

EVALUATION REPORT UNICEF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAMME HURRICANE STAN – GUATEMALA

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UNICEF/Guatemala/smse-001/JRChew K.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CCC	Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies
COCODE	Community Development Council
CODEFEM	Association for Advocacy of Guatemalan Women's Rights
CONJUVE	National Youth Council
CONRED	National Emergency Reconstruction Committee
CO	Country Office
ECPAT	Global Network to Prevent Sexual Exploitation of Children
FGER	Guatemalan Federation of Radio Phonic Schools
JPO	Junior Professional Officer
MINEDUC	Ministry of Education
MSPAS	Ministry of Health
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OJ	Judicial Organism
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PGN	Office of the Attorney General
PROSAN	National Food and Nutrition Security Programme/ Ministry of Health
SBS	Social Welfare Ministry
SOSEP	Secretariat of the First Lady for Social Works
TACRO	UNICEF Regional Office/ Latin America
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	The United Nations Children's Fund
UNISTAN	Orphan Protection Group
WatSan	Water and Sanitation
WHO	World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation Objectives and Methodology

The main objectives of this evaluation are to draw lessons from UNICEF's response programme to Hurricane Stan in October 2005 and to make recommendations in order to strengthen UNICEF's support in possible future emergencies. The methodology was based on documentation reviews and interviews carried out with UNICEF staff, implementing partners, donors and beneficiaries in the field. This evaluation will be published at the same time as the UNICEF evaluation concerning the Tsunami response. It might be worthwhile taking note of both documents to discover similarities and differences in the UNICEF emergency response.

Hurricane Stan: A Crisis Which Caught Most Actors Ill Prepared

Hurricane Stan, which affected about a half of the Guatemalan territory in October 2005, required preparation and capacity by the government and international stakeholders beyond their immediately available means. The government estimates that the total cost of the damage amounts to approximately US\$ 976 Million. To the date (July 2006), the country has not still recovered from the emergency and has faced small scale emergencies caused by heavy rains. The affected population still lives in temporary shelters, which are sometimes in unsuitable conditions.

The UNICEF Response

The UNICEF emergency response was based on a joint United Nations Flash Appeal and the UNICEF Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies. Emergency interventions were structured according to the following components: water and sanitation, health, child protection, education and nutrition. Communication was not included in the Flash Appeal; nevertheless this component received emergency funds. UNICEF received more funds than the requested amount in the Flash Appeal. US\$ 5,034,682.18 were donated mainly from the governments of Sweden, Norway, Canada, Luxembourg and The Netherlands. The UN system as a whole appealed for US\$ 31,860,000 of which US\$ 20,694,073 (65%) were funded.

Major Findings

Positive results:

- In some areas, the emergency was transformed into an opportunity to establish inter-institutional collaboration mechanisms (UNISTAN). New topics were introduced by UNICEF (Return to Happiness), and issues that were neglected by the government could raise their profile with UNICEF's support (WatSan).

- Inter-agency coordination was mostly implemented well. UNICEF actively participated in the elaboration of the Flash Appeal and its follow up, as well as in UN joint disaster preparedness meetings.
- Some of the initial emergency response activities were rapidly implemented. UNICEF quickly distributed some stocks of emergency items, such as oral re-hydration salts, essential drugs and radio messages on nutrition, health and child protection.

The major weaknesses of UNICEF's emergency response consist of the following six areas:

- Delay in purchase and delivery of supplies (procurement),
- Insufficient number of staff in key sectors (Water and Sanitation, Nutrition, Protection, Operations),
- Weak monitoring process of the emergency response in some cases,
- Limited internal coordination between two programmes as well as among programmes and operations,
- Selecting some ineffective implementing partners that caused administrative and implementation constraints,
- Some internal deficiencies in emergency preparedness.

Recommendations

The recommendations also focus on six key areas: supplies, staffing issues, monitoring, coordination, selection of implementing partners and emergency preparedness.

EVALUATION REPORT

1. OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

The main purpose of this internal evaluation was to draw lessons from UNICEF's response programme to Hurricane Stan in October 2005 and to make recommendations in order to strengthen UNICEF's support in possible future emergencies. The objectives were to:

- Measure the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, the impact and sustainability of UNICEF's emergency response activities;
- Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the response in each sector,
- Draw lessons to help UNICEF Guatemala enhance its preparedness and its ability to respond in an effective way to emergencies.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation of the UNICEF response programme to Hurricane Stan was undertaken at the request of the UNICEF Guatemala OIC. The consultant, who had worked for UNICEF during the emergency period, was hired to carry out the evaluation. The consultant worked closely with UNICEF staff members at all levels, implementing partners (ministries and NGO's), municipal governments as well as children in the affected areas to obtain a balanced view of the effectiveness and impact of UNICEF's emergency response.

The evaluation methods were based on the various reviews of good practices, such as UNICEF Evaluation Report Standards and OECD/DAC. The methods included:

- Documentation review at various levels and across a broad range of sectors, including financial data.
- Discussions with UNICEF Guatemala staff, including programme officers, operations, and administrative staff.
- Discussions with the UNICEF regional office (TACRO, emergency section)
- Discussions with UN organizations (UNDP, Resident Coordinator's Office, World Food Programme)
- Interviews with implementing partners (Ministries and NGO's)
- Visits to the affected areas (southern coast, Sololá, San Marcos)
- Interviews with municipal governments, implementing partners in the field, beneficiaries and affected children.

To carry out the interviews, the consultant designed questionnaires tailored to each stakeholder according to the UNICEF Evaluation Report Standards.

Evaluation criteria were: relevance, efficiency, impact, sustainability, coverage and coordination.

The results and achievements of the emergency operations were assessed against the aims and objectives set out in the United Nations Guatemala Flash Appeal (October 2005) and the UNICEF Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies (CCC's).

2.2 Limitations

Only one consultant was in charge of the evaluation of all sectors of emergency response in six weeks. This resulted in some time constraints. Analyzing all aspects of the emergency response in a detailed manner and interviewing all stakeholders involved in the emergency response was a challenge.

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3 GUATEMALA: BACKGROUND

3.1 A Vulnerable Country

Guatemala is rated by the World Bank (2005) as a low to intermediate middle income country with a GNP per capita of US\$ 2,130. The UNDP Human Development Index places Guatemala at 117 out of 177 countries, meaning that two-thirds of all countries worldwide have better standards of living.

Guatemala's income disparity is one of the highest in Latin America. Approximately 56% of the population lives under the poverty line, and 16% is affected by extreme poverty (surviving on less than US\$1 per day) (ENCOVI, 2000). The National Human Development Report (UNDP, 2003) indicates that extreme poverty increased from approximately 16% to 22% between 2000 and 2003, reflecting a continuing negative trend.

In Guatemala, 49.2% of children under the age of five suffer from chronic malnutrition. This is the sixth highest prevalence rate in the world and the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean. The problem is concentrated in rural areas and among the indigenous population; the chronic malnutrition rate is 69.5% compared with 35.7% in non-indigenous areas.

Due to its geographic location and geological formation, Guatemala is exposed to a wide range of geophysical, meteorological and hydrological threats. In addition, man-made environmental, technological or even socio-political hazards threaten lives and sustainable development.

3.2 Hurricane Stan

In the period from 4 to 7 October 2005, heavy rains caused by Hurricane Stan severely affected the southern coast and western highlands of Guatemala. Floods and landslides resulted in the loss of lives, injuries, displacement of persons, damaged housing and infrastructure in 15 of the country's 22 departments. The most vulnerable groups of Guatemalan society, indigenous communities, children and women, were most affected by the impact of Hurricane Stan. In the Departments of Sololá and Chimaltenango, the percentages of indigenous population are as high as 96.4% and 78.4% respectively. Even before the natural disaster occurred, the areas most affected by Hurricane Stan had the highest poverty rate and were ranked lowest in the human development index. The disaster caused cross-cutting consequences in the social, economic and environmental spheres. The government estimates that the total cost of the damage amounts to approximately US\$ 976 Million¹.


The official reconstruction phase started in March 2006. However, the rainy season started again in May and has posed a great challenge to reconstruction efforts. So far, the rainy season has been exceptionally hard, and there have been several small scale emergencies in the same areas, which had been affected by Hurricane Stan. The UN Disaster Management Team is currently developing a joint Emergency Preparedness Plan. Efforts are being undertaken to reposition essential emergency items to vulnerable areas.

