

COUNTRY CASE STUDY

Evaluation of WASH Programming in Protracted Crises

May 2020

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Lebanon



EVALUATION OFFICE

Global Evaluation of UNICEF's WASH Programming in Protracted Crises, 2014-19 Lebanon Country Case Study

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United Nations Children's Fund
Three United Nations Plaza
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This Lebanon country case study report is one of four country case studies conducted as part of a global evaluation of UNICEF's WASH Programming in Protracted Crises, 2014-19. The global report and country case studies for this evaluation were conducted by Itad. The Lebanon case study report was prepared by Moira Reddick, Oula Aoun, Jihad Farah and Ben Harris. Jeremie Toubkiss, Koorosh Raffii, and Mona Fetouh of the Evaluation Office supported the management of the evaluation including inputs to quality assurance.

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For further information, please contact:

Evaluation Office
United Nations Children's Fund
Three United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017
evalhelp@unicef.org

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CCCs	Core Commitments for Children
EQ	Evaluation Question
HCMT	Healthy Camp Monitoring Tool
IAMP	Inter-Agency Mapping Project
INGO	International non-governmental organization
KIIs	Key informant interviews
KM	Knowledge management
L1, L2, L3	Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 emergencies
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
LHD	Linking Humanitarian and Development
NGO	Non-governmental organization
RAM	Result Assessment Module
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SMQ	Strategic Monitoring Question(s)
VASyR	Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
WAP	WASH Assessment Platform
WiPC	Wash in Protracted Crises

1. INTRODUCTION

Background to the evaluation

The global WASH in Protracted Crises (WiPC) evaluation was commissioned by the UNICEF Evaluation Office (EO) following commitments made in the Global Evaluation Plan (GEP) for 2018–21. This WiPC evaluation was deemed to be important given the increased scale of vulnerability and needs in protracted crisis and consequent significant increases in funding to WASH humanitarian action – both within UNICEF and the wider sector. It includes UNICEF's emergency-related work before and after crises and the organization's related development activities, strategies and coordination work.

The new global WASH strategy for 2016–2030¹ reflects the shift from the Millennium Development Goals to the more ambitious Sustainable Development Goals. The WASH strategy is set within the broad context of SDG 6, while also articulating how WASH contributes to the achievement of other Sustainable Development Goals relevant to UNICEF's 'priority cross-sectoral interventions'.

The number of Level 2 (L2) or Level 3 (L3) emergencies that UNICEF responds to each year has increased from 3 or fewer between 2011–2015² to up to 10 in a single year between 2016–2018. This is in addition to numerous Level 1 (L1) responses. L2 and L3 emergencies are primarily armed conflicts that have an average duration of the emergency phase of more than three years. Of these crises, responses in 20 countries were deemed to be protracted (defined in the terms of reference for this evaluation as 'major humanitarian situations in which a large proportion of a population in a country is vulnerable to death, disease or disruption of

their livelihood over a significant period of time'). WASH was a major component in every emergency response of this type. This evaluation focuses on those 20 crises classified by UNICEF as L2 or L3 for a duration of at least 18 months as of September 2018. It also considers three protracted emergencies that were classified as L1 during time frame of the evaluation.³

All country offices with a WASH in protracted crises (WiPC) programme contributed to the evaluation through an online survey. Eight of these countries covered in the evaluation are the focus of country or thematic case studies. Lebanon is one of four country case studies that inform this global evaluation.

Purpose of the global evaluation

This evaluation is both formative and summative. It is intended to provide learning (for UNICEF and the wider sector) on WASH action in protracted crises between 2014–2019 and also provide accountability for UNICEF's performance in this area. Some areas of enquiry cover both functions. However, the evaluation team recognizes that there are some areas (most notably linking humanitarian and development programming, or LHD) for which, although there was a clear commitment from UNICEF, there was no universally agreed standard or framework applied to UNICEF programming in the period 2014–2019.

The evaluation questions (EQs) finalized during the inception phase are:

- **EQ1** To what extent has UNICEF achieved quality, including equity and inclusion, in WiPC?

¹ UNICEF's Strategy for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 2016–2030.

² 2011 was when the 'L' classification system was introduced.

³ The 20 protracted crises declared by UNICEF as L2 and L3 emergencies since 2014 are the following: Nigeria and Lake Chad Basin (Cameroon, Chad, the Niger); Central African Republic; the Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa

(Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone); the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kasai province); the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia); South Sudan; Syrian Arab Republic and the neighbouring countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey); Iraq; and Yemen. In addition to these countries, the evaluation has included Afghanistan (only declared as L1), Bangladesh and Haiti within the scope of the evaluation.

- **EQ2** How well has UNICEF exercised its leadership and coordination roles for WiPC?
- **EQ3** How well has UNICEF monitored and reported the results of its WASH programming in protracted crisis?
- **EQ4** To what extent has UNICEF had the capacity to implement a timely and effective WiPC response and coordination?
- **EQ5** To what extent has UNICEF ensured linkages, coherence and mutual reinforcement of its WASH action in protracted crises with longer-term development objectives?

The most commonly discussed expectation for this evaluation during key informant interviews during the evaluation's inception phase was that it should assess how well UNICEF is using its humanitarian and development programming in countries affected by protracted crises to reduce risk and build resilience. This includes making links between the ongoing response mainly funded using emergency funds and longer-term development work, which is funded primarily through UNICEF's regular country programme.

Purpose of the country case studies as part of the global evaluation

The main objective of the country case studies is to build evidence from a field-level perspective about specific questions and problems and contribute to the findings of the global evaluation report.

This report will not make recommendations for the Lebanon Country Office, although the evaluation team was asked by this country office to give views during the final debrief. This first country case study visit was also designed by the Evaluation Office to test the premise of the evaluation as well as its tools.

This country case study describes the protracted context in which the Lebanon Country Office is working; the history and nature of the WASH response in Lebanon; and the approach and tools taken by the evaluation team. It discusses the findings

against each of the EQs and presents conclusions.

The evaluation team's visit to Lebanon took place between 1–10 July 2019.

General comments for this report

All figures and references to staff in this report should be interpreted as specific to the Lebanon Country Office unless otherwise stated. For example, senior staff means the senior staff of this country office and not of UNICEF globally. Budgets provided are those for the Lebanon Country Office and not the overall UNICEF WASH budget. All dollar amounts are in US dollars unless otherwise indicated.

2. CRISIS AND EVOLUTION OF CONTEXT AND NEED IN LEBANON

Globally, Lebanon has the highest number of refugees per capita.⁴ Since 2011, Lebanon has hosted a Syrian population fleeing from conflict inside the Syrian Arab Republic. Persons displaced from Syria⁵ now comprise a quarter of the country's overall population. As of the end of 2018, the Government of Lebanon estimated that the country was hosting 1.5 million displaced Syrians, of whom almost one million were registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).⁶ Many of those interviewed for this evaluation believe the government numbers are an underestimation. The Government of Lebanon stopped registration in 2015.⁷ In addition to displaced Syrians, there are also 28,800 Palestinian refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, along with a pre-crisis population of 180,000 Palestinian refugees from Lebanon living in 12 camps and 156 gatherings.

UNICEF declared an L3 crisis in Lebanon (along with other countries hosting Syrian refugees) in January 2013. This was downgraded to an L2 crisis in February 2018, and in June 2019 UNICEF made the decision to cease the L2 Corporate Emergency Activation Procedures in Lebanon (along with other countries hosting Syrian refugees). The Syrian Arab Republic itself remains an L3 crisis.

The majority of vulnerable Lebanese (67 per cent) and people displaced from Syria (87 per cent) live in the country's 251 most vulnerable Cadastral Zones.⁸ Approximately 80 per cent of

the Syrian displaced population currently lives within existing urban or rural agglomerations (also referred to as host communities) while 15–17 per cent of this group lives in approximately 5,000 informal (tented) settlements.

It is estimated that more than one million Lebanese live below the poverty line. The poorest areas of the country are impacted by the Syrian crisis and the subsequent refugee influxes in multiple ways – one of the most obvious being competition for low skilled jobs. The crisis had already cost the Lebanese economy an estimated \$18.15 billion⁹ by the end of 2015 due to economic slowdown, loss in fiscal revenues and pressure on public services.¹⁰

Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or to the 1967 Protocol. The Government of Lebanon maintains that it is neither a country of asylum nor a final destination for refugees. For this reason, the government's social protection programmes do not automatically extend to non-nationals in Lebanon. Instead, the rights of refugees/displaced are protected and their needs met by relevant UN agencies. Of great importance to UNICEF's work and to the programmes covered in this case study, it should be noted that the WASH sector, in common with other sectors in Lebanon, is prohibited from developing permanent structures in the context of its programmes.

⁴ UNHCR, 'Global Focus: Lebanon', web page. UNHCR.

⁵ The preferred Government of Lebanon term and the term used by UNICEF

⁶ UNHCR, World Food Programme, Interagency Coordination – Lebanon, *VASyR 2018: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*, 2018.

⁷ The Government of Lebanon considers that it is being subject to a situation of mass influx. It refers to individuals who fled from the Syrian Arab Republic into its territory after March 2011 as temporarily displaced individuals and reserves its sovereign right to determine their status according to Lebanese laws and regulations. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) uses the following terminology to refer to persons who have fled from and cannot return to Syria: 'persons displaced from Syria' (which can, depending on the context, include Palestine refugees from

Syria and Lebanese returnees as well as registered and unregistered Syrian nationals); 'displaced Syrians' (referring to Syrian nationals); and 'persons registered as refugees by UNHCR'.

⁸ Lebanon has six administrative regions divided into 25 Caza (not including Beirut). Each Caza is further divided into Cadastral Zones. In total there are 1,492 Cadastral Zones in Lebanon, including Beirut. UNICEF and OCHA instituted the system of categorizing vulnerability at the Cadastral Zone level for the 2015–16 LCRP after a through a REACH-conducted survey. The 251 most vulnerable Cadastral Zones include zones in Beirut.

⁹ All amount in this report are in US dollars, unless otherwise noted.

¹⁰ Government of Lebanon and United Nations, *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017–2020 (2019 update)*.

Displaced Syrian households and Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic are suffering from the impact of protracted displacement and sinking deeper into debt and negative coping mechanisms as they struggle to meet their families' needs. More than 76 per cent of displaced Syrians are living below the poverty line, with 54 per cent of these children. Around 53 per cent of displaced Syrians live in substandard shelter conditions, with 4 per cent of all shelters ranked as being in a dangerous condition. It is estimated that half of all displaced Syrian children remain out of certified education.¹¹

Evictions from informal settlements¹² – apparently escalating at the time of the case study visit – happen for a variety of reasons and are resulting in multiple protection challenges for displaced people. Against the backdrop of increasing tensions, acceptance by host communities and local authorities of displaced people relocating within Lebanon due to evictions by landlords or authorities, or as a household cost-saving measure, is becoming more challenging.

Information on the settlement of displaced Syrians is not clear – in part because refugee registration was suspended in 2015. The *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017–2020* describes a situation where vulnerable populations often live in poor urban areas, where living conditions are already poor and rents are increasing as is pressure on the basic services such as water, energy, sanitation and solid waste collection. Social stability challenges are also on the rise. It is estimated that poor urban neighbourhoods and Palestinian refugee camps now host a larger proportion of displaced Syrians than ever before.¹³ There is clear evidence (including data from the Inter-Agency Mapping Project [IAMP]) that a minority of displaced Syrians reside in the approximately 5,000 informal settlements. However, key informants interviewed for this case study unanimously reported that the number residing in these

settlements continues to grow as people flee high rents and other expenses in urban areas.¹⁴ While servicing the approximately 5,000 informal settlements is continuously challenging given the (still) limited humanitarian WASH community, the overall move from urban areas makes it harder for organizations to assist displaced Syrians. There is a level of confidence expressed by the Lebanon Country Office that the WASH needs of those in informal settlements are known and understood. Conversely, staff acknowledge that people in need in urban areas are dispersed and difficult to identify and locate. In addition, there are implementation problems due to the shortage of partners with experience in urban and peri-urban contexts who can conduct assessment and analysis.

In addition to the normal complexities of providing services within an urban context, the *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017–2020* states that 64 per cent of the overall population in Lebanon does not have access to safely managed drinking water services. Existing WASH infrastructure is often inadequate to cope with rapid urban growth, or it is simply neglected: more than half of all water supply networks are past their useful life with some networks losing up to 60 or 80 per cent of water. Only 3 per cent of wastewater is treated for bacteriological contamination prior to discharge into the ground or water bodies, resulting in severely compromised water quality. The situation is further compounded by illegal private boreholes and a power supply that is intermittent.

