Myanmar, Uzbekistan)

1POLDADV\*3evidres\*4CAP\*6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup\*11CTXINDS (101101 1 case: Lebanon)

**f) Analysis of 5 condition model synthesising the above** 1 (advocacy) 3 (evidence) 6a (financial resources bottom up) 6b (financial resources top down) 11 (context indicators):

Successful pathways:

1POLDADV\*3EVIDRES\*6afindown\*11CTXINDS (110-1 6 cases: **Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Fiji, Thailand**)

3EVIDRES\*6afindown\*6BFINUP\*11CTXINDS (-1011 5 cases: Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Armenia)

1POLDADV\*3EVIDRES\*6AFINDOWN\*6BFINUP\*11ctxinds (11110 1 case: Zimbabwe)

Unsuccessful pathways:

1poldadv\*3evidres\*6bfinup\*11ctxinds (00-00 5 cases: **Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Pakistan**)

1poldadv\*6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup\*11ctxinds (0-100 6 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Myanmar, Uzbekistan)

1POLDADV\*3evidres\*6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup (1010- 2 cases: Lebanon, Uganda)

**g) Analysis of 4 condition model synthesising the above (1, 3, 6a, 6b):**

Successful pathways:

1POLDADV\*3EVIDRES\*6afindown (110- 6 cases: **Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Fiji, Thailand**)

3EVIDRES\*6afindown\*6BFINUP (-101 5 cases: Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Armenia)

1POLDADV\*3EVIDRES\*6BFINUP (11-1 5 cases: Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, South Africa, Zimbabwe)

Unsuccessful pathways:


1poldadv\*3evidres\*6bfinup (00-0 5 cases: **Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Pakistan**)

1poldadv\*6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup (0-10 6 cases: Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, Myanmar, Uzbekistan)


1POLDADV\*3evidres\*6AFINDOWN\*6bfinup (1010 2 cases: Lebanon, Uganda)

## Annex 6: Venn diagrams of the short models


First analysis of overall outcome tested on all cases, against 11 conditions (leading to 4, 6a, 8, X).



Second “4+3” analysis, tested on all cases (4, 4.6, 5.7, 6a, 8, X, 11)




New 11 condition-model tested on all cases (leading to 1, 6a, 6b, 8, 11)




Analysis of 11 condition-model tested on subset of 17 “safe” cases, leading to seven simple models of 3 conditions each, with roots 1 & 3 (advocacy & evidence) and 6a & 6b (the two types of financial resources):


1 3 6a




1 3 6b




1 3 11




1 6a 6b




3 6a 6b




### 4 6a 6b




### 6a 6b 11



**Analysis of 5 condition model synthesising the above (1 (advocacy) 3 (evidence) 6a (financial resources bottom up) 6b (financial resources top down) 11 (context indicators):**



**Analysis of 4 condition model synthesising the above (1, 3, 6a, 6b):**



## Annex 7: Supersubset analysis (necessity & sufficiency analysis)

### Overall outcome tested on 24 cases:

No single condition is necessary, although 91% of the successful cases present investments in capacity and 82% of the successful cases show investments in evidence and research. In the second iteration, 11 context indicators and 5.7 case management joined 3 evidence and 4 capacity in the group of “almost” necessary conditions for success: 91% of successful cases present a positive value of context indicators and 82% of successful cases present a positive value of 5.7 Case Management.

Below is the list of necessary disjunctions (or logical unions of conditions) for the outcome. The number represents the percentage of successful cases out of all the cases covered by the configuration (it’s an index of non triviality, the higher it is the more the configuration is also sufficient... sometimes necessary conditions are trivial if they’re present equally in successful and unsuccessful cases and don’t help discriminate or explain success... like oxygen). I highlighted the most significant ones. We can see all of them in the Venn diagram except the one with ServDel.

