



**PARTICIPATORY REVIEW (EVALUATION) OF THE
UNICEF RESPONSE TO THE
REFUGEE AND MIGRANT CRISIS IN EUROPE
2015-2017**

MAIN REPORT

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ACRONYMS

AMIF	European Union Asylum Migration and Integration Funds
BPRM	Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration of the US State Department
CCCs	UNICEF Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action
CO	Country Office
CP	Child Protection
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRM	Child Rights Monitoring
DOC	Division of Communications
DG Home	European Commission Department of Migration and Home Affairs
DG-ECHO	European Commission Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
DRP	Division of Data, Research and Policy
EC	European Commission
ECARO	UNICEF Europe and Central Asia Regional Office
ED	Executive Director
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GMT	Global Management Team
HIC	High-income country
HPM	Humanitarian Programme Monitoring system
HQ	UNICEF Headquarters
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
JSP	UNICEF-Natcom Joint Strategic Plan
KII	Key Informant Interview/Interviewee
L3	Level 3 emergency
MENARO	UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office
Natcom	UNICEF National Committee
PD	Programme Division
PBR	Programme and Budget Review
PFP	Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division
PPD	Public Partnership Division
RG	Reference Group
RO	Regional Office
SSOPs	Simplified Standard Operating Procedures
TOR	Terms of Reference
UASC	Unaccompanied and separated children
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VFM	Value for Money
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

Executive Summary

Introduction

In 2015, over one million refugees and migrants, entered the European continent by sea, predominantly from Africa and the Middle East. By the end of 2017 over 1.8 million people had arrived in Europe including an estimated 432,000 children, representing 23 per cent of the total. In the face of the gravity and complexity of the situation, UNICEF launched a crisis response for affected children, building upon the ongoing work of UNICEF national committees (Natcoms) and the UNICEF EU office in Brussels. Two years into the response, and recognising that migration will be a continuing issue for Europe, UNICEF decided to take stock of its experience to learn how it might adapt its approach for future engagement on these issues.

Purpose: This participatory review was undertaken by Vine Management Consulting between November 2017 and April 2018, with the following purposes: To inform the future engagement of Europe and Central Asia Regional Office (ECARO) on migration issues in Europe, as a whole and in differing country contexts; to inform the future role of Natcoms on these issues, and to contribute relevant experience to UNICEF's global engagement on these issues. The review covered the two-year period from September 2015 to September 2017.

Focus: The review focused primarily on five high-income countries (HICs) with a combined UNICEF and Natcom 'One-UNICEF' crisis response, namely; Austria, Italy, Germany, Greece and Slovenia and has analysed the progress made in delivering against the three pillars that formed the basis of the response, namely: technical assistance, advocacy and communication, and service delivery.

Audience: The primary audience for the Review was the Regional Director for Europe and Central Asia region (ECARO), in her role as Special Coordinator for the Refugee and Migrant response. Other key stakeholders were the Reference Group, ECARO, Private Fundraising and Partnerships Division (PFP), other UNICEF regional offices and HQ divisions, plus the Natcoms. The review was overseen by an interdivisional Reference Group, chaired by the Special Coordinator.

Methodology

The methodology comprised: Document review of more than 150 documents were reviewed; 50 key informant interviews with stakeholders at HQ and regional level, and a further 100 interviews conducted during country visits, with UNICEF, Natcoms, Government, UN, INGOs and civil society organizations; two online surveys, one for partners and a second for UNICEF and Natcom staff, with 59 and 83 responses, respectively; an 'Options' workshop held in Geneva before the draft report was compiled to validate the review's preliminary findings and to begin an internal debate on future options.

Refugee and Migrant Response

In response to the rapid increase in the flow of refugees and migrants entering Europe during 2015, on 16 September the UNICEF Executive Director issued a Global Broadcast appointing the Regional Director for CEE/CIS as the Special Coordinator for the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe. The UNICEF Global Management Team (GMT) approved an Action Plan, and the crisis was designated a status similar to a Level 3 emergency (L3), giving the Special Coordinator access to the UNICEF tools for an L3 response.

Results for Children

Using data from UNICEF Humanitarian Performance Monitoring (HPM) reports, the following results for children were achieved by UNICEF over the two-year period of the refugee and migrant response

under review.¹ (HPM results, which focus mainly on service delivery, are detailed in section 5, while achievements under technical support and advocacy and communication are discussed in Section 6).

2015 only

# of children reached in child-friendly spaces	64,200
# of babies reached in mother and baby corners	26,800
# of children reached with winter clothes and other non-food items	49,100

2016 and 2017 to September, cumulative

# of children (boys and girls) who received psychosocial and other community-based child protection support in family support hubs, child friendly spaces and mother-baby corners	103,980
# of frontline workers trained on child protection standards/child protection in emergencies	5,633
# of at-risk children (including UASC) identified through screening by outreach teams and child protection support centres	16,320
# of children aged 6-17 including adolescents participating in structured education activities	13,968
# of children receiving school materials	5,826
# of children (3-5 years old) benefitting from early childhood activities	886
# of infants (under 2) who accessed mother and baby care centre services, including health services and nutrition services	10,696
# of mothers benefitted from infant and young child feeding counselling at family support hubs, child friendly spaces and mother-baby corners	8,571
# of children receiving culturally appropriate non-food items	9,490
# of children vaccinated against vaccine-preventable diseases (e.g. measles, diphtheria and polio)	12,000
# of children who received basic supplies (including clothing and baby hygiene items) to protect them from weather conditions and keep good personal hygiene	64,239
# of children and women reached with hygiene promotion and awareness activities	6,101
# of children including adolescents who participated in life-skills education	2,289

Innovations and good practices

The One-UNICEF response has demonstrated innovation and good practices in all three strategies employed.

Good practices in technical support:

- The process of developing the minimum standards for reception and accommodation centres² (Germany)
- The placement of well qualified consultants within government bodies (Greece, Italy)
- Mapping of Child Protection Systems (Slovenia, Greece)

¹ Note that data presented for 2015 and 2016 does not account for double counting and counts number of times services were accessed as opposed to individual children who received support over time and across countries. Another limitation to this data is that indicators were set by individual countries thus making compiling the data challenging. The methodology for 2017 was adjusted to avoid double counting and reflects the number of children accessing services.

² Terminology for reception and accommodation centres varied by country from asylum centres, refugee centres, reception centres and accommodation centres. In this report, the use of “accommodation centres” refers to all centres where refugees and asylum seekers were received and/or housed.

Country level good practices in advocacy and communications:

- The joint report of the UK Natcom and French Natcom 'Neither Safe nor Sound' helped to influence their governments to speed up the Dublin procedures, helping 750 children to reach the UK from France
- For International Migrants Day, in Greece, UNICEF arranged for 20 unaccompanied children from safe zones to meet to the President of the Hellenic Republic
- In France, Natcom volunteers helped to monitor the condition of children dispersed from the Calais 'jungle' to centres around France

And good practices in service delivery:

- 'Blue Dot' Child and Family Support hubs, a joint initiative of UNICEF, ICRC and UNHCR, provided combined services in one location, including; psychosocial support, legal support, care for mothers and infants, recreational activities and referrals
- The U-Report system in Italy provided real time feedback from 500 unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) and data is shared with the Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents in Palermo
- In Slovenia, cultural mediators, often refugees themselves, work to ensure that services are culturally appropriate and that the needs of children are highlighted
- In Skaramagas camp in Greece, the British Council offers innovative non-formal education for several refugee nationalities and prepares children to enter the formal school system
- Also in Greece, UNICEF has supported a Lebanese NGO to provide balanced-literacy approach mother-tongue training to teachers and field coordinators, in a multicultural, multilingual environment
- In Croatia and Serbia, UNICEF prioritised infant and young child feeding support to women on the move, who were not breastfeeding due to of lack of privacy, exhaustion and misinformation.

Key Messages from the Review

(See section 11 for details)

❖ *Migration into Europe continues*

While Europe may not see the volume and speed of inward migration witnessed in 2015 again, inward migration continues, mainly into Italy and Greece. Long-term trends are hard to predict and there may be further spikes in migration.

❖ *The crisis exposed gaps in national capacities and systems in HICs in Europe*

The refugee and migrant crisis exposed weaknesses in child protection systems in some high-income countries in Europe. Some authorities have contravened children's rights through administrative detention, refoulement, and drawn-out asylum procedures. While differing between countries, gaps in child protection capacity, policy and systems remain substantial. With the increasingly negative public attitudes to inward migration across Europe, governments may not be motivated to improve their approach without pressure from child rights organisations and from the European Union.

❖ *UNICEF mounted a minimal response in HICs during the emergency phase*

UNICEF mounted a quick crisis response in some programme countries but not in non-programme countries, where, aside from the strong advocacy and communications by UNICEF and the Natcoms, there was very little direct support provided to children by UNICEF in the nine months after the UNICEF Executive Director's emergency declaration. UNICEF was held back by a series of organisational and bureaucratic challenges. As a result, UNICEF and the Natcoms lost public profile and position with the authorities, but subsequently recovered their reputation. UNICEF will not be able to respond quickly to future crises using the same processes employed for this response.

❖ *UNICEF put children's rights 'on the map' in HICs*

During the response, UNICEF and the Natcoms succeeded in “putting children on the map,” highlighting the unique needs and rights of refugee and migrant children in this crisis and making this group a policy priority, both for governments and for human rights bodies in the countries reviewed. This represents the single most important achievement of the One-UNICEF response.

❖ *UNICEF’s role was relevant and has added value*

Given the limited scale of UNICEF’s response, it was appropriate that UNICEF focused on child protection, a niche it filled successfully. By the time of the review, UNICEF’s counterpart government ministries and bodies were highly appreciative of UNICEF’s work as an independent, expert, standard-setting international organisation, able to analyse children’s rights issues and make constructive policy and practical contributions to the improvement of national and local systems. In most cases, this complemented the already strong relationship that the Natcom had with government partners. Partners were also appreciative of UNICEF’s ability to convene international and national actors to drive change and push a child rights agenda.

❖ *The One-UNICEF response model was partially successful*

The One-UNICEF model, and its accompanying Framework for Collaboration, was an innovative approach to bringing Natcoms and UNICEF together to contribute to a combined UNICEF response to the refugee and migrant crisis. There were important joint achievements, especially in advocacy and communications. UNICEF and Natcoms gained a much better understanding and appreciation of each other’s work as a result of their experience of implementing the ‘One-UNICEF’ approach. Both UNICEF and Natcoms have been committed to making collaboration work but there have also been tensions. Important issues of leadership and accountability are still to be resolved.

❖ *UNICEF has strengthened its policy and capacity on migration*

UNICEF regions, including ECARO, were addressing refugee and migrant rights before the 2015 crisis but migration has only recently become an organizational priority for UNICEF, and the issue was previously neglected at the corporate level. UNICEF has now made up ground. It has developed policy and advocacy positions around migrant and refugee children, and increased its human resources working on the issue, though probably not sufficiently to play a leading role in this area. UNICEF has undertaken important research and generated high quality publications on the challenges faced by refugee and migrant children in Europe.

❖ *Equity gaps were not well monitored*

Neither the governments nor UNICEF have the situation analysis or collective response tracking processes to determine the gaps in the realisation of refugee and migrant children’s rights gaps in the countries reviewed. Some positive initiatives in child rights monitoring (CRM) are highlighted in the report, yet CRM remains a challenge. There are gaps in information regarding the risks to, and abuse of, refugee and migrant children’s rights including the extent to which the UNICEF Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) have been met for them. The review team did not find evidence of UNICEF monitoring equity gaps and, apart from the early months of the response.

❖ *Senior UNICEF and Natcom staff managed ambiguity*

The two Special Coordinators and other senior staff managers have shown flexibility and skill in navigating a response for which there was no precedent or pre-set procedures. Senior staff have shown capacity to manage ambiguity and find solutions in a context where many actors need to be engaged to achieve a result and where accountability was not always clear.

❖ *There is a demand for some elements of the response to continue*

UNICEF response teams, ECARO, PFP, Natcoms and the majority of government and other partners consulted agree that aspects of the work started under the refugee and migrant response should continue, especially capacity development, standard-setting, policy development, advocacy and communications, and child rights monitoring.

Recommendations

Readers are encouraged to review the full recommendations in section 12 of the report.

The review team has no position on whether UNICEF should expand its work in HICs in Europe, or on whether Natcoms should play a wider role in crisis response.

Recommendation 1: Assure the short-term future of One-UNICEF responses that are closing

- ❖ UNICEF should determine how those initiatives started during the refugee and migrant response that the governments want to see continuing can be assured.

Recommendation 2: Complete the development of the One-UNICEF response model

- ❖ UNICEF should resolve outstanding challenges within the One-UNICEF response model, using Italy as the case study.

Recommendation 3: Determine the future role of UNICEF in HICs Europe

- ❖ UNICEF should determine whether it intends to increase its attention to child rights issues in European HICs.

Recommendation 4: Determine future UNICEF and Natcom response to crises HICs in Europe

- ❖ UNICEF should determine whether and how UNICEF and/or the Natcom should respond to future crises, large or small, in HICs in Europe, in a way that ensures rapid deployment, working through the Options in 10.4. UNICEF must clarify the process required for a formal agreement with governments of non-programme HICs should another crisis response be required.

Recommendation 5: Strengthen UNICEF cross-regional programming on migration

- ❖ UNICEF should strengthen its cross-regional programming on migration, tapping into resources that donors appear keen to provide for such initiatives, and task the Directors Group on Migration to develop route-based cross regional programming on migration.

Recommendation 6: Strengthen UNICEF collaboration with UNHCR and IOM

- ❖ UNICEF should maximise the potential benefits to refugee and migrant children by strengthening its work with UNHCR and IOM at regional and country levels, building on the good regional cooperation during this crisis and taking advantage of the new global refugee and migration compacts due to be agreed in 2018.

Recommendation 7: Strengthen UNICEF advocacy on EU funding instruments for migration

- ❖ UNICEF should strengthen its influence at Brussels level over the regulations covering the country level application and oversight of the very substantial European funds going to migration initiatives within and beyond the EU to improve outcomes for refugee and migrant children.

Recommendation 8: Explain UNICEF's role to HIC governments in Europe

- ❖ Some HIC governments in Europe do not understand UNICEF's role well, but they need to, including the different roles played by UNICEF and Natcom. UNICEF should explain their respective roles to individual governments.

Recommendation 9: Present key elements of the review findings to the Global Management Team

- ❖ The Regional Director should present key elements of the review that have organisation-wide implications to the Global Management Team, and UNICEF may wish to include aspects of review findings in the background paper for the Executive Board's next discussion on UNICEF's role in HICs.

1 Introduction

In 2015, over a million refugees and migrants, entered the European continent by sea, predominantly from Africa and the Middle East. By the end of 2017, over 1.8 million people had arrived in Europe seeking protection and asylum and economic opportunity. Of these, an estimated 432,000 (23%) were children.³ The European Commission (EC) formulated a European Agenda for Migration in May 2015 and the EU agreed a 17 Point Plan for the Western Balkans Migration Route.

In the face of the gravity and complexity of the situation, on 16 September 2015 UNICEF launched a crisis response for affected children and the Regional Director for Europe and Central Asia was appointed as Special Coordinator for the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe. Two years into the response, and recognising that migration will be a continuing issue for Europe, the Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia (ECARO) decided to take stock of the experience so far, with particular reference to high-income, non-programme countries, so as to learn how it might adapt its approach for future engagement on these issues. Vine Management Consulting was contracted to undertake the Review in the period November 2017 and April 2018.⁴

2 Purpose, Objectives, Scope and Audience of the Review/Evaluation

According to the Terms of Reference (TOR), included as Annex 1, the purpose of the Review was threefold:

- ❖ To inform the future engagement of ECARO on migration issues in Europe, as a whole, and in differing country contexts.
- ❖ To inform the future role of National Committees on these issues.
- ❖ To contribute relevant experience to UNICEF's global engagement on these issues.

Also, as per the TOR, and with slight modifications agreed in the Inception Report, the four objectives of the Review were:

- ❖ Document the contribution to results for children of the UNICEF response to the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe, as a whole, and in differing country contexts, including achievements, successes, challenges and lessons learned.
- ❖ Define priorities and opportunities for the future engagement of ECARO on migration issues in Europe, as a whole and in differing country contexts.
- ❖ Identify lessons learned and recommendations to inform the future role of National Committees on migration issues in Europe, as well as UNICEF's global engagement on migration.

³ For the review, the following definitions were assumed:

A **migrant** is a "person who moves from one place to another, especially in order to find work or better living conditions."

According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a **refugee** is any person who: "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

An **asylum seeker** is someone who claims to be a refugee but whose claim hasn't been evaluated. This person would have applied for asylum on the grounds that returning to his or her country would lead to persecution on account of race, religion, nationality or political beliefs. Someone is an asylum seeker for so long as their application is pending. So not every asylum seeker will be recognised as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum seeker.

⁴ The review team comprised Simon Lawry-White, team leader; Jessica Alexander, senior review consultant; and Angus Urquhart, research analyst. (For more background on team members, see Annex 7).

- ❖ Identify modalities to ensure cost-effective and sustainable support of UNICEF to National Committees, national authorities and partners in Europe regarding refugee and migration issues, according to differing country needs, and in line with relevant global frameworks.

The review covers the period from 15 September 2015, when the Executive Director appointed the ECARO Regional Director as Special Coordinator for the Refugee and Migrant Crisis, to end September 2017.

The geographic scope of the review focuses primarily on the five high-income 'One-UNICEF' countries where UNICEF mounted a response in collaboration with Natcoms, namely: Austria, Italy, Germany, Greece and Slovenia. In these countries, UNICEF had had no status agreement or programme (so called 'non-programme' countries). At the request of the Special Coordinator, the review team also interviewed the UNICEF representatives and reviewed key documents for Croatia and Serbia to provide some additional insights from programme countries. Natcoms of three further countries where new modalities of support for the response were identified were also interviewed: France, Hungary and the United Kingdom.

The programmatic scope of the review has been an integrated analysis of UNICEF's response as an organisation, including ECARO and relevant headquarters divisions, covering the three pillars that have been the focus of this response. These were: technical assistance, advocacy and communication, and service delivery. In this report, the review team has analysed the common features of the response as a whole, while highlighting specific features of each country context, where relevant.

The results of the review may imply amendments to relevant UNICEF policy documents, such as the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (the CCCs) and the Simplified Standard Operating Procedures for Emergencies (SSOPs), or clarifications to the Cooperation Agreement with Natcoms. Proposing detailed amendments is beyond the scope of the review.

The primary client for the Review was the Regional Director for Europe and Central Asia, including in her role as Special Coordinator for the Refugee and Migrant response. Other key stakeholders were the Reference Group (see below), ECARO, other UNICEF regional offices and HQ divisions, plus the Natcoms.

3 Methodology

3.1 Approach

The review was participatory in nature and consultants have engaged a wide range of UNICEF, Natcom and external stakeholders who were, or are, involved in the refugee and migrant response. The main methodological approaches are summarized below.

This review has applied the UNEG general standards and principles for evaluation⁵. The review team ensured that their obligations (independence, impartiality, credibility, avoiding of conflicts of interest, accountability) were met and that all analyses were sufficiently transparent and explicit to produce robust and reliable findings that would be replicated by an independent team using the same evidence.

⁵ UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation
file:///C:/Users/dvakarelska/Downloads/UNEG%20Norms%20&%20Standards%20for%20Evaluation_English-2017%20(2).pdf

3.2 Desk review

More than 150 documents provided by UNICEF were reviewed, including organizational, strategic, policy and operational documents relevant to UNICEF and the Natcom response.^{6,7} Further documents were collected by the team during the review. Reports such as “*Lessons Learned from the UNICEF Response to the Refugee and Migrant Crisis*” and other reflective documents concerning UNICEF’s experience in the early phases of the response provided some analysis from programme countries to which this review has, by design, given limited attention. Documents consulted in the compilation of this report are listed in Annex 2.

3.3 Key informant interviews

Not including the country visits, key informant interviews (KIIs) have taken place with 50 stakeholders at all levels: ECARO Refugee and Migrant Response Team, ECARO regional advisers, COs in Croatia and Serbia, UNICEF Headquarters divisions (PFP, EMOPS, PPD New York and Brussels, PD, DOC, DRP), plus MENARO, Natcoms in France, UK and Hungary, UNHCR HQ, and two donors to the response. For a full list of headquarters, regional and country level interviews, see Annex 3.

3.4 Country visits to One-UNICEF response countries

Visits to the five countries under review took place during December 2017 and January 2018, with durations as specified by the evaluation managers: Austria (2 days), Germany (3 days), Greece (5 days), Italy (4 days) and Slovenia (2 days). These countries represent a wide range of operating contexts.⁸ In total, over 100 face-to-face individual and group key informant interviews were conducted with UNICEF Technical Response Teams, Natcoms, Government Ministries and Bodies, with key UN, NGO and other partners, and with the office of the Ombudsman/persons in Greece and Italy. On-site visits to accommodation centres and other points of service also took place, where possible. Solicitation of the perspectives of migrants and refugees was outside the scope of the review.⁹ At the end of each field visit, the team held a closing meeting with the UNICEF response team leader¹⁰ to provide feedback, validate initial findings and solicit further information.