Against this background, it is inevitable that one of the points of communal tension is access to water. UNICEF describes this as primarily resulting from a lack of adequate infrastructure after years of neglect. More than 20 per cent of Lebanese households are not connected to the public water network. Those that are connected receive between 6 and 12 hours of water daily. The remaining needs are supplemented through other sources, e.g.,

¹¹ Government of Lebanon and United Nations, *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017–2020 (2019 update)*.

¹² 'HRW condemns 'pressure' on Syrians to leave Lebanon', *The New Arab*, web article, 6 July 2019.

¹³ Government of Lebanon and United Nations, *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017–2020 (2019 update)*.

¹⁴ Based on perceptions of key informants.

private water truckers, illegal tapping, bottled water or boreholes. Households in the poorest areas can pay up to \$850 annually for these other water sources; however, regional water tariffs/revenue collection rates are low, so the problem is cyclical. In addition to all the above issues, poor urban areas may also be deprioritized for connection as they are perceived to be conflict-prone and thus inaccessible. WASH, therefore, is a key need and could be a driver for coherent, and linked,

humanitarian and development programming. Better WASH access could support social stability efforts (or 'stabilization', as it is most commonly referred to within UNICEF Lebanon). This is a key focus of the *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017–2020* and the UNICEF Strategic Plan 2018–2021, and it underpinned proposals being developed by the Lebanon Country Office during this country case study visit.¹⁵

3. DESCRIPTION OF UNICEF'S WASH RESPONSE

Country office structure

UNICEF has had an office in Lebanon since 1948. The office has expanded and contracted based on needs and resources. In 2011, there were only 18 staff members and the budget of the office was approximately \$800,000. As of June 2019, there were 176 employees and the budget was around \$280 million.¹⁶

At the end of 2018, the UNICEF country office re-structured and established geographic area teams. To support a new emphasis on integration, each of the area teams now has a child survival officer who is the lead. Teams include staff in WASH and health, and each team is supported by three roving WASH officers. This has meant a contraction in the WASH team structure. However, at the time of this evaluation, all the child survival officers were former UNICEF WASH officers, with obvious immediate knowledge transfer occurring. At the time of the case study visit, the new structure was six months old, and it was too early to comment on whether the change was having its intended impact of more integrated programming.

The UNICEF WASH section has three workstreams: humanitarian response (in the informal settlements), stabilization (in the urban centres) and capacity building. In humanitarian work, UNICEF partners with non-

governmental organizations (currently primarily international non-governmental organizations); in stabilization work, UNICEF partners with the private sector. These partnering agreements are in line with the government's strategy.

WASH cluster coordination

The Lebanese ministry responsible for WASH is the Ministry of Energy and Water, although there are also strong links to the Ministry of the Environment, particularly for issues related to sanitation and the management of excreta. There is no direct vertical government connection or delegation from the national ministries to the municipalities. Prior to 2016, UNICEF led on WASH at a national level, with UNHCR leading at the local level. UNICEF took on overall leadership of the WASH sector from UNHCR after a review in 2016–17. At the end of 2018, the UNICEF WASH sector coordinator left and was not replaced. Now UNICEF's Chief of WASH in Lebanon is double-hatting as national WASH sector coordinator, with additional support for this role required of the UNICEF WASH team. In 2019, UNICEF discussed with partners how to establish a revolving co-lead, and this seemed likely to be agreed and established in the second half of the year.

Budget for WASH activities


According to interviewees, since 2015, the overall budget for WASH has remained

¹⁵ This specifically refers to a proposal to the Japanese Government.

¹⁶ The number of 176 employees excludes consultants, volunteers and Junior Professional Officers.

relatively constant with an expectation and agreement with the government that the budget would be used as follows: 50 per cent for humanitarian response and 50 per cent for stabilization work. About 10 per cent of the funds for humanitarian response and stabilization are intended for capacity building.¹⁷ Analysis of UNICEF expenditure data by the evaluation team (see the inception report for the methodology used for this analysis) shows that other resources emergency (ORE) funds expended on WASH increased rapidly from \$25.5 million in 2014 to \$69 million in 2016 but have since dropped, to just under \$40 million in 2018. There are little to no funds from regular resources (RR) or other regular resources (ORR) expended against SIC codes that are relevant to WASH in emergencies. This is in common with other countries which are implementing a response to the Syrian refugee crisis, where 99.7 per cent of WASH in emergencies expenditure comes from ORE resources.

Figure 1: Expenditure on WASH in emergencies by Lebanon Country Office, 2014-18



The 2017–20 budget for WASH in emergencies in Lebanon was \$108 million; however, the total already spent/committed at the time of the field visit in mid-2019 was \$140 million. Funds for humanitarian response are reliant on one major donor (see Table 1, below, for details) with Germany and OCHA providing additional multi-year funding. Since 2018, UNICEF has also attracted some small but important funding for innovation which is being used in the informal

settlements for the 'humanitarian' portfolio. Fundraising was reported to be a constant pressure for UNICEF Country Office management, with needs exceeding available funds.

Table 1: Five largest donors for WASH in emergencies, Lebanon Country Office, 2014-18

Donor	Value of funding (2014–18) (US\$)	Percentage of total funding (2014–18) ¹⁸
BPRM¹⁹	144,431,606	59%
Germany	40,333,259	17%
The United Kingdom	16,520,163	7%
Japan	12,302,920	5%
UNOCHA	9,059,106	4%
Others	21,042,632	9%
Total	243,689,686	100%

The evaluations team noted the budget is already over-committed only halfway through the planning period (2017–20) and that caseload numbers continue to grow (they are estimated by UNICEF staff to be growing at an additional 10 per cent each year). UNICEF staff and partners named the following factors related to humanitarian funding as constraining evolution of programming: the nature of humanitarian funding, with limited multi-year funding available; current dependence on one major funding source for WASH; the demands of the funding cycles; and reporting and contracting burdens. As significant, if not the more significant, is the government policy that only permits temporary response options for displaced Syrians.

Needs assessments for displaced Syrians living in urban settings do not take place at a household level. Because the needs of the urban displaced Syrian population have not been assessed at the household/community level, it is difficult to determine the size and nature of the funding and response gap. This

¹⁷ There is also a component of WASH in schools designed to prepare Lebanese schools for afternoon teaching of Syrian children, but this was described by UNICEF staff as minor and now consisting primarily of advocacy work.

¹⁸ Percentages may not total 100 per cent due to rounding.

¹⁹ United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.

also applies to vulnerable Lebanese households in the urban context, a situation which is affecting equity in Lebanon and is of concern to the country office. The issue of assessment and gap analysis becomes more challenging²⁰ where the provision of CCC and Sphere minimum standards is not seen as appropriate and adapted standards have been applied.²¹ This point will be discussed in more detail in the Section 5 of this report, on findings. It essentially relates to the normative expectations of users from a middle-income country and the additional burden that this places on service delivery costs.

The Lebanon Country Office is attempting to address funding challenges by prioritizing the urban areas as discussed elsewhere in the report and by focusing on the update of the National Water Sector Strategy.

To further complicate the allocation picture, there is a verbal agreement with the Lebanese Government that the humanitarian and stabilization portfolios should be maintained at a 50/50 level in terms of resource expenditure. For the government, this means that a minimum of 50 per cent of funds should be directed towards the stabilization portfolio to benefit both vulnerable Lebanese and displaced Syrians. Internally, UNICEF has held that the budget for the humanitarian response should never be less than 50 per cent. Overall, this verbal agreement has been adhered to, despite the fact that in 2017 and 2018 a dip in funding meant that more money needed to be directed to humanitarian response than to stabilization. UNICEF was able to navigate this situation in part due to the steady development of relationships with the government and intends to continue this distinction.

²⁰ UNICEF now ranks and prioritizes by geographic area urban locations for infrastructure-related WASH programming. At the time of the case study work, UNICEF was in the process of rolling out a new local integrated programming approach.

²¹ The evaluation team is not questioning use of the adaptive standards that are appropriate to the context but is noting that this makes comparison with other contexts difficult.

Partners

When the Syria-related refugee influx began in 2010, there were very few national or international NGOs in the WASH sector in Lebanon. By 2013, UNICEF had four NGO partners in humanitarian WASH (in the informal settlements). The refugee influx increased in 2014, and the number of WASH partners increased to 10 by 2015. At this point UNICEF, was co-lead of WASH with UNHCR. The UNICEF humanitarian WASH programme focused on Beqaa and the northeast (with UNHCR leading and responding in the Beirut – Mount Lebanon area). When UNICEF took on the overall lead in the informal settlements from UNHCR, the organization reduced the number of partners due to performance problems with some of them. A smaller number of partners allows for more effective oversight. UNICEF is currently partnering with five international NGOs and three national NGOs.²² UNICEF has considered and rejected the possibility of consortia based on past (poor) experience in other contexts.²³

In 2019, nine years into the crisis, and despite considerable attempts at capacity-building of national NGOs and community-based organizations, there are still fewer than 10 WASH NGOs in-country. UNICEF interviewees believe this is insufficient to respond to need. UNICEF does not partner with all of these NGOs (including some of the more traditional WASH actors such as Oxfam or the Lebanese Red Cross). However, actors such as Oxfam are active participants in the WASH sector.²⁴

There has previously been no international or local NGO contracted by UNICEF with regard to the delivery of the stabilization programming, which uses tendering to the private sector.²⁵ This is in line with the government's strategy. However, there is now one national NGO contracted to work on a

²² One of the three national NGOs, Development for People and Nature Association, has only very recently started working with UNICEF on WASH interventions.

²³ Interviews with UNICEF staff.

²⁴ The cluster mechanism is not active in Lebanon.

²⁵ It is understood that all contracts are with national private sector for-profit businesses.

stabilization project in Tripoli, an integrated community-based stabilization project to reduce social tensions. This project was visited by the evaluation team and is discussed in detail elsewhere in the report.

There are currently no private sector partners contracted for humanitarian work in the informal settlements despite pressure from the government for this to be considered.

Programming

As already described, UNICEF has been supporting WASH in the informal settlements since the onset of the crisis, working through international NGOs and other NGO partners. There are now approximately 5,000 informal settlements, a number that has grown over time. This work will be substantively discussed in the Findings section of the report.

UNICEF began working on stabilization with infrastructure assistance to public Lebanese water institutions shortly after the response began. UNICEF has provided pumping networks and small networks and generators to be used power pumping equipment from some wells in key problematic areas. UNICEF's work on the stabilization portfolio was then expanded to respond to the 2014 drought. According to a key informant, what is provided in terms of infrastructure represents only 1–2 per cent of the real national demand; what's more, this occurs in a context where Lebanon has overall old and undersized infrastructure to which the additional load of Syrian displaced was added.

Since 2018, UNICEF has also been piloting cash-transfer programming for WASH. This covers a small number of informal settlements in the greater Beirut area and provides beneficiaries with cash for drinking water and desludging, with the intention that beneficiaries will procure these services from local private sector providers. UNICEF staff have directly managed the pilot programme, with a local NGO engaged in mid-2019 to provide software support to the targeted communities.

UNICEF interviewees believe that their approach – which is one of building trust over time, acting on behalf of partners in

negotiations with the government, and adhering to internally agreed red lines – is now delivering. Also critical is that they have maintained the balance between the 'humanitarian' response in the informal settlements and the 'stabilization' response related to urban infrastructure. This financial split is underpinned by an internal commitment to maintaining the humanitarian response. The Ministry of Energy and Water is now drafting a National Water Sector Strategy, after recognition that a more formal sectoral strategy is required. UNICEF, as sectoral lead, has been invited to contribute. It is hoped that this will lead to government endorsement of enhanced capacity building of national NGOs and community-based organizations, and that opportunities to build on the current infrastructure-focused approach to stabilization will enable more effective community-level work.

In 2017, the Lebanon Country Office began implementing a new approach in alignment with the *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan* to ensure a longer-term approach to humanitarian response and more development-focused strategies. Education has had a five-year plan aligned with the regional 'No Lost Generation' multi-stakeholder strategy in place since 2013, which aims to support the education of Syrian children. WASH is now evolving a longer-term internal approach and believes that one lesson learned is to do this sooner in a protracted crisis. Critical of course is having an operational space that is conducive to longer-term approaches. This requires political will to do so which, until recently, has not been visible in Lebanon.

Since January 2019, both internally and externally, UNICEF has focused on moving towards local integrated programming. However, WASH partners do not see this as a reality yet. The Lebanon Country Office demonstrates an open and flexible attitude towards innovation (on the part of both UNICEF and its partners) and has attracted new donors who are keen to support this. Although there is management support for scaling up innovation doing so has not been possible due to the ongoing day-to-day humanitarian work and the small emergencies that occur on top of this, and because of funding constraints.

4. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

Description of case study approach

During the inception phase of the evaluation, the evaluation team developed a set of criteria (building on the evaluation terms of reference) for selecting country case studies. The team sought input from Evaluation Advisory Group members on which countries and/or regions should be considered for case studies. These criteria and an analysis of relevant countries against these criteria are presented in the inception report (section 5.3).

From this analysis, Lebanon and Jordan were selected as possible country case studies in the Middle East and North Africa region on the following basis:

- They represent some of the largest country programmes in terms of WASH in emergency expenditure for the evaluation period (\$244 million and \$272 million, respectively).
- Geographic diversity – it was deemed essential to cover the Middle East and North Africa region, and specifically the response to the Syrian refugee crisis.
- Type of response – both countries hosted large populations of refugees and displaced people, with associated challenges around managing displaced population/host community tensions.
- Context – both included camp/settlement and urban contexts in their response.
- Maturity – both responses were long-established (> five years).
- Access – both provided relatively easy access (particularly compared with other Middle Eastern countries such as the Syrian Arab Republic or Yemen).

The original preference of the evaluation team for a country case study from the Middle East and North Africa region was Jordan. This was based on the agreed criteria as well as the opportunity to work with the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office, and because of synergy with an ongoing evaluation of education in humanitarian settings. However, following internal UNICEF discussions and an agreement with Itad, Jordan was replaced

with Lebanon, which became the first country case study. The evaluation team remains grateful to the Evaluation Office and the Lebanon Country Office for ensuring that the case study was organized and supported so quickly, efficiently and effectively and with such goodwill.

For this initial country case study (envisaged as a 'test' case study after which the approach might be refined) the evaluation team was accompanied to the field by both the outgoing and incoming managers of the Evaluation Office. The evaluation team secured the services of two highly experienced national consultants who played specific roles in the case study. Both are urban specialists and extremely familiar with the response for the Syrian displaced. They are also familiar with UNICEF programming. The national consultants divided their responsibilities so that one of them focused on participation in the field visits and led on observation and consultation with partners, volunteers and end-users.

Generic terms of reference were developed for field-based country case studies and key interviewees were agreed prior to each field visit because these were a priority.

Ethical approval was obtained for all data collection tools prior to the visit. Evaluation team members were provided with a set of communication tools to use at the field level to explain the ethical framework in which UNICEF required them to operate. Standardized in all UNICEF evaluation work, these tools help inform stakeholders of the purpose of the work, the identity of the team and relationships to UNICEF, the boundaries of the work and the guidelines in place for their protection (i.e., how their anonymity will be maintained). The evaluation team was dutiful in ensuring that this communication took place at the start of every engagement. A total of 29 people were interviewed for key informant interviews (a small number of UNICEF staff kindly agreed to multiple interviews). The team did field visits to six locations and undertook transect walks in five of them – in the sixth location a transect

walk was not possible due to security considerations.

For the country case study, ahead of the field-visit the UNICEF country office was invited to complete a self-assessment. This was intended to foster country office participation and ownership – and to focus the field data collection work and make the best use of the time of the UNICEF country office team and other stakeholders. The self-assessment allowed the office to state how its approach to WASH in protracted crises has evolved over time, comment on successes and challenges, standards followed, relevant partnerships, working with government, etc. The self-assessment forms were to go to the relevant office at least three weeks prior to the evaluation team's visit to allow time for completion. The self-assessment was to be completed one week before the team's arrival. Due to the rapid organization of the Lebanon country case study, this timing was not possible (see *limitations, below*).

Prior to the case study, key documents were provided by the country office and reviewed in order to establish evidence gaps relevant to the evaluation questions and triangulate with the self-assessment. The intention was to inform the evaluation team and allow it to prepare for an initial workshop with the country office and focus the initial key informant interviews. In the case of the Lebanon case study, despite huge efforts by the country office, the rapid set-up time for the visit meant that not all the documents could be sourced and analysed in advance.

The evaluation team conducted an initial workshop with country office management and technical staff. The focus was on the purpose of the global evaluation and the case study, the evaluation questions underpinning the global evaluation and their relevance to the context, the self-assessment (which had not been completed at this point) and, finally, planning and logistics for the visit.

Interviews began immediately following this workshop and continued throughout the visit. The focus of the individual interviews was agreed by the members of the evaluation team. Documentation of the interviews was

initially done through simple notetaking but after the first few days was standardized by using a more structured excel spreadsheet organized by evaluation question and sub-evaluation question. Towards the end of visit, repeat interviews were requested with four key UNICEF staff to clarify strategy, intent and decision making.

During the inception phase, it was agreed that the main form of field interaction with both partner personnel and end-users would be transect walks. These were to take the form of guided walks through a site or community to allow for observation and an appropriate level of interaction. The guided walks would be led (after consultation on the purpose of each visit) by partner and/or community leaders who would be able to provide responses to questions and/or to facilitate a conversation with households. The experience of the evaluation team was that this process worked well in Lebanon, largely due to support from UNICEF and partners. One of the national consultants worked in parallel to conduct interviews with groups of women. One challenge with this mechanism in Lebanon was the size of the visiting group – on many days it included Itad consultants (three), UNICEF representatives (from the Evaluation Office and country office), partner representatives and often a representative of the landlord. Managing this group and adhering to agreed technical protocols and ethical standards was sometimes challenging. The Itad consultants agreed among themselves who would take the lead as appropriate, prioritizing time for the national consultant to speak to end-users and, in particular, female end-users.

For Lebanon – at the request of the country office – two separate debriefing meetings were held with country office representatives. The evaluation team provided its preliminary assessment to the country office, including the Acting Representative, and had the opportunity to receive feedback.

Details of any country-specific challenges, limitations and changes

As a result of delays in the overall global evaluation process, the inception report and final locations of the three country case studies

were only agreed in early June 2019. (A fourth country case study was added later in 2019).

It was not possible to access and review critical documentation prior to the visit and this was done while on the visit. Similarly, the self-assessment was only received after arrival in country (through no fault of the country office) and therefore it could not inform areas of inquiry as had been intended. As a result, the team needed to prioritize its work daily as

information came in and needed to conduct a second round of key informant interviews with three UNICEF staff towards the end of the visit.

With the field visit happening in July, some key interviewees were unavailable. However, the country office worked hard to arrange phone interviews where possible. It was not possible to speak with donors (who are not in-country), despite requests by the evaluation team. The team felt this to be a significant gap.



5. FINDINGS AGAINST EACH SUB-EVALUATION QUESTION

EQ1 To what extent has UNICEF achieved quality, including equity and inclusion, in WiPC?

SEQ 1.1 To what extent have UNICEF staff and partners been made familiar with and able to apply the relevant normative frameworks and agency and sectoral standards for WiPC?

UNICEF staff are familiar with the relevant normative frameworks and standards (typically SPHERE and the Core Commitments for Children, or CCCs). Since 2015, there have been annual workshops with partners to reinforce these and standardize reporting. Partners clearly demonstrated in their interviews an understanding of UNICEF's expectations.

However, there is clear evidence from the key informant interviews with UNICEF and partner staff and from the self-assessment that the CCCs and SPHERE were quickly considered to be irrelevant to interventions in Lebanon due to the high standard of living of both displaced Syrians and the Lebanese host community. One senior staff member suggested that the CCCs may have been relevant for the first 24 hours of the response and SPHERE for the first few weeks.

UNICEF, in its role as sector coordinator, moved quickly (within the first six months of the onset of the UNICEF response in 2014) to establish alternative norms (referred to within the WASH community in Lebanon as 'adapted SPHERE') for humanitarian WASH services. These include:

Ensuring provision 35lpcd of water. This can be through direct provision (e.g., trucking) or a mixture of water trucking (10lpcd) and additional provision from on-site sources (which may or may not be safely managed).²⁶

Provision of one latrine per family (with each family including an average of eight people).

Figure 2: Latrines in a communal area. Families typically have latrines adjacent to their tents. In this example, latrines are in a communal area, but each family has a dedicated latrine for their use



These revised norms have been clearly communicated to NGO partners (as evident through discussions with their staff) through a variety of means, including a common programme document which has been used with all UNICEF partners for proposals for WASH projects. UNICEF staff stated that these norms were incorporated into the latest version of the *Lebanon Country Response Plan*. The *Response Plan* (specifically its logframe) includes indicators in water supply and sanitation. However, it does not specifically refer to the norms, outlined above, that UNICEF has used with its partners. While these norms go beyond the minimums laid out in the CCCs and SPHERE, and they are achieved (see *Figure 3, below*), there is some evidence that they are not (in terms of quantity of water provided) sufficient to meet the needs of the affected population. This is because, according to *VASyR 2018: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in*

²⁶ According to the WASH Assessment Platform, 52 per cent of the informal settlement population is serviced by trucking.

Lebanon more than half of households report paying for water (this includes households in non-permanent structures).²⁷ It is unclear the extent to which the revised norms were based on a needs assessment of the population, versus a pragmatic appraisal of what was feasible to deliver over time. Interviews led the evaluation team to believe that these norms were developed by the WASH team in Lebanon with little or no support or advice from UNICEF WASH staff at the regional office or at headquarters. It should be clear that no criticism is implied here. The question instead is how these revised norms can be sustained over time. Interviews with UNICEF staff and management clearly indicated that this question remained unanswered.

The revised norms apply only to WASH services delivered to displaced Syrians living in informal settlements – there are no equivalent norms for the provision of water to displaced Syrians living in host communities (whether in residential or non-residential buildings), where UNICEF's focus is on supporting infrastructure maintenance and development. There is no water trucking to these communities. During the last 18 months, there has been one pilot working in an informal settlement in an urban area using cash for water and cash for desludging. However, it was not accompanied by a monitoring and analytical process that allowed the country office to determine whether working in cash at scale in either informal settlements or urban areas is feasible.

There is a broader perception (particularly from interviewees with those experienced in other international emergencies) that guidance available within UNICEF and, to a lesser extent, that found in the wider sector, are applicable to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, with little relevance to the Middle Eastern context or for middle-income countries more generally. Specific examples of this were given around hygiene promotion and sanitation: an ongoing discussion about whether investment in promoting handwashing was required; a focus on the need to eliminate open defecation

when incidence of this is low in the affected population due to cultural norms; the provision of hygiene promotion materials featuring African or South Asian characters during the initial phase of the response (although the UNICEF country office subsequently developed more context-specific approaches).

The evaluation team focused in later interviews on whether and how the Lebanon Country Office had drawn on experiences of other middle-income countries in protracted crises with regard to use of enhanced standards and/or basic services. While staff interviewed were eager to stress how responsive the regional office was to any requests, they also acknowledged that the conversation about standards had not happened in any substantive form. In addition, while the staff were keen to discuss their learning with the evaluation team, this had not been captured for use by others. In fact, while staff had individually been asked to deploy to other middle-income countries as surge capacity, technical staff reported that there had been no request for the Lebanon Country Office to liaise with other offices to share lessons learned. More senior UNICEF staff, however, reported that information and lessons are shared in a monthly Skype meeting with all country offices in the region and that the Lebanon Country Office also participates in an annual retreat. All staff, however, continue to feel that the specific context and challenges of Lebanon limit options in terms of learning from other contexts.

The country office staff (and partners) state that maintaining the enhanced norms is becoming increasingly difficult because obtaining funding is getting more challenging (see *discussion of funding trends in Section 3, above*). However, in seeking alternative approaches, UNICEF staff have not yet moved past initial pilot programming on the use of cash for water and desludging, or alternative technologies. Contextual constraints – the prohibition on improved infrastructure, the number of informal settlements and the small


²⁷ According to the WASH Assessment Platform only 52 per cent of the informal settlement population is serviced by NGO trucking.

number of households in each, and increasing concerns about environmental problems – have all impeded efficiencies. Ideally, investment in piloting and innovation and scale-up where possible would have taken place within a more favourable funding, social and political environment. Nevertheless, it is now urgently required. Senior staff in the country office feel that there is now a favourable political climate and intend to prioritize responding to this. The debriefing session with the country office reflected on

whether, and how, institutional knowledge management might be drawn on to support this.

SEQ 1.2 Service level
 In its WASH programming in protracted crises, to what extent has UNICEF achieved adequate provision of WASH services for men, women and children?

Figure 3: Humanitarian WASH targets and achievements, Lebanon Country Office, 2014-18



Overall, based on responses to the Strategic Monitoring Questions (SMQs), it appears that the UNICEF Lebanon WASH programme is consistently meeting or exceeding the targeted number of people with WASH interventions. There is only one example (hygiene in 2014) where achievement was considerably below target. It is not clear that the SMQ responses are providing a like-for-like comparison. For example, there were a considerably larger number of water beneficiaries in 2014–15, equating to roughly the entire estimated population of displaced Syrians in Lebanon – than in later years. The country office confirmed that in 2014–15 these

figures included stabilization work (with the majority of beneficiaries being Lebanese) and later years include only the population living in informal settlements. The evaluation team notes that the SMQs did not change between 2015 and 2016, and that the 2016 UNICEF Annual Results Report for WASH appears to include all 1.5 million beneficiaries reported in Lebanon in global figures for achievement in emergency WASH.