1	x7servdel+X9CHPART	0.154
2	x6afindown+XCOMMPART	0.154
3	x6afindown+X9CHPART	0.077
4	x6afindown+X8MINSTQLTCTRL horizontal rectangle)	0.615 (green cases are either at the top or inside the central
5	x6afindown+X7SERVDEL	0.000
6	X5COOPARTN+X9CHPART	0.154
7	X5COOPARTN+x6bfinup	0.154
8	X4CAP+xcommpart vertical rectangle)	0.462 (green cases are either on the right or outside the central
9	X4CAP+X9CHPART	0.077
10	X4CAP+x8minstqltctrl	0.077
11	X4CAP+x7servdel	0.462
12	X4CAP+x6bfinup	0.000
13	X4CAP+x6afindown	0.462 (green cases are either on the right or at the top)
14	X4CAP+x5coopartn	0.077
15	x3evidres+X4CAP	0.000
16	X3EVIDRES+X9CHPART	0.077
17	X3EVIDRES+x6bfinup	0.000
18	x1poldadv+X4CAP	0.154

19 X1POLDADV+X9CHPART	0.154
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The second iteration added the following disjunctions to the necessity analysis:

1 X4CAP+x4.6work	0.000
2 X4CAP+x5.7casemg	0.077
6 X4CAP+X11CTXINDS	0.538
7 X4.6WORK+X11CTXINDS	0.692
8 X5.7CASEMG+x6afindown	0.462
9 X5.7CASEMG+xcommpart	0.385
10 X5.7CASEMG+X11CTXINDS	0.538
13 X6AFINDOWN+X11CTXINDS	0.154
14 X8MINSTQLTCTRL+X11CTXINDS	0.615
15 XCOMMPART+X11CTXINDS	0.231

As for the subset sufficiency analysis of single conditions, no single condition is sufficient by itself, but the chances of success are particularly high with workforce strengthening (83% success rate) and minimum standards and quality control (when UNICEF invests in this, 80% of cases are successful). These values can also be seen below.

### **Annex 8: Excel tables with data from the subset analysis of single conditions compared**

(available on request: see second worksheet of Excel file names "seconddataset")

## Annex 9: Country context indicators

Country	HDI	GNI per capita 2018	GNI per capita (HDR)	WB classification 2018	Fragility	Civil society index	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Voice and Accountability
Afghanistan	0.479	570	1,871	LIC	2.75*	Repressed	-1.56	-1.22	-2.75	-1.33	-1.62	-1.09
Armenia	0.743	4,000	8,189	UMIC		Obstructed	-0.57	-0.15	-0.60	0.25	-0.11	-0.62
Cote d'Ivoire	0.474	1,540	3,163	LMIC	3.53*	Obstructed	-0.54	-0.67	-0.90	-0.36	-0.67	-0.28
DRC	0.435	450	680	LIC	3.08*	Closed	-1.33	-1.51	-2.20	-1.32	-1.61	-1.39
El Salvador	0.680	3,560	7,732	LMIC		Obstructed	-0.57	-0.28	-0.06	0.09	-0.71	0.28
Ethiopia	0.448	740	1,523	LIC		Closed	-0.44	-0.64	-1.57	-1.10	-0.39	-1.45
Fiji	0.736	4,970	8,245	UMIC		Obstructed	0.13	-0.25	0.83	-0.38	-0.29	-0.03
Guatemala	0.640	4,060	7,063	UMIC		Obstructed	-0.74	-0.60	-0.54	-0.20	-1.04	-0.31
Lebanon	0.763	8,310	13,312	UMIC	*	Under review	-0.97	-0.53	-1.56	-0.34	-0.86	-0.52
Moldova	0.699	2,180	5,026	LMIC		Obstructed	-0.96	-0.62	-0.28	-0.12	-0.54	-0.03
Mongolia	0.735	3,290	10,449	LMIC		Obstructed	-0.50	-0.11	0.82	-0.08	-0.22	0.45
Morocco	0.647	2,863	7,195	LMIC		Obstructed	-0.15	-0.10	-0.29	-0.23	-0.14	-0.65
Myanmar	0.556	1,190	4,943	LMIC	3.19	Repressed	-0.65	-0.98	-0.63	-0.87	-0.99	-0.85
Nigeria	0.527	2,080	5,443	LMIC		Obstructed	-1.04	-1.09	-1.85	-0.92	-1.05	-0.30
Pakistan	0.550	1,580	5,031	LMIC		Repressed	-0.86	-0.64	-2.47	-0.64	-0.83	-0.69
Peru	0.740	5,970	11,295	UMIC		Obstructed	-0.35	-0.17	-0.16	0.51	-0.49	0.28
Romania	0.740	9,970	14,519	UMIC		Narrowed	0.00	-0.17	0.27	0.59	0.30	0.51
South Africa	0.666	5,430	12,087	UMIC		Narrowed	0.05	0.27	-0.13	0.21	0.07	0.64
Sri Lanka	0.766	3,840	10,789	LMIC		Obstructed	-0.28	-0.21	0.07	-0.10	-0.01	-0.11
Sudan	0.490	2,379	3,846	LMIC	2.51*	Closed	-1.61	-1.41	-2.38	-1.49	-1.26	-1.80
Thailand	0.740	5,960	14,519	UMIC		Under review	-0.40	0.34	-0.93	0.17	0.01	-1.10
Uganda	0.493	600	1,670	LIC		Repressed	-1.06	-0.57	-0.72	-0.21	-0.24	-0.71
Uzbekistan	0.701	1,980	5,748	LMIC		Closed	-1.20	-0.60	-0.34	-1.62	-1.13	-1.89
Zimbabwe	0.516	910	1,588	LIC	2.69	Repressed	-1.28	-1.16	-0.61	-1.72	-1.32	-1.11

