




Inception Report




15 APRIL 2022



Real-time evaluation of UNICEF's response to the Haiti earthquake of 2021

Inception Report



Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACF	Action contre la Faim
ACTED	Agence d'aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AMC	Affaires mondiales Canada
ASCP	Agent de Santé Communautaire Polyvalent
BINUH	Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti
BIT	Bureau International du Travail
BM	Banque Mondiale
C4D	<i>Communication for Development</i> - Communication pour le développement
CAD	Comité d'Aide au Développement
CEDAW	<i>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</i> - Convention sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination à l'égard des femmes
CERF	<i>Central Emergency Response Fund</i> - Fonds central d'intervention d'urgence des Nations Unies
CPD	<i>Country Programme Document</i> – Document de Programme Pays
DG-ECHO	Direction générale pour la protection civile et les opérations d'aide humanitaire européennes de la Commission européenne
DINEPA	Direction nationale de l'eau potable et de l'assainissement
DPC	Direction de la Protection Civile
DSF	Direction de la Santé familiale
EAQ	Expert en assurance qualité
EMMUS	Enquête de morbidité, de mortalité et d'utilisation des services
FAO	<i>Food and Agriculture Organization</i> - Organisation pour l'Alimentation et l'Agriculture
FNUAP	Fonds des Nations unies pour la population
FONDEFH	Fondation pour le développement et l'encadrement de la famille haïtienne
FOSREF	Fondation pour la santé reproductrice et l'éducation familiale
GAVI	<i>Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization</i> - Alliance mondiale pour les vaccins et la vaccination
GHEKIO	<i>Haitian Global Health Alliance</i>
GPE	<i>Global Partnership for Education</i> – Partenariat mondial pour l'éducation
GRE	Groupe de Référence de l'Évaluation
HHF	<i>Haitian Health Foundation</i>
IBESR	Institut du bien-être social et de la recherche
IDG	Indice de Développement de Genre
IDH	Indice de Développement Humain
IHSI	Institut haïtien des statistiques et de l'information
JICA	<i>Japan International Cooperation Agency</i> - Agence japonaise de coopération internationale
LACRO	<i>Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office</i> - Bureau régional de l'UNICEF pour l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes
MAST	Ministère des Affaires sociales et du Travail
MdM	Médecins du Monde
MENFP	Ministère de l'Éducation nationale et de la Formation professionnelle
MINUJUSTH	Mission des Nations Unies pour l'appui à la justice en Haïti
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti
MPCE	Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération externe
MSP	Ministère de la Santé publique et de la Population
OCDE	Organisation de coopération et de développement économique
ODD	Objectifs de Développement Durable
OMS	Organisation Mondiale de la Santé
ONG	Organisation Non-Gouvernementale
OPS	Organisation panaméricaine de la santé
PAGEDEV	<i>Partnership for Gender Equity and Development</i>

PAM	Programme Alimentaire Mondial
PDNA	Post Disaster Need Assessment
PIB	Produit Intérieur Brut
PIPE	Programme d'interventions prioritaires en éducation
PLAFODA	Plate-forme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif
PNPPS	Politique nationale de protection sociale
PNS	Politique Nationale de Santé
PNUD	Programme des Nations unies pour le Développement
PSDH	Plan Stratégique de Développement d'Haïti
PSN	<i>Programme Strategy Notes - Notes stratégiques de programme</i>
PSNSSANH	Politique et Stratégie Nationales de Souveraineté et Sécurité Alimentaires et de Nutrition en Haïti
PTF	Partenaires Techniques et Financiers
SI	Solidarités International
SitAn	<i>Situation Analysis – Analyse de la Situation</i>
SMR	<i>Strategic Moment of Reflection - Moment de Réflexion Stratégique</i>
SNU	Système des Nations Unies
TdC	Théorie du Changement
TDR	Termes de Référence

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION.....	6
1.1. Structure of the Inception Report	6
1.2. Purpose and objectives of the RTE.....	6
1.3. Object and Scope of the RTE.....	7
2. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT	7
2.1. Haiti, a complex socio-political context	7
2.2. A disaster hot spot country.....	9
2.3. The disasters of August 2021.....	11
2.3.1. The events.....	11
2.3.2. UNICEF’s response: Object of the evaluation	12
3. METHOD.....	12
3.1. The different steps of the RTE process	12
3.2. A participatory approach	13
3.3. Information validation processes	14
3.4. Evaluation frameworks and criteria.....	14
3.4.1. Classic DAC evaluation criteria:.....	14
3.4.2. The UNICEF Core Commitments for Children and the L2 declaration and their impact on the evaluation framework.....	21
3.5. A utilisation focused Real-time evaluation	21
3.6. The RTE evaluation logic	22
3.7. A complex evaluation matrix	22
An evaluation matrix synthesising the different evaluation frameworks that will be used has been drawn up and will serve as a key tool bringing together the different elements that they contain.	
3.8. Information sources and collection methods.....	22
3.8.1. Timelines	23
3.8.2. Testimonies and life stories	23
3.8.3. Data analysis	23
3.9. Limits, risks and mitigation measures.....	24
3.9.1. Contextual risks and uncertainty	24
3.9.2. Difficulties in accessing information	24
3.9.3. Mitigation measures related to the identified risks	24
3.9.4. Synthesis of the risk management strategy.....	25
3.10. The governance of the RTE and quality assurance	25
3.11. Ethical considerations	26
3.12. Key issues arising from the inception phase to explore during the RTE.....	27
4. WORK PLAN	29
4.1. The evaluation team	29
4.2. The RTE workplan	29

ANNEXES	33
Annexe 1: Terms of reference	33
Impact and damages of Haiti 2021 earthquake	33
UNICEF’s response	33
B. Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation	35
Purpose	35
Objectives	35
C. Expected Users	36
D. Special Considerations	36
E. Evaluation Scope	36
G. Approach and Methods	40
H. Limitations and anticipated Challenges	40
Norms and Standards Guidance documents mentioned below are those that the Evaluation Team is expected to comply with: 41	
I. Management and governance arrangements	41
LACRO Regional Office:	41
Evaluation Reference Group:	41
Country Office:	42
J. Evaluation Team composition, responsibilities and required qualifications	42
Team Composition and responsibilities:	42
Individual contracts will be issued to each team member.	42
Timeframe and deliverables	43
Tentative timeframe and deliverables	43
The RTE is expected to produce the following outputs:	44
Annexe 2: Consulted documents	45
Annexe 3: interviews	48
Annexe 4: Guidelines for the interviews, RTE UNICEF in Haiti	49
Annexe 5: Workshop Lessons learn Les Cayes 7-9 Feb 2022	50

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Structure of the Inception Report

The present Inception Report is based on the ToR (see Annexe 1), 25 interviews (Annexe 3) and lessons learned from an internal UNICEF workshop in Les Cayes (attended by one member of the RTE team between February 9 and 10, see Annexe 5) as well as on the basis of a desk review of more than 30 documents related to Haiti and UNICEF's response. (Annexe 2). After an introduction presenting the objectives of the Real Time Evaluation, section 2 outlines the team's first analysis of the Haitian context. section 3 then looks at UNICEF's activities in Haiti and its response to the tragic events of August 2021. The fourth section describes the methodology that will be used by the RTE team, including information management, risk and mitigation analysis, and the quality assurance process. Finally, the report provides an up-to-date workplan.

1.2. Purpose and objectives of the RTE

Though it is mainly learning oriented, the real time evaluation aims to contribute both to learning and accountability, by:

- providing **iterative feedback loops on the last phase of post-earthquake recovery and the reconstruction** (operationally and programmatically) in the ongoing response;
- informing the **direction of recovery efforts** and the planning of forthcoming response phases;
- identifying **lessons to strengthen resilience and the future preparedness levels** of the UNICEF Country Office, the Haitian government and key partners;
- **supporting the learning of LACRO vis-à-vis** the activation of L2 emergency procedures in the future;
- **strengthening UNICEF's accountability** towards affected people, as well as towards partners and stakeholders supporting the response.

In accordance with the ToR, the **objectives** of the RTE are to:

- a. determine the appropriateness/relevance, effectiveness, coverage, connectedness and coherence (coordination/partnerships) of UNICEF's response;
- b. assess the extent to which UNICEF adhered operationally and programmatically, to the Core Commitments for Children (CCCs)
- c. examine the extent to which UNICEF effectively responded to the needs of the most affected people in a timely manner and identify gaps and appropriate strategies to improve operational coverage and effectiveness.
- d. assess the extent to which emergency preparedness and organizational readiness have enabled Haiti to respond more effectively to rapid onset disasters, with the objective of identifying the factors hampering/facilitating the response;
- e. examine the extent to which the Haiti Country Office took into consideration gender issues and equity (e.g. communities in hard-to-reach areas; people with disabilities; separated or unaccompanied children; etc.);
- f. identify lessons and make recommendations for ways to adjust and improve the response and planning for recovery after sudden onset emergencies.

This evaluation is seen as particularly relevant in view of UNICEF's significant involvement in the response: The Activation Procedure applies to L2 emergencies, defined as situations where the magnitude of the emergency is such that a Country Office (CO) needs additional and prioritized support from other parts of the organization (Headquarters and Regional and Country Offices) to respond, and where the Regional Office (RO) must provide dedicated leadership and support. L 2 is designed to support UNICEF Country offices to ensure that their responses (both in the sectors of responsibility of UNICEF and in cross-cutting areas) are timely, appropriately assessed, designed and executed according to the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs).

This RTE is therefore primarily aimed at UNICEF's management and staff involved in the response to the Haiti earthquake in the field, in the Country Office, the Regional Office, and at HQ. It will also be of interest to a variety of stakeholders, including governmental and UN agencies, and other implementing partners, the people affected by the emergency, the Executive Board, interested supporting states, and donor agencies who support emergency programmes with technical and financial resources at all levels.

1.3. Object and Scope of the RTE

The RTE will review UNICEF's immediate response to the 2021 earthquake as well as its ongoing recovery efforts; as such, it will cover the period from August 2021 to April/May 2022. The evaluation team will collect information and will exchange with the population and a wide variety of stakeholders during their field visit to Haiti in April/May. The geographical areas covered by the RTE include the three southern departments of Haiti (Sud, Grand'Anse, and Nippes) and, more specifically, the communes of Les Cayes, Aquin, Cavaillon, Petite-Rivière-de-Nippes, and Anse-à-Veau.

The evaluation will cover UNICEF's projects in the areas of WASH, health, nutrition, emergency relief, education, C4D, child protection and social protection. It will cover UNICEF's role as cluster lead or co-lead, as relevant, as well as its response in sectors where it has no cluster leadership responsibilities. It will also assess the availability and management of supplies, human and financial resources and partnerships from an operational point of view. The impact of advocacy, communications and fundraising will also be assessed. The activities that will be evaluated are presented in paragraph 3.2 below.

The RTE will specifically review:

- the UNICEF corporate emergency activation for L2 emergencies (which was used between August 2021 and February 2022);
- the emergency response in different sectors (e.g. WASH, nutrition, education, child protection, health, C4D and social protection);
- UNICEF's coordination role in the response;
- the response plan;
- how partnerships were established with different stakeholders (from line ministries to civil society organisations) and for different types of activities (data gathering, project implementation, etc.);
- the UNICEF Country Office's level of preparedness before the earthquake.

2. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT

2.1. Haiti, a complex socio-political context

Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere, with a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of USD 756 in 2019¹. It is ranked 170th out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI) (2018), with an HDI value much lower than the regional average (0.510 compared to 0.766 for Latin America and the Caribbean). The country's socio-economic situation is also marked by major inequalities in human development: the Gini index was 41.1 in 2012, ranking Haiti 57th in the world. These inequalities depend on whether a person lives in an urban or a rural environment, the department where they live, the level of income within the family and the level of education of the head of the household.

The latest poverty survey in 2012² puts the number of Haitians living below the poverty line (less than USD 2.41 per day) at 6 million, i.e. more than half the population, including 2.5 million in extreme poverty (less than USD 1.23 per day).

¹ World Bank report <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview#1>

² "World Bank; Observatoire National de la Pauvreté et de l'Exclusion Sociale. 2014. Investing in people to fight poverty in Haiti : Reflections for evidence-based policy making – Final report. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21519> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO."

According to the latest United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on the HDI in Haiti (2020) and based on 2016 data, 41.3% of the population lives in multidimensional poverty and 21.8% are considered vulnerable to multidimensional poverty. Both urban and rural contexts are affected by food insecurity, high levels of malnutrition and significant levels of unemployment. In the last 20 years, the country has been affected by the earthquake of 2010, hurricane Matthew in 2016, a cholera epidemic, and a series of political crises. Since 2018, it has been faced with anti-government demonstrations, gang violence and kidnappings. With the country already caught up in a major crisis that the authorities were struggling to cope with, 2021 was a particularly difficult year socially and politically (see table below on page 15).

Increased criminal activity by armed gangs and related consequences

Since 2019, the situation in the Martissant area has been extremely difficult, with gang violence, the main victims being the inhabitants and the government unable to resolve the crisis. Due to the growing number of shootings and attacks by armed gangs,³ thousands of Martissant residents fled⁴ the area in June 2021. National Road 2, which is the main artery⁵ to reach the Grand Sud region, is regularly blocked by the gangs. Those who take the road do so at their own risk. In December 2021, a bus carrying 38 passengers was attacked by bandits⁶ and several people were injured. Between October and November 2021, the country had to deal with a major fuel shortage due to armed gangs who blocked access to oil terminals. This paralyzed several institutions. Health centres had to stop taking in new patients. 2021 also saw a significant increase in kidnappings. Between January 1 and December 15, 2021, there were 949 recorded kidnappings, with 55 foreign nationals among the victims. This reduction of humanitarian space had a significant impact on operations.

Constitutional controversy surrounding the end of the President's mandate

In January and February 2021, there were protests⁷ about when President Jovenel Moïse's term in office should officially end. The President and his allies contended that his term would end on 7 February 2022,⁸ but the opposition parties and certain civil society groups⁹ argued that it should end on 7 February 2021. Referring to the contested constitution, the President had ended the mandates of MPs and certain Senators¹⁰ in 2020 rather than in 2021, leaving the legislative authority in an institutional vacuum. As a result, the country had no effective legislative authority¹¹ to control the actions of the government.