However, the main challenge to summarizing overall findings for EQ1.2²⁸ is that there are little to no data on needs and coverage in urban areas. This relates to the different focus of the

²⁸ This point regarding the different approach to needs assessment, monitoring and data in urban areas

(compared to the informal settlements) also impacts the findings related to other EQs.

stabilization programme²⁹ in the urban areas (where UNICEF is focused on repair and new construction of water facilities); the modalities of working with the private sector (although now a new connection with youth programming may allow for data collection and analysis); and a technical focus on monitoring and evaluation of activity. The country office believes that the support it is providing to the government for the development of a National Water Sector Strategy will allow a renewed focus on needs analysis and data.

Currently, there is no information on the service level received by displaced Syrians living in urban areas, and the current SMQs do not require this. The community-level stabilization programming claims to reach a high number of displaced Syrians through the improvement of communal systems which they should have access to alongside vulnerable Lebanese. There is no hygiene response activity in these urban areas. There have been no satisfaction surveys. And, while there is a complaints system, this focuses on mechanical issues related to repair and maintenance.

UNICEF and the WASH sector do not aim to cover all informal settlements with water and sanitation interventions – there are approximately 20 per cent of such settlements with no intervention because they are either too small (fewer than four tents) or not covered by the sector for other reasons. This means that, although the UNICEF and sector targets WASH are consistently met or exceeded,³⁰ the needs of the entire affected population have not necessarily been met. This fact is supported by the WASH Assessment Platform data, which indicate that there are consistently 8–9 per cent of informal settlements that have no other source of water than that purchased by the displaced population themselves. However, these data also show that there are no situations where there are zero water sources. Assessing total coverage in the informal settlements is challenging due to constant

changes in their locations and sizes, as well as frequent movements from urban areas to these informal settlements. It is not currently possible to state definitively how many people living in informal settlements are not covered by WASH sector interventions.

As mentioned in Section 2 of this report, the quantity of water received in winter has decreased in all informal settlements where there is an alternative water source, except settlements in Aarsal in 2018 and 2019. This means that the quantity no longer meets the 'adapted SPHERE' standards, but still meets or exceeds both CCC and SPHERE requirements. In interviews, UNICEF and partners reported this to be primarily related to funding levels and funding uncertainties. Although it is reasonable to assume that the quantity of water needed by the affected population is less (because there is greater recharge of groundwater, so greater availability of groundwater sources such as protected wells) the evaluation team did not see that there had been an in-depth analysis of this at the site level to understand the effect cutting the quantity of water supplied would have on the affected population. Those interviewed now expect that to happen routinely every winter and interviewees did not report any current planning to avert this or adopt alternative mechanisms for the coming winter season. Although this evaluation is not undertaking a financial analysis of the costs per beneficiary for various interventions,³¹ it is relevant to highlight that water trucking is likely to incur higher recurrent costs than more permanent water supply interventions to maintain the same standard of service.

The quality of water in the informal settlements is routinely reported to be good and to exceed standards (CCCs and SPHERE) for much of the year and in most locations. However, in many locations, it is widely reported that displaced Syrians are also buying water for drinking from alternative sources due to dislike for the taste of chlorinated water. This raises questions

²⁹ It is not clear that this activity is captured in the SMQs for 'development' programming either. In 2018, 0 (zero) additional people in urban areas were reported as gaining access to drinking water services, which does not align

with the evaluation team's understanding of the country WASH programme.

³⁰ The only significant exceptions are for hygiene in 2014 and 2015.

³¹ See section 3.3.4 of the inception report.

(which the country office and the sector more generally are well aware of) about current delivery practice. If people are buying water for taste and quantity there may be other, more effective, mechanisms of ensuring service in a sizeable proportion of the sites rather than direct trucking through partners. Alternatives could include providing cash through the e-card distribution mechanism used by UNICEF and other agencies.³² Currently, the feasibility of this at scale is unknown.

Figure 4: This is an example of poor solid waste management, but also shows an informal connection (black pipe) to a local water network, highlighting the complexity of understanding the multiple water services people use



There is nothing in the *Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon* or in other monitoring reports commenting on overall user satisfaction with the quantity and quality of water, although individual monitoring reports routinely discuss users' need to purchase additional water (primarily for drinking and cooking, although sometimes also for other needs) and their dissatisfaction with the taste of the water provided.³³

Monitoring data and partner reports indicate that sanitation generally exceeds standards, with latrine coverage appropriate for CCC and SPHERE standards. However, WASH Assessment Platform data at the time of the country case study visit stated that there are 120 informal settlements without any latrine

coverage at all. Country office staff confirmed that this was in sites where local authorities and/or the landlord do not authorize interventions. It also reflects the fact that the WASH sector does not aim to cover all informal settlements (see *discussion, above*). UNICEF and partners realized early in the response (in the first year according to interviews) that only family-style latrines and washing facilities would be acceptable to the displaced communities and have implemented programmes accordingly. This means that gender requirements for access should be met. However, it was only in 2016 that specialist advice was sought regarding disabled access. The evaluation team was shown examples of latrines constructed in the previous two years specially tailored for disabled needs at the household level. However, there are no data available showing that all such needs have been met. The evaluation team recognizes that this is particularly challenging in an environment where many of the informal settlements are being relocated.

There is conflicting evidence from field visits about whether hygiene promotion has been carried out regularly and appropriately for people living in the informal settlements. This mixed picture was reinforced by interviews, and the answer seems to be 'sometimes' and – perhaps appropriately – less regularly over time. Interviews very quickly led to a debate about the relevance of classic hygiene promotion activity in this context, where many of the displaced were from a middle-class urban environment and pre-existing knowledge of handwashing was high. Interviewees also indicated that standards and reporting did not appropriately recognize the value of a targeted approach to this based on a demonstrated knowledge and analysis of the needs of the populations in individual informal settlements. However, the evaluation team also heard expressed and recognized the challenges of administering this for more than 5,000 informal settlements. The evaluation team was provided with evidence that earlier in the response there was work to adapt

³² For an explanation of how the e-card or 'red card' mechanism works, see '[WFP e-card loading Q&A \(September 2017\)](#)'.

³³ Note that these points also refer to EQ4.1.

standardized tools for hygiene and communication with communities to fit the context, and that these tools were used widely and well. Not new is the question of whether tools adapted on a case-by-case basis for responses in middle-income countries should now be standardized, so that this doesn't have to happen from the ground up each time a tool is used in these settings. In addition, the broader question of how relevant classic hygiene promotion is middle-income countries after initial crisis stabilization needs close attention.

The evaluation team has not looked at WASH in learning spaces as part of this case study. Lebanon presents a unique situation, because education for displaced children is integrated into the national system (through 'double shifts'), so there are no specific learning spaces for the emergency response. Although there is some work around advocacy and hygiene education, this was described by UNICEF staff as small in scale and not systematic, because the bulk of this work is undertaken by the Ministry for Education and Higher Education. Some key informants did feel that there had been a missed opportunity to develop more comprehensive WASH in schools programmes in earlier years, when funding was more available.

While the information on school attendance is collected by the education section, this does not always include information on *why* children who are out of school are not attending. For example, it is not known whether non-attendance of teenage girls is related to the absence of menstrual hygiene management support in schools. Without such information, this area cannot be prioritized with the government.

SEQ 1.3 **Equity and protection**
In its WASH programming in protracted crises, to what extent has UNICEF achieved safe and equitable access to WASH services and facilities?

The findings related to EQ 1.3 pertain only to the 'humanitarian' response in the informal settlements.

The monitoring systems coming on board since 2016 (see SEQ 3 for more details) are disaggregated by geography for the informal settlements, and also by gender and disability in some cases. However, there are discrepancies reported with the *Vulnerability Assessment (VASyR)* monitoring system. There is no disaggregation by ethnic group, but this is acknowledged and would be of very limited use. UNICEF staff and partners note that the Lebanese population living in the informal settlements is very small.

For access issues, the case that many of the normal measurements are not relevant can be substantiated. Distance to water is not measured. However, due to the size of most the informal settlements, this is not relevant because water tanks are either very close to households or (frequently) the household water storage system is connected to the reservoir. As detailed under SEQ 1.2, both latrines and washing facilities in informal settlements were very early on located at the individual household level where possible, or in areas shared with several households. For example, the evaluation team during field visits observed that family latrines sited in a communal area were lockable latrines.

Figure 5: Light installed inside a latrine in an informal settlement



Most latrines observed by the evaluation team had lights in them, and this is monitored by the Healthy Camp Monitoring Tool. Whether the light is sufficient, how the maintenance is done and whether the paths to the latrines are also lit is unclear. On these questions, as with all others, feedback and complaint systems are not aggregated so it is difficult to assess users' experiences.

In the 2018 SMQs,³⁴ only 401 beneficiaries were reported to be people with disabilities – 0.2 per cent of total beneficiaries. This does not seem credible: the 2018 *Vulnerability Assessment* reports that 12 per cent of Syrian refugees have a physical or mental disability. This suggests that UNICEF's reporting fails to fully capture the number of people with disabilities. Since training was organized by UNICEF as sector lead in 2016, there has been an uptake in the design and delivery of appropriate latrine facilities for the disabled. However, not all needs are reported to be met.³⁵ During its field visits the evaluation team observed one example of a child wheelchair user who still couldn't access the latrine because the design did not accommodate her specific needs. In a separate informal settlement, the team spoke with a disabled woman who had been provided with an adapted latrine that was not suitable for her needs, so she was unable to use it.

During key informant interviews and in discussions with UNICEF partners, menstrual hygiene management was highlighted multiple times as one of the most successful and relevant aspects of UNICEF hygiene promotion programming. However, during the evaluation period the country office did not report (via the SMQs) any targets or achievements for reaching women and girls with support for menstrual hygiene management in 2014 and 2015. This suggests that results and successes in WASH programming are not adequately captured and reported.

SEQ 1.4 Context appropriateness In its WASH programming in protracted crises, to what extent has UNICEF achieved relevant and appropriate responses that meet the needs of the population?

Interviews with UNICEF staff and partners repeatedly demonstrated that there was strong knowledge and understanding of the local context. The same interviews supported by transect walks demonstrated that the knowledge was applied – despite constraints – in individual informal settlements. Constraints include repeated and ongoing negotiation with local authorities and landlords. Among staff, there is a high awareness of the need to apply a conflict sensitivity lens at all times.

The challenge of delivering context-appropriate services and solutions in 5,000 informal settlements where durable solutions are prohibited cannot be underestimated. UNICEF has, as noted above, routinely delivered to CCC and SPHERE standards in these sites, although it is unclear what the expectation is for timely resumption of services when an informal settlement is evicted or relocated.

Needs assessment and service delivery in the urban context has already been described. The current approach of 'stabilization' work in urban areas and 'humanitarian' work in the informal settlements means that the discussion of SEQ 1.4 refers largely to the latter.

³⁴ SMQ-24-01-4.a.3-4b.

³⁵ Interviews with partners as well as field observations.

Figure 6: Example of handwashing promotion posted on a latrine in an informal settlement



In the informal settlements, UNICEF and partners moved rapidly to make context-appropriate decisions on family latrines and washing facilities, increase quantities of water delivered (although arguably still not to the levels contextually required) and adapt standards accordingly. Multiple interviews referred to the unsuitability of the hygiene promotion materials to the context due to existing high levels of knowledge of handwashing and cultural practices (supported by knowledge, attitudes and practice [KAP] surveys as early as 2017 showing 99 per cent of Syrians use some form of soap and have a high level of knowledge of handwashing). Although UNICEF has adapted hygiene promotion to reflect needs identified

in the Healthy Camp Monitoring Tool, it is clear that handwashing is still seen as a key plank of hygiene promotion.

The lack of personnel with operational experience in complex protracted crises in middle-income countries has made it difficult to evolve the basic strategy and modality for delivering WASH services. UNICEF staff expressed during interviews that there was a need for staff experienced in 'transition' to work in the crisis from the outset, to ensure that the country office seizes opportunities to evolve the response.

UNICEF interviews repeatedly referred to the development and use of neighbourhood profiles to focus and prioritize work in Lebanon. The 'Neighbourhood Profile' approach, led by UN-HABITAT in partnership with UNICEF, is an interesting needs assessment, analysis and participatory action method that looks at some of the most vulnerable urban areas identified in the 251 most vulnerable Cadastral Zones. It is working now on 31 profiles (most of the first quintile of the 251 Cadastral Zones). The purpose is to show municipalities that such analysis can be done and could be used for prioritizing and programming.