## Annex 10: Country context factors

Country	Year of CP systems mapping	2014-17 CPS spending	CPS spending as a % of total CP spending	Under 18 population in thousands	Country type
<b>Afghanistan</b>	2015	9,758,776	25%	17,744	Conflict-affected
<b>Armenia</b>	none	2,509,787	78%	685	Pre-existing CPS
<b>Cote d'Ivoire</b>	2010	144,856	1%	11,689	
<b>DRC</b>	2017	0	0%	41,553	Conflict-affected
<b>El Salvador</b>	none	433,035	11%	2,153	
<b>Ethiopia</b>	2010	0	0%	49,500	
<b>Fiji</b>	2008	3,689,980	31%	303	
<b>Guatemala</b>	2012	3,427,306	31%	7,047	
<b>Lebanon</b>	2017	6,801,587	4%	932	Conflict-affected
<b>Moldova</b>	none	2,527,365	78%	768	Pre-existing CPS
<b>Mongolia</b>	2012	811,247	63%	1,017	
<b>Morocco</b>	2015	2,321,665	53%	11,491	
<b>Myanmar</b>	2012	3,874,441	10%	17,485	
<b>Nigeria</b>	2016	4,114,722	8%	93,965	Federal
<b>Pakistan</b>	2012-16	19,999,426	65%	79,005	Federal
<b>Peru</b>	none	1,519,192	43%	10,454	
<b>Romania</b>	2016	5,439,287	100%	3,667	Pre-existing CPS
<b>South Africa</b>	none	668,080	8%	19,428	Pre-existing CPS
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	2016	617,768	7%	6,020	
<b>Sudan</b>	2015	1,231,912	3%	18,971	Conflict-affected
<b>Thailand</b>	2013	7,662,624	72%	14,961	
<b>Uganda</b>	2013	5,221,031	16%	22,807	
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	2017	1,706,384	63%	10,386	
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	2015?	31,276,184	33%	7,726	<i>Pre-existing CPS?</i>

## Annex 11: Dataset for 2<sup>nd</sup> iteration

CaseID	1PolDAdv	3EvidRes	4Cap	4.6work	5CooPartn	5.7casemg	6aFINdown	6bFINup	7ServDel	8MinStQItCtrl	9ChPart	XCommPart	10CtxActors	11CtxInds	12RegFrame	13GovStruct	14Serv	15MinStds	16Resourc	17Particip	ALL
1.Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2.Armenia	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3.Cote d'Ivoire	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
4.DRC	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.El Salvador	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
6.Ethiopia	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
7.Fiji	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
8.Guatemala	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
9.Lebanon	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
10.Moldova	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
11.Mongolia	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
12.Morocco	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
13.Myanmar	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
14.Nigeria	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
15.Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
16.Peru	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
17.Romania	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
18.South Africa	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
19.Sri Lanka	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
20.Sudan	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
21.Thailand	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
22.Uganda	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
23.Uzbekistan	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
24.Zimbabwe	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1