3.5 Country visit feedback meetings

The review team drafted an internal aide memoire following each country visit, which outlined the main observations from each visit including key successes, challenges, good practices, and suggested ways forward. A subsequent feedback teleconference was held to discuss the aide memoires, to correct inaccuracies of findings and provide further feedback. The aide memoires were used by the review team in compiling this report but are not included amongst the products of the review.

3.6 Online surveys

Two online surveys were issued in January 2018, one for UNICEF implementing and other partners, and a second for UNICEF and Natcom staff who are, or were, part of the response.¹¹ The survey provided important additional inputs from those already interviewed, and other stakeholders not

⁶ These include: assessment reports, offers of technical support, country response plans, regional contingency plans, country updates and situation reports, minutes of all relevant meetings, policy papers, lessons learned reports, country specific materials.

⁷ A Dropbox was created to store documents and was updated throughout the review as new documents were identified. The review team would like to record its thanks for UNICEF’s efficient document management.

⁸ These countries represent a range of national contexts in terms of government capacity, attitudes and receptivity towards migration, evaluation of child protection systems, financial situation of countries, engagement of civil society, and capacity of Natcoms.

⁹ A few informal conversations were held with adolescent males in safe zones and accommodation centres in Greece and Italy

¹⁰ And in Austria and Italy with the Natcom.

¹¹ The surveys were open for two weeks and had both a short and long version (with completion times of 10 minutes and 20-25 minutes respectively) depending on the level of detail respondents were able or interested to provide.

designated by UNICEF for interview, including those no longer engaged in the response. A good response was received, with 59 partners responding, and 83 UNICEF and Natcom staff.¹² Readers of this report are strongly encouraged to review the summary survey report in Annex 4.

3.7 Workshops

Towards the end of the review, ECARO organized an 'Options' workshop with; the Special Coordinator, some Reference Group members, the current UNICEF country coordinators, and a broader group of invited stakeholders from ECARO and PFP. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for the stakeholders to discuss and comment on preliminary findings and to start a debate on future options. The workshop proved valuable to the review team in refining its analysis and recommendations.

3.8 Governance and Management of the Review

The review has been overseen by a Reference Group (RG), chaired by the Special Coordinator, and attended by the UNICEF review managers and the review team.¹³ (For membership of the RG, see Annex 5). The RG's role was to represent different parts of the organisation at director level, and to provide guidance and feedback on the conduct of the review. The RG members will eventually take ownership for the implementation of the review recommendations that UNICEF accepts. The review was managed day to day jointly by the ECARO Refugee and Migrant Response Team Senior Emergency Manager and the ECARO Monitoring & Evaluation Regional Advisor, and since January 2018 by the ECARO Monitoring & Evaluation Regional Advisor and the Associate Regional Director, ECARO.¹⁴

3.9 Consistency and Complexity

The evaluation methodology produced remarkably consistent results across the documentation, interviews and survey results, including the May 2016 report "*Lessons Learned from the UNICEF Response to the Refugee and Migrant Crisis*". However, in some areas, the review also found divergent opinions in UNICEF, more than is typical of such reviews. For example, the scale of UNICEF's response was adequate and was not adequate; the partnership with the Natcoms was successful and not successful; UNICEF should invest more in being able to respond to crises in high income countries, and it should not. These differences reflect several complex questions UNICEF now needs to answer concerning the future of its work in high income countries (HICs) in Europe, including with the Natcoms; questions which, in part, prompted the commissioning of the review. Equally, the review highlights several areas of consensus on which UNICEF can build.

On major issues of principle and policy, by presenting options, the review aims to map out the choices the organisation needs to make for the future. The review team is neutral on these questions and does not recommend a specific course of action for the organisation.

3.10 Ethical Considerations

The review was conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation' and the UNEG Code of Conduct for **Evaluation in the UN System**¹⁵. As per the TOR, the methodology only includes a desk review and interviews with staff and stakeholders. There will be no interviews with vulnerable groups or children and therefore there are no particular ethical to consider regarding the review methodology. Confidentiality of interviews and survey inputs will be maintained to ensure that any individual comments included in the report cannot be attributed to individuals or teams.

¹² Though only 9 of these from Natcoms.

¹³ No formal TOR was agreed for the RG.

¹⁴ The review team would like to record its thanks to the managers of the review and staff of the ECARO migration unit who provided excellent support to the team.

¹⁵ <http://www.uneval.org/search/index.jsp?q=ethical+guidelines>.

3.10 Limitations

The review was subject to various limitations:

- The expectations of the review were high from the outset in terms of its making recommendations that would lead to solutions for, and clarification of, UNICEF's and Natcoms' future roles in support of achievement of children's rights in HICs. Within the constraints of time and data available, the review has developed options for UNICEF's consideration, based on the learning from the response but leaves the choices to UNICEF.
- This was a review rather than an evaluation. No new evaluative information has been generated and evaluative material from country level was generally not available. The review has summarised UNICEF's results for children using the HPM output data available. Assessments on effectiveness are perception based, as data on outcomes and impacts are almost entirely lacking. The assessment depends on the documentation collected, the perceptions of a cross-section of stakeholders and the review team's observations.
- Interviews at country level were well balanced between UNICEF, Natcom, Government and partners. (In some countries, not all Natcom staff involved were interviewed) but at HQ level, there were very few external interviews: UNHCR, IOM and two donor representatives (see Annex 3).

4 Background

4.1 External Operational Context: Europe


In 2015, European states found themselves experiencing levels of mass migration not seen since World War II. During the height of the surge, there was an almost continuous flow of people moving rapidly through countries of transit where people later became stranded as a result of border closures. Mobile populations proved a challenge to the normal humanitarian systems designed for supporting static groups.

European states were unprepared for migration of this scale and scrambled to adapt and to meet needs. Despite their high or middle-income status, the refugee and migrant flows exposed the weakness in national asylum and status determination procedures¹⁶ and, in some cases, their capacity to respond. The process of refugee status determination has been very slow in some countries. The crisis revealed gaps in systems for child protection, education and health systems (for both refugee and migrant children as well as vulnerable national children), and limited capacity to absorb refugee and migrant children into education systems. In particular, for many countries, case management systems and guardianship for unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) were, and remain weak, or even absent.


The numbers and make-up of migrants through the Turkey-Greece and Libya-Italy routes have fluctuated over time, as have the proportions of children and unaccompanied children (See Graphs 1, 2 and 3)¹⁷. Refugees and migrants came from many countries, with different languages and cultural and social practices. Language barriers have been extremely challenging for refugees and service providers to surmount. (For example, providing psychosocial support to someone who only speaks Farsi can only be done in Farsi.) This, and the non-European cultural practices and social norms of refugees and migrants, have made social inclusion and integration difficult. Further, European states have tended to privilege some nationalities (Syrian/Iraqi) over others, rather than making a status determination based on the individual case for asylum.

¹⁶ Refugee Status Determination (RSD) is defined by UNHCR as the legal or administrative process by which governments or UNHCR determine whether a person seeking international protection is considered a refugee under international, regional or national law.


¹⁷ Data derived from UNHCR's Mediterranean Portal, as UNHCR is the international authority on the issue of status-determination. For more on method for status determination, see: <http://www.unhcr.org/refugee-status-determination.html>.



Graph 1. Sea arrivals in Italy and Greece in 2015 (no data on children specifically)



Graph 2. Sea arrivals in Italy in 2016-2017 (November) – 14.5% children in 2017



Graph 3. Sea arrivals in Greece in 2016-2017 (November) – 36.8% children in 2017

As the scale of migration increased throughout the second half of 2015, several deterrence measures were implemented across Europe, including tightening of border controls, building physical barriers along borders, and introducing detention policies for migrants (including migrant children). Accommodation centres were sometimes left in poor condition. Towards the end of February 2016, there were reports of tightened border controls in states all along the Balkan migration route. On March 9 2016, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia announced they would no longer allow irregular migrants into their territories from Greece, effectively closing the Western Balkan migration route. More than 60,000 refugees and migrants were stranded along the borders of these states and in Greece. The closures significantly impacted population flows and influenced UNICEF’s planning and programming for the remainder of 2016 and 2017.

On 20 March 2016, the EU-Turkey Statement came into force. This significantly stemmed the flow of refugees and migrants into Europe through Greece, by allowing refugees and migrants arriving

irregularly in Greece to be sent to Turkey on a ‘one-in one-out’ basis.¹⁸ In addition, the EU agreed to give Turkey an estimated €6 billion in financial aid to support refugees on Turkish soil.¹⁹ Consequently, thousands of asylum seekers were stranded in Greece. The relocation of those granted asylum to elsewhere in Europe has proceeded slowly.²⁰

Some children have suffered abuse as national authorities have contravened their own and European legislation by, for example, detaining children as a means of containment. Such measures have in turn exposed vulnerable children to smugglers and human traffickers, and Europol at one point reported 10,000 children missing across Europe (although these figures were questioned by UNICEF). As the UNICEF-IOM report, “Harrowing Journeys” describes, adolescents and youth face significant risks on both the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) and the Eastern Mediterranean route. However, risks are considerably higher on the CMR, where two thirds of those surveyed who had travelled through Libya reported some form of exploitation.²¹

Overall, there has been a failure of European solidarity. Only a small proportion of the promised numbers of relocations under the Dublin agreement have taken place. Germany and Sweden have been generous in accepting many thousands of spontaneous arrivals in their countries.²² However, even in Germany, the particular vulnerabilities of children have not received the necessary attention and were not seen as a high priority until UNICEF, with others, pushed the welfare of refugee and migrant children up the political agenda.

Due to reinforced border control and agreements between Libya and Europe that were aimed at stemming smuggling and dangerous migrant crossings, the numbers of refugees and migrants entering southern Europe have decreased significantly since 2015. Yet, population flows continue. By the end of 2017, 171,300 people, including some 32,000 children and at least 17,500 UASC had arrived in Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. Most are refugees that have fled from countries affected by conflicts, along with migrants searching for stability and economic opportunities. With 64 per cent of all international migrants worldwide living in high-income countries in 2017²³ (many of them legally), migration will continue to be a major concern for European countries.

4.2 Policy Context on Migration

4.2.1 European Policy

The policy landscape within Europe regarding migration has not been favourable and has prioritized keeping migrants out.²⁴ A number of relocation policies within Europe have failed to meet their objectives. **The European Agenda for Migration** was set out by the European Commission in May 2015 and detailed a plan to alleviate the pressure on Italy and Greece caused by the influx of refugees and migrants. Under the Agenda, 40,000 persons in need of international protection were to be relocated to other EU Member States.

In September 2015, a further commitment was made by European governments with an initial target to relocate an additional 160,000 refugees and migrants from Hungary, Italy and Greece. In addition

¹⁸ for every person returned to Turkey from Greece, the EU would accept one refugee from Turkey into one of its Member States

¹⁹ A small proportion of what Turkey has spent itself supporting refugees from the wars in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan

²⁰ For more on numbers resettled in EU, see European Agenda on Migration Factsheets: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information_en

²¹ ‘Harrowing Journeys’ (UNICEF/IOM – September 2017).

²² With a population of 10 million, Sweden took in 160,000 refugees in 2015. Austria also hosted around 800,000 refugees in 2015 with a population of around 8 million. Here as elsewhere, attitudes are hardening. See e.g. foreignpolicy.com, the Death of the most generous nation 10.2.2016

²³ International Migration Report, DESA, 2017.

http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf

²⁴ As noted, Germany and Sweden are the exceptions.

to the relocation programme, the Agenda includes the establishment of a €1.8 billion trust fund to address the causes of migration in countries of origin. By 4 September 2017, just 27,695 of the target of 160,000 had been relocated when the scheme came to an end. Similarly, the **Dubs Scheme**, an amendment of the 2016 UK Immigration Act which through consultation with local authorities based on capacity to receive children, capped the number that would be taken in at 480. As of February 2017, 200 children had been admitted.

The **Partnership Framework on Migration**, June 2016, combines short and long-term measures aimed at priority countries of origin and transit,²⁵ focusing on the EU's economic development activity in these countries to provide opportunities at home and address the root causes of migration.

New policies, both in Europe and globally, aim to improve the protection of refugee and migrant children in Europe. The **EU Communication on the Protection of Children in Migration** agreed in April 2017 provides a comprehensive policy framework for the protection of all children (not just for UASC) in the context of migration. It provides an anchor in terms of commitments, legislative processes and policy debates. Other policies at country level include; the first national **Safeguarding Strategy** for unaccompanied asylum seeking and refugee children in the UK; and an **EU commitment to expand resettlement and other safe legal pathways to Europe**, including from Libya.

4.2.2 Global Refugee/Migration Frameworks

The **New York Declaration** is a non-binding consensus document adopted by UN Member States in September 2016 that aims to “save lives, protect rights and share responsibility on a global scale.”²⁶ The Declaration envisaged the development of ‘separate, distinct, and independent’ Migration and Refugee Compacts.²⁷ The **Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration** will set out to protect the human rights of migrants and their integration in places of arrival. IOM will most likely be appointed as the lead agency for the Compact. UNICEF has successfully advocated, through written inputs, meeting with key member states and actively engaging in the Child Rights Initiative, for the compact to include guidelines on handling particularly vulnerable migrant children, including unaccompanied children.

UNHCR is leading on developing the **Global Compact on Refugees (GCR)**, which will consist of a **Programme of Action** for the implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF),²⁸ setting out actions that can be taken by Member States and by other stakeholders to ensure that the CRRF is implemented.²⁹

4.2.3 The Response Strategy in ECA Region

The inter-agency response strategy to the crisis in Europe took into account all circumstances taking place in the region in 2016 and 2017, such as the border closure along the Western Balkans route, and the entry into force of the EU-Turkey statement. From a response solely targeting people on the move, the overall strategy focused on a largely static population, with the majority residing in urban areas,

²⁵ Namely: Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal and Ethiopia

²⁶ The Declaration followed the release of a Secretary-General's report on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, which highlighted the need to: address root causes of migration; provide protections and assistance for those on the move; and prevent discrimination and xenophobia as part of the broader effort to support integration.

²⁷ A Special Representative of the Secretary-General for International Migration was appointed to lead the follow-up to the migration-related aspects of the New York Declaration and work with Member States in developing the first-ever global compact on migration

²⁸ The implications of the CRRF are being realised within UNHCR itself, and they are currently rolling out the CRRF to gather important experience and lessons learned to further define and strengthen the GCR. The CRRF represents a new more collaborative way of working for UNHCR in support of governments. It may open a way for further constructive engagement with UNHCR, an opportunity UNICEF should seize.

²⁹ In January 2018, UN Secretary-General Guterres presented his report, “Making Migration work for All,” which serves as a zero draft of the Global Compact on Migration. It emphasized, among other things, the impact of migration on children and that migration policies can make children more vulnerable. UNICEF is aiming to be part of the follow up process to the two Compacts due to be agreed in 2018.

while at the same time recognizing that people still continue to move in a clandestine manner through Europe, exposing them to significant protection risks.

The Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RRMRP) remains the framework for an inter-agency response to the refugee and migrant flows into Europe through the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans route. It represented a coherent and predictable package of interventions based on standardized approaches and comparative advantages of involved partners.

Alongside cooperation with governments, close cooperation with the European Commission and relevant EU Agencies was established, including the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FRONTEX) and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

The response strategy recognized the need for a coordinated and comprehensive response. It also recognized that while legal and physical restrictions have been put in place at borders along the former route, the motivation of refugees and migrants to reach further into Europe will not abate. There were therefore considerable risks that people remaining in countries along the previous route may approach smuggling networks to facilitate their onward travel, further exposing them to human rights violations and exploitation.

Overall, a nuanced and flexible approach was established to ensure that access to protection, basic services and assistance, as well as legal alternatives and assisted voluntary return were made available to people, in accordance with legal status. In light of these challenges, the strategy aimed to protect and assist refugees and migrants, while at the same time support governments in further developing and operationalizing a sustainable, comprehensive and cooperative framework for concrete action in the areas of refugee protection and migration management, consistent with international and European standards. As the operational context has been rapidly and continuously changing, partners recognized the need for the plan to remain flexible and aligned with operational realities.

4.2.3 Sustainable Development Goals

The universal nature of the **Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)** means that UN Member States will have to report on their implementation. Some SDGs have direct relevance for migration.³⁰ As noted in the UNICEF Executive Board paper “Review of UNICEF experience in high-income countries and in countries transitioning from upper-middle-income to high-income status”³¹ there may be a role for Natcoms, not only in monitoring and reporting on the SDGs but also in being called upon by governments to help achieve them.

4.3 Internal Operational Context: Evolution of the Response

4.3.1 Build up the Emergency Declaration

The numbers of migrants arriving in Italy had been steadily increasing since 2014, with Frontex warning in May of that year that the numbers were likely to increase into the summer months.³² Natcoms, PFP and Country Offices throughout Europe had been raising concerns about the migrant situation in their countries. Some Natcoms requested support from PFP on this issue. As per UNICEF rules, Natcoms could not directly respond, which put them in a difficult position vis à vis partners and funders. (See also section 9 below).

The UNICEF Brussels office, PFP and DOC began issuing communications on the plight of refugee and migrant children crossing the Mediterranean in February 2015. The first assessment mission was

³⁰ In particular, SDG 8 on planned and well-managed migration policies and SDG 10 on labour rights for migrants

³¹ UNICEF, September 2016

³² BBC World News, Europe <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27628416>

conducted by PFP and PD to Italy in July 2015. By August 2015, UNICEF Country Offices in Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYRoM) and Serbia began responding to the needs of refugee and migrant children transiting through their countries.

On 2 September 2016, the body of toddler Alan Kurdi was found dead on a Turkish beach after attempting to cross to Greece. This ‘stick of dynamite’ (interview) jolted UNICEF into realising that this was a crisis for children. On 16 September 2015, the UNICEF Executive Director issued a Global Broadcast appointing the Regional Director for CEE/CIS as the Special Coordinator for the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe, to lead and coordinate the response.³³ The Global Broadcast highlighted the root causes of the crisis in Syria and neighbouring countries as well as those in Africa (Nigeria and Eritrea, in particular), calling upon the Special Coordinator to work closely with MENARO, ESARO and WCARO, to ensure an integrated response. That same month, ECARO and PFP conducted an assessment mission to Hungary.

4.3.2 Emergency Declaration

The UNICEF Global Management Team (GMT) agreed on an Action Plan “to scale up and expand our response in countries with the greatest number of children on the move.” Cognizant of the scale and nature of the situation, the Executive Director, with the Special Coordinator’s support, proposed and crafted an “L3 like” status so that the response would have full access to the SSOPs for L3 response. There was hesitation within UNICEF to declare an emergency in European countries as L3, especially when those countries had not themselves declared an emergency. A compromise ‘L3-like’ status was established to gain access to the corporate response mechanisms for funding and fast-tracking human resources, procurement and contracting procedures.

4.3.3 Initial Response

The UNICEF response initially focused on three Western Balkan countries – Croatia, Serbia and fYRoM. As the crisis continued to unfold, UNICEF scaled up its response in partnership with Natcoms to address the needs of refugee and migrant children in an additional eight countries. UNICEF deployed international staff members in five countries – Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Slovenia, and new modalities of support were identified with Natcoms in France, United Kingdom and Hungary.

4.3.4 Response Mechanisms activated

A Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal was launched to raise US\$14,019,015 for the refugee and migrant response in 2015. The Geneva Crisis Coordination Cell (the Cell) was established³⁴ and resourced, initially, with temporary staff deployments. The Response Planning and Management TOR for Emergency Coordination and Management Team (ECMT) on Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe was issued on 28 September 2015. The objective of the ECMT was to optimize, through well-coordinated complementary contributions, the support from the organisation to scale up the response in the affected countries in accordance with the UNICEF Integrated Action Plan. The ECMT was chaired by the Special Coordinator and the first meeting took place on 18 September 2015.

The Programme and Budget Review (PBR) of January 2016 stated that the “CEE/CIS Regional Director [acts] as Special Coordinator for the Refugee and Migrant crisis in Europe [and] is responsible for the planning and coordination of the whole organisation’s response.” The Special Coordinator was to be supported by:

- A Country Coordinator in each country with no country programme presence.

³³ Special Coordinator being a similar function to Global Emergency Coordinator, as specified in the UNICEF SSOPs for an L3 response

³⁴ with the following positions: Geneva Crisis Cell Coordinator; Senior Communication Specialist; Partnerships Specialist; Knowledge Management Specialist; Programme Assistant to support the Special Coordinator

- A Technical Response Capacity, in countries where UNICEF does not have a country programme, in consultation with Natcoms, Private Fundraising and Partnerships (PFP), and other key divisions.
- A standing Emergency and Coordination Management Team (ECMT).
- A Core Group, constituted by members designated by the ECMT for inter-divisional engagement on day to day operational matters.
- Emergency Focal points³⁵

4.3.5 Assessment Missions

The first assessment mission was conducted by PFP and PD to Italy in July 2015. Subsequent assessment missions were conducted by ECARO in close collaboration with PFP and Natcoms between September and November 2015 in a further five non-programme countries; Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Slovenia. In January 2016, a second assessment team visited Italy. Offers of Technical Support were made by UNICEF to Greece and Slovenia in October 2015, and to Germany in November 2015.³⁶ By January 2016, the PBR set out the structure of the regional response and the Cell and proposed the establishment of Country Coordinator positions in Austria, Greece, Germany, Italy and Slovenia. In the same month, the first temporary Country Coordinators were deployed in Germany, Greece and Slovenia. For the first time in Europe, UNICEF began to provide technical assistance in countries in which it had had no status agreement³⁷, Country Office, or standing technical or operational capacity. Rather, UNICEF was represented by the Natcoms, which have a fundraising, advocacy and communications remit. In Greece, a legal agreement is yet to be concluded, while the formal status of UNICEF's operations in Germany is still under discussion.