The Neighbourhood Profile team and UNICEF staff believe the pilots demonstrate the possibility of scale-up at the city level without having to replicate the survey and research, because most of the modules identified in a neighbourhood could more or less be useful for others. Others, however, feel that the data are too specific to each neighbourhood and do not translate to the needs of the most vulnerable, independent of area.³⁶ The government has been interested in the Neighbourhood Profiles but has not yet formally adopted the tool.³⁷ UNICEF staff suggested that this could be due to reservations about to the selection of neighbourhood. Admirable though it is within the context, it is not clear to the evaluation team how those engaged in administering and further developing the Neighbourhood Profile tool are engaged in

³⁶ Non-UNICEF interview.

³⁷ The Lebanon Country Office subsequently provided information that the neighbourhood profile database

would soon be formally launched with the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities.

broader and longer-term planning around urban development with government and such international financing institutions as the World Bank. Without this, it is unclear to the evaluation team how the Neighbourhood Profile tool could be used to leverage the types of resources required to support the medium- to long-term scale-up that could be transformative in Lebanon.

SEQ 1.5 Reliability and use To what extent have WASH services provided/supported by UNICEF been reliable?

Overall, the reliability of WASH services provided to displaced populations is generally very good – despite the considerable challenges related to lack of political will as well as those related to funding (particularly the short duration of funding agreements). It is clear from interviews and discussions with the affected population that basic services (water trucking and desludging) have continued without significant interruption. This is difficult to substantiate absolutely, because data on the reliability of services are not collected centrally, although they would be available from partners (e.g., through records of water deliveries or desludging).

Despite the overall reliability of WASH services being positive, there are examples of shortcomings in this area (primarily based on the evaluation team's field observations and discussions with beneficiaries).

- **Access to water storage.** Families are typically provided with tanks to store water. However, this is not consistent from site to site or family to family. A particular challenge occurs when families move between informal settlements or arrive at an informal settlement from other accommodation – there were numerous reports from beneficiaries of families taking tanks with them when they move, leaving newcomers with no water storage. While UNICEF and partners aspire to provide tanks


to all families, the feasibility of doing this is constrained by funding – leaving families without storage for several months. There are examples of families purchasing their own tanks or carrying small volumes of water. Some NGOs have claimed families sometimes attempt to sell tanks, which may exacerbate this problem. A lack of water storage was reported as a problem in three out of the five informal settlements visited. In a fourth site, families complained that the storage was insufficient at only 275 litres.

- **Frequency of latrine desludging.** Although all sites were desludged on a set schedule, there were frequent reports (in three of the six sites visited) that desludging was not frequent enough to prevent pits from filling up or overflowing. This was a particular problem in the site that was piloting cash transfers for WASH – the economics of individual families arranging for desludging (as opposed to desludging multiple pits at once) led to infrequent desludging. The evaluation team observed that a small number of latrines has been adapted to discharge into the open as a result.
- **Palatability of water.** Although water quality is tested in a systematic way and the water is safe for drinking, there is a widespread issue of the acceptability water taste, which leads some families to pay for additional water sources³⁸ such as bottled water. There are also examples (linked to challenges with water storage) in one site of families mixing water from multiple sources in one tank – meaning it was not possible to be certain of the quality.
- **General living environment.** Based on the evaluation team's observations, the general living environment in informal settlements is generally very good. With a few specific exceptions (e.g., the direct latrine discharge noted above) there was no evidence of faecal contamination. There were WASH-related problems observed – several sites reported flooding, and there was one site where vector control (mosquitoes) was cited as a problem – but it was not clear which sector was responsible for these.

³⁸ VASyR 2018: *Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon* reports that 56 per cent of Syrian families pay for drinking water, but this includes families living in

permanent dwellings as well as those in informal settlements.

Figure 7: Example of an alternative water source (in this case a protected well) in use in an informal settlement



While the current situation is positive, partner interviews show concern about the ongoing efforts to implement to agreed quality standards in the context of a desire to reduce costs (partners indicate that UNICEF is fully aware of and understands these challenges). Partners understand the funding context but also are clear that further cost reduction is not possible if reliability of services is to be maintained. Partners also clearly understand the contextual constraints but spent most time discussing with the evaluation team funding and consequent contract and administrative challenges. When the evaluation team raised questions about the impact of reduced water supply or reduced reliability, UNICEF partners were not in a position to respond. There has been one small survey done by one implementing partner, but further data collection and analysis is required.

EQ2 **How well has UNICEF exercised its leadership and coordination roles for WiPC?**

SEQ 2.1 **At individual crisis level in country, to what extent has UNICEF provided effective coordination of the WASH cluster, and effective support to nationally led WASH sector coordination mechanisms?**

Lebanon does not have a cluster system and UNICEF has been the WASH sector coordinator nationally since the onset of the crisis (until 2016 UNHCR was leading at the local/field level). There is a suggestion that prior to 2019 the

sector coordinator had a low profile among partners and was overly focused upon the government relationship. This was verified in country office interviews and is part of the reason that the Chief of WASH is currently double-hatting in both roles (see below). Some sector partners still feel that information sharing is insufficient, but the evaluation team noticed that this was coming from sector partners who were not UNICEF implementing partners.

The primary government representative met by the evaluation team feels that UNICEF is playing an appropriate and effective role with in both the humanitarian and stabilization work. However, other government representatives raised concerns about longer-term approaches, and they were particularly concerned about environmental degradation – a concern that is becoming increasingly politicized.

As could be expected in a protracted crisis in a middle-income country, access to government representatives is limited and UNICEF – as acknowledged by partners – has acted as an interlocutor for WASH agencies seeking approval for work and resolution of problems. From both the government and partner perspective, UNICEF is now balancing these requirements well from the programmatic and budget approval problem-solving perspective. From a strategic perspective, UNICEF believes that (since the start of 2019) it is increasingly leveraging its good relationships with the government to increase opportunities to have voice at the policy level. In this context, that requires intensive maintenance of key relationships and a positive attitude in senior levels of government. UNICEF believes that this has only recently been possible and that the organization must capitalize on this moment in time. Therefore, the senior management focus at the institutional and sectoral level is on this government relationship building.

One clear question is the extent to which partners are informed of and understand the opportunities and dynamics of this relationship building, and how they are able to participate in this process. Some partners are critical of UNICEF's oversight of subgroups, including technical working groups focused on areas such as the standard operating procedures

(SOP) on toilets.³⁹ Partners have commented that, given the structural norms in Lebanon and with the government only working directly with UNICEF, these groups cannot proceed smoothly without visible UNICEF leadership. Partners also maintain that without UNICEF presence and knowledge at a technical level the groups do not advance. However, UNICEF currently does not have the in-house technical capacity to devote to these groups.

UNICEF responded to these criticisms by saying that it had made a strategic choice not to lead all initiatives, preferring to provide strategic space to others and promote their participation. The evaluation team believes this to be correct path given the nature of the individuals involved. At the same time, this makes it difficult to comment on thought leadership from UNICEF, although arguably the commitment to the National Water Sector Strategy will answer this point if the Strategy is as transformative as hoped. UNICEF and other actors commented repeatedly on the limited national WASH capacity in Lebanon. UNICEF's strategic choice to provide space to others to lead is laudable but will only deliver results at the local/field level if others have the capacity to step forward.

A repeated issue raised among UNICEF staff and sectoral partners is the current double-hatting of the UNICEF Chief of Wash as WASH sector coordinator. One key interviewee maintained strongly that this was a strategic decision, not a resource-driven one, and that positive outcomes were being derived in part from the knowledge base and relationships both roles offer. However, this view was not shared more widely by UNICEF staff. There is clearly great respect for this individual and this position, however, both vertically and horizontally, there were doubts expressed about the additional management pressure internally and the apparent compromise at sectoral level – with a focus on influencing high-level government strategy as opposed to driving forward sector coordination to identify positive innovations and working to take these to scale, and finding collective solutions to repetitive problems. While this is the role of the

technical working group leads, UNICEF, as sector lead, has the responsibility to ensure that these working groups are properly established and able to fulfil their roles. This is a critical issue both with the Lebanon Country Office and within the WASH sector in Lebanon right now. It is also – perhaps – an inevitable point of tension within a protracted crisis, with little progress on medium-term change and solutions and against a backdrop of reduced resources.

In response to these questions, UNICEF is now proposing that a partner should take the role of Deputy Sector Coordinator. This is intended to be a revolving post. Again, UNICEF insists that this is a strategic decision, not a resource-driven decision. Some partners interviewed were optimistic that this capacity would allow expansion of working groups on critical issues – one such being the capacity to improve data analysis. Currently, there is a sense that there is little capacity within the sectoral leadership to allow for this. However, partners doubt that filling this role will provide them with any more access to government – something that they would like and which some feel UNICEF is not facilitating. The evaluation team recognizes the structural issues within the government which make this challenging for UNICEF. Going forward, agreeing on the role of the co-lead will be important in terms of addressing these problems. One factor to consider is that having a revolving co-lead may hinder development of the necessary relationships due to lack of continuity.

Another gap in sector collaboration and previous sectoral leadership that was identified by partners was the absence of experience with and knowledge of responses to other protracted crisis and in other middle-income countries. There was a criticism that there was much 'reinventing of the wheel'. UNICEF staff, in the debriefing, did not dispute this and mentioned that over the years there has not been deployments of staff experienced in such contexts and tasked to think proactively about how to advance work. Immediately prior to the evaluation team visit there had been several missions to the country office, including one

³⁹ Interviews with partners.

focused on resilience, which might produce interesting ways forward. However, that consultant was not available for discussion and the draft report could not be shared.

UNICEF's role as a 'provider of last resort' was raised by all stakeholders. The evaluation team felt that there was little shared agreement on what that this commitment meant in a context such as Lebanon, where there are ongoing minor and medium-scale crises related to fire, natural disaster and eviction. The Lebanon Country Office had been able to leverage resources in previous years (on a loan basis) to cover funding gaps. This would now be more challenging, especially should there be a programme of mass eviction, which was a concern at the time of the evaluation team's visit. No planning had yet taken place for such an event.

EQ3 **How well has UNICEF monitored and reported the results of its WASH programming in protracted crisis?**

SEQ 3.1 **How well has UNICEF monitored and reported WASH outputs and outcomes?**

The Lebanon Country Office collects significant data on WASH activities and outputs (e.g., the number of people receiving a service), which allows it to meet UNICEF corporate reporting requirements. They collect some data on outcomes, but the indicators used for these data are not always in line with expected practice.⁴⁰ Monitoring data are used for identifying gaps in service provision. However, there was less evidence that UNICEF staff (as opposed to partners) have been able to use monitoring data to identify improvements in programming approaches. For example, the 2017 KAP survey showed high levels of knowledge and practice for handwashing with soap: 99 per cent of respondents reported

using soap when handwashing and approximately two out of three respondents cited handwashing (before eating and/or after using the bathroom) as being one of the most important ways to avoid disease transmission. However, handwashing knowledge is still one of the hygiene measures in the Healthy Camp Management Tool and appears to be a key element (alongside others) of the hygiene promotion programme.

Partners interviewed said that the WASH Assessment Platform (WAP) data were difficult to access in a usable format, that this impacted activity planning. They also noted that no data from the Healthy Camp Monitoring Tool were being used when identifying lessons learned. The evaluation team interviewed people directly involved in the data gathering and maintenance of monitoring and information management systems. The interviewees suggested that more needs to be done (in terms of raising awareness, training, modifying procedures) to ensure that UNICEF staff and partners were comfortable with using the systems. This would, in turn, lead to better use of data for learning and programme adaptation. No examples were produced of systems providing data that influenced programmes, except for identifying and ensuring coverage gaps were filled.

In interviews, partners registered appreciation for UNICEF's leadership in providing monitoring systems. However, they repeatedly noted challenges in access to the systems/data and questioned the extent to which the data were being used to target, prioritize or focus the scale-up of new approaches.

There are multiple monitoring systems that are relevant to the UNICEF Lebanon WASH programme, many of them developed in the last few years:

⁴⁰ For this evaluation, WASH outputs and outcomes were defined as follows:

Outputs are the interventions delivered by UNICEF and its partners, e.g., provision of water and sanitation infrastructure, training sessions. Outputs are typically measured as access to services or coverage.


Outcomes are the changes resulting from the outputs delivered, e.g., usage of (not simply access to) water and

sanitation facilities, changes in hygiene-related behaviours, improvements in the management of WASH facilities. Outcomes can be WASH-specific (as above) or they can be outcomes to which WASH programming makes a contribution alongside other sectors, e.g., menstrual hygiene management programming contributes to greater school attendance by adolescent girls.