Assassination of President Jovenel Moïse

On 7 July 2021¹², the country was plunged into a state of shock and uncertainty following the assassination of the President in his residence. A few days before the President's tragic death, he had issued an order appointing a new government¹³, but the latter was unable to take up its functions in accordance with the constitution. The outgoing government acted as the interim authority following the assassination.

³ <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2022/01/1112722>

⁴ <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/229978/la-querre-des-gangs-se-poursuit-a-martissant>

⁵ https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2021/09/01/haiti-apres-le-seisme-fragile-treuve-des-gangs-a-martissant_6093001_3210.html

⁶ <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/232937/martissant-six-mois-apres-la-querre-des-gangs-se-poursuit-les-forces-de-lordre-tenues-en-echec>

⁷ <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/225880/le-mandat-du-president-jovenel-moise-doit-prendre-fin-le-7-fevrier-2021-selon-la-fbh>

⁸ <https://www.france24.com/fr/am%C3%A9riques/20210207-crise-en-ha%C3%AFti-le-mandat-du-pr%C3%A9sident-jovenel-mo%C3%AFse-est-termin%C3%A9-estime-le-pouvoir-judiciaire>

⁹ <https://univ.edu.ht/note-sur-l-expiration-du-mandat-du-president-jovenel-moise/>

¹⁰ <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/217933/le-mandat-du-president-de-la-republique-prendra-t-il-fin-le-7-fevrier-2021-ou-le-7-fevrier-2022>

¹¹ <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2022/01/1112722>

¹² https://www.liberation.fr/international/amerique/en-haiti-lassassinat-du-chef-hai-dun-pays-trahi-20210707_5SBKP3W325GT3LZ2MIK6Q2APCQ/?redirected=1

¹³ <https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1807246/jovenel-moise-assassinat-crise-constitution-claude-joseph>

Migration crisis

A major migration crisis also began in September 2021. Many Haitians who tried to migrate to other countries were repatriated. At least 165 pregnant Haitian women were deported by the Dominican Republic back to Haiti¹⁴. At the end of September 2021, there was chaos at the border between Mexico and the USA, with more than 3,700 Haitian migrants being repatriated to Haiti¹⁵. The combination of an ongoing political crisis, socio-economic challenges, food insecurity and gang violence are further deteriorating the precarious humanitarian situation. Some 4.4 million people, or nearly 46 per cent of the population, are in a position of acute food insecurity, including 1.2 million in an 'Emergency' situation (IPC Phase 4) and 3.2 million people in a 'Crisis' situation (IPC Phase 3). An estimated 217,000 children are suffering from moderate-to-severe acute malnutrition.

The COVID pandemic. By the end of January 2022, there had been 29,323 cases and 876 deaths reported.¹⁶ The numbers continue to rise. The COVID pandemic has further limited mobility of people and lines of supplies. It has also further increased pressure on the health sector, with 24 facilities affected by the earthquake.

2.2. A disaster hot spot country

Located in the Caribbean Sea, and crossed by a complex system of seismic faults, Haiti is significantly exposed to both tectonic and hydro-climatic risks. Over the years, and particularly since the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince (see table below), there has been significant effort to increase the response capacity of Haitian institutions. The Haitian Civil Protection agency or DGPC was transformed by mid-2000 into a fully-fledged disaster management unit with its own national emergency centre (*Centre d'opérations d'urgence nationale*) and several regional emergency centres (*Centres d'opération d'urgence départementaux*). Significant resources have been invested to strengthen Haiti's disaster management system, with key donors including UNDP, the World Bank, French and Foreign Cooperation and Development office (FCDO) and regional cooperation mechanisms such as CARICOM (Caribbean Community). When there have been disasters in the past, the proximity of the US coast, and of Dutch and French territories and former territories has made it easier to mobilise significant assets and support. It is important to note that despite the regular occurrence of seismic events, most disaster preparedness efforts are still focused on hydroclimatic events. However, efforts to strengthen the response capacity at the department level have had a positive impact, particularly in the response to Hurricane Matthew.

The table below presents the different disasters that have taken place since 2004. One important point that stands out is how frequently the southern peninsula has been affected by earthquakes, hurricanes and tropical storms over the last 20 years¹⁷.

¹⁴ Haiti Libre, 4/12/2021

¹⁵ Haiti Libre, 29/9/2021

¹⁶ John Hopkins University <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/haiti>


¹⁷ <https://www.ufondwa.org/history-natural-disasters-haiti/>

Year	Dates	Events
2004	23–24 May	Torrential rains pounded the south-east of Haiti causing 1,232 deaths, 1,443 disappearances and 31,130 displaced persons. <u>Mapou</u> , <u>Belle-Anse</u> , <u>Bodary</u> and <u>Fonds-Verrettes</u> , all located in the Sud-Est department, were the most badly hit.
	10 September	Hurricane Ivan struck the southern peninsula and west coast, causing serious damage in several areas due to flooding.
	18–19 September	Hurricane Jeanne crossed the western section of Haiti and the Artibonite, causing flooding which killed 1,870 people and left 2,620 injured, 846 disappeared and 300,000 displaced. With more than 2,000 dead, <u>Gonaïves</u> was the most seriously affected city
2005	6-7 July:	Hurricane Dennis hit the south-east coast of Haiti, causing flooding in several towns in the Sud department (<u>Bainet</u> , <u>Grand-Goâve</u> , <u>Les Cayes</u> ...) and leaving more than 500 homeless.
	4 October	Floods in several parts of the country, including <u>Pétion-Ville</u> and <u>Grand-Goâve</u> in the Ouest department, caused considerable loss of property. The government did not produce official figures for this disaster.
	17–18 October	Hurricane Wilma struck the west and south of Haiti.
	23 October	Tropical Storm Alpha crossed the south peninsula, affecting the departments of <u>Grand'Anse</u> and <u>Nippes</u>
	25 October:	Flooding caused by torrential rain hit many parts of the Nord-Ouest department, particularly the settlements of <u>Port-de-Paix</u> , <u>Bassin-Bleu</u> , <u>Anse-à-Foleur</u> and <u>Saint-Louis du Nord</u>
2006	22-23 November	Heavy rain caused flooding in the Grand'Anse, Nippes and Nord-Ouest departments, causing damage to roads including the collapse of a bridge across Ravine Sable at Trou-Bonbon
2007	17 March:	Floods caused by storms hit a large part of Haiti for over a week. Six departments were particularly affected: Grand'Anse (Jérémie, Abricots, Bonbon, Les Irois); Sud-Est (Jacmel); Ouest (Cité Soleil, Delmas, Port-au-Prince); Nord-Ouest (Port-de-Paix, Saint-Louis du Nord, Anse-à-Foleur); Nord (Cap-Haïtien); and Nord-Est (Ferrier, Ouanaminthe).
	8–9 May:	Torrential rain, causing considerable damage in several regions of the country, in particular in the Nord, Nord-Est and Sud departments. The town of <u>Ouanaminthe</u> was hit particularly badly.
2008	16 August:	Tropical Storm Fay crossed the entire country
	26 August	Hurricane Gustav crossed the south peninsula, including the Sud and Grand'Anse departments, causing approximately 77 deaths and 8 disappearances, together with serious destruction of property. 15,000 families were affected by the storm, which destroyed 3,000 houses and damaged 11,458.
	1 September	Hurricane Hanna ravaged the Artibonite and Nord-Est departments. Several towns were flooded, including <u>Gonaïves</u> . One death was officially confirmed. In addition to Gonaïves, several towns in Jacmel, Nord-Est, Sud and Sud-Est were flooded.
	6 September	Hurricane Ike, a category 4 hurricane, grazed the western coastline of Haiti, leading to heavy rain in Nord, Ouest and Nord-Ouest departments
2009	20 October	Heavy rain hit the <u>Haitian capital</u> and its suburbs. <u>Carrefour</u> , in the southern suburbs, was completely flooded.
2010	12 January	The magnitude 7.0 earthquake killed between 100,000 and 316,000 people. Its epicentre was at approximately 25 km from Port-au-Prince, the capital. A dozen secondary shocks of magnitudes ranging from 5.0 to 5.9 were registered during the hours which followed. It was one of the deadliest earthquakes ever recorded.
	20 January	Magnitude 6.1 earthquake. The epicentre was at approximately 59 km west of Port-au-Prince, and at least 10 km beneath the surface
	20 October	A cholera epidemic imported by external actors hit outside of Port-au-Prince, infecting over 340,000 people and killing at least 3,597.
	5 November	Hurricane Tomas killed at least 10 Haitians causing damage and worsening the cholera epidemic
2012	24 October	Hurricane Sandy passed just west of Haiti, causing flooding. At least 108 people were killed and 21 disappeared. Around 200,000 people were left homeless as of October 29.
2016	3–4 October	Hurricane Matthew caused flooding of up to 40 inches and storm surge of up to 10 feet. ^[18] At least 580 people were killed and more than 35,000 left homeless.
2018	6 October	A 5.9 magnitude earthquake with a depth of 11.7km ^[19] killed 12 people and injured 188. Damage was mainly recorded in the far north of the island.
2020	23 August	Hurricane Laura killed 31 people in Haiti and four in the Dominican Republic.
2021	14 August	A magnitude 7.2 earthquake struck southwestern Haiti. Its epicentre was about 10 km from Petit-Trou-de-Nippes, approximately 150 km west of Port-au-Prince, the capital. The earthquake caused significant damage. Tsunami warnings were immediately issued as several small tsunami waves struck surrounding areas. An estimated 2,207 people have been confirmed dead, while 344 remain missing, and over 12,000 have been left injured
	17 August	A storm hit the southern peninsula. Luckily, what was initially seen as an incoming hurricane transformed itself into a milder form of extreme event.

2.3. The disasters of August 2021

2.3.1. The events

On 14 August at 8:29 am local time, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake struck the south-western coast of Haiti causing large-scale damage across the country's southern peninsula. The powerful 10 km deep earthquake occurred 13 km southeast of Petit-Trou-de-Nippes, in the department of Nippes, the same region devastated by Hurricane Matthew in 2016. Only two days after the quake, Tropical Depression Grace dumped extremely heavy rains on people who had lost their homes, causing flooding in the same earthquake-affected areas.



Despite being much less catastrophic than the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince, which had left more than 220,000 people dead and 1.5 million injured, the impact of the 14 August earthquake was still devastating. According to reports issued by the Haitian Civil Protection Agency on 21 August 2021, the death toll was over 2,200, with more than 12,200 people injured. Almost 53,000 homes were destroyed and more than 77,000 sustained damage. About 800,000 people were affected and an estimated 650,000 people – 40 per cent of the 1.6 million people living in the affected departments – were in need of emergency humanitarian assistance.

Concerns increased in view of the arrival of a cyclone which turned out to be only a tropical storm. These concerns were compounded by the decision of the Government to ban the construction of camps. Many of the areas affected by the earthquake where many houses had been destroyed were also hit by heavy rain, making relief operations more complicated, but the situation did not become as disastrous as initially feared.

The combined impact of the earthquake and Tropical Storm Grace¹⁸ left 650,000 people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance. 500,000 were targeted by UN agencies and humanitarian partners through the activities planned under the Flash Appeal¹ for \$187.3 million. Based on an initial impact assessment in collaboration with the tripartite partnership comprised of the World Bank, the European Union, and the United Nations, under the leadership of the Ministry for Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE), the government estimated that the damage exceeded US\$1 billion.

2.3.2. UNICEF's response: Object of the evaluation

The UNICEF Country Office rapidly began to respond in the sectors where it has responsibility (WASH, nutrition, child protection, health, education, and gender). A few days after the earthquake, UNICEF decided to implement a Level-2 Emergency Response, which was extended until early 2022. This triggered support from UNICEF Headquarters and the Regional Office (LACRO) in Panama. This L2 declaration triggered fast track procedures for surge and operations and financial. In addition, the Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal process was activated after the earthquake.

UNICEF was also significantly involved in coordination at different levels: with the UN Humanitarian Team (HCT), and with the national authorities (COUN, line ministries, institutions in the field,), UN agencies, NGOs, etc., particularly in the sectors for which it is responsible.

3. METHOD

The RTE will adopt a mixed approach, including a desk review of existing secondary data and documentation¹⁹ (e.g. relevant findings from earlier UNICEF evaluations, parallel inter-agency evaluations, reviews; SitReps; HAC; needs assessments; monitoring indicators and reports; funding information; HR data; supply data; COs preparedness and contingency plans reflected in the Emergency Preparedness Platform (EPP)).

The main information collection phase has not yet begun. The principal sources of information, in addition to observation, will be focus group discussions and key informant interviews with a purposive sample of stakeholders:

- affected community members and leaders;
- UNICEF staff and country/regional/HQ levels;
- Government representatives (national and subnational);
- implementing partners;
- development and humanitarian partners and other UN agencies

3.1. The different steps of the RTE process

The RTE will involve several steps, as is the case for all evaluation processes:

- An inception phase, with a literature review and a first series of interviews to establish a framework for the process
- A field mission which should end with a debriefing before leaving the country
- Preparation of the draft evaluation report
- Finalisation of the report, based on the comments made by the commissioning agency
- A final presentation to an audience of relevant stakeholders

¹⁸ https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL072021_Grace.pdf (fig. 1 pag. 32)

¹⁹ See list of consulted documents in Annexe 3

Several additional components have been added to make the process more inclusive and to enhance the ownership of the findings by UNICEF Haiti:

- The participation of RTE members in a special lesson-learning event organised by UNICEF Haiti and LACRO in February;
- The organisation of a participation workshop to ensure that there is proper discussion of the Inception Report;
- A visit to LACRO for a specific debriefing with the regional team;
- The organisation of a workshop at the end of the process to explore how the RTE findings can be used in the June 2022 Strategic Moment of Reflection which will inform the next Country Plan Document (CDP).