4.3.6 Initial focus

The Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCC)³⁸ were the starting point for framing UNICEF's response to the crisis, though the nature of the crisis meant that an adaptive, flexible approach needed to be taken.^{39, 40} In the period to March 2016, the response focused primary on two elements: To ensure the safe and healthy passage of children on the move, and; to support the provision of social protection and integration in countries of destination.

47. The May 2016 Lessons Learned study included a useful assessment of the extent to which the CCCs were being met. It is not clear that this assessment was subsequently used or repeated.

³⁵ UNICEF offices and divisions did not have defined roles in response. The Special Coordinator, supported by the 'Cell' and ECARO more broadly, has worked in close collaboration with: 1. Private Funding and Partnerships (PFP), as the division responsible for UNICEF's relationship with Natcoms and advocacy support to Natcoms, 2. Programme Division (PD) in relation to the development of UNICEF's global policy on migration, 3. Division of Communications (DOC) in relation to all public communications related to the response, 4. Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) regarding setting up of the response mechanisms, and on application of the L3 procedures and the CCCs, 5. Public Partnerships Division (PPD) regarding public funding and advocacy with the European Commission and Parliament, 6. Division of Data, Research and Policy (DRP) on key UNICEF publications on migration and the development of the Six Policy Asks.

³⁶ And subsequently to Hungary in December 2015, Italy in February 2016 (with staff present in July 2016) and Austria in February 2016 (with staff present by April 2017).

³⁷ Although some countries (Greece and Austria, for example), have argued that UNICEF is covered by the agreements entered by their country with the UN and that a specific "host country agreement" was not required.

³⁸ 'Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action' (UNICEF – May 2010). The CCCs cover: performance monitoring; rapid assessment, monitoring and evaluation; nutrition, health; water, sanitation and hygiene; child protection; education; HIV and AIDs; supply and logistics.

³⁹ The CCCs were used in developing the checklists for the assessment missions in Europe. In practice the format of the assessment missions varies and it not always clear whether the checklist was used.

⁴⁰ Within the regional 'Lessons Learned' document May 2016, UNICEF set out the extent to which the CCCs were being met in the UNICEF response across Europe. After that, there are few references to the CCCs in the response documentation.

4.3.7 Initial Deployments

Initially, surge mechanisms were used to support Country Offices in Croatia, fYRoM and Serbia. Political conditions in Hungary were such that no progress on developing a UNICEF programme could be made and neither the Government nor the Natcom asked for UNICEF’s assistance. Advisors from within the Cell and other regional advisors made several support visits to the non-programme countries to provide technical assistance to the UNICEF teams and, sometimes, to fill gaps due to the turnover in surge deployments.

4.3.8 From Assessment to Deployment

48. Table 1 shows the progress in each country from Assessment Mission to first FT deployments.

Country	Assessment mission	Offer of technical support	Agreement signed (Exchange of letters / Joint Declaration)	Time from assessment to UNICEF/govt agreement	Deployment of Country Co-ordinator	Time from assessment mission to deployment of Country Coordinator in-country
Austria	23-26 Nov 2015	15 Feb 2016	27 June 2017	498 days ⁴¹	April 2017	1 year 5 months
Germany	3-6 Nov 2015	16 Nov 2015	14 Dec 2015	38 days	Jan 2016 (temp) June 2016 (full)	59 days
Greece	9-12 Oct 2015	10 Nov 2015	No formal agreement		Jan 2016 (temp) July 2016 (full)	7 months
Hungary	14-15 Sept 2015	3 Dec 2015	No international UNICEF presence agreed			
Italy	July 2015; 18-22 Jan 2016	22 Feb 2016	27 May 2016	90 days	July 2016 (full)	6 months
Slovenia	23-24 Oct 2015	28 Oct 2015	21 Dec 2015	58 days	Jan 2016 (temp) July 2016 (full)	78 days

Table 1: Progress in operationalising UNICEF response in One-UNICEF countries

4.3.9 Framework for UNICEF-Natcom collaboration

The intended cooperation between UNICEF and Natcoms was detailed in the March 2016 paper, ‘Implementing UNICEF Response to the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in countries with Natcom Presence: Framework for collaboration between the different teams involved’ (referred to as the Framework for Collaboration).⁴² The paper recognized the Natcoms’ work in policy advocacy, public awareness raising, fundraising and child rights education, but also maintained the Natcom’s scope of work within the parameters of the Cooperation Agreement (i.e. within the so-called ‘red lines’), excluding the Natcoms from any role in technical assistance or service delivery.⁴³


4.3.10 Response Funding Received and Utilised

Graph 4 shows the funding contributed by donors over the course of the crisis from 2015 to 2017. The European Commission’s European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), is, by some distance, the largest donor to UNICEF’s response, contributing US\$19.3 million, almost four times as much as the second most generous contributor, the German Committee of UNICEF (US\$5.2 million). In total, the crisis response has received contributions from 16 UNICEF Natcoms, while public funds have been contributed by five national governments.

⁴¹ Austria first made a provisional response and then only in June 2017 made a formal agreement.

⁴² Signed off by the Special Coordinator, PFP, and the Standing Group he mechanism representing the Executive Directors of all Natcoms.

⁴³ Key principles regulating the cooperation included: UNICEF and the Natcom will contribute to one UNICEF Response in each country; a spirit of trust and full collaboration will be established; the role of Natcoms in each country and their relationship with the government will be recognised; systematic and timely consultation and information sharing methodology will be established.



Graph 4: Contribution by Donors 2015-2018⁴⁴

Table 2 shows the non-thematic funding received by UNICEF Country Offices and One UNICEF response countries. Greece received the most, US\$21.1 million over three years of the crisis, almost five times as much as the second recipient, Serbia, at US\$4.3 million. Austria, where the UNICEF response was deployed only in April 2017, received just US\$118,750.

Country	2015	2016	2017*	Total
Austria	-	-	118,750	118,750
Croatia	1,218,000	-	-	1,218,000
fYRoM	1,352,636	921,411	56,084	2,330,131
Germany	-	1,740,914	944,687	2,685,601
Greece	-	10,090,930	11,033,901	21,124,831
Italy	-	-	2,181,574	2,181,574
Serbia	1,466,233	694,444	2,143,624	4,304,301
Slovenia	-	956,401	118,750	1,075,151
CEE/CIS RO	1,895,420	-	105,000	2,000,420

Table 2: Non-thematic funding (US\$): recipients 2015-2017 (as at 28.11.2017)

In January, the multi-agency Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for 2016 set out a coordinated approach to the crisis.⁴⁵ A new UNICEF HAC was then released in January 2016 with an initial fundraising total for the response of US\$30,822,000, subsequently revised up to US\$31,375,228 in June 2016. The scope of the 2016 HAC included responses in countries with children on the move (Croatia, Greece, Serbia, Slovenia, fYRoM and Turkey), countries of destination and contributions to the regional and global response. The scope of the 2017 HAC was similar to that of the 2016 HAC but with an increased funding target of US\$43,452,000.⁴⁶

4.3.11 Significant change in circumstances

With the closure of the Western Balkan route and the agreement of the EU-Turkey statement, the response needed to adapt to attending to the needs of those children unable to proceed on their journeys. UNICEF's response therefore adapted to providing longer-term support and assistance across a broader range of issues (detailed in sections 5 and 6 below).

4.3.12 UNICEF Response Review Meeting and Workshop on Migration Policy

In February 2016, CEE/CIS RO and EMOPS held the first multi-stakeholder consultation and review of the response, with over 50 stakeholders, to reflect on successes and challenges of the response thus far and to plan for the next phase of the response. The results informed a June 2016 workshop held

⁴⁴ Op cit, 'Resource Mobilisation Update' (Dec. 2017)

⁴⁵ UNICEF also produced Regional Consolidated Contingency Plans in April and November 2016, detailing potential scenarios in the evolution of the refugee and migrant crisis and planned UNICEF responses to these scenarios.

⁴⁶ The budget for 2018 is some 25% lower than for 2017, back to US\$31 million approx.

in Istanbul, attended by the Cell and representatives from all regional and country offices concerned, to discuss migration challenges, responses and emerging needs and priorities. Proposals for future work directions for UNICEF's engagement in migration emerged in the areas of policy, programme, partnership and internal coordination. Initial policy 'asks' were outlined, precursors of the six Global Policy Asks later elaborated in UNICEF's September 2016 'Uprooted' report.

4.4 **Internal Context: Corporate plans and commitments relevant to migration response**

Internal UNICEF policy documents (described below) have highlighted the universality of UNICEF's mandate and its consequent commitment to protect and promote the rights of all children, everywhere. UNICEF policy reports describe the growing interconnectedness of migration issues and the potential spill-over from one country to another and the implications for UNICEF's preparedness and programming. UNICEF has maintained a neutral position, neither actively promoting nor discouraging migration, while at the same time ensuring that the organisation advocate effectively in the best interests of children and holds governments to account.

4.4.1 'HICs' Board paper

The **Review of UNICEF experience in high-income countries and in countries transitioning from upper-middle-income to high-income status** paper (September 2016) notes the need to adapt programmatic responses and institutional structures to engage in high income countries. The paper recognises the value of investments in HICs from a fundraising perspective but also the need to engage at a programmatic level where promoting the best interests of the child becomes necessary.

The paper describes Natcoms as "legally independent non-governmental organizations created for the purposes of advancing children's rights and well-being globally through resource mobilization, advocacy and other activities in their respective territories, thereby advancing the mission of UNICEF." As the paper notes, in many cases, UNICEF is the only UN agency to maintain regular engagement within HICs, through its Natcoms.⁴⁷ The paper concludes that "UNICEF should continue to be flexible and innovative in developing different programming and engagement approaches for differing contexts"; and, "A universal approach to child rights is proving to provide other benefits as well, notably including synergies between programme work and fundraising in countries with higher GNI per capita, as well as horizontal cooperation and the sharing of lessons, evidence and innovations."

4.4.2 Recognition Project

The **Recognition Project** was introduced in January 2018 with a ED's Decision Memo on a "New System of Recording, Reporting and Costing of Advocacy for UNICEF." The Memo argues that advocacy activities should be seen as an investment in the promotion of children's rights and therefore a Natcom contribution, rather than an operating cost⁴⁸. It notes that the Cause Framework demands increasingly that Natcoms invest in advocacy to further UNICEF's goals for each global UNICEF campaign. As per the memo, as of January 2018, UNICEF considers up to 5 per cent of Natcoms contribution to children to originate from advocacy.

4.4.3 Volunteering

UNICEF is developing a **Volunteer Force for Children** to build a membership cadre of millions of UNICEF volunteers to carry out a number of actions including organizing events, advocacy, fundraising, and service delivery. An interactive Action Hub is envisioned with separate portals to support each

⁴⁷ Prior to the refugee and migrant crisis in Europe, Natcoms had had limited programmatic collaboration with UNICEF, for instance in Italy in 2009 in response to the L'Aquila earthquake and in 2011 to the Japanese tsunami. "Partnerships between the National Committees and UNICEF for programme and policy work in some HICs...have been largely financed from domestic resources in the countries concerned."

⁴⁸ The Memo highlights global trends such as the 2030 Agenda (which will oblige all countries to report on advances in human rights and development over the next 15 years); the significant advocacy work that Natcoms conducted as part of the European Migration response (which was considered a cost, not a contribution);

national effort through information sharing, trainings and briefings from UNICEF staff, with opportunities to get involved. Natcoms are considered a critical part of this mobilization effort and already have extensive volunteer networks in their countries. Although the possible role of Natcom volunteers in the response was considered, perceived challenges related to the vetting, training and monitoring of qualified volunteers meant that they were not utilised. Some volunteered with other organizations, such as the Red Cross.

5 Results for Children

49. Table 3 shows the areas in which UNICEF reported response activities, as of September 2017⁴⁹.

Country	Advocacy and Communication	Training and capacity building	Outreach to children at risk	Health and Nutrition (Inc. psychosocial)	Education	WASH	Activities with adolescents	Child rights monitoring	Basic supplies	Technical assistance	Legal counselling
Austria	✓	✓					✓			✓	
Bulgaria	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Croatia	✓	✓		✓	✓			✓		✓	
FYRoM	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	
Germany	✓	✓			✓			✓		✓	
Greece	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Italy	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	
Serbia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	
Slovenia	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓

Table 3: UNICEF Response Activities as of September 2017

Tables 4, 5, and 6, below, detail the progress made by UNICEF against selected Humanitarian Performance Monitoring (HPM) indicators, based on the Consolidated Emergency Reports for 2015 and 2016 and the Regional Situation report from September 2017.

In 2016, performance against the selected targets appears to have varied markedly between countries. In Croatia, Serbia and the fYRoM, performance exceeded targets in almost all areas. Slovenia exceeded targets for the provision of psychosocial support but fell short in other areas. Notably in Greece the results achieved were some way below the targets set across the range of indicators. In Germany, performance was measured against just one HPM target, the training of frontline workers in child protection standards. Targets established before the closure of Balkan route became irrelevant in the changed circumstances.

In the results for 2017, covering the period January to the end of September, performance against the targets continued to vary across countries and between indicators. Greece has exceeded its targets for the provision of health and nutrition and is close to achieving targets for most of its other indicators. UNICEF appears to be having success, as measured against its targets, in identifying children at risk, with most countries close to achieving or exceeding their annual targets. This is

⁴⁹ Information taken directly from the UNICEF regional situation report (Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe - Humanitarian Situation Report #25

particularly evident in Italy where 11,152 children at risk have been identified, against a target of 4,700.

50. Performance against educational targets in 2017 appears to be generally positive, with Italy, Serbia and fYRoM surpassing their targets. Targets for WASH and basic supplies services have been exceeded in Italy and in Serbia, with twice the number of children reached than planned.

Overall regional results	Results in 2015
# of children reached in child-friendly spaces	64,200
# of babies reached in mother and baby corners	26,800
# of children reached with winter clothes and other non-food items	49,100

Table 4: 2015 – Combined Regional Results⁵⁰

Summary of results – UNICEF and Implementing Partner Response			
Country	Target	Result	% achieved
# of children who received psychosocial support in family support hubs, child friendly spaces and mother-baby corners			
Greece	6,000	2,654	44%
Slovenia	3,200	3,811	119%
fYRoM	33,000	35,508	107%
Serbia	30,200	38,513	128%
Croatia	18,000	17,511	97%
# of frontline workers trained on child protection standards / child protection in emergencies			
Greece	200	135	67%
Germany	2,000	50	2%
Slovenia	500	236	47%
fYRoM	150	325	217%
Serbia	200	447	223%
Croatia	200	182	91%
# of children-at-risk (including UASC) identified and referred to specialised care/services			
Greece	2,000	524	26%
# of infants (under 2) who accessed mother and baby care centre nutrition services			
Greece	600	316	53%
Serbia	3,400	6,690	197%
Croatia	1,600	1,582	99%
# of women who accessed infant and young child feeding counselling at family support hubs, child friendly spaces and mother-baby corners			
Greece	1,200	431	36%
Slovenia	150	83	55%
fYRoM	110	130	118%
Serbia	3,500	4,821	138%
Croatia	1,900	1,713	90%
# of children vaccinated against vaccine-preventable diseases (e.g. measles, diphtheria and polio)			
Greece	25,000	12,000	48%
# of children who received basic supplies (including clothing and baby hygiene items) to protect them from weather conditions and keep good personal hygiene			
Greece	10,000	1,191	12%
Slovenia	400	83	21%
fYRoM	20,960	21,212	101%
Serbia	21,200	25,124	118%
Croatia	17,600	16,629	94%
# of children and women reached with hygiene promotion and awareness activities			
Greece	10,000	6,101	61%
# of children including adolescents who participated in structured education activities			
Greece	10,000	7,165	72%
# of children including adolescents who participated in life-skills education			
Greece	5,000	2,289	46%

⁵⁰ Op cit, 'Consolidated Emergency Report 2015', p. 13

Table 5: 2016 Combined Regional Results⁵¹

Note: while operations began in Italy in July 2016, the Consolidated Emergency Report 2016 notes that “as the context changed and the number of arrivals evolved, challenges arose in defining the targets for Italy.”⁵² A target and results framework was developed in 2016 for monitoring in 2017.

Summary of Results – UNICEF and Implementing Partner Response			
Sector/Country	Targets 2017	Total Results	% achieved
Child Protection			
# of children (boys and girls) received psychosocial and other community-based child protection support in family support hubs, child friendly spaces and mother-baby corners			
Greece	6,000	8,188	136%
Serbia	4,800	3,558	74%
# of frontline workers trained on child protection standards/child protection in emergencies			
Austria	500	570	114%
Croatia	50	47	94%
Germany	775	2,100	271%
Greece	500	556	111%
Italy	1,000	1,660	166%
Serbia	300	272	91%
Slovenia	200	580	290%
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	150	164	109%
# of at-risk children (inc. UASC) identified through screening by outreach teams and child protection support centres			
Greece	2,000	2,853	143%
Italy	4,700	7,033	150%
Serbia	1,000	4,717	472%
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	150	280	187%
Education			
# of children aged 6-17 including adolescents participating in structured education activities			
Greece	5,000	4,884	98%
Italy	700	2,106	301%
Serbia	4,000	2,035	51%
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	150	197	131%
# of children receiving school materials			
Greece	5,000	7,232	145%
# of children (3-5 years old) benefitting from early childhood activities			
Greece	1,500	1,164	78%
Health and Nutrition			
# of infants (under 2) accessed mother and baby care centre services, including health services and nutrition services			
Greece	1,000	1,782	178%
Serbia	1,600	1,540	96%
# of mothers benefitting from infant and young child feeding counselling at family support hubs, child friendly spaces and mother-baby corners			
Greece	1,000	1,561	156%
Serbia	1,000	1,000	100%
WASH and Basic Supplies			
# of children receiving culturally appropriate non-food items			
Italy	1,000	1,195	120%
Serbia	4,800	9,473	197%

Table 6: 2017 – Combined Regional Results⁵³

⁵¹ Op cit, 'Consolidated Emergency Report 2016', p. 12

⁵² Op cit, 'Consolidated Emergency Report 2016', p. 12

⁵³ Op cit, 'Consolidated Emergency Report 2017', pp. 12-25

6 UNICEF Achievements by Response Strategy

The main achievements in the One-UNICEF response in the areas of technical support, communications and advocacy and service delivery are outlined below:

6.1 Technical Support

6.1.1 Prioritizing children

The most important contribution of the One-UNICEF response was its success, in concert with the other child rights organisations, in ‘putting children on the map’, highlighting the unique needs and rights of refugee and migrant children in this crisis and making this group a policy priority both for governments and for human rights bodies. For example, in Slovenia, where the Ministry of the Interior was the main counterpart for migration issues, UNICEF facilitated the direct involvement and ownership of the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities on issues related to children. As one partner reflected, “Without UNICEF, migrant children would not be on the radar of the Government.”

6.1.2 UNICEF as a valued partner

Some governments reported being sceptical of UNICEF’s presence at the outset, thinking that UNICEF would be monitoring them, without understanding UNICEF’s role as a normative and operational United Nations agency. As UNICEF built relationships with and among governments and NGOs, often facilitated by the Natcom, they came to be seen as a trusted and reliable partner, making a highly relevant whose contribution. In the partner survey, one respondent noted UNICEF’s ability to “bring actors together, to influence decision making process, [and] to take action in order for needs to be met.”⁵⁴ Others commented on UNICEF’s “prestige and its capacity to ‘open doors’ of the authorities”, and that “UNICEF as an international organisation is able to communicate/interact with the government in a different way” (i.e. different from NGOs).

UNICEF has been recognized for bringing needed international expertise, (in Germany, partners appreciated UNICEF’s perspective of ‘this is how it works elsewhere’), introduction of new terms (such as ‘best interests of the child’), and approaches and methods to responding to gaps in child protection and human rights (such as psychosocial support and cultural mediators). Ultimately, the work has strengthened UNICEF’s credibility and image in One-UNICEF countries with governments and partners, who welcomed UNICEF support, partnership and engagement and, in some cases, want to see the partnership extended.

6.1.3 Convening Role

UNICEF’s name has carried weight for convening disparate partners around children’s rights. Long-term staff have demonstrated their skill in identifying, engaging, rallying actors and garnering consensus across sectors on the refugee and migrant response. In some countries, UNICEF is performing an important facilitation role in support of governments. In Germany, UNICEF has been effective in co-leading the ‘National Initiative for the Protection of Refugees and Migrants in Refugee Accommodation Centres’ with the Ministry of Family Affairs. The Initiative has engaged over 30 national and international organisations to promote partnership, develop standards for accommodation centres, build capacity, conduct CRM, and lead in advocacy and communication. In Austria, partners were impressed by UNICEF’s ability to bring over 20 different partners together to develop the Child Protection System Standards and noted that active participation and engagement has been maintained over time, due to the professionalism and value of these meetings.

⁵⁴ Other partner comments to this effect include: “UNICEF was able to take the coordinating role and to gather actors from governmental and civil sector. Being well positioned to negotiate with the governmental bodies in charge of refugee crisis management, UNICEF was able to influence their policies and to ensure that the needs of children are met.”