¹ CEPAL, ' Preliminary notes on the effects of Hurricane Stan in Guatemala', 7 November 2005

3.3 The International Response: Facts and Figures

In response to Hurricane Stan, the UN system at the Guatemala country level has made significant advances in inter-agency coordination. Various UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes prepared a Joint Flash Appeal for US\$ 31,860,000, of which US\$ 20,694,073 (65%) has been funded. The agencies reoriented their regular programming to give priority to the integrated emergency response during the period of October-December 2005.

UNICEF requested US\$ 3,600,000 within the UN Joint Appeal and had received US \$5,282,859 by 8 June. It also reoriented US\$ 350,000 from the regular Cooperation Programme to rapidly respond to the emergency. The areas of response involved water and sanitation, health, nutrition, child protection and education.

 Flash Appeal: Guatemala 2005 Table C: Requirements, Commitments/Contributions and Pledges per Appealing Organization as of 08-June-2006 http://www.reliefweb.int/fts (Table ref: R1)								
<i>Compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by donors and appealing organizations.</i>								
Appealing Org.	Original Requirements USD	Revised Requirements USD	Carry over USD	Commitments/ Contributions USD	Total resources available USD	Unmet Requirements USD	% Covered	Uncommitted pledges USD
FAO	3,500,000	3,500,000	0	320,000	320,000	3,180,000	9.10%	0
IOM	1,865,000	1,865,000	0	58,000	58,000	1,807,000	3.10%	0
OCHA	113,000	113,000	0	600,456	600,456	-487,456	100.00%	0
PAHO	1,770,000	1,770,000	0	3,216,239	3,216,239	-1,446,239	100.00%	0
UNDP	5,962,000	5,962,000	0	4,593,045	4,593,045	1,368,955	77.00%	170,192
UNESCO	300,000	300,000	0	25,000	25,000	275,000	8.30%	0
UNFPA	650,000	650,000	0	218,696	218,696	431,304	33.60%	120,192
UNICEF	3,600,000	3,600,000	0	5,282,859	5,282,859	-1,682,859	100.00%	50,000
WFP	6,910,000	14,100,000	0	6,379,778	6,379,778	7,720,222	45.20%	965,018
GRAND TOTAL	24,670,000	31,860,000	0	20,694,073	20,694,073	11,165,927	65.00%	1,305,402

Pledge: a non-binding announcement of an intended contribution or allocation by the donor. ("Uncommitted pledge" on these tables indicates the balance of original pledges not yet committed.)

Commitment: creation of a legal, contractual obligation between the donor and recipient entity, specifying the amount to be contributed.

Contribution: the actual payment of funds or transfer of in-kind goods from the donor to the recipient entity.

4 UNICEF EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN GUATEMALA

The United Nations Flash Appeal requested emergency funds for the duration of six months. Hence, the emergency phase lasted from October 2005 until March 2006. The government launched the official reconstruction plan on 16 March, which consists of three components: restoration of the social fabric, economic security and reconstruction of infrastructure. In collaboration with the international community, this plan will be implemented until the end of 2007. Some UNICEF donors, such as Sweden and Norway, allocated emergency funds for the period of three years. Donations from Canada and Luxembourg expired in March and April 2006 respectively.

The following components of the Flash Appeal were covered by UNICEF:

- ***Water, Sanitation and Hygiene***: with the aim of preventing water-borne diseases, the main actions were: assessment of the water and sanitation conditions, provision of water purification supplies and water containers, cleaning and disinfection of wells, establishment of waste disposal services and information dissemination.
- ***Health***: prevention of infectious disease outbreaks, provision of essential medicines.
- ***Nutrition***: monitoring of the nutritional status of children and lactating or pregnant women, treatment of acutely malnourished children.
- ***Child Protection, Education and Recreational Activities***: with the aim of preventing abuse of children, adolescents and women, the main activities were: needs assessment of affected children, adolescents and women; registration of and support services for unaccompanied children and orphans, prioritising family reunification; protection of children in shelters and affected areas from abuse; exploitation and trafficking; support of educational and recreational activities and psycho-social assistance.

UNICEF took on the lead agency role in the Water & Sanitation and Nutrition sector.

Until July 2006, the following funds were received and channelled to implementing partners:

Guatemala Flash Appeal
 UNICEF Emergency Response to Hurricane "Stan" and Ensuing Floods
 Up to June 30, 2006 In US\$ dollars

Funds Available

Donor	PBA	Amount	Recovery Cost	Prog. Imp. Amount
Sweden	SM/2005/9983	1,838,352.94	119,880.61	1,718,492.33
Norway	SM/2005/9983	1,212,571.08	79,059.64	1,133,511.42
Canada	SM/2005/9983	67,391.00	3,207.81	64,183.19
U.S. Funds for Guatemala	SM/2005/9983	86,019.18	4,094.51	81,924.67
Canada	SM/2005/0628	211,865.00	20,995.82	190,869.18
Luxemburgo	SM/2005/0599	118,483.00	11,741.66	106,741.34
Netherlands	SM/2005/0701	1,450,000.00	131,805.00	1,318,195.00
Agfund	SM/2006/0011	50,000.00	4,955.00	45,045.00
Total		5,034,682.18	375,720.05	4,658,962.13

Pending Funds

OCHA'S Financial Services for Humanitarian AID Flows

Donor	Amount	Status
Allocations of unearmarked fund by UN agencies	350,000.00	Paid contribution
New Zealand	103,808.00	Commitment
Total	453,808.00	

Programme Implementation

Emergency Response Component	Budget Estimate	Funds Received (a)	Pending to be Received or Assig. of funds Received	Amount Requested &/or Obligated (b)	Implement. Level % (b/a)
Health Services	400,000.00	447,168.30	-47,168.30	359,914.99	80.5%
Nutrition	100,000.00	397,464.66	-297,464.66	273,448.22	68.8%
Child Protection	150,000.00	244,073.07	-94,073.07	141,783.08	58.1%
Education	150,000.00	332,614.95	-182,614.95	154,570.95	46.5%
Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	2,387,316.54	2,849,646.65	-462,330.11	2,095,912.76	73.5%
Communication for Emergency	0.00	171,177.87	-171,177.87	170,370.13	99.5%
Total	3,187,316.54	4,442,145.50	-1,254,828.96	3,196,000.13	71.9%
Project Support, Logistics and Admon. 5%	159,335.00	216,816.63	-57,481.63	90,289.78	41.6%
Total	3,346,651.54	4,658,962.13	-1,312,310.59	3,286,289.91	70.5%

Guatemala Flash Appeal
 UNICEF Emergency Response to Hurricane "Stan" and Ensuing Floods
 Up to June 30, 2006 In US\$ dollars

Programme Implementation

Donor	Emergency Response Component	Allocated (a)	Amount Requested &/or Obligated (b)	Implement. Level % (b/a)
PBA SM/05/0903-01 Global Thematic Humanitarian Resp. Sweden and Norway Expiration Date: 31/12/08	Health Services	340,519.21	278,042.32	81.7%
	Nutrition	248,350.83	127,219.50	51.6%
	Child Protection	178,898.50	83,672.99	47.3%
	Education	207,149.18	67,212.83	32.4%
	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	1,887,362.47	1,157,003.23	61.3%
	Communication for Emergency	0.00	0.00	0.0%
	Project Support, Log. & Adm.	139,831.42	33,565.84	24.0%
Total		2,998,111.61	1,748,718.71	58.3%
PBA SM/06/0011-01 Agfund Expiration Date: 31/12/08	Health Services	0.00	0.00	0.0%
	Nutrition	0.00	0.00	0.0%
	Child Protection	0.00	0.00	0.0%
	Education	45,045.00	24,875.60	55.2%
	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	0.00	0.00	0.0%
	Communication for Emergency	0.00	0.00	0.0%
	Project Support, Log. & Adm.	0.00	0.00	0.0%
Total		45,045.00	24,875.60	55.2%
PBA SM/05/0701-01 Netherlands Expiration Date: 31/12/08	Health Services	57,291.63	32,860.00	57.0%
	Nutrition	85,144.00	85,116.93	100.0%
	Child Protection	18,101.63	9,037.15	49.9%
	Education	75,202.61	57,282.51	76.2%
	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	849,613.08	827,512.21	97.4%
	Communication for Emergency	170,070.87	169,573.03	99.7%
	Project Support, Log. & Adm.	62,771.20	42,842.01	68.3%
Total		1,318,195.00	1,224,013.84	92.9%
PBA SM/05/0628-01 Canada Expiration Date: 11/04/08	Health Services	0.00	0.00	0.0%
	Nutrition	58,623.92	55,397.84	94.7%
	Child Protection	28,358.32	28,358.32	100.0%
	Education	5,218.16	5,200.01	99.7%
	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	91,373.77	90,242.34	98.8%
	Communication for Emergency	308.00	114.30	37.4%
	Project Support, Log. & Adm.	9,089.01	8,756.93	96.3%