3.2. A participatory approach

A participatory approach, involving UNICEF HCO staff, will be adopted at every stage of the evaluation: this should be validated during the mission start-up meeting. The 3 phases of the RTE process should involve participation:

- Information gathering
- Analysis
- The co-construction and validation of conclusions and recommendations

The evaluation has therefore been divided as follows:

- Inception phase:
 - o Initial series of interviews
 - o Lessons learnt workshop in Les Cayes on 7-9 February. Groupe URD sent the Deputy Team Leader to attend the full event while the rest of the team took part in two sessions on interaction between the Les Cayes event and the RTE team, by video conference.
 - o A video workshop will be organized after the drafting of the Inception Report to get feedback from UNICEF staff and to create a sense of ownership on their part;
- The field mission will involve:
 - o continuous interaction with UNICEF staff;
 - o a one-day debriefing workshop to discuss the observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations from the RTE process;
 - o a final workshop to discuss the initial draft of the RTE evaluation report before its finalisation to ensure proper appropriation and ownership.

The RTE team will ensure that proper consultation with the national and local institutions and with the population of the affected areas is included in the information gathering and analysis process.

Particular importance will be given to the following points.

Interaction in the field with the population and with different stakeholders

During visits to sites, the evaluators will speak to members of the population and different stakeholders, in parallel to observing the level of damage, the state of rehabilitated infrastructures, changes in behaviour, etc. The content of these discussions and the way questions are asked will very much depend on the circumstances in which the information is collected (in offices, in the field, in a bilateral discussion, in a group discussion, etc.).

Focus group discussions

These "focus groups", which are classic tools in qualitative surveys and evaluations, make it possible to collectively convey the complexity of a subject. Specific focus groups will be organized with UNICEF staff, operational partners and different population groups. Due attention will be paid to ensure that the focus groups are gender-balanced; In view of the complexity of the context, it is not possible at this stage to give more details about the number of focus groups and where they will take place, etc. The capacity of the RTE team to identify and opportunities to set focus group in the field will be an important asset

Co-construction of recommendations

Given the complexity and volatility of the context, collective intelligence tools will need to be used to ensure that recommendations are sufficiently robust and agile to accompany the management of future crises. A series of workshops will be carried out in the field and in Port-au-Prince (see the calendar in the annexes), including validation workshops bringing together staff from HCO, LACRO and HQ.

3.3. Information validation processes

To guarantee that the evaluation findings are inclusive, accurate and credible, primary data collection and subsequent analysis will be disaggregated as much as possible by sex and age. The views of different stakeholders/social groups affected by the intervention should be gathered, particularly the most vulnerable (e.g. displaced persons, people with disabilities, isolated communities, people who have not left their homes despite having lost assets and livelihoods, unaccompanied/separated children, returnees, resettled communities, etc.).

The validity of the data and information collected will be tested by means of triangulation. It will also be cross-validated at key stages, as deemed relevant by the evaluation team, through in-country briefings with stakeholders. Without compromising the independence of the exercise, RTEs are by design participatory in nature and built around regular interaction with key stakeholders. As such, exit workshops will be arranged prior to the departure of the evaluation team from each country. These will be an opportunity for the evaluators to share their findings and recommendations at the country level and for stakeholders, in turn, to validate the findings prior to the finalization of the evaluation report.

3.4. Evaluation frameworks and criteria

Groupe URD will use an evaluation methodology based on a number of tried and tested evaluation frameworks:

- the OECD DAC evaluation criteria, revised by ALNAP <https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&q=quality+frameworks+ALNAP+DAC>
- the 12 criteria of the Quality Compass
- the 9 criteria of the widely used Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS) <https://www.urd.org/en/publication/the-core-humanitarian-standard/> and <https://www.urd.org/en/publication/toolbox-quality-accountability-compass-to-help-implement-the-chs-in-the-field-2019/>

These complementary evaluation frameworks have been chosen to meet the demands expressed by UNICEF. We

3.4.1. Classic DAC evaluation criteria:

The DAC evaluation criteria are the norm for humanitarian evaluations.

Evaluation Matrix related to the CAD evaluation criteria:

Evaluation meta criteria ¹¹	Overarching RTE Questions	RTE Sub-questions	Indicators	MoV / Data collection method(s)	Source of Information
<p><i>Relevance / Appropriateness - whether the response is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy) and humanitarian activities are tailored to local needs, increasing ownership and accountability</i></p>	<p>1. How appropriate is UNICEF's response strategy (present and planned) in reaching the most affected people at scale?</p>	<p>1.1. To what extent is UNICEF's response aligned with and tailored to the needs of the most affected people?</p>	<p>Degree of satisfaction</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels, Interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Population, authorities, press</p>
		<p>1.2. What tools (i.e. methodologies, situation analysis, needs assessments, data systems etc.) were used to gauge these needs? /What was the quality/appropriateness of these tools?</p>	<p>Knowledge of the existing tools Existence of data management</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels, Interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, reports</p>
		<p>1.3. To what extent have affected people been involved in the needs assessment, and in the delivery and management of humanitarian assistance?</p>	<p>Number of focus groups Perception of the population and local stakeholders</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels Interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, population, reports</p>
		<p>1.4. To what extent has UNICEF been able to adapt its response to the changing needs on the ground?</p>	<p>Number of recorded and unrecorded programme adaptations</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels Interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, population, reports</p>
		<p>1.5. How were CCC taken into account in shaping the assessments?</p>	<p>Number of references to the CCC</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels Interviews with other stakeholders; report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, reports</p>

<p><i>Effectiveness</i> - the extent to which the response achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs</p>	<p>2. To what extent has UNICEF achieved/is UNICEF achieving its intended results, within the planned timeframe? (consider HAC, response plans, monitoring, adherence to CCCs etc.)</p>	<p>2.1. How timely was the response?</p>	<p>Number of days</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels; interviews with other stakeholders; report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>2.2. How realistic/feasible are planned targets (e.g. in HAC) and to what extent are they based on a situation analysis that is updated when new information becomes available?</p>	<p>Level of implementation over a sequence of time</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels; interviews with other stakeholders; report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>2.2. How effective was the support for HQ and LACRO in mobilising human resources and financial means to respond to the urgent needs (impact of the L2 declaration)</p>	<p>Timeliness of surge and financial support (in line with L2 procedures)</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels; interviews with other stakeholders; report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>2.3. What factors contributed to the success of UNICEF's operations and what factors limited this success? (HR surge; fundraising; communication w/donors and NatComs) What role have COs, the RO and HQ had in this?</p>	<p>Level of knowledge of L2 & CCC procedures Level of confidence with the national authorities Level of DRR</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels; interviews with other stakeholders; report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>2.4. What monitoring systems were put in place to ensure that the response was effective?</p>	<p>Existence and sophistication of the monitoring systems</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels; interviews with other stakeholders; report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, reports</p>
		<p>2.5. How have the main parameters of sector-based commitments (CCC) been used?</p>	<p>Number of CCC sectoral commitments achieved</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels; interviews with other stakeholders; report analysis</p>	<p>reports</p>
		<p>2.6. How have the main parameters of cross-sector commitments been used?</p>	<p>Number of CCC cross sectoral commitments achieved</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels; interviews with other stakeholders; report analysis</p>	<p>reports</p>
		<p>How have humanitarian principles, standards and guidelines been respected? How have key issues related to AAP, PSEA, and child protection guidelines been used?</p>	<p>Number of references to humanitarian standards</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels; interviews with other stakeholders; report analysis</p>	<p>reports, interviews</p>

<p>Efficiency - measures the relations between outputs (qualitative and quantitative) and inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same output, to see whether the most efficient process has been used</p>	<p>3. To what extent has UNICEF achieved/is UNICEF achieving its intended results, within the planned timeframe? (consider HAC, response plans, monitoring, adherence to CCCs etc.)</p>	<p>3.1. How efficient was the work through the national institutions in the context of Haiti ?</p>	<p>Timeliness in decision making</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels, interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>3.2. What factors contributed to the efficiency of UNICEF's response? (HR surge; fundraising; communication w/donors and NatComs)/ What role have COs, the RO and HQ had in this?</p>	<p>Timeliness of implementation of L2 and CCC procedures Level of confidence with national authorities Presence of UNICEF in the field</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels, interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>3.4. To what extent did the emergency preparedness planning influence the CO's capacity to respond?</p>	<p>Level of development of DRR procedures in HCO</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels, interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
			<p>Level of knowledge of DRR procedures in HCO</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels, interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>3.5. How aligned was the supply component with the overall emergency response? What have been the specific and most significant contributions of supply to the response?</p>	<p>Timeliness of the arrival of the supplies Comparison of what was requested with what was sent</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels, interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>3.6. To what extent was the initial response by the Country Office and Regional Office informed and enabled by preparedness activities implemented prior to the crisis?</p>	<p>Level of knowledge of DRR procedures in HCO</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels, interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>3.7. What role has innovation played in needs assessment and the response?</p>	<p>List of innovations and the locations where they were used</p>	<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels, interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>3.8. Were there any unintended consequences of the humanitarian assistance (positive or negative)?</p>		<p>Documentation, interviews with UNICEF staff at different levels, interviews with other stakeholders, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>

<p><i>Coverage : the geographic, socio-economic and societal out-reach of the programmes, including their capacity to address the needs of the most vulnerable areas and groups according to their needs</i></p>	<p>4. Responding to the need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are</p>	<p>4.1 To what extent was UNICEF able to reach the population in the different affected areas in view of the security and logistical constraints?</p>	<p>List and map of the areas where UNICEF managed to conduct operations</p>	<p>Interviews, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>4.2. How successful has UNICEF been in reaching the most vulnerable groups (communities in hard-to-reach areas; IDPs; people with disabilities; unaccompanied/ separated children; pregnant women; etc.?)</p>	<p>% of vulnerable people in the list of UNICEF beneficiaries</p>	<p>Interviews, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
<p><i>Connectedness - - the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and inter-connected problems into account</i></p>	<p>5. To what extent is UNICEF's response contributing to the longer-term goals of preventing future emergencies, mitigating the negative effects of future natural hazards (resilience/sustainable solutions) and preparedness?</p>	<p>5.1. What has UNICEF contributed to post-earthquake rehabilitation?</p>	<p>Number of rehabilitated services</p>	<p>Lists of rehabilitated services</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, populations, reports</p>
		<p>5.2. What was the role of UNICEF in disaster preparedness and how will the lessons learnt from the earthquake be integrated in future disaster preparedness efforts?</p>	<p>Level of development of DRR procedures in HCO Level of awareness of the importance of DRR among HCO staff</p>	<p>List of DRR measures seen as important</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, reports</p>
		<p>5.3. How successful has UNICEF been in ensuring youth participation during the response?</p>	<p>Level of engagement with Youth</p>	<p>List of young people among the partners and the informants</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, population reports</p>

<p><i>Coordination - the systematic use of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner</i></p>	<p>6. How effectively and efficiently has UNICEF coordinated its response both internally and externally with national and local governments and with other key actors, such as other UN agencies, CSOs and development partners? And how has it contributed to sector-based coordination</p>	<p>6.1. How successful was UNICEF in supporting the coordination of sectoral response at the central level.</p>	<p>Degree of satisfaction of the partners</p>	<p>List of staff involved and technical mechanisms where UNICEF had a presence in the coordination systems. Analysis of the impact of this presence</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, population, reports</p>
		<p>6.2. How successful was UNICEF in supporting the coordination of sectoral response at the local levels</p>	<p>Degree of satisfaction of the partners</p>	<p>List of staff involved and field location where UNICEF had a presence in coordination systems. Analysis of the impact of this presence.</p>	<p>Staff, partners, authorities, population, reports</p>
		<p>6.3. Was UNICEF's role in coordination sufficiently recognized?</p>	<p>Degree of satisfaction of the partners</p>	<p>Minutes of coordination meetings</p>	<p>Staff involved in coordination, partners, authorities, reports</p>
		<p>6.4. What were the weak points and constraints affecting UNICEF's coordination role?</p>	<p>List of constraints identified</p>	<p>Interviews, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff involved in coordination, partners, authorities, reports</p>
<p><i>Equity (specific to UNICEF and not in DAC criteria) - direct consideration of specific effects for poor, young women (and the most marginalised), in line with the nature of the intervention</i></p>	<p>7. To what extent have gender and disability dimensions been integrated in the needs assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting of the response, as well as in recovery planning?</p>	<p>7.1. To what extent was the affected population, including vulnerable girls and boys, displaced persons and persons with disability, adequately identified, targeted and reached by UNICEF and its partners?</p>	<p>Degree of disaggregation by vulnerability criteria in the list of UNICEF beneficiaries</p>	<p>Interviews, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff involved in needs assessments and the response, partners, authorities, reports</p>
		<p>7.2. What constraints affected equity in the Haiti earthquake response ?</p>	<p>Number of identified constraints</p>	<p>Interviews, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff involved in M&E and communication, partners, authorities, reports</p>


<p><i>AAP</i></p>	<p>8. To what extent was UNICEF accountable to affected people</p>	<p>8.1. To what extent was AAP included in the response strategy</p>	<p>Number of feed back and accountability exercices</p>	<p>Interviews, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff involved in needs assessments and the response, partners, authorities, reports</p>
<p><i>PSEA</i></p>	<p>9. To what extent did UNICEF respect PSEA</p>	<p>9.1. What was the level of knowledge of PSEA?</p>	<p>Level of knowledge</p>	<p>Interviews, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff involved in needs assessments and the response, partners, authorities, reports</p>
		<p>9.2. What was done when cases of PSEA were identified?</p>	<p>Number of cases</p>	<p>Interviews, report analysis</p>	<p>Staff involved in needs assessments and the response, partners, authorities, reports</p>

3.4.2. The UNICEF Core Commitments for Children and the L2 declaration and their impact on the evaluation framework

UNICEF's Core Commitments for Children and the L2 declaration impose specific criteria for the evaluation framework. They have been incorporated into the evaluation framework as much as possible.

Timeliness is critical in evaluating the effectiveness of the L2 activation is the deactivation process. One month prior to the expiry date of the L2 emergency, the RD and the Director of the Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) assessed the four criteria (scale, urgency, complexity and capacity), and then recommended to the Deputy Executive Director of Programmes to either: deactivate the L2 emergency; extend the scale-up phase for another three months; or support the transition to a stabilisation phase and specify for how long, if the complexity of the crisis persists and there still needs to be additional support from the RO. As such, the Emergency Management Team in UNICEF HQ in New York and LACRO are key players and it will be important to monitor whether HQ and RO fulfilled their responsibilities in relation to CCC.