1. Activity Info (AI) is an inter-agency reporting platform which covers all sectors. The WASH indicators are typically numbers of beneficiaries reached (e.g., number of affected people assisted with improved access to adequate quantity of safe water for drinking and for domestic use) or strictly activity-based (e.g., volume of safe drinking water provided through water trucking). The data submitted to Activity Info by UNICEF partners and WASH sector members form the basis of UNICEF corporate reporting for SMQs and the Result Assessment Module (RAM). The cross-sector and inter-agency nature of the platform means there are only a limited number of WASH indicators, and these are difficult to change or adjust.
2. The Inter-Agency Mapping Project (IAMP) is primarily responsible for identifying and recording informal settlements but also collects demographic and basic WASH status information.
3. The WASH Assessment Platform (WAP) is a WASH sector-wide monitoring system which covers all WASH actors (with the exception of the Lebanese Red Cross). The WAP was developed in-house by the Lebanese WASH sector in 2016, with development work primarily carried out by UNICEF. Prior to this, an alternative system was used, but this was not user-friendly. The WAP provides data on water and sanitation facilities and also measures the WASH 'vulnerability' of informal settlements to identify sites where additional work is needed. This is based on data collected at a site level – typically based on observations or discussions with leaders in the informal settlements (such as the *shawish* or settlement supervisor).
4. The Healthy Camp Monitoring Tool (HCMT) is a tool for UNICEF partners which was designed to go beyond counting the number of people with access to facilities. It has been revised multiple times. It currently includes site-level observations (such as whether there is evidence of open defecation, and whether the settlement is a 'clean environment') but also measures some indicators at the household level, including:
 - Knowledge of key times for handwashing
 - Disease prevalence
 - Condition and status of sanitation facilities
 - User perception of safety when using facilities.

The evaluation team found that monitoring is still quite focused on activities. Only in 2019 were systems fully rolled out that allowed for collection of additional data, including access and outcome data (e.g., through the latest version of the HCMT developed in 2019). However, at the time this report was written (October 2019), these new systems had not yet been used to support wider analysis and knowledge management. In addition, some of their indicators (for example on hygiene) are not best practice internationally and, given that knowledge among the beneficiary population around hygiene practice is acknowledged to be high, simply continuing to monitor and report on this does not advance programming. There is also currently a problem of the frequency of data collection. While partners are expected to collect data on an ongoing basis (with the intention of updating data whenever a site is visited or, at a minimum, three times a year) some of the data available in the system for some of the sites visited by the evaluation team were more than one year old.

Figure 8: An example of the WASH 'vulnerability scores' available in the HCMT



The appropriateness to this context of global-level indicators was raised by the WASH team. The WASH section met 90 per cent of its water targets (for the entire year) by the end of January 2019. This is because of the way that the indicator is measured and because it is against global standards. This form of reporting also does not illuminate the continuity of water

supply and whether access to water is continuous during the year. The 2018 SMQs were changed and thus are more relevant than previous versions (it was unclear if this was as a result of consultation or lessons learned at a regional or global level), but until the 2018 SMQs came out, the Lebanon Country Office was not aware that the changes were coming, so staff were not able to respond quickly to those changes and ensure data gathering methods were adapted accordingly.

For UNICEF programming, complaints mechanisms and feedback mechanisms have been delegated to UNICEF's implementing partners. While UNICEF staff are confident that their knowledge of partners and sites allows them insight into patterns in problems and complaints, there is no indicator or measure for the numbers of complaints, complaints by topic, response times or feedback time. In short, there is no aggregation of this. The evaluation team found out that it was only recently that an overall complaints and feedback mechanism had been put in place in the protection sector and acknowledges that this may be a multi-sectoral issue in this operating context. However, at the debriefing (exit meeting) the WASH team immediately committed to addressing this.

SEQ 3.2 What does available evidence tell us about changes in the lives of affected populations associated with WASH action?

There is currently limited available evidence about how UNICEF's WASH action has changed the lives of the affected population. Although the majority of key informants interviewed agreed that the primary motivation for WASH programming in informal settlements was public health, the mechanism through which this would be realized is not clearly articulated and recorded. While there is data collection on WASH outputs, only very limited data are systematically collected on the perceptions of end-users. Stabilization projects were more typically expressed in terms of the impact on social cohesion or on the environment.

The UNICEF Lebanon WASH strategy clearly identifies reducing public health hazards as the

primary driver for emergency WASH interventions (e.g., those in informal settlements), with secondary drivers being reducing adverse environmental impact (e.g., through the discharge of untreated wastewater) and reducing conflict between displaced Syrians and host communities. This hierarchy was supported in the majority of key informant interviews with UNICEF staff, although other motivations (including reducing the need for users to go into debt to purchase water) were also identified. The ongoing 18-month cash for water and cash for desludging pilots are an admirable effort to look at alternatives. However, the necessary market and financial analytical framework has not been put in place during the pilot phase of this work and monitoring does not provide evidence that could support scale-up.

The evaluation team did not see a formal theory of change (or similar document) that identifies the specific public health risks arising from the WASH situation in the informal settlements and how UNICEF WASH actions address these risks. Typically, the justification proposed by staff in interviews rested broadly on improved water and sanitation facilities to reduce public health risks, without exploring specific risk factors or disease transmission pathways.

As an example, based on Ministry of Public Health data, hepatitis A is one of the most common water-related diseases in the country. This is highlighted in the country office's WASH strategy. However, it is not clear that there is any work undertaken to understand how current WASH services may be contributing to incidence of hepatitis A and what activities could reduce the risk of transmission.

Numerous respondents referred to the lack of a public health outbreak (a statement supported by Ministry surveillance data) as a significant achievement. This is to be applauded. However – as would be expected – there are multiple other factors consider when attempting to link the absence of an outbreak directly to WASH interventions by UNICEF or other sector partners. These factors include: source of drinking water – the majority of respondents in *VASyR 2018: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*

report paying for drinking water; source of water for general use – 56 per cent of respondents in non-permanent shelters rely on sources other than trucked water; comparison of incidence of water-related disease – they are at least as common (if not more so) among the Lebanese population as they are among the displaced Syrians.

There are positive examples of where WASH programmes have been explicitly designed to contribute to cross-sectoral outcomes:

- The 'labour-intensive' component of the stabilization programme sees Lebanese and non-Lebanese (e.g., Syrian) youth who have received vocational training employed in the construction of WASH infrastructure projects. Although the overall project outcome is improved water supply, there are specific outputs related to youth employment. This programme began in 2018 and at the time of the case study visit was still in the initial phase of training. At present the indicators for WASH and youth-related outcomes and outputs are monitored separately by the respective sections.
- The 'area-based' approach to urban WASH identifies inequitable access to water services as a source of marginalization and social tension. This approach has been piloted in Tripoli and the country office is seeking to expand it to areas of South Beirut. In the draft proposal for expanded work seen by the evaluation team, there is a discussion of how the social component of this programme would address community tensions, but there were not (at that point) any indicators or outcomes linked to this objective.

Attempts to establish integrated WASH and health programmes (the THRIVE proposal) were not successful in obtaining funding. During the visit of the evaluation team, another such proposal to a bilateral donor was the subject of intense work within the country office. The evaluation team discussed with multiple staff

members the competing priorities to which the current donor proposal development was subjected to and sympathized with staff given the funding gaps for the work of the country office. The need to advocate with donors to consider objectives related to medium-term solutions and support continued basic services exemplifies the daily management concerns the country office management team expressed to the evaluation team. Moving forward, securing medium-term funding for medium-term objectives and solutions will increasingly depend on better ability to describe change in the lives of affected populations. The view of country office management is that the ability to monitor and describe this requires enhanced integrated objectives, design and programming, and this is a view that the evaluation team endorses.

UNICEF currently collects limited data on end-users' perceptions of the services they receive. The Healthy Camp Monitoring Tool includes questions related to perceived safety while using WASH facilities, but these appear to be too narrow to capture user satisfaction more broadly or identify unintended consequences arising from WASH interventions. It is likely that such information would only be collected through relationships with partners at a field office level and may not be collated in a systematic manner. Cross-office interviews suggested that work on end-user perception is more advanced in other sectors and it is unclear why WASH has not kept pace.

In response to questions about knowledge management approaches, the evaluation team was shown an [impact story](#) documenting changes in the lives of the affected population in Marej, but this type of documenting work is not part of a wider WASH knowledge management strategy – a fact confirmed in both in interviews and in the 2018 SMQ responses.⁴¹ Development of such a strategy has never been a priority due to other pressures and has also not been a request from the regional office or headquarters. The priority since the crisis started has been to ensure the

⁴¹ The country office undertook additional work understanding social tensions to inform the pilot project of the community-based WASH-approach in Tripoli.


provision of services; knowledge management work and the collection of additional data have not been regarded as likely to improve the impact of these services. The WASH section is now receiving global funds for innovation and the evaluation team was shown the projects that these funds are supporting with a solid explanation of why these projects were identified. It appears that neither Lebanon Country Office nor headquarters has a strategy for capturing and communicating this work in a way that could appropriately showcase its innovative quality or lead to sourcing more funding. What's more, with regard to the good story in *Marej* – as with other good examples of work done by the country office – the analysis with regard to replication and scale-up has not yet been done.

EQ 4 To what extent has UNICEF had the capacity to implement a timely and effective WiPC response?

SEQ 4.1 To what extent have UNICEF Preparedness, HR, WASH Field Support Team and surge capacity systems been fit for purpose in responding to WASH in protracted crises?

During interviews and in the debriefing at the end of the evaluation team's visit, human resources were identified by the WASH team as one of the key successes of the Lebanon WASH programme – the WASH team has been exceptionally stable, with many members in their posts for several years. As a result, there has been little use of UNICEF preparedness, HR, FST or surge systems to support the country office, and it is difficult to make a judgement on the appropriateness of these systems. Overall, the WASH section has had considerable freedom to determine resourcing requirements and has not sought external support.

Figure 9: Lebanon Country Office WASH team, 2019



Following the country office's restructuring to facilitate integrated programming, the WASH team currently includes four people – the only changes over the course of the evaluation period have been that instead of a dedicated sector coordinator in the country, UNICEF's Chief of WASH is now double-hatting, and there is no longer a public health specialist. Although the surge mechanism was used to fill specific gaps early on in the process, the WASH team was clear that the HR approach has been on ensuring quality recruitment – with a willingness to accept gaps in resourcing until the right long-term appointment could be made. Reactive support for specific HR problems has been provided by the regional office.

The situation of the double-hatting was discussed at length under the coordination section of this report. However, it will be covered here from the perspective of the UNICEF programme, due to the number of times this was raised with the evaluation team. Some senior managers clearly articulated a positive rationale for this: that combining the roles allows for a more sophisticated relationship with government counterparts, and that WASH programming and the country office as a whole benefit from this. It allows UNICEF to more quickly identify resources which can be used to meet Ministry priorities for intervention. There is evidence that this assertion is true – both in the very positive view of UNICEF expressed by government

stakeholders and also in how UNICEF now has direct engagement with the government in policy development.

However, there were widely expressed concerns within UNICEF that this placed increased burdens on other team members. Members of the WASH sector in the country were concerned that UNICEF is under-resourced (see *the section above*) and unable to fully support pilots, plan for scaling up innovations, etc. The evaluation team had sympathy with these concerns following interviews and a transparent discussion at the country office debriefing. However, it was only six months into the double-hatting experience, combined with the other structural changes and the push towards integrated programming, that judgements about this were being made.

Current WASH preparedness plans are designed to respond to multiple small emergencies (flooding, storms, evictions, etc.) and this is predicated by partners' ability to flex budgets and surge resources internally as appropriate. This approach is heavily dependent on strong relationships with partners. There has been no preparedness for a larger emergency because the context analysis to date has suggested that this is not a likely scenario. For example, the current planning is for 5,000 household evictions per year (in terms of providing additional WASH hardware). However, in 2017 there were approximately 14,000 evictions and in 2019 approximately 11,000 evicted at the time of writing (across all types of shelter) – suggesting that the current preparedness planning is based on normative demands, i.e. the actual 'normal' level of movement, numbers of fires, instances of high winds, evictions. If there was to be significant, widespread evictions or relocations – a small but real possibility – it is not clear how UNICEF and partners would respond. As mentioned above, the 'provider of last resort' role has not been planned for.

SEQ 4.2 To what extent have UNICEF COs appropriately developed and managed their partnership portfolio so that it remains efficient, effective and context-appropriate?

UNICEF Lebanon's WASH programme currently works with eight NGO partners – five international NGOs and three local NGOs. All NG's are managed directly, with no consortium arrangements in place. There is a general perception that the quality of work is adequate given the structural and contextual constraints. However, there is also widespread concern about how to maintain services, and an awareness that the number of partnerships is not increasing.