Guatemala Flash Appeal
 UNICEF Emergency Response to Hurricane "Stan" and Ensuing Floods
 Up to June 30, 2006 In US\$ dollars

Total		190,889.18	188,069.74	97.5%
Programme Implementation				
Donor	Emergency Response Component	Allocated (a)	Amount Requested &/or Obligated (b)	Implement. Level % (b/a)
PBA SM/05/0599-01 Luxembourg Expiration Date: 31/03/08	Health Services	49,357.46	49,222.67	99.7%
	Nutrition	7,445.91	5,713.95	76.7%
	Child Protection	22,714.62	22,714.62	100.0%
	Education	0.00	0.00	0.0%
	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	21,297.35	21,154.98	99.3%
	Communication for Emergency	801.00	682.80	85.2%
	Project Support, Log. & Adm.	5,125.00	5,125.00	100.0%
	Total		108,741.34	104,814.02

5 SECTOR RELATED FINDINGS


5.1 Water and Sanitation

The UN humanitarian reform organizes humanitarian response according to clusters and assigns specific responsibilities to each agency. The global cluster as well as the Guatemala Flash Appeal establishes UNICEF as the lead agency for the water and sanitation.

Consequently, UNICEF coordinated with the Ministry of Health and WHO. The Ministry of Health established the *National Plan for Water and Sanitation*. UNICEF contributed to this plan financially and provided materials and technical assistance. Prioritized support was given to the departments of Sololá, Jutiapa, Quiché, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Retalhuleu, San Marcos, Suchitepequez, Escuintla and Santa Rosa. However, the southern coast currently constitutes the main focus.

The emergency response consisted of the following areas:

- Provision of safe drinking water;
- Sanitation and solid waste disposal;
- Information, education and social communication;
- Institutional Capacity Building.



Source: National Water and Sanitation Plan, June 2006

Positive Aspects:

- Prior to the emergency, the issue of water and sanitation did not receive sufficient attention by the government. In the aftermath of Hurricane Stan, the Ministry of Health was assigned with the responsibility to create the National Plan for Water and Sanitation. However, this entity could be a separate unit within the Ministry of Health if it were to receive sufficient political and financial support by donors and international organizations in the future.
- Water and sanitation response on southern coast was relatively quick. The cleaning of wells started in November.
- A UNICEF consultant was hired (OV) who carried out multiple field visits and provided technical assistance to the National Plan for Water and Sanitation.
- Projects were multi-faceted. They included education in hygiene and community participation. For instance, participation in hygiene education was a prerequisite to receiving latrines and wells. In order to receive aid, the community also had to contribute with labour and relatively cheap items such as cement. The effects were positive. The population seemed to value the projects more if they had to contribute instead of passively receiving aid. Furthermore, the community spirit was strengthened since building and maintenance of community wells required a certain degree of coordination and collaboration among neighbours.
- Due to water and sanitation projects, some communities have developed an emergency response plan. Some COCODEs have established emergency committees.
- After severe initial problems of water & sanitation, governance and security in the temporary shelter of Tecún Umán/ Ayutla, UNICEF financed the recruitment of one social worker and one water & sanitation technician. The temporary shelter is currently better organized. Various committees (education, women, health, and hygiene) have been established, and community leaders have been selected to contribute to the functioning of the shelters' organization.
- The population perceives UNICEF aid as very useful. Interviews with members of COCODE's, women's groups, community leaders, mayors, water and sanitation technicians, health workers on the southern coast rated UNICEF's intervention very positively.
- Since the southern coast received hardly any aid by International Organizations or NGO's, the UNICEF water and sanitation projects were perceived as particularly valuable.
- Some health indicators have improved. Interviews with health workers showed that the number of cases of diarrhoea, malaria and dengue had significantly decreased in health districts where wells had been cleaned and treated with chlorine.

- The provision of portable laboratories has had the positive effect that the quality of water is regularly monitored in affected communities. The population has received training on how to add chlorine to their drinking water and how to measure the appropriate amount. This knowledge will be beneficial in future emergencies.
- Immediately after the hurricane occurred, UNICEF Colombia sent a specialist in WatSan, in order to facilitate the emergency response in Guatemala.

To be improved:

- Projects financed by UNICEF need to be more visible. Most members of the affected communities were aware of the existence of the National Water and Sanitation Plan; however, they were not aware of UNICEF's involvement. The possible solution would be to provide UNICEF T-shirts, hats, signs to the equipment, UNICEF staff members on field visit to increase the visibility.
- During the emergency, there was a lack of coordination between UNICEF programmes. For example, only the water and sanitation project was present in the temporary shelter Tecún Umán. However, the overall impact of UNICEF's intervention could have been more effective if education/ psychosocial efforts had been carried out in the same location. Furthermore, water and sanitation activities were nearly the only UNICEF intervention (apart from nutrition) on the southern coast. During interviews carried out with the affected population, questions were raised as to why UNICEF exclusively focused on water and sanitation.
- During the emergency, one project official was responsible for water and sanitation, health and parts of nutrition. This resulted in a considerable work overload.
- Water and sanitation interventions focused on the southern coast. However, the water and sanitation systems in San Marcos and Sololá were heavily affected by the hurricane. Water and sanitation items to be delivered to San Marcos are only being purchased now. (June)

Recommendations:

- Since UNICEF is assigned as the lead agency in the water and sanitation cluster, UNICEF will have to play a major role in the water and sanitation sector in the future. Hence, UNICEF needs to strengthen its water and sanitation section. Even though the programme officer has worked very efficiently, he had to deal with multiple responsibilities. Considering the major responsibility UNICEF has in the water and sanitation cluster, the CO is strongly advised to strengthen its water and sanitation section and analyze additional personnel possibilities.

- In order to make efforts in water and sanitation sustainable, UNICEF should take advantage of the opportunity the emergency has created. The National Water and Sanitation Plan should be strengthened and should be transformed into an independent water and sanitation unit within the Ministry of Health. This requires political and financial support from the government and UNICEF.
- Interventions were focused on the southern coast. Affected areas in San Marcos have hardly received any aid in water and sanitation. It is planned to deliver water and sanitation supplies to Tacaná, Sibinal and Tajumulco in July. However, this response should have been planned earlier. In a future emergency, the prioritized geographical areas selected should receive a similar amount of funding and technical assistance.

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5.2 Health

The objective in the health component was to facilitate logistical assistance for the delivery of essential drugs to the affected population and to strengthen the delivery of basic health services, according to the needs identified by the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare.

Activities:

- Technical and financial assistance to governmental emergency health projects directed towards children;
- prevention of the outbreak of likely diseases (diarrhoea, cholera);
- publicity campaign by radio and television delivering key messages concerning health and nutrition;
- delivery of oral re-hydration salts to the Ministry of Health;
- re-establishment of vaccine cold chains.

Geographic coverage:

83 municipalities in 14 departments (Santa Rosa, Jalapa, Jutiapa, Sácatepequez, Chimaltenango, Escuintla, Sololá, Totonicapán, Quetzaltenango, Suchitepéquez, Retalhuleu, San Marcos, Huehuetenango, Quiché)

Positive Aspects:

- There was no outbreak of diseases (diarrhoea, cholera) in the aftermath of the hurricane. This is partly due to UNICEF's and WHO's support to the Ministry of Health, as well as the presence of Cuban medical staff in the field.
- Hardly any vaccines were lost during the emergency (only 0.4 %), even though electricity failed and the cold chain was damaged. Health staff in the field was trained by the Ministry of Health how to act in emergency situations.
- The oral re-hydration salt packets were immediately delivered to the Ministry of Health. UNICEF Guatemala had a small stock of re-hydration salt packets and borrowed additional packets from partner UNICEF offices in the region.

To be improved:

- The Ministry of Health pointed out that the administrative procedures required by UNICEF were not always clear. Three different formats of project plans had to be filled in and the Ministry of Health maintained that, concerning administrative issues, communication with UNICEF staff members had to be improved.