From different evaluation frameworks




3.5. A utilisation focused Real-time evaluation

A real-time evaluation by essence aims to inform concrete decisions This evaluation comes at a specific time:

- HCO is preparing its new Country Plan Document (CPD) and any information and recommendations that can result from the RTE will be highly valuable for that process;
- The post-Sendai process is continuing its exploration of key issues related to disaster risk management (DRM) and the RTE could help Haiti to make a significant contribution to the process; HCO and LACRO could play a significant role by using the results of the RTE properly;
- With the acceleration of climate change, as described in recent IPCC reports, severe climatic events are going to become more frequent and more unpredictable. The RTE could contribute to the improvement of DRM programming for UNICEF and for Haitian population.

3.6. The RTE evaluation logic

The evaluation logic is as follows:



3.7. A complex evaluation matrix

An evaluation matrix synthesising the different evaluation frameworks that will be used has been drawn up and will serve as a key tool bringing together the different elements that they contain.

3.8. Information sources and collection methods

To guarantee that the findings are inclusive, accurate and credible, the RTE will use existing primary data. Subsequent analysis should be disaggregated by sex and age as much as possible. The information collected should include the views of the different stakeholders/social groups affected by the earthquake and targeted by the intervention, particularly the most vulnerable (e.g. displaced persons; people with disabilities; hard-to-reach communities; people who have not left their homes but have endured significant difficulties).

Information of different kinds will be collected: documentary (reports, analyses, etc.), qualitative (non-directive interviews, focus groups, etc.) and quantitative (from reports). Information will be collected from various categories of actors, who will be identified during internal meetings within the RTE team. Interviews will be carried out with:

- Institutional actors (from the Haitian Civil Protection Agency, the Ministries of Health, Education, and Social Protection, the DINEPA at both central and decentralized levels, and staff from the three most affected municipalities -Les Cayes, Miragoane and Jérémie).
- Aid actors: Haitian NGOs, international NGOs, mutual aid networks, and the diaspora.
- Donors: it will be useful to meet 4-5 donor institutions: ECHO, USAID, etc.
- Representatives of coordination mechanisms (UN, NGOs, clusters, PCs, town halls).
- People targeted by the assistance programmes.
- Actors from the private sector who were very active during the crisis (DIGICEL, etc.).

Several social science tools will be used and are presented below. Some examples of interview guides are presented in Annexe 3.

Sampling strategy

As the mission is taking place months after the events, the issue will be to reconstruct the chain of events that took place. As such, the objective will be to find people who are able to recall what happened. In addition, as there will be no generation of quantitative data, the issue of sampling strategy and method is not really relevant in the present context.

Site visits will be chosen on the basis of UNICEF's activities in different environments:

- Activities in urban settings
- Activities in easily accessible rural areas
- Activities in hard-to-reach rural areas

In the different sites, the RTE team will discuss UNICEF's response with the local authorities, local primo-responders, local managers of health and WASH structures and the populations using them.

3.8.1. Timelines

Experience shows that establishing and comparing timelines is a way of objectifying, comparing and validating narratives that may otherwise be difficult to reconcile.

Several periods of time should be analysed:

- The month before
- The first 48 hours
- The first two weeks
- The first two months
- From the fourth to the sixth month

3.8.2. Testimonies and life stories

The recording of 'life stories' is one of the most powerful tools in the social sciences for gathering perceptions, and listening and understanding complex facets of multiple realities. Obviously, it will be necessary to work with individuals who reflect the full range of perspectives that exist.

- Affected people (aid seen through the eyes of those it is supposed to serve):
 - o By age
 - o By gender
 - o By socio-economic categories.
- Aid actors (aid as seen by those who implement it):
 - o Informal solidarity
 - o Mushroom NGOs
 - o Traditional NGOs
 - o International NGOs
- Authorities:
 - o National actors
 - o Municipal actors
- Donors
- Coordination bodies

3.8.3. Data analysis

The validity of the data and information collected will be tested by means of triangulation. It will also be cross-validated at key stages, as deemed relevant by the evaluation team, through in-country briefings with stakeholders. Without compromising the independence of the exercise, RTEs are by design participatory in nature and built around regular interaction with key stakeholders. As such, exit workshops will be arranged prior to the departure of the evaluation team from each country. These will be an opportunity for the evaluators to share their findings and recommendations at the country level and for stakeholders, in turn, to validate the findings prior to the finalization of the evaluation report.

3.9. Limits, risks and mitigation measures

In a context such as Haiti, there is a very high level of risks and uncertainty. A number of possible mitigation measures to offset the risks in conducting the evaluation have therefore been developed.

3.9.1. Contextual risks and uncertainty

The context analysis presented in the first part of this Inception Report underlined all the difficulties of operating in the Haitian environment

- **Political and gang-related insecurity:** this affects transport, access to the field, the choice of locations for nights in the field, etc.
- **Earthquakes:** these are unpredictable.
- **Extreme climatic events :** During the cyclone season, these can be anticipated and monitored relatively well thanks to existing specialized media and tools. The danger comes from the growing probability of extreme events outside of the normal season due to climate change.
- **Health issues:** In Haiti, there are significant health risks, including cholera, COVID, dengue fever, diarrhoea, etc.

3.9.2. Difficulties in accessing information

- **The quality of data and information:** For an RTE taking place long after the events, there is a risk that what people remember might, at best, be selective, and at worst, inaccurate.
- **Difficulties finding people who were in the areas:** after a few months, many people may have moved.
- **The quality of existing planning, monitoring and reporting.**

This issue of evaluability refers to the fact that it is important to have a base with which you can compare the observed response. For the RTE, this base will be contingency plans, emergency response plans, etc. The existence or absence of these documents will either facilitate the evaluation or oblige the RTE team to “artificially create” a theory of change for the UNICEF earthquake response with which the actual response can be compared.

3.9.3. Mitigation measures related to the identified risks

For all the risks that exist, vigilance and permanent links with the UNICEF team are prerequisites of risk management. The team will ensure that it has all the available means of communicating with UNICEF (radio, mobile phone, satellite connections).

Security briefings with UNICEF security staff and UNDSS will ensure that the team is fully aware of up-to-date information on risks and related existing security measures for transport, overnight stays, etc. Dangerous areas will be avoided using air transport. In the south, where there are fewer security problems, UNICEF and UN field security processes will be respected. UNICEF will have to ensure road. If required, video-conferencing will be used as a last resort. Holding meetings in Port-au-Prince takes time. UNICEF senior staff are working from home due to COVID (they live close to the Karibe Hotel). When they are present in the office, they are busy running from one meeting to another. Meeting people outside takes an enormous amount of time due to traffic jams. Many people refuse to meet in their offices due to security risks. This can be mitigated by holding meetings in safe neutral places (such as the Karibe hotel and the Montana Hotel) and by having a vehicle and driver assigned to the RTE that could pick people up from where they are working. All options will be used to ensure that possible and predictable information gaps are covered. The U-Report Network will be particularly valuable in this respect. Regarding health issues, the team is experienced in adopting appropriate behaviour and will be equipped to deal with any initial symptoms.

3.9.4. Synthesis of the risk management strategy

Risks	Mitigation measures	Comments
Political and gang-related insecurity:	Link with UNDSS, UNICEF security and local authorities. Follow the rules in place and the advice given.	This affects transport, access to the field, the choice of locations for nights in the field, etc.
Logistics	Link with UNICEF and other stakeholders. The team will organise its own logistics when needed.	This might have financial and planning repercussions. To be discussed in the planning phase of the field mission.
Earthquakes:	Classic "stay safe" approaches	These are unpredictable
Heath issues:	Classic "stay safe" approaches	Risks largely known by the team
New extreme climatic events	Classic "stay safe" approaches	These are unpredictable
Lack of data	Try to work through "KII" and other information sources	To be clearly mentioned in the evaluation report
Absence of knowledgeable staff	Contact missing key informants by video conference, WhatsApp or other means	This is normal procedure during an RTE carried out months after the event
Differing views and understanding	Organize focus groups and mediation processes	This is typical for exercises of this kind.

3.10. The governance of the RTE and quality assurance

The governance of the RTE will be the responsibility of the LACRO evaluation unit. They will advise the RTE team and ensure that UNICEF expectations are duly taken into account. *LACRO Regional Office:* The RTE will be managed by UNICEF's LACRO Regional Evaluation Advisor. This is in line with UNICEF's Evaluation Policy which prescribes that the Regional Offices are responsible for the management of evaluations of L2 emergencies. The Regional Evaluation Advisor will provide overall guidance for the evaluation.

Evaluation Reference Group: An RTE Reference Group will be established to ensure ownership from relevant stakeholder groups of the RTE process, provide expert advice, inputs and support to the RTE as the evaluation unfolds. The RTE Reference Group should include representatives from EMOPS, the Evaluation Office, the Programme and key staff from the Haiti Country Office and Sub-Office.

14	UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation, 2016. Available at: http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1914	
15	UNEG Ethical Guidelines, 2008. Available at: http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/102	
16	UNICEF Procedure for Ethical Standards in Research, Evaluation, Data Collection and Analysis, 2015. https://www.unicef.org/supply/files/ATTACHMENT_IV-UNICEF_Procedure_for_Ethical_Standards.PDF	17
17	http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1452	
18	https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/alnap-evaluation-humanitarian-action-2016.pdf	
	https://evaluation.msf.org/sites/evaluation/files/real_time_evaluations_of_humanitarian_action.pdf	

The reference group will have the following responsibilities:

- a. Provide input during the inception phase to influence the approach of the evaluation, and, where necessary, provide information and institutional knowledge as key informants.
- b. Support the work of the evaluation team by facilitating connections with key informants and ensuring the team has relevant reference documents.
- c. Review selected evaluation products (inception report and final/penultimate report) and provide written comments to the evaluation team through the evaluation manager; and,
- d. Where feasible, contribute to the post-evaluation management response, action plan and dissemination strategy.

Country Office:

The Country Office will be responsible for hosting the evaluation team, providing a workspace, and providing documentation, data and materials that are not readily available within the Regional Office. The CO will appoint a focal point for this evaluation who will liaise with the LACRO, provide logistical support and act as resource person for the exercise, including helping to arrange interviews with key stakeholders.

To ensure the quality of the evaluation products the evaluation team will:

1. Hold regular internal project management meetings to track delivery and quality, and deal with problems as they arise;
2. Compile and document relevant information in the project files (including meeting minutes, work plans and deadlines, programme documentation and relevant reports);
3. Maintain clear and open communication with UNICEF HCO and UNICEF LACRO at all times;
4. Seek feedback from the client and incorporate all feedback into evaluation design, processes and outputs; and
5. Conduct an internal evaluation team review of all deliverables, including internal quality assurance.

Quality assurance will be based on three complementary processes:

- One highly experienced member of staff from Group URD will review all the documents and check that they respect all key quality criteria for evaluation reports;
- Professional copy-editors will review all the documents to ensure that both the French and English documents are of high quality. A professional Haitian translator will be in charge of translating the documents into Haitian Creole;
- UNICEF evaluation specialists from LACRO will review the documents and make comments and remarks.

All deliverables will be compliant with UNICEF-Adapted UNCEG Evaluation Report Standards (2017), UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation (2016) and the GEROS Evaluation Quality Assurance Tool (2020).

As per the ToR, in addition to the internal Quality Assurance process, UNICEF Reference Group, CO and RO staff, and the Regional Evaluation Adviser, will be responsible for the quality of the evaluation and will provide comments to the evaluation team before submission of the revised and final drafts.

3.11. Ethical considerations

As for any process involving the collection and treatment of potentially sensitive personal and organisational information, there are important ethical considerations related to protecting sources. This is particularly critical as many UNICEF programmes that are being evaluated concern children and women. The RTE team will pay due attention to these ethical issues. At this stage, it is not expected to have interviews specifically with children.

The RTE team will make best use of a series of the following guidance documents:

- United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the UN System 2016;¹ (including impartiality, independence, quality, transparency, and consultative process);
- Ethical Guidelines for UN Evaluations;¹
- UNICEF Ethical Guidelines and standards for research and evaluation;¹
- UNEG guidance on integrating human rights and gender equality and UN System-Wide Action Plan (UN-SWAP) on gender equality;¹
- Relevant ALNAP guidance for evaluation and real-time evaluations of humanitarian action;¹ Results Based Management principles, theory of Change applied in the emergency response, etc. should be determined by the evaluation team)

The key principles the team will comply with include the voluntary nature of participation in interviews, confidentiality, the non-attribution of findings to specific informants etc.