Key informant interviews with UNICEF staff and staff of other international NGOs reported that there was initially difficulty in identifying local WASH partners due to the lack of an established WASH sector (in the sense of NGOs able to deliver direct services) in Lebanon. At the same time, international NGOs struggled to provide staff with the appropriate skills and resources – often the post-holders were experienced in sub-Saharan Africa, with little Middle East or middle-income country experience.

At the time of the evaluation team visit, the overall situation had not changed substantially – UNICEF was working with three national WASH partners in emergency response (LebRelief, Development for People and Nature Association, or DPNA, and the Lebanese Organization for Studies and Training, or LOST). It had recently commenced work with DPNA as part of the cash transfer pilot programme. International NGOs were still struggling to provide stability of staffing, in part due to administrative challenges. There was, however, evidence that UNICEF had taken proactive steps to manage partner performance. UNICEF has reduced the number of partnership agreements where there have been problems of implementation quality. There was also evidence that UNICEF had made attempts over the years to work differently; that individual staff members with vision have been supported to maximize opportunities with partners that have delivered results; and that UNICEF had also ended partnerships when these were not delivering.

There are apparent barriers to working more widely with local NGOs – one challenge raised was the ability for smaller NGOs to manage funding – but there does not appear to be a

coherent approach to building the capacity of local partners. The most successful example of a local partner improving their capacity to implement projects and account for funding was deemed to be due to ad-hoc support from a single member of UNICEF staff.

There is generally good private sector capacity in-country – UNICEF works with pre-approved private sector contractors extensively as part of the stabilization programme. Limits are recognized and accepted (for example that the private sector has no interest in expanding its work in the urban context beyond the structural stabilization work) but there does not appear to be an ongoing approach to capacity building in that regard, or efforts to broker partnerships between the private sector and NGOs.

There are positive relationships with both international and local NGO partners, yet formal accountability relies heavily on monitoring visits from UNICEF WASH staff. Data provided to the evaluation team by the Lebanon WASH section indicate that in 2018 13 Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers⁴² programmatic visits were undertaken to WASH interventions. Third-party monitoring was discontinued because UNICEF WASH felt it did not deliver adequate assurance of results. This type of monitoring is only now being reintroduced. There is no peer-to-peer monitoring work, although partners are increasingly working together in new sectoral working groups.

EQ5 **To what extent has UNICEF ensured linkages, coherence and mutual reinforcement of its WASH action in protracted crises with longer-term development objectives?**

In summary, the WASH section in Lebanon which had closed in 2010 prior to the crisis has made the case that it has been required to operate in emergency mode for the past eight years due to: a limited and low technical partner base; continuous small emergencies; a challenging and limited operational space;

and recently very short-term funding cycles resulting in high administrative and management time commitments. Staff say that they have received support and guidance when it was requested but that progress with regard to linking humanitarian and development (LHD) has not been required of them over the years. The last 18 months have seen the WASH section, in company with the rest of the country office, engage in a rigorous Mid-Term Review which commits them to change ways of working including using local integrated programming designed to ensure improved LHD. A senior manager has stated the challenge is to implement the approach, identify and document attempts and successes and advocate and secure appropriate funding – while continuing to shift to longer-term durable solutions, leverage resources, work on national policy development, provide technical support and move towards social cohesion, resilience and climate change programming.

SEQ 5.1 **How well has UNICEF's commitment to linking humanitarian and development programming been reflected in its programme planning and design at crisis level?**

UNICEF, in common with other actors, faces a context in Lebanon where the State's response to the Syrian crisis has been welcoming but at the same time resistant to programming that provides semi-permanent solutions. UNICEF has also been keen to ensure that vulnerable Lebanese affected by the crisis are recognized and included in the response. However, although UNICEF implements both humanitarian and stabilization programmes, the links between these are not consistently exploited. Although it is being phased out, the infrastructure-focused stabilization work aimed to raise the standard of Lebanon's WASH infrastructure but appears to have undertaken construction of infrastructure in isolation. While there are good examples of work with regional Water Establishments (notably in South Governorate), the links between this work and the response in informal settlements are not

⁴² Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) establish common principles and process for managing cash

transfers among UN agencies that have adopted the approach across all countries and operational contexts.

always clearly established. For example, the evaluation team was not originally due to meet the UNICEF staff responsible for this work because it was not deemed relevant to the humanitarian response. One major challenge for agencies such as UNICEF is understanding where in the Lebanese State structure (both vertically and horizontally) is the best place for discussing integrated protracted crisis response, both nationally and locally. Discussions are still ongoing but for WASH (for now) the Ministry of Energy and Water will continue to be the partner. At the same time, a new workplan was signed and took effect in 2019 with the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities which should support UNICEF's intention to align local and national WASH thought and practice leadership. UNICEF staff members acknowledge that the WASH response in the informal settlements has been operating within an emergency framework since the onset of the crisis and that this has continued, due, in part, to the many contextual constraints in Lebanon. It appears to have been part of a pattern within the country office whereby work by different sections is happening in the same geographic area, but there is lack of clarity on whether these programmes are reaching the same people – or on how integrated results can be achieved and articulated. A senior staff member in the country office recognized that, while UNICEF sections frequently work in the same geographic areas, the country office cannot currently say whether these programmes are serving the same affected individuals and households. The staff member felt strongly that this was not yet full integration in practice.

This pattern appears to be replicated in the WASH stabilization work, although recently there have been concrete moves towards integration with youth and other sections. The models and pilots being described more recently in both the WASH emergency work and the stabilization work, if scaled up, could significantly underpin the new integrated approach. However, at this point, it is not clear

what the real potential for scale-up of the stabilization work will be just as it is not clear what the potential for moving from pilots in the informal settlements will be. Pilots and new approaches, coming late in the crisis, have not been accompanied by monitoring, risk assessment and the necessary planning for scale-up. Also, effective knowledge management is a gap in a country office that that seeks to move away from an emergency response approach in some sectors. This impedes cross-team work and effective advocacy to the government and donors.

Baseline indicators did not exist in 2011. Donors⁴³ were described as not wanting more evolved reporting or being interested in integrated programming. A proposal to a bilateral donor, which was being finalized at the time of the visit, was seen as a major opportunity in this regard. The proposal was seen as an opportunity to advance integration and the linking humanitarian and development programme push. Unfortunately, the proposal was also subject to pressures to ensure immediate service delivery, and putting this into the proposal and budget meant reducing the budget for medium-term integrated programming.

Given this context, the desire of the Lebanon Country Office to seek agreed long-term approaches, not long-term solutions, is appropriate. By this the senior staff member meant that the current structural blockages to 'durable' or 'sustainable' solutions were impossible to overcome. UNICEF and partners would have to identify ways of working with affected people that allowed medium-term solutions rather than permanent solutions. This would involve potentially building on current pilots such as the cash for water and desludging pilot programme.

In 2018, an important focus of the Mid-Term Review was upon local integrated programming, though moving from developing a strategy for this to actually implementing it is described as a 'work in progress' – particularly

⁴³ No interviews with donors were possible. Donors were not present in the field and requests for telephone interviews did not meet with success.

for the integration of health and WASH. While it is evident that the WASH team in Lebanon is universally respected throughout the office and is described as collaborative and innovative, it is equally clear that WASH programming is still thought of as stand-alone by others.

WASH partners report seeing a clear change in the discourse over the last year or so, indicating that UNICEF has been trying to move towards an LHD approach. But they are not aware of any pathway to actually moving this approach forward. Partners describe communication about the intention to move towards intersectoral work and engagement with development programming and approaches but cannot yet see how UNICEF intends to overcome the barriers to this and achieve government and donor support.

At this point, in the country office and at headquarters there does not appear to be a strategy for capturing and communicating this work in a way that could raise its profile (and that of the office) as innovators, or lead to more funding.

The Lebanon Country Office is indicating at all levels that one of the key constraints has been, and continues to be, political will and commitment and the nature of the funding available to them. This is no longer an L3 emergency, yet operating costs remain high and are increasing as more Syrians move to informal settlements from urban areas due to the rising costs of urban living. With new ways of working being rolled out in the office, staff members identified the lack of flexible multi-year funding as the key constraint to more effective LHD-orientated programming. While WASH has had some flexible funding, the form in which funding is available means that, most months, 50–70 per cent of the WASH team's time⁴⁴ is tied up in administration with repeated short-term revisions of partner contracts.

While management is clearly supportive of staff and partners who have the vision to innovate and use pilot approaches to support LHD, the capacity to effectively manage risk, ensure

that quality is maintained and undertake necessary integration work required to plan and manage an effective LHD approach was not demonstrated in recent pilot programmes. This was discussed at the debriefing and staff agreed it has been the case.

SEQ 5.2 To what extent has UNICEF followed key elements of LHD when implementing WASH action in protracted crises?

Following on from the discussion of SEQ 5.1, the evaluation found that although humanitarian and stabilization work has co-existed in the country office's WASH programme, only now are key elements of LHD being explicitly brought into planning and implementation. Interviews with country office staff demonstrated a high awareness of the elements of LHD; gaps related to LHD in terms of actual operations; and what would be needed to move towards a clearer LHD approach. Staff also acknowledged that the operating environment and its constraints had prevented application of the approach.

The restructuring within UNICEF leading to the appointment of area child survival officers should support programme integration and should lead to improved analysis and use of data for beneficiary targeting and programme management. Partners report that there were many debates in 2018–2019 about how to ensure sustainability in the current framework and the need to improve (and document) quality in order to be able to tell a story about impact.

Relationships with authorities have been principled and guided by a clearly articulated framework within the Lebanon Country Office. Conflict sensitivity has been well understood and management has overseen this clearly at the project level and in terms of ensuring a balance between geographical locations. However, the stabilization work has not evolved over time in the way that might have been hoped and, apart from one pilot, these projects have not yet become an entry point for local integrated work or for the more classic

⁴⁴ Estimates from management.

sensitivity work. The country office's new programme strategy and the subsequent office restructure are clearly designed to address this but have not yet been in place long enough to determine whether or not these internal changes will lead to changes in programming. Partner trust in UNICEF to lead on this in negotiations with the government has largely been preserved, although there are points of tension as the crisis continues without evident progress in moving to more sustainable solutions.

Risk-informed programming has been a key operational principle and a cornerstone of managing relationships with key stakeholders. Only recently have effective tools been in place to take this broader view. The progress towards an LHD approach over the last year and a half, with considerable engagement and consultation in the development of the new country office programme strategy; the emphasis on integration across sectors and the office; influence on government procurement policies towards the most vulnerable; support for the development of the national water strategy; and capacity building of the regional Water

management within the WASH section has not yet been able to move to a more analytical framework to scenario plan on a medium-term basis, let alone undertake wider risk analysis on environmental and other concerns.

There is a similar story about preparedness (see above). Mechanisms for flexibility work well for the scale and nature of the ongoing small emergencies experienced during the course of the crisis. However, in common with other sectors in UNICEF Lebanon, there is no contingency/planning mechanism in place for a larger crisis.

Senior management in the Lebanon Country Office maintain that there has been substantial

Establishment in terms of quality, communication and systems. There is some evidence that the LHD approach is being implemented within the office. However, despite an extremely positive attitude toward the WASH section and team members and their attitudes, it is also clear that WASH work has not yet fully embraced this new emphasis on integration.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Delivering the UNICEF WASH response in Lebanon is clearly challenging because of the scale of the needs and the complex political space in which the country office is working. Despite this, there is clear evidence that over the course of 2014–2019, the WASH team has consistently delivered ongoing basic WASH services to the affected population which meet – and frequently exceed – global norms for WASH in emergency contexts.

The WASH intervention has consistently achieved its targets for the number of people reached⁴⁵ with services, and the country office has been successful over a number of years in attracting significant volumes of funding to achieve this.

While the country office continues to invest significant senior staff time in supporting this opportunity, there is a keen awareness that the operating and funding environment for 'business as usual' is becoming more challenging for UNICEF and for partners as the UNICEF response continues into the seventh year and beyond (the recent downgrading of Lebanon from an L2 to an L1 crisis may be indicative of this changing environment).

Continued reliance on activities such as water trucking and desludging, which incur high recurrent costs, will make it harder to sustain basic services should funding challenges continue and even accelerate. Attracting new funding – and the desirable multi-year funding – require a fleshed-out new approach and design for WASH programming. While the Lebanon Country Office is actively exploring alternative solutions and undertaking upstream work, this is yet to lead to widespread changes in which WASH interventions are delivered, and how.

To address this, the country office has invested considerable time since 2018 engaging in strategic reflection and in ensuring that the new country office programme strategy

contained a new approach to adequately and efficiently reach targets. The country office structure was changed to reflect this intent. The new strategy has been in place since January 2019. However, there is still some way to go to ensure that WASH programming is fully integrated with health and other sectors. In addition, the evolution of WASH programming could benefit from a fuller integration with technical resources already available within the country office, such as cash transfer support and knowledge management.