6.1.4 Partnerships

Working in HICs, UNICEF has had access to strong civil society partners and the majority of its partnerships have yielded strong results. At regional level, the partnership with IOM and UNHCR has been quite strong. At country level, UNICEF's relationships with the two organisations have been the usual mix of cooperation and competition. Both organizations were disappointed that UNICEF was not providing direct services to children earlier, but have appreciated UNICEF's added value since its mobilisation. In Italy and Greece, in particular, partners want UNICEF to remain engaged for future. At Geneva level, all three organisations could be doing more to promote collaboration at country level.

6.1.5 Capacity Building

The crisis exposed gaps in knowledge and understanding of child rights concepts and approaches in HICs. Informants agreed that UNICEF has played a significant role in developing capacity in these areas. By the end of 2017, UNICEF had reached more than 6,300 frontline workers with training on protection standards, mental health and psychosocial support and other child protection-related topics.⁵⁵ In their survey, partners gave a high score of 83 per cent to UNICEF's 'building the capacity of front line workers'. In Austria, front-line service providers in 8/9 Federal States attended the UNICEF training of basic measures to prevent abuse violence and neglect of children in refugee and migrant settings. 60 government officials of the Ministry of Interior participating in similar training in Vienna.

In Slovenia, significant progress was made in building competencies of professionals, from frontline workers to policy makers, and staff working in accommodation centres. Training focused on competency gaps including; psychosocial support, child rights, and child friendly forensic interviewing (for the Ministry of Justice). UNICEF developed a module on child protection, which is now integrated into the social work licensing system and also supported an interdisciplinary Lifelong Learning course on child protection that highlights refugee and migrant children. Similarly, in Serbia, UNICEF advocacy and technical assistance to authorities has resulted in the mainstreaming and full integration of the 2016 Child Protection Standard Operating Procedures into the mandatory Instruction for Social Welfare Institutions issued by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In Italy, through the University of Palermo, UNICEF funded the training of frontline workers interacting with unaccompanied children, including educators, lawyers, and cultural and linguistic mediators.

6.1.6 Child Rights Monitoring

Child Rights Monitoring has been constrained in several countries, due to poor data collection by the government as well as the decentralized system in many states. Despite these obstacles, UNICEF has contributed to strengthening the evidence base on refugee and migrant children. In Germany, UNICEF has developed CRM partnerships and conducted national advocacy on child rights indicators for refugee and migrant children. Using evidence, UNICEF drafted a technical brief on strengthening the role of child and youth welfare services in accommodation centres that was widely acknowledged and disseminated by partners. UNICEF has contributed to the consultations of the national CRC Coalition, the Family Ministry, the CRC Monitoring Centre of Germany and to the development of child rights indicators in Germany.

In Greece, UNICEF has contributed to a significant improvement in the management of data regarding unaccompanied children by EKKA (National Centre for Social Solidarity). EKKA now generates the only authoritative data concerning UASC in Greece, including graphical dashboard representation, which has been instrumental in informing child protection service providers, policy makers and donors, both in Greece and, reportedly, in Brussels. A web-based data collection system is under development. The data, together with regular child rights monitoring visits, has enhanced the Office of the Greek Deputy Ombudsman for Children's Rights' advocacy on behalf of uprooted children.

⁵⁵ According to the Regional SitRep #26; January 2018 which combines results for Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Slovenia has also trained up to 700 frontline workers and Austria an additional 500.

In Slovenia, the UNICEF team was closely involved in developing national child rights indicators for all children, working with the Child Rights Observatory.

In Hungary, accessing information about the situation for children in detention is extremely challenging. The Government did not accept UNICEF's offer of technical assistance, and UNICEF could not access the detention centres. In order to monitor the conditions of refugee and migrant children, UNICEF partnered with the Hungarian Helsinki Committee to obtain basic qualitative data. With UNICEF support, the Committee drafted a report, **Two Years After: What's Left of Refugee Protection in Hungary?** (September 2017) which strongly decried national policies towards migrants and reported that the Government had "willingly destroyed [the] asylum system." Although the Natcom feels powerless to make changes in the current political environment, the report is an important advocacy tool, summarizing the violations and ongoing protection risks to migrants in Hungary.

6.1.7 Guardianship

Guardianship for UASC continues to be a concern across most countries and UNICEF has made some progress in this area. In Slovenia, UNICEF facilitated a visit of government counterparts to the Netherlands to learn about their models of support for UASC, including foster care arrangements and community-based accommodation solutions. This enabled the Slovenian Government to develop multi-tier, long-term solutions for UASC. In Northern Italy, a pilot project for alternative care through foster families is being implemented in collaboration with the CNCA (National Council of Foster Families) for 50 children. UNICEF has also partnered with the Ombudsperson of Sicily and the National Ombudsperson to train 320 guardians, with a coordination mechanism established to support volunteer guardians. The Ministry of the Interior sees these as good practices that can be spread to other parts of the country. In Greece, following extensive advocacy and with UNICEF and UNHCR support, a new semi-independent living scheme for UASC is expected to be piloted in 2018 under the leadership of the Public Prosecutor, which UNICEF will support through the development of a procedural framework and minimum standards.

6.1.8 Education

In Greece, UNICEF has provided non-formal education for refugee and migrant children, not all of whom could be absorbed into the formal school system and has given them support to be 'school ready'. In 2017, UNICEF established a 'Joint Action Plan' with the Ministry of Education to formalize and further strengthen their relationship as well as outline shared priorities. This, and the UNICEF leadership of the Working Group for the Education of Refugee Children, are greatly appreciated by the State Secretary for Education. In 2017, with UNICEF support, the Serbian Ministry of Education developed a national strategy on the education of refugee and migrant children. UNICEF has supported the authorities through technical and coordination assistance, capacity building of schools and a monitoring framework for inclusion of refugee and migrant children into the education system.

6.2 Good Practices in Technical Support

6.2.1 Process of developing Minimum Standards for Protection – Germany and Austria

National Minimum Standards for the Protection of Children, Adolescents and Women in Accommodation Centres. The German Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth partnered with UNICEF and child protection partners to develop National Minimum Standards for the Protection of Children, Adolescents and Women in Accommodation Centres. Although not legally binding, the Standards provide a set of recommendations that authorities and service providers can choose to follow. No formal evaluation of the effect of the Standards on reception and accommodation centres has been conducted. However, the inclusive and consultative process of developing the Minimum Standards supported by UNICEF was noted by many stakeholders as having been exemplary.

The highly participatory and consultative process by which the standards were developed increased the engagement of authorities and other stakeholders at national, regional and local levels. The

standards were being rolled out to 100 accommodation centres during 2017/2018. An interdisciplinary Training Package and Toolkit has reached over 2,500 refugee centre managers, protection coordinators, volunteers and staff across Germany. Formal evaluations of the trainings provided positive feedback on content, relevance and delivery. Reception and accommodation centre managers and protection coordinators have access to several lines of support: on the job support provided by a UNICEF programme specialist (field outreach manager), a ‘buddy system’ connecting the less experienced protection coordinators with the more experienced, local/regional networks for sharing experiences, and webinars.

The revised Minimum Standards continue to be presented as a good practice example for other countries, for instance in Austria, where they were adapted to the local context. While the standards have yet to be rolled out there, partners also described the participatory process of developing the standards as being as critical as the standards themselves.

6.2.2 Placing consultants within government bodies – Greece

UNICEF has placed eight well qualified national consultants in various Greek ministries and bodies to provide direct technical support, including EKKA, the ministries of education and migration policy, and in office of the Deputy Ombudsperson for children. All these partners were very satisfied with this model because the expertise of the consultants and the results achieved. With this UNICEF support, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for children⁵⁶ has formed of a network of child protection organisations to provide information with which to formulate formal requests to the authorities for action regarding child protection and education. In Italy, UNICEF is supporting a CRM officer placed with the Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents in Palermo.

6.2.3 Child Protection System Mapping - Slovenia

The Child Protection System Mapping in Slovenia was ‘eye-opening’ for Ministries, allowing them to recognize the gaps in the system. A coordinating body has been established, the Council for Children and Families (C4CF), chaired by MoLFSAE0, to monitor child well-being, prepare the yearly State of the Child Report for the Government and develop policies based on a UNICEF supported child well-being index. UNICEF is currently undertaking a mapping of child protection systems in Greece, which, although felt to be overdue, is very much welcomed by stakeholders and considered a potential first step in building a strategy for the reform of national child protection systems.

6.3 Advocacy and Communications

Advocacy and communications are widely recognized as strong aspects of the One-UNICEF refugee and migrant response, with numerous publications, policy documents and press statements being issued. Advocacy and communications by some Natcoms prior to the crisis was seen as having been critical to children’s right being prioritised in some countries during the crisis. The UNICEF-Natcom survey rated ‘public communications’ and ‘advocating for the rights of children,’ as the highest performing areas of the response, scoring 81 and 82 per cent respectively. Partners gave their highest rating to UNICEF for ‘advocating for the rights of refugee and migrant children’, at 85 per cent.⁵⁷ These high ratings are consistent with UNICEF having adopted advocacy and policy advice as its main mode of engagement in Europe, working with Natcoms.

⁵⁶ The Deputy Ombudsman recently resigned

⁵⁷ One respondent summarised UNICEF’s success in this area: “Given the fact that UNICEF was not really ‘operational’ in the frontline states (Greece, Italy) nor in the countries of destination during the height of the crisis and only supportive on flow through the Balkans, it is noteworthy that UNICEF succeeded in capturing the greatest share of voice on refugee and migrant children (compared to UNHCR and IOM as well as other agencies).” UNICEF was deemed to be successful in “drawing public, media and partners’ attention to the crisis and situation on the ground; bringing a personal touch by publishing human stories”. Another respondent similarly asserted that UNICEF successfully implemented “high level child rights-based advocacy, monitoring and reporting situation and rights violations, signalling priority areas for action.”

6.3.1 Global Policy Reports and Publications

At the start of the crisis, there was a dearth of migration policy or advocacy materials within UNICEF. Apart from the Joint UNHCR-UNICEF report, “**Safe and Sound**” (2014) which aimed to support EU states in applying the best interests principle when dealing with UASC, UNICEF lacked policy positions on issues such as returns, safe legal pathways, and detention. The Natcoms had perspectives from their individual countries, and PFP started an advocacy working group with Natcoms, Brussels office and PD in May 2015. Coordination of a harmonized global position did not begin until December 2015. As the crisis unfolded, the issue of migration rapidly increased in profile in UNICEF corporately. Despite some internal hesitation to speak out without demonstrable results from field programmes, and reluctance to upset relations with donor states within Europe, UNICEF began developing its positions on migration. These were later organized through the **Cause Framework** - an integrated approach to communication, advocacy, public engagement. After a lengthy consultation process, several Advocacy Briefs were released,⁵⁸ focused on the experience of migration from the perspective of children:

- Exploitation, trafficking and smuggling can be avoided – October 2016
- The Right of the Child to Family Reunification – May 2016
- A call for effective guardianship for unaccompanied and separated children – August 2016
- A home away from home for refugee and migrant children (on detention and accommodations) – August 2016
- On Issues Related to Return of Children and Border Control (undated)
- Improving children’s future through access to education (December 2016)

UNICEF’s Six Policy Asks⁵⁹ were largely derived from the Advocacy Briefs and provided clear UNICEF positions on issues related to children and migration. They first appeared in the ‘**Uprooted**’ report (September 2016), whose title was used for the Uprooted Campaign.⁶⁰ Although deemed late, they have provided a platform on which UNICEF has advocated consistently and vocally. The Six Asks form the basis for the UNICEF **Global Programme Framework for Children on the Move** (November 2017). The framework sets out a series of programmatic principles that are intended to guide their implementation. For each Ask, the background context, a theory of change and key interventions are provided.⁶¹ The Framework was not intended to be a ‘how-to’ guide for implementation, but aims to bring expertise, guidance and resources in other areas of programmes into a coherent migration-related framework. That said, field practitioners mentioned that further practical detail was needed to make it useful.

Another UNICEF policy document, **A Child is Child** (May 2017), highlights the significant numbers of unaccompanied children in the migration to Europe. It notes that where barriers to legal migration exist, children are forced to find other ‘underground’ ways to move and are often forced into the arms of smugglers or traffickers. **Harrowing Journeys** (September 2017) details the dire experience of children seeking to cross the Mediterranean to Europe. **Beyond Borders** (November 2017) promotes the uptake of the Six Policy Asks in the two Global Compacts, using examples from around the world to show how each Ask has been successfully addressed in practice. The Child Alert, **A Deadly Journey for Children: The Central Mediterranean Migrant Route** (February 2017) provides an in-depth look at

⁵⁸ Subsequent Advocacy Briefs were released on Dublin Reform (undated), and Health Care (January 2017)

⁵⁹ The six policy asks are: 1. Protect child refugees and migrants, particularly unaccompanied children, from exploitation and violence; 2. End the detention of children seeking refugee status or migrating; 3. Keep families together as the best way to protect children and give children legal status; 4. Keep all refugee and migrant children learning and give them access to health and other quality services; 5. Press for action on the underlying causes of large scale movements of refugees and migrants; 6. Promote measures to combat xenophobia, discrimination and marginalization in countries of transit and destination. The policy asks are attached in Annex 8.

⁶⁰ one of the four integrated global campaigns under the Cause Framework that has served as the umbrella structure for later reports.

⁶¹ Specifically, the Framework provides: •Overall guidance on the relevant normative framework for each of the core policy asks •A graphical and narrative Theory of Change for each policy ask, including key programme interventions to practically implement the policy asks; •Recommendations on monitoring and measuring the proposed interventions.

the extreme risks facing refugee and migrant children as they make the perilous journey from sub-Saharan Africa into Libya and across the sea to Italy and was used to advocate in the Italian Parliament. UNICEF and Natcoms have been active, vocal and opportunistic, drawing attention to critical issues for children, especially UASC. In October 2016, when the Europol announcement that 10,000 children were missing in Europe, UNICEF built a narrative around protection systems failing children, and used it as an opportunity to shine light on underlying issues making children vulnerable.

6.3.2 EU-level Advocacy

The UNICEF PPD Office in Brussels, in cooperation with ECARO, positioned itself with the European Commission, UNHCR and IOM as an expert informant on key legislative policy developments around technical issues such as guardianship, age assessment, and fingerprinting. The UNICEF global reports on migration were found to have most impact where they were directly applicable to Member States. Natcom inputs were valuable in tailoring advocacy to each country context.

UNICEF has consistently advocated for a child focused response. In April 2016, UNICEF helped to convene a meeting in Palermo, with the Italian Natcom and the Co-chair of the Intergroup on children's rights of the European Parliament, which led to the **Palermo Call for Action**, which listed ten priorities for the protection of refugee and migrant children. By April 2017, the EC presented the **Policy Framework on Children** and UNICEF was invited to speak at the European Council meeting announcing the framework. This platform has elevated the issue of the detention of refugee and migrant children, amongst others, and is likely to further influence EU funding and legislative processes such as Dublin Reform.

6.3.3 Advocacy with Partners

Cooperation with UNHCR and IOM in Geneva has been positive, and the Special Coordinator is seen to have been proactive in initiating joint approaches between the three organizations. They co-organized regular joint briefings to Member States in Geneva, starting in November 2015, to provide situation updates and advocate for improved protection of refugee and migrant children and families. Although inter-agency collaboration has since reduced, the joint work of the three organizations is regarded as a good practice to build on.

To address the gaps in implementing regional and national laws affecting UASC, UNHCR, UNICEF and IRC co-led regional consultations involving over 100 experts in arrival, transit and destination countries. These meetings identified promising practices and provided technical support to European States to ensure improved protection and care for foreign UASC. The consultations led to seven recommendations being presented in the report, **'The Way Forward to Strengthened Policies and Practices for Unaccompanied and Separated Children in Europe'** (July 2017).

6.3.4 Communications

Natcoms started to communicate the challenges faced by growing numbers of refugees and migrants entering Europe during 2014. With the launch of the One-UNICEF response, combined Natcom and UNICEF press activity became prolific. In the review period, over 100 press releases were issued on a range of issues. In some instances, media communications were delayed by overly long clearance processes. Key changes in the humanitarian context for children, such as the onset of winter, increasing risks in sea crossings, and the deteriorating conditions in reception accommodation, were highlighted in press communications. UNICEF spoke out on the EU-Turkey agreement in March 2016 and the closure of borders in the Western Balkans. UNICEF has lobbied against potential harmful changes to legislation in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Slovenia and the UK, though not always successfully.

6.3.5 Country level advocacy and communications

UNICEF and the Natcoms have had some notable achievements with regards to advocacy for children, either with government or among local populations. For example:

- In January 2017, the UNICEF response team and the Natcom in Slovenia successfully advocated for changes to the proposed Aliens Act to ensure that it contained no differentiation of treatment based on age, and for UASC to be exempted from border return procedures and further amendments restricting the right of family reunification for persons with subsidiary protection were removed as a result.⁶²
- The Italian Natcom has several hundred thousand social media users who receive content at least once per week, including stories of migrant children in Italy. In the third quarter of 2017, the UNICEF Natcom spokesperson issued 94 press statements and interviews on Italian social media, TV and radio, with the following results.

Channel	Posts/pages	Views	Interactions
Facebook	16	250,090	3,931
Twitter	37	281,592	8,077
YouTube	4	975	24

- The German Natcom report, **Kindheit im Wartezustand** (Childhood on Hold), 2017, developed with UNICEF support, captured first-hand experience and views of young refugees. The report was widely praised for providing the first picture of the potential scale and types of violations of refugee children’s rights in Germany. The report had an impact in the media and on other organisations.
- Advocacy by the French and UK Natcoms focused on the poor conditions experienced by unaccompanied children living in informal camps in northern France. This helped to persuade the French and UK governments to speed up the Dublin Procedures, enabling children to relocate to apply for asylum in the same country as family members. 750 children benefitted from these procedures and were relocated to the UK.
- **Legislation 47/2017**, a new a progressive piece of draft legislation in Italy, known as **Legge Zampa**,⁶³ aims to improve guardianships and foster care for UASC, allows for voluntary guardians to be trained and made responsible for helping young people with legal issues, health assistance and requesting international protection, and ensures high accommodation standards for them, regardless of their migration status. In Palermo, UNICEF has supported 56 volunteer guardians (and trained 120) in concert with the Ombudsperson’s office.
- As part of the Uprooted Campaign, Italy, with PFP, other G7 country Natcoms and OED, advocated for the inclusion of the **Uprooted six-point agenda in the G7 communiqué**. The Italian Natcom organized a highly visible event in Sicily on the eve of the G7 to generate stronger public support for the rights of UASC.
- UNICEF/REACH-IMPACT partnership on qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis on refugee and migrant children in Greece and Italy improved the understanding of children motivations and perceptions of access to basic services. Their report **‘Children on the Move in Italy and Greece’** (June 2017) used statistically representative interviews with UASC (especially in Italy) to bring to light the risks faced by children on the move. The report attracted press coverage and was presented in Palermo and Rome. A further report, “Youth on the Move: Investigating decision-making, migration trajectories and expectations of young people on the way to Italy” by MHUB-REACH provided first-hand information on the motivation and aspirations of young migrants.
- In Greece, UNICEF, in collaboration with the media agency Weber & Shandwick and supported by DG ECHO, began a two-month communications campaign in early September 2017 to raise awareness on the importance of education and the social integration of refugee in host

⁶² Partly as a result of UNICEF and the Natcom’s good advocacy on child rights, the Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child was ratified by the Slovenian Government.

⁶³ UNICEF did not play a leading role in the development of the law, which was led by a parliamentarian, Mrs Zampa, with support from Save the Children. However, UNICEF has actively publicised the law outside Italy.

communities. The campaign has already produced significant results in terms of reach and impact. UNICEF produced a leaflet and booklet with funding from DG Justice for the Thessaloniki Fair, highlighting refugee stories and UNICEF achievements.

- UNICEF with other actors in Greece has successfully advocated for a reduction of the detention of children by having them transferred to safe zones and shelters. As a result, the average length of detention has been reduced.

6.4 Good Practice in Advocacy and Communications

6.4.1 Calais Study – French and UK Natcoms

In June 2016, the UK and French Natcoms released the Calais study, titled **“Neither Safe Nor Sound.”** The study revealed the dire situation of UASC in Northern France, the traumas children faced in reaching there, the living conditions they are exposed to in the camps, and the risks they take in being reunited with their family. The study generated significant global media coverage and called for children with family ties in the UK to be rapidly reunited with relatives in their best interests. As a result, both Governments sped up Dublin procedures, which allowed 750 children to reach the UK. The report represents good practice both because it was effective but also because it was the product of a joint effort by numerous actors. Informants noted the detailed cooperation between the two Natcoms, the Cell and PFP in developing key messages.

6.4.2 International Migrants Day – Greece

To commemorate International Migrants Day (18 December) in Greece, UNICEF organized a visit for 20 UASC from the safe zones of Schisto and Elaionas to the Hellenic Parliament, where they met with the President of the Hellenic Republic.

6.4.3 Volunteer monitoring visits – France

After the Calais ‘jungle’ closed in late 2016, 2,000 UASC from there were placed in 65-70 ‘Caomi’⁶⁴ centres around France. As there was little information about the conditions for children in the centres, UNICEF trained its large network of volunteers to go into the local Caomis and conduct basic assessments.⁶⁵ The information from these monitoring visits allowed the Natcom to continue advocating for the needs of UASC with national authorities and gave them a platform on which to speak to media, donors and other partners about the situation for refugee and migrant children in France.