3.12. Key issues arising from the inception phase to explore during the RTE

From the initial set of interviews, reports and other documents, several issues have been identified and will be further explored during the evaluation mission. The UNICEF response was generally well perceived both internally and externally, but several areas required improvement. Some of these have been partially identified in the text above but need be clarified. The following additional questions have been identified at this stage. Comments received on emerging findings will be used as a basis to triangulate findings for the draft report

Criteria	Emerging issues
Relevance/ Appropriateness	<p>The HPM (humanitarian program monitoring) system was set up but with delays . Why?</p> <p>The- Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) Appeal was rapidly launched but the actual response plan took weeks and was not fully respected. Ad-hoc response activities were very useful but sometimes used up a lot of energy. Could a better balance be beneficial?</p>
Efficiency	<p>The LACRO office supported the HCO in multiple ways. How useful was it? How was it perceived in Haiti? What should be done next time?</p> <p>More than 60 surge staff were mobilized from outside of Haiti CO. How did the surge work? How timely was it? Did it respond to the critical needs of the CO? How useful was it in implementing response activities? How complementary was it with the local response?</p> <p>It would be important to know why Emergency Response Plans were not shared with RO/HQ, despite repeated requests, including during REMT meetings.</p> <p>Other agencies recruited staff more quickly. Could UNICEF use its HR processes to support operations more effectively?</p> <p>An overall view of the operation was missing: there was no integrated information management. There was no overview of what existed in terms of staff, funding in-country and in the pipeline, when supplies were expected to reach the country and where they were destined, etc. Could this be significantly improved? How?</p> <p>Slow internal processes in Finance and Admin had huge implications for partners and staff. How could this be improved? Surge staff? Other?</p> <p>Information management was slow during the first weeks. How can this be improved?</p>

Effectiveness	<p>The lack of an operational Emergency Response Plan proved to be an issue as RO/HQ did not have detailed information and HCO's plan in order to support what was requested in HAC. Even though the ERP was approved before and reviewed after the earthquake, was it fully put into action? What should be improved?</p> <p>Staff selection for Haiti for day-to-day operations is challenging. Are the proper mechanisms in place to attract highly effective emergency staff who have skills to build long-term governance as well as national expertise?</p> <p>The provision of supplies after the first response was delayed. Why? Were the supplies distributed in time? Did UNICEF use its full capacity to bring in supplies rapidly? (from Copenhagen, with partners in other countries and from the Panama warehouse). Were there enough local purchases? Some supplies were in Les Cayes but there were difficulties distributing them. Why? Nobody knew what was in the partners' warehouses.</p> <p>E-tools for the PCA and other tools existed. Could they have been used more? Were they known by staff? Are there any limitations? Were simplification procedures in HR, Finance, etc. used? Rapidly, training for Haiti staff was set up by EMOPS and was well received. Should more have been done? How can institutional memory be improved?</p> <p>Cash-On-Hand was generally well received. However, it took weeks before it was approved by HQ. Why did it take so long? Where were the bottlenecks? Cash versus in-kind or complementary?</p> <p>Construction unit. Was it set up well? On time? Should this reconstruction capacity not be kept in the country to continue building schools and health centres so that they can be operational immediately when another emergency takes place. We could have all the school building designs approved before the disaster and save precious time, and respond more effectively to shocks.</p>
Coordination	<p>The government decided not to activate the Cluster mechanism. However, UNICEF was nevertheless responsible for sector coordination in Nutrition, Education and WASH. How effective was it? Were other agencies/institutions/NGOS involved and did they benefit from it? Were the UN Appeal Funds distributed according to the capacities of different organisations? Was the government left with increased capacities? Did the sector co-leader adopt a neutral position, as it is required, so that local authorities were able to receive independent and objective information?</p> <p>How beneficial was the UN humanitarian coordination for UNICEF and what were its limitations? Did UNICEF benefit from inter-agency synergy?</p>
Connectedness	<p>The WASH department started to send teams to fix pipes months after the earthquake. Would it have been possible to go faster? Was there a proper balance between going through the government and being slow while the population was without access to water?</p> <p>The link between preparedness and response: too little investment in preparedness to ensure a better response. What should be done to improve this? Why?</p>
AAP /PSEA	<p>The Education sector dealt with very interesting issues and conducted a large-scale survey to ensure that local education personnel, children and the private sector took part.</p> <p>How successful were Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse activities? Was enough done?</p>

4. WORK PLAN

4.1. The evaluation team

The evaluation team is very experienced and is able to cover all issues, including gender.

Team Leader - François Grünewald: As an agronomist, François has been working in the solidarity sector for over 35 years. After working for the UN, the ICRC and NGOs, he managed Groupe URD (www.urd.org) for 20 years. Groupe URD is a research, evaluation, methodological and training institute specialised in crisis management, humanitarian action and reconstruction. He has extensive experience as a team leader in complex evaluation missions in difficult environments. He has conducted a wide range of studies on disasters (including research and evaluation of humanitarian programmes, risk management preparedness in Africa, Latin America, Caucasia, Asia, and the Middle East) for donors, the Red Cross movement, the UN and NGOs. As a former associate professor at the University of Paris XII, he also teaches at various institutions in Europe, Canada and the United States. He has written numerous articles for specialist reviews and has edited several books, including "Entre Urgence et développement", "Villes en Guerre et Guerre en Villes"; "Bénéficiaires ou partenaires : quels rôles pour les populations dans l'action humanitaire" published by Karthala Editions. <https://www.urd.org/fr/projet/observatoire-covid-19/>

F. Grunewald will be responsible for the quality of the process, coordination of the team's activities and the preparation of the different documents required by the contract. He will link with UN agencies and the national authorities.

Jean Luc Poncelet, MD, MPH, has 35 years of experience in disaster management capacity building, and public health emergency response especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, but has also worked in Yemen, Mali and Burundi. He started his disaster management career in 1986, comparing the public health status of refugee versus recipient populations in Central America. He then became involved in the rapidly growing field of disaster risk reduction, recovery and resilience. He has contributed to post-disaster needs assessment guidelines developed by OCHA (cluster), WB- PNUD-ECLAC (PDNA) and WHO. He has been involved in a large number of missions in Haiti since 1990 including casualty management plans, the creation of the Civil Protection department, and recovery and resilience projects. He actively participated in the 2010 Haiti earthquake health sector response and the cholera epidemic response (2014-2017). He was in charge of dialogue high level authorities, assisted 35 countries, among other with funding of EU/ECHO, USAID, CIDA, UN/CERF and others at responding efficiently to humanitarian crises. He is presently the Natural Hazard Disaster Management associate at John Hopkins University and a Senior Health Advisor and Researcher at Groupe URD.

Jean-Luc will assist the team leader and analyse different issues related to health, disaster management, information management and M&E.

Woodline Taverne is a lawyer with a Master's in Public Administration. Since 2009, she has been working on programmes with a strong gender and child protection component in Haiti. In 2016, she also worked on education in the Dominican Republic. She works for a Canadian NGO in the Chantal Commune (South Haiti) on how to better respond to the needs and conditions of girls and women in the community.

Woodline will be in charge of the child protection and gender equity issues as well as the links with the Haitian civil society organisations who are partners of UNICEF.

4.2. The RTE workplan

The tentative calendar proposed by UNICEF will have to remain flexible in view of the complexity and volatility of the situation in Haiti. Delays in getting all the interviews required for the inception phase, the introduction of the Les Cayes workshop, which had not initially been planned, and the fact that the Team Leader caught the COVID-19 virus has led to some delays in producing the inception report, thus delaying the whole process by a few weeks.

Task/Deliverable	
Inception and desk review of key documentation and data	January 2022
Participation in the Les Cayes lessons learnt workshop	February 2022
Production of the Inception Report	Mars 2022
Inception Report validation workshop	March 2022
Production of the final Inception Report	End of March
Validation of the mission's programme	Early April
Haiti mission (2 weeks)	April -May 2022
Travel to Panama/UNICEF Regional Office and mission debriefing (2 days) (optional)	May 2022
Submit first draft of Evaluation Report	May2022
Final Report validation workshop	May 2022
Submit final Evaluation Report, annexes and briefs	May 2022
Communication and dissemination (including filming video clip)	June-July 2022

Before the field mission, a discussion will take place between the RTE team, the HCO office and its security/access specialists to finalize the details of the programme.

A learning workshop, which had not initially been programmed, was organized by the Haiti CO with support from LACRO. We felt that it was important for a member of the RTE to attend this workshop, which proved extremely useful and allowed a first encounter to take place between the RTE team and the HCO staff. The RTE team's participation in the workshop in Les Cayes and the first series of meetings with the HCO in Port-au-Prince also allowed cross-fertilization between the internal learning process and the RTE.

The aim of the field mission will be to collect information (visual observation, interviews with local actors and with the population). It is expected that the RTE team will visit:

- The main stakeholders in the response in Port-au-Prince (UN agencies, national institutions, donors, NGO partners) (see list earlier in the report)
- The main affected urban settings (Les Cayes, Miragoane and Jérémie), as well as affected rural areas, in particular in the mountainous areas.

The specificities of the programme are being finalized with HCO, and, will be adjusted in Haiti according to the conditions prevailing at the time of the mission.

Location	date	Who we want to see	Comments
From Home	Early to mid April	RTE team: - set the travel schedule (shift visit dates?) - share list of people to interview UNICEF : share list/mapping of intervention site and partners UNHAS flight booking & car rental (Grand Sud)	
Port au prince	19 Avril 20 Avril Day 1 to 3	Arrive à PAP Briefing sécurité & interviews PaP (UNICEF team & COUN & MSPP DG MS, responsible) UNICEF rep (biletaral) Strategic focus group (deputy reps) Technical Focus group (all sectors) COUN, DINEPA, Key ministries, UN Agencies	Interviews with chefs of sections
Les Cayes	21 avril 22-23 avril Day 4 to 7	Vol UNHAS (PaP ->Camp Perlin) UNICEF team: Municipalities DINEPA (Les Cayes) DEE (education) Sud Visits to water points and schools COUD, Local technical administrations Visits to affected areas and UNICEF programmes , UNICEF partners Interviews with beneficiaries in the field	Criteria to chose areas: Urban/rural Access easy & difficult UNICEF should share information, maps and list on the interventions of UNICEF Transport: vehicule for rent)
Jeremy	24 avril 25 avril 26 ou 27 Avril (TBD) Day 8 to 9	AM :brfeifing session (Bureau les Cayes) PM : Les Cayes -> Jeremie (véhicule) Back to les Cayes Additional interviews Fed back session with UNICEF team COUD, Local technical admins Visits to affected areas and UNICEF programmes UNICEF partners	RTE team will try to clarify expected programmes visits in advance As conditions permit Inviter les autres agences ?
Miragoane	28 avril 29 avril 10 to 12	Arrivée à Miragoane UNICEF focal point COUD, partenaires Visits aux sites d'interventions to affected areas and UNICEF programmes UNICEF partners WASH, Santé, Education	Miragoane (les Nippes) visit 1 day Back to Cayes or directly to PauP
Port au prince	30 avril? (TBC) 2-4 Mai (date TBC) 5 mai Day 13 to 15	Back to PaP Meetings with 'UNICEF Meetings with line ministries Debriefing with UNICEF rep (bilateral) Strategic focus group (deputy reps) Technical Focus group (all sectors) Workshop for final feed back COUN, DINEPA, Key ministries UN Agencies	(initial findings) Final sessions to validate facts and co-elaborate recommendations
Port au Prince	6 au 9 10/5 au matin	Additional interviews (RC, OCHA, UNDP, lines ministries) Workshop with HCR, LACRO, NY	

As indicated earlier, a discussion between the RTE team and Haiti UNICEF took place a week /10 days before the mission to finalize the programme.

A specific phase for dissemination and communication of the report and a short video will start when the final RTE Report is available.

ANNEXES

Annexe 1: Terms of reference

TITLE/PURPOSE	<i>Real-Time Evaluation (RTE) of the UNICEF's response to the Haiti 2021 earthquake.</i>
RECRUITING OFFICER	<i>Regional Evaluation Advisor, UNICEF LACRO</i>
CONTRACT MODALITY	<i>Consultant Team Institutional Contract (2 international and 1 national consultant)</i>
LOCATION OF ASSIGNMENT	<i>Home based with travel to Haiti. Will report to UNICEF LACRO</i>
LANGUAGE(S) REQUIRED	<i>English and French</i>
DURATION OF CONTRACT	<i>5 months</i>

Background

Impact and damages of Haiti 2021 earthquake

On August 14th, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, causing hospitals, schools and homes to collapse, claiming hundreds of lives, and leaving communities in crisis. The three most affected departments include Sud, Grand'Anse, and Nippes, while UNICEF estimates that about 2.200 lost their lives and 1.2 million people, including 540,000 children, have been affected by the powerful earthquake. The earthquake's devastating impact was later compounded with heavy rains from the tropical depression Grace on 17 August, causing flooding in the same quake-affected areas. The combined impact of the earthquake and the Tropical Depression Grace have left 650,000 people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance, of which 500,000 are being targeted by UN agencies and humanitarian partners through the activities planned under the recently launched \$187.3 million Flash Appeal¹. Based on an initial impact assessment, the Government estimates that damages from the powerful 7.2-magnitude quake exceed US\$1 billion, as national authorities plan a more detailed assessment of damages, losses and post-earthquake needs in collaboration with the tripartite partnership comprised of the UN, the European Union and the World Bank as well as the Inter-American Development Bank. The back-to-back disasters are exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities. In fact, the persistent political instability, is further compounded by socioeconomic crisis and rising food insecurity and malnutrition, gang related insecurity and internal displacement, the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the Haitian-Dominican migration situation. The Flash Appeal states that "At the time of the disaster, Haiti is still reeling from the 7 July assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and still facing an escalation in gang violence since June that has affected 1.5 million people, with at least 19,000 displaced in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. The compounded effects of an ongoing political crisis, socio-economic challenges, food insecurity and gang violence continue to greatly worsen an already precarious humanitarian situation".

UNICEF's response

In response, UNICEF Haiti is supporting the Government and humanitarian partners to ensure the continuity of basic services, including water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), education, health, nutrition, child protection and social protection services, while facilitating disaster risk reduction, emergency preparedness,

¹ [Haiti: Flash Appeal - Earthquake \(August 2021\) - Haiti | ReliefWeb](#)

and interventions to address violence against children as well as gender-based violence and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse.

On August 19, following the Haitian Government State of Emergency Declaration, UNICEF's Executive Director activated a Level 2 Corporate Emergency Activation Procedure (CEAP) for Haiti's earthquake response for an initial period of 3 months. On August 25, an inter-agency flash appeal was launched requesting US\$187.3M, US\$73.3M of which were requested by UNICEF, for a period of 3 months. In parallel, UNICEF Humanitarian Action Appeal (HAC) for Haiti was reviewed in early September², requesting US\$122.2 million to meet the humanitarian needs of Haitian children and their families. This includes US\$ 73.3 million for the earthquake response and US\$48.9 million to reach 1.6 million people, including 800,757 children, over a 6-month period from August 2021 to February 2022.

Overall, UNICEF's response to Haiti earthquake was informed by the varying scale of the disaster and the differing contexts in each department. Overall, in the first few weeks of the crisis, UNICEF provided critical life-saving assistance and recovery support to affected populations, while strengthening its support to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) crisis in the metropolitan area providing WASH, health, nutrition, education and child protection services, and strengthened disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness through various modalities including cash transfers.