The evaluation team appreciates the constraints on programming evolution in the Lebanon context and has also reflected upon the fact that such constraints are frequently found in protracted crisis contexts. Going forward, during the remainder of the evaluation, the evaluation team will be on the lookout for patterns in other country case studies to better understand how realistic application of the LHD procedure is coming up against contextual realities.

Should there be an emergency larger than the 'normal' level of emergency experienced in the informal settlements, it is unlikely that capacity and resources are available to respond. With respect to the WASH response in Lebanon, stepping in and acting as the 'provider of last resort' needs to be carefully studied in the country office and regional office and at headquarters.

In addition to meeting numerical targets, the WASH response has consistently met global norms for WASH services. The WASH team in Lebanon clearly recognizes that ensuring the quality of the response is as important as achieving 'numbers' and the early adoption of 'adapted SPHERE' standards of higher norms to recognize the needs and expectations of displaced Syrians is a good example of this.

⁴⁵ See Figure 3 on Page 20.

This does, however, raise some questions: to what extent is it appropriate to apply existing global standards in middle-income countries and with such populations as the Syrian displaced as a marker of achievement and success? And to what extent is there support at a corporate level within UNICEF for the process of establishing context-specific standards? Standards on quality are currently not required to be effectively monitored and/or the tools for doing so are not applicable to a middle-income country. The evaluation team has noted this and also noted that, even with considerable effort and cost being invested in upgrading monitoring tools in the last few years, the Lebanon Country Office still lacks the capacity to easily and clearly report on quality of services. There is an absence of reliable aggregated data on special needs and gaps of services – e.g., for disabled people – and there is no aggregation of complaints, or data on resolution of complaints and feedback to users. Monitoring systems (both for UNICEF and the sector more generally) appear to have been developed specifically for deployment in Lebanon – support (to provide expertise, experience or learning from other countries) has been neither requested from nor offered by the regional office or headquarters. Reporting systems do not appear to pick up these gaps.

The strength of the relationship between UNICEF and key government counterparts was striking. In an environment where implementing programmes with displaced Syrians can be controversial, and the government is sceptical of the involvement of NGOs, UNICEF has fostered strong relationships and created the space to deliver services to the affected population. The WASH section is a small team which, at the management level, is stretched by the strategic decision for the Chief of WASH to also lead the national WASH sector. This burden on the management team may be inhibiting the evolution of UNICEF's WASH practice.

The Lebanon Country Office clearly understands the complexity of the context. Staff members were able to describe the daily obstacles and barriers that they experienced when attempting to implement and evolve the WASH response. While the institutional relationship with the government is very constructive overall, the prohibition (still in place at the time of the evaluation team's visit) on formal medium- or long-term solutions remains a significant challenge to delivering more sustainable (and even more cost-effective) WASH services in informal settlements.⁴⁶ There is a perception within WASH management that there may currently be an opportunity to exert influence with regard to the government's national WASH strategy and that senior-level commitment and investment is wise. Going forward, this needs to be balanced with the demands of maintaining the core mandate of UNICEF's WASH efforts.

WASH management is constrained by the need (seen as an increasing burden) to secure and maintain resources and contract for service provision in the 'humanitarian' programme and the oversight required for commercial contracting in the 'stabilization' programme. There are some positive indications that the stabilization programme is making constructive links to other sectors of work in the country office (e.g., with youth programmes and others). WASH staff are working to better understand the impact of structural stabilization work on communities and harmonize better with other sectors. There are some interesting pilot programmes underway, but it was not clear to the evaluation team at the end of the visit what the vision was for scaling up of these pilots.⁴⁷

For both the humanitarian and stabilization programmes, WASH management support is required to assess current innovations and pilots and determine opportunities for the evolution of the programmes' overall direction in line with the country office strategy and the linking humanitarian and development (LHD)

⁴⁶ The government position is reported by the country office to have shifted in recent weeks and months, leading to a positive perspective on this in the country office.

⁴⁷ Following the evaluation team's visit, the Lebanon Country Office informed the team that the approach

between WASH and Vulnerable Youth Programming is being put forward as a potential model for incoming CEDRE and CIP funding, as well as more broadly for donor funding.

approach. While the direction of the country office's WASH strategy has been set out, there is a risk that the heavy burden of day-to-day programme management will prevent the realization of this strategy.

There is evidence that, since early 2018, the country office has made steps to conceptualize and pilot how WASH programmes would need to work to successfully link humanitarian and development programmes and to integrate their work with other sectors.

The suitability of the Lebanese context for applying LHD is reflected in the new country office strategy. While previous WASH stabilization work had been somewhat disconnected from other programming, it has nonetheless located UNICEF programming in areas where poor Lebanese, displaced Syrians and other refugees live together. It also offers opportunities to leverage now-established government relationships, extend advocacy and influencing opportunities.

However, the evaluation team perceives that, in the Lebanese context, the WASH sector has not been able to move as far, or as quickly, in this direction as other sectors (most notably education). Some of the factors behind this are referenced above (the political environment, the availability of longer-term funding). There is some potential for this to move in the right direction, though. The extensive stabilization programme in urban settings appears to have made a valuable contribution to improving the standard of water and sanitation infrastructure, but it is not possible (due to a lack of evidence) to understand how it impacts WASH services received by displaced Syrians, or what role (beyond short-term gap-filling) it plays in improving service delivery for water and sanitation services in Lebanon. At the same time, where the country office is undertaking work that could be described as a 'systems approach' to WASH (such as working with regional Water Establishments to improve customer relations) the opportunities for linking this work and the emergency WASH programme are not readily recognized or exploited.

From this case study, there is a sense that the complex middle-income country context is one where UNICEF corporately (as opposed to solely the country office) is still working to find a niche in urban contexts and determine its value-added alongside the private sector and the international financing institutions. Country offices may benefit from support in terms of positive case studies and greater sharing of experience and knowledge.

The Lebanon Country Office is aware of these issues. The focus of WASH work in municipalities is changing: going forward, the stabilization programme will only work in 'labour-intensive' projects (generating employment opportunities); and the area-based approach will address community conflict and build transferable skills and employability opportunities as it meets WASH needs.

The evaluation team notes that while there was an implicit understanding of LHD among staff members in the country office, discussion of this were the most challenging conversations for the staff in terms of comfort with the terminology (as used by UNICEF at a global level), the narrative of experience, knowledge capture and strategy for scale-up of innovation. The evaluation team believes that there are positive stories – but that they are not being well captured and told. This is particularly the case in WASH. Documenting positive results, sharing experience and improving knowledge management are areas where regional office and headquarters support would be welcomed by the Lebanon Country Office. A positive move in this direction could be morale-boosting and extremely supportive for fundraising, and it could stimulate a stronger knowledge management culture.

While there are examples of good practice, learning and adaptation and innovation to be captured from the Lebanon experience, these are frequently not captured and shared within the country office or more widely.

The evaluation team saw examples of innovations adapted to the Lebanese context, such as the pilot cash project in Beirut-Mount Lebanon and adaptation in the same project with community monitoring and mobilization introduced after the first year. There has been

no focus on knowledge-management within the WASH section and the country office does not have readily at hand the evidence and stories to support its advocacy to donors for new forms of funding. The absence of an effective knowledge management system may mean that there is not an awareness within UNICEF globally of the achievement of the Lebanon Country Office. The lack of such a system also clouds the extent to which staff in Lebanon have had to work with tools that are not appropriate for the context – or reinvent the wheel.

Equally, the evaluation team saw no evidence that, at a global level, UNICEF was seeking to learn from the Lebanon experience to inform WASH action in similar contexts. Given the growing number of refugees hosted in middle-income countries, this may be a significant lost opportunity.⁴⁸

Clearly indicated in this report are strategic areas in which support is needed to force change, as well as opportunities for taking pilot projects to scale if judged appropriate. This requires attention and focus. This is something that senior management seems already to be well aware of; they should therefore consider

how global and regional support can best be drawn on to support this.

Limitations of this case study

This 'test' country case study was extremely well supported at short notice by the Lebanon Country Office. The short preparation time did not allow the evaluation team to adequately study the supporting documentation. This, combined with the fact that the self-assessment was not received until after the visit began, meant that the evaluation team was not able to target key informant interviews well. In addition, the time allocated for the introductory workshop was decreased and the focus was very much on explaining the global evaluation, introductions and logistics planning. Again, this reduced opportunity for refining the purpose of interviews and field interactions. The evaluation team will try to improve management of this in future country case studies and will seek the support of the Evaluation Office in this regard. The evaluation team now feels that the introductory workshop is crucial in terms of establishing a timeline for the response and working with the country office to agree on areas where they feel the evidence is less well documented and established.

⁴⁸ In feedback on the draft version of this report, the Lebanon Country Office provided information that

headquarters and donors were showing strong interest in the Tripoli pilot project.

ANNEX A: LIST OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Name	Organisation	Office	Position
Violet Warnery	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Deputy Representative/Representative OIC
Jackie Atwi	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Child Protection Officer (Child Labor)
Prem Bahadur Chand	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Chief Field Operations (OIC) North
Maxime Bazin	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Cash Specialist
Genevieve Begkoyian	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Head of Child Survival
Jorge Bica	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	WiE Specialist
Hussein Fakih	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	WASH Stabilization Specialist
Georges Haddad	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	PME Specialist
Diala Ktaiche	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	C4D Specialist
Mazen Manna	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Deputy Representative, Operations
Ahmad Nizam	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Team Lead Labour Intensive Project / Former DG Water Establishment South
Amal Obeid	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Youth Specialist
Nabil Rizk	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Communications Specialist - Engagement
Olivier Thonet	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Chief of WASH WASH sector Coordinator
Rahel Vetsch	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Emergency Officer / OIC Humanitarian Affairs
Mahdi Wehbi	UNICEF	Lebanon CO	Water Sector Coordination (IM)
Charbel Hanna	UNICEF	North and Akkar Field Office	OIC Child Survival & Development Officer Water Sector Field Coordinator-North & Akkar
Houssein Nouredine	UNICEF	BML Field Office	Child Survival Program Officer
Maria Saidy	UNICEF	Zahle Field Office	Water Sector Field Coordinator-Bekaa Child Survival Program Officer
Utpal TK	UNICEF	Zahle Field Office	Chief of Field Office
Suzy Haoyek	Ministry of Energy and Water		Adviser to the Minister
Lamia Mansour	Ministry of Environment		Adviser to the Minister

Name	Organisation	Office	Position
Randa Nemr	Ministry of Energy and Water		Adviser to the Minister
Beatriz Navarro-Rubio	ACF		Head of Mission
Jean McCluskey	Oxfam		WASH Coordinator
Elie Mansour	UN-HABITAT		Head of Urban Planning and Design
Bobbie Francis Baker	UNHCR	Lebanon	Senior Technical Officer (Shelter & WASH)
Carol Sparks	UNHCR	Lebanon	Inter-Agency Coordinator

In addition to the KIIs listed above the evaluation team held discussions with staff of the following organisations during field visits. As the discussions were not conducted as formal interviews, they have not been included in the list of KIIs but have informed the findings in this case study.

- Action Against Hunger (ACF)
- The mayor and local government staff of Bebnine
- DPNA
- LebRelief
- Solidarités International
- World Vision.

ANNEX B: LOCATIONS OF FIELD VISITS

Cadaster (site#)	Governorate	Coordinates	Population of site (# shelters)	Partner	Comments
Baaloul BG (007)	Beqaa	33.58933784N 35.73472098E	347 (56)	ACF	Location of decentralized wastewater treatment pilot project
Barr Elias (166)	Beqaa	33.79133472N 35.94408263E	502 (70)	WV	Barr Elias represents 2 adjacent IS
Barr Elias (028)	Beqaa	33.79063993N 35.94396814E	700 (70)	WV	Barr Elias represents 2 adjacent IS
Haouch Mandara (001)	Beqaa	33.78191476N 35.85653284E	857 (96)	WV	
Choueifat El-Quoubbe (008)	Mount Lebanon	33.80479659N 35.49341334E	180 (29)	DPNA	Location of cash for WASH pilot project
Semmaqli (007)	Akkar	34.54289903N 36.01542918E	165 (18)	SI	IS is served by a motorized private borehole

All information taken from WAP data provided by UNICEF Lebanon Staff.

In addition to the IS listed above the evaluation team visited a location in urban Tripoli which was part of the area-based project implemented by LebRelief. Due to the security considerations this visits consisted on a single discussion with a member of the area committee. It was not possible to meet other beneficiaries or view project interventions.



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3 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017 USA
www.unicef.org/evaluation