6.4.4 DOC’s early monitoring initiative with Natcoms

The Division of Communications (DOC) and PFP have an antenna early monitoring system for high profile issues that are attracting media attention in Natcom countries. On a daily basis, the German, Spanish, French and Italian Natcoms scan their media for stories relating to children and relay them to DOC and PFP. This has been useful to many parts of the organisation, who would otherwise miss some of the internal political issues in each country. The information is used as a platform on which to base media messages and positions. It is considered a good model of how to use Natcom resources to build a wider news line on migration and other issues.

6.5 Service Delivery

Although much of UNICEF’s work focused on systems strengthening, it has engaged in several areas of service delivery, and continues to do so in Greece and Italy. (Results in service delivery are detailed in Section 5 above).

⁶⁴ Centres d’orientation pour mineurs isolés

⁶⁵ With clear instruction not to do service delivery, despite volunteers wanting to give French classes, for example

6.6 Good Practices in Service Delivery

6.6.1 Blue Dots – Greece, Serbia, Slovenia, fYRoM, Croatia

The COs that launched an emergency response in the early weeks of the crisis faced significant challenges in addressing the needs of populations moving quickly through countries, sometimes staying only a few hours. One of the responses to this situation was the development of the Blue Dots (or Child and Family Support Hubs) in early 2016. This was highlighted by UNICEF as a successful example of adaptive programming. A joint initiative of UNICEF, ICRC and UNHCR, the Blue Dots integrated interventions into one minimum services package, including psychosocial support, legal support, care for mothers and infants, recreational activities and referrals to specialised services. Blue Dots became a recognizable ‘trademark’ of emergency assistance and news of the services they offered spread among refugees and migrants across borders via word of mouth and social media.

6.6.2 Emergency supplies

UNICEF Supply Division worked with country offices in the Balkans to set up long-term agreements with suppliers in Serbia for the provision of non-food items, such as winter coats, and to organise the collection of relief items left behind by refugees and migrants unable to carry the items to the next stop. Supply kits were unpacked to allow mothers to choose what they needed to carry with them, as they moved rapidly towards their intended destination. While UNICEF did its best to adapt to the provision of materials supplies for a moving population, it was recognised that the process was not efficient and that new approaches will be needed if the same circumstances are faced again.

6.6.3 U-Report System – Italy, UK

The U-Report system introduced in Italy and now rolled out in the UK,⁶⁶ provides an innovative means of real-time monitoring, while also providing information to users. The U-report app has weekly polls to gauge adolescents’ needs, experiences and opinions; allows users to receive and send messages, sharing information on issues and concerns; and enables users to access information supporting their protection and social inclusion.⁶⁷ These reports have revealed serious concerns and uncertainty among users about their legal status, lack of clarity about their guardians, and has uncovered episodes of violence. Since May 2017, 500 UASC have joined U-report in Italy and UNICEF aims to expand this number in 2018. In the pilot phase, U-report polls were shared with the Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents in Palermo, who uses the data to generate proposals for action.

6.6.4 Cultural Mediator - Slovenia

In Slovenia, the concept of Cultural Mediator was highlighted by partners as an innovative approach introduced by UNICEF. Many mediators are migrants or refugees themselves and serve an important psychosocial outlet for families living in accommodation centres. The role of the mediator is not only to provide translation during interviews, but also to act as a facilitator between children and frontline workers, ensuring approaches are culturally appropriate and that needs are communicated effectively. Government partners noted how useful these positions were and intend to integrate them into their plans for addressing migration.

6.6.5 Skaramagas Learning Centre - Greece

In Greece, the British Council, under contract to UNICEF, operates the Skaramagas Learning Centre in one of the largest camps in Greece. Since November 2016, the Learning Centre has supported more than 500 children through English language lessons and life skills activities. The project aims to build the children’s psychosocial stability, confidence and potential, to help them make the transition to the formal Greek school system, and to support their integration into Greek and wider European society. These children have missed 2.5 years of schooling on average and some have never attended school. In parallel, the project provides interactive learning to teachers and youth trainers to raise awareness

66 ‘2017-2020 Joint Strategic Plan agreed between UNICEF UK and UNICEF’ (March 2017), p. 42

67 ‘U-report on the Move: the challenge of young migrants’ participation’

of the plight of refugees and immigrants. They acquire skills relating to child protection and child trauma, as well as how to set up inclusive and ‘resilient’ multicultural and even multilingual classrooms. The British Council aims to codify the experiences and materials in an educational toolkit that can be used to facilitate refugee children’s integration in Greece and elsewhere. The project is well regarded as innovative, with high quality technical development.⁶⁸

6.6.6 Balanced Literacy Approach - Greece

Also In Greece, UNICEF supported a Lebanese based organization, Ana Aqra Association, to conduct a five-day Balanced Literacy Approach Mother Tongue training for 22 teachers and field coordinators. The purpose of the training was to strengthen their knowledge and skills to better meet the needs of refugee and migrant children who have either joined Greek schools or are awaiting enrolment. They provided support to trainees on how to run a multi-lingual classroom, such as planning different lessons and differentiating instructions. The programme responds to the needs of multilingual and multi-cultural learners and offers an enabling learning environment. Almost all learners reported that the training had exceeded their expectations.

6.6.7 Infant and Young Child Feeding – Croatia and Serbia

In Croatia and Serbia, UNICEF prioritized Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF), as women on the move were not breastfeeding due to of lack of privacy, exhaustion and misinformation. Women resorted to a combination of breastfeeding and powdered infant formula, (without instructions in their language). Using dirty bottles resulted in infants suffering from diarrhoea, dehydration and malnutrition. UNICEF and its implementing partners formed 24-hour Mother and Baby Centres in reception sites that provided mothers a safe and private space to rest, breastfeed, and access medical teams. There were also private spaces to change children’s clothes and diapers and receive information and counselling. UNICEF was recognised for its progress in establishing effective processes and protocols, training and capacity building of staff, active outreach to mothers and children, counselling, referral and provision of nutritional support.⁶⁹ The Serbia office set up a mobile IYCF programme that provided the same services to women in transit zones.

6.7 Summary of Performance by ECARO Core Roles

The review team’s observations on UNICEF’s performance against ECARO’s eight core roles⁷⁰ are included here at the clients’ request.⁷¹ UNICEF has had varying success in their application between countries. Generalising across countries, however, performance can be summarised as follows:

Core Role of UNICEF, as defined by ECARO	Implementation	Effectiveness
Advocacy (the independent voice)	Very strong	High
Policy dialogue and advice	Strong	Moderate
Knowledge generation and child rights monitoring	Strong/Medium	High/Moderate
Convening partnerships, leveraging resources for children	Convening: Very strong Leveraging: Moderate	Partnerships: High Leveraging: Moderate
Capacity development of professionals and organizations	Strong	Unknown
Modelling and testing innovations	Medium	Unknown
Horizontal cooperation beyond-borders	Weak	Low
Ensuring proper internal controls and risk management	Overly risk averse	Reduced

Table 8: Performance against ECARO-defined 8 core roles for UNICEF

⁶⁸ This is one of few initiatives within UNICEF’s refugee and migrant response to have been externally reviewed.

⁶⁹ Results described in joint UNICEF-RODA report “Support for breastfeeding and young child feeding in emergencies: Experiences gained during the migrant and refugee crisis in Croatia in 2015 and 2016” February 2017.

⁷⁰ The core roles are applicable to development programming and do not cover emergency response.

⁷¹ As set out in ‘Discussion Note on Core Roles and Achieving Results for Children in the CEE/CIS Region’, 2015

7 Shortcomings of the Response

In addition to the many successes detailed above there have been several gaps in UNICEF's response.

7.1 The Executive Director was not visible

Three UNICEF deputy executive directors (DEDs) visited Europe in connection with the refugee and migration crisis during the review period. One DED visited Sicily twice, including for the May 2017 launch of the UNICEF report, 'A Child is a Child'. Staff noted that the UNICEF Executive Director did not visit Europe or make any media appearance in relation to the refugee and migrant crisis, despite its high media profile. While UNHCR and IOM made periodic visits to Brussels for discussions with the European Commission at High Commissioner/Director General level, UNICEF was not represented at a sufficiently high level. UNICEF did not attend the EU Africa Summit on Migration held in Valetta, November 2015. Some informants expressed concern that UNICEF's profile and influence with governments and the EU would have been strengthened by the ED's visible support to the crisis response.

7.2 Media-driven rather than data-driven response

The emergency declaration was made only after the release of images of Alan Kurdi lying dead on a beach in Turkey. Significant migration into Europe had been taking place for at least two years prior along the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) and in growing numbers on the Eastern Mediterranean route (EMR) since early 2015. Early warning from Natcoms and some UNICEF country offices were not acted on. The very large numbers of refugees and migrants surging through Europe in Q3 2015, at least half of whom were refugees from the war in Syria, attracted most of the media attention and international funding, with many humanitarian organisations rushing to respond in Greece. From Q2 2015, the Italian Natcom was raising concerns with UNICEF HQ about the numbers and need of migrants reaching Italy, yet the 200,000 migrants entering via the CMR through Italy during 2016 attracted far less international attention than those in Greece. UNICEF's response in Italy was not fully mobilised until 2017, 15 months after the emergency declaration.

7.3 Challenges to providing assistance during rapid migration

In some respects, UNICEF's provision of material assistance to rapid moving populations proved unsuitable and wasteful. There is a consensus that UNICEF needs an alternative model, including for 'green logistics'. The same products were distributed several times to the same families and sometimes by several organisations. Some country offices did succeed in recycling some of the donated materials left behind.

The case for cash assistance was considered but rejected for various reasons; cash was not acceptable to governments who believed it would end up going to smugglers, the migrant routes were not near shops, and some refugees and migrants already had cash. Some agencies positioned themselves to be able to use cash and later scale up in Greece, while UNICEF did so only in Turkey. Given the challenges of material supplies, there may be a case for reviewing – with others – how suitable the cash was as a modality and its potential future application in similar circumstances.

7.4 Gender analysis

Women received less attention than in a typical UNICEF emergency response. The crisis was perceived as a 'children's emergency', as UNICEF argued it should be. There was less gender analysis in the programme planning than UNICEF's CCC's expect. Some attention was given to mothers and babies, especially in support of breastfeeding, but the programme documentation shows little focus on women's rights otherwise.

7.5 Gender Based Violence (GBV)

Apart from a few specific country level interventions, Gender-based violence was not a full part of the response before mid-2017.^{72, 73, 74, 75} In the initial rapid mass movement phase of the crisis, UNICEF field staff indicated that women would not report GBV incidents in transit, even if there were services available, as they wanted to go as quickly as possible out of the country and reach their destination. GBV was included more fully in the 2017 HAC than previous appeals and the GBV response has been strengthened in recent months with dedicated funding from the US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM). The emergency was recognised as one that affected boys, in particular, and new appropriate guidance is being developed under the BPRM programme.

7.6 Refugee and Migrant movements or returns

So far, UNICEF has not so far involved itself in best interests of the child determination for child migrants. Up to 20,000 children are reportedly being returned from Libya, for example. UNICEF is not following up, nor providing documentation to the countries of origin on the abuses children have faced while in Libya to ensure proper reintegration services are provided. Some attempts have been made to reach out to UNICEF Reps from countries of origin, but this has not been systematic or formal.⁷⁶ IOM would very much welcome UNICEF's assistance with this process. In addition, as of today, UNICEF does not have a system to track or monitor UASC once they leave countries. When there are claims that children are 'missing' UNICEF cannot adequately respond as there is no cross-border collaboration to follow-up on children who pass through. There is a need to strengthen information exchange between UNICEF offices in countries of origin/return, transit, destination and return, as part of a cross-regional transit route-based approach (see below).

7.7 Cross-regional migration

In the early stages of the response, the Special Coordinator was in active discussion with her regional counterparts in WCARO and MENARO. In 2016, the potential for cross-regional collaboration on migration in UNICEF was recognised corporately. The integrated approach emphasised in the Global Broadcast message to ensure UNICEF also addresses countries of origin has made limited progress. There is a general recognition that UNICEF needs a 'route-based approach' that deals holistically with root causes of migration in countries of origin and the condition of asylum seekers and migrants in countries of transit and destination. A director level group, jointly chaired by DRP and PD, was formed to push this initiative forward. However, interviews indicate that this group has somewhat lost momentum. One of the lowest scores in the UNICEF-Natcom survey was given to UNICEF performance in 'coordination between regions of origin and regions of destination' (45 per cent). Because such initiatives necessarily cross UNICEF regional boundaries, it may be that regional directors are unsure how to proceed jointly.

A recent attempt to include a cross-regional approach to migration in the HAC for 2018 was not accepted by management, in part because cross-regional work on migration requires an on-going programme approach, not an humanitarian approach, making the HAC perhaps the wrong tool for the task. Donors are keen for cross-regional proposals to be presented – given their policy that migration

⁷² UNHCR, UNFPA, MSF, and Women's Refugee Commission documented specific GBV violations that women, boys and girls were facing. Reportedly, these were subsequently shared with the country coordinators and the Cell.

⁷³ GBV was integrated into the minimum standards for reception centres in Germany.

⁷⁴ Several country offices carried out training on Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) in the review period

⁷⁵ The roll out of the revised IASC GBV guidelines in Greece generated additional attention for GBV in the UNICEF response in Greece

⁷⁶ PFP reports that some Natcoms have developed "child notices" on countries of origin to inform governments of child rights context in countries of origin prior to sending back children to these countries.

should be slowed – which presents an opportunity. DFID has shortlisted four agencies for cross-regional funding to countries in West and North Africa, including UNICEF.^{77,78}

8 Implementing the One-UNICEF response

8.1 Innovations in tools and processes

There was no precedent for UNICEF responding to a crisis in HICs in Europe and new tools and processes were developed by amending other tools or starting from first principles. The templates for the assessment missions included checklists derived from the CCCs. The Offer of Technical Support is a document required in a Country Office. The proposed form of legal agreement, seeking to strike a balance between obtaining a formal agreement to operate without the complications of a Basic Cooperation Agreement, was also an innovation. Periodic meetings in Geneva brought together UNICEF divisions, ECARO, the country coordinators and the Natcoms. These meetings were highly spoken of and stakeholders regret that they no longer take place.

The development of the new model leading to the Framework of Cooperation between UNICEF and the Natcoms was an innovation. The Special Coordinator received recognition from several informants for her astute management of the relationships between UNICEF divisions and between UNICEF and the Natcoms in agreeing the model in consultation with PFP, and through PFP, with the Natcoms. As with many other aspects of the response, this process was political both in terms of UNICEF-Natcom relations and PFP-ECARO relations. It took some months to finalise the framework, from first drafting in October 2015, to agreement in March 2016, six months after the emergency was declared.

8.2 Management structures, regional and country

8.2.1 RO Structures

There are mixed and contradictory views concerning the benefits and drawbacks of the dedicated Cell⁷⁹ reporting directly to the Special Coordinator. On one hand, the provision of extra capacity to support the response was beneficial and seen as a way of preventing the diversion of all RO resources to the crisis. Boosting the RO capacity on migration issues was also valuable. The head of the Cell provided a natural counterpart for the crisis response leaders in IOM and UNHCR. Regular internal coordination meetings were open to all RO participants.

There are very differing perceptions of the value of the Cell. Some informants considered that it boosted teamwork, while some of the regional advisers sensed a narrowing of participation in these meetings, without understanding the logic of the (at least perceived) inclusion/exclusion. The Cell was seen by some to have become too much of a silo. These contrasting perspectives are hard to reconcile. Some regional advisers were completely absorbed in the response and had to put other regular support to country programmes on hold for the first year, while other advisers found no 'entry point' for their work in the response. It is possible that the positives aspects might well have been realized without setting up a separate Cell, by strengthening existing RO structures from the outset, or by using the Cell for an initial period to launch the response before transitioning back to regular RO management structures.⁸⁰ (See also 8.2.6 below)

⁷⁷ Funding decisions may have been made by the time this report is complete

⁷⁸ Swiss Development Corporation was also said to be interested in supporting cross-regional approaches

⁷⁹ We heard that the idea for the Cell came from UNICEF's experience of setting up such a unit in the MENA regional office in Amman, Jordan as part of the management of UNICEF's response to the Syria sub-regional crisis.

⁸⁰ UNICEF corporately may wish to reflect on other evaluations concerning the role of such emergency cells. For example, the UNICEF evaluation of its Ebola response found that: 'WCARO contributors found the Ebola Cell was too narrowly focused.... Participants in internal learning exercises saw no reason to change standard ways of working through EMOPS... the response established new structures that bypassed existing emergency response mechanisms, which led to delays and coordination difficulties in affected countries'. (Evaluation of UNICEF's response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa 2014–2015, p53)

8.2.2 Human resources

The appointment of a Special Coordinator meant that UNICEF could draw widely on personnel from within and outside UNICEF. The staffing table for the response shows that 26 FT contracts were issued during the review period, along with 321 other temporary and surge contracts⁸¹ either for the RO or temporary country deployments. Mobilising such numbers is an achievement in itself. Informants were positive about the quality of the majority of the surge personnel, especially those from stand-by partners.

The first year of the response was a stressful time for those involved. ECARO staff and PFP focal points noted the “all hands-on deck” atmosphere in the office, with staff working late hours and committing themselves to supporting this unprecedented situation. In the UNICEF and Natcom staff survey, staff commitment and dedication to the response was rated very highly (89 per cent) and the experience of longer term staff and surge staff was rated highly (76 per cent).

Longer-term country coordinators are seen to have performed well in their roles, with few exceptions. It has been a challenging task and they have shown resolve in building partnerships, networking and convening, adapting to changing circumstances, and handling uncertainty. Staff from the two Special Coordinators⁸² down have shown flexibility and skill in navigating the ‘grey areas’, understanding that the new circumstances of this response required collaboration between many parties (both inside and beyond UNICEF) without one simple line of accountability. This is somewhat counter-cultural for UNICEF, which instinctively reaches for operating procedures as the solution to implementation challenges.

8.2.3 Child Rights Monitoring

Aside from the achievements in this area (as described in section 6.1.5 above), as of today, CRM remains a critical weakness in some countries. Of the five countries, Greece, which otherwise has arguably the least developed national child protection systems, has perhaps the best developed national child rights monitoring system, in part thanks to UNICEF support. Obtaining sex and age disaggregated data on children caught up in the crisis, including children on the move, has been particularly challenging. Most of the national systems in the One-UNICEF countries do not yield the necessary data to understand vulnerabilities. Countries without functioning central data collection systems struggle to aggregate data. It can still be difficult to get quality and disaggregated data from some partners. UNICEF has taken important steps to improve the quality of national data systems, but much remains to be done.

8.2.4 Humanitarian Programme Monitoring

Shortly after the regional emergency was declared, work started on adapting the UNICEF humanitarian performance monitoring system (HPM) to the refugee and migrant response in Europe. When people were moving rapidly across countries, baselines could not be assessed. When movement stopped/slowed, it became more possible to count them. Donors demanded baseline information, which was sometimes hard to generate. In the absence of baselines, UNICEF has not reported the scale of UNICEF’s assistance, or the assistance being provided overall, against overall needs.⁸³ Instead, UNICEF has reported against UNICEF targets without reference to overall need.

⁸¹ including TA, Consultancy(SSA), SSA/Retiree, Emergency Response Team, Immediate Response Team, Standby partner, Mission, Intern, and UN Volunteer

⁸² i.e. successive Regional Directors designated as Special Coordinator

⁸³ Functions it is required to perform when acting as Cluster coordinator

For HPM, the RO at first devised a highly complex system that required each country office to provide up to 170 data points. This proved impractical^{84, 85} and a consultant subsequently helped to streamline the system and to agree a limited set of core indicators to be applied across all 11 countries in the response, which proved challenging given the different operating contexts of the countries involved. For the One-UNICEF response countries, this sometimes meant a very limited set.⁸⁶ As the response developed, and more emphasis went to advocacy, CRM/data management, and policy development, the HPM indicators became less relevant and country teams have progressively devised country specific indicators to reflect the results of their work more accurately, while retaining the HPM indicators. The results of the country level response cannot be well represented within VISION because the entire operation exists as a single outcome in the RO management plan.⁸⁷

8.2.5 Funding and fund utilisation

Funds came in slowly at the start of the response but picked up in the second year and the response is now relatively well funded (see figures in 4.3). Fundraising has been quite successful compared with some other countries featured in the HAC, with 84% of the funds requested being raised. Because of implementation delays, utilisation has also been slow at stages. Significant funds have been rolled forward into the following years (from 2016 to 2017 and 2017 to 2018). Slow utilisation meant a rush to spend at certain times to stop funds from expiring. It was possible to launch the education response in Greece because the Cell was spending funds slowly during early 2016.