- Refrigerators and freezers (cold chain) were ordered by the Ministry of Health in October. The refrigerators were delivered to the Ministry of Health in March and freezers in April. These items were purchased from Copenhagen. Since the items were delivered late, the emergency tax exemption, which was temporarily granted by the Guatemalan government, no longer applied to these items. Since the Ministry of Health was not able to pay the taxes immediately, the emergency supplies were temporarily stored at the country's border. Currently, the emergency supplies are stored in the Ministry of Health and have not been delivered to the affected areas yet. This is due to internal administrative problems of the Ministry of Health.

Recommendations:

- The Ministry of Health suggests that emergency preparedness meetings should be held with UNICEF staff, particularly in order to clarify needs and administrative issues.
- The purchase and delivery of emergency items should be accelerated considerably. UNICEF administrative and programme officers should jointly analyze the different processes (local and international purchases) and develop a strategy for future emergencies.

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5.3 Nutrition

The emergency response in the nutrition cluster had five components:

- Monitoring of nutritional status of children under the age of five; (monitoring of nutritional status of lactating and pregnant women was planned in the Flash Appeal; however, the project did not meet this objective.)
- education in nutrition in communities;
- strengthen hospitals with equipment, personnel and F-75;
- provision of micronutrients (iron, folic acid, vitamin A).

The emergency response was carried out in five departments: Huehuetenango, San Marcos, Totonicapán, Sololá, and Chimaltenango

UNICEF collaborated with PROSAN, WHO, USAID.

Health District	No. of Nutritional Monitoring Assistants
San Marcos	25
Huehuetenango	14
Sololá	38
Totonicapán	12
Chimaltenango	28
TOTAL	117

Source: PROSAN July 2006

Positive Aspects:

- The acquisition and distribution (to PROSAN) of 5,000 packets of Formula 75, for the recovery from acute malnutrition, was carried out quickly.
- Immediately after the emergency, key messages about how to prevent malnutrition were distributed to local radio stations. These messages were created during the drought emergency in 2001 and adapted to the current situation.
- Coordination among UNICEF, PROSAN, PAHO and USAID was effective. Meetings were held on a regular basis.
- According to PROSAN, the nutritional status of children in the five selected departments did not deteriorate. In May, the percentage of acutely malnourished children was 1.6 %.

DEPART.	TOTAL CHILDREN EVAL.	ADEQUATE Nut. Status	Light Malnut.	Moderate Maln.	Acute Maln.	% Light, Moderate Maln.
San Marcos	2170	1893	231	42	4	2.1
Huehuetenango	2036	1840	162	26	8	1.6
Totonicapán	786	696	80	8	2	1.3
Chimaltenango	2480	2292	173	14	1	0.6
Sololá	3499	3210	269	18	4	0.6
TOTAL	10972	9931	915	108	19	1.1

Source: PROSAN July 2006

To be improved:

- According to PROSAN, the purchase of 200 equipments to measure heights, 1,000 weight for height charts (Nabarro) and 300 scales was too slow. The equipments were delivered in February. Nutritional monitoring activities started in January without adequate equipments.
- Monitoring of the nutritional status was implemented in only 38% of the communities which were prioritized in the original plan. PROSAN argues that they initially overestimated the number of affected communities. Furthermore, its monitoring capacity was limited.
- UNICEF financed the recruitment of 125 persons to carry out nutritional monitoring (PROSAN, implementing partner). Training of this personnel took very long because PROSAN had virtually no established capacity to carry out nutritional monitoring activities before the emergency. Some of the employees had to be re-trained three times until they were able to measure height and weight correctly. The monitoring started in January (Hurricane Stan occurred in October).
- Initial results of the nutritional monitoring were distributed in May. In San Marcos, the results had not made public by the end of June. Since the aim was to monitor acute malnutrition caused by the effects of Hurricane Stan, the evaluation process took far too long. The state of health of an acutely malnourished child can change within weeks or even days.
- The monitoring did not include the areas of *extensión de cobertura*, which were covered by NGO's. No information exchange among NGO's and PROSAN took place. (In San Marcos, "extension de cobertura" covers approximately 30 % of the population).

- The Flash Appeal included monitoring the nutritional status of pregnant and lactating women. However, this objective was not achieved by the nutritional monitoring activities.
- UNICEF and PROSAN did not carry out sufficient joint field visits. The monitoring of the emergency project was weak. Nutritionists interviewed in San Marcos indicated that they never received any field visit from UNICEF, and that there was no direct communication with UNICEF.
- In general, the government's capacity in monitoring the nutritional status and combating malnutrition is weak. There are only a limited number of nutritionists available in the country. This poses a considerable challenge to the country.

Recommendations:

- UNICEF has taken on the cluster leadership in nutrition within the UN system. Accordingly, the nutrition programme needs to be strengthened with additional personnel, in order to be able to react adequately to future emergencies.
- Receiving results on the status of acute malnutrition nearly seven months after the emergency occurred is of limited value. The strategy to carry out emergency nutritional monitoring activities has to be analyzed and modified. This analysis should be carried out in coordination with PROSAN and WHO. Possibly, taking a few samples in each affected community and developing statistical data based on these examples would be more efficient than measuring all affected children under the age of five.
- Monitoring of the emergency response has to be strengthened in the future. Regular field visits with implementing partners should be carried out.
- The slow purchase of supplies should be analyzed with Operations. Possible solutions would be maintaining a small stock of emergency items or establishing one-dollar contracts with supply companies.
- PROSAN's effort to establish a national database on nutritional status should continue to be supported by all stakeholder institutions, such as NGO's and SOSEP's *Growing Well* programme (Creciendo Bien).

5.4 Child Protection and Education

In the aftermath of Hurricane Stan, the Child Protection and Education Programme focused on the following issues:

- Registration of orphans as well as legal and social protection;
- provision of psychosocial support to affected children using the Return to Happiness strategy;
- prevention of sexual exploitation and trafficking of affected children;
- promotion of the women's participation in the reconstruction process.

The emergency response concerning orphans was mainly carried out in Panabaj (Sololá). Psycho-social support activities took place in Sololá (particularly Panabaj), San Marcos (Cua, Ojo de Agua, Piedra Grande). The women's project was implemented in San Marcos, Chimaltenango, Huehuetenango and Sololá. The 'prevention of sexual exploitation' project was carried out in Tecún Umán, Sololá and San Marcos (Ojo de Agua, Tacaná).

Protection of Orphans

In order to register and protect orphans, UNICEF coordinated with the Social Welfare Secretariat (SBS), the Judicial Organism (OJ) and the Office of the Attorney General (PGN). Shortly after the hurricane occurred, UNICEF convened a meeting with all the protection and education implementation partners. After this meeting, smaller coordination groups were created. The orphan protection group was named UNISTAN. A social worker was hired to ensure the follow up process. UNISTAN collaborated in registering orphans, giving them legal protection (PGN/OJ), placing them in kinship care and guaranteeing a financial subsidy for the duration of one year (SBS). In June, 17 orphans in Panabaj/ Sololá benefited from this joint protection project.

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Positive Aspects:

- The creation of the orphan protection group UNISTAN was an extremely valuable initiative. It united institutions which had not cooperated in this manner and in this issue before. UNICEF showed that it was able to facilitate coordination and to contribute through technical expertise. This experience was new to all participating institutions and was rated very positively. PGN suggested that the experience with UNISTAN could be applied to the adoption issues since it involved

the same actors (apart from the Foreign Ministry).

- The strategy developed by UNICEF and its partners to combine legal protection of orphans with kinship care (which includes financial subsidies) was considered very positive by orphans and foster families.
- Political approval of the programme was sought with local governments.