According to UNICEF's Appeal *"UNICEF continued supporting access to essential health care services, including immunization and maternal and child health, as well as prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition."* The health sector responses included the provision of essential medicines, medical supplies, equipment and nutritional supplies as well as support for health care services resumption. *WASH response interventions "ensured access to sufficient safe drinking water for vulnerable communities, provide emergency latrines, and hygiene services, including critical hygiene supplies, hand washing facilities, and COVID-19 prevention" and "the rehabilitation/upgrade of damaged WASH facilities" as well as "hygiene promotion and awareness raising in health centers and schools" for the prevention of "infectious diseases including cholera, diarrhoeal diseases, malaria and COVID-19".* For education sector, *"UNICEF promoted a safe return to school through provision of school supplies for school reopening and access to distance learning programmes where needed."* to respond to extended school closure. In earthquake affected areas, *"UNICEF prioritized the rapid establishment of temporary learning spaces and rehabilitate schools to provide a protective environment for 100,000 boys and girls while providing mental health and psychosocial support to students and teachers."* UNICEF also supports national partners for the provision of child Protection services *"to children exposed to violence, including gender-based violence, exploitation and family separation" as well as "psychosocial support, identification, referral and service provision for vulnerable children, and community and family sensitization on child protection risks and preventative measures."* *"UNICEF provided emergency cash transfers to help the most vulnerable families meet their immediate needs" in order to mitigate the negative socio-economic impacts of crises. "In collaboration with the Government, UNICEF leads the WASH sector, continued to co-lead in education, nutrition, child protection sub-sector. Gender equality, Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) and Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) was mainstreamed throughout the response".*

Approximately two months after the onset of the emergency, the immediate life-saving supply provision mode of the response was gradually phasing out, the medium-term response still needs to focus on the

² [Haiti Appeal | UNICEF](#)

resumption of interrupted essential services and the continuation of essential services. The challenges linked with the recovery phase are presenting themselves in different forms from immediate responses, yet with a common underlying query of how to reconstruct and restore basic services, while laying the ground for increased resilience and more sustainable solutions ('how to build back better') given the fact that the country have been facing multiple crisis and the disaster-prone context remains.

Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

UNICEF's LACRO is proposing a real-time evaluation (RTE) of UNICEF's response to Haiti's 2021 earth quake to generate timely feedback and learning on key elements of its response, while complying with UNICEF's Evaluation policy requirements.³ Given that this is a rapid-onset emergency, the value of rapidly-available evidence-based findings, and the support they can provide in informing the upcoming transition to the recovery phase, makes a strong case for an RTE of the response to Haiti earthquake to be conducted at this point in time.

Purpose

The RTE of UNICEF's response to Haiti earthquake is expected to have a strong learning purpose on several fronts: i) providing iterative feedback loops, both operationally and programmatically, into the initial phase of UNICEF's response to the crisis; ii) informing the direction of ongoing recovery efforts and planning of forthcoming response phases; iii) identifying lessons to strengthen resilience and the future preparedness levels of UNICEF Country Office (CO) and Government as well as key partners; and iv) supporting the learning of Regional Office (RO) and HQ vis-a'-vis the activation of emergency procedures in the future. In this sense the evaluation is expected to yield learning that will be useful and applicable not only the CO level but also with the national as well as the RO level. The RTE will finally strengthen UNICEF's accountability towards affected populations, as well as partners and stakeholders supporting the response at large, and should be thus conceived as an intrinsic component of the humanitarian response itself.

In line with this purpose, the RTE is expected to generate actionable recommendations on how to strengthen ongoing recovery efforts from Haiti earthquake and how to improve future preparedness, response and planning for recovery after sudden onset emergencies in Haiti.

Objectives

The objectives of the evaluation are as follows:

- a. In line with the learning component mentioned above, the evaluation will determine UNICEF's response to Haiti's earthquake vis-a'-vis issues of appropriateness/relevance, effectiveness⁴, coverage, connectedness⁵ and coherence (coordination/partnerships).⁶
- b. Assess the extent to which UNICEF adhered operationally and programmatically, to the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs)
- c. Examine the extent to which UNICEF effectively responded to the needs of the most affected population in timely manner and identify gaps and appropriate strategies to improve operational coverage and effectiveness.
- d. Assess the extent to which emergency preparedness and organizational readiness have enabled Haiti to respond more effectively. This should include reviewing the extent to which UNICEF has systematically incorporated lessons learned from previous Independent Review of UNICEF's Operational Response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti⁷ and the 2019 ALNAP 16 lessons on responding to earthquakes⁸ into its preparedness strategies in the current response; how the Emergency Preparedness Platform (EPP), SOPS, HR/surge capacities; data and monitoring systems; social protection/shock responsive systems in place, etc. have all enabled the Haiti country to respond rapidly. The experience on Huracan Mathew in the same area of disaster will be used as reference⁸.
- e. Examine the extent to which the Haiti Country Office have considered gender and equity during the response, including how UNICEF has been gender-responsive across its efforts and sensitive to the needs of the most vulnerable groups affected by the emergency (e.g. communities in hard-to-reach areas; people with disabilities; separated, unaccompanied children etc.).⁹ Along these lines, the evaluation should be informative about the ways in which Haiti earthquake affected different categories of people and the

extent to which UNICEF has, in turn, incorporated this knowledge as a key driver of its response.

- f. Finally, the evaluation is expected to distil lessons and make recommendations for adjusting and improving the response and planning for recovery after sudden onset emergencies.

By showcasing what UNICEF has done well so far and identifying key gaps and the areas that will require more focus (in terms of efforts and funds) in the next stage of the response, the evaluation is also anticipated to have an instrumental role in supporting fundraising efforts for the recovery phase.

³ UNICEF's Evaluation Policy states that all short-term L2 and L3 emergencies must be evaluated at least once.

⁴ The timeliness of UNICEF's action will be looked at as part of the 'effectiveness' criterion.

⁵ Connectedness can be conceived as the equivalent of the 'sustainability' criterion applied to humanitarian action.

⁶ Reference to the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria is made, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/reviced-evaluation-criteria-dec2019.pdf>

Expected Users

The expected *primary audience* of this RTE is UNICEF's management and staff at the field, country, regional and HQ levels involved in the response to Haiti earthquake; *Secondary audiences* include: the larger community of partners (governmental, UN agencies and other implementing partners; populations affected by the emergency, the Executive Board and interested member states; donor agencies that support emergency programmes with technical and financial resources at all levels, among others. Finally, the evaluation report and its summary brief will be publicly available on UNICEF's Country Office and Regional Office website page.

Special Considerations

The design and timing of the RTE will pay due consideration to the ongoing Formative Evaluation of UNICEF Haiti country programme 2017-2023¹¹. The design and planning of the RTE will factor in the diverse magnitude of the crisis in Haiti (including insecurity and displacement crisis as well as COVID-19). With the initial emergency phase covered by the revised HAC 2021, largely over at the time the RTE will be conducted, the emergency response and recovery efforts will be covered in equal measure by the exercise.

⁷ Reference to [Independent Review of UNICEF's Operational Response to the January 2010 Earthquake in Haiti](#) ⁸

Reference to [ALNAP Lessons Paper: Responding to Earthquakes | ALNAP](#)

⁸ Reference to [Mathew Evaluation 2018](#)

⁹ Findings, conclusions and recommendations of the RTE are expected to reflect these considerations. ¹¹

Originally was 2017-2021, but due to country circumstance it has been extended to Feb. 2023

Evaluation Scope

The RTE will cover UNICEF's response in Haiti, starting from mid-August 2021, when the earthquake struck the Sud, Grand'Anse, and Nippes departments. Good part of these departments was affected also by the Tropical Depression Grace dumping heavy rains in southern Haiti, causing flooding in the same quake-affected areas. Areas of these 3 departments, where the impact of the earthquake was the greatest, will represent a relatively greater focus of the evaluation. Pre-emergency issues will be looked at only in relation to contingency planning and preparedness and the extent to which they affected UNICEF's response to the emergency. Given the real-time nature of the exercise, the timeframe will cover the ongoing response until the evaluation team is deployed to the field. The evaluation will assess UNICEF's humanitarian action across urban and rural allocations affected by the earthquake, including areas of displacement (accommodation centres), return, relocation and resettlement, where present, and hard-to-reach areas, wherever possible. Along these lines, primary data collection from key informants will be prioritized in the most affected areas of the country including but not limited to the Sud, Grand'Anse, and Nippes departments.

Programmatically, the evaluation will cover UNICEF's multi-sectoral interventions across the areas of WASH, health, nutrition, education, C4D, child protection and social protection. The RTE will cover UNICEF's role as

cluster lead, as relevant, as well as its responsibilities to respond to the needs of affected populations in sectors where it has no cluster leadership obligations. The RTE will also assess, from an operational standpoint, the availability and management of supplies, human and financial resources and partnerships which feed into the response. Advocacy, communications and fundraising will also be assessed to the extent to which they were factors that affected (facilitated/hampered) the response.

A Post Disaster Needs Assessment of any ongoing recovery programming that does not pertain to UNICEF's response to the earthquake is beyond the scope of this evaluation. The RTE will gauge the 'immediate effects' that UNICEF's humanitarian action contributed towards the affected population. Yet, given the nature of the exercise and context, it will not isolate the change and attribute it to UNICEF's specific intervention (or, in other words, evaluate 'impact'). As mentioned above, given the recurrent and cyclical nature of natural hazards in Haiti and more specifically the 2010 Haiti earthquake response and the Southern Provinces following Hurricane Matthew, the evaluation will try to reflect and gather evidence on the extent to which UNICEF has contributed, over time, to improving preparedness/resilience to rapid onset disasters - with the understanding that considerations on the specific impact of UNICEF's response to the 2021 Haiti earthquake on future preparedness levels pertain to future exercises.

The RTE will also provide an analysis of UNICEF's coordination/cluster responsibilities and how well it balanced these with its more 'operational' role. Due to time limitations, the evaluation will *not* address the efficiency of UNICEF's response¹⁰, which would imply a lengthy costing exercise and comparisons with alternative implementation approaches. The timeliness of UNICEF's action will nonetheless be addressed as a key facet of its effectiveness. The RTE will also assess whether or not UNICEF the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) has been effectively into consideration in its programming in the context of Haiti 2021 earthquake response – however, it will not assess systematically the results of such programming, given that this would require additional time and different sets of competencies. As part of recovery efforts,

¹⁰ Or, in other words whether the least costly resources possible were/are used to achieve results.

it would be pertinent to consider how the Post Disaster National Assessment is planned and established based on the recovery needs, and the role played by UNICEF in this exercise.

Indicative Evaluation Questions

In line with the objectives outlined above, the following two tables list a set of general overarching questions and a more specific set of queries/sub-questions, respectively, that will drive the evaluation. They will be

fine-tuned, revised and reduced, as deemed appropriate, to ensure relevance and utilization of the exercise once the evaluation team is onboard and the RTE Reference Group established.

Evaluation Criteria ¹¹	Overarching RTE Questions
Relevance/ Appropriateness <i>- whether the response is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy) and humanitarian activities are tailored to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness accordingly</i>	1. How appropriate is UNICEF's response strategy (present and planned) in reaching the most affected populations at scale?
Effectiveness <i>- the extent to which the response achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs</i>	2. To what extent has UNICEF achieved/is UNICEF achieving its intended results, and within the planned timeframe? (consider HAC, response plans, monitoring, adherence to CCCs etc.)

Coverage - the need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are	3. To what extent was the affected population, including vulnerable girls and boys, displaced persons and persons with disability, adequately identified, targeted and reached by UNICEF and its partners?
Connectedness - the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account	4. To what extent is UNICEF's response contributing to longer-term goals of enhancing prevention of future emergencies, mitigation of negative effects of future natural hazards (resilience/sustainable solutions) and preparedness?
Coordination - the systematic use of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner	5. How effectively and efficiently has UNICEF coordinated its response both internally and externally (with key actors such as other UN Agencies, CSOs and developing partners, national and local governments)?
Equity - direct consideration of specific effects for poor, young women (and the most marginalised), in line with the nature of the intervention ¹²	6. To what extent have gender and disability dimensions been integrated in the needs assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting of the response, as well as in recovery planning?

¹¹ Indicative definition of each criteria is based on the [Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria: An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies](#).¹² This indicative definition is from [Applying Evaluation Criteria Thoughtfully](#) (OECD/DAC).

Evaluation Criteria	RTE Sub-questions
Relevance/ Appropriateness	<p>4.1. To what extent is UNICEF's response aligned with and tailored to the needs of the most affected populations?</p> <p>4.2. What tools (i.e. methodologies, situation analysis, needs assessments, data systems etc.) were used to gauge these needs? /To what extent was the quality/appropriateness of these tools?</p> <p>4.3. To what extent have affected populations been involved in the needs assessment, delivery and management of humanitarian assistance?</p> <p>4.4. To what extent was the initial response by the CO and RO informed and enabled by elements of preparedness in place prior to the crisis?</p>

	<p>4.5. How internally coherent/consistent has the response been between the various sectors of UNICEF's response? / how integrated was UNICEF's approach across key sectors when addressing key priorities (e.g. WASH, Child protection, etc.)</p> <p>4.6. To what extent was the response designed to complement activities of other humanitarian partners operating in the most affected areas?</p> <p>4.7. How coherent is UNICEF's response with the priorities/responses of affected Government?</p> <p>4.8. How consistent has the response been with core principles of humanitarian action?</p>
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Effectiveness	<p>4.9. How realistic/feasible are planned targets (e.g. in HAC) and to what extent are they based on situation analysis and updated as new information becomes available?</p> <p>4.10. What factors contributed to success and what factors constrained UNICEF's success? (HR surge; fundraising; communication w/donors and NatComs)/ What role have COs, the RO and HQ had in this?</p> <p>4.11. How timely was the response?</p> <p>4.12. To what extent did the emergency preparedness planning influence CO capacity to respond?</p> <p>4.13. How aligned was the supply component with the overall emergency response? What have been the specific and most significant contributions of supply to the response?</p> <p>4.14. To what extent has UNICEF been able to adapt its response to the changing needs on the ground?</p> <p>4.15. What role has innovation¹³ played in needs assessment and the response?</p> <p>4.16. Were there any unintended consequences of the humanitarian assistance (positive and negative)?</p>
Coverage	<p>4.17. How successful has UNICEF been in reaching the most vulnerable groups (communities in hard-to-reach areas; IDPs; people with disabilities; unaccompanied/separated children; pregnant women etc.?)</p> <p>4.18. How successful has UNICEF been in ensuring youth participation during the response?</p>

¹³ Innovation has gained increasing attention across the humanitarian world in the past few years given its 'potential to improve humanitarian practice by introducing new and better ways to respond to emerging challenges...'. Further, 'it can be defined as a process of improvement and adaptation to context, involving a number of stages: problem specification, solution identification, piloting and testing and adapting, scaling where appropriate'. Despite the 'positive and transformative' role it can have, it poses a series of potential ethical dilemmas which academics have unpacked and attempted to contain by developing a series of principles that humanitarian action should abide by (see June 2015 Occasional Policy Paper 'Principles for Ethical Humanitarian Innovation',