8.2.6 Cost Effectiveness

UNICEF has no measures for cost effectiveness. However, various comments and concerns were raised with the review team during the review concerning value for money (VFM), which can be broadly grouped under VFM themes, shown in Table 7 below:

<i>VFM theme</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Uncertain and delayed response	The personnel and resources for the response were not efficiently used before mid-2016, given the absence of results, apart from the strong progress in advocacy and public communications.
Placement of resources	UNICEF country teams expressed concern about the size of the Cell in Geneva compared with the staffing needs at country level. While the Cell continued to grow, in-country teams remained small, apart from Greece, latterly. Germany and Italy could have done with more team members. In mitigation, our impression was that some Natcoms did not want the UNICEF response teams to grow further. It could also be argued that keeping resource at the regional level made for the most flexible use of resources. (In practice, this argument was not made to the review team).
Unit Costs	The question of unit costs, especially for the accommodation of unaccompanied children in Greece and Italy has been a matter of concern. UNICEF is not generally engaged in providing high quality, relatively intensive inputs for relatively small numbers of vulnerable children (adolescents in this case). The RO questioned the unit costs proposed by Greece more than once. The team in Greece provided cost comparisons that satisfied the concerns of the regional Contract Review Committee

⁸⁴ Google offered UNICEF 100 tablets for use in data collection. The regional office thought these might be a solution for capturing the many data items required by the first version of HPM. The UNICEF innovation team developed an app for use with the tablets. This initiative did not take off and was seen from the field level as a top-down solution that was unlikely to have worked.

⁸⁵ In common with the early stages of other emergency responses, COs felt overwhelmed with reporting requirements and were frustrated that they are being required to provide CRM and HPM data rather than providing services. In this case, the early version of the HPM indicators seem to have been unusually detailed.

⁸⁶ In Germany, for example, only one of the common indicators was applicable (numbers of frontline workers trained)

⁸⁷ In comments to the draft of this report, the Evaluation Office commented that the challenge of VISION holding the entire emergency operation as a single outcome in the RO management plan is a consistent finding of UNICEF global evaluations.

	regarding alternative care unit costs. According to the country team, comparable costs in the UK and Norway are several times higher there. Under EC funding, day rates for such accommodation have been fixed at €68/day, so this may end the argument.
Valued added investment	In Greece, UNHCR has 650 staff, while UNICEF has 20 staff and consultants. ECHO considered that UNICEF was making a significant impact with a relatively small team and saw ECHO's UNICEF investment to be good value for money.
Relative staff costs	HICs have high levels of human capital and the question naturally arises as to why UNICEF would deploy UNICEF staff on FT posts, with the high salaries and on-costs that implies, while there are qualified national personnel who could be hired for far less, much more quickly, and who can be released more quickly and easily when workload declines. This is a valid question that UNICEF needs to address. Any work on preparedness by UNICEF's undertaken in these countries (in case this should be seen as being required) should map likely sources of qualified individuals and partner organisations. Whatever the use of staff or consultants on local contracts, as noted elsewhere, there is still a need for UNICEF international civil servants, where international experience, or representation of UNICEF as a UN agency, is required.

Table 7: Stakeholders' comments and concerns regarding Cost-effectiveness

8.3 Implementation challenges faced by the One-UNICEF response

8.3.1 Uncertain approach to the response in non-programme countries

In common with other humanitarian actors and governments of the countries affected, UNICEF was not well prepared for this unprecedented crisis, as the majority of UNICEF informants acknowledged. The region has responded to past crises (e.g. Balkans, Georgia, Ukraine) but nothing on the scale of this crisis. In the UNICEF-Natcom survey, 'being prepared to respond' was rated at only 42 per cent. UNICEF in the region has modest resources and experience in emergency response compared with other regions in Africa, the Middle East or Asia. In part, this is because governments in the region are considered capable of handling emergencies but, due to the scale of the crisis, this proved not to be the case in some countries. To address UNICEF's earlier lack of preparedness, in November 2016 ECARO developed a Regional Consolidated Contingency Plan for migration across the Mediterranean. As of November 2017, it includes a 'Rapid Reaction Support' to be triggered when the influx in any one country exceeds 800 children per week (or 3,000 people).⁸⁸

In the first months of the response, ECARO was hesitant and unsure of how to proceed in this unprecedented situation, as some of those directly involved noted themselves.⁸⁹ Some survey respondents were critical of the lack of decisiveness during this period. One referred to the "procrastination, timid and delayed decision making of the RO". A great deal of energy was consumed in resolving internal issues between ECARO-Cell-FPP-PD-Legal Office-Natcoms that would otherwise have gone into building partnerships and implementation in-country.

8.3.2 Governments in non-programme countries did not understand UNICEF

When the UNICEF response began, governments, partners and public in HICs often did not understand the role of UNICEF as: 1) an inter-governmental UN body, 2) a normative standing setting body, and 3) an emergency response organisation. Instead, the general understanding of UNICEF before the response was based on the activities of the Natcom. There was no clear concept of UNICEF as an organisation which regularly and globally works with governments to strengthen their capacity to uphold children's rights.

⁸⁸ The planned response is within 48-72 hours for a maximum of 90 days, with a target to reach 75% of the migrant children and with a budget of US\$0.5 million. The contingency plan was updated in May and November 2017.

⁸⁹ "Organization of roles and responsibilities among the Cell and RO - especially at the beginning [was a challenge]. It was owned by certain sections, not allowing others "in" with information and programming space." (survey)

Some governments were unsure of UNICEF's motives at the outset, thinking they were there to monitor them, which they found confusing, even insulting. Some stakeholders in the countries reviewed were surprised to find that UNICEF did not provide services during the emergency phase but welcomed its action later.⁹⁰ It has taken considerable work and patience by the UNICEF response teams to improve governments' understanding of UNICEF's role. In the countries reviewed, between 3-12 months were lost as a result in the implementation of some aspects of UNICEF's response. However, UNICEF's persistence, and the value assigned to UNICEF's work, means that UNICEF is now viewed very positively as an organisation that brings expertise and international experience to the national context.

8.3.3 Some aspects of the response did not start before June 2016

In One-UNICEF response countries, there was minimal delivery in some aspects of the UNICEF response in the early phase. While UNICEF was active in advocacy and communications from before the time of the emergency declaration, before June 2016, there was no service delivery or capacity building on any scale comparable to needs in any of the countries reviewed.⁹¹ The first service provision in Greece began one year after the regional emergency was declared.⁹² The lack of initial response on the ground by UNICEF was noted in many interviews and almost all survey responses from both staff, Natcoms, government counterparts and partners.

At first, UNICEF and Natcom advocacy and communications efforts were constrained by having little to report by way of UNICEF results for children. In Greece and Italy, UNICEF was amongst the last humanitarian emergency and protection agency to mobilise, far slower than UNHCR, IOM and humanitarian NGOs. The review team found varying levels of concern amongst UNICEF staff members about the slow start-up. Some were relatively unconcerned⁹³. Others were troubled by what UNICEF had not managed to do for children in the early stages of the crisis and the opportunities lost by UNICEF to show its relevance and raise its profile. Some even spoke of the lack of practical support for children from UNICEF during the emergency phase as 'tragic', or 'shameful'.⁹⁴ It is not clear that UNICEF has understood the full cost of its delayed practical support to children in One-UNICEF countries. This includes:

- UNICEF was not able to make detailed assessments of the risks or level of violations faced by children, beyond the initial assessment mission reports. (Information from Natcoms and other organisations closed this gap to an extent)
- The reputation of the Natcoms and UNICEF was undermined⁹⁵
- Natcoms lost ground in profile to local competitors (and probably income)
- In some countries, UNICEF was not at the 'top table' discussing the management of the crisis with national governments or in the European Commission in Brussels or locally, and, relatedly;
- UNICEF missed out on leadership and coordination roles⁹⁶
- UNICEF later had to find a niche for its programme not already taken by others.

⁹⁰ One interviewee commented: "At least UNICEF wasn't pretending to be an emergency response organisation"

⁹¹ As one exception, in Slovenia, the first child-friendly space was put in place in early 2016

⁹² As discussed above, in programme countries, UNICEF responded much more quickly.

⁹³ The review team has pondered the relative lack of concern expressed by some interviewees. Possible reasons are that 1) governments of HICs did not call for international support, 2) ultimately, UNICEF made valuable contributions to systems strengthening and policy-advocacy, 3) UNICEF's original technical offers to HIC governments was to strengthen government systems not to provide emergency assistance.

⁹⁴ A few government counterparts considered UNICEF's response to have been timely, because by the time they were themselves were ready to respond, they found UNICEF there to assist them. In Greece, some stakeholders stated that UNICEF has been 'wise' to hold back on responding until the emergency died down and it could assess the most appropriate areas in which to intervene.

⁹⁵ In interviews, both UNICEF and Natcom staff spoke of 'reputational risk' as if as if this was only a potential but not actual damage to UNICEF's reputation. Natcoms were challenged by government partners, national media, their own pledge donors, and volunteers as to why there was no response.

⁹⁶ Which, in some cases, were assigned to Save the Children or IRC in UNICEF's absence

- UNICEF has to work hard to establish its credibility with government after a late mobilisation (some countries only)

A series of confounding factors help to explain how this situation arose.

- The unprecedented scale and nature of the emergency, in Europe, and including in HICs
- Determining how UNICEF should respond to an emergency where, with exceptions, the basics of food and water, health care, and shelter were provided by governments and local actors, thus seeming to cover many of the areas of UNICEF traditional humanitarian response detailed in the CCCs
- Needing to reach agreement within UNICEF and between UNICEF and Natcoms on how to proceed
- Many and various delay factors, as discussed below

8.3.4 Delays in implementation

There are several overlapping causes of delay in UNICEF mounting its response, with varying importance in different countries.⁹⁷ While some of the delays were beyond UNICEF's control, most of them were caused by UNICEF itself. In summary, the various delay factors were:

Delays in reaching some Legal Agreements

Following discussions between the Special Coordinator and UNICEF senior management, a Decision Memo was issued setting out how operational and legal arrangements for UNICEF's programmatic response to the refugee and migrant crisis work could be made for countries where UNICEF had no Basic Cooperation Agreement. The preferred strategy was an Exchange of Letters with the national government to establish a temporary UNICEF presence in the country. The memo noted several advantages of such an arrangement but also highlighted the risk that a protracted negotiation might delay full operation of UNICEF's activities. UNICEF's Legal Office provided the template for the legal agreement. The text included confirmation that UNICEF will enjoy the immunities and privileges of the UN.^{98, 99} The negotiation process was to be handled by PPD in discussion with the UN permanent missions of the countries concerned. (This last point was not specified in the memo).

Agreements with Germany¹⁰⁰ and Slovenia were the first to be made, in December 2015 and January 2016, respectively, and given the nature of such negotiations, relatively quick. The period from end of the respective assessment mission to signature was 38 days for Germany and 58 days for Slovenia. Other negotiations proved more protracted and UNICEF's response was significantly delayed as a result. Agreements were signed with Italy in May 2016 and with Austria in April 2017. No agreement has been signed with the Government of Greece.¹⁰¹ The delays in reaching these agreements were a source of great frustration to UNICEF staff and the Natcoms both at the time and since. While the

⁹⁷ The Reference Group asked the review team to clarify what it means by 'slow' response in One-UNICEF countries: 1) UNICEF was slower than other organisations to respond, and the last of any major humanitarian organisations, 2) the UNICEF response in HICs was much slower in non-programme countries than in programme countries, 3) governments and partners almost all considered that the UNICEF response was slow and expressed surprise at UNICEF's lack of action in the emergency phase.

⁹⁸ Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations

⁹⁹ According to some, Governments felt that the Exchange of Letters focused too much on privileges and immunities of UNICEF rather than on actions and results for children.

¹⁰⁰ This agreement did not follow the normal protocol in that it was made directly with the Ministry of Family Affairs rather than via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The agreement was only partial via a Joint Declaration of Intent. The German Foreign Ministry has not yet shared the Note Verbale that will provide the necessary legal platform

¹⁰¹ For Greece, UNICEF undertook a risk assessment at the request of the Executive Director who then made an (undocumented) decision that UNICEF should launch a programme in Greece. In Greece, UNICEF has since made agreements with various ministries and authorities for the provision of technical assistance. UNICEF now has MOU's with the Ministry of Migration Policy, and with the municipalities of Athens and Thessaloniki, and a joint work plan with the Ministry of Education. Discussions on an Exchange of letters with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs are still on-going.

Natcoms were prevented during the emergency phase from trying to mount their own response by the 'red lines', UNICEF itself was also not providing no services to the children affected.

Slow recruitment

An emergency PBR was conducted in January 2016¹⁰² and a second in May 2016. By early 2016, a decision had been reached that it was the appropriate time to consolidate the UNICEF presence with FT staff, using internal recruitment to identify staff who carried a strong understanding of UNICEF ways of working and internal networks of support. Despite the availability of the rapid recruitment procedures for placing staff in emergency operations, the recruitment of long-term staff for the UNICEF response teams took many months and meant that surge staff had to be used for a longer period than should have been necessary. UNICEF personnel were deployed on short-term missions to fill gaps. The longest average delay between requests for staff and staff arriving in post were seen in Austria (127 days), Slovenia (122 days) and Greece (110 days).

High turnover of personnel

The frequent turnover of personnel over the early months of the response was a challenge for UNICEF, as well as governments and Natcoms. The Cell had four leaders in as many months before a longer-term appointment was made.^{103, 104} The high turnover of staff deployed to the One-UNICEF countries in the period January-June 2016 reduced the effectiveness and coherence of the response.¹⁰⁵ "In the beginning the staff turnover in countries was like a revolving door. This led to multiple opinions and strategies which were constantly changing" (survey). Governments and Natcoms expressed dissatisfaction with this lack of continuity and found they could only form proper working relationships with UNICEF once the longer-term country coordinators were in place. Speed of recruitment for longer term staff was not well rated in the UNICEF-Natcom survey (52 per cent).

Slow planning

The UNICEF lessons learned exercise (May 2016) found that the lack of UNICEF integrated planning for response activities in all countries "meant delays in agreeing and establishing programme response strategies supported by pertinent humanitarian monitoring (HPM) and reporting".¹⁰⁶ The ECARO Regional Planning Office does not seem have been engaged in planning the crisis response. Once UNICEF did mobilise, it took time to find a "space" to operate that was not already occupied by other agencies.

Some operations staff did not know the SSOPs

Some operations staff in Common Services in Geneva were not fully familiar with the SSOPs for L3 emergency responses (which were in play as a result of the Special Coordinator appointment). This has resulted in some delays as staff were uncertain on how to use the simplified and shortened procedures for emergencies.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² more than 3 months after the L3 declaration but considered 'fast' by RO informants

¹⁰³ 'UNICEF Response Review Meeting: A Reflection of UNICEFs Response to the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe' (UNICEF – Feb 2016), p. 11

¹⁰⁴ Op cit 'Lessons Learned', p. 6

¹⁰⁵ Some of those deployed to act as interim coordinators in One-UNICEF countries were not well-equipped to work in a start-up office without backup.

¹⁰⁶ 'Lessons Learned from UNICEFs Response to the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe: June 2015 to May 2016' (UNICEF), p.6

¹⁰⁷ In March 2017, a Senior Operations Manager from the ERT provided a one-day training and simulation on SSOPs in emergencies for all ECARO local staff who serve in both programmes and operations. Regional Office Operations and HR also participated in this exercise.

Challenges and delays in the set-up of VISION

Neither ECARO operations staff nor other operations staff in UNICEF were initially sure how to set up the non-programme country operations in VISION¹⁰⁸ and some weeks were lost in the process. Establishing staffing tables, tables of authorities and setting up the new team locations within VISION proved difficult and slow, partly because there was no precedent. As UNICEF teams in HICs do not constitute a formal UNICEF representation, the 'country office' remains within ECARO, with the country operations set up in the system as sub-offices. UNICEF staff, including the operations staff themselves, were frustrated with how long this took.

The end result is that country teams lack control and delegated decision-making, which slows down approval processes as all decisions and signatures have to come back to ECARO. The table of authorities within VISION does not allow coordinators to authorise project cooperation agreements (PCAs), to plan interventions based on available budget, or to sign for expenditures, which are processed through ECARO. In the case of Greece, because UNICEF cannot have a bank account there, all payments are made by the Natcom, which is then reimbursed by ECARO.¹⁰⁹

PCAs versus Service Contracts

In mid 2016, there was an extended discussion between ECARO and the country teams about whether it would be possible to issue Programme Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) to partners in the absence of a formal agreement with government on UNICEF's presence in-country.^{110, 111} Some weeks were lost in this process (in some countries). The initial the advice from ECARO was to use service contracts instead of PCA's, advice that was later reversed.

8.3.5 Language barriers

In the One-UNICEF response, UNICEF faced two different language challenges. Firstly, as noted earlier, the refugees and migrants comprised many nationalities. Some Natcoms and UNICEF offices were able to find volunteers or surge staff who could speak the languages of the refugees and migrants and obtained materials in the relevant languages from UNICEF offices in, for example, Lebanon and Afghanistan.¹¹² Secondly, it was a challenge to find staff with both the appropriate programme experience and the national language for the countries concerned. The normal language requirements for UN staff were exceeded¹¹³ but in this case, specific languages were required. It was considered, correctly, that it was not realistic to work in English in any of the One-UNICEF countries, except Greece, where UNICEF did not require the country coordinator to be a Greek speaker.¹¹⁴

8.3.6 Limited coordination across countries and regions

Some informants pointed out that the refugee and migrant response depended on individual country initiatives that could have been better coordinated across the region into a regional response. Balkan countries along the migration route would have liked to have seen ECARO playing a role in coordination across countries. Instead, Serbia and Croatia, for example, instituted their own

¹⁰⁸ VISION is UNICEF's Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system

¹⁰⁹ "Our own internal procedures and bureaucracy to a great extent (extremely slow and time-consuming), plus very high staff turnover. At a time when we all should have been focused on monitoring a crisis that changed day by day and on being in touch with what was going on in the field, we had to dedicate most of our energy to solve internal hurdles." (Survey)

¹¹⁰ The regional office was also uncertain how the HACT (Harmonised Approach to Cash Transfers) procedures should be applied on non-programme countries

¹¹¹ The PCA is the instrument generally used to contract organizations (generally NGOs) to provide direct services to children and their families at scale.

¹¹² In Greece, an implementing partner is providing translators in a range of languages to support to teachers adsorbing refugee and migrants into their school classes.

¹¹³ For example, even though Arabic is a UN language, UNICEF staff deployed to Amman are not automatically required to be able to speak Arabic.

¹¹⁴ Some informants suggested UNICEF would have made faster progress in Greece if it had

information exchange concerning groups of migrants passing through their countries so that they would have early warning of arrivals at the border. Country level informants commented on a lack of joint scenario building across countries. The calls organised by ECARO were deemed ineffective by some country-based staff. Country offices had to get materials in languages of refugees for themselves, a role they expected ECARO to play.

9 Natcom-UNICEF collaboration

The Natcoms vary considerably in their size and capacity, in their stance towards their own governments, in their level of domestic engagement, and in their level of interaction with UNICEF. The role of the Natcoms in the One-UNICEF response has been, logically enough, a feature of almost every interview conducted for the review.¹¹⁵ The success of the One-UNICEF response has been greatly influenced by the quality of the interaction between the Natcoms and UNICEF. PFP acted as the key interlocutor between the Natcoms and UNICEF RO and HQ, taking part in assessment missions, helping shape the response, making sure Natcom interests were considered, helping to define the parameters of the collaboration, and supporting the Natcoms. As with all other aspects of the review, the context, actions and relationships have varied between countries and the generalisations below do not apply equally to all countries reviewed.

9.1 Successful elements of the One-UNICEF collaboration

9.1.1 Mutual education

An important side benefit of the One-UNICEF response has been the mutual education of UNICEF and the Natcoms concerned regarding their respective roles and capabilities. UNICEF regional and country-based staff acknowledge that their understanding of the breadth of Natcom activity, their roles in civil society and community engagement, including with schools and hospitals, and in awareness raising on children's rights and, in some cases, policy advocacy has been enhanced by their working alongside the Natcoms.

9.1.2 Natcoms have made UNICEF a household name

The work of the Natcoms over many years of fundraising for UNICEF and undertaking advocacy and educational activities means that UNICEF is a household name in all the countries reviewed. This has been an advantage for UNICEF in being accepted as an actor in the refugee and migrant response.

9.1.3 UNICEF reacted to Natcoms pressure to respond

As the scale of the refugee and migrant crisis became clear, the Natcoms lobbied UNICEF for help in responding to the situation. The response was not imposed by UNICEF. Rather, it was UNICEF HQ that was initially reluctant to be involved.

9.1.4 Natcoms have opened doors for UNICEF

The Natcoms have opened doors by providing entry points for UNICEF with governments¹¹⁶ and partners, while providing UNICEF with an understanding of the national context and child rights issues in the country. Natcoms initiated communications work even when there were significant delays in the UNICEF response and raised funds for other countries where UNICEF was already responding.

¹¹⁵ There are UNICEF National Committees in 36 industrialized countries, each established as an independent local non-governmental organization. Natcoms 'serve as the public face and dedicated voice of UNICEF', working 'to raise funds from the private sector, promote children's rights and secure worldwide visibility for children threatened by poverty, disasters, armed conflict, abuse and exploitation.' (synthesised from the UNICEF public web site)

¹¹⁶ In non-programme countries, UNICEF is more likely to maintain relationships with Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Development rather than those covering immigration or social affairs.