To be improved:

- UNISTAN concentrated mainly on one municipality (Panabaj in Sololá). Orphans in San Marcos were registered. On a field visit in June, 8 orphans in Cua claimed that they had still not received any aid from UNICEF and its implementing partners. However, SBS maintains that 7 orphans have received financial aid in Cua. Considering that San Marcos was heavily affected by the hurricane, it is possible that there are more orphans in remote communities which are more difficult to access.
- In San Marcos, mayors had a slightly negative attitude towards the orphan protection project, which made coordination more difficult than in Panabaj, where political approval was obtained immediately.
- Financial constraints were mentioned as the major issue which prevented UNISTAN from covering a wider geographic area. The inclusion of emergency funding in regular work plans and budgets caused delays due to the counterpart's delay in liquidating its accounts for 2005. This affected the emergency component and the full functioning of UNISTAN in the first part of 2006.
- Furthermore, financial constraints and institutional changes hindered SBS's social workers to regularly visit the affected areas and to monitor the success of the project. SBS maintained that one of the primary conditions for the provision of financial subsidies was the regular school attendance of orphans. However, on the evaluation field visit, it became apparent that some orphans received financial aid by the SBS without being enrolled in any school.
- No UNISTAN meetings took place from December to May, and the coordination effect was weakened during this period. However, UNICEF convoked meetings again in June in order to be prepared for possible new emergencies.
- Since in Guatemala no orphan protection group had existed before hurricane Stan, coordination efforts took about one month before the registry of orphans could begin - although several preparatory steps were taken during that time, including the preparation and distribution of orphan and unaccompanied children registration forms and the formation of UNISTAN

Recommendations:

- Implementing partners (especially PGN) suggested that it would be highly valuable to try to institutionalize UNISTAN. In order to make it less dependent on changing personnel, the experience should be systematized. Also, a “UNISTAN Handbook” should be created with clearly stated roles and responsibilities. Possibly, UNICEF could hire a consultant to carry out this task.
- In a future occasion, emergency funds should be channelled more efficiently to implementing partners. This should have been possible, especially since UNICEF did receive more emergency funds than the requested amount. There is a need to address how emergency funds are processed with counterparts in order to not to impede their delivery by delays experienced in regular programming of UNICEF funds.
- It is necessary to ensure that more significant numbers of affected areas are covered by UNICEF and its implemented partners. Areas without a similar degree of media attention as Panabaj should also be taken into account.



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Return to Happiness

Positive Aspects:

- The issue of mental health has gained importance. Ministry of Health did not deal with post disaster trauma before this emergency.
- The affected population is sensitized concerning psycho-social issues. People interviewed affirmed that they had not been familiar with psycho-social support before the UNICEF project started. (Volunteers, adolescents, families, school teachers, children)
- There is a great demand for psycho-social support. Communities are in favour of the project. The Ministry of Health informed that it had received several letters from the population in affected areas that requested the continuation of the project and the strengthening of psychological support in the aftermath of emergencies.

- Children, parents, volunteers, members of COCODES and school teachers were interviewed. The overall response was positive, especially in San Marcos. There were requests for a longer duration of project.
- Interviewed children enjoy participating and feel that the project helps them to overcome traumatic experiences. The children do not perceive the project activities as therapy, since it involves a lot of games. The games have the purpose to help children to express their traumatic experiences and to overcome them.
- Psychologists and the Ministry of Health appreciated the training given by a specialist from UNICEF Colombia. They rated contents and methodology positively. Since the project is new in Guatemala and there is hardly any experience in treating post disaster trauma, the presence of an experienced UNICEF staff member was considered as extremely important.
- The system in San Marcos seems to work well. UNICEF negotiated with teachers and MINEDUC, consequently the project could take place in schools and during school time. This guarantees participation and acceptance by parents. However, negotiations to implement the project activities in schools were only successful in San Marcos. Furthermore, in San Marcos, volunteers seemed to be more motivated. In particular, an innovation involved School Directors awarding academic points to students participating as volunteers in the project that is resulting in engendering a sense of community service among the adolescent volunteers and building their knowledge of and capacity to implement psycho-social interventions with children. In most cases, volunteers are students who are going to be teachers. They consider it a valuable experience to be able to work with children and to be familiarized with psycho-social issues, since this does not form part of their education as a teacher. In Sololá, there are participation and space problems.
- According to beneficiaries the programme is very important. Even after eight months, the interviewed children were still very affected by the disaster. In one case, an orphan is a volunteer in the Return to Happiness project.



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To be improved:

- Slow transfer of funds, procurement problems. The implementing partner CONJUVE hardly participated in project. It was planned that CONJUVE would be UNICEF's implementing partner in the Return to Happiness strategy. CONJUVE was unable to channel funds to psychologists.
- Emergency funds were transferred to CONJUVE on 9 January (late reaction of UNICEF, amount: 23,295 Quetzals, PBA 9963). Part of this fund was spent on workshops with volunteers. On 31 March, CONJUVE had to return 14,319.61 Quetzals to UNICEF in order to avoid the freezing of their account since funds had not been spent on time. CONJUVE was unable to present 2006 project plan in January. CONJUVE signed 2006 project plan in June 2006. It presented its project plan in April, and changes had to be made. UNICEF signed this project plan on 8 May and CONJUVE signed it in June. Funds (70,640 Quetzals) are transferred to CONJUVE on 27 June. The psychologists were recruited in February, and the Return to Happiness project started in March. Hence, no emergency funding was channelled through CONJUVE to the psychologists. Psychologists were entirely dependent on private funds by UNICEF programme officers. These private funds have not been reimbursed yet. The psychologists complained that they had hardly any material to carry out activities nor an office space. UNICEF had promised funding for transportation and food for volunteers; however, it did not comply. According to the psychologists and UNICEF personnel, CONJUVE maintained a very low profile and hardly contributed to the success of the project throughout its cycle.
- Tardy UNICEF response in delivering items. For example, recreational psychosocial boxes were initially planned for temporary shelters; however, they were delivered to schools in the end. UNICEF only managed to buy, assemble and deliver items by 20 June. The administrative process was far too slow. Instead of one order, every item was quoted separately. CONJUVE volunteers assembled boxes, and they have been distributed by MINEDUC (Direcciones Departamentales de Educacion).
- The health district in Sololá initially refused to continue its collaboration with UNICEF since the project was announced in October. However, since the project had to be established from scratch, volunteers had to be trained and psychologists to be recruited. Hence, direct work with the beneficiaries started in March.
- In order to make this valuable experience sustainable, the project needs to be institutionalized. If the project ends in August, the experience will end there. There is no mechanism yet to institutionalize it. It is suggested that psychologists' contracts be extended and to second them to the Ministry of Health for two months, in order to systematize their experience and coordinate with the Ministry.
- In Sololá, Return to Happiness activities do not take place in schools, and children sometimes refuse to participate in their free time. Furthermore, it was difficult to

motivate volunteers in Sololá. People seem to perceive UNICEF as a donor and insisted on receiving funding in order to participate as volunteers.

- Coordination with the Ministry of Health needs to be strengthened. The Ministry of Health is requesting data about the cases handled by UNICEF's psychologists. However, the Ministry has not received any information yet.

Recommendations:

- Extend project duration until December in order to institutionalize it.
- For future emergencies: analyze which implementing partners would be suitable. Search for allies which are experienced in the issue of psychosocial support and have the administrative capacities to comply with UNICEF's administrative requirements.
- Promote institutionalization by strengthening coordination with Ministry of Health. If necessary, UNICEF could provide funding for one or two psychologists who could transfer their experience to the Ministry of Health.
- For future emergencies: more than one psychologist is necessary to establish the Return to Happiness project in one region. The experience in San Marcos (2 psychologists) and Sololá (1 psychologist) show that better results can be achieved if at least two consultants are recruited.
- Protection/ Education section should analyze together with Operations:
 - as to why the funds were paid to CONJUVE with such delay (January),
 - how the process of purchasing and delivering items (recreational items) could be accelerated.

Preventing Sexual Exploitation

To prevent sexual exploitation in temporary shelters, UNICEF collaborated with ECPAT and Casa Alianza. ECPAT monitored temporary shelters in San Marcos (Ojo de Agua, Piedra Grande) and Tecún Umán. Casa Alianza monitored temporary shelters, bars and community centres in Escuintla and Sololá. Assistance was provided to potential or rescued victims.

ECPAT coordinated closely with UNICEF in order to raise parents' awareness in sexual exploitation issues and to offer recreational activities for children.

Positive Aspects:

- ECPAT rated the collaboration with UNICEF very positively. A solid partnership and previous experiences in the issue considerably strengthened the monitoring and assistance system. The NGO received technical assistance, and coordination meetings were held on a regular basis. The communities were selected in coordination with UNICEF, and protection messages were prepared. Also, field visits were planned in coordination with UNICEF.
- ECPAT managed to prevent the selling of a female adolescent in Tecún Umán. Casa Alianza rescued two children after conducting a field trip to Escuintla and Sololá.
- In January and February, migration to Mexico increased. Hence, a separate 'prevention of sexual exploitation' project was initiated in the border area of Tecún Umán. A total of 330 migrants were taken care of in the 'Casa del Migrante' (195 women, 135 adolescents). A monitoring tool to detect trafficking and sexual exploitation was developed.