Connectedness	<p>4.1. How successfully have recovery considerations been incorporated into planning and relief interventions?</p> <p>4.2. To what extent is UNICEF’s response specifically contributing to improving the resilience of local government systems and their capacity to prepare, respond and mitigate the effects of an emergency?</p> <p>4.3. To what extent has the response set the groundwork to contribute to the humanitarian development nexus?</p>
Coordination/ Partnership (at national/decentralized levels)	<p>5.1. How effectively has UNICEF balanced its ‘internal’ operations with cluster coordination/leadership responsibilities?</p> <p>5.2. To what extent are considerations of comparative advantage applied in designing and implementing the response and, as applicable, recovery efforts?</p> <p>5.3. How well did UNICEF support the Government at different levels (districts, city, provincial, central) in coordinating the response? And clusters/national nongovernmental partners?</p> <p>5.4. How effective was the CO in coordinating the setup of and delivery of new stations at the heart of crisis?</p>
Equity (Gender and disability)	<p>6.1. What are/were the specific gender and equity dimensions of the emergency?</p> <p>6.2. What particular challenges or good practices have arisen in working with vulnerable groups?</p>
	<p>6.3. Were activities and practices (including assessments, innovations etc.) implemented based on ethical principles (respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, justice)?</p>

Approach and Methods

The RTE will adopt a mixed-methods approach, including a desk review of existing secondary data and documentation (e.g. relevant findings from parallel inter-agency evaluations/ reviews; SitReps; HAC; needs assessments; monitoring indicators and reports; funding information; HR data; supply data; COs preparedness and contingency plans reflected in the Emergency Preparedness Platform (EPP); focus group discussions and key informant interviews with a purposive sample of stakeholders (i.e. affected community members and leaders; UNICEF staff at country/regional/HQ levels; Government representatives (national and subnational); implementing partners; development and humanitarian partners and other UN agencies); and observation. To guarantee inclusion, accuracy and credibility of the evaluation’s findings, primary data collection and subsequent analysis will be sex and age-disaggregated, to the extent possible. Data collection should further attempt to gather the views of the diverse universe of stakeholders/social groups affected by the intervention, particularly the most vulnerable (e.g. displaced population; people with disabilities; hard-to reach communities; populations who have not moved from places of origin despite loss but have encountered significant destruction of assets and livelihoods; unaccompanied/separated children; returnees; resettled communities etc.).

Limitations and anticipated Challenges

Key limitations will include the typical time constraints affecting RTEs, access and availability of data in emergency contexts and the need to balance timeliness with depth of information and well-substantiated findings. Further challenges that can be anticipated relate to UNICEF’s humanitarian response in Haiti which does not only focus on the earthquake response (insecurity,

Government instability, access to some areas).

The potential limitations of the RTE as well as the mitigation strategies identified by the assessment team are presented below:

Table. Limitations and Mitigation Measures

Limitations	Mitigation measures
<p>Limitation 1 Context: The diversity of stakeholders, in particular beneficiaries, national and sub-national levels may require more time and resources than originally planned when designing and conducting the RTE to ensure that its objectives are aligned with expectations.</p>	<p>It should be ensured that in addition to primary data collection, secondary sources to enrich analysis and capture the experience of the response.</p>
<p>Limitation 2 COVID-19: The context of the pandemic has caused challenges to agencies staff, many of which continue to be working from home and may impact the response of key personnel to the tasks of the evaluation. Furthermore, the pandemic continues to involve public health restrictions such as school closures which affect the ET in-person access to beneficiaries.</p>	<p>The activities will be programmed respecting the time possibilities of the country office team, and clear criteria will be set for carrying out hybrid country visit</p>
<p>Limitation 3 Availability and Access to information and informants: It is possible that there will be challenges in terms of informants accessibility or information availability, so some data may be difficult to collect.</p>	<p>This situation is anticipated by making contact with UNICEF or other staff and trying to follow up access to information and staff through remote consultations/interviews.</p>

Norms and Standards

Guidance documents mentioned below are those that the Evaluation Team is expected to comply with:

- United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the UN System 2016;¹⁴ (including impartiality, independence, quality, transparency, consultative process);
- Ethical Guidelines for UN Evaluations;¹⁵
- NICEF Ethical Guidelines and standards for research and evaluation¹⁶;
- NEG guidance on integrating human rights and gender equality and UN System-Wide Action Plan (UN-SWAP) on gender equality;¹⁷
- Relevant ALNAP guidance for evaluation and real-time evaluations of humanitarian action;¹⁸ Results Based Management principles (Theory of Change applied in the emergency should be determined by the Evaluation Team)

Management and governance arrangements

LACRO Regional Office:

The RTE will be managed by UNICEF’s LACRO Regional Evaluation Advisor. This is in line with UNICEF’s Evaluation Policy which prescribes that the Regional Offices are responsible for the management of evaluations L2 emergencies. The Regional Evaluation Advisor will provide the overall guidance to the evaluation.

Evaluation Reference Group:

An RTE Reference Group will be established to ensure ownership from relevant stakeholder groups of the RTE process, provide expert advice, inputs and support to the RTE as the evaluation unfolds. The RTE Reference Group should include representatives from EMOPS, the Evaluation Office, the Programme

¹⁴ UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation, 2016. Available at: <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1914>

¹⁵ UNEG Ethical Guidelines, 2008. Available at: <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/102>

¹⁶ UNICEF Procedure for Ethical Standards in Research, Evaluation, Data Collection and Analysis, 2015. https://www.unicef.org/supply/files/ATTACHMENT_IV-UNICEF_Procedure_for_Ethical_Standards.PDF ¹⁷
<http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1452>

¹⁸ <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/alnap-evaluation-humanitarian-action-2016.pdf>
https://evaluation.msf.org/sites/evaluation/files/real_time_evaluations_of_humanitarian_action.pdf

Division, Supply Division, Regional Office and Country Office. The reference group will have the following responsibilities:

- a. Provide inputs in the inception phase to influence the approach of the evaluation, and, where necessary, provide information and institutional knowledge as key informants.
- b. Support the work of the evaluation team by facilitating connections with key informants and ensuring the team has relevant reference documents.
- c. Review selected evaluation products (inception report and final/penultimate report) and providing written comments to the evaluation team through the evaluation manager; and,
- d. Where feasible, contribute to the post-evaluation management response, action plan and dissemination strategy.

Country Office:

The Country Office will be responsible for hosting the evaluation team and providing a workspace, and providing documentation, data and materials that is not readily available within the Regional Office. The CO will appoint a focal point for this evaluation who, in liaison and strong coordination with the LACRO, will provide logistical support and act as resource staff for the exercise, including helping to arrange for interviews with key stakeholders.

Evaluation Team composition, responsibilities and required qualifications

Team Composition and responsibilities:

The evaluation will be conducted by a 3-person team including 2 international consultants (one team leader, one WASH and one other subject matter expert) and 1 national consultant. One member from UNICEF's LACRO will be 'embedded' in the team and will provide logistical support and assist with data collection and report writing. UNICEF calls for gender-balanced and culturally diverse team composition where possible.

Individual contracts will be issued to each team member.

The evaluation team is expected to execute the following tasks:

- a. Develop a realistic work plan for the evaluation.
- b. Execute the evaluation to respond to the questions stipulated in the terms of reference (or subsequent revisions of the evaluation questions);
- c. Generate evaluation products and deliverables as shown in the table below, and in accordance with contractual requirements.
- d. Provide written responses to comments from the reference group, and update report; accordingly, and,
- e. Provide regular updates to the Evaluation Managers.

Required Qualifications:

Team Leader

- i) extensive experience in emergency response, preferably with a UN agency ii) experience in conducting and managing multi-disciplinary evaluations, including evaluating rapid onset emergencies for UNICEF, other UN agencies or other international partners at the global, regional or country levels.
- iii) knowledge of latest methods and approaches in humanitarian evaluation, especially participatory methods and accountability to affected populations, and RTEs
- iv) familiarity with UNICEF's emergency response, including the Core Commitments to Children preferred
- v) excellent oral and written communication skills (in English and French)
- vi) knowledge of qualitative and quantitative methods vii) experience managing a team
- viii) experience with the ethics of evidence generation; experience collecting data from vulnerable groups; familiarity with ethical safeguards

Senior Evaluator

- i) extensive knowledge of UNICEF's programmes in emergency contexts highly desirable, and of UNICEF's corporate emergency procedures preferred.
- ii) WASH/cholera or other technical expertise relevant to UNICEF's emergency operations
- iii) extensive experience in emergency response, preferably with a UN agency,
- iii) a minimum of five years' experience evaluating humanitarian action
- v) familiarity with UNICEF's emergency response, including the Core Commitments to Children vi) knowledge of qualitative and quantitative methods
- vii) experience with the ethics of evidence generation; experience collecting data from vulnerable groups; familiarity with ethical safeguards
- viii) excellent ability to communicate and write in English

One National consultants

- i) experience working on research, studies or evaluations ii) experience in primary data collection in affected communities; including leading focus group discussion and participatory methods
- iii) qualitative data analysis skills
- iv) experience in programme monitoring
- v) experience with the ethics of evidence generation; experience collecting data from vulnerable groups; familiarity with ethical safeguards
- vi) good ability to communicate and write in English and French and local languages (Creole for National Consultants)

Timeframe and deliverables

Tentative timeframe and deliverables

Task/Deliverable	
ToR drafted	October 2021
Evaluation team recruited	December 2021
RTE Advisory Group set up	November 2021

Finalization of ToRs	December 2021
Inception and desk review of key documentation and data	January 2022
Haiti mission (3 weeks)	February-March 2022
Travel to Panama/UNICEF Regional Office and mission (2 days)	February-March 2022
Submit first draft of evaluation report	March-April 2022
Validation workshop	April 2022
Submit final evaluation report	May 2022

Total Level of effort Expected: 90 working days total for the team. Tentative: evaluation leader (40 working days), senior evaluator (30 working days), national evaluator (20 working days)

The RTE is expected to produce the following outputs:

1. Brief Inception Report (including draft timeline summarizing key events and response) (maximum 15to 20 pages excluding Annexes)
2. Short interim reports (to be submitted prior to the consolidated report)
3. Concise and fully edited report in English (maximum 20.000 words excluding Annexes), includingdetailed timeline summarizing events and response¹⁹
4. The Executive Summary should be translated in French
5. Oral briefings/PPT/workshop for different audiences at different points in time of the evaluationcycle, containing preliminary findings and emerging conclusions/recommendations.

Annexe 2: Consulted documents

Reports and operational documents

- Baker J & al, 2011, independent review of UNICEF's operational response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Evaluation Report. Evaluation Office Sept 2011; 105 pages
- DARA, Evaluation de la Réponse d'UNICEF à l'Ouragan Matthew en Haïti Volume I. Rapport Final. Juillet 2018. Dara. 122 Pages
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- Grunewald F. 2011 ; New trends in civil-military relations : lessons learnt from Haiti ; article présenté à la Conférence «Challenges in civil-military relations », Londres, FCO/MOD/DFID
- Grunewald F. 2012 ; « Haiti et les enseignements de la catastrophe » in PCM, revue des ingénieurs des Ponts et Chaussées et des Mines, Paris,
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- Grunewald F ; 2011 ; "L'aide humanitaire : quel bilan un an et demi après le séisme" ; in Haïti, réinventer l'avenir, Ouvrage collectif, Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme ;
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- Grunewald F & all 2010 : Chef de la mission d'évaluation inter-agence en temps réel en Haïti (avril-mai 2010)
- Grunewald F & all 2010: Chef de la mission d'évaluation en temps réel de la réponse à l'urgence à Haïti,DAS, Paris
- Karoum N. (2017) La localisation de l'aide en haït après l'Ouragan Mattheuw, http://www.urd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/LocalisationHaitiReponseMathieu_GURD_2017.pdf
- De Villier C, Grunewald F. & all, Health response in Haiti: lessons to be learnt for the next disaster <http://new.paho.org/disasters/dmdocuments/HealthResponseHaitiEarthq.pdf>, PAHI
- OCHA flash appeal Haiti ; earthquake August 2021 to February 2022. 38 pages
- Saint-Fleur, Jean Ernst (2022), *Rapport de redevabilité envers les populations affectées dans le Grand Sud : Etat de la situation.*
- UNICEF (2022), *Simplifications and Mandatory Process for L1, L2, L3 Emergencies*, UNICEF.
- UNICEF (2022), *Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report N° 2 – Reporting Period: 1 January to 31 December 2021*, UNICEF.
- UNICEF (2022), *Lessons learned from Earthquake Response : Comparative Advantages, 7-9 Janvier 2022, Cayes*, UNICEF.
- UNICEF (2022), *Lessons learned from Earthquake Response : External Coordination, 7-9 Janvier 2022, Cayes*, UNICEF.
- UNICEF (2022), *La Réponse au TdT de Août 2021 dans le Sud : Les résultats – Atelier LL, Les Cayes, 7-9 Février 2022*, UNICEF.
- UNICEF (2022), *Atelier : Leçons apprises de la réponse au TdT Sud, Les Cayes, 7-9 Février 2022*, UNICEF.
- UNICEF (2022), *Haïti – Procédures d'Urgences, 7 février 2022*, UNICEF.
- UNICEF (2022), *Situation of Children in the Southern Departments, M&E*, UNICEF-Haiti.