9.1.5 Natcoms have provided funding, offices, and administration for UNICEF

In Germany, the Natcom identified private donors who have donated anonymously all the resources required to pay for the UNICEF response team. Amongst the Government's very significant investments in support of refugees, it has paid for 100 protection advisors in refugee reception and accommodation centres, without cost to UNICEF. In Italy, the National committee has provided almost all the funding, both for the UNICEF team, and for the programme response.¹¹⁷

9.1.6 Natcom reputations were enhanced

Ultimately, after a slow start, Natcom reputations have benefited from the successful elements of UNICEF interventions. The strong recognition from government and civil society partners for the response by UNICEF that has grown during 2017 reflects positively on the Natcoms. Over time, the Natcoms have come to see the UNICEF contribution as complementary and a boost to their own reputation. Natcoms recognised that there was much to be learned from working with the UNICEF staff. Both interviews and survey results confirm that the Natcoms would not have been able to play the same role with governments as the 'international' UNICEF team members have been able to do. This is partly a matter of mandate and partly of experience, especially international experience. Governments and partners all noted the added value of the approach and capacity of UNICEF technical experts. Their concern is now that the reputational and other benefits should not be lost by a precipitate end to the initiatives started with UNICEF.

9.1.7 Joint UNICEF-Natcom communications, advocacy and products

As discussed earlier in the report, UNICEF and the Natcoms, with PFP support, have worked closely on advocacy positions and strategies, press statements, and publications directly related to the refugee and migrant crisis. Their collaboration was regular and close, especially in the first year of the response. It took time to understand that all public communications needed to be agreed jointly.

9.2 Challenges in One-UNICEF collaboration

While much has been positive, there have also been significant challenges in making the Natcom-UNICEF partnership work in implementing the One-UNICEF response. Some Natcoms were concerned about what they sensed as the potential for a UNICEF 'take-over' and a lack of respect from UNICEF for existing relationships. It has taken time to build trust and agree to a new set of roles and accountabilities between UNICEF and the Natcoms for the response. Some of the challenges were systems related, other were more relational. Turning to systems issues first:

9.2.1 Separate accountability lines can undermine teamwork if not well managed

The One-UNICEF Framework for Collaboration set out the broad division of responsibilities between UNICEF and Natcom in the response. Underlying the framework are the separate accountabilities of UNICEF to the Executive Director and the Executive Board and the Natcom to its own Board as a national charity or NGO. These two lines of accountability remain distinct. The Framework brings together activities conducted under these two different lines of accountability. The Framework's apparently straightforward distinction between technical support plus service delivery (UNICEF) and advocacy (Natcom) is not as clear in reality as it seems on paper. Both parties find themselves working with the same actors, sometimes in the same networks. Sometimes both technical assistance and advocacy are required to achieve the same result; "...the theoretical difference between 'direct response' by UNICEF/UN and 'advocacy' by UNICEF/Natcom is in fact a very grey area with significant overlap... for example, work undertaken in the context of legislation and its enactment." (Survey)

In 2016, joint UNICEF/Natcom response plans were developed. In 2017 and 2018, greater efforts have been made to develop improved joint plans. The commitments of the Natcom appear in the relevant

¹¹⁷ Some of the income sent by the Natcoms to PFP has been designated as global thematic funds and made available to ECARO for the response. As a result, some staff in ECARO do not understand how directly some Natcoms have supported the UNICEF response.

year's Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) agreed with PFP, and the UNICEF element in the UNICEF annual work plan agreed separately with the Special Coordinator. Even with the genuine goodwill available, this arrangement can lead to unclear accountability, crossed-wires, slow decision making, frustration, and strained relationships, at least one element of which has been seen in all five countries reviewed.

The 2018 plan for Italy¹¹⁸ has an agreed results framework showing which are to be delivered by UNICEF and which to be achieved jointly with the Natcom. This is a step in the right direction but will only work properly when the joint work plan is backed up by a single mechanism for holding all parties jointly to account, which is currently missing (using, for example, a monthly meeting/teleconference between Natcom-PFP-ECARO-UNICEF country team). This would move the parties closer to a genuine teamwork approach. During the review, joint transition plans were in preparation for Germany and Austria to provide a follow-up plan for the period running up to the departure of the UNICEF response team.

9.2.2 UNICEF funds NGO implementing partners using Natcom resources

It was difficult for the Natcoms to accept that UNICEF funded other domestic NGOs, some of which are their competitors, to provide the service delivery and training aspects of the response, using funds coming from the Natcom itself. This was all the more so when the NGOs funded had almost no track record in service delivery and were only then building up their own capacity to respond as the additional emergency funding was coming into the country. UNICEF ended up capacitating the Natcom's competitors, which then fundraised off the back of their partnership with UNICEF. In some countries, the Natcom refused to agree to UNICEF funding its direct competitors, especially Save the Children.

9.2.3 Lack of clarity on leadership, ownership and representation

The Natcom is an independent NGO that carries the UNICEF name within its territory. There has been some tension over who makes decisions regarding the response and who signs agreements with the Government.¹¹⁹ As far as the Natcoms are concerned, all decisions should be made with the Natcom because – 'we will be here when you have gone'. The One-UNICEF model does not help to establish who makes judgement calls about implementation. On occasions, other actors have been confused about the role of UNICEF, which 'UNICEF' they are working with, and who is speaking for UNICEF. It is important that UNICEF moves to address that confusion now and in the future.

According to one survey response, the "roles and responsibilities of UNICEF and Natcom need to be clearly defined. There cannot be two leaders. One has to lead if the response is to be effective, coordinated and holistic." This sounds sensible but, in the review team's view, there needs to be a measure of joint leadership as long as there are two separate lines of accountability, one to UNICEF and the other to the Natcom Executive Board. For Greece and Italy at least, UNICEF needs to do more to specify how this joint can leadership work, with an additional system for joint accountability. The aspiration for one leader is attractive but unrealistic, except where UNICEF is not present or where the Natcom lacks the capacity to contribute, and even here close liaison with the Natcom is needed.¹²⁰

In the One-UNICEF response, UNICEF has been working with organisations and individuals who are already partners or collaborators with the Natcom, therefore working relationships are shared. Public

¹¹⁸ Because the programme continues to 2019, the Natcom has significant capacity to contribute to elements of the response, and the Natcom/UNICEF collaboration at country level has greatly improved.

¹¹⁹ In Italy, all important communications regarding the One-UNICEF response are signed by the Natcom ED and the UNICEF country coordinator

¹²⁰ In the long term, the Croatia model may have appeal. Here UNICEF has a status agreement with the Government, but the UNICEF programme is self-funding and raises additional funds for UNICEF. UNICEF combines the functions of a UNICEF office and a Natcom. There are only 7 staff, and all are nationals, on national salaries. There is no dual line of accountability because the Representative reports to ECARO and there is no local Board. UNICEF Croatia reacted immediately to the crisis, with the first Child Friendly Space up and running in 48 hours.

messaging clearly has to be aligned between the two organisations. UNICEF programmes are being implemented in communities, and perhaps schools or hospitals, where the Natcom already has a presence and relationships and understands the local context. All this makes a simple delineation of responsibilities between UNICEF and the Natcom all the more unrealistic.

UNICEF and the Natcoms share a name and therefore an identity.¹²¹ Even if the organisations are different in nature and their interests are not 100 per cent aligned, what is good for the Natcom is good for UNICEF and vice versa. Fear of disturbing the relationship may be why the Natcoms and UNICEF have tended to avoid the tough and detailed talk required to arrive at a fully developed way of jointly implementing the One-UNICEF response. The Framework for Collaboration provided, in practice, just a starting point for cooperation, not the end point.

9.2.4 Natcom volunteers were frustrated

In all five countries reviewed, the Natcom found itself under pressure from its volunteers to respond in the early stages of the emergency and many were frustrated that they individually could not play an active role.¹²²

9.2.5 Challenges in UNICEF-Natcom relations

Both Natcoms and UNICEF have tried hard to establish good working relationships to make the One-UNICEF response a success, and some of the achievements listed above were only possible because of the level of cooperation achieved. At the same time, relations have sometimes been difficult. Some of the main challenges are set out in Table 8 below:

<i>According to Natcom informants:</i>	<i>According to UNICEF informants:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Natcoms were concerned that they might lose control of activities in their own country through the presence of the response team. • Any failure of UNICEF’s interventions would harm the Natcom’s reputation and it looked initially as if UNICEF was not going to respond. • Natcoms were concerned that UNICEF staff unfamiliar with the context would upset its network of relationships. • At the outset, some Natcoms felt disrespected by the UNICEF staff coming to start the response. UNICEF staff were somewhat dismissive, giving the impression that; “you are not really UNICEF” and “we are the ones bringing the solutions”. The manner of delivery provoked a negative reaction. • The Natcom is concerned that UNICEF works directly with high-level actors in government without involving the Natcom and may arrange meetings without the Natcom knowing. • It has proven difficult for Natcom managers to explain why UN staff as international civil servants are paid more than Natcom staff, and some resentment has resulted. • Natcom staff complained that they are sometimes kept out of the loop on important 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNICEF staff sometimes found themselves constrained by the Natcom in the contacts they could make, and the meetings they could attend. The Natcom facilitated some contacts, but blocked others. • The Natcom insists on being involved but then makes no meaningful participation and may not even attend the meeting they insisted they should be invited to, sometimes because Natcoms have little spare capacity to work on the response. • The Natcom should not attempt to speak for UNICEF concerning the response, especially to government or the UN (even if they represent UNICEF in other ways in their country). • UNICEF being potentially in a client position where the Natcom is the donor has been hard to handle even with the best good will on all sides. • That Natcom has its own political alliances which may lead to questions as to its being an independent voice for children. • Being a country coordinator has often been frustrating, assigned responsibility for delivering the whole response, even for elements for which the Natcom is responsible, over which they have no control.

¹²¹ A few UNICEF informants considered that allowing the Natcoms to take the name ‘UNICEF+country name’ was a mistake because it makes the Natcom seem more a part of UNICEF than it really is.

¹²² Bearing in mind that Natcom volunteers can be very influential; in Italy, for example, they vote in the Natcom board members (who are themselves volunteers).

<p>correspondence; UNICEF staff said exactly the same.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNICEF wants to, and sometimes does, contract the Natcom’s direct competitors to provide services. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Natcom Executive Boards do not seem to be sufficiently informed about or engaged in the One-UNICEF response to hold the Natcom management responsible for its part of the response. • The Natcom should not be in a position to veto UNICEF’s partnership decisions.
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Table 8: Challenges in UNICEF-Natcom working relationships in One-UNICEF response countries

10 Future Options for One-UNICEF response

The experience of developing and implementing the UNICEF refugee and migrant response in Europe, particularly in non-programme countries, is obliging the organisation to reflect on; the future of the response, both for the short term; the longer-term future of collaboration between UNICEF and Natcoms; and, the future role of UNICEF in HICs.

10.1 The short-term future of the One-UNICEF response

UNICEF has begun to consider how the gains made in non-programme countries in capacity and policy terms can be sustained. This in turn means thinking through the respective roles of UNICEF’s and the Natcom, in maintaining progress.

In Slovenia, the UNICEF response has ended, and by mid-2018, the response teams in Germany and Austria are due to have been stood down. This may be premature. A reputational risk now arises because partners are turning to the Natcoms to ensure continuity of the technical support work started under the One-UNICEF response. However, the Natcoms may not have the mandate, capacity, funds, or intention, to carry the work forward. How governments receive ongoing technical support from UNICEF and/or the Natcom in Austria, Germany and Slovenia to allow one or more aspect of the response to continue is yet to be resolved. (UNICEF and Natcom planning for 2018 was on-going at the time of report drafting). While PFP continues to provide technical support to Natcoms, PFP and ECARO need to agree how the Natcom/UNICEF package of support to national institutions is coordinated after the UNICEF response team leaves the country.

The programmes in Greece and Italy are set to continue to the end of 2019, and therefore have time to consider how the progress achieved so far can be maintained beyond 2019. UNICEF teams and Natcoms need to start planning for this now, rather than leaving it until 2019 to develop an exit plan for the last six months that allows for a UNICEF withdrawal but does not address sustainability.

10.2 Maximising Impact at EU level

At country level, UNICEF has relied on a mix of strategies, service delivery at local level and advocacy and technical support at national or government levels. In several cases, UNICEF’s provision of services and financial resources, and the small-scale modelling of new interventions, have led to UNICEF gaining a seat at national policy level. The same logic could be applied at European Commission/Parliament level.

During the response, UNICEF demonstrated how effective its lobbying at the European Commission and European Parliament can be (see 6.3.2), using inputs from the Natcoms. Using its experience from the national and local level in programme and non-programme countries of the EU, UNICEF is well placed to collect and synthesise information on the real-life effects of EU legislation on refugees and migrants and the challenges faced by governments in receiving and supporting them, in concert with UN and NGO partners. In practice, European funds are not always well used or monitored by the decentralised authorities that eventually administer them, and child migrants are suffering as a result. Several deficiencies in the management of reception and accommodation centres were reported by UNICEF and other partners during the review. This can result in sudden relocations, lack of access to services, delays in moving on from first line to second line centres, delays in receiving appropriate documentation, and other areas of poor practice.

UNICEF could usefully influence the planning, monitoring and incentive systems for the European Funds, especially the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)¹²³ from DG Home for use in European countries, and DG-ECHO funding to countries of origin.¹²⁴ AMIF funds are very substantial. Italy relies heavily on them, and Greece will also once DG-ECHO funding stops in Q1 2019. Similar arguments can be made for UNICEF to step up its advocacy on the implementation of other funding mechanisms, including from DG NEAR for neighbourhood and enlargement countries, including the Western Balkans, and DG DEVCO for system building work in countries of origin.

10.3 The longer-term role of UNICEF and Natcoms in HICs

Beyond the short term, UNICEF needs to clarify how it will work with Natcoms on migration issues and other relevant child rights issues as UNICEF response teams withdraw from non-programme countries. UNICEF is faced with a series of issues it needs to resolve, in discussion with the Natcoms

- Whether there is a case for UNICEF to further its work in HICs on migration and/or more broadly on children's rights
- Whether and how, in the light of the SDGs and the improved understanding of the state of children's rights in HICs, the role of UNICEF National Committees should evolve, and how UNICEF best supports them, in close collaboration with PFP
- Whether and how it works in HICs at time of crisis, including with Natcoms.

The Natcom remit as set down in the UNICEF-Natcom Cooperation Agreement excludes the Natcoms from service delivery^{125, 126, 127} and from the provision of technical assistance.^{128, 129} Some Natcoms in Europe already undertake research, analyse data, and advocate with their governments at policy level, including the Natcoms of some One-UNICEF countries, plus France and the UK. Some Natcoms already develop child rights policy for their national context, building on UNICEF global policy.¹³⁰

10.3.1 National Committee Position and Aspirations

In these discussions, UNICEF needs to bear in mind the following:

- The technical capacity of Natcoms to manage research into children's rights, to provide policy advocacy support or challenge to government varies significantly.¹³¹
- Natcoms do not all have the same aspirations. Some have no wish to expand their role.
- The current One-UNICEF Natcoms do not want a long-term presence of UNICEF 'international' teams in their country. However, some would welcome technical support from UNICEF experts.

¹²³ There are two separate sets of AMIF 'Actions', 1. Actions by national governments, accounting for approximately 80% of AMIF, and 2. Actions at EC level.

¹²⁴ In principal, the same applies to the much smaller funds from DG Justice and to EEA Norway funding

¹²⁵ For those sticking closely to this approach, if a national committee were to, for example, contract a university to undertake research on the status of migrant children in the country, this would amount to programme work and so fall outside the agreement.

¹²⁶ The Cooperation Agreement recognises to areas of activity for the National committee beyond fundraising. These are Child Rights Advocacy and Education for Development.

¹²⁷ The agreement states that, "UNICEF will provide policy support and technical guidance to National Committees and will provide access to relevant research, evidence and information". Paras 12d and 13d. This could be read as indicating that UNICEF does not wish the Natcoms to carry out research/evidence generation for themselves but PFP has confirmed that this is not the case (the agreement could helpfully be clarified on this point).

¹²⁸ Natcoms' provision of 'direct technical assistance' was specifically excluded by the ED's Global Broadcast message of 16.9.2015

¹²⁹ Some UNICEF informants stated that Natcoms should undertake programme work. The Cooperation Agreement does not use the term 'programme' but UNICEF staff (outside PFP) did when discussing Natcoms' role the One-UNICEF response. The use of this language adds to the lack of understanding of the limits of the Natcoms' remit.

¹³⁰ Some Natcoms have no interest on conducting policy work

¹³¹ PFP reports that it is conducting a pilot initiative with selected Natcoms to see how Natcoms could conduct Situation Analysis on Children, in the same way as UNICEF Country Offices do

- Natcoms are seeking a fuller role for their volunteers and see UNICEF's new global initiative on volunteering as an opportunity to strengthen volunteer engagement.^{132, 133}
- Natcoms are under pressure to make their work relevant to the rights of all children in the country, not just to refugees and migrants, especially as anti-refugee/migrant sentiment grows.
- Natcoms understand that any new or expanded activity should not threaten their income stream or the resources going to UNICEF. Some believe that a wider set of domestic activities will raise their profile and bring greater income for UNICEF, but a proper business case has yet to be made.

10.3.2 Continuing elements of the One-UNICEF response

The survey results did not support to the statement that 'National Committees could have responded to the crisis without UNICEF assistance' (44 per cent agreement)¹³⁴. However, there is a majority view in support of continuing at least some elements of the current response and in support of a greater engagement of Natcoms in future crises. 64 per cent of UNICEF/Natcom respondents agreed that child rights initiatives started during the response should continue, with a still stronger, 75 per cent, endorsement by partners. 61 per cent of UNICEF-Natcom respondents agreed that Natcoms should play a greater role in future crises,¹³⁵ with slightly weaker assent from partners, 58 per cent. Only 18 per cent of UNICEF respondents disagreed with a stronger role for Natcoms in future crises.¹³⁶ (See Figure 1 below)

Natcoms are a crucial part of UNICEF's fundraising machinery and contribute almost half of UNICEF's flexible, unearmarked funding.¹³⁷ The 'HICs paper' assumes that 'advocacy on domestic and international child rights issues contributes to fundraising, and vice versa', though no research has been conducted into income lost by UNICEF's lack of results in the first year of the response, or income gained by improved performance in the second. Any new models considered for the Natcoms should be accompanied by a fundraising impact assessment to assess the potential income gains and losses.¹³⁸

If Natcoms are to play a wider role beyond fundraising and advocacy, it will be necessary to strengthen the interaction with UNICEF, potentially beyond PFP, to ensure that technical standards are set and maintained. This might include a strengthened role for PFP in planning and coordinating inputs from various UNICEF offices/divisions with Natcoms. In some cases, Natcoms have appreciated being able to interact with the Special Coordinator and UNICEF divisions without going through PFP but in more steady-state situations Natcoms still want to have one principal contact point in UNICEF, probably somewhere in PFP.

Within UNICEF, there is some support for a stronger role and recognition for Natcoms in child rights research and monitoring, and policy advocacy. There is much less support for Natcoms providing technical support or service delivery. Some Natcoms want to be able to provide at least a modest level of emergency assistance in their own country. Otherwise they may again find themselves, in their

¹³² In addition to the global initiative, PFP reports that it is developing a 'framework' for Natcom volunteers

¹³³ In Italy, a training course for volunteers is under consideration to provide them with skills to assist with social inclusion.

¹³⁴ Acknowledging that there were many more responses from UNICEF than Natcoms. However, partners also disagreed

¹³⁵ As there are only a maximum of nine responses from Natcoms to any one question, their responses do not bias the UNICEF-Natcom survey on this point.

¹³⁶ There may be a bias towards those with an interest in a stronger role for Natcoms being likely to answer the survey

¹³⁷ In 2015, National Committees contributed \$499 million to UNICEF regular resources (RR), or 42 per cent of the total amount of fully flexible funding received by UNICEF. They also contributed \$648 million in other resources (OR), or 17 per cent of the total amount of restricted funding received by UNICEF.

¹³⁸ There are at least two reasons why increased an expanded scope of activities for Natcoms might raise more funds: Greater visibility of UNICEF in influencing government and other actors to respect child rights, and Greater domestic income for domestic causes from donors who will not give to international causes, for example, the anonymous donors who funded UNICEF's response team in Germany.

view, disadvantaged in their local market by not being permitted or able to act, as happened during the emergency phase of this crisis.




Figure 1: Survey results on whether One-UNICEF child rights initiatives should continue, and whether Natcoms should have a greater role

10.3.3 Reviewing the scope of UNICEF-Natcom cooperation

If Natcoms are to expand their scope, the spectrum of possible activities needs to be debated to determine what to encourage and where to set the limits of such activity. Figure 2 (below) provides some example activities, some within the scope of Natcom activity and others not, to aid that debate. (Fig. 2 uses practical examples of actual and potential activities raised by stakeholders during the review. Other examples and schema are possible).



Figure 2 – Current and possible future Natcom activities; for debate

Currently, activities 1 and 2 would cause no concern to UNICEF (or at least, not to PFP). Some Natcoms are already deeply involved in such activities. Activity 3 is within the Natcom's remit as a civil society organisation supporting children's rights and social inclusion in the local community. Activities 4, 5 and 6 are currently outside the Cooperation Agreement. UNICEF needs to consider whether there are circumstances under which 4, 5, or 6 might be 1) feasible, 2) valuable, and 3) permissible, and, if so, determine its role in supporting such initiatives.