To be improved:

- ECPAT stated that it was not prepared for an emergency before the hurricane. Hence, no emergency kits were prepared, and the social workers went to the field without any materials. No materials, such as recreational and educational items, were requested from UNICEF. However, basic emergency kits would facilitate the work in a future emergency.
- Emergency funds were only planned for the duration of two months (November/December). However, the funds were channelled to ECPAT with delay (by the end of November). ECPAT started monitoring activities without UNICEF funds and carried out the project until February. Hence, ECPAT managed to sustain the project for four months with the funding for two months.

Recommendations:

- Emergency preparedness should be enhanced. ECPAT requested regular meetings in order to develop a strategy and to create basic emergency kits.
- In June, temporary shelters in San Marcos and Sololá still existed. The risk of sexual exploitation in temporary shelters continues to persist. Hence, the project should have been planned and funded for a longer period of time, especially since the Flash Appeal emergency funding had a minimum duration of six months.

Participation of Women in the Reconstruction Process

UNICEF collaborated with CODEFEM and Beijing Committee in order to promote women's participation in the reconstruction process.

Due to time constraints, the evaluation focuses on CODEFEM, which is the major UNICEF implementing partner. Beijing Committee conducted an evaluation in Sololá and Chimaltenango.

CODEFEM carried out and a rapid assessment of the damages caused by Hurricane Stan and gender related violence in December. A second evaluation will be delivered to UNICEF by end of June. Furthermore, CODEFEM trained eight women in each community (in total: 112 women) in topics such as: gender equality, organization and participation, mental health and food security. CODEFEM worked in San Marcos, Huehuetenango and Sololá. In all the communities, monitoring committees were established to detect cases of sexual violence and to promote women's participation in the reconstruction process. Additionally, mobile kindergartens were established to enable women to participate in CODEFEM's trainings , and a manual produced for the promoters.

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Positive Aspects:

- According to CODEFEM, women in the affected communities are better organized than before the emergency. In June 2006, the community of Panabaj / Sololá was partially evacuated again due to heavy rains and landslides. The women trained by CODEFEM showed their capacity in emergency preparedness and contributed to a quick and organized evacuation.
- Women trained by CODEFEM replicated the instructions they had received in their respective communities. Consequently, the number of trained women could be increased.
- The Guatemalan government has placed a great degree of emphasis in the reconstruction of infrastructure. The social aspects were not prioritized. The reconstruction project coordinated by UNICEF and implemented by CODEFEM takes into account the psychosocial aspects of 'reconstructing' people's lives and focuses on women. These are two aspects which have been neglected by other actors and provided a niche which needed to be filled.
- The creation of mobile kindergartens enabled women to participate in trainings. Additionally, children who attended these mobile kindergartens were taught issues such as health and mental health. (325 children benefited from mobile kindergartens, 2 days per week.)
- Social auditing undertaken with the women in the affected communities opened spaces for women to voice their opinions and concerns regarding reconstruction efforts at local and national levels, including with Congressional representatives.

To be improved:

- Channelling of emergency funds was delayed (December).
- Administrative problems between UNICEF and CODEFEM slowed down the emergency response.
- Large amount of funds was given to CODEFEM (US\$ 39,868.02), especially in order to establish mobile kindergartens. Emergency protection funds should have been distributed more evenly to emergency implementing partners. (ECPAT received US\$ 15,510.13).
- The trainings provided by CODEFEM in an emergency setting seem to mostly be a replication of its normal development programme. It is not entirely certain whether the objective of the project, namely the participation of women in the reconstruction

process, has been achieved. Trainings should have been more geared towards emergency issues.

Recommendations:

- The protection team should consider whether an implementing partner with limited experiences in emergency response and limited administrative capacity is suitable for an emergency setting where rapid response and accountability are required.
- Emergency funds should be distributed more evenly.
- The child protection section should consider how CODEFEM's monitoring and findings can have an impact in reconstruction efforts.

5.5 Communication

The communication issue was not included in the Flash Appeal. Nevertheless, UNICEF decided to allocate US\$ 200,000 to emergency communication projects. However, these funds were only allocated in December.

Immediately after the hurricane occurred, key messages on health, nutrition and protection were distributed to local radio stations in Sololá, San Marcos and Huehuetenango. FGER was the main implementing partner.

UNICEF provided technical assistance in training local radio producers in San Marcos. This activity was financed by the Child Protection Section. Furthermore, approximately 100 communication activities were carried out by local communication networks in markets and parks in Sololá, San Marcos and Huehuetenango, distributing key messages on nutrition, child protection, health and education.

In a joint effort, (Save the Children, WHO, UNDP, UNFPA, CONRED, UNICEF), an emergency communication kit was created. The kit contains key messages on how to take actions before, during and after an emergency.

Additionally, CONRED received support in printing education materials to conduct a national earthquake simulation in schools. The education materials covered issues such as emergency preparedness in schools and psychosocial support.

The communication section supported UNICEF's efforts in increasing advocacy for affected children. Field visits were carried out, and 'real life stories' were published on the UNICEF website. Some of the emergency spots, which were used by the government on television, were based on spots produced by UNICEF during previous emergencies.

Positive Aspects:

- Even though communication was not included in the Flash Appeal, the communication section tried to be integrated in the emergency response and managed to negotiate funds. This commitment by staff members should be noted positively.
- Existing emergency key messages were distributed rapidly after the hurricane.
- The joint effort to produce an emergency communication kits demanded a great deal of coordination among various institutions. This collaboration mostly worked well.

To be improved

- Implementing partners (FGER) had difficulties adapting to UNICEF's administrative requirements. Resulting from this, funds allocated to FGER were frozen and not all planned activities could be carried out.

Recommendations

- In a future emergency, communication should be included as a separate sector of emergency response. If this is not feasible in a Flash Appeal, funds should be allocated more quickly to the communication section.
- In coordination with Operations and FGER, analyze the main reasons for the freezing of funds. If necessary, train FGER personnel in UNICEF's administrative procedures.

6 GENERAL FINDINGS

6.1 Initial Response

The initial response was partly quick and adequate. This included delivery of oral re-hydration salt packets and essential medicines, quick distribution of radio messages on nutrition, health and protection to local radio stations, delivery of orphan registration forms and protection messages.

Nevertheless, a considerable part of the emergency response in most components was delayed for several months (see above for details). Some of the emergency items have only been delivered in May / June. This is due to slow and complicated administrative procedures, some weak implementing partners, lack of UNICEF personnel and insufficient emergency preparedness.

6.2 Monitoring

Apart from the water and sanitation component and the Return to Happiness project, monitoring of the emergency projects was mostly weak. Joint field visits with implementing partners took part immediately after the hurricane occurred. In December and January hardly any joint field visits were carried out due to the Christmas holidays. Regular bilateral and multilateral coordination meetings took part in the first few months after the emergency. Equally, there was an interruption in December and January.

6.3 Reporting

In the aftermath of the emergency, weekly situation reports were elaborated by UNICEF for the whole UN system. By end of October, OCHA took on the responsibility to write weekly situation reports. UNICEF emergency donor reports were written on the basis of the information obtained by programme officers. Four monthly emergency reports, one Consolidated Emergency Report, and two individual donor reports to Canada and Luxembourg were written.

6.4 Coordination

UNICEF actively participated in the preparation of the Flash Appeal. Furthermore, UNICEF took part in the United Nations Disaster Management Team meetings, both at the representatives and technical levels. UN agencies criticized the fact that UNICEF did not participate in joint UN field offices in Sololá and San Marcos.

6.5 UNICEF Internal Coordination

There were some deficiencies in internal coordination. Emergency projects were geographically dispersed and different components did not coordinate sufficiently enough. For example, Ayutla temporary shelter received only water and sanitation assistance, even though there was a great need for protection and education assistance. A positive effort was made in San Marcos, where three municipalities were selected for common emergency/ reconstruction efforts. However, this joint response was delayed and a fully coordinated emergency/ reconstruction project does not yet exist.

6.6 Relations with Donors and Funding

UNICEF received more funds than requested and the donor response was relatively quick.