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UNICEF, 2021, *Stratégie de Réponse Éducative de l'UNICEF, à l'urgence liée au tremblement de terre du 14 aout 2021 dans les départements de la Grand'Anse, des Nippes et du Sud* ; 5 pages

UNICEF: EMERGENCY RESPONSE HAITI EARTHQUAKE August 2021 – February 2022, situation overview and actions, 9 pages

UNICEF Child Friendly Spaces/Environments (CFS/E): An Integrated Services Response For Emergencies and Their Aftermath, UNICEF/HQ99-0440/Radhika Chalasani, University of Pittsburg 2004 84 pages

UNiversalia , 2021, *Évaluation Formative du Programme de Pays de l'UNICEF en Haïti (2017-2021) ; Rapport d'évaluation, version finale | decembre 2021*, UNiversalia ; 93 pages

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Icart F (2021) « Le mandat du président de la République prendra-t-il fin le 07 février 2021 ou 07 février 2022 » <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/217933/le-mandat-du-president-de-la-republique-prendra-t-il-fin-le-7-fevrier-2021-ou-le-7-fevrier-2022>

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Annexe 3: interviews

1. - Bruno Lemarquis, UN RC
2. - Bruno Maes représentant UNICEF Haiti
3. - Jean Gough, LACRO Director LACRO
4. - Michele Messina, Head emergency LACRO
5. - Dorica Tasuzgika Phiri Surge EMOPS NY
6. - Toni Marro Head Emergency UNICEF Haiti
7. - Hiroaki Yagami, M&E UNICEF Haiti
8. - Shameza Abdulla, Surge Emergency Response UNICEF NY
9. - Jules Hans Beauvoir Surge,
10. - Dr Février Direction Départementale santé Cayes
11. - Silvera au Coud les cayes
12. - Sylvain Jean DESIR Directeur Education Cayes
13. - Bertrand Méridien coordonnateur IBESR cayes
14. - Enel Andre Responsable CFRAPS
15. - Dr Marhonne, Directeur nutrition National
16. - Saurel Dorelus Budget UNICEF Haiti
17. - Patrick Midot Security UNICEF
18. - Anne Marie Dembele Nutrition UNICEF Haiti
19. - Sara Brownlow head HR UNICEF
20. - Eveline Dominique Health Les Cayes
21. - Jean Guerson Alexandre Officier protection UNICEF Haiti
22. - Maureen Birmingham Représentant OPS/OMS Chantal Calvel
23. - Chantal Calvel, Urgence OPS/OMS
24. - Dr Guillaume , Country Director - CHEMONICS - GHSC-PSM - Haiti
25. - Jean Bosco et Alex Sante Unicef Haiti
26. - Sayo Aoki UNICEF Emergency response, HQ

Annexe 4: Guidelines for the interviews, RTE UNICEF in Haiti



Introduction:



Tour de table/présentation

Enjeux pour nous :

- Comprendre l'organisation du Bureau avant, pendant et après le séisme d'Aout 2021
 - o Situation avant le séisme
 - o Pendant le séisme
 - o Pendant les deux semaines qui ont suivi
 - o Ensuite
- Comprendre les contraintes rencontrées :
 - o Avant le séisme
 - o Pendant le séisme
 - o Pendant les deux semaines qui ont suivi
 - o Ensuite
- Comprendre le fonctionnement du UNCT/HCT et le rôle de l'UNICEF dedans, mais aussi les défis rencontrés
- Comprendre la vision de Bruno sur les enjeux de relation avec le Gouvernement dans les conditions complexes,
- Comprendre les enjeux d'apprentissage :
 - o Pour lui
 - o Pour le HCO
 - o Pour LACRO
 - o Pour HQ
- Comprendre les enjeux de financement
 - o Avant le séisme
 - o Pendant le séisme
 - o Pendant les deux semaines qui ont suivi
 - o Ensuite
- Comprendre les enjeux de renforcement de l'UNICEF pour répondre aux défis de la multiplicité des enjeux
 - o Bussiness continuity en cas de crise
 - o Recherche de financement
 - o Suivi-éval-redevabilité
 - o Coordination interagence
 - o Plaidoyer auprès du Gouvernement

Workshop: Lessons Learned of EQ Response and Planning, Les Cayes, 7-9 Feb 2022**Agenda**

Day / time	Activity, Facilitators, Methodology	Details, Resource docs	
Mon 7th Feb – Day 1, Les Cayes Sub-Office			
7:30 am	Transfer from Hotel to UNICEF sub-office - Coffee		
8:00 – 12:00	<p>Welcome to LACRO and HQ visitors – Presentation of the workshop's objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Opening Remarks (Welcome) – 15 min, (Bruno Maes) <p>Introduction of participants - 30 min</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security briefing – 10 min, (Henry Claude) <p>Training session on the new CCCs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Presentation of CCCs, tailored to Haitian context (2h), (Carole Vignaud) Briefing on UNICEF Emergency Procedures (1h 30 min), (Pablo/EMOPS colleagues (remote)) <p><i>Coffee break (30 min) during the session</i></p>	<p>All HCO's Pgm and Ops sections are represented in Les Cayes sub-office: Sections Chiefs + one f.p. + South f.p.</p> <p>Recommendation to participants: Read the CCCs + take CCCs Training (Agora). <i>Msg sent by Bruno</i></p>	
12:45 – 13:45	Lunch		
Workshop: LL of EQ Response & Planning- 1st day			
Facilitators:	<p>Alejandro Escalona, Chief PME, Francoise Chandler, PME Spec. Jean Ernst, PME Specialist Reginald Williams, HACT Spec.</p>	<p>Hiroaki Yagami, KM/M&E Officer Jin Iwata, Res. Mobilization Spec. Saurel Dorelus, Budget Specialist Toni Marro, Chief Emergency,</p>	<p>Floraine, Jean Max, Dickson: South Emergency Officers J. Luc Poncelet, Consultant RTE</p>
15:00 – 15:30	<p>Welcome and Introduction</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overview of objectives – Agenda, methodology – 15 min, (Pablo/Michele) Presentation of the Real Time Evaluation (RTE) – 15 min, (Jean Luc Poncelet) 		
15:30 – 16:45	<p>Stock Taking and Lessons Learned – Part 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Summary presentation of Emergency Response achievements – 20 min, (Stenio/Toni) 	<p>Analysis of the ongoing UNICEF response to EQ in the South: results, challenges, LL.</p> <p>Resource docs:</p> <p><i>Initial LL done in Dec 2021</i></p> <p>  Lecons Apprises  Lecons Apprises Reponse EQ Sud 15.1 Reponse Grand Sud 1 </p>	

Day / time	Activity, Facilitators, Methodology	Details, Resource docs
16:30 – 16:45	Wrap-up of day 1 (Alejandro)	
17:00	Back to the Hotel – Dinner and night	
Tue 8th Feb – Day 2, Les Cayes Sub-Office		
8:00 am	Transfer to UNICEF sub-office - coffee	
Workshop: LL of EQ Response & Planning – 2nd day		
8:30 – 10:30	<p>Stock Taking and Lessons Learned – Part 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparative advantage & what we are doing well – 20 min Presentation and plenary exchange (Francoise) • Presentation of the AAP survey's main findings – 30 min, J. Ernst • What we did well & what needs improvement, in Programme and Ops –60 min Group work (4 groups): (Michele/Pablo) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Preparedness (conting. PCAs, pre-positioning, training, etc.), 2. Needs analysis/assessments/data (EDAB, MIRA), First response, 3. Sectoral coordination/Govt & CSO, Inter-sector coordin./COUD, Inter-agency coordin./ response, 4. RO/HQ support on L2 (surge, etc.), Supplies/ Logistique, HR, Finance. Internal coordination (Pgm/Ops, Field/S.O./PaP, Inter-sections, <p><i>Methodology: Group work and Plenary + Notes in the flip charts</i></p>	<p>Analysis of the ongoing UNICEF response to EQ in the South: results, challenges, LL.</p> <p>Resource docs:</p> <p>AAP survey results</p> <p>CCCs (Pocket version, FR)</p>
10:30 – 10:45	Coffee break	
10:45 – 12:45	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presentation of group work results – 60 min (Pablo/Michele) • SWOT Analysis Exercise – 45 min (w.g. + plenary) (Alejandro) <p><i>Methodology: review of the flip chart and plenary discussion</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussion on the lessons we are learning (Programme and Ops) based on the CCCs – Plenary: exchange views and share thoughts/reflections – 30 min, (Michele/Pablo) <p><i>Methodology: Analysis of the SWAT with CCCs and Plenary</i></p>	<p>Analysis of the ongoing UNICEF response to EQ in the South: results, challenges, LL.</p> <p>Resource docs:</p> <p>Initial LL done in Dec 2021</p> <p> Lecons Apprises Response EQ Sud 15.1</p> <p> Lecons Apprises Response Grand Sud 1</p>
12:45 – 13:45	Lunch	
13:45 – 16:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Summary of the 1st part of LL and importance of the corrective actions, 30 min (Bruno) • What changes/corrective actions we need to take, in order to scale-up & accelerate the response and to do better in future crises – Key action points – 1hr 30 min (Jean Luc, RTE/ Pablo/Michele) <p><i>Methodology : Group work, restitution and plenary discussion</i></p>	

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17:00 – 17:30	Back to the Hotel – Dinner and night	NOTE: debrief with Bruno, back to PaP for the HCT retreat
Wed 9 th Feb – Day 3, Les Cayes Sub-Office		
8:00 am	Transfer to UNICEF sub-office - Coffee	
Workshop: LL of EQ Response & Planning - 3 rd day		
8:30 – 11:30	<p>Resume of Day 2 – 10 min, Hiro</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consolidation and wrap up of action points/ corrective actions (and responsible sections) to improve / do better and scale up, for this and future responses – 60 min, Toni/Stenio <p>UNICEF Programming and Prioritisation – identify priority actions and programme strategies vis-a-vis the current EQ response and the situation of children in the Southern Departments.</p> <p>Situation update: Setting the Scene, the landscape – Presentation and Plenary:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political Update / Situation in the Southern region – 30 min, Stenio Situation of Children in the Southern Departments. Overview, including key fact/figures, demogr. data – 30 min, Jean Ernst <p>Short term planning:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nexus and LHD: linking the current humanitarian response and the longer-term planning – 30 min, Michele Gaps and residual needs of the population to be fulfilled – 30 min (ongoing response + next 3-4 months, CERF, etc.) - J.Max, Floraine, Dickson Review of the EQ Response Plan focusing on next 3-4 months, based on CCCs (2022: ongoing response, CERF UFE + other funding) – 1 hr, (Michele/Pablo) <p><i>Methodology: Group work and Plenary</i></p> <p><i>Coffee served during the session</i></p>	<p>Based on the results of day 2, review of UNICEF programming in the South, both for the ongoing EQ response and the residual humanitarian needs (2022, short term), and for the longer term (new CDP, 2023 – 2027).</p>
11:30 – 12:45	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resources available for planning and Fund raising for next months, 15 min. Jin / Saurel Coordination with other agencies / intervention of WFP, IOM, UNFPA, 40 min. Stenio/Floraine/Dickson 	<p>Guests: WFP, IOM, UNFPA</p> <p>Resource docs:</p> <p>PDNA</p>
12:45 – 13:45	Lunch	
13:45 – 16:15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid-term planning: <p>Review of the existing South Work Plan vis-a-vis the identified priority actions (1st part)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Presentation of the South Work Plan developed in May 2021 (excel) – 30 min, Stenio/Reginald W./Hiro 	<p>PME section and Stenio</p> <p>Share the South Work Plan (2021)</p>

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beyond the EQ response: recovery phase and PDNA planning – 15 min, Jin • Sub-Office structure in the system and decentralization framework looking at the future. 20 min. Reginald W./Saurel • Based on prioritisation, identify what needs to be updated/ added/ changed – 45 min, (Pablo/Michele) <i>Methodology: Workgroup (by section / subject)</i> • Presentation of groups' outputs & discussion in plenary – 40 min 	
16:15 – 17:00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Summary of key findings/ agreed key actions points and next steps + responsible persons – 30 min, Toni/Hiro/Pablo <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey on the workshop methodology, 15 min (Francoise) 	Chief PME Projection of findings/agreed action points Ensure Bruno's participation (remote)
16:45 – 17:00	Concluding Session , (Armand and Michele)	
17:00 – 17:30	Back to the Hotel – dinner ad night	
Thu 10th Feb – Day 4, Les Cayes		
8:30 – 9:00	Transfer from Hotel to DGPC office / Office	
9:30 – 10:30	Meeting with DGPC , other Govt partners (MoE/DED, OREPA) and NGO partners: analysis of EQ response' achievements and challenges 6 months after the EQ.	Michele, Pablo, Toni, Stenio, Sections Chiefs, South Emerg. f.p. Stenio to ensure invitations
10:30 – 13:00	Field visit in Les Cayes zone – Area affected by the EQ and UNICEF response (WASH / Education) - Camp Perrin / Chantal (TBC) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semi-permanent school rehabilitation model – • Water system rehabilitation 	idem
13:00 – 13:45	Lunch (with NGO partners, TBC)	
13:45 – 15:00	Debriefing of the mission with the Chief of SO and his team. Les Cayes Sub-Office	Michele, Pablo, Stenio, Sub-Office Team, Sections Chiefs
15:00	Transfer to Les Cayes airport	Michele, Pablo, HCO colleagues
16:00 – 16:30	Flight from Les Cayes to PaP – Sunrise Air	Sunrise Air
16:45 – 17:30	Transfer from PaP airport to Hotel	Michele, Pablo
Fri 11th Feb – Day 5, PaP		
08:00	Transfer to HCO office, Debussy	NOTE: ensure Covid Test
8:30 – 10:30	Working Session with HCO management/CMT on PaP Urban response intersectoral strategy , based on the CCCs (session's Agenda to be developed)	Participants: all Programme sessions (chiefs + designed f.p.), M&E, Soc. Policy, Comms, Dep. Rep and Representative
11:00 – 12:30	Meeting on Access with the remote participation of EMOPS/Access colleagues, 1h, 30 min <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OCHA to present the Access w.g. – Q/A (30 min) • Exchange with UN sister agencies and ICRC on coordination for humanitarian access 	Michele, Pablo, Toni, Patrick, Chief M&E, Dep. Rep., Representative Guests: WFP (mission from HQ on Accès) and ICRC Connect with EMOPS/HPS Access Team (remote)
12:30 – 13:30	Lunch	
13:30 – 15:00	Discussion with HCO management and develop draft Outline of March' PaP Urban planning meeting	Michele, Pablo, Chief M&E, Dep. Rep., Representative

Day / time	Activity, Facilitators, Methodology	Details, Resource docs
15:00 – 16:00	Final debriefing with Representative/HCO management on the visit and the LL/ planning workshop. Agree on next steps/ action points (at the hotel)	Michele, Pablo, HCO management See possible visit of Urban context
16:00	Transfer Hotel Marriott –	Michele, Pablo
Sat 12th Feb		
Time TBC	Transfer from Hotel to Airport – Fly back to Panama	Michele



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