The UNICEF Executive Board decision on HICs includes encouragement for UNICEF to aim for 'the most appropriate engagement approach to contribute to results in favour of the most

disadvantaged children' and to use flexible models.¹³⁹ If this involves a stronger role for Natcoms, this may require:

- A clarification of the Cooperation Agreement concerning the scope of Natcom activities
- A few additional posts in the relevant Natcoms
- UNICEF training of the Natcoms by PFP, but also from beyond PFP
- Periodic assessment of Natcom capacity and quality assurance by UNICEF

Options for delivery of support at national level could include:

- In-country consultants placed in government ministries or bodies, contracted by ECARO (a model that has worked well in Greece and Italy), or in Natcoms
- Technical consultants identified by UNICEF, but employed directly by Government
- One or more PCAs with an NGO or academic institution under contract to the Natcom to undertake research (or under contract to UNICEF for multi-country studies), or to develop publications in the national language, perhaps as part of a child rights network.
- And for service delivery, the potential for partnerships with one or more national NGOs might be explored.

Whatever solutions are considered, in each country they need to be based on thorough analysis of the context, legal and political, and operational, with a mapping of relevant organisations and national capacity, with a view to determining UNICEF's primary added value in case of a crisis. In the HICs of Europe, it is likely that the provision of fundamentals such as food, shelter, accommodation, health care can be provided by the State. In HICs, UNICEF's main contribution lies elsewhere.

¹³⁹ 'Also notes the heterogeneity of high-income countries and invites UNICEF to continue to use the most appropriate engagement approach to contribute to results in favour of the most disadvantaged children, depending upon the context in any given high-income country, such as working with other United Nations agencies, working with National Committees, working through UNICEF country offices and programmes, working through multi-country offices and programmes, working through the Global and Regional Programme or, subject to approval by the Executive Board, other approaches as may be developed and tested;' from 2016/11 Review of UNICEF experience in high-income countries and in countries transitioning from upper-middle-income to high-income status, Decisions, point 5.

10.4 Options for emergency response in non-programme countries

Both ECARO and PFP are keen to see the development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for emergency response with Natcoms to specify the expected role and limits of Natcoms emergency activities, how it should be organised, and under what circumstances and how UNICEF would become involved. The first decision is to clarify whether UNICEF and Natcoms are to make any first phase emergency response at all in HICs, and whether a partnership with an existing national response organisation (civil protection, Red Cross, or other NGO) is feasible and preferable.

10.4.1 If 'No' to emergency response in HICs

If there is to be no rapid response (by either UNICEF or the Natcom):

- UNICEF needs to communicate in advance to government and partners explaining the rationale for no response.¹⁴⁰
- AND/OR: UNICEF could make a pre-agreement with another humanitarian response organization, national or international, in the country, or with the civil protection mechanism, whereby UNICEF would not respond but provide technical assistance to the organisation/mechanism concerned to make sure children's rights were held in focus.
- AND/OR: UNICEF could focus on influencing Government, the Red Cross Red Crescent, UNHCR, IOM for some level of incorporation of children's rights (building on the coming Refugee and Migration Compacts). If this current response is representative, IOM and UNHCR's willingness to address specific issues relating to children is limited, one of the reasons they were keen to see UNICEF deploying earlier.

10.4.2 If 'Yes' to emergency response in HICs

If UNICEF and /or the Natcom are to make an emergency response in HICs, another series of options presents itself, perhaps depending on the scale of the emergency:

- Option 1. Train UNICEF volunteers to work with another organization(s) in lower risk areas of response, so that the Natcom is not directly involved or responsible
- Option 2. Train the Natcom to undertake a modest scale of response, with UNICEF staff placed within the Natcom – in which case the response is still the Natcom's responsibility, not UNICEF's
- Option 3. Bring in a UNICEF response team, having gained an understanding with government in advance of any emergency

10.4.3 Maximise the use of local human resources

An expanded role for Natcoms, or Natcoms and UNICEF working together in crisis response, should maximise the use of national personnel, which bring many advantages:

- They can be recruited more quickly than international staff
- They can be let go more easily when the need disappears
- They can be employed at lower salaries than UN staff of the same seniority.
- They have the language skills required
- They are likely to understand the political context and local networks.

In HICs in Europe, there may be nationals with previous emergency experience available. If UNICEF itself needs national staff to be employed this can be done via the Natcom if UNICEF is prevented from a lack of formal agreement with the Government from employing its own staff.

¹⁴⁰ UNICEF cannot again fail to respond, while at the same time offering no explanation

The options from 10.4 above are represented graphically in Fig 3.




Figure 3: Options for emergency response in HICs

10.4.4 Learning from other regions

The refugee and migrant crisis in Europe is not the only HIC emergency response in which UNICEF has been involved. It now has examples of emergency response, with and without Natcoms, from the USA, Japan and the Caribbean, in addition to Europe. There may be lessons to be synthesised from across these responses.

10.5 The requirement for legal agreements

As discussed above, UNICEF sought legal agreements to operate in five One-UNICEF countries. The process for doing so was agreed between the Special Coordinator and the Legal Adviser. UNICEF reached agreements in two countries relatively quickly, at least quickly enough not to slow progress delayed for other reasons, while in two other countries delays in reaching agreement impacted the timing of the response. In another, the Executive Director instructed ECARO to proceed with the response without an agreement.

Given the lack of full legal agreement with governments to operate in some of the countries reviewed, UNICEF is fortunate that no major risk has arisen so far. There are some senior managers who consider that UNICEF does not need a formal agreement with Member States which are already signatories to the Convention on the privileges and immunities of the UN. This is not the view of the Legal Adviser. UNICEF must clarify this situation. It is not tenable for senior staff to be taking opposing views on this issue, without resolution and a shared UNICEF position being established.

UNICEF should aim for a legal agreement in non-programme countries before deploying staff on long term posts but must find other ways to respond in the meantime, perhaps using some of the options in 10.3.2 above. This itself then presents options concerning the legal agreement:

- To make an agreement in principle with governments in advance,
- OR expedite an agreement with government after the start of a crisis within, say, two months,
- AND/OR to make a risk assessment and deploy anyway after three months in case no agreement is reached

11 Conclusions

11.1 Migration into Europe will continue

While Europe may not see the volume and speed of inward migration witnessed in 2015 again, migration into Italy and Greece from Africa, Asia and the Middle East continues. Many refugees and migrants suffer greatly on their journeys to Europe, especially along the Central Mediterranean Route. In Greece, there are not enough safe places for unaccompanied children and the gap in provision is widening; and in Italy, where a high proportion of migrants are adolescents, reception centres are often failing to provide quality services for unaccompanied children. In Germany, there is no systematic mapping of the condition of the many thousands of children in thousands of reception and accommodation centres. Many refugees, asylum seekers and migrants across Europe have no access to education or proper guardianship. Although the emergency that prompted UNICEF's emergency declaration is over, many thousands of refugee and migrant children in Europe remain highly vulnerable. Long term trends are hard to predict and there may be further spikes in migration.

11.2 Gaps in national capacity and child protection in HICs in Europe

UNICEF and other international actors were surprised at the relatively poor state of child protection systems in some high-income countries in Europe and at the readiness of some authorities to contravene children's rights through administrative detention, refoulement, and drawn-out asylum procedures. While differing significantly between countries, the gaps in capacity, policy and systems remain substantial, in part because some countries have not faced such a crisis before. Many gaps stem from the failure to explicitly and consistently define refugee and asylum-seeking children as vulnerable in national sectoral strategies and, with the increasingly negative attitudes to inward migration across Europe, governments may not be motivated to improve their approach without pressure from child rights groups and, for its members, from the EU.

11.3 UNICEF mounted a minimal response in HICs in the emergency phase

While UNICEF was successful in mounting a quick response at modest scale in some programme countries, in non-programme countries, there was very little practical support to children from UNICEF in the first nine months after the emergency declaration. UNICEF was held back by a series of organisational and bureaucratic challenges, some of its own making, that added to the already difficult political and working environment at country level. UNICEF and the Natcoms lost public profile and position with the authorities as a result but subsequently recovered their reputations. With the processes UNICEF employed for this response, it would not be able to mobilise any technical support or service delivery for an emergency response in days, or even weeks. ECARO will need a different approach to implement its Rapid Reaction Support.

11.4 UNICEF put children's rights 'on the map' in HICs

During the response, UNICEF and the Natcoms succeeded in "putting children on the map," highlighting the unique needs and rights of refugee and migrant children in this crisis and making this group a policy priority both for governments and for human rights bodies in the countries reviewed. This represents the most important achievement of the One-UNICEF response.

11.5 UNICEF has added value

By the time of the review, UNICEF's counterpart government ministries and bodies were highly appreciative¹⁴¹ of UNICEF's work as an independent, expert, standards-setting international organisation, able to analyse children's rights issues and make constructive policy and practical contributions to the improvement of national and local systems. In some cases, this complemented the already strong relationship that the Natcom had with relevant government partners.

¹⁴¹ Ultimately, if not initially in some cases

11.6 UNICEF has demonstrated several innovations and good practices

As detailed in section 6 of the report, UNICEF has demonstrated innovation and good practices in all three strategies employed for the response – in technical support, advocacy and service delivery. There is much to be learned from these to be carried forward into other situations.

11.7 The ability to handle ambiguity has been a key to success

The Special Coordinators and other managers in the response have shown flexibility and skill in navigating the ‘grey areas’, showing how important it is that senior staff can manage ambiguity and finds solutions where many actors need to be engaged – in this case UNICEF, Natcoms, governments and others – to achieve a result, when lines of accountability are unclear, and no one has complete control. No standard operating procedure can substitute for the capacity to solve problems collectively when no one party is in control. By keeping a focus on vulnerable children, UNICEF has shown that it can negotiate its way to shared solutions, even though bureaucratic obstacles have hampered progress. There are however some important outstanding obstacles to full cooperation, as discussed in section 9.2 and elsewhere in this report.

11.8 Child Protection was an appropriate focus for the response

Given the limited scale of UNICEF’s response, it was appropriate that UNICEF focused on child protection. Survey respondents gave very strong support for the statement ‘UNICEF was right to put child protection systems at the centre of the response’ (91 per cent). UNICEF’s work in other sectors, to the limited extent that it has taken place, has also been valued. In Italy and Greece, UNICEF has investment most into the protection of unaccompanied children, a highly vulnerable group, with resource intensive needs.

11.9 UNICEF’s strengthened policy and capacity on migration needs further investment

Having previously neglected migration as an issue, UNICEF has now made up ground, in part spurred on by the refugee and migrant crisis in Europe. UNICEF has developed policy and advocacy positions, and increased its human resources on migration, though probably not sufficiently. The post of Senior Advisor Migration (P5) located in NY was created to address the overall coordination and resource mobilization functions and significant new resources have been generated. UNICEF has undertaken important research and generated high quality publications on the challenges faced by refugee and migrant children in Europe.¹⁴² There is a consensus that a route-based approach to migration initiatives (covering countries of origin, transit and destination) is required and could be an area of comparative advantage for UNICEF. However, the director-level group on cross regional migration group seems to have lost momentum. Country based staff want to see more detail of how the Six Policy Asks can be implemented as they do not find the ‘Global Programme Framework for Children on the Move’ sufficiently practical.

11.10 Equity gaps have not been monitored

It is UNICEF’s role to understand the levels of child deprivation and abuses of children’s rights, whether governments want it to or not. This is part of UNICEF’s normal business in programme countries, and UNICEF needs to decide to what extent, if any, the same should apply to non-programme countries. The review cannot report with any precision on equity gaps in the response by governments or by UNICEF because UNICEF does not have the situation analysis or collective response tracking process to make such a determination in the countries reviewed. UNICEF’s original rapid assessments proved useful in determining the best avenues for UNICEF’s offers of support to governments. At regional level, UNICEF worked with UNHCR and IOM to improve availability of data on refugee and migrant children (e.g. IOM flow monitoring surveys, inter-agency factsheet on refugee and migrant children).

¹⁴² UNICEF is preparing a provides a detailed assessment of risks for several of countries, including Greece, Italy, and Turkey to be titled; ‘The Legal Entitlements of Refugee and Migrant Children in 33 European Countries’

At country level, UNICEF initiated a number of positive initiatives in child rights monitoring (CRM), as highlighted in the report.

Overall, CRM has been and remains a challenge. There is no comprehensive assessment of risks to, and abuse of, refugee and migrant children's rights in the countries reviewed, nor of whether the CCCs are being met for refugee and migrant children. With exceptions¹⁴³, UNICEF has not systematically monitored other organisation's inputs to the achievement of the CCC's for refugee and migrants in sectors other than child protection, for example, health, nutrition, or shelter, a role it would normally fulfil in programme countries.

11.11 The One-UNICEF response model was innovative and partially successful

The One-UNICEF model, and its accompanying Framework for Collaboration, was an innovative approach to bringing Natcoms and UNICEF together to contribute to a combined One-UNICEF response to the refugee and migrant crisis. Having pressed UNICEF to respond to the crisis, some Natcoms were concerned that the presence and actions of a separate UNICEF response team might be prejudicial for the Natcom. However, the Natcoms made vital contacts for the UNICEF teams and provided considerable practical support, while also funding much of the response (not in Greece). Over time, good working relationships and goodwill developed. There were important joint achievements, especially in advocacy and communications. The Framework for Collaboration, while creative, was not sufficiently detailed to make the collaboration work fully and to overcome the inherent weakness of dual lines of accountability. ECARO and PFP tried to clarify the modus operandi but the complexities of the arrangement were only partially addressed and important issues of leadership and accountability remain unresolved.

11.12 There is demand for some elements of the One-UNICEF response to continue

UNICEF response teams, ECARO, Natcoms themselves, and, most importantly, the majority of government and other partners consulted, agree that aspects of the work started under the refugee and migrant response should continue, especially capacity development, standard-setting, policy development, and child rights monitoring.¹⁴⁴ Options for how future support to these areas might be delivered are discussed briefly in section 10 above.

¹⁴³ In Greece, the coverage of education provision is well monitored

¹⁴⁴ A UNICEF survey respondent remarked "...our technical support/capacity development is where we have added more value...This is why it would be so crucial that we do not drop this line of work, now that we have finally started seeing some results".

12 Recommendations

Preamble to the recommendations:

- The review team has no position on whether UNICEF should expand its work in HICs in Europe, or on whether Natcoms should play a wider role in crisis response.
- Some of the solutions to be developed based on the recommendations will require GMT agreement where they have organisation wide implications, and perhaps Executive Board agreement for some elements.
- Discussion of the future role of Natcoms in HICs cannot be determined for Europe alone; UNICEF also has Natcoms in HICs in North America, Asia and Oceania to consider.

Recommendation 1: Complete the development of the One-UNICEF response model

UNICEF should resolve outstanding challenges within the One-UNICEF response model, using Italy as the case study. This requires: 1) Joint planning that shows actions to be taken by the Natcom and UNICEF (as the 2018 joint plans does), with detail of actions to be taken by whom and by when, i.e. not just targets for the year, and 2) a new joint accountability mechanism to review the plan and track progress.

➔ **Action by: 1) Italian Natcom and UNICEF response team on joint planning; 2) PFP to lead on the joint accountability mechanism, with the UNICEF country team, ECARO and the Italian Natcom.**

Recommendation 2: UNICEF should assure the short-term future of the One-UNICEF response

UNICEF should determine how it can assure the continuity of those initiatives started during the refugee and migrant response that governments want to see continued in the HIC countries where the UNICEF response team has recently withdrawn or is about to withdraw: Austria, Germany, and Slovenia. These include various forms of systems strengthening for which governments have come to see UNICEF's added value.

➔ **Action by ECARO, with the Natcoms concerned and PFP**

Recommendation 3: Determine the future role of UNICEF in HICs in Europe

UNICEF should determine whether it intends to increase its attention to child rights issues in European HICs. If so, it will need to determine:

- The child rights monitoring and policy advocacy initiatives required to support governments in HICs,
- How Natcoms can strengthen their work in these areas, including for refugee and migrant children and other areas of children's rights, with or without UNICEF support,
- How to strengthen technical cooperation between ECARO and PFP in support of Natcoms in Europe.

(While beyond the scope of this review, this recommendation may have global application as it may not prove possible to make decisions concerning Natcoms in Europe without a UNICEF-wide decision about the future role of, and support to, Natcoms).

➔ **Action by: PFP with Natcoms, ECARO, EMOPS and PD**

Recommendation 4: Determine future UNICEF and Natcom response to crises in HICs in Europe

Determine whether and how UNICEF and/or the Natcom should respond to future crises, large or small, in HICs in Europe, in a way that ensures rapid deployment, working through the Options in 10.4.

- **4a.** If preparedness and response for HICs is to be strengthened, UNICEF should maximise the use of the high level of social capital available in HICs, employing national staff and consultants within Natcoms, or directly as local UNICEF staff. Natcoms can help UNICEF to understand the national resources available whether, individual or institutional. Any initiative by UNICEF on emergency preparedness in HICs should map and maximise the sources of qualified individuals and partner organisations and consult with national authorities about their systems for allocation of national resources to emergency response, and how UNICEF can contribute to civil protection and other emergency response processes.
➔ **Action by ECARO, with PFP and Natcoms, EMOPS and PD**
- **4b.** UNICEF must clarify the process required for a formal agreement with governments of non-programme HICs should another crisis response be required. This may or may not be the same arrangement used for this response. The lack of clarity about whether UNICEF needs a formal agreement to respond in HICs should be addressed, using the learning from this review, to achieve a shared understanding and consensus amongst senior staff. Whatever the arrangement reached, UNICEF should have a solution for rapid crisis response in the period before a formal agreement is being reached.
➔ **Action by: Office of the Executive Director, with the Legal Adviser and Regional Directors**

Recommendation 5 – UNICEF should explain its role to HIC governments

Some HIC governments in Europe do not understand UNICEF's role well. They should be briefed on the different roles played by UNICEF as a UN agency and the role of the UNICEF National Committee as a national NGO. UNICEF should explain their respective roles to individual governments, in particular ministries of health, education, social welfare, migration, and others as relevant, in one or more briefings arranged via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the first instance, this would not include any commitment to action. Rather, UNICEF could explain past examples of its technical support, and test government interest in UNICEF engagement. (While beyond the scope of this review, the same recommendation may apply to HICs in other regions, for example, LACRO and EAPRO).

➔ **Action by: Regional Director, ECARO, in the first instance in collaboration with PPD and PFP.**

Recommendation 5: UNICEF should strengthen its cross-regional programming on migration

UNICEF should strengthen its cross-regional programming on migration, tapping into resources that donors appear keen to provide for such initiatives. UNICEF should task the Directors' Group on Migration to develop and raise resources for route-based cross regional programming on migration. This will require a designated programme manager at HQ level (perhaps the Senior Advisor Migration in PD), to coordinate across the regions and HQ divisions concerned. The organising group should report to the Deputy Executive Director Programmes, at least for the first year, to ensure that directors concerned create initiatives that are based on a single route-based strategy and programme, rather than separate programmes in each region covered by the route. (While this recommendation aims to ensure that UNICEF adopts route-based strategies for migration into Europe, it may have global application).

➔ **Action by: Director of PD, in consultation with the Deputy Executive Director, Programmes, with support from DRP, PFP, and relevant Regional Directors.**

Recommendation 6: UNICEF should strengthen its collaboration with UNHCR and IOM

UNICEF should maximise the potential benefits to refugee and migrant children by strengthening its partnerships with UNHCR and IOM, given that both organisations have a large and continuing presence in Greece and Italy. The Refugee Compact and Migration Compact due to be agreed in 2018 provide important entry points for UNICEF in its work with these organisations. UNICEF should work with UNHCR and IOM to determine what technical support UNICEF can reliably offer them to make

their programmes as child friendly as possible. The good UNICEF-UNHCR-IOM cooperation at Geneva level demonstrated at the height of the crisis should be extended to ensuring stronger joint action by the three organisations at country level.

➔ **Action by: Head of the Migration Unit, ECARO, with the Inter-Agency and Humanitarian Partnerships section of EMOPS, in discussion with IOM and UNHCR.**

Recommendation 7 - UNICEF should strengthen its advocacy on EU funding instruments for migration

UNICEF should use its advocacy capacity to influence the regulations covering the country level application and oversight of the very substantial European funds going to migration initiatives within and beyond the EU - DG Home (AMIF), DG ECHO, DG Justice etc - with the aim of improving the welfare of refugee and migrant children. The advocacy can draw on UNICEF and Natcom local knowledge of how national programmes based on EU funding are affecting the lives of refugee and migrant children. While acknowledging that UNICEF may also need to access AMIF and other funds directly to support its own programmes, the strategic goal target here is to influence the conditionality for, and management of, all EU migration funding. In connection with Recommendation 6 above, joint advocacy on EU migration funds with UNHCR and IOM would be still more effective. (This recommendation aims to target specific failings in the protection and welfare of migrant and refugee children in Europe, as part of UNICEF's wider agenda for advocacy for political and legislative change in European Union institutions).

➔ **Action by: Head of the Migration Unit, ECARO, with PD and PPD.**

Recommendation 8: ECARO should present key elements of the review findings to the GMT

Given the breadth of issues explored in this report, the currency of the discussion of UNICEF's role in HICs, and the relevance of this response to other regions addressing migration issues, the Regional Director, ECARO, should present those elements of this report with organisation-wide implications to the Global Management Team. In addition, UNICEF may wish to include aspects of the review in the background paper for the Executive Board's next discussion on UNICEF's role in HICs.

➔ **Action by: Regional Director, ECARO**