6.7 Staffing Issues

- During the emergency, there was no Child Protection Officer. Additionally to the country programme, the Education and Protection Programme Officer and the JPO had to organize the emergency response, which resulted in considerable work overload. No additional staff member was hired for the protection section until March 2006.
- The Programme Officer for Water and Sanitation was also responsible for the Health and Nutrition components. Considering UNICEF's leadership role in Water & Sanitation and Nutrition, more staff should be available in this section. Furthermore, WatSan, Health and Nutrition have only one administrative assistant. Periodically, additional administrative staff was hired. However, more constant additional administrative support is required for this programme.
- Considering the amount of supplies necessary for an emergency response and the procedures involved in purchasing these items, the current staff situation is not adequate. CO should consider to temporarily strengthen the operations section in emergency situations (TFT's, consultancies)

6.8 Supplies: A Major Bottleneck

The purchase and delivery of supplies was one of the major weaknesses of UNICEF's emergency response (see above for details). Some emergency items were purchased in May 2006. The purchasing procedures for emergency response items did not differ from normal procedures. Each item had to be quoted three times. Local procurement was at times too slow. In one case, one provider did not accept UNICEF's conditions and withdrew the order which had already been made. Generally, international procurement (Copenhagen) was quick and well organized (apart from refrigerators/ Health component). There was also an internal problem of priority setting. Some

Programme Officers did not meet deadlines set by Operations to specify different emergency items or changed their requirements in the last minute. In some instances, antagonism between Programmes and Operations was increased by misunderstandings or lack of communication. Staffing issues also made a quick purchase of all the emergency items more difficult.

7 CONCLUSIONS

7.5 Relevance

The technical sectors (WatSan, Health, Nutrition, Child Protection, Education and Communication) were extremely relevant to the needs of the affected population. The problems related to populations affected by hurricane were well identified in humanitarian circles, yet the strategy adopted by UNICEF to deal with these problems was less developed. It may be misleading to assume that an emergency response can be mainstreamed into development projects. Administrative procedures and staffing issues have to be adapted to an emergency situation. Emergency preparedness of staff members should be strengthened. The question of the relevance of the CCC is also important. In some projects (e.g. Education), the focus was on one particular aspect (e.g. Return to Happiness) and not all requirements of the CCC's were fulfilled.

7.6 Efficiency

UNICEF's efficiency relies on its partners and this posed a problem in some components. For example, the implementing partner in the nutrition sector, PROSAN, did not have the capacity to carry out a rapid assessment of acute malnutrition situation, even though it was strengthened by UNICEF. CONJUVE, which should have acted as an implementing partner in the Return to Happiness project, kept a very low profile and was unable to channel emergency funds to the psychologists recruited by UNICEF. CODEFEM (amongst other NGO's) had severe difficulties in coping with UNICEF's administrative requirements. As a result, some implementing partner's accounts were frozen, which considerably delayed UNICEF's emergency response.

Some supplies were available in stock or could be obtained from UNICEF partner offices (e.g. oral re-hydration salt packets). These items were delivered in an efficient manner. However, the emergency items which had to be purchased locally or internationally were mostly delayed. (See above for more detail). Hence, purchasing procedures should be analyzed and adapted to an emergency situation.

An external factor which had a negative impact on the efficiency of UNICEF's emergency response was the Christmas holiday, which resulted in an interruption of activities and additional staff shortages.

7.7 Impact

A relatively weak monitoring systems did not permit a thorough assessment of progress and impact. On the field visits carried out for this evaluation, the impact of

the Water and Sanitation emergency efforts was rated very positively by local governments and beneficiaries. Equally, the Return to Happiness project was considered to be of great benefit to affected children. The impact of the UNISTAN orphan protection project was significant in terms of inter-institutional coordination and the combination of legal and social protection. However, the project was geographically restricted. The impact of the assessment of acute malnutrition was limited since the results were delivered too late.

7.8 Coordination and Coherence

Coordination with UN agencies mostly worked well. UNICEF actively participated in the preparation of the Flash Appeal as well as in the meetings of the UN Disaster Management Team. Internal coordination should be improved between Programmes, as well as between Programmes and Operations. The emergency response was not very coherent. UNICEF did not seem to respond as one programme, but carried out different activities in different geographic areas. Partly, the delay in purchasing emergency items was due to lack of coordination between Programmes and Operations.

7.9 Sustainability

In general, emergency strategies focus on saving lives and sustainability is not necessarily a key objective. Nevertheless, a well organized emergency response facilitates the recovery and reconstruction phase without leaving a gap between humanitarian relief and development assistance. UNICEF, which is both an actor in emergency relief and development assistance, should work towards closing this gap and make emergency response sustainable. One factor for sustainability is the institutionalization of project efforts and the strengthening of implementing partners. Also, emergency preparedness is an essential part of creating sustainability. Hence, it is vital that projects, such as Return to Happiness, the orphan protection group UNISTAN, the National Plan for Water and Sanitation, are not short-term experiences to be lost when personnel changes or funds expire. UNICEF should work towards the institutionalization of these project efforts in order to be well equipped for a future emergency.

8 RECOMMENDATIONS

Sector related recommendations can be found in the paragraph 6 of the Sector Related Findings section.

Six main priorities have been identified which should be considered in a future emergency:

- Emergency Preparedness

Some staff members felt insufficiently prepared for emergency situations and were not familiar with all the procedures involved. Possibly, an emergency training could be organized by OCHA, the UNICEF Regional Office's Emergency Section or the UNICEF Guatemala Emergency Focal Point. Each new staff member should be provided with the Emergency Response Manual (CCCs).

- Selection of Implementing Partners

The selection of competent implementing partners is vital for an efficient emergency response. During the Hurricane Stan emergency response, UNICEF's response was hindered by some weak implementing partners. The CO is strongly encouraged to analyze NGO's in Guatemala to ensure their solid background in humanitarian affairs and reliability of their administrative system (e.g. Oxfam, Red Cross) and to establish working relationships before an emergency occurs. Furthermore, UNICEF should avoid continue working with implementing partners, which have proven unreliable during the Hurricane Stan emergency response.

- Supplies

The purchase and delivery of emergency supplies has to be considerably accelerated. One option would be to establish small stocks of emergency items, which could also be used in non emergency situations (such as education kits). Another option would be to quote vital emergency items in advance and make a list of possible suppliers. With the most important suppliers, once dollar contracts could be signed in order to speed up the emergency response. Information on emergency supplies available in partner UNICEF offices should be updated. Procurement procedures in an emergency setting should be revised. It is not recommendable that the normal procedure of quoting each item separately three times is followed during an emergency situation. Operations and Programmes should work on improving communication in this matter.

- Staffing issues

The sectors where UNICEF will take on cluster lead in the future, (WatSan, Nutrition, Telecommunications) should be strengthened with additional personnel in emergency situations. The efficiency of UNICEF's emergency response could also be increased if administrative assistance and the Operations section were

strengthened in emergency situations. A roster of locally available potential consultants/ administrative assistants should be established and maintained. Additionally, UNICEF Guatemala should follow up with the Regional Office on the progress made with the Emergency Roster. Temporary staff members could be transferred quickly from other UNICEF offices in the region, considering the positive experience with UNICEF Colombia staff in the Return to Happiness project.

- Monitoring

In order to keep track of how UNICEF's emergency response is implemented in the field and to be aware of possible shortcomings, UNICEF should carry out more frequent joint field visits with implementing partners and hold regular follow-up meetings.

- Coordination

Internal cooperation between Programmes and between Programmes and Operations should be improved. Information sharing and updates on the emergency response is vital. From the outset, UNICEF should plan its emergency response in an integrated manner and avoid a 'geographically divided response' as it occurred with Hurricane Stan. As mentioned above, Programmes and Operations should improve coordination on procurement/ supply issues.

APPENDICES

List of People Consulted

UNICEF

Jorge Mejia
Oscar Liendo
Stephanie Luttmann
Julian Duarte
Ana Maria Sanchez
Karen Hickson
Ramiro Quezada
Sandra Recinos
Dora Giusti
Ligia Rubio
Maria de Vadillo
Ana Regina Mendoza
Alma Regina Saravia
Lucky Solorzano
Rene Oliva
Parisa Nabili
Justo Solorzano (formerly OJ)
Oscar Vaides
Tania Santisteban

Implementing Partners

PROSAN – Dr. Ivan Mendoza
Ministry of Health/ Immunization – Dr. Licet Barrera
Ministry of Health/ Psychosocial
National Plan for Water and Sanitation – Ing. Estuardo Velasquez, Guillermo Duarte
CODEFEM – Patricia Pinto
ECPAT – Maria Eugenia Villareal
OJ – Justo Solorzano, Anabela Guzman
PGN – Oscar Perdomo
SBS – Nancy Amaya
Psychologists (Berta Alicia Pacheca, Gloria Yax)
MINEDUC , Miguel Angel Reyes/ Vice Depacho Tecnico

UN-Agencies

UNDP – Resident Coordinators Office – Victoria Cremeniuc
UNDP – Gustavo Quilca
WFP – Rossella Bottone

Field Visits

- Lourdes Velasquez, San Pedro/ Tajumulco – UNICEF consultant
- Rene Romero Ramirez, Sibinal/ Tacaná – UNICEF consultant
- Incolaza Ratean Mesia (foster parent, Panabaj)
- Rosa Sicay Ratean (orphan, Panabaj)
- Ester Xiquin Leja (foster parent, Panabaj)
- Juan Carlos Sacarias Pospoy (orphan, Panabaj)
- Sulma Revolorio Paredes (Health comité, temporary shelter Tecún Umán)
- Concepcion de Barrios (Education Committee, temporary shelter Tecún Umán)
- Amparo Siebenhor (women’s Committee, temporary shelter Tecún Umán)
- Julio Solorzano (president, central committee, temporary shelter Tecún Umán)
- Jose Barrios (vice president, central committee, temporary shelter Tecún Umán)
- Bejnamin Juarez, Armando Guzman, Santos Vidal Cifuentes, Efren Emilio Maldonado, Julio Solorzano, Alberto Bautista (sectoral leaders, temporary shelter, Tecún Umán)
- Elvira Gaitan, Magdalena Gonzales (women’s group, WatSan, La Salvacion, Escuintla)
- Gabriela Hernandez, (chemist, laboratory Escuintla)
- Hernando Reyes (Ministry of Health, La Nueva Gomera, Escuintla)
- Freddy Garcia, (municipal government, San Felipe)
- Pablo Nelson Davila (mayor, Guazacapan)
- 10 members of COCODE (Guazacapan)
- Dr. Yury Contreras (Ministry of Health, Guazacapan)
- Ninfa Orozco (nurse, Santa Rosa)
- 5 members of COCODE, (El Naranjo, Moyutla)
- Manuel Patal (WatSan Technician, Nueva Concepcion)
- Dr. Raul Bosameyer (Ministry of Health, Managua)
- Mary Cruz de Ochoa (nutritionist, San Marcos)
- Gerwin Humberto Velásquez Diaz (orphan, Cua/ Tacaná)
- David Velásquez, Darid Velásquez, Dari Alvarado (children participating in Return to Happiness activities, Cua, Tacaná)
- Braudilio Ismael Orozco Navarro (headmaster, Ojo de Agua, San Marcos)
- Edmundo Alberto de Leon Ovalle (teacher, Cua, San Marcos)
- Osman Fuentes Lopez , Edson Fuentez Lopez (affected children, Return to Happiness, Ojo de Agua, San Marcos)
- Elena Fuentes, Elena Lopez (mothers, Return to Happiness, Ojo de Agua, San Marcos)
- Mainor Joaquin Gomez Ramoz (president COCODE, Ojo de Agua, San Marcos)
- Miguel Pop (headmaster, Santiago)


Flash Appeal: Guatemala 2005

Table E: List of Appeal Projects (grouped by sector), with funding status of each as of 08-June-2006

<http://www.reliefweb.int/fts> (Table ref: R5)

Compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by donors and appealing organizations.

Project code	Sector/activity	Appealing agency	Original requirements USD	Revised requirements USD	Commitments/ Contributions/ Carryover	% Covered	Unmet requirements USD	Uncommitted Pledges USD
AGRICULTURE								
GUA-05/A01	Technical assistance	FAO	3,500,000	3,500,000	320,000	9%	3,180,000	0
Sub total for AGRICULTURE			3,500,000	3,500,000	320,000	9%	3,180,000	0
COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES								
GUA-05/CSS01	Support to needs assessment and technical assistance	UNDP	4,100,000	4,100,000	0	0%	4,100,000	0
GUA-05/CSS02	Census and surveillance of affected population	IOM	600,000	600,000	58,000	10%	542,000	0
GUA-05/CSS03	Acquire and distribute inputs and equipment to start clearing operations to re-establish access	UNDP	410,000	410,000	0	0%	410,000	0
GUA-05/CSS04	Acquisition of land and sea vehicles	UNDP	1,363,000	1,363,000	0	0%	1,363,000	0
GUA-05/CSS05	Acquisition of radio communication equipments	IOM	65,000	65,000	0	0%	65,000	0
GUA-05/CSS06	Support to the Resident Coordinator Office and to National Institutions	UNDP	89,000	89,000	0	0%	89,000	0
GUA-05/CSS07	Disaster preparedness, mitigation and information management	OCHA	113,000	113,000	110,096	97%	2,904	0
GUA-05/UNDP	Awaiting allocation to specific project	UNDP	0	0	4,593,045	0%	-4,593,045	170,192
Sub total for COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES			6,740,000	6,740,000	4,761,141	71%	1,978,859	170,192
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND INFRASTRUCTURE								
GUA-05/ER/I01	Procurement of bridges	IOM	1,200,000	1,200,000	0	0%	1,200,000	0
Sub total for ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND INFRASTRUCTURE			1,200,000	1,200,000	0	0%	1,200,000	0
EDUCATION								
GUA-05/E01	Child protection education and recreational activities	UNICEF	300,000	300,000	0	0%	300,000	0
GUA-05/E02	Resumption of access to education	UNESCO	300,000	300,000	25,000	8%	275,000	0

Project code	Sector/activity	Appealing agency	Original requirements USD	Revised requirements USD	Commitments/ Contributions/ Carryover	% Covered	Unmet requirements USD	Uncommitted Pledges USD
Sub total for EDUCATION			600,000	600,000	25,000	4%	575,000	0

FOOD

GUA-05/F01	Provision of food aid and nutrition	WFP	6,910,000	14,100,000	6,379,778	45%	7,720,222	965,018
Sub total for FOOD			6,910,000	14,100,000	6,379,778	45%	7,720,222	965,018

HEALTH

GUA-05/H01	Nutritional surveillance	UNICEF	100,000	100,000	0	0%	100,000	0
GUA-05/H02	Technical assistance	PAHO	120,000	120,000	0	0%	120,000	0
GUA-05/H03	Support to medical care and epidemiological surveillance	PAHO	850,000	850,000	36,115	4%	813,885	0
GUA-05/H04	Provision of basic reproductive health services	UNFPA	250,000	250,000	170,328	68%	79,672	0
GUA-05/H05	Provision of basic health services for children	UNICEF	400,000	400,000	0	0%	400,000	0
Sub total for HEALTH			1,720,000	1,720,000	206,443	12%	1,513,557	0

SECTOR NOT YET SPECIFIED

GUA -UNS-05/OCHA - Unearmarked	Unearmarked funds channeled by donor to OCHA for distribution to implementing agencies	OCHA	0	0	490,360	0%	-490,360	0
GUA-05/PAHO	Awaiting allocation to specific project/sector	PAHO	0	0	3,180,124	0%	-3,180,124	0
GUA-05/UNFPA	Awaiting allocation to specific project	UNFPA	0	0	48,368	0%	-48,368	120,192
GUA-05/UNICEF	Awaiting allocation to specific project/sector	UNICEF	0	0	5,282,859	0%	-5,282,859	50,000
Sub total for SECTOR NOT YET SPECIFIED			0	0	9,001,711	0%	-9,001,711	170,192

WATER AND SANITATION

GUA-05/WS01	Provision of basic inputs for safe water and sanitation	UNICEF	2,800,000	2,800,000	0	0%	2,800,000	0
GUA-05/WS02	Support technical assistance to water and sanitation	PAHO	800,000	800,000	0	0%	800,000	0
GUA-05/WS03	Provision of basic inputs personal hygiene	UNFPA	400,000	400,000	0	0%	400,000	0

Project code	Sector/activity	Appealing agency	Original requirements USD	Revised requirements USD	Commitments/ Contributions/ Carryover	% Covered	Unmet requirements USD	Uncommitted Pledges USD
Grand Total: USD			24,670,000	31,860,000	20,694,073	65%	11,165,927	1,305,402

Pledge: a non-binding announcement of an intended contribution or allocation by the donor. ("Uncommitted pledge" on these tables indicates the balance of original pledges not yet committed.)

Commitment: creation of a legal, contractual obligation between the donor and recipient entity, specifying the amount to be contributed.

Contribution: the actual payment of funds or transfer of in-kind goods from the donor to the recipient entity.