



## **EVALUATION OF UNICEF'S SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION**

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## ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS

AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
AP	Anti-Personnel
BCPR	Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery
CABDIC	Capacity Building of People with Disability in the Community
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CBL	Campaign to Ban Landmines
CBR	Community-Based Rehabilitation
CBMRR	Community Based Mine Risk Reduction
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CCC	Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies
CCW	United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CDC	Centre for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia, US
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMAA	Cambodian Mine Action Authority
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
CO	UNICEF Country Office
CPC	Country Programmes of Cooperation of UNICEF
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CU	Cranfield University
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DfID	Department For International Development (UK)
DPKO	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
EAPRO	East Asia and Pacific Regional Office
EMAO	Ethiopian Mine Action Office
EMOPS	Office of Emergency Programmes
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office
FPDO	Friends of Peace and Development Organisation (Sudan)
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI	Handicap International
HRBAP	Human Rights Based Approach to Programming
HRU	Human Rights Unit
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEC	Information Education and Communication
IECD	Integrated Early Childhood Development
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards

IMEP	Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
IP	Implementing Partner
KAP(B)	Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices (and Beliefs) Survey
LASAT	UNICEF Landmines and Small Arms Team, in New York
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
LM	Landmine Monitor Report
LSN	Landmine Survivors Network
MAC	Mine Action Centre
MASG	Mine Action Support Group
MBT	Mine Ban Treaty
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MOPC	Ministry of Planning and Coordination (Ethiopia)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPO	Master Plans of Operations
MRE	Mine Risk Education
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MTSP	Medium Term Strategic Plan
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OD	Organisational Development
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PD	Programme Division
ProMS	Programme Management System
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RO	UNICEF Regional Office
SIDA	Swedish International Development and Cooperation Agency
SITAN	Situation Analysis
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats analysis
TA	Technical Advisor
TDVA	Tigray disabled Veterans Association (Ethiopia)
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VA	Victim (survivor) Assistance
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### *Key recommendations*

1. Irrespective of strategic and organisational developments, all emergency and development mine action interventions should be accompanied by guidance on the effective use of quality and performance management systems, procedures and metrics. These should be consistent with UNICEF's Programme Management System (ProMS) and the Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (IMEP). Wherever possible, such systems should also be consistent with the performance reporting needs of other key stakeholders including UNICEF's donors. The adoption of performance management systems would enable mine action project managers to consider progress and report success, not only when planning or reviewing plans, but throughout the project cycle. This would enable results-based management principles to be implemented. This would demonstrate much more clearly the contribution of mine action to the UNICEF's MTSP and to donors, thereby improving the sustainability of UNICEF's approach to mine action.
2. UNICEF should continue to enable decentralised decision-making through global policies that remain sufficiently open and which are not implemented in a 'top down' fashion. However, it is recommended that UNICEF's mine action policies be accompanied by technical notes which provide appropriate guidance to ROs, COs and implementing partners to enable and encourage unity of purpose and consistency of effort and quality.
3. Such guidance should include, inter alia, specific implementation project development and management procedures for:
  - Emergency contexts. These should build on Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies (CCC), UNICEF's Emergencies Handbook and Technical Notes for Emergency Programming. These should enable identification of immediate needs and programming of emergency response that is considerate of mid to long term needs. Specific guidance should follow the project cycle, including mainstreaming into UNICEF's PD and transition to development approaches where appropriate.
  - Development contexts. These should build on MTSP and enable distinction between immediate needs and mid to long term needs, including how to enable greater mainstreaming into UNICEF's PD. Specific guidance should follow the project cycle, including guidance on capacity building of local implementing partners, recognising their type and transition requirements.
4. UNICEF should recognise the risk of financial dependency on a few key donors and on a few mine action human resources. It should address this issue by broadening its sources of funding for mine action, and ensuring that a broader group of UNICEF mine action focal points have opportunities to develop skills, experience and exposure to mine action.
5. Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) should retain responsibility for support to mine action in emergencies through coordination of responses, threat monitoring, resource mobilisation, capacity building and support to PD in emergency and development projects.
6. UNICEF should adopt the Human Rights Based Approach to Programming (HRBAP) in its strategy for mine action and this should be integrated into PD and EMOPS. The mainstay of UNICEF support to mine action takes place in development contexts under PD management. Technical support to both PD and EMOPS should be provided by the LASAT in New York.

7. UNICEF should redefine its VA goal and raise awareness within the UN system regarding the needs of survivors which the World Health Organisation (WHO) and others may be better able to address.
8. UNICEF advocacy should change focus from MBT to policy instruments that defend the rights of people affected by conflict. It may be appropriate for UNICEF to assume a lower profile with MBT and to increase its efforts in other aspects of advocacy.
9. UNICEF's support to MRE should be maintained.
10. UNICEF should further develop its ability to support civil society organisations (CSOs) and to build the capacity of local partners in mine action through better mid to long term planning.

### ***Conclusions and lessons learned***

Progress towards achievement of the MRE goal is very positive, notably at a global level through creation of standards and guidelines, as well as through CO support in mine/UXO affected countries. UNICEF should retain the lead role in this area, in particular bringing together expert organisations and facilitating dialogue on best practice. Effort has been placed, in terms of human resource time and funding, towards the achievement of this goal in a way that is proportional to the four year ambition of the goal and that respects the capabilities of UNICEF, which are substantial. The areas that should be emphasised in the future are: (1) inclusion of MRE into the broader humanitarian development and peace building activities, particularly with RO support and (2) embedding MRE into UNICEF's work in education, health promotion, child protection, integrated early childhood development (IECD) and other UNICEF sectors as well as establishment of surveillance systems. In order to achieve this, UNICEF should engage non-mine action personnel in MRE, thereby furthering mainstreaming and build cross-sector information management and surveillance within UNICEF.

MBT related advocacy has almost achieved universal ratification and UNICEF's support has had an impact at a global level. This has been achieved predominantly through the effective efforts at CO and HQ level. The designation of UNICEF as a lead agency for advocacy is appropriate. Non-MBT related advocacy, particularly in relation to the quality of life of survivors and promotion of requirements for international assistance for VA, requires additional emphasis. Advocacy related to implementation of the new UN mine action strategy will require awareness to be raised. A lesson learned from the past is to realistically consider RO and CO awareness of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and keep them abreast of the stages of development of instruments such as the Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities.

The VA goal was unrealistic in its ambition and has suffered from insufficient resource allocations, relying on the experience of UNICEF staff in the field and on ad-hoc donor interest in-country. This area of the UNICEF's mine action strategy needs urgent revision. Most effort has taken place at CO level, particularly in relation to development of strategies and access to health care and school education. Lack of expertise in physical rehabilitation has resulted in reliance on international NGOs such as HI and other agencies – notably ICRC. ROs have assisted, on occasion, in the identification of needs and development of strategies. The Landmines and Small Arms Team (LASAT) has also contributed to strategic support to COs. However, these initiatives have been at a small scale in general and HQ and ROs could do more to support COs push this goal forwards. Despite widespread motivation within middle management of UNICEF, the main reason for lack of progress is lack of human resources with the relevant VA experience and time. In future UNICEF should better consider capabilities of

UNICEF in VA. In hindsight it would have been more appropriate to curtail the ambition of the goal to one of mainstreaming of mine / UXO victims into UNICEF's existing communication, education, health and protection activities. Notwithstanding these limitations, the quality of VA when it is supported tends to be high.

***Relevancy, appropriateness and sustainability of UNICEF's mine action approach***

UNICEF contributed well within the framework of the 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy' of 1998. It continues to do so under the June 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy', which exemplifies UN reform policies and is more moderate regarding the role of UNICEF in VA. UNICEF is collaborative and inclusive of other UN agencies. Its approach enables others to contribute.

UNICEF's mine action support is highly relevant in terms of its contribution to national priorities and does target the requirements of affected populations, particularly in emergencies. Its approach tends to be of a very high technical standard and outputs are substantial considering its organisational constraints.

UNICEF mine action targets local needs, although its support is not entirely consistent with UNICEF's priorities, strategies or development programmes. UNICEF's mine action support does not make appropriate use of international humanitarian and human rights instruments and its contribution to UNICEF's organisational priorities and Millennium Development Goals is not adequately reported. UNICEF has specific responsibilities regarding human rights that it could better meet through the HRBAP. UNICEF's mine action support is overly dependent on particular financial and human resources, leading to the implementation of only some aspects of the strategy. Its mine action support is under-resourced and fuller use could be made of the development capabilities within UNICEF.

MRE needs are identified in an appropriate and timely fashion. However, there are differing views on how well they are met. The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) has made great progress towards universal ratification and implementation, but the use of other legal instruments has not progressed as well. The scope of the VA goal is too ambitious for the resources currently available to UNICEF. Mine survivors, including children, do not have access to the highest attainable standards of services and support. UNICEF support in emergency contexts has greater financial sustainability than in development contexts. Sustainability in development contexts could be improved if UNICEF's support became more mainstreamed into the activities of Programme Division (PD) and embedded into UNICEF's organisational priorities that are planned with mid to long term considerations in mind. The strategy does not set quantified outputs to be achieved within a fixed time period which impacts on critical assessment.

***Effectiveness and impact of UNICEF's mine action approach***

UNICEF has had significant impact through its ability to facilitate external coordination through the creation of fora that are inclusive, and enable experienced practitioners to contribute to coordination decisions and to exchange best practice. Coordination across sections and divisions internally or with other UN agencies is less effective.

UNICEF's mine action support is not being implemented entirely as envisaged in the global strategy. Mine action remains more stand-alone than was intended. However, it is responding to real needs and it is, increasingly, mainstreaming into UNICEF's other thematic areas of support. UNICEF's support to mine action adheres to technical best practice and is responsive to contextual changes and new information. However, quality and performance management systems are weak, both internally and in the management of implementing partners. In some cases, this has led to duplication of effort or inability to respond due to lack of resources.



UNICEF's support to mine action has contributed directly to the three global strategy goals, particularly MRE and MBT-related advocacy. Activities related to non-MBT advocacy and VA tend to be of high quality but are very localised and limited in their scope. UNICEF could make better use of existing development resources. The impact of UNICEF's support on landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affected populations has not been adequately proven and indicators that do exist contradict one another or are open to misinterpretation. It appears that UNICEF has contributed to awareness of mine/UXO related risks, but not necessarily to the adoption of alternative behaviour that has reduced those risks. It appears that UNICEF has contributed to legislation that improves access to public services by survivors, although there is limited evidence that UNICEF has contributed elsewhere to improvements in the quality of life of survivors.

### ***Risks to sustainability of UNICEF's mine action approach and consequences***

UNICEF mine action is entirely dependent on project funds, and is therefore vulnerable to changing donor priorities. If donor support were to be significantly reduced the main impact would be on MRE. UNICEF support relating to the quality of life of survivors has been limited, and if UNICEF support to VA ceased, the impact would be localised but important, particularly for those organisations soliciting funding.

### ***Background of the evaluation***

UNICEF has been a driving force in mine action since the 1990s and its role and priorities have developed over time, culminating in the first UNICEF Mine Action Strategy, covering the period 2002 to 2005. This strategy served an important purpose at a time in the evolution of mine action and of UNICEF. It enabled the raising of funds, and improved recognition and respect for UNICEF in mine action, while increasing the understanding of the importance of MRE as potentially one of the most cost effective risk reduction methods in mine action. The strategy was composed of three goals, covering MRE, VA and advocacy.

At the end of the strategy period, UNICEF contracted Cranfield University (CU) to evaluate the document's relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness and impact. The outcome of the evaluation would be an understanding of the progress made during the period of the strategy, and would provide lessons learned to shape the development of a new UNICEF mine action strategy and inform current mine action operations, strategies and policies.

A new UN strategy for mine action for the period 2006 to 2010 has been published. It reflects ongoing developments in mine action, and it acknowledges the broader political, economic, development and humanitarian context within which mine action occurs. It embraces new challenges including the impact of explosive remnants of war (ERW). It also emphasises the need to develop mine action performance management.

### ***Evaluation methodology and approach***

The evaluation team comprised Ms. Taz Khaliq (Deputy Director, Humanitarian Resilience) at CU, consultants Mr. Ralph Hassall and Mr. Steve Harknett, with some involvement of Mr. Alastair McAslan (Director, Humanitarian Resilience). The evaluation was divided into three information collection stages: (1) a 10-day scoping study; (2) a 15-day desk review; and (3) a field visit stage which involved an evaluation of 36 days in two regions. A fourth stage involved drafting the evaluation report, followed by a final stage where the findings were reviewed in a 1-day workshop and finalised prior to submission. A group of experts was established by CU and a Project Steering Committee (PSC) by UNICEF during the scoping study. The group of experts reviewed the quality of the evaluation method and analysis during each of the five evaluation stages. The PSC reviewed scoping findings at the end of Stage 1 and attended the workshop

during Stage 4, where findings were presented and the content of the final evaluation report agreed.

During the desk review stage a questionnaire was sent to all COs that had supported mine action since 2002. Half of these COs responded. In addition, stakeholder analysis was conducted by interview at HQ level with UNICEF, other UN agencies, donors, independent mine action organisations and implementing partners. Over 100 project and policy documents were reviewed and the impact on strategy analysed. Field visits were conducted to two ROs: Thailand and Kenya; and four UNICEF COs: Laos, Cambodia, Sudan and Ethiopia. The field visits included interviews with similar organisations to those interviewed at HQ level, but also provided the unique opportunity to directly observe UNICEF support to mine action and talk to national implementing partners and beneficiaries of UNICEF support. The main limitation of these methods was time. UNICEF has supported mine action in almost 40 countries during the period of the strategy, but only four UNICEF mine action UNICEF COs could be visited and five working days spent in each. Notwithstanding these challenges, patterns did emerge – corroborated by factual data – leading to the conclusions and recommendations summarised above.

The MTSP for the period 2006 to 2009 has already been developed. However, the findings of this report have significant relevance at the field level and should be reviewed while developing mine action specific sections of UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and Master Plans of Operations (MPO) with host governments. In addition, it is hoped that UNICEF will use the findings and recommendations contained in the report to streamline current programmes, and more effectively plan for future ones.

*This evaluation began in October 2005 and was completed in March 2006. The majority of the work was conducted at UNICEF HQ in New York, CU in the United Kingdom, in the UNICEF ROs in Kenya and Thailand and in the following UNICEF Country Offices: Cambodia, Ethiopia, Sudan and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The final report was presented to UNICEF on 10<sup>th</sup> April, 2006.*

## INTRODUCTION

1. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has been involved in mine action since it began its mine awareness operations in El Salvador and Somalia in 1993, indeed before the term "mine action" was coined. During that period the main international legal instrument that existed was the 1980 UN Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) which includes reference to landmines, booby traps and explosive remnants of war<sup>1</sup>. In those days the components of mine action were often considered in isolation and there was limited understanding of the inter-relationship and inter-dependence of advocacy, mine risk education (MRE), survey, clearance, victim (survivor) assistance (VA) and stockpile destruction. Early UNICEF mine action projects were often undertaken in refugee camps and linked with United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Such projects focused on the provision of basic warning messages, informing communities of the nature of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), their threat and basic messages to help avoid the risk. They were guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) under UNICEF's organisational focus on child protection.



*UNICEF support to mine action has become part of a galvanised UN effort and is now part of the 2006 – 9 MTSP.*

2. In 1994, UNICEF's executive director issued a statement calling for a total ban on Anti-Personnel (AP) landmines, which prompted far greater engagement by UNICEF in country programmes and international advocacy efforts. Advocacy, including that by UNICEF, culminated in the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) which represented a breakthrough in the struggle against landmines and provided a legal framework for international cooperation on mine action<sup>2</sup>. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was also created in 1997 and its mission was to act as focal point for mine action within the UN system. Notwithstanding the relevance of CCW, particularly as a good source of information for governments that are not yet MBT members, UNICEF advocacy focused on MBT obligations particularly through support to MRE programmes and some VA support.

3. In the late nineteen nineties, UNICEF supported MBT initiatives particularly relating to article 1 which prohibits use of AP landmines, Article 4 which requires destruction of stockpiles and Article 5 which requires mined land to be cleared. UNICEF also responded to programme support requests from mine/UXO affected countries under Article 6 which engages international cooperation, by mobilising resources or providing other support and UNICEF became particularly engaged in reduction of risks faced by children and women in mine affected

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.ccw-treaty.com/> Protocol II relates to landmines and booby traps and Protocol V to Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

<sup>2</sup> *Humanitarian Mine Action Fact Sheet*, Landmine Monitor Report, 1999.

communities or in efforts to improve the quality of life of survivors. Contributions to Article 7, which requires reporting to be transparent, were also made particularly in those countries where UNICEF was the only UN agency present. By 1998, UNICEF had its first mine action policy. Though the document fell short of being recognised in UNICEF's Medium Term Strategic Plan (MTSP), landmine issues were included in the Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies (CCC) and institutionalised in the Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS), where a dedicated unit sits to this day.

4. The 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy' of 1998 designated UNICEF as the focal point in the UN system for MRE and advocacy, and gave it an important role in VA. The adoption of this policy was followed by a dynamic period where UN agencies, including UNICEF, further developed their efforts. 'United Nations mine action: a strategy for 2001-2005,' brought together UN agencies under a common framework. The UN strategy related mine action back to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and to humanitarian imperatives that are core to the organisational priorities of UNICEF. In 2001 UNICEF allocated dedicated staff at their headquarters in New York to mine action and engaged in a thorough consultative process with mine action organisations including NGOs, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), donors and other UN agencies to elaborate the first UNICEF mine action strategy<sup>3</sup>. In 2002 the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 started to be implemented as a planning tool by UNICEF Country Offices (CO) and UNICEF continued to engage with mine action stakeholders at a global level, notably by hosting a review of the 2002-2005 UN mine action strategy in their Innocenti Research Centre in Florence, Italy in 2003.

5. The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 elaborates and defines the role and activity of UNICEF headquarters (HQ), CO and Regional Offices (RO) in relation to implementing three goals: (1) MRE needs are identified and met in an appropriate, effective, and timely fashion; (2) the MBT and other related legal instruments are universally ratified and implemented; and (3) mine survivors, especially children, have access to the highest attainable standards of services and support<sup>4</sup>. The strategy outlines the policy for UNICEF's efforts in mine action and has a comprehensive list of areas of contribution per goal and sub-objective for consideration at three levels, at headquarters, in ROs and CO level. The list is very comprehensive and some technical notes for interpretation and selection of them were drafted<sup>5</sup>. However, the process of outreach of these principles to ROs and COs was cut short, in part due to staff turn-over<sup>6</sup>, but also due to other priorities taking precedence, for example participation in the development of the 2002-2009 MTSP and 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy'.

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<sup>3</sup> Interviews with most international donors and international NGOs specifically refer to the period where between 2002 and 2003 as a period where UNICEF gained credibility for its mine action programmes and made particular efforts to develop UNICEF's capacity in mine action support.

<sup>4</sup> *UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002 – 2005*, UNICEF – An excerpt of this strategy is attached in Appendix B.

<sup>5</sup> *A Best Practice and Briefing Guide to UNICEF and Mine Action – An Overview of Operational and Programming Strategies*, was developed by Andy Wheatley, UNICEF consultant and does contain specific reference to context-based interpretation of the strategy. However this served more as an introduction and technical study than a guideline. It remained in draft form, and makes little to no reference to non-mine action priorities of UNICEF. Guidelines include a section in UNICEF's emergency handbook on MRE which has mainstreamed use within UNICEF and manuals developed by GICHD with UNICEF sponsorship.

<sup>6</sup> In 2004 there was a period of almost nine-months where the Landmines and Small Arms Team (LASAT) coordinator position in New York remained vacant.

6. Notwithstanding these human resource challenges during an important period of adaptation to UNICEF's first mine action strategy, UNICEF has supported a fairly wide range of activities in mine action in over 40 UNICEF Country Offices since 2002. UNICEF has adopted a number of roles, from direct implementation to national Technical Advisor (TA) and coordinator of MRE initiatives. It has provided support in a dynamic environment where the concept of mine action continues to develop, in terms of its impact on other related sectors such as humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction and development, and the security of the state, community and individuals. The types of organisations engaged in mine action have become more diverse, with a greater role for military and commercial organisations than was recognised previously<sup>7</sup>. Mine action increasingly takes place in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, which has led to increased efforts to scrutinise coordination and leverage the capabilities of international NGOs<sup>8</sup>. MBT advocacy has been relatively successful and the focus is now turning towards non-state actors and other legal instruments relating to ERW<sup>9</sup>. The Human Rights Based Approach to Programming (HRBAP<sup>10</sup>) in mine action has gathered momentum in mine action, and UNICEF has taken a strategic decision to implement this approach across all of its organisational priorities, including mine action<sup>11</sup>.

7. A description of these organisational priorities and the location of mine action within UNICEF are provided in [Box 1](#). More recently thought has been given to the role of UNICEF in the monitoring, promotion and protection of the rights of children and how this might relate to mines/UXO.

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<sup>7</sup> *A Study of the Role of the Military in Mine Action*, GICHD, September 2003, contributed to the wider recognition and acceptance of the military in mine action. The role of RONCO Consulting Corporation as the prime global contractor for US State Department sponsored humanitarian mine action programmes further served to increase awareness of commercial operators and collaboration with them.

<sup>8</sup> *The Price of Preparedness, Evaluation of UN Mine Action Rapid Response Plan in Iraq*, Cranfield University, 2003 illustrates one effort to learn from emergency programmes.

<sup>9</sup> The 2005 Landmine Monitor Report states that approximately two thirds of the world's countries are now states parties of the MBT, but also mentions non-state actors who increasingly endorse the principles of the MBT. A CCW Second Review Conference was held on 11–21 December 2001 in Geneva. The Conference amended the basic Convention to make it applicable to armed conflicts within states as well as between states. The Second Review Conference also agreed to establish a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to discuss ways and means to address the issue of "explosive remnants of war" (ERW), including cluster bombs.

<sup>10</sup> A definition of HRBAP and an explanation of its potential application to mine action by UNICEF is provided in [Appendix F](#).

<sup>11</sup> UNICEF committed itself to introducing a HRBAP in 1998 and began the process in January 2002 covering its (HQ, ROs and COs, 7,000 staff and some 161 Country Programmes of Cooperation (CPCs). It is also important to note that UNICEF has been the UN vanguard in developing and implementing HRBAP.

UNICEF is divided into two main divisions – Programme Division (PD) and EMOPS. Both focus on organisational priorities of UNICEF, which are young child survival and development; basic education and gender equality; HIV/AIDS and children; child protection from violence, exploitation and abuse; and policy advice and advocacy for children's rights. UNICEF's principles and strategies for achieving its goals are girls' education, integrated early childhood development (ECD), immunisation 'plus', fighting HIV/AIDS, improved protection of children from violence, exploitation, abuse and discrimination. PD is organised in sections for each of the thematic areas, and has a number of geographic desk officers. Mine action has recently been included into the 2006 - 2009 Medium Term Strategic Plan (MTSP) and placed under the child protection organisational priority. The majority of mine action focal points in Country Offices (CO) are located in PD sections, notably Child Protection and, to a lesser extent Education or Communication and the majority of UNICEF's support to mine action takes place in development contexts under PD focal point management. For historical reasons the LASAT is located in EMOPS. EMOPS, as the name suggests, specialises in emergency support for those same organisational priorities. EMOPS coordinates emergency responses, mobilises resources and undertakes capacity building. It also manages an Operations Centre (OPCEN) that conducts threat monitoring and manages a Humanitarian Response Unit. Mine action emergency responses can be initiated and managed by EMOPS or PD, requiring close coordination between EMOPS capabilities (LASAT, the Humanitarian Response Unit and OPCEN) and PD capabilities, via the geographic desk officers and sections. The Humanitarian Policy Unit in EMOPS focuses on inter-agency policy, whereas the Division of Policy and Planning develops UNICEF policy. Resource mobilisation is managed by the Programme Funding Office, in coordination with the Private Sector Division and Regional Offices (ROs), notably the one in Geneva.

*Box 1: UNICEF mine action organisation.*

8. The Landmine Monitor reports that global funding for mine action is stable and, in some cases, has increased over the past five years. At the March 2006 Mine Action Support Group meeting, it was predicted that this trend would continue until 2009. Nevertheless, there are increased pressures to prove the positive effects on the lives of mine/UXO affected populations in order to better justify financial support and funding streams are changing, towards the more mainstreamed allocation of development funds for thematic areas such as mine action. As UNICEF enters the next strategy period encapsulated in its 2006-2009 MTSP, one of the challenges it faces is how to maximise impact of its support to mine action in an environment where donor support for mine action as a stand-alone thematic area of intervention is dwindling. There are competing organisational priorities within UNICEF related to other threats that result in child mortality and morbidity to a greater extent than mines/UXO. Although UNICEF does not only target needs leading to significant mortality, some UNICEF staff do question the relative merit of mine action over other humanitarian concerns. These are some of the challenges that the new LASAT coordinator, who was recruited in early 2006, and all staff involved in UNICEF support to mine action programmes will have to face. This evaluation is timely as it should enable UNICEF to consider its own performance, lessons learned, organisational strengths and practical constraints in such a way as to inform future strategic decisions. It should also provide information that can be used to plan for change management at operational and tactical levels. It should help UNICEF to report on its successes while, at the same time, paving the way for informed organisational development that is considerate of emerging needs.

9. The findings of this report have significant relevance at the field level and should be reviewed while developing mine action specific sections of UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and Master Plans of Operations (MPO) with host governments. In addition, it is hoped that UNICEF will use the findings and recommendations contained in the report to streamline current programmes, and more effectively plan for future ones. The primary beneficiaries of the evaluation will be policy and decision makers within UNICEF, partners and donor organisations and, ultimately, UNICEF target populations.



*MRE in Pailin Province, Cambodia implemented by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports with the support of UNICEF. Partners of UNICEF were involved in this evaluation.*

## AIM, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF EVALUATION

10. The aim of this evaluation is to examine and evaluate the current organisational structure and procedures of UNICEF in relation to mine action to determine:

- (1) the relevance, appropriateness and sustainability of UNICEF's approach to mine action and;
- (2) the global effectiveness and impact of UNICEF supported activities in mine action.
- (3) In addition to the above, the evaluation undertakes an analysis of the risks and impact on communities and UNICEF's programme partners if UNICEF should be unable to meet any of its different commitments contained in the mine action strategy.

11. UNICEF posed eight specific questions relating to objective (1) and a further five relating to objective (2). The specific questions posed are listed in [Appendix A](#). An excerpt of UNICEF's mine action strategy, which delineates the intended division of responsibilities of HQ, ROs and COs, is attached in [Appendix B](#). There is significant overlap and interdependency between the thirteen questions asked by UNICEF<sup>12</sup>. For the purposes of this evaluation, relevance and appropriateness of the UNICEF mine action strategy and approach is in relation to the needs of key stakeholders, including UNICEF as an organisation. Effectiveness and impact questions are in relation to whether the goals have been met. Factors that affect both appropriateness of approach and effectiveness in achieving goals include the relationship between outputs and inputs, such as the timeframe that has been set or the allocation of human resources and financial or material resources. For this reason, it is assumed that the direct beneficiaries of the evaluation will consider findings in relation to the thirteen questions in their entirety, rather than in isolation<sup>13</sup>.

12. Although UNICEF did not pose specific questions regarding objective (3), a third section on risks faced by UNICEF that may affect its ability to implement the strategy, and consequences on partners and beneficiaries has been added. Risks are taken to be those prerequisite factors required for the strategy to be implemented that cannot be assumed. Impact is the direct effect on partners and stakeholders should the strategy cease to be implemented.

13. The evaluation is intended to benefit UNICEF in three main ways<sup>14</sup>: (1) To measure progress that has been achieved to date in terms of the implementation of the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005; (2) To capture lessons learned and provide an examination of the general impact of UNICEF's work in mine action in terms of reducing risk for communities, promoting compliance with relevant international legal instruments, and in providing assistance to landmine survivors; and (3) To inform the development of a new UNICEF Mine Action Strategy, and to advise on current mine action operations and strategies and policies in UNICEF.

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<sup>12</sup> Appropriateness, for example of goals that have been set in the first place or of organisational features, has an effect on both relevancy to stakeholders and effectiveness of support.

<sup>13</sup> On 17<sup>th</sup> March 2006, the Project Steering Committee advised CU to avoid duplication of findings. It was decided that, rather than provision of stand-alone answers to each of the thirteen questions, and thus some duplication of findings in the Final Evaluation Report, CU should cross-reference findings that correlate to more than one question, rather than repeat those findings.

<sup>14</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action* – Request for Proposals dated 29 June 2005.



## FINDINGS

### Appropriateness, relevance and sustainability of the strategy and approach

***Are the activities, goals and objectives outlined in the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy and Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies consistent with the requirements of affected populations, international humanitarian and human rights instruments, global and national priorities, partner and donor policies?***<sup>15</sup>

14. UNICEF's mine action support is highly relevant in its contribution to national priorities and addressing the requirements of affected populations. The goals, objectives and activities outlined in the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 are all relevant to the requirements of affected populations and national priorities. However, the relevancy varies quite logically depending on the strategy of donors, implementing partners and independent stakeholders. A summary of stakeholder analysis, conducted primarily by interview, is included in [Appendix C](#). Further UNICEF mine action programme analysis related to analysis of questionnaire and documented data is included in [Appendix D](#). UNICEF mine action strategic objectives and goals are so broad and all-encompassing that they serve more as a framework for consideration by UNICEF mine action focal points at CO level<sup>16</sup>. Specific national priorities have not been mentioned in the strategy, for example in relation to those countries most affected.

15. When country projects are mapped onto the strategy to test relevancy, the overlap is significant. In practice, the majority of UNICEF supported mine action is preceded by a needs assessment, at times informally<sup>17</sup>. UNICEF proposals in support of mine action have to compete with other needs of children and justify their relative merit as a project with respect to UNICEF, let alone to donors. This serves to ensure that relevancy to affected people and to UNICEF's MTSP and CCC is demonstrated from the inception phase. The absence of performance targets or time-bound objectives in the global strategy reduces accountability or its usefulness as a practical planning tool<sup>18</sup>. The performance of UNICEF's support to mine action and current systems and tools from document review data is expanded upon in [Appendix E](#). Given the decentralised organisation of UNICEF, the strategy, if treated as a broad policy, does enable localised decision-making that targets the requirements of affected populations while considering national priorities.

16. The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 is relevant to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The link between the MTSP and CRC is more evident than the link between the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 and the MTSP or CRC. Article 38 of CRC stipulates the obligations of states parties to IHL. However, further analysis is required regarding the awareness raising and advocacy requirements pertaining to IHL in mine action.

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<sup>15</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action – Request for Proposals* dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.

<sup>16</sup> A minority respondents to questionnaires indicated that they used the strategy for planning. Under 40% used it in UNICEF managed programmes, and 75% used it, in conjunction with in-country needs assessments in UNICEF supported government mine action programmes.

<sup>17</sup> An example of a formal needs assessment is the quick assessment of MRE in North Darfour.

<sup>18</sup> According to questionnaire data, needs assessments tend to precede mine action in UNICEF supported government mine action programmes, but only a third of respondents indicated that needs assessments were used when UNICEF was part of a UN managed mine action programme.

Overall, UNICEF support to mine action could make better use of human rights instruments such as CRC, notably if a more rights based approach was adopted. Illustration of this rights based approach and use of legal instruments such as CRC is provided in [Appendix F](#). Areas of relevancy include contributions made through UNICEF support to mine action in the right to life (Article 6), the right to participation (Article 12), the right to access information, particularly that affecting children's health and development (Articles 13, 17 and 24), the right to health care (Articles 23 and 24) and the rights of the disabled child (Article 23). However, the strategy does not enable implementation of action oriented in support of these policies through objectives that are oriented around CRC or guidelines on how to implement the principles within CRC. There are instances where MRE programmes incorporate messages relating to CRC. However, these efforts can be further institutionalised so that UNICEF support to mine action better integrates the aims of CRC<sup>19</sup>.

17. The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 is relevant to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). UNICEF support to mine action has an opportunity to contribute to the right to: participate in political and public life (Article 7); access education and information (Article 10); employment (Article 11); and access health care services (Article 12). It does not specifically highlight rural women's rights (Article 14). However, the strategy does not enable implementation of action oriented around these policies through objectives that are oriented around CEDAW or guidelines on how to implement action to support the principles within CEDAW. The current appropriateness of the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 as a tool for CEDAW is limited. We have found no instances where CEDAW has been considered in UNICEF supported mine action.

18. The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 is relevant to the CCC. As a tool for implementation of CCC, UNICEF mine action support suffers from a lack of specific guidance related to emergency contexts. Technical notes have been developed that contain specific reference to context-based interpretation of the strategy<sup>20</sup>. UNICEF has also developed a series of manuals and guidebooks that are widely disseminated, for example via the MRE working group. These remain more geared towards implementing organisations than to UNICEF internally. Internal mine action guidelines make little reference to non-mine action priorities of UNICEF. Knowledge of these documents appears to be very low, and they are not being used to further emergency specific efforts around children through mine action. UNICEF's CCC clearly identifies its role to meet rights and needs<sup>21</sup> and direct reference is made in CCC to ensure special protection for children who are victims of war.

19. The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 is not designed in a way that appropriately enables HRBAP. This is unsurprising since in 2002, HRBAP remained relatively conceptual and UNICEF is still in the process of change today. Using the HRBAP in isolation of other related interventions, which do not take the same approach, is less likely to provide a cohesive

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<sup>19</sup> An example of an exception of this is the MRE networks established in Ethiopia are now being used in support of CRC objectives.

<sup>20</sup> *A Best Practice and Briefing Guide to UNICEF and Mine Action – An Overview of Operational and Programming Strategies*, by Andy Wheatley is an example of a technical study that can serve as guidelines.

<sup>21</sup> "The Central Role of UNICEF in unstable situations is the implementation of programme activities for children and women, with particular emphasis on advocacy; assessment and coordination; and care and protection of vulnerable children. In these efforts, UNICEF implements an integrated approach in meeting the rights and needs of children and women in crisis, based on recognition of the complex range of factors and the relationships between physical and emotional security, social and cognitive development, and health and nutritional status." UNICEF's Core Commitment to Children in Emergencies.

humanitarian intervention. UNICEF support to mine action does contribute to some of these rights, as mentioned above. The rights-based approach is well-articulated at headquarters and management-level, but is yet to filter into practice at the country and regional level. Strategies, such as that for mine action, do not include procedures for implementation, provide for guidance in how to implement the HRBAP principles, do not contain examples of good practice, enable analysis “on the ground” to develop innovative approaches or contain sub-objectives designed to identify areas of progress. This is a broader challenge that UNICEF faces as it moves towards implementation of HRBAP. If UNICEF were to adopt a rights based approach to mine action, this would entail a paradigm shift in the approach, and incur re-organisation so that mine action considerations became embedded in other thematic areas and prioritisation of needs would be replaced by consideration of all rights on equal merit.

20. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in [Box 2](#). The activities, goals and objectives outlined in the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy and CCC are consistent with the requirements of affected populations and national priorities, partner and donor policies. Areas where consistency can be improved relate to global requirements. There are few activities that relate to international humanitarian and human rights instruments. Use of these instruments is further expanded upon on pages 34 and 55.

The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002 – 2005 is consistent with the expectations of partners and relevant to national priorities and the needs of affected populations. It could be made more consistent with international humanitarian and human rights instruments, notably CRC and CEDAW, and some effort has gone into improving its relevancy to CCC. The approach that UNICEF support to mine action has taken could be made more consistent with these requirements if a HRBAP approach was adopted. The current approach is appropriately responsive to national priorities.

*Box 2: UNICEF consistency with requirements of mine action stakeholders.*

***Are UNICEF strategies and activities in mine action effectively tailored to local and international needs as the case may be?***<sup>22</sup>

21. In the emergency phase, MRE is the most relevant of the three goals and UNICEF support to MRE is by far the most critical to the achievement of national priorities and in targeting the requirements of affected people. As the situation stabilises and emergency risk reduction needs are addressed, sub-objectives related to capacity building become more relevant, and goals relating to assistance to survivors and non-MBT related advocacy<sup>23</sup>, particularly in relation to the requirements of survivors, correspond more to national priorities and the requirements of affected people<sup>24</sup>. In development phases the relevance of UNICEF support to mine action, to the requirements of affected populations and national priorities would increase if UNICEF were to redirect its development efforts around non-MBT advocacy and VA<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>22</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action* – Request for Proposals dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.

<sup>23</sup> Even in non-signatory countries such as Azerbaijan and Armenia, where signature is inter-dependent.

<sup>24</sup> Questionnaire data indicates that HRBAP is sometimes used for VA and disability advocacy.

<sup>25</sup> Consensus between national implementing partners interviewed, including organisations in Iraq, Afghanistan, international NGOs and donors. Many cited examples of successful support by UNICEF, but wished to see more in capacity building and VA once immediate risks were reduced.

22. The relevancy of the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 and support to implementing partners differs depending on which phase of the crisis UNICEF support is taking place, from emergency to development. Analysis of data in relation to the phase of the crisis (as opposed to the status of the programme as defined by UN policy vis-à-vis government) did uncover differences of appropriateness and relevancy of UNICEF's support depending on context - emergency to development. There are some indications that the point of transition from a UNICEF led programme to UNICEF support of a government led programme, as encapsulated in the Master Plan of Operations, is at times insufficiently considerate of government capacity. UNICEF support to mine action is affected by the capacity of local implementing partners and transition should be more realistically planned<sup>26</sup>.



*A landmine victim from the Afar region of Ethiopia receives a prosthesis made and fitted by a local NGO, TDVO in Tigray province. UNICEF has identified TDVO as a potential partner for the disability programme. Support to partners is relevant in all stages of a crisis.*

23. Particular sub-objectives and goals of the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 come into play at different times as the country context stabilises. As it is, the strategy aims to be all encompassing, irrespective of contextual changes. This leads to weakening of the strategy, when country programmes 'cherry pick' certain elements over others, and this also complicates implementation of a strategy that could be made more user friendly if clearer distinctions were made in relation to crisis phases. There is no clear change of UNICEF approach as implementing partners become more capable or when the country context stabilises<sup>27</sup>. The relevancy of UNICEF support for implementing partners is consequently, for the most part, limited to funding and technical support<sup>28</sup>.

24. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in Box 3. UNICEF strategies and activities are tailored to local humanitarian needs and international needs as defined in UN policies for mine action. However, there are few activities specifically tailored to the needs of local implementing partners, particularly in relation to management capacity building and financial viability. Capacity building activities, strengths and weaknesses are further expanded upon on pages 46 to 49 and again on pages 53 to 55.

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<sup>26</sup> An example of inadequate transition planning is Ethiopia. Interview and field visit data show inappropriate consideration of the mid to long term capacity building and transition requirements of the local NGO implementing partner and lack of understanding of the organisational features of an NGO. This has resulted in loss of capability. This is a legacy from the past, but the consequences are manifesting today.

<sup>27</sup> An example of a country that has displayed a range of phases leading to full hand over to government is Angola.

<sup>28</sup> Some international NGOs state that technical support provision, particularly in VA, is not required, however UNICEF support, particularly through funding, is welcome.

The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002 – 2005 is open enough to interpretation that it enables support to mine action to be tailored to local and international needs. MRE is the most relevant at both levels in emergency phases. However, VA and capacity building become increasingly relevant in addressing local needs as the country programme enters the development phase. The approach taken by UNICEF does enable tailored response. However, more guidance is required regarding response to development needs.

*Box 3: UNICEF ability to tailor mine action to local and international needs.*

**Are the activities, inputs and approach for delivering the programme consistent with the expected outcomes and impact, and organisational structure of UNICEF?<sup>29</sup>**

25. A summary of UNICEF mine action staff<sup>30</sup> views is provided in Box 4:

UNICEF is good at raising awareness of issues at the ministerial and government levels. However, field support at country level to implementing partners, particularly relating to more community based approaches tends to be weaker. HRBAP has not turned into a reality and remains conceptual. The confusion between rights and needs indicates how embryonic the HRBAP process is. This is a feature not unique to UNICEF – the same can be said for the UN system as a whole. Advocacy tends to be done well, but there are 'amateur' interventions, for example an MBT related statement targeting Russia, China and the US, in what some perceived to be an unhelpful / deconstructive way. UNDP and UNMAS appear to have more dedicated VA personnel than UNICEF. Nevertheless UNICEF achieves a notable amount in this area given the limited resources it has available. UNICEF should do more on information management, notably impact survey and use of victim data. UNICEF has a tendency to underestimate the resources required to effectively create an organisation that can function in a sustainable fashion. UNICEF has achieved a lot in terms of global knowledge management amongst mine action practitioners at a technical level. It now needs to focus more on management viability, both within UNICEF and in its work through partners. The general consensus is that UNICEF should focus on needs of children and women, regardless of whether or not there is any overlap with mine action. There were divided opinions regarding the requirement to have a dedicated mine action capability and strategy and there are reservations regarding the way that mine action programming is reportedly uncoordinated with other UNICEF efforts i.e. considered more as a standalone, task or project.

MRE seems to differ depending on the section that is managing it at CO level. If its Child Protection, MRE is more likely to be oriented towards acquisition of life skills, and if it is the Communications Division, MRE is more likely to be TV spots and other IEC initiatives. Mine action sometimes suffers because CO staff members do not wish to solicit additional funding for mine action when UNICEF has already requested funds for other programmes from a particular donor. LASAT tends to respond to requests as a technical expert and this is considered sufficient support by a number of COs.

*Box 4: Summary Stakeholder Analysis: UNICEF mine action staff interviews.*

26. A summary of UNICEF non-mine action staff<sup>31</sup> views is provided in Box 5:

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<sup>29</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action* – Request for Proposals dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.

<sup>30</sup> Interviews were conducted with UNICEF staff in HQ, in Thailand and Kenya ROs and in Laos, Cambodia, Sudan and Ethiopia COs. This included mine action focal points, UNICEF consultants in mine action and more permanent mine action UNICEF staff.

<sup>31</sup> Interviews were conducted with UNICEF staff in HQ, in Thailand and Kenya ROs and in Laos, Cambodia, Sudan and Ethiopia COs. This is a summary of the opinion of non-mine action UNICEF staff.



The technical qualifications of LASAT are impressive and LASAT is one of the few capabilities within UNICEF HQ that raises its own funds, effectively sustaining itself without reliance on other sections. The Nairobi Summit was effective in creating internal UNICEF recognition regarding mine action support and its place within the organisation's priorities. The position of mine action in EMOPS is historical. It would be better located in the Child Protection section, particularly given the difficulty defining transition, from emergency to development phases in-country or, in terms of national mine action programming, from UNMAS to UNDP lead. Communications, public relations and advocacy capabilities in UNICEF are significant. This has effectively supported global advocacy. The main impact of UNICEF's support is in educating affected people on risk. ROs are the main strategic drivers within UNICEF, with HQ supporting, and COs implementing under strategic and technical guidance provided by ROs. The 2002 – 2005 UNICEF Mine Action Strategy served to raise awareness of mine action and the potential contribution of UNICEF across COs in terms of VA, MRE and advocacy. UNICEF actually does a lot more regarding disability programming than the mine action programmes may realise. This could be because information regarding disability activities is not managed in such a way that LASAT or COs can consider mine / UXO impact reduction contributions.

At HQ level there is some duplication of effort that could make better use of competences and resources through better coordination. For example capacity building conducted by PD and EMOPS could make better use of transition planning and management capacity building experiences in PD or resource mobilisation conducted by PD, EMOPS and the Programme Funding Office could send proposals for projects to a broader set of non-mine action donors. There is also duplication of capability, for example on policy development by Humanitarian Policy Unit and Division of Policy and Planning or on thematic competences such as curriculum development, awareness campaigns, or community based approaches. If these competences were better mobilised across technical areas, such as mine action or water and sanitation or health, then these would benefit from lessons learned in UNICEF.

Two programming cultures exist within UNICEF – those who stick to the MTSP and those who respond to context defined needs in a more dynamic way. In the past, mine action has relied on the latter group. From 2006, with inclusion into the MTSP, support for mine action should become more institutionalised. The CCC references to mine action are at a very general level, and should be considered more as 'intent' than a guideline for mine action.

*Box 5: Summary Stakeholder Analysis: UNICEF non-mine action staff interviews.*

27. The argument that UNICEF should justify a role in mine action by expanding its mission statement to include children and their families is not necessary. According to the 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy', which clarifies the meaning of the word, lead means focal point and enabler, in a way that encourages other UN agencies to become engaged in programmes<sup>32</sup>. According to the 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy', UNICEF may play a lead role, or act as focal point in mine action, irrespective of demography of the at-risk group since this does not preclude other agency contributions directed towards other target groups. Expansion of the target group of UNICEF to include families, i.e. all demographic groups, does make sense, given the indirect impact on children if parents are injured or their livelihoods affected by mines/UXO. Notwithstanding the sound arguments for inclusion of older demographic groups, these interpretations have not filtered into the mindset of some UNICEF CO staff.

28. Country programme support to mine action currently varies in its demographic focus and is sometimes out of kilter with the at-risk group<sup>33</sup>. There are instances, for example in refugee and

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<sup>32</sup> Interview with UNMAS.

<sup>33</sup> There are numerous examples where UNICEF is responding to need, irrespective of age or gender, and this is the tendency of UNICEF. However, some UNICEF interviews and country profiles/project

Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps in emergencies, where the majority of those at potential risk as a result of repatriation may include children and women<sup>34</sup>. However, this does not follow global trends which clearly indicate that adolescents and males are the most at risk globally<sup>35</sup>. Rather than briefing country programme staff on an expansion of UNICEF target group, it would be more appropriate to brief them on the meaning of 'lead' agency. UNICEF support to mine action has significant technical merit. However, put bluntly, mine action does not correspond to the demographic focus group of UNICEF as an agency.

29. UNICEF's mine action support is relevant to implementing partners. However, the appropriateness of activities, inputs, organisation and approach varies, resulting in inconsistent outcomes which impact on partners. UNICEF support to capacity building in mine action could be planned with mid to long-term needs more carefully considered. Particular weaknesses in approach include weaknesses in transition and exit planning, and there are instances where either a monopoly has been inadvertently created or status of the different kinds of organisation (NGO versus government organisation) inappropriately considered<sup>36</sup>. On occasion, support provided by UNICEF capacity building efforts has suffered due to lack of foresight and human resource limitations which in turn are due to staff turnover or even inexperience. UNICEF tends to provide good technical support to implementing partners. However, neglect of management functions, including external relations and fundraising, finance, and contract management does suggest that UNICEF support is sometimes not appropriately designed for the fledgling organisations it aims to support. In general, UNICEF's support to more formal organisations such as ministries, or to international implementing partners does not require elongated transition and exit strategy, and tends to be more appropriately designed. There are some indications that the effectiveness of partner activities suffers significantly when UNICEF financial and technical support is withdrawn<sup>37</sup>.

30. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in Box 6. The appropriateness of activities, inputs and approach for delivering mine action support varies based on the experience of the UNICEF mine action focal person. Outcomes and impact on women and children as well as on local partners range from significant and effective, through to very little, at times negative impact on local implementing partners. The impact of UNICEF's

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documents imply that children are most at risk when that is suspected not to be the case. An example is the Azerbaijan project proposal, Baku country office, 2003-2005.

<sup>34</sup> 'Men of economically active age make up most of those who have suffered mine/UXO incidents, but women and children make up a substantial proportion as well. This varies in different regions ranging from a ratio in adults of female to male of 1 in 4 in Mozambique to 1 in 35 in Cambodia (Andersson 1995)', quote from World Health Organisation, [http://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/index.html](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/index.html) Many current injury surveillance data mentioned in interviews indicate males and adolescents tend to be most at risk, with the exception of refugee and IDP groups, which tend to include more women and children. According to information provided by the UNICEF team in Cambodia, there has been a reduction of accidents and injuries among children by 35% compared with 2005 and a reduction of mine/UXO casualties by 50% compared with 2005.

<sup>35</sup> An example contradicting the global trend is the *CIDA monitoring of UNICEF in Columbia Final report* which notes female survivors are abandoned by men in the patriarchal society.

<sup>36</sup> In Iraq, some implementing organisations and Iraqi government organisations suggest that mine victim information should not be managed by an Iraqi NGO, even though this direction was pursued in Iraq. In Ethiopia the national implementing partner of UNICEF claims to have been unprepared for withdrawal of UNICEF support and unwilling to become a government controlled body.

<sup>37</sup> Interviews with UNICEF staff suggest that implementing partner outcomes and outputs are increased as a result of the efforts of a small number of mine action focal points and consultants.

mine action support is described on page 51 and analysis of impact of activities is described on page 51.

The experience of UNICEF staff in mine action varies. International implementing partners are not dependent, in general, on UNICEF, but appreciate fundraising support and coordination. However, local partners tend to be more reliant on UNICEF for technical support and capacity building. UNICEF technical support is particularly good, but management functions are sometimes neglected resulting in difficulty with transition and exit. The outcome on mine / UXO affected children and their families is that, once UNICEF support is withdrawn, effectiveness of MRE and VA decreases.

*Box 6: The relationship between inputs and outputs of UNICEF support to mine action.*

**How well do UNICEF's mine action objectives and approach fit with UNICEF organisational priorities and programmes?**<sup>38</sup>

31. UNICEF's mine action support is not fully tailored to match UNICEF's priorities, strategy or programmes. Contribution of mine action to the MTSP is not adequately reported, so relevancy of mine action to UNICEF is, to a significant extent, unrecognised. This is explained by the fact that mine action was not included into the 2002 – 2005 MTSP. Despite the inclusion into the 2006 – 2009 MTSP, UNICEF support to mine action still does not clearly draw its authority from UNICEF's five organisational priorities<sup>39</sup>. It is placed under child protection, but the specific role of mine action within that focus area is not sufficiently elaborate to enable information management and project development that truly mainstreams mine / UXO considerations into protection. Furthermore, mine action is relevant to other UNICEF focus areas, namely policy, advocacy and partnerships for children's rights, basic education and gender equality and young child survival and development. The UNICEF mine action strategy served a purpose, at a time in the evolution of mine action and of UNICEF. The main benefits of the strategy were to enable the raising of funds, to improve recognition and respect for UNICEF in mine action, and increase understanding of the importance of MRE as potentially (but yet to be proven), one of the most cost effective risk reduction methods in mine action<sup>40</sup>. UNICEF support to mine action has contributed to the use of information, communication and advocacy to influence the actions of others, for example promoting best practice in MRE<sup>41</sup> and advocating for universal ratification of the MBT. Further use of information, communication and advocacy so that survivor needs get considered more holistically would increase relevance to the MTSP.

32. Areas where weaknesses exist and effort should be placed to increase relevancy of mine action to UNICEF are: inclusion of a rights-based approach, particularly the key standards embodied in the CRC and CEDAW; inclusion of clearly defined objectives and continuous monitoring, as part of results-based management; participation of children, women and men in decision-making; proactive coordination and common planning by the various UN agencies and other stakeholders; embedding mine action considerations into the mainstreamed activities of

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<sup>38</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action* – Request for Proposals dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.

<sup>39</sup> The MTSP highlights five strategies for achieving its priorities: programme excellence through a results-based management approach and a human rights-based approach to programming; effective country programmes of cooperation (CPCs); partnerships for shared success; influential information, communications and advocacy; and excellence in internal management and operations

<sup>40</sup> It was also used to advocate internally to senior management of UNICEF regarding certain aspects of the programme in country.

<sup>41</sup> Guidelines for messages and tools in Liberia have raised the level of technical adherence to IMAS.



Country Programmes of Cooperation (CPC) – as the primary means through which UNICEF pursues its organisational priorities – and then enshrining it in the Master Plan of Operations with the host government.

33. The 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy' of 1998 appointed UNICEF with the lead role in MRE. UNICEF's own goal on MRE is the most prescriptive of the three, with UNICEF clearly dominating in this area. Nevertheless, seven years on from the original attribution of this role, UNICEF has developed a considerable technical capability in MRE. In 2005, it has become appropriate that UNICEF retain a lead MRE role,



*Children at the Salaam Camp in Jabal Awaliya receive MRE from volunteers recruited by UNICEF-trained local NGO, FPDO. IDPs and refugees may include more women and children requiring MRE than is generally the norm.*

even though this should not have been the case when the 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy' of 1998 was developed. This comparative technical advantage also exists with advocacy, thanks to UNICEF's global network and communications division. The comparative technical advantage of UNICEF versus other UN agencies is does not exist for VA.

34. World Health Organisation (WHO) contributions in VA are limited to public health policy and research, including disability treatment protocols, training and professional standardisation at a Ministry of Health level<sup>42</sup>. UNICEF is ill-equipped to lead direct support to survivors be that through economic, social or physical rehabilitation<sup>43</sup>. It is not appropriate that UNICEF has a VA goal that is so all-encompassing of survivor needs. It is appropriate that UNICEF leverage their existing capabilities to facilitate improved inclusion of mine/UXO incident survivors into core activities of UNICEF<sup>44</sup>. UNICEF has an opportunity to holistically mobilise around survivors given UNICEF's engagement in water and sanitation, education, health, shelter, nutrition etc. UNICEF's support to information management relating to survivors is relevant to mine action. However, the 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy' should be more specific regarding the contributions of UNICEF and leave no misunderstanding regarding the scope of UNICEF's support to VA as well as those aspects of VA not covered by UNICEF. UNICEF may mainstream VA to such an extent that it ceases to

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<sup>42</sup> Interview with implementing partners and donors.

<sup>43</sup> An example is in Afghanistan where UNICEF considered then discounted direct support to survivors due to insufficient technical capability.

<sup>44</sup> According to Help the Aged International, it is worth looking at the aged/older people who are frequently the most marginalised. Children, however are generally the focus of some 50% of humanitarian agencies. Extending the mission to families should be inclusive if it is to be used at all. Otherwise it is misleading and misrepresents what is to be done.

formally exist, or it may decide to address disability issues more comprehensively. VA has currently fallen to the initiatives of a few individuals. UNICEF must decide to either implement a plan of action for more comprehensive approaches to VA, or drop the focus on mine victims entirely, favouring a broader disability focus that encompasses all causes of trauma.

35. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in [Box 7](#). UNICEF's mine action objectives and approach do not comfortably fit with UNICEF organisational priorities and programmes which are: young child survival and development; basic education and gender equality; HIV/AIDS and children; child protection from violence, exploitation and abuse; and policy advice and advocacy for children's rights. The correlation between mine action and the 2006 – 2009 organisational priorities and programmes has been improved in the current MTSP through specific mention of mine action in focus area four, child protection. However, mine action relates to most of the other focus areas, notably young child survival and development, basic education and gender equality and policy advocacy and partnerships for children's rights. Mention in a strategy under child protection and in the CCC go some way towards strategic fit, but more comprehensive inclusion of mine action is required if the approach is to truly satisfy the role of UNICEF in meeting the requirements of children and women. The risks that mine action support may face if it is mainstreamed within UNICEF are described on page 58.

Mine Action has been added to the MTSP for 2006 – 2009 which will improve the viability of mine action as one of the core capabilities of UNICEF. The actual correlation is currently weak, and instruments such as CEDAW and CRC or HRBAP are not sufficiently incorporated into the mine action strategy. VA and disability in general is included under the 'most vulnerable' that UNICEF aims to assist, however its place within UNICEF is insufficiently defined and the requisite technical capability is low in mine action.

*Box 7: Viability of the current UNICEF mine action approach within UNICEF.*

**Are UNICEF mine action activities and strategies consistent with UN reform policies and programmes?<sup>45</sup>**

36. The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 does correspond to the '2005 Coordination: The UN Inter-Agency Policy' and UNICEF's decentralised organisation enables in-country coordination decisions favoured by that policy. Most responsibilities mentioned in the 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy' are reflected in UNICEF's 2002-2005 mine action strategy, although there is room for further clarification of UNICEF's activities, roles and responsibilities, particularly in programme management and project implementation during emergencies. The 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy' requires that in certain circumstances: (1) UNICEF should support: implementation of quick response mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal activities, (2) hazardous area marking projects, (3) national coordination of MRE with UNMAS in situations of emergency (in the absence of UNMAS or UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF may accept responsibility as the UN focal point for mine action), but these three activities are not mentioned in the 2002-2005 strategy. UNICEF support to national coordination is very relevant and appropriate. However, UNICEF's involvement in clearance and marking in emergencies would improve relevance to donors,

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<sup>45</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action* – Request for Proposals dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.

national priorities and the mine/UXO populations themselves although this would require additional training of UNICEF staff <sup>46</sup>.

37. The importance of mine action as “a crucial supporting element of the broader humanitarian, development and peace-building agenda”<sup>47</sup> is stated in point 36 of the 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy'. Processes for formal UNICEF mine action coordination with agencies such as World Food Programme (WFP) or UNHCR, or collaboration with these same organisations using more reactive mechanisms tends to be at a national and not regional level. At a national level, there are examples, such as in Sudan, where mine action has preceded peace building, notably through coordination between regions in the same country. Examples of formal coordination include plans made with UNHCR in Ethiopia or with WFP in Iraq. However, such coordination is rarely accompanied by collaborative mechanisms that include, for example, joint needs assessment, joint mine action planning or exchange of technical support that goes beyond provision of materials. In the case of Ethiopia, for example, MRE in certain regions and to particular groups is implemented by UNHCR and not by UNICEF, both organisations effectively coordinating to ensure that response to needs identified by either agency do not duplicate. However, in terms of collaboration within this coordination framework, the level of involvement of UNICEF in these regions or to these groups is minimal<sup>48</sup>.

38. There are few instances where UNICEF has seized opportunities for cross-border collaboration regarding needs, for example through preparedness activities<sup>49</sup>, or planning coordination, for example to cover both IDP and refugee needs. Collaboration with UNHCR and WFP does take place, notably through provision of materials or exchange of information (such as situation reports or needs assessments) between offices and agencies present in the region. However, there is little evidence of planning activities such as joint surveillance of population movements for mine action risk mapping or liaison between UNICEF, WFP and UNHCR regarding repatriation plans and integration of activities such as VA or MRE<sup>50</sup>. An example where this could be more prevalent is in the Great Lakes region of Africa, where there are some records of UNICEF monitoring of refugee movements from Tanzania into Burundi using information provided by UNHCR. However, there was no reported or documented evidence of practical consideration of the programming requirements of UNICEF support to mine action to meet projections by UNHCR, repatriation plans made by the government of Tanzania or resettlement plans made by the Government of Burundi using joint planning processes that involved all three agencies.

39. Objectives 1.2 and 1.4 of the 2002-2005 mine action strategy could have gone further in their commitment to development mainstreaming (one of the key UN positions). Surprisingly, there is no mention of the MDGs. Mine action helps with the realisation of several of the MDGs: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (MDG1); promote gender equality and empower women (MDG3); reduce child mortality (MDG4); ensure environmental sustainability (MDG7); develop global partnerships for development (MDG8). Given that the strategy does not facilitate implementation of action oriented around MDGs through objectives that are time and output

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<sup>46</sup> Interview with donors.

<sup>47</sup> An example of mine action as a conflict mitigating tool is its inclusion in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between North and South Sudan.

<sup>48</sup> Interviews in Ethiopia and document review suggest little to no UNICEF involvement.

<sup>49</sup> Both Ethiopia and Iraq are examples where cross-border collaboration can be facilitated through UNICEF COs in the region, but is not.

<sup>50</sup> Interview with UNHCR and WFP.

bound, or indicators that enable progress to be tracked, its appropriateness as a tool for the 2005 – 2009 UN mine action strategy and associated 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy' can be significantly improved through better information management. UNICEF's support in mine action is not considerate of poverty reduction strategies in general and would become more relevant to UNICEF, donors and affected populations if this weakness were addressed.

40. The 1998 UN Interagency Mine Action Policy appointed a significant role to UNICEF in support in advocacy relating to mine/UXO affected people. UNICEF has substantial corporate capabilities in policy and communication and can leverage a national committee structure – a feature unique to UNICEF in advocacy, comparable only to the Red Cross movement and its committee structure. It can mobilise a network of stakeholders and create pressure groups, both formally and informally, in a way few other UN agency can do. Once again, and this applies to all three of UNICEF's mine action goals, it is now generally accepted that the demographic group most at risk tends to be adolescent and/or adult males. However, UNICEF's ability to raise awareness regarding the rights and needs of children and women has a worldwide effect that can lead to momentum around the needs of other demographic groups. Country programme support to advocacy varies, at times focusing on children's needs to the detriment of other at-risk groups<sup>51</sup>. Given the advantages of UNICEF, and the re-interpretation of lead agency functions in the 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy', it is appropriate that UNICEF remain engaged in advocacy related to mine action.

41. The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 does correspond, albeit in an imprecise way, to the 2001-2005 UN Mine Action Strategy and UNICEF states that it has a role in all of the "Six Strategic Goals" and 22 of the Objectives. The strategy does not detail all of the six strategic goals (it refers to some of them in a more cross-cutting manner) and it is unclear how UNICEF's strategy goals and objectives were derived from the UN ones, nor how they provided coherence with the UN's goals<sup>52</sup>. Practical UNICEF support to mine action is relevant to all six UN goals, and notably contributes to goals relating to rapid response<sup>53</sup>, fund raising and advocacy. UNICEF's support could be made more relevant to the UN if it further developed its role in information management, particularly as UNICEF is sometimes present where other UN agencies are not. UNICEF's mine action support doesn't make appropriate use of international humanitarian and human rights instruments or enable others to do so.

42. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in [Box 8](#). UNICEF mine action activities and strategies are consistent with UN reform policies and programmes. UNICEF is particularly strong at interagency collaboration, but the direct correlation between UNICEF support to mine action and the 2001 – 2005 UN strategy and MDGs is not developed. The

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<sup>51</sup> Interview with implementing partners suggest that, even though this is not the trend, it does take place.

<sup>52</sup> UN Goals are as follows: Strategic Goal One. Information is produced and made available to all to understand and address mine-action problems; Strategic Goal Two. Rapid response capability is in place to meet mine action requirements in emergency situations; Strategic Goal Three. National and local capacities are in place to plan, coordinate and implement mine-action programmes; Strategic Goal Four. Mine-action operations are implemented in a safe and cost effective manner; Strategic Goal Five. Adequate resources for mine action are mobilised and their use is effectively coordinated and; Strategic Goal Six. International instruments that address the mine/unexploded ordnance problem are universalised.

<sup>53</sup> Example is the Iraq rapid response plan. Despite the relatively negative findings relating to UNICEF emergency response within the framework of that plan, this evaluation, which had a broader scope, found that UNICEF's contributions in emergencies tended to be effectively programmed and delivered.

impact of this on UNICEF's ability to solicit mainstreamed donors for mine action funding is described on page 28.

UNICEF is particularly collaborative and supportive of other UN agencies in mine action and is consistent with the 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy'. Areas where coordination is less developed include cross-border efforts and efforts behind the peace-building agenda. Collaboration tends to be in the form of information exchange. The exact contribution of UNICEF towards the 6 UN mine action strategy goals is not apparent and linkages with other agencies could be improved if the contribution towards MDGs was made more apparent.

*Box 8: UNICEF mine action as part of a reformed UN effort.*

**Does UNICEF have sufficient human, financial and material resources to implement the activities as outlined in the Strategy?**<sup>54</sup>

43. A summary of donor views is provided in Box 9<sup>55</sup>:

Most of UNICEF's donors were consulted during the development of the strategy, but are no-longer familiar with its contents. Donors tend to be particularly complimentary regarding the efforts behind the 2002 – 2005 UNICEF mine action strategy which raised respect for UNICEF's role in mine action and improved UNICEF's ability to deliver quantified results and report needs. Donors are very satisfied by field visits they have made to UNICEF offices and programmes. They state that while it is usually rare for field offices to compliment HQ, LASAT is almost always praised by COs during field visits. The small arms issue sits uncomfortably with some mine action donors, whereas for others the same funding stream may be used. Most donors engage with LASAT rather than directly with the country offices and they compliment LASAT for its pro-active contact and information provision. Most donors approve of UNICEF's lead on MRE; however they do call into question the added-value of UNICEF vis-à-vis international implementing organisations that they could fund directly. Some state that it is expedient to have one larger contract with the UN rather than numerous smaller contracts with implementing organisations. Some voice a concern regarding donor dependency of UNICEF mine action, and all predict that funding will decrease over time. Most are satisfied with narrative performance reporting, but state that in the next funding cycles a more systems-based approach to verifiable effectiveness and impact will be required in order to justify funds. Government policy is often to support UN efforts. Competing demands, especially if funds are no-longer ear-marked for mine action, will require additional justification of funding through: approaches that integrated into more mainstreamed development efforts over time; better indications of reduction in impact / injury / fatality; clear contribution of UNICEF as part of a collective UN effort, for example in national coordination with MACs and bilateral ministerial partnerships; and better transition and exit planning. Most believe that UNICEF mine action will continue to exist at current levels for as long as the MBT deadlines have not been met.

Some donors cite MRE as the most effective pillar of mine action and the cause of decreases in new victims – although absolute numbers are increasing – and that the slow rate of clearance could not have created such an effect. Other donors state clearly, that impact of MRE is unproven and the benefits of informing people of a risk and appropriate behaviour, without providing alternate options, is a waste of donor funds. There is also a difference of opinion regarding the role of UNDP, UNICEF and UNMAS in mine action.

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<sup>54</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action – Request for Proposals dated 29 June 2005.* Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.

<sup>55</sup> Interviews were conducted with donors at HQ level, as well as with a selection of donors present at country level in the Horn of Africa and South East Asia.



Box 9: Summary Stakeholder Analysis: Donor interviews.

44. The vast majority of financial support associated to UNICEF support to mine action is directed towards the MRE goal. VA and advocacy combined represent less than a third of funding. As would be expected, advocacy activities, according to questionnaire data, tend to take place when there is a national government that UNICEF is supporting through mine action. Advocacy spending is low because it tends to be less resource intensive and more mainstreamed into UNICEF's activities than activities relating to the MRE or VA goal. These findings are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows spending over the past two years in programmes where UNICEF is supporting a national government, and in Figure 2, which shows spending over the past two years in programmes where UNICEF is managing a mine action programme on behalf of, or in the absence of a national government. Low/high refers to the lowest and highest budget figures obtained for that activity from questionnaires.




Figure 1: 2004/5 spending in UNICEF supported mine action according to questionnaires.




Figure 2: 2004/5 spending in UNICEF managed mine action according to questionnaires.

45. A very small proportion of UNICEF supported mine action funding has been attributed to VA investment. Non-mine action funding that has been allocated towards disability assistance, possibly including mine/UXO victims, was not analysed as part of this evaluation. It is very possible that, if disability funding via UNICEF were mapped onto mine/UXO victim inclusion, the amount of VA supported by UNICEF would increase<sup>56</sup>. Given the limited capacity of UNICEF in management of disability programmes there is some caution before engaging in demanding

<sup>56</sup> Comment made during the 1-day workshop on 17<sup>th</sup> March, 2006.

support programmes. If such comprehensive VA programmes are launched, it is often as a result of the efforts of the particular mine action focal person<sup>57</sup>. There are more reported survivors, in part due to improved reporting mechanisms and there is a global shift in need, from prevention through clearance and risk education, towards assistance to survivors remaining after this legacy of war has been contained. Notwithstanding this trend, UNICEF has not approached more long-term development sources of funding. VA is neglected in part due to lack of traditional mine action donor interest. This is compounded by a lack of disability expertise in UNICEF HQ as well as in the UN mine action system. There is little evidence of participation by UNICEF in VA working groups. UNICEF capability in VA is reliant on a few individuals, needs are often not identified, and fundraising efforts associated with UNICEF supported mine action tend to focus on donors more familiar with clearance and risk education than health, social welfare or economic development. Relevancy of VA to donors could be improved if the donor base were expanded to include other thematic areas and more mainstreamed donors.

46. The relevancy of advocacy appears to be at its highest in UN managed programmes, often in emergency contexts, but there are few solicitations for funding support to advocacy in development contexts where UNICEF supports a government led mine action programme. This is symptomatic of UNICEF's current focus on MBT related advocacy. VA and VA related advocacy is not prioritised, sometimes for very practical reasons such as lack of human resources.

47. The smallest proportion of UNICEF supported mine action funding has been attributed to advocacy. What has been allocated is almost entirely at a global level and almost entirely in relation to MBT. Furthermore, investment in advocacy peaked a few years after the creation of the MBT and has declined in recent years, suggesting that the relevancy of MBT related advocacy is decreasing. This is due to successful advocacy in the past and the diminished number of affected states that still need to sign the treaty. Investments into advocacy show peaks and troughs that have little correlation to specific country needs and there is a lack of awareness of other, non-MBT legal instruments that could be utilised to advocate for reduction in mine/UXO impact. Use of other advocacy instruments is neglected, predominantly because of lack of UNICEF awareness of other legal instruments that could be utilised to advocate for reduction in mine/UXO impact. This has resulted in non-identification of needs, and non-solicitation of funding to donors who would be interested in supporting activities such as those related to access to buildings, benefits for people living with disability, the effect of war on children etc. The relevancy of the advocacy focus on MBT is reduced over time, and relevancy of the advocacy goal could be increased if other legal instruments were considered and health and social development donors mobilised, possibly around Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

48. The largest proportion of UNICEF supported mine action has been attributed to MRE. This is not only true of global fund allocations, for example from Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the UK Department for International Development (DfID), but also true of funding that is more regionally or locally sourced. This trend has consistently been the case since UNICEF commenced formal mine action in the late nineteen nineties. This is the area of greatest technical competence for the mine action focal points within UNICEF. The

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<sup>57</sup> Interviews with ESARO in Nairobi and EAPRO in Bangkok suggest that a push towards disability may take place in Africa irrespective of a continued need for MRE because of the interest of UNICEF staff and that MRE may continue in South East Asia even though the needs in disability assistance are greater. This implies that programme development areas are predicated more by staff experience than need or strategy.

community liaison role within mine action, traditionally associated to MRE, has furthered the relevancy of MRE to donors and as part of the collective UN mine action effort. MRE needs tend to be identified, funds tend to be solicited for these needs, and projects tend to be supported both at HQ and CO levels. This is in part because, of the three goals, UNICEF is most aware of its MRE role through the lead role taken at a corporate level, for example through the development of international standards and guidelines, and organisation of workshops. MRE support sometimes relies on human resources that have little experience in mine action. The use of consultants and support provision through LASAT does compensate for this. The relevancy of the MRE goal could be increased if community liaison and MRE data was used to enable the efforts of other UN agencies and mine action organisations and if reporting was more oriented towards UNICEF's organisational priorities, including MDGs.

49. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in [Box 10](#). UNICEF has sufficient human, financial and material resources to implement the MRE and advocacy activities as outlined in the strategy, but this is not the case for VA. The experience and technical qualifications of UNICEF mine action focal points is variable in MRE and advocacy, but competencies do exist and can be high. In the case of VA, an insufficient number of human resources have the required technical background and financial and material resources are lacking. The effect of insufficient VA resources on achievement of goals within the timeframe is described on page 29 and the contributions to VA objectives by UNICEF are described on pages 38 and 40.

UNICEF mine action staff tends to be experienced in MRE and, to a lesser extent, disability. Part-time focal points tend to be specialised in other areas and time that they can dedicate to supporting mine action is limited. Financial resources for MRE dominate and few attributions are made to advocacy or VA. Lack of adequate inputs has resulted in insufficient progress on VA, disability related advocacy or support to local MBT campaigns. Sufficient quality of resources has enabled MRE and global MBT advocacy to progress.

*Box 10: UNICEF mine action inputs and scope of the strategy.*

***Are the activities and approaches sustainable? Is there a better way that activities and approaches might be organised?*<sup>58</sup>**

50. UNICEF's mine action support has contributed towards achievement of global priorities and has been relevant to donor priorities. However, these priorities are changing and the relevancy of UNICEF's strategy is waning. Most mine action support programming decisions taken by UNICEF reflect need and interest<sup>59</sup>. Most donors state that MRE is the most relevant of the UNICEF mine action goals and the majority of CIDA/Dfid global fund allocations made by LASAT are also directed towards MRE<sup>60</sup>.

51. UNICEF's mine action support is overly dependent on particular financial, human and material resources, leading to implementation of only some aspects of the strategy. UNICEF staff engaged in mine action tend to be more experienced in MRE than VA or advocacy and more effort is directed towards MRE than MBT related advocacy, globally and also in COs. The

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<sup>58</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action* – Request for Proposals dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.

<sup>59</sup> Not strategy. See "effectiveness and impact" section, later in this document

<sup>60</sup> Some mine action donors indicate a shift, towards more mainstreamed funding mechanisms and towards a broader ERW and small arms consideration related to impact of war.



technical competence of LASAT is good, and recently improved by the inclusion of a coordinator with a disability-work background for the first time. However, UNICEF has been known to direct these resources towards other EMOPS priorities<sup>61</sup>, resulting in a greater staff effort in more administrative and policy related tasks at the expense of direct technical support to COs. There is a lack of capacity at an RO level, in terms of technically qualified and available mine action focal points and this, again, has had a negative impact on the level of direct technical support to COs<sup>62</sup>.

52. The financial sustainability of UNICEF's mine action capabilities, particularly at HQ, is low. UNICEF should decide which, if any, of these capabilities are so core to the mission that it should ensure that these positions are maintained irrespective of donor interest. Approximately 70% of UNICEF's funding comes from institutional donors and a significant proportion of HQ staff are funded by projects using institutional donor support. Following this trend, critical positions within the LASAT team are entirely funded by DfID. As such, it may be unfair to utilise attribution of core funding as an indicator of interest and commitment of UNICEF. The fact remains that mine action capabilities within UNICEF are extremely fragile. If DfID funding were withdrawn or if a handful of key mine action focal points were to leave the organisation, UNICEF could lose most of its mine action capability. This precarious situation is inappropriate, as UNICEF has a lead role in the UN mine action strategy and the contributions of UNICEF within the 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy' have been planned up to 2009. The VA and advocacy goals could become increasingly relevant to donors, thereby enabling diversification of funding sources, if they were linked to other UNICEF thematic strategies, under MDGs for example, with greater linkages to PD than currently exist.

53. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in [Box 11](#). The activities and approaches are sustainable in the short term. However, activities and approaches should be organised in a way that mainstreams into development and that enables access to health sector, education and development donors in the mid to long term. UNICEF's technical viability in relation to use of consultants is described on pages 46 and 47. The role of HRBAP in improving the institutional viability of mine action in UNICEF is described on page 63. Factors affecting effective transition and exit to self-sustaining partners are described on pages 48, 59 and 64.

UNICEF's mine action capability is overly dependent on one donor and a few human resources, particularly at HQ and CO levels. VA resources are not only insufficient, but the sustainability of resource mobilisation around VA and cultural viability of VA in UNICEF is in at risk and will continue to be unless it is better mainstreamed into social, economic and health development efforts. Financial viability of MRE is good. Advocacy needs are changing, away from MBT towards disability and rights. Advocacy will be sustained in UNICEF if it is tailored to meet UNICEF's organisational priorities.

*Box 11: Organisational sustainability of UNICEF mine action.*

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<sup>61</sup> For example the MTSP development process in 2005 and the UN Mine Action 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy' of 1998 and the June 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy' during the same period. These efforts are all relevant to mine action, and it can be argued that loss of a full-time coordinator to ensure these policies were developed is justified. However, the involvement in disaster management such as Banda Ache after the tsunamis or response to hurricane Katrina has no clear link with mine action.

<sup>62</sup> Interview and document review indicate that ROs are not fulfilling the roles and objectives as envisaged in the UNICEF mine action strategy.

***Is the timeframe set for the Strategy realistic to meet the goals and objectives?***<sup>63</sup>

54. The objectives in the strategy are not accompanied by time bound targets. The timeframe has not been set and the objectives encapsulated under the global mine action strategy are not Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound (SMART). For this reason, it is inappropriate for this evaluation to state clearly that the timeframe is appropriate or not.

55. If one considers that the end-date for all sub-objectives of the MRE goal in the 2002 – 2005 strategy to be December 2005, then progress towards achievement of the MRE goal is positive. The MRE goal has progressed, notably at a global level through creation of standards and guidelines, as well as through CO support in mine/UXO affected countries. Effort has been placed, in terms of human resource time and funding, towards the achievement of this goal in a way that is proportional to the four year ambition of the goal. The areas that have not progressed as far are: (1) inclusion of MRE into the broader humanitarian development and peace building activities at RO level and (2) embedding MRE into UNICEF's work in education, health promotion, child protection, IECD and other UNICEF sectors as well as establishment of surveillance systems at HQ level<sup>64</sup>. This is not because the timeframe was unrealistic, but rather because there were few LASAT team members with the technical profile *and* availability to further mainstreaming and injury surveillance within UNICEF.

56. If one considers that the end-date for all sub-objectives related to the advocacy goal in the 2002 – 2005 strategy to be December 2005, MBT related advocacy has almost achieved universal ratification. This has been achieved predominantly through the effective efforts at CO and HQ level. ROs have been notably absent in their contribution to advocacy objectives<sup>65</sup>. Non-MBT related advocacy, particularly in relation to the quality of life of survivors and promotion of requirements for international assistance for VA has not progressed as far. Neither has advocacy at RO and CO level related to implementation of the UN mine action strategy. When the timeframe was set, there was insufficient consideration of the stage of development of the Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities<sup>66</sup>. The level of awareness of IHL and IHRL of mine action focal points and awareness of the UN mine action strategy was over-estimated. Had mine action focal points been more aware of these instruments and methods of advocacy around them, the timeframe would have been realistic.

57. However, the 2005 timeframe set regarding the VA goal was unrealistic. The VA goal suffered from insufficient resource allocations and has relied on the experience of UNICEF staff in the field and on ad-hoc donor interest in-country. Most effort has taken place at CO level, particularly in relation to development of strategies and access to health care and school education. ROs have assisted, albeit only on occasion, in the identification of needs and development of strategies. LASAT has also contributed to strategic support to COs. However, these initiatives have been at a small scale in general and LASAT and ROs have not really

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<sup>63</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action* – Request for Proposals dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.

<sup>64</sup> Desk review analysis based on document review indicates little progress in these areas.

<sup>65</sup> This is purely based on document review data, taking frequency of reporting regarding activities related to these objectives as an indicator of effort.

<sup>66</sup> This convention, the first ever for people living with disability, is being drafted. There have been seven sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee so far.

supported COs push this goal forwards<sup>67</sup>. Despite widespread motivation within middle management of UNICEF, the main reason for lack of progress is lack of human resources with the relevant VA experience and time. The timeframe set by the strategy did not sufficiently consider capabilities of UNICEF in VA. It would have been more appropriate to curtail the ambition of the goal to one of mainstreaming of mine / UXO victims into UNICEF's existing communication, education, health and protection activities.

58. MRE needs do tend to be identified and met in an appropriate, effective and timely fashion. The MBT has made great progress towards universal ratification and implementation, but other legal instruments, notably related to IHL, IHRL and instruments such as lag behind. Mine/UXO incident survivors, especially children, do not widely have access to the highest attainable standards of services and support. This suggests, if the timeframe for the achievement of all three goals in the mine action strategy is December 2005, this was unrealistic for the advocacy and VA goals, but sufficient for MRE.

59. A summary of findings in relation to the 2005 timeframe is included in Box 12. The timeframe set for the strategy, assuming an end-date for all objectives in December 2005, was realistic to meet the MRE and advocacy goals and objectives. This timeframe did not realistically consider the technical capabilities and availability of resources for VA and was, by consequence, too short. A description of the contributions made towards the three goals is provided on pages 32 to 40.

Time-bound targets were not set in the strategy and it is inappropriate to consider the end-date of all sub-objectives to be December 2005. In December 2005 MRE needs did tend to be identified and met in an appropriate, effective and timely fashion and MBT advocacy had assisted significant progress towards universal ratification and implementation. The December 2005 date could have been more realistic, particularly if staff had been made more aware of other legal instruments, notably related to IHL, IHRL and instruments such as the draft Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities and given specific tools and guidelines regarding advocacy promoting these principles. The December 2005 date is unrealistic, particularly when resources are taken into consideration, regarding assistance to mine/UXO incident survivors, especially children, and provision of access to the highest attainable standards of services and support.

*Box 12: Realism of UNICEF mine action goals within the 2005 timeframe.*

### **Summary**

60. The strategic goals of UNICEF's support to mine action and the support provided in practice are very relevant to mine/UXO affected populations. UNICEF support is directed towards the achievement of humanitarian priorities and to the mine action services that the UN as a whole has a responsibility for.

61. In some cases, UNICEF has taken on roles that have been inadvertently neglected by other UN agencies, such as VA and advocacy for survivors, both of which UNICEF addresses only partially.

62. The relevancy and sustainability of mine action to UNICEF, particularly in relation to donor support and technical viability, can be improved beyond inclusion into the current MTSP.

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<sup>67</sup> This is purely based on document review data, taking frequency of reporting regarding activities related to these objectives as an indicator of effort.

UNICEF has not fully adapted its mine action support to better fit MDGs, CRC, CEDAW, HRBAP, use legal instruments where necessary or enable access to humanitarian and development assistance to survivors. There are some institutional viability issues that place UNICEF support to mine action at risk. Financial viability is weakened due to donor dependency. Technical viability is dependent on a few individuals and consultants.

63. The timeframe set for the achievement of the VA goal was unrealistic, given capability limitations. However, that set for MRE and advocacy were realistic and achievable. UNICEF support to mine action adapts to in-country needs in a way that is responsive to information and does contribute to the three strategic goals.

64. The appropriateness of the current structure of mine action within UNICEF could be improved through greater mainstreaming, notably within development capabilities in relation to rights based advocacy, health and education. The VA goal would be more relevant to donors in health, economic and social development rather than traditional mine action donors.

65. The relevancy of the three UNICEF goals to key stakeholders is illustrated in [Figure 3](#), based on interview data. It uses a traffic light system where green represents good, amber satisfactory and red unsatisfactory. The two red areas are: (1) UNICEF's organisational priorities and the strategic fit of mine action, within child protection and other focus areas is insufficiently understood or developed and; (2) the current group of mine action donors of UNICEF mine action are not the most appropriate for VA funding.

Level /degree of relevance /appropriateness of the 2002 – 2005 UNICEF mine action strategy →	MRE goal	VA goal	Advocacy goal
Mine / UXO affected populations (incl. children)	■	■	■
UNICEF	■	■	■
2005 'Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy'	■	■	■
UN strategy	■	■	■
Human Rights	■	■	■
International donors	■	■	■
Implementing partners	■	■	■

*Figure 3: Relevancy of UNICEF goals to stakeholders. UNICEF's approach is relevant to other UN agencies and to national needs. Mine action is sometimes treated as an untraditional area of support by UNICEF staff in COs. VA, although relevant to communities, appears to be less appropriate for UNICEF and to the mainstay of mine action donors.*

## Effectiveness and impact of the strategy and approach

### ***Are national and international activities identified in the strategy being implemented as envisioned?***<sup>68</sup>

66. UNICEF's mine action support is not being implemented as envisaged in the global strategy, however the support that is provided at country level does correlate to the majority of objectives. Mine action remains more stand-alone than was intended in the strategy and has not become embedded into PD processes. Stakeholder analysis indicates that while UNICEF tends to be effectively coordinated with the efforts of UNMAS and UNDP its effectiveness could be improved in-country if UNICEF adopted more streamlined internal coordination, either through the use of a capability matrix approach, or through greater inclusion of mine action in PD. A summary of stakeholder analysis, conducted primarily by interview, is included in [Appendix C](#). UNICEF support is responding to real needs and increasingly, considering these needs more holistically. The impact of the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 document itself, i.e. its use in the classic way to direct efforts, is minimal because it is not generally being used for planning<sup>69</sup>. Most COs admit that they do not use the global strategy to plan, but that it is useful and is sometimes used for awareness raising purposes as well as planning. Further analysis on the usefulness of the strategy and contributions towards the three goals based on document review and questionnaire data is provided in [Appendix D](#). Activities 'on the ground' do relate to needs of affected people, and most UNICEF country programmes which include mine action have contributed to achievement of the three goals<sup>70</sup> although findings indicate that contribution to the three global strategy goals tends to be by chance, not by design<sup>71</sup>.

67. Country programmes showed limited awareness of the strategy. Country planning processes tended to consider in-country needs assessments, using varied approaches ranging from informal appraisal to more systemised programming methods. The actual impact of UNICEF supported mine action does alleviate needs of affected populations and contribute to achievement of national priorities. The effect of UNICEF support at country level is better than non-implementation of the global strategy would suggest. No systemised strategic implementation management process that enables results-based management throughout the project cycle exists. An illustration of the performance-based planning approaches used by UNICEF in mine action and an example of possible improvements to this approach is provided in [Appendix E](#).

68. At country level, factors that affect whether UNICEF provides support to mine action include, in order of greatest to least importance: the human resources (their background, areas of interest, how technically comfortable they are with MRE, advocacy or VA and their availability), the level to which the 'need' is perceived or known by UNICEF, donor interest and

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<sup>68</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action – Request for Proposals* dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.

<sup>69</sup> Under half of questionnaire respondents in UN managed programmes used the strategy for planning.

<sup>70</sup> Sri Lanka is an example of a country that is significantly contributing to all three goals.

<sup>71</sup> Interviews with UNICEF staff in New York, Sudan, Ethiopia, Cambodia and Lao People's Democratic Republic and review of organisational processes and procedures indicate that, while an annual planning process does exist and tools such as Programme Manager System (ProMS) and the Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (IMEP) are used for quarterly and annual review, rather than really engaging with national counterparts or assisting Programme Officers to 'rationalise' project considerations against strategy. The motivation is more procedural and some of the benefits are lost.

opportunities for visibility and fundraising, and the effectiveness of UN inter-agency coordination. COs tended to identify a need or opportunity and develop a project. Reconciliation against the strategy, if it took place at all, tended to be once the project had been conceived, either for annual planning purposes or in order to solicit funds allocated by New York.

69. The original rationale behind the MRE goal was that MRE would become embedded in UNICEF's organisational priorities<sup>72</sup>. In addition UNICEF would play a more pronounced role in enabling other UN agencies and implementing partners or independent practitioners to raise technical standards. This would mean that UNICEF would better utilise its civil society and public service network to reduce risks to children and to their families, remaining focused on risk reduction through health, education and other community development efforts of UNICEF. If UNICEF was to mainly focus on women and children, other UN agencies and organisations would have to target other demographic groups. UNICEF would create platforms of dialogue with MRE agents, create best practice standards and guidelines for the implementation of these, all in addition to coordinating MRE in such a way as to capture expertise of others and maximise lessons learned in a collaborative way. The mainstreamed elements of this approach have not happened.

70. UNICEF continues to develop and seek funding for MRE projects that could be better correlated to UNICEF's organisational priorities. Mismatches, particularly as the majority of UNICEF mine action focal points work to objectives defined by PD, not EMOPS, lead to lack of engagement in mine action. What UNICEF has done better is create platforms of dialogue, raise standards and engage others in an inclusive collaborative forum at an *international* level. At country level, UNICEF MRE support remains somewhat out of kilter with other UNICEF efforts and with the efforts of other UN agencies. This deviation from strategy is, to some extent, due to staff turn-over at LASAT level leading to re-interpretation of the strategy, or lack of awareness at CO level of its intent. Planned work on performance indicators, technical notes, training and technical support provision from LASAT has suffered as a result of the unprepared departure of the LASAT coordinator, elongated periods where no coordinator was present, or redirection of coordinator efforts to developments such as the MTSP or 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy'. The mine action strategy exists, but UNICEF has not re-organised, adapted procedures or information management and invested in personnel to fit the intent of the strategy.<sup>73</sup>

71. Very limited performance data has been collected or used by UNICEF regarding MRE during the project cycle. UNICEF tends to focus on establishing confirmed MRE needs through needs assessments, which do provide information on the performance requirement. UNICEF also tends to focus on impact assessment after MRE support has been provided, through evaluations, which do provide information on outcomes. What is lacking is performance management during the MRE project life. A sample of performance indicators that could be generated, from data that this evaluation obtained from project documents, is provided in [Appendix E, Table 1](#). This is accompanied by a more detailed example of data relating to one of the MRE objectives in [Appendix E, Table 4](#).

72. UNICEF generated MRE performance data was not systematically collected over time, tended not to be SMART, or accompanied by means of verification. Questionnaire data also indicated a widespread lack of knowledge of performance management by mine action focal

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<sup>72</sup> Interview with Polly Brennan, coordinator of LASAT at the time of the development of the 2002 – 2005 strategy.

<sup>73</sup> From interviews with UNICEF and ex-UNICEF staff.

points. For this reason, this evaluation has had to rely on interview data, questionnaire data and documented evidence of performance and not on a retro-fit of performance indicators and analysis of them as was originally envisaged. The absence of such systems is a finding in itself.

73. With these constraints in mind, [Figure 4](#) illustrates the prevalence of UNICEF activities that relate to the MRE goal based entirely on document review. Although documented evidence does provide indication of activities happening or not, it would be inappropriate to use frequency and content of documentation as a performance indicator in isolation.

74. The majority of reported contributions to the MRE goal are taking place at country level. Overall performance in support of MRE programmes is good and significant investments have been made based on confirmed needs and concern for impact. Threat monitoring and preparedness activities have only partially been reported<sup>74</sup> and the ROs are reporting the main effort to embed MRE as a more cross-cutting consideration within other UNICEF activities. LASAT has contributed particularly well to provision of technical guidance and best practice. Most areas of underachievement are simply because that objective is less relevant to the RO or to LASAT.

Goal	Objective	CO	RO	HQ
GOAL 1 <sup>75</sup> MRE needs are identified and met in an appropriate, effective and timely fashion.	OBJECTIVE 1.1 At risk populations are identified, MRE needs are assessed and appropriate mine risk reduction education is provided, in all new and existing UN mine action programmes			
	OBJECTIVE 1.2 MRE is coordinated at global and country levels, and is integrated with other mine action components and with broader humanitarian development and peace building activities.			
	OBJECTIVE 1.3 Threat monitoring and rapid response capacity is in place to meet emergency mine reduction education needs			
	OBJECTIVE 1.4 MRE is fully reflected in and mutually supportive of UNICEF's work in education, health promotion child protection IECD and other sectors			
	OBJECTIVE 1.5 MRE is supported by surveillance systems which enable affected communities to report and receive assistance with mine problems			
	OBJECTIVE 1.6 Technical guidance is provided, and best practice is promoted in MRE			

*Figure 4: Performance towards the MRE goal at CO, RO and HQ. Green signifies 75% or more documented reference to this objective in COs. Amber signifies approximately 50% of CO documents refer to contribution to this objective. Red signifies less than 25% of COs have documented evidence of contribution to the objective.*

75. Incongruity between performance relating to specific strategic objectives exists depending on the nature of performance indicator used. If frequency and depth of documentation are used as indicators, as is the case in [Figure 4](#), then it appears that (a) HQ provides a key role in provision of technical guidance; (b) ROs contribute well to the

<sup>74</sup> Ethiopia, Iraq and Sudan are examples where more threat monitoring, preparedness or regional coordination could be undertaken.

<sup>75</sup> Findings are based on a product of the statistical and narrative results from the document review stage.

mainstreaming of MRE into UNICEF's other non-mine action work, but that (c) in other areas, both ROs and HQ have moderate to low performance. On this documentation basis, it appears that (d) COs contribute most, by far, to the majority of MRE specific objectives, however that (e) UNICEF is underachieving as a whole when it comes to threat monitoring and preparedness.

76. It is worth noting that if qualitative indicators are used, primarily from interview data, a few corrections must be made. For example, (a) HQ has contributed to the establishment of surveillance systems (objective 1.5), in part through training and studies in partnership with CDC, and rather than a red, it should be rated as a green. Similarly, (b) HQ has developed and maintained a passive roster of consultants ready to deploy at short notice, and has therefore contributed more to the development of a rapid response capacity (objective 1.3) than documentation would suggest. Another example where qualitative performance assessment contradicts documentation based performance assessment is coordination (objective 1.2) as (c) ROs are more involved in annual planning and regional mine action coordination than documentation would suggest.

77. Analysis of [Figure 4](#) shows that some activity areas are accompanied by insufficient documentation / reporting and that UNICEF would do well to consider the introduction of standard reporting systems per specific objective. It also further illustrates the importance of a well-thought through performance management system, with balanced indicators, that run through any project and planning system. Such a system does not currently exist, and prevalence of documentation regarding particular areas of effort by UNICEF is not an adequate performance measure.

78. Of the three goals, the advocacy goal has remained truest to its original intent. It was, in 2002, very MBT oriented and has remained so<sup>76</sup>. Possibly due to UNICEF's traditional preference for 'soft' advocacy, this evaluation has uncovered few instances where UNICEF has made use of legal instruments such as IHL or IHRL for the betterment of the lives of people living with disability, or children at risk due to mines/UXO. These are at HQ level and include: development of a guide that explains the relationship between CCW and CRC; a training package on IHRL, refugee law and IHL and its relationship with landmines and; contribution to the development of a draft convention on the rights of people living with disability. UNICEF support to mine action has advocated for people living with disability at a policy level, advocating for improved access to education, health or disability benefits for example. However, this has been in relation to needs, not rights. Needs do not have the legal recourse that rights have. Needs can be prioritised, but rights are all equal. UNICEF's advocacy should also address the emergent conventions, soft law<sup>77</sup>, guidelines and best practice in human rights dealing with issues such as rights of the disabled, especially if their disability is linked to mines/ERW.

79. The under utilisation of IHL and IHRL is aggravated by the existence of two separate policy units, the Humanitarian Policy Unit in EMOPS which tends to focus on inter-agency policy and the Division of Policy and Planning which tends to develop UNICEF internal policy. There is interaction between LASAT and the Humanitarian Policy Unit in EMOPS, but this tends to remain at a global policy level. There is little indication that either of the policy units is charged

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<sup>76</sup> Interviews with UNICEF.

<sup>77</sup> The term "soft law" refers to quasi-legal instruments which do not have any binding force, or whose binding force is somewhat "weaker" than the binding force of traditional law, often referred to as "hard law", in this context. The term "soft law" initially appeared in the area of international law, but than it has been transferred to other branches of law.



with support to CO level mine action focal points or with provision of advice regarding advocacy methods and instruments that might be used by focal points to improve the quality of life of survivors and at-risk groups. It also appears illogical to have organisational distinctions between policies developed in emergency versus development contexts or policy development that is for external or internal use. It would be easier for CO mine action focal points to liaise with one unit rather than two. CO, RO and HQ personnel demonstrate the need for basic and practical guidance on HRBAP for Mine Action<sup>78</sup>.

80. Very limited performance data has been collected or used by UNICEF regarding advocacy during the project cycle. What is lacking is performance management during the advocacy project life. The advocacy data that this evaluation did obtain, a sample of which is provided in [Appendix E, Table 2:](#), was not systematically collected over time, tended not to be SMART, or accompanied by means of verification. Questionnaire data also indicated a widespread lack of knowledge of performance management by mine action focal points. For this reason, this evaluation has had to rely on interview data, questionnaire data and documented evidence of performance and not on a retro-fit of performance indicators and analysis of them as was originally envisaged. The absence of such systems is a finding in itself.

81. With these constraints in mind, [Figure 5](#) illustrates the prevalence of UNICEF activities that relate to the advocacy goal based entirely on document review. Although documented evidence does provide indication of activities happening or not, it would be inappropriate to use frequency and content of documentation as a performance indicator in isolation.

82. Documentation suggests advocacy needs tend to be identified through informal needs assessments by mine action focal points, which provide some information on the performance requirement. UNICEF does not tend to conduct impact assessment after advocacy support has been provided, through evaluations. However, the benefits of advocacy are occasionally reported, which does provide some information on outcomes. At CO level there is a tendency of UNICEF supported mine/UXO related advocacy to act independently, rather than utilise common advocacy policies of UNICEF that consider evolutions in country contexts<sup>79</sup>.

83. Note that HQ has received an amber rating in relation to objective 2.1 because the frequency of documentation available regarding HQ advocacy was lower than that available at RO and CO level and the scope of activities reported more limited. What document review did not recognise was the relative importance of activities, such as work leading up to the Nairobi Summit, which had global significance, or undocumented work in support of COs and RO advocacy. Ironically, COs received a green rating for the same objective because approximately half of the COs reported advocacy activities, even though these tended to be limited in scope and scale. Further investigation and interpretation of document review does illustrate that HQ level advocacy activities tend to be in support of RO / CO activities or in a technical advisory capacity within UNICEF and, for the most part, go unreported. CO advocacy activities tend to be in the form of support to national campaigns and awareness raising through participation in technical working groups or through meetings, but that CO's report on these activities, often routine activities, extensively despite small scale and scope.

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<sup>78</sup> The majority of UNICEF CO and RO staff interviewed showed limited awareness of IHL and IHRL and of advocacy requirements related to these.

<sup>79</sup> Interviews in UNICEF HQ and in field visits to South East Asia suggest that there is limited support provided to mine action focal points regarding advocacy tools and methods. LASAT provides support as best it can however the absence of HRBAP is in part due to lack of awareness of staff at all levels.

Goal	Objective	CO	RO	HQ
GOAL 2 <sup>80</sup> The MBT and other related legal instruments are universally ratified and implemented	OBJECTIVE 2.1 States and non-state actors are encouraged and assisted to respectively ratify or endorse and comply with regional and international legal instruments relevant to landmines and other ERW			
	OBJECTIVE 2.2 Local, national and global advocacy efforts in relation to mines and other explosive remnants of war are supported, in particular those by and for those most affected			
	OBJECTIVE 2.3 The needs of mine affected countries are identified and assessed and subsequent planning and response supported			
	OBJECTIVE 2.4 International assistance for all mine action requirements in affected countries is promoted			
	OBJECTIVE 2.5 Development and implementation of the interagency UN Mine Action Strategy is supported			
	OBJECTIVE 2.6 Advocacy for the further development of international law on mines and other explosive remnants of war, including ERW protocols to the UN Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons is promoted			

Figure 5: Performance towards the advocacy goal at CO, RO and HQ.

Green signifies 75% or more documented reference to this objective in COs. Amber signifies approximately 50% of CO documents refer to contribution to this objective. Red signifies less than 25% of COs have documented evidence of contribution to the objective.

84. Incongruity between performance relating to specific strategic objectives exists depending on the nature of the performance indicator used. If frequency and depth of documentation are used as indicators, as is the case in [Figure 5](#), then it appears that (a) HQ provides only a moderate contribution to pressure to ratify or endorse MBT, whereas (b) ROs and COs do the bulk of the work in this area. It also appears that (c) HQ support for advocacy efforts or identification of advocacy needs is moderate at HQ level, and that (d) RO contribution is low to insufficient, COs really leading in both sub objectives in relative isolation.

85. If qualitative indicators are used, primarily from interview data, a few corrections must be made. For example, (a) HQ has contributed to global MBT ratification and endorsement (objective 2.1), in part through global conferences such as the Nairobi Summit, but also through policy input, press releases and collaboration with the ICBL globally, so rather than amber, it should be rated as a green. Similarly, (b) HQ has drafted a number of policy papers or assisted UNICEF to research and develop such papers, for example relating to small arms or to ERW not covered by the MBT and has therefore contributed more to objective 2.6 than documentation based evidence would suggest and (c) has been an active participant in the development of a new UN mine action coordination policy and mine action strategy (objective 2.5). Another example is (d) HQ's role in using global funds to support response in countries that would otherwise suffer from lack of financial support (a part of objective 2.3), which again

<sup>80</sup> Findings are based on a product of the statistical and narrative results from the document review stage. Green indicates that 75% or more COs, ROs or HQ reports contained or implied activities, inputs, outputs and outcomes that related to the objective. Amber indicates approximately 50% of COs, ROs or HQ reports contained or implied activities, inputs, outputs and outcomes that related to the objective. Red indicates that less than 25% of COs, ROs or HQ reports contained or implied activities, inputs, outputs and outcomes that related to the objective.

means that rather than a red, HQ should be rated green. Again, analysis of [Figure 5](#) shows that some activity areas are accompanied by insufficient documentation / reporting and that UNICEF would do well to consider the introduction of standard reporting systems per specific objective. It also further illustrates the importance of a well-thought through performance management system, with balanced indicators, that run through any project management and planning system. Such a system does not currently exist, and prevalence of documentation regarding particular areas of effort by UNICEF is not an adequate performance measure.


86. Most reported efforts that related to MBT take place at a global level. This has served not only to put the impact of landmines on the agenda, but also to raise recognition of the role that UNICEF can play in mine action within UNICEF. To note is UNICEF's role at international conferences and in working groups.

87. Since 2004 UNICEF has assisted the humanitarian policy unit consider impact of ERW, notably cluster munitions and small arms. At CO level, however, there is little evidence of support local campaigns or advocacy regarding weapons use or impact. The exact area of support provision and division of responsibility between the policy units and LASAT vis-à-vis COs on advocacy is somewhat undefined and under resourced.

88. Other legal instruments, such as those relating to the rights of women, children or people living with disability, IHL or IHRL are very rarely reported. Efforts to improve the quality of life of survivors do take place at country level. Country offices and LASAT tend to liaise directly regarding advocacy responses and LASAT liaises with other UN agencies regarding advocacy policies and support at HQ level. Very few advocacy activities are reported at all. There are some efforts to consider HRBAP in disability awareness and combine these with other awareness activities of UNICEF.

89. The original rationale behind the VA goal was as follows: VA would become embedded in UNICEF's organisational priorities. UNICEF's existing health, nutrition, social development, education, advocacy, water and sanitation and other core UNICEF sections' efforts would consider the needs of the disabled, including mine victims, as well as those of mine/UXO affected populations in a cross-cutting way. This would entail information management systems that engaged different elements of EMOPS and PD around the needs of children affected by mines/UXO and inclusion of those children and their families into existing programmes of UNICEF.

90. UNICEF is beginning to mainstream the needs of survivors into UNICEF's core activity areas. Recent collaboration at a global level with Centre for Disease Control (CDC) is promoting a more holistic public health approach through the provision of training to practitioners and



*UNICEF proved its ability to effectively support MBT related advocacy at the Nairobi Summit in November / December 2004.*

studies into epidemiology information management systems that can communicate not only to the other pillars of mine action, but also with education and health<sup>81</sup>.

91. Very limited performance data has been collected or used by UNICEF regarding VA during the project cycle. What is lacking is performance management during the VA project life. The advocacy data that this evaluation did obtain, a sample of which is provided in [Appendix E, Table 3](#); was not systematically collected over time, tended not to be SMART, or accompanied by means of verification. Questionnaire data also indicated a widespread lack of knowledge of performance management by mine action focal points. For this reason, this evaluation has had to rely on interview data, questionnaire data and documented evidence of performance and not on a retro-fit of performance indicators and analysis of them as was originally envisaged. The absence of such systems is a finding in itself.

92. With these constraints in mind, [Figure 6](#) illustrates the prevalence of UNICEF activities that relate to the VA goal based entirely on document review. Although documented evidence does provide indication of activities happening or not, it would be inappropriate to use frequency and content of documentation as a performance indicator in isolation. Documentation suggests VA needs tend to be identified through needs assessments by mine action focal points and international implementing partners, which provide some information on the performance requirement. UNICEF does not tend to conduct impact assessment after VA support has been provided, through evaluations. However, the benefits of VA are reported, which does provide some information on outcomes. UNICEF's VA efforts are localised to a few COs and, despite limitations in scope or scale, they tend to demonstrate attention to quality. Notwithstanding these positive efforts, the bulk of physical, economic and social rehabilitation needs remain neglected by the UN system. ICRC and HI (HI) dominate in international assistance to survivors. National Ministries of Health and Social Services are the main implementing organisations, and receive financial support via the UN or international NGOs, from international donors for VA. To further the effectiveness of UNICEF in these areas, UNICEF needs to invest more heavily in organisation and procedures that link PD to EMOPS. UN mine action is currently underutilising WHO and other agencies such as the WFP, UNHCR and UNDP.

Goal	Objective	CO	RO	HQ
GOAL 3 <sup>82</sup> Mine Survivors, especially children, have access to the highest attainable standards of services and support	OBJECTIVE 3.1 The needs of mine survivors are identified and assessed			
	OBJECTIVE 3.2 Local and national strategies for assistance to survivors are developed			
	OBJECTIVE 3.3 Public and community health, disability and other services are accessible to mine survivors, especially children and women			
	OBJECTIVE 3.4 Special rehabilitation and social reintegration services, if needed, are provided, especially to children			
	OBJECTIVE 3.5 Child survivors are able to attend school			
	OBJECTIVE 3.6 Survivor assistance is supported by mine action programmes			

<sup>81</sup> Project proposal from UNICEF to CDC and interview with UNICEF and CDC.

*Figure 6: Performance towards the VA goal at CO, RO and HQ level.*

*Green signifies 75% or more documented reference to this objective in COs. Amber signifies approximately 50% of CO documents refer to contribution to this objective. Red signifies less than 25% of COs have documented evidence of contribution to the objective.*

93. Incongruity between performance relating to specific strategic objectives exist depending on the nature of performance indicator used. If frequency and depth of documentation is used as an indicator, as is the case in [Figure 6](#), then it appears that (a) both HQ and ROs significantly underachieve in most aspects of VA, providing only moderate assistance to VA strategic planning and that (b) COs perform well in VA strategic planning, in enabling access to health and education services by victims, but that (c) COs perform only moderately well in VA needs assessment, provision of rehabilitation services or VA programme support (presumably in part aggravated by lack of support at HQ and RO level). On this documentation basis, it appears that (d) COs contribute most, by far, to some of the VA specific objectives, however that (e) UNICEF is underachieving in VA, particularly at RO and HQ levels and particularly in aspects of VA that are more operational such as needs assessment, programme support and rehabilitation / integration.

94. It is worth noting that if qualitative indicators are used, primarily from interview data, a few corrections must be made. For example, (a) HQ has contributed to the establishment of surveillance systems (objective 1.5), which does enable VA needs assessment (objective 3.1), which means rather than a red, HQ contributions to objective 3.1 could be rated as amber. Similarly, (b) HQ has allocated global funds to those VA programmes that would otherwise suffer from lack of funding, and has therefore contributed more support for VA (objective 3.6) than documentation would suggest. Another example where qualitative performance assessment contradicts documentation based performance assessment is (c) HQ contributions to technical working groups in relation to the rights of people living with disability and the draft Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, which aims to promote integration and access to public services (objective 3.3) among other things. Most significantly, UNICEF efforts to ensure provision of rehabilitation (objective 3.4) do not have always have a mine action budget code and are not necessarily managed by LASAT, but may remain completely distinct, with documentation that was not subject to Desk Review as it is held by a PD section of UNICEF<sup>83</sup>. As such, using documentation as an indicator of performance in VA is misleading unless the desk review data were broadened to include health, education etc. programmes of UNICEF. Analysis of [Figure 6](#) shows that some activity areas are accompanied by insufficient documentation / reporting and that UNICEF would do well to consider the introduction of standard reporting systems per specific objective. It also further illustrates the importance of a well-thought through performance management system, with balanced indicators, that run through any project management and planning system. Goal 3, VA, differs from Goals 1 and 2 in that a significant amount of project work is conceived, budgeted, implemented and managed by non-mine action capabilities of UNICEF. This means it is quite inappropriate to use prevalence of data from the Desk Review documents included in this evaluation as a performance indicator.

95. Almost the entirety of VA activities take place at country level, with the exception of identification of needs and development of VA strategies. Documents contain data that shows

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<sup>82</sup> Findings are based on the statistical analysis of VA in the global scoping document review (both managed and supported), in conjunction with narrative reports and summaries compiled during the document review stage particularly for the RO and HQ levels.

<sup>83</sup> Only documents provided by LASAT and documents obtained during field visits were subject to Desk Review as part of this evaluation. A list of these is included in [H](#).

that non-mine action disability programmes are being implemented, albeit at a small scale, and that mine action focal points are sometimes involved in these. Documents may be misleading as the few plans in existence tend to be well documented and the level of detail in reports related to inclusive education and access to public services suggests localised depth, not breadth of VA. Nevertheless, given the limitations on human resource experience and funding, opportunities are being seized to include disabled people, including mine / UXO victims, into UNICEF activities.

96. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in [Box 13](#). National and international activities identified in the strategy are being implemented, but not entirely as envisioned. MRE activities dominate. VA is at a very small scale. Advocacy is MBT focused. This is in part due to a insufficient strategy implementation guidance, but in most cases is due to human resource requirements that do not match those available at CO or RO level, or because other needs have taken primacy. Consistency of activities, inputs and approach with that of UNICEF is described on page 16 and conformity with reform policies on page 21. The financial, human and material resources used for implementation of activities is described on page 24, and the result of these within the timeframe in terms of achievement of goals is described on page 29. The sustainability of activities is described on page 27 and the associated capacity building activities, strengths and weaknesses are further expanded upon on pages 46 to 49 and again on pages 53 to 55. The nature of activities and their impact is described on page 51.

The 2002 – 2005 strategy was not accompanied by performance/results based management systems that ensured its implementation as envisioned. RO roles were not fulfilled as intended according to the strategy and the link between LASAT and COs was direct. VA support is at a smaller scale than intended and is only sometimes mainstreamed into disability. Advocacy, on the other hand, has been implemented as planned, focussing on MBT. This indicates that the strategy had sufficient scope to be interpreted at CO level. However, any future strategy should reconsider the divisions of responsibility.

*Box 13: Implementation of mine action and the original intent.*

***Are the activities cost effective, timely and of a high quality according to best practice in mine action?*<sup>84</sup>**

97. UNICEF's support to mine action does adhere to technical best practice for the most part, but the absence of quality and performance management systems either internal or those used when supporting implementing partners lead to resource management issues. The impact of UNICEF's support to mine action has not been monitored by UNICEF in any consistent way. Examples of the types of indicators that are or could be generated by UNICEF mine action and systems that could be adopted is provided in [Appendix E](#). CU has developed a compendium of generic mine action indicators, measures and benchmarks, mainly as a result of past collaboration with the US Department of State, and it was originally envisaged that these, along with UNICEF's own data generated through the project management cycle would be reconciled and analysed. At country, regional and HQ level: a) very little conformity in UNICEF reporting exists and almost no reports are written against strategic goals; b) UNICEF has a performance management system that includes targets, indicators of achievement or means of verification, but that is not applied fully in mine action; c) UNICEF contracts with implementing partners do

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<sup>84</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action* – Request for Proposals dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.



specify deliverables, but could go further in quality and performance management requirements<sup>85</sup>.

98. The evaluation finding, in relation to performance and quality management systems applied by UNICEF mine action, is that there is no harmonised approach. This is a critical weakness, that ultimately means that impact or effectiveness evaluation of UNICEF support to mine action has had to rely on data gathered by interview, inferred from documents or through direct observation. Evaluation findings relating to impact are relatively subjective and unsubstantiated<sup>86</sup>.

99. UNICEF's technical competences, particularly that of full-time mine action focal points, can be extremely high. UNICEF is reliant on a few key individuals, including LASAT staff, UNICEF staff deployed in country programmes and consultants. UNICEF's reliance on consultants inhibits its ability to grow as an organisation or respond rapidly in emergency contexts. Some of these consultants work repeatedly for UNICEF, so it could be argued that historical knowledge is not lost and lessons are learned and applied. Nevertheless, outsourcing comes with its advantages, mainly financial, and drawbacks, mainly relating to organisational development. Data from this study indicates that technical standards vary enormously between full-time and part-time mine action focal points in UNICEF<sup>87</sup>. Many of the UNICEF COs and all of the ROs do not have qualified staff with experience of occupational health, risk education, advocacy, capacity building or other mine action relevant background and a relatively large number of UNICEF mine action programme officers are unaware of the existence of International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

100. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in [Box 14](#). When support to mine action is provided by UNICEF, the activities tend to be cost effective, timely and of a high quality according to best practice in mine action. This trend is due to the efforts of those mine action focal points with relevant experience in MRE or VA or thanks to the global advocacy efforts, again supported by staff who are familiar with MBT. Cost effectiveness, timeliness and quality does suffer when mine action focal points are unfamiliar with IMAS or lack mine action experience. The timeliness of activities in achieving the UNICEF goals is described on page 29. The effectiveness of activities is further expanded upon on page 46. Quality assurance, particularly through impact assessments are described on page 51. The role of implementing partners on quality is highlighted on page 60.

There are significant variations on the quality of UNICEF support to mine action and of the experience of mine action focal points. A core group of mine action focal points and consultants lead UNICEF's support to mine action in a way that adheres to international standards and shows maturity of approach. Better information management would enable better support to those other COs with mine action focal points who have less mine action experience and often less time.

*Box 14: Quality, time and cost of UNICEF mine action.*

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<sup>85</sup> There is some evidence of the Logical Framework Approach and reports allude to data, however the 4 COs visited and document review shows that this is not systematically collected or analysed in any consistent way.

<sup>86</sup> Appendix E includes a sample of performance indicators that could be developed from UNICEF data.

<sup>87</sup> Questionnaires suggest that most UNICEF support is believed to be compliant with IMAS, however other documented and interview data indicated that some mine action focal points were unaware of these.



***Are the activities well coordinated?*<sup>88</sup>**

101. A summary of opinions of other UN agencies involved in mine action, based on stakeholder analysis, is provided in Box 15 below<sup>89</sup>:

Most UN agencies know that UNICEF has a mine action strategy, but have either never read it, or are unfamiliar with it. Most UN agency collaboration takes place at a global level, in international meetings and conferences. Practical collaboration with UNHCR and WFP tends to be limited to division of responsibilities, but not provision of technical advice, joint planning or information management. UNICEF is effective at advocacy, particularly given the agency's child-focus which tends to create an impact on stakeholder groups. The general belief is that UNMAS should take on more of a lead role across all pillars of mine action, with UNICEF and UNDP acting as technical advisors to UNMAS and to implementing partners while UNOPS remains a recruitment and contracting agency for the sector. Many comment that the human resource pool in UN mine action is finite and the same people move between agencies, but UNICEF is somewhat different and staff tend to retain the corporate identity and added value better than in some other UN agencies. There is a perceived cultural disconnect with other UN mine action efforts at a country level, however effective collaboration as a collective UN mine action team has since evolved at HQ levels. General improvements in country level coordination can be seen when UNICEF staff are located in the same office as other UN mine action staff and not in the UNICEF office and more harmonisation is required with operational agencies, notably UNHCR, WFP. Interagency collaboration tends to be better in emergency contexts; however UNICEF is more likely to work separately from other UN agencies in development contexts. In terms of UNICEF mine action responsibilities, continued efforts around MBT advocacy are likely to provide diminished returns and interest in MRE is waning, with more interest being placed on other non-clearance risk reduction methods such as area reduction or cancellation of suspected hazard areas through community based approaches, marking, and fencing. It is widely believed that UNICEF is unable to achieve the VA goal, however no other substitute agency was recommended. There is widespread disappointment regarding WHO, particularly because both WHO and UNICEF have regional offices around the world and the institutional potential for collaboration is evident. UNDP and UNMAS mine action is programmed in New York and this difference with UNICEF – where decisions are taken in country offices – has led to some frustrations while, in general, collaboration has improved with the current LASAT team.

The MBT process has identified the 24 countries with the most mine/UXO victims. UNICEF should prioritise its mine action programmes in these countries. LASAT is providing too much support to ROs and COs and UNICEF would be better placed by strengthening country level capabilities otherwise resources will continue to be over-stretched. UNICEF should not mainstream mine action, otherwise it will become another cross-cutting issue.

*Box 15: Summary Stakeholder Analysis: other UN agency mine action staff interviews.*

102. UNICEF's support to coordination of mine action has positively contributed to strategic performance, particularly in relation to external coordination with UN agencies and implementing partners at a national level. UNICEF support to both MRE and VA tends to be accompanied by coordination activities that include government stakeholders, NGOs and that encourage participation by other UN agencies such as UNDP, and WFP and UNHCR where appropriate. This has resulted in plans that involve, or at least consider, resource mobilisation by more than one agency or implementing partner. An example is in Iraq, where there are plans to collect victim data from implementing partners in each governorate, and to set up information

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<sup>88</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action – Request for Proposals* dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.

<sup>89</sup> A list of UN agencies contacted and interviewed a part of the evaluation is included in Appendix I.

management systems with NGO collaboration that enables both the Ministry of Health and the mine action and health sectors. Another example where UNICEF support to mine action coordination has resulted in joint plans is through development of national standards or methods of MRE that remain consistent across organisations<sup>90</sup>. UNICEF has enabled such plans to be made based on shared access to information and consideration of the needs and recommendations of key stakeholders.

103. Within the framework of external coordination, UNICEF has enabled collaboration between mine action agencies that is able to react to needs and opportunities. This is notably through technical advice and information exchange at a national level. As a result of such UNICEF supported collaboration in Laos, for example, there is greater support for a data-base to be created that includes data on child accidents that goes beyond the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) incident form and that can be used by the health and mine action sectors alike, and that includes accidents other than those caused by UXO. In Cambodia, UNICEF has facilitated useful technical exchange between its VA partners through meetings and exchange visits, resulting in some partners using almost identical forms for assessing and following up children. UNICEF support to collaboration between stakeholders, for example through exchange of materials and creation of disability or MRE working groups, has created effective platforms for lessons learned to be exchanged.

104. A summary of opinions of other UN agencies involved in mine action, based on stakeholder analysis, is provided in Box 16 below<sup>91</sup>:

UNICEF is perceived to be a relatively small donor by most international implementing partners. A number of good experiences and examples of successful UNICEF programmes are cited, however most international implementing organisations also cite weaker programmes that suggest that decentralised management has resulted in loss of control of mine action support quality. Concerns regarding the qualifications and experience of some part-time mine action focal points are raised, however almost all implementing partners praise the HQ technical capabilities and are grateful for the efforts regarding international standards, working groups and guidelines. All would like to see more training opportunities provided by UNICEF. Most international VA, advocacy and MRE organisations do not require technical support from UNICEF, but would welcome continued financial support. In contrast, most local organisations and government partners require not only funding, but also technical support. Many state that management training, particularly regarding fundraising and financial management is needed and that this is a weakness in the current UNICEF approach to mine action. Some local partners deem their capabilities to be higher than that perceived by UNICEF and there are instances where these partners question decisions taken by UNICEF regarding their mid- to long-term needs. Some suggest that official transition to national ownership is sometimes administratively planned before the local partner has a sustainable capacity, leading to collapse once UNICEF management is withdrawn. Others state that UNICEF's partnership approach, with particular ministries such as Education, Youth and Sport, can be innovative, collaborative and effective. UNICEF is not scrupulous enough in its selection of local implementing partners and its reputation as a mine action agency is, at times, damaged because the partner either lacks the capability or lacks the motivation.

*Box 16: Summary Stakeholder Analysis: implementing organisation and partner interviews.*

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<sup>90</sup> Two thirds of questionnaire respondents from UNICEF supported mine action programmes stated that they had assisted national standards to be developed for MRE.

<sup>91</sup> A list of mine action agencies and UNICEF partners contacted and interviewed a part of the evaluation is included in Appendix I.

105. However, activities and outputs relating to the three goals could make better use of technical and human resources. Effectiveness of UNICEF supported coordination, vis-à-vis the efforts of other UN agencies traditionally providing staff for mine action coordination, for example in the Mine Action Centre (MAC), improves when UNICEF mine action staff are co-located. Cases such as Iraq or Bosnia illustrate that this does not diminish the UNICEF focal person's ability to 'reach-back' to the wider offices of UNICEF or to leverage discriminating features of UNICEF, such as its consideration of individual needs in a holistic way that is mainstreamed across sectors. Nor does it restrict the mine action focal person's ability to coordinate with national partners and implementing organisations. Staff within the MAC are often recruited by UNMAS, UNDP and UNOPS, and often come from similar mine action backgrounds, be that military or international mine action NGO related. UNICEF, on the other hand, has a heterogeneous pool of mine action focal points somewhat different from other agencies traditionally placed in the MAC. When UNICEF staff are not co-located with other UN coordination staff, communication is aggravated by differences in human resource background and of organisational culture. This has led to communication and UN coordination problems, at times resulting in divergent UN plans. An example in Sudan, where UNICEF staff are not co-located and misunderstanding between UN agencies is reported.

106. In general UNICEF's contribution to coordination and capacity building in inter-agency efforts, including those of NGOs, other UN agencies and ICRC has been inclusive and collaborative. There are instances where UNICEF is organised in relative isolation from other UN mine action efforts and it appears that the rationale behind the 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy', or even of its 1998 predecessor, has not always trickled down to field level. Impediments to UNICEF effectiveness include: (1) physical location of UNICEF staff, i.e. not seconded to the MAC; (2) poor performance management leading to an unfairly, but often damaged reputation as UNICEF is perceived to be from a different culture than other mine action agencies that use more visible approaches to target setting; (3) focus on women and children when, again, the risk is often on other demographic groups; (4) technical background and availability of UNICEF staff – very often not mine action or disability and more often than not, not full-time.

107. UNICEF support in MRE, VA or advocacy in development contexts suffers due to section and division mismatches that mean that internal communication and coordination is complicated. The location of mine action in EMOPS leads to a management disconnect, but this could potentially add value to what the LASAT can offer to country offices in mine action by providing inputs from a different section. At regional level, there are loose, informal linkages by which the Emergency and Child Protection / Education or Communication Sections can communicate on mine action issues. EMOPS strategy is not embedded into PD, therefore into the development capabilities of UNICEF and mid to long term planning from the project inception phase remains weak.

108. Furthermore, the Child Protection / Education or Communication Sections are currently ill-equipped to take on mine action in terms of human and financial resources and has many other competing priorities. The Child Protection section of UNICEF is functionally the natural seat of mine action in development contexts as it can enable creation of a protective environment around the needs of affected communities and survivors in a holistic way that interacts with social, medical and economic capabilities within UNICEF. Child Protection would be better equipped to consider mine / UXO related impact if some HQ capabilities in LASAT were to direct capacity building efforts towards sections that support mine action focal points in COs. There is some overlap between child injury and mine action which could be made more efficient through better coordination within UNICEF. Coordination between UN agencies in development contexts tends to be weaker than in the emergency phase.

109. ROs are also currently ill-equipped to provide technical support for mine action in terms of human resource and financial capability. They play an important role in programme planning and have access to regional donors that can act in support of CO plans. Notwithstanding these roles, field visits conducted during this evaluation corroborated document review data that indicates that ROs tend not to coordinate or provide technical support to mine action. Any decision to either build RO mine action capability or establish such capabilities for regional use in COs in the region should reinforce the central role of ROs in UNICEF in order to be consistent with procedures associated to the focus areas of the MTSP.

110. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in [Box 17](#). UNICEF mine action activities are well coordinated with those of other UN agencies and implementing organisations. However, internal coordination with activities relating to UNICEF's organisational priorities and regarding mobilisation of internal non-mine action resources is less well coordinated. Coordination dynamics, particularly the successes of external coordination are described on page 32 and again on page 53. RO weaknesses in coordination are described on page 50.

UNICEF mine action tends to be better coordinated externally than internally. External coordination with other UN agencies is improved when UNICEF is co-located. UNICEF coordination with implementing partners and government is excellent. Internal coordination between LASAT and COs is effective, however CO mine action focal points need to liaise with various sections and units and this has complicated their ability to efficiently obtain support. ROs play a very small role in mine action coordination due to lack of mine action capability and time.

*Box 17: Coordination of UNICEF mine action.*

***Are the activities appropriate to realise the goals and objectives of the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy?***<sup>92</sup>

111. The strategy makes an effort to delineate the responsibilities at HQ, regional and country level. However, it assumes a capability and availability that is not necessarily present, particularly at regional level. In general, the ROs have insufficient or inappropriate human resources to provide the coordination and support to country mine action programmes. They are preoccupied by other organisational priorities and lack technical expertise that relates to mine action<sup>93</sup>. There are not enough staff in LASAT with the technical support profiles to compensate for this regional shortfall in technical support, resulting in over-stretch of a few key individuals, and lack of technical support provided to the country offices.

112. UNICEF is technically capable of supporting implementing partners and mine action programmes in a way that adheres to best practice, but in general it does not have enough staff with appropriate technical background. Project development, quality management through appropriate monitoring and advice, and successful transition and exit planning is suffering as a result. The traditional recourse to consultants when gaps are identified is an unsustainable, inappropriate solution in the mid- to long-term, particularly in relation to capacity building objectives that require sustained support in the mid- to long-term and rely on institutional memory and ability to capture lessons learned.

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<sup>92</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action – Request for Proposals dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.*

<sup>93</sup> Interviews with ROs in Thailand and Kenya.

113. The effectiveness of UNICEF support to mine action is greater when it partners with government institutions. It relies on the quality of implementing partners when support is directed towards CSOs, particularly informal organisations or involves community based approaches<sup>94</sup>. UNICEF has supported some excellent projects that engage at community level using informal networks. However, these tend to rely heavily on the quality of the implementing partner, and the experience of the UNICEF staff in charge. In general, UNICEF capacity building plans or collaboration with informal networks insufficiently consider mid to long-term needs<sup>95</sup>.



*'Sport-in-a-Box' school activities in Laos, implemented by the Lao Youth Union and supported by UNICEF. Youth volunteers spread UXO risk education messages through songs, games and sports activities. This is just one example where Ministerial partners are mobilised through UNICEF partnership support.*

114. As the country context stabilises, the types of partnership relationship UNICEF has with government institutions do not evolve significantly. There is some indication that, in government led programmes, UNICEF tends to support government more than non-government or CSOs. In UN managed programmes UNICEF tends to support local NGOs, government and, on occasion, CSOs<sup>96</sup>. However, no consistent distinctions could be extracted from these two typologies and there is insufficient evidence to suggest that methods applied differ or that activities and reporting mechanisms change depending on the maturity of local government.

115. UNICEF support to mine action tends to work through government institutions and the civil service and has a good track record of technical NGO capacity building, but is weaker in management capacity building towards successful exit, of transition planning or of management of community based programmes. The main reason for shortfalls as partners become less formally organised is in part due to neglect of management training and efforts towards financial sustainability of the local organisations receiving UNICEF support<sup>97</sup>. Another impediment to long term planning from the inception of a project towards sustainable exit is the turnover of staff and the reliance on consultants as opposed to UNICEF staff who have some longevity in the

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<sup>94</sup> An example is Handicap International (Belgium) involvement in Community Based Mine Risk Reduction (CBMRR) in Cambodia.

<sup>95</sup> In Ethiopia, for example, UNICEF's implementing partner claims that withdrawal of technical and financial support by UNICEF was not sufficiently prepared and that strategic decisions to hand over capacity to government were taken without sufficient consultation with partners.

<sup>96</sup> In Sudan there has been a shift from NGO to government partners as the capacity of governments improves and the context stabilises.

<sup>97</sup> In Ethiopia the main implementing partner NGO was supported and sustained, but when the requirement for collaboration had changed, the NGO was technically competent, but unable to manage or raise sufficient resources to operate.



organisation. These challenges are not unique to UNICEF, but are faced by the mine action sector as a whole.

116. The effectiveness of UNICEF in the lead role in support to mine action in emergency contexts is good<sup>98</sup>. UNICEF's emergency response capability is comparable to that of UNHCR and WFP and one that very few other UN agencies share. UNDP support to mine action is located within Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and focuses on government capacity building through technical advice and material / financial support in over 40 countries. UNDP does not utilise an emergency response capability in mine action despite its location within BCPR, nor does it have the mandate for independent implementation of projects without government partners, which is often required in emergency contexts. UNMAS has a very small presence in the field (around 7 countries) and its main institutional emergency capability involves reach-back to Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO). In contrast, UNICEF supported mine action programmes do tend to make most effective use of UNICEF's discriminators during conflict and during the humanitarian / emergency phase post conflict. According to stakeholder analysis, UNICEF mine action is currently more effective in emergency phases than in development phases. The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002 – 2004 includes objectives that are relevant in emergencies, as does the CCC, but both of these lack specific and practical guidance that could further improve the effectiveness of mine action in emergencies. Although the evaluation of UNICEF's role in the rapid response plan for Iraq was quite negative<sup>99</sup>, in general a broader scope of analysis suggest that UNICEF responds quickly and effectively<sup>100</sup>.

117. UNICEF effectively leverages its discriminating advantages in emergency contexts. These features include: (1) MRE and VA are often seen as a less military, more neutral, activity area and an easy 'entry point'; (2) UNICEF has proven capabilities in emergency response, including rapid mobilisation of funds, adapted methods of intervention leading to rapid risk reduction and an expanding roster of individual consultants and international partnerships; (3) UNICEF's global footprint is amongst the largest of any UN agency. A lead role of UNICEF in the emergency phase of MRE, VA or advocacy requires an ability to rapidly mobilise. Given both technical ability and global presence, a lead UNICEF role is justified. UNICEF mine action is located in EMOPS and has direct access to the emergency capabilities of UNICEF. These capabilities are coordination of emergency interventions, whether supported by EMOPS or by PD, threat monitoring in part via the Operations Centre and Humanitarian Response Unit, mobilisation of resources for emergency response and capacity building.

118. The effectiveness of UNICEF support to MRE, VA or advocacy in rehabilitation or development contexts is reduced through non-use of existing development expertise. UNICEF is not currently mobilising the capability required to fulfil a lead role. UNICEF is particularly adept at institutionalised mine action capacity building, through schools and, to a lesser extent, other civil service departments<sup>101</sup>. UNICEF's approach to community development and capacity building requires further development. There are also indications that UNICEF's effectiveness in mine action is reduced in development phases due to weak mid to long-term planning in the

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<sup>98</sup> The vast majority of other UN agencies, donors, implementing partners and notably UNHCR, WFP and WFP stated this in interview. Document review also highlights rapid mobilisation capabilities.

<sup>99</sup> *The Price of Preparedness, Evaluation of UN Mine Action Rapid Response Plan in Iraq*, Cranfield University, 2003.

<sup>100</sup> Interviews with ICRC, UNHCR, WFP.

<sup>101</sup> UNICEF support through the Ministry of Youth and Sport in Laos is one example of sustainable partnership, where technical management has been, to a large extent, transitioned to national ownership.

emergency phase, and insufficient consideration of transition and exit strategy from inception, but also periodically in the life of the project. UNICEF has a few discriminators, such as its close links with civil society, but this is a relatively new phenomenon. UNICEF's traditional focus is on partnership and implementation through government and UNICEF could do more to leverage civil society links in the rehabilitation to development phases.

119. UNICEF has a development capability, comparable to that of UNDP, but that very few other UN agencies share. Both UNDP and UNICEF share the same challenge in development phases. UNDP does not mainstream mine action into development, in part due to weaknesses in coordination from BCPR to other more development-oriented UNDP capabilities, such as democratic governance, poverty reduction, energy, the environment or health<sup>102</sup>. UNICEF has a few advantages in development contexts: (1) UNICEF has development and capacity building capabilities in food, health, education, and other primary and secondary needs areas; (2) UNICEF has proven, in non-mine action projects, to have successful development approaches that could be utilised in mine action, including risk education (malaria, hygiene), assistance for survivors (HIV/AIDS, child soldiers), advocacy (rights of the child, disability) and has a network of development professional partnerships that could mobilise holistically around the needs of mine/UXO affected communities; (3) UNICEF's global footprint is significant and includes civil society. These advantages and internal lessons learned in other thematic areas of development are not being utilised in UNICEF supported mine action<sup>103</sup>. The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002 – 2004 includes objectives that are relevant in development contexts, but lack specific and practical guidance that could further improve the effectiveness of mine action, particularly in relation to capacity building.

120. MRE is an area where UNICEF staff members have technical competence at HQ and in certain COs – although the regional level capability is often lacking. A large number of COs and ROs are unaware of IMAS<sup>104</sup>. Reliance on consultants and staff turn-over has resulted in some loss of institutional knowledge. However, the calibre of international implementing partners and a core group of UNICEF mine action staff has helped maintain quality. UNICEF staff supporting MRE tend to have either a child protection background or an MRE background, each with different approaches to the job. The main impediments to effectiveness of UNICEF supported MRE are: unavailability of staff at country level due to competing priorities; and lack of capacity building expertise of UNICEF staff at country level, leading to over-reliance on implementing partners or



*A Mines Advisory Group MRE team delivers MRE messages to a community in south Sudan. UNICEF has embraced international NGO experiences and enabled these to be used, not only as implementing partners, but also through joint coordination efforts.*

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<sup>102</sup> Interview with UNDP.

<sup>103</sup> Interviews with UNICEF HQ.

<sup>104</sup> Approximately 75% of COs that responded to questionnaire believe they are IMAS compliant, however interviews and document review suggest that not all mine action focal points are aware of IMAS.



poor mid to long term planning<sup>105</sup>. The main strengths of UNICEF supported MRE are at a technical level and through UNICEF's long established partnership approach at ministry level.

121. In general, UNICEF is competent at conducting surveys and assessments and has maintained an ability to react to emerging trends. Indications of this are: the recent shift towards scrap metal<sup>106</sup> and tampering-related causes of injury<sup>107</sup>; re-consideration of community mine marking<sup>108</sup>; limited demining as part of community based mine risk education; and also the introduction of the public health approach to disability<sup>109</sup>, which includes but is not limited to mines/UXO related disabilities.

122. UNICEF organisational effectiveness could be better improved. The main weaknesses are at the regional level, where ROs do not have the human resource capability, time nor funds to dedicate effort towards support of mine action as indicated in the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005. These offices are often unable to coordinate or technically support the country programmes despite the will to do so. LASAT has the technical expertise to support COs. However, this capability is dependent on one donor. UNICEF therefore suffers from financial and human resource dependency and this has resulted in a consultancy reflex that may be expedient and cost effective, but does have drawbacks relating to institutional memory and the capture and application of lessons learned.

123. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in Box 18. The MRE and advocacy activities at CO and HQ level are appropriate to realise the goals and objectives of the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy. RO activities are less than envisaged due to lack of human resource availability and experience. VA activities are overly narrow in scope and small in scale to realise the goals and objectives. The financial, human and material resources used for implementation of activities is described on page 24, and the result of these within the timeframe in terms of achievement of goals is described on page 29. Findings relating to performance management of the actual realisation of these goals are described on page 41.

Activities do not significantly change whether UNICEF is supporting a government programme or managing one. Technical competence is high, but dependent on a small pool of people and funding sources. Emergency response activities tend to be effective. In development phases, UNICEF underutilises its capacity building lessons learned, particularly in relation with CSO implementing partners and management capacity building towards sustainable exit.

*Box 18: Activities in UNICEF mine action.*

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<sup>105</sup> Most interviews with international implementing partners express significant variation in the experience of mine action focal points in UNICEF.

<sup>106</sup> UNICEF was instrumental in raising awareness of changing risks and needs in Laos, in part through UNICEF sponsored studies, but also through regular interaction with strategic and technical working groups and appreciation of lessons learned by implementing partners.

<sup>107</sup> UNICEF Cambodia has a long history of funding pilot projects and sponsoring studies, including a study of the deliberate tampering phenomenon.

<sup>108</sup> Community mine marking in Sudan has been considered by UNICEF as a potential risk management method.

<sup>109</sup> UNICEF Laos has a disability prevention programme that includes various causes of trauma, from congenital disease to road accidents and UXO incidents.

***Are the activities having the desired impact on target populations, in terms of reducing risk, promoting compliance with relevant legal instruments and providing support to landmine survivors?***<sup>110</sup>

124. UNICEF's support to mine/UXO affected populations in terms of risk reduction is not proven at a global level, UNICEF reports suggest that there is due diligence regarding identification of needs and assessing the impact of UNICEF support to MRE and that overall impact tends to be central to UNICEF decision-making. Impact on survivor's lives is localised as projects tend to be small, focusing on one aspect of disability<sup>111</sup>. Those VA projects that UNICEF does support show innovation and consideration of technical expert opinion, in the form of needs assessments and impact studies. Of the three goals in the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005, the goal that has been the most effective, and apparently had the most impact is MRE<sup>112</sup>. Most indicators of impact that UNICEF that can be extracted from UNICEF documentation relate to inputs and activities<sup>113</sup>. There has been significant investment into the achievement of this goal, both financially and in terms of technical efforts towards standardisation of approach and implementation of the MRE standards through guidelines and through creation of platforms through which professionals can exchange best practice.

125. Global indications of impact include: the readiness of donors to fund UNICEF supported MRE projects; an increase in reported victims that could be attributed to better community liaison which has in turn reduced the number of unreported victims, awareness raising and information management; a reduction in numbers of new victims<sup>114</sup>; the quality and number of standards and guidelines in MRE that have been developed through support by UNICEF; and the proportion of MRE projects around the world that have been preceded by, and developed as a result of, some form of needs assessment that – which indicates effective resource allocation. The evaluation has uncovered many more indicators from



*A 'circus' group of children spreading MRE messages. The group is based in Pailin but has toured schools in other mine-affected parts of Cambodia. Methods such as these are engaging and commonly used in risk education, particularly where fear may exist. However, the impact of MRE in Cambodia is still a topic of much debate.*

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<sup>110</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action – Request for Proposals* dated 29 June 2005. Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 made reference to this question.

<sup>111</sup> An exception is Chechnya, where a comprehensive VA programme is supported.

<sup>112</sup> This is based purely on the proportion of staff time, qualifications of staff and funding dedicated to MRE compared with the other two goals.

<sup>113</sup> A sample of the type of data generated by UNICEF mine action is provided in Appendix E.

<sup>114</sup> Although the number of known survivors is increasing and victim numbers are not solely dependent on awareness.

document review that are not listed here. A sample of performance indicators that UNICEF currently generates, but has not analysed in a systematic way, is provided in [Appendix E](#).

126. More perceived and reliable benefits of UNICEF support at a national level were obtained in South East Asia than in the Horn of Africa. UNICEF staff in Ethiopia and Sudan acknowledged that impact could not be adequately proven there due to lack of surveillance systems and other impact assessment tools. This evaluation can record an apparent appreciation for the role of community liaison and the importance of MRE in addition to a strong sense of awareness in a small sample of regional government workers, officials and community volunteers.

127. Indicators of impact from field visits conducted as part of this evaluation as a result of VA to disabled children, including mine / UXO victims included: improved physical functioning of some disabled children; improved standard of living for disabled children and their families; increased educational opportunities for disabled children and children of disabled people; increased acceptance of disabled children by families and society; and benefits related to persuasion that schools provide ramps for wheelchairs.

128. Indicators of impact from field visits conducted as part of this evaluation as a result of MRE include: children having alternative play activities to keep them away from risks, inclusion of children who are out of school or from ethnic minorities into social activities that are fun and memorable, especially songs; and indications of actual risk reduction include reports that children are digging in safer ways, using safe ways of making a fire and reporting UXO to an adult if they find one.

129. MRE has not been subject to the same level of output/outcome (impact) assessment that public health approaches usually adopt. There are two schools of thought on this issue: one that favours this public health approach to impact assessment of MRE and another that favours a more social science based impact assessment approach. Public health experts state that if the impact of other risk education campaigns can be measured (e.g. anti-malaria, HIV/AIDS, diarrhoea, nutrition), then MRE can be too. Their belief is that current MRE methods should not be endorsed, let alone expanded upon, until such output/outcome (impact) evaluations have been conducted to internationally recognised public health standards<sup>115</sup>. UNICEF has not adopted this approach to impact assessment of MRE.

130. Social science experts, on the other hand, recognise that mine/UXO risks do not propagate in the same way as disease, and depending on the nature of the mine/UXO threat, may be more or less predictable than, say, HIV/AIDS and risk will certainly be defined under different scenarios which means that they measure impact differently. UNICEF has adopted the social science approach<sup>116</sup>. Although UNICEF collaborates closely with the CDC, UNICEF has chosen to adopt a more social science approach to impact assessment of MRE which is widely endorsed by MRE practitioners. However, many non-MRE mine action practitioners, health experts and donors still question this approach, preferring more process driven approaches to impact assessment. As it is, it appears that MRE has had the most positive impact of the three UNICEF goals, given the quality and amount of inputs<sup>117</sup>. The recurring questioning regarding

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
<sup>115</sup> CDC consider that potential negative effects should be determined along with positive effects of MRE prior to international endorsement of current approaches.

<sup>116</sup> *Angola Mine Awareness Evaluation*, UNICEF, DEFAIT, CIET, 2000 is an example of this approach.

<sup>117</sup> Most performance indicators, a sample of which is contained in Appendix E, relate to inputs and activities, with fewer outputs and outcomes.

the effectiveness of current approaches to MRE as a method of risk reduction needs to be resolved, either through wider dissemination of findings regarding impact at a global level, or through debate that engages key stakeholders in endorsement of global social science studies or the public health equivalent. If this debate as to the effectiveness of MRE continues, the sustainability of MRE as mine action funds decrease will be damaged.

131. Figure 7 shows the types of activities and the frequency of these activities taking place in questionnaires that were received from COs. MRE took place in nearly all of the COs that responded, followed by advocacy and then VA. There was little mention of activities related to interagency assessment. Capacity building activities were prevalent.



*Figure 7: Activities of UNICEF supported mine action according to questionnaires. The left hand graph shows results from UN Managed programmes and that on the right shows the results from UN supported programmes.*

132. Implementing partners have benefited from significant UNICEF support, mainly in the form of funding, but also technical support. Aside from acting as a financial conduit between national partners and international donors, this has been in the form of: numerous localised guidelines, for example regarding integration of education on accidents, injuries and disabilities; including MRE into primary school curricula; policy and guidelines for integrating community based approaches into rural development plans. UNICEF impact on MRE training of teachers MRE teaching of students/out-of-school children/young people in contaminated areas; training of social and health workers and NGOs on accident, injury and disability prevention; training of relevant ministerial institutions on community outreach; establishment and capacity-building of local MRE focal points, establishment or participation in MRE working groups; and the conducting of studies and development of MRE strategies. UNICEF support in the provision of technical advice<sup>118</sup> or technical/management capacity building of national partners has had some impact on the quality of outputs. The level of technical capacity building is dependent on the appropriateness of UNICEF staff experience, and is predominantly directed to MRE, not VA or advocacy.

133. One of the most significant impacts of UNICEF's support to mine action has been its ability to enable experts from implementing organisations to lead on projects. This same quality

<sup>118</sup> In early 2006 manuals explaining the implementation of MRE were developed by UNICEF and GICHD.

of UNICEF has also been effective in coordination. UNICEF has been particularly effective in enabling country level coordination, not necessarily through UNICEF taking the lead role, but in enabling others, sometimes more experienced organisations, to define priorities and direct coordinated efforts as a dominant participant in a coordination platform<sup>119</sup>. The impact of UNICEF coordination in countries where no other UN mine action agency has a permanent presence has been through the provision of information for awareness-raising which has resulted in the development of programmes and facilitation of mine action advocacy<sup>120</sup>. On occasion, UNICEF has been tempted into a leadership role rather than one of a facilitator and enabler of others, and this has been less effective, particularly when experienced international organisations can provide advice and lessons learned in coordination and planning forum.

134. UNICEF's direct impact on the lives of survivors is localised<sup>121</sup>. The quality of VA support tends to be of high standard, but UNICEF is not supporting VA at a sufficiently large and sustained scale for significant impact to be evident. VA programming is of great relevance to mine affected communities but currently in a state of neglect by the UN system at large. This is an important issue for the UN to resolve considering that ultimately, mine related VA needs will remain for longer, while educational and clearance needs decrease more rapidly over time. UNICEF has not organised itself around this trend by investing in survivors. This emanates from a wider lack of leadership on VA by the collective interagency movement. UNICEF has remained focused on preventative measures such as MRE and advocacy around the MBT, to the neglect of other legal instruments such as those relating to human rights or the rights of the disabled. Some shifts in focus are taking place at a regional level, including greater emphasis being placed on the quality of life and not just risk reduction<sup>122</sup>. UNICEF support suffers due to lack of resources, but most of all because VA is labour intensive, therefore expensive, technically demanding and very difficult to sustain in the mid to long-term. Given these challenges, there are some efforts taking place to raise awareness of survivors needs at a country level, notably through information dissemination, participation in working groups and studies<sup>123</sup>.

135. UNICEF has had little effect in terms of integration of mine/UXO survivors into UNICEF's existing programmes at an operational level. However, awareness regarding this shortfall and efforts to remedy it at policy level are apparent. Activity-based indicators of UNICEF's impact on the lives of survivors based on document review are its engagement in support for recreational activities in particular and in the inclusion of people living with disability into advocacy or MRE programmes. Another, albeit infrequent, indicator is UNICEF's collaboration with groups

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<sup>119</sup> UNICEF has been known to second international NGO staff to UNICEF functions, indicating that it recognises the unavailability of experienced staff and the competence of other organisations.

<sup>120</sup> In Burundi, for example, UNICEF has acted alone as a UN agency present in-country with a mine action mandate. Through UNICEF's efforts local advocacy campaigns have been assisted and MRE supported. Information has been gathered and disseminated to other UN agencies that are not present in-country.

<sup>121</sup> <sup>121</sup> VA is the second most funded of the 3 goals according to questionnaires, but represents less than 10% of total mine action expenditure in general. There are some indications that spending on VA is increasing in some COs. According to questionnaires VA is the least relevant of the three goals to UNICEF.

<sup>122</sup> VA is being developed in Ethiopia – where there is a movement from MRE towards a general disability programme. A more realistic approach to VA which focuses on integration into mainstream programming, and disability programmes has also been incorporated into the 2005 UN mine action coordination policy.

<sup>123</sup> Example: Laos – Life After the Bomb, 2004 and A Study of Scrap Metal Collection in Lao PDR, 2005 and Cambodia – A Collection of Practices from UNICEF's Mine Action Experience in Cambodia; UNICEF Cambodia, 2002 and Crossing the Divide, Landmines Villagers and Organisations, 2003.

representing the disadvantaged persons. These kinds of partnerships and efforts are often accompanied by UNICEF staff members who have a relevant background or interest. Other indicators, albeit infrequent, include: support for development of legislation, policy and guidelines on the rights of disabled people, specialised care and social welfare for disabled children and adults, community-based rehabilitation (CBR) and school integration efforts. UNICEF has put some effort into capacity building of self-help groups, on occasion supporting the establishment and training of working groups on legislation of disabled people's rights.

136. UNICEF tends to be most effective when it considers mine/UXO related trauma within a broader disability context. Examples include but are not limited to: UNICEF impact on enabling access to CBR services for all disabled people, with a special focus on accident survivors 'including mine/UXO accidents'; integration of disabled children in mainstream schools; primary school teachers trained in special education; government institutions, NGOs and local NGOs supported to provide rehabilitation services, counselling and learning opportunities to disabled children; production and distribution of mobility devices; and income-generation support.. Overall, impact indicators suggest that UNICEF is not doing all it can for survivors. The VA goal does not match the capability area of UNICEF country offices and there are some indications that disability is not being prioritised at HQ level<sup>124</sup>. Disability considerations are not being made in a cross-cutting way. The main impediments to effectiveness of UNICEF supported VA are: unavailability of staff at country level due to competing priorities of UNICEF staff at country level, leading to negligence of VA needs. The main strengths of UNICEF supported VA are through its long established partnership approach at ministry level and its ability to regard survivors needs in a more holistic way, from a protection perspective that considers the environment within which affected people and survivors live.

137. UNICEF's impact on the MBT universalisation is significant at an international level. However, advocacy using more holistic information management around the needs or rights of survivors and affected people is lagging behind. Broader advocacy efforts have suffered from weak information management within UNICEF and functional challenges between the Humanitarian Policy Unit in EMOPS and the Division of Policy and Planning. It would be easier to liaise with one shared policy capability that spans from emergency to development phases of a crisis and links external to internal policies. UNICEF's effectiveness in information management relating to survivors, and also mine/UXO affected communities is weak. However, one of the key areas where UNICEF has invested effort is in information management relating to the rights of the disabled and of human rights violations in general<sup>125</sup>. UNICEF efforts to improve the integration of mine/UXO related injury into public health thinking, through information management is also innovative. It would follow logically that effectiveness of advocacy relating to the broader humanitarian issues of mine/UXO affected people, and utilisation of other legal instruments, not just MBT, will improve. As it is, the most impact of UNICEF advocacy work is at a global level regarding the MBT.

138. UNICEF has been noticeably absent regarding the use of IHRL or IHL as tools for advocacy for recognition of the wider needs of survivors. There are some broader advocacy

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<sup>124</sup> It was stated during the 1-day workshop on 17<sup>th</sup> March that the two disability positions in UNICEF HQ, one in Education and the other in Health sections of PD had both been terminated and that despite support for greater consideration of disability, this was not specifically added to the MTSP, but was included under the more generic 'most vulnerable' category.

<sup>125</sup> LASAT indicated it was the intention of UNICEF to integrate rights violations surveillance in the future. This evaluation did not find evidence of UNICEF's involvement with the development of International Conventions, or soft law, relating to this activity.



efforts, including those to include students, teachers, school directors and communities in local advocacy for prevention of accidents, injuries and disabilities including those related to landmines/UXO. There have also been Information Education and Communication (IEC) materials developed and used to advocate for the inclusion of disabled children in schools. These efforts are very much dependent on the availability of UNICEF personnel in country. It is clear that advocacy could be made more effective through the injection of additional human and financial investment in this area. There is also little provision for synergy between offices, particularly with the Human Rights Unit (HRU) or across the UN system.

139. The strategy does not address UNICEF's widespread uncertainty about the relevance of a human rights-based approach in situations of political instability, peace building and post-conflict. This could be done by creating objectives relating to UNICEF human resource capacity building in this regard. UNICEF has commenced the development of tools or indicators for global monitoring of the rights of women and children and is working towards increased integration of HRBAP. Indications of the effectiveness of UNICEF's support to advocacy are the "International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action" on the 4<sup>th</sup> of April, progress towards universal ratification of the MBT and the visibility of UNICEF in international forum associated with the MBT. At a country level, there are fewer indications of effectiveness. However, to note are the number of countries that have supported the development of disability related law and benefits, or that are making moves towards greater inclusion of disabled children into school life. Support to local campaigns tends to be rare, and primarily financial.

140. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in [Box 19](#). In general MRE activities that have been impact assessed are reported to having the desired impact on target populations, in terms of reducing risk. Efforts to promote compliance with relevant legal instruments are also reported to have had a positive global impact on support for MBT obligations, but impact on human rights is more localised. Provision of support to landmine survivors, when it does take place, has also had a positive impact on the quality of life, but these efforts are limited in scope and at a small scale. Findings regarding the consistency of outcomes and impact with UNICEF as an organisation are on page 16. The extent to which performance and quality management data from UNICEF has allowed for impact assessment during this evaluation is described on page 42. The impact of UNICEF's mine action support is described on page 51.

Performance indicators used by UNICEF are predominantly input and activity based, so it is not possible to measure output and outcome impact in any consistent way. The impact of MBT related advocacy cannot be attributed to any one organisation. However, acknowledgement of the role UNICEF has played in MBT advocacy is widespread. UNICEF has had significant impact on enabling mine action professionals to raise standards of MRE and effectively coordinate their efforts. It appears that MRE has had the most impact on people, followed by localised impact as a result of survivor assistance. Knowledge of risks has improved and mobility and inclusion of survivors into mainstreamed life has improved.

*Box 19: Impact of UNICEF support to mine action.*


### **Summary**

141. The effect that UNICEF support to mine action has had on the lives of mine/UXO affected populations remains insufficiently verified and UNICEF can do much more to develop adequate performance and quality management systems. This is not as 'bad' as it sounds because the quality of inputs is high, the needs based use of resources – although not always programmed in a systemised way – is rationalised. Quality control mechanisms are used more than quality assurance. This is a defensible way of operating, but one that does need to re-gain



balance through more focus on verifiable outputs and outcomes during the implementation phase than is currently taking place. In terms of outputs and outcomes, UNICEF's impact on raising the professional standards of MRE, its role in the success of MBT related advocacy, and its impact in reducing mine/UXO risks in emergency contexts are visible. There are organisational features leading to duplication of effort and other planning deficiencies particularly in sustainable capacity building in development contexts. Considering human resource and financial limitations, UNICEF has maintained allocation of resources that really does consider civil society in a merit based decentralised way.

142. Resource management within UNICEF can be better rationalised towards the needs of COs and the products and services UNICEF mine action provides. A simplified illustration of resources and their relationship with the outputs of UNICEF mine action is provided in [Figure 8](#). Stated or implied outputs in the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005 do not always match the available inputs. Functional analysis of processes leading to desired outputs highlights competencies within UNICEF that could be better used. Internal chains of command do not fully recognise human resource availability and technical profile. HQ and RO should focus on development of in-house mine action expertise at CO level. There should be a collective effort towards diversification of donor base. Information management should enable advocacy and preparedness activities. MRE and VA materials and guidelines should be developed that enable the CO mine action focal point, particularly those who are part-time, to provide support in a way that makes best use of their time.



*Figure 8: Inputs and processes of UNICEF support in mine action.*

## Risks and sustainability of the strategy and approach

***What are the risks and impact on communities and UNICEF's programme partners if UNICEF should be unable to meet any of its different commitments contained in its mine action strategy?***<sup>126</sup>

143. Any decision to mainstream mine action more broadly within UNICEF supported programmes runs the risk that it will be lost, but if it is not mainstreamed then mine/UXO programmes may clash with UNICEF's organisational priorities. UNICEF does not only prioritise its efforts around the main causes of child mortality and morbidity, but also focuses on humanitarian concerns that cause significant trauma, even if not widespread<sup>127</sup>. Mines/UXO are not major causes if compared to some diseases, social or environmental concerns, but their impact on the life of a child can be considerable. If UNICEF mainstreams mine/UXO related risk reduction programmes into its development programmes, while this would appear to be the most effective way of ensuring institutional viability of the thematic area within UNICEF, in reality it may lead to mine/UXO risks simply being sidelined as other more obvious concerns take primacy. Mainstreaming may lead to better identification of non-clearance solutions – not just in education and awareness – in the form of alternatives. If the current approach to UNICEF support to mine action remains and mine action is pushed onto a wider programmatic approach within UNICEF that has other priorities, there is a risk that country programmes will simply choose not to address the needs of mine/UXO affected people or decide to create stand-alone support that insufficiently utilises UNICEF's core capabilities, particularly in development contexts.

144. Questionnaire data, as shown in [Figure 9](#), suggests that UNICEF programmes are jeopardised in UN managed programmes as a result of changing needs and lack of monitoring and evaluation of internal performance and that of implementing partners. Questionnaires also indicate, as illustrated in [Figure 10](#), that the three main risks when UNICEF is supporting a government led programme are either lack of funding, changing needs or lack of appropriately experienced personnel.

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<sup>126</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action* – Request for Proposals dated 29 June 2005 did not specifically refer to this question. However, the Cranfield University proposal to UNICEF entitled *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action*, dated August 2005 did.

<sup>127</sup> An example given during the 1-day workshop on 17<sup>th</sup> March is polio.




Figure 9: Risks affecting UNICEF managed mine action based on questionnaires sent to CO mine action programmes.




Figure 10: Risks affecting UNICEF supported mine action based on questionnaires sent to CO mine action programmes.

145. UNICEF's dependency on implementing partners is heavy and donors may choose to fund these partners directly instead. Considering UNICEF works exclusively through implementing partners, there is a risk that unless it improves the visibility of its added-value as a custodian of best practice, quality, performance and provider of information, donors and implementing partners will go elsewhere. UNICEF shows some weaknesses in quality and performance management although reporting and liaison with donors has improved in the last four years. UNICEF support to mine action shows weak consideration, at times, of mid to long-term viability of partners and thus is heavily reliant on the experience of mine action focal points to create managerial and financial capacity, to transition to national ownership and to finally exit. If UNICEF does not demonstrate greater progress and success to donors; continues to levy an

administrative charge without better demonstration of quality management, or does not improve information management that brings donors closer to direct implementation results of partners, donor interest may be put at risk.

146. When one considers the slow rate of clearance efforts, the high resource requirements of clearance and VA, and the pace at which clearance can reduce risk compared to that of MRE, it is clear that MRE – if its real impact is widely acknowledged – could be a very effective means of risk reduction in terms of time and cost. It could, although this is as yet unproven, be a key reason why global trends indicate that the mine action sector is resolving the finite mine/UXO problem. Implementing partners, in general, are dependent on UNICEF mainly for financial support and those without fundraising expertise would suffer as a result of withdrawal of UNICEF support for mine action.

147. UNICEF support to MRE standardisation, development of guidelines that assist practitioners to implement those standards and creation of forum through which professionals can exchange best practice are admirable, and the other pillars of mine action would benefit from similar efforts. MRE may have received a smaller proportion of mine action funding than clearance. However, UNICEF support has resulted in greater practical support to practitioners and capture of lessons learned than the other pillars of mine action. A twin track system has been created, with MRE moving forward in one way and other pillars in another. This is not the intention of UNICEF, nor is it unique for MRE. Clearance and VA tend to operate separately and the international standards and health protocols that govern them are separate. Nevertheless UNICEF support to IMAS runs the risk of reinforcing the pre-existing tendency for stand-alone pillars of mine action that insufficiently coordinate, thereby increasingly alienating an effective tool for risk reduction, MRE.

148. The closest forum of technical exchange and dialogue regarding clearance that can compare to the MRE working group that UNICEF supports is the survey working group, which does not aim at professional development of a pillar of mine action in the way the MRE working group does. Studies, for example relating to the tool-box approach to clearance, training and technical advice methods, ways in which task prioritisation and selection can be made etc. do exist. However, the guidelines and handbooks that exist for clearance tend to be academic in nature, whereas those available for MRE practitioners have become increasingly implementation focused. The culture of self-development is different, in some ways better for MRE. This is not to suggest that UNICEF supports "stand-alone" guidelines or standards or that UNICEF does not sufficiently interact with public health and mine action. However, UNICEF could do more to advocate for other mine action agencies to adopt approaches for professional development of other pillars in tandem with those developed through UNICEF support to MRE. Failure to do so may lead to divergence of approach regarding professional development and runs the risk of damaging the extent to which MRE interacts with and is understood and respected by other mine action professionals. If UNICEF or other UN agencies consider the development of guidelines oriented around the needs and rights of survivors, they would do well to avoid tangential approaches that may impact negatively on integration across the sector.

149. UNICEF support to VA should be mainstreamed into public health programmes, if these are available, otherwise it will continue to run financial risks due to lack of interest by traditional mine action donors and of UNICEF staff. Lack of progress towards achievement of UNICEF's VA goal combined with negligence of this area of need by other UN agencies, including UNDP and WHO, has resulted in reliance on international NGOs such as HI and on other agencies – very notably ICRC. If the UNICEF strategy is not significantly curtailed in its ambition and the UN does not take a deep and realistic look at its ability to improve the quality of life of survivors

then the current neglect, particularly of adults and adolescents in need of survivor assistance, will continue.

150. A summary of findings in relation to this question is provided in [Box 20](#). The main risk UNICEF support to mine action faces are that donors prefer to fund direct implementation rather than support via UNICEF because quality and performance management systems do not demonstrate added-value. Another key risk is that over-reliance on mine action donors, rather than development donors as a result of internal mainstreaming, leads to insufficient funding for activities entailed in any future UNICEF mine action strategy. A third key risk is over-reliance on a few key human resources for UNICEF's mine action technical capability. If the human resource pool is not broadened and more UNICEF staff do not have mine action career development possibilities, then quality and sustainability of support will be jeopardised at CO level. Impact on communities and UNICEF's programme partners if UNICEF should be unable to meet any of its different commitments contained in its mine action strategy would be: (1) loss of exchange and dialogue of MRE practitioners at a global level; (2) localised deterioration on the quality of life of survivors, particularly as a result of reduced activities by government and non-government local implementing partners of UNICEF; and (3) deterioration in the level of risk awareness by affected communities as a result of reduced activities by government and non-government local implementing partners of UNICEF. Many of these government and non-government local implementing partners of UNICEF will cease to conduct MRE or VA as they are financially and managerially dependent on UNICEF. UNICEF is not a major donor of mine action. Impact on advocacy, on international implementing partners and on global VA and MRE that is provided will not be significant. Specific risks affecting quality of coordination are highlighted on page 45. Risks related to widespread recognition or not of the effectiveness of current best practices in MRE are described on page 52.

If UNICEF mainstreams mine action, particularly in development contexts there is a risk that it disappears entirely. However, if it does not, there is a risk that it restricts access to donor support or that it is not supported at CO level because it is not seen to fit in with organisational priorities. Dependency on a small number of human resources and donors is another risk. UNICEF should diversify its donor base and invest in mine action focal points.


*Box 20: Risks to sustainability of UNICEF mine action.*

## **SUMMARY**

151. UNICEF has achieved much in terms of raising standards and recognition of the MRE sector, and advocacy relating to the MBT. If support was withdrawn, the main impact would be on these areas. UNICEF support relating to the quality of life of survivors has been at a low scale. If UNICEF ceased to support VA, the impact on partners would be localised but important for those organisations soliciting funding.

152. A well-balanced dynamic between mine action stakeholders and UNICEF stakeholders of UNICEF support to mine action is diagrammatically represented in [Figure 11](#). UNICEF's approach to mine action should satisfy the MTSP focus areas, and should be part of a broader UN effort that works to cover other humanitarian mine action needs in a way that leverages the discriminating features of each UN agency. This collective UN effort should correspond to external stakeholders, notably the affected people. In reality, UNICEF has satisfied the UN mine action requirements and created a mine action strategy that corresponds more to the needs of mine/UXO affected populations than to UNICEF as an organisation. The contribution of mine action to the achievement of UNICEF's areas of focus is not adequately clear. The role of UNICEF as part of a collective UN effort is considerable and its contribution recognised.

However, internal challenges persist that inclusion into strategic documents such as CCC and MTSP has only resolved in part. UNICEF has not adapted processes or organisation to meet strategic requirements. Mine action support is dependent on non-core funding and is struggling to prove its outputs and outcomes in an environment where competing demands, both internally and externally with donors, jeopardise sustainability of its approach.



*Figure 11: UNICEF support to mine action and its environment.*

## CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

153. The UNICEF Mine Action Strategy for 2002 – 2005 served an important purpose, at a time in the evolution of mine action and of UNICEF. The main benefits of the strategy were to enable the raising of funds, to improve recognition and respect for UNICEF in mine action, and to demonstrate clearly the importance of MRE and its broader use as, according to some stakeholders, one of the most cost effective risk reduction method in mine action. The direct impact of the strategy on the development of UNICEF's mine actions programmes and field projects was less tangible or measurable. The strategy provided direction, established unity of effort within UNICEF mine action, and defined policy. It provided a framework within which other planning decisions can be taken. The strategy was not intended to be a prescriptive plan of tasks and activities to be implemented.

154. Although the global UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002 – 2005 appears to lack some of the features, such as targets, of a traditional strategy, the past four years illustrate that UNICEF should maintain decentralised decision-making. In future, targets should be set, but these should fall into two categories - prescriptive elements and context-based objectives. Additional technical guidelines and project management systems should accompany any future strategy. The intention, at the very least, is to induce consistency of approach and organisational focus. More centralised directives in a strategy would be more appropriate for the donor community at large. Irrespective of the extent to which decisions are decentralised, UNICEF would do well to incorporate mine action information management systems that enable coordination internally as well as externally into its programming. Some of the performance data generated by UNICEF, along with just one example of how this data might better be used, is illustrated in [Appendix E](#).

155. The mid to long term relevancy of mine action to UNICEF would be greatly improved if HRBAP approaches were progressively adopted, and the sustainability of UNICEF's internal support would improve consequentially. There has been only limited progress in mainstreaming mine action into UNICEF core activities. Mine action supported by UNICEF remains essentially a stand-alone activity, raising its own funds at HQ, unlike most other thematic areas of support. It is visible and creates substantial interest at senior level, possibly also for political reasons. It is not purely an emergency issue or a development issue, but one that spans all phases in a crisis and yet is insufficiently integrated into the PD. Two separate approaches should be developed, possibly through the development of two strategies – one for emergency mine action, and another for more sustainable mine action. An illustration of a HRBAP version of the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 20002 – 2005 is illustrated in [Appendix E](#).

156. UNICEF has made significant efforts to improve the effectiveness of MRE and has developed a core technical capability in this area. Good examples are the IMAS on MRE developed by UNICEF in 2004, and the recently published MRE Best Practice Guides. The effectiveness and impact of UNICEF support to MRE is at a global level. UNICEF should retain the lead role in this area, in particular bringing together expert organisations and facilitating dialogue on best practice. The areas that should be emphasised in the future are: (1) inclusion of MRE into the broader humanitarian development and peace building activities, particularly with RO support and (2) embedding MRE into UNICEF's work in education, health promotion, child protection, integrated early childhood development (IECD) and other UNICEF sectors as well as establishment of surveillance systems. This requires use of human resources that have technical profile and availability to further mainstreaming and information management and surveillance within UNICEF. The ongoing questioning of the effectiveness of current approaches to MRE as a method of risk reduction is damaging the efforts of MRE implementing



organisations and needs to be resolved, either through the wider dissemination of findings on the impact of MRE at a global level, or through debate that engages key stakeholders in endorsement of social science studies. If this debate on the effectiveness of MRE continues, the funding sustainability of MRE will be at risk.

157. UNICEF advocacy has made significant progress towards the main goal – the universal ratification of the MBT. However, UNICEF could make better use of other legal instruments, notably IHRL and IHL. The designation of UNICEF as a lead agency for advocacy is appropriate. However, there needs to be a clearer focus on UNICEF's capabilities – which are not limited to MBT advocacy. UNICEF should provide mine action focal points with practical guidance on the use of non-MBT related instruments for advocacy. This will require a change of UNICEF strategy and associated technical notes, taking into consideration the the Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, the June 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy' and the 2005-2009 UN mine action strategy so that the rights of all at risk groups and survivors, irrespective of age or gender, are promoted in a way that is harmonious across UN agencies and that leverages UNICEF's specific competence in advocacy.

158. Lack of progress in achieving UNICEF's VA goal, together with inadequate investment of effort and resources by other UN agencies, including UNDP and WHO, has resulted in reliance on international NGOs such as HI and other agencies – notably ICRC. This area of the UNICEF's mine action strategy needs urgent revision. The UN strategy should re-consider VA needs and take a closer look at the capabilities of each UN agency, possibly resulting in a less ambitious, but more realistic set of goals, or the development of additional capabilities, or changes to the roles and responsibilities of each UN agency. The current organisational structure, roles and associated processes are having a limited impact on VA, particularly on adults and adolescents in need of survivor assistance. Most effort is at CO level, particularly in relation to development of strategies and access to health care and school education. ROs have assisted, on occasion, in the identification of needs and development of strategies. The Landmines and Small Arms Team (LASAT) has also contributed to strategic support to COs. Despite widespread motivation within middle management of UNICEF, the main reason for lack of progress is lack of human resources with the relevant VA experience and time. This goal is not effectively achieved: UNICEF's support to VA lacks coherence and its impact is questionable.

159. UNICEF's effectiveness in capacity building towards sustainable transition and exit requires more mid to long term planning and greater resources. The sustainability of UNICEF's mine action based on civil society is fragile and lacks resilience. UNICEF should further develop its capacity for community-based approaches.

160. In most supported programmes, the mine action focal point is located within the Child Protection Section. Other sections commonly involved in mine action are Education in PD, Communication Division and EMOPS through direct liaison between LASAT and CO mine action focal points and with the Humanitarian Policy Unit. The current set up is negatively impacting on mine action activities according to COs because UNICEF sections and divisions tend to communicate vertically rather than on the basis of capability matrixes. The main reasons for not supporting mine action at CO level given were as follows: regulations required for activity implementation; linkage of CO to RO not being strong enough; a clearer corporate commitment needed; and that mine action is not visible enough in regular programming and UNICEF humanitarian response. A Child Protection officer in a CO currently liaises with his/her homologue in the Child Protection section in the RO and HQ. Requests for LASAT support in

EMOPS is dependent on the Child Protection officer's level of awareness of mine / UXO related risks and that of PD staff with whom he/she interacts.

161. The two main channels, PD and EMOPS, for support provision to UNICEF mine action focal points in ROs and COs is illustrated, in simplified form, in [Figure 12](#). Mine action focal points in sections of PD at CO level may have to liaise with a mine action focal point at RO level which is in a different section of PD or in EMOPS. ROs are sometimes by-passed entirely in mine action. Whether CO or RO, both may have to liaise with elements of PD for their sectional work, and also with LASAT in EMOPS regarding mine action. This is the case, for example, in South East Asia. They may also have to liaise with the Humanitarian Policy Unit in EMOPS, which tends to focus on inter-agency policy, or with the Division of Policy and Planning which tends to focus on UNICEF policy. The involvement of more than one section in PD, and of both PD and EMOPS has the features of a capability matrix approach. In theory this has advantages, the main one being that resources are brought together across UNICEF, irrespective of hierarchy or thematic area, for mine action purposes. In reality, it is sufficiently confusing that most mine action focal points revert to organisation chart defined vertical communication from CO to RO to HQ, remaining within their section or division, and asking for LASAT support when deemed necessary. This tends to be in relation to solicitation of global funds allocated by LASAT in relation to the mine action strategy and annual plans, or technical support.




Figure 12: UNICEF internal support to mine action.

162. At times efforts are duplicated or opportunities are missed. An example is fundraising. Solicitations to mine action donors by LASAT are coordinated with the Programme Funding Office of UNICEF, which conducts similar fundraising activities, with different donor representatives for different needs. Opportunities for fundraising through development donors (as opposed to mine action ones) via that office are not seized, in part because mine action funding needs are not channelled through the Programme Funding Office in the way most other UNICEF activities are. At other times needs are missed, for example the use of HRBAP, IHL and IHRL in mine action, which could be enabled by simplified policy advice from a single policy unit that addressed the interagency role of the UN in human rights as well as UNICEF internal policies regarding these same issues.

163. Common Country Assessments (CCA) and UNDAF seem to be of limited use in the development of UNICEF's mine action country programmes and projects. Needs assessments and UN joint annual planning are seen as more useful for planning UNICEF's work. The lack of linkage with CCAs and UNDAFs is indicative of a lack of mid to long-term planning, and limited mainstreaming of UNICEF's mine action work. Some of these challenges could be improved through more effective coordination between PD and EMOPS.

164. Mine action capabilities within UNICEF are extremely fragile. If DfID funding were withdrawn or if a small number of key mine action focal points were to leave the organisation, UNICEF would lose much of its mine action capability. This precarious situation is inappropriate, as UNICEF has a lead role in the 2005 – 2009 UN mine action strategy and the contributions of UNICEF within the June 2005 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy' have also been planned up to 2009. UNICEF needs to develop a more resilient mine action capability.

165. Performance management of UNICEF support to mine action focuses on two areas – the accurate identification of needs, and the impact assessment and evaluation once the intervention has taken place. There are no formal mechanisms for applying quality or measuring performance during the life of a project. Although most experts agree that the quality of UNICEF support tends to be high, the lack of measurable outputs and outcomes is likely to significantly impact UNICEF's future ability to mobilise resources.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

166. UNICEF should remain as the lead UN agency responsible for the development of UN policy on MRE, the development of MRE standards and the global coordination of MRE best practice. Where appropriate, UNICEF should fund and direct MRE projects in the field. EMOPS should retain responsibility for support to mine action in emergencies through coordination of responses, threat monitoring, resource mobilisation, capacity building and support to PD in emergency and development projects.

167. UNICEF should retain an important role in advocacy, but its responsibilities regarding the MBT need to be clarified. There is some confusion over UNICEF's role and responsibilities vis-à-vis other UN agencies. It may be appropriate for UNICEF to assume a lower profile with MBT and to increase its efforts in other aspects of advocacy.

168. The suitability of UNICEF as a leading UN agency in VA needs to be revisited. The suitability of UNICEF in promoting the special needs of mine and UXO victims and survivors may be in conflict with broader UNICEF policies regarding assistance to all victims. UNICEF should reconsider its involvement in VA at international, regional and field level. UNICEF should raise awareness within the UN system regarding the needs of survivors which the World Health Organisation (WHO) and others may be better able to address.

169. UNICEF should continue to enable and encourage decentralised decision-making through global policies that remain sufficiently open and which are not implemented in a 'top down' manner. It is recommended that UNICEF's mine action policies be accompanied by technical notes which provide appropriate guidance to ROs, COs and implementing partners to enable and encourage unity of purpose and consistency of effort and quality. This should include, *inter alia*: guidance for emergency mine action interventions which is consistent with UNICEF's Medium Term Strategic Plan (MTSP), Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies (CCC), UNICEF's Emergencies Handbook and Technical Notes for Emergency Programming; and guidance for mine action interventions in development contexts and how to enable greater mainstreaming into UNICEF's PD.

170. UNICEF should consider broadening the scope of its mine action strategy to include the impact of small arms on children during and after conflict. This recommendation is outside of the terms of reference of this evaluation. However, a significant majority of key informant and focus group interviewed expressed this need and the appropriateness of UNICEF as an agent for small arms risk reduction as part of child protection.

171. UNICEF should recognise the substantial risk of its current financial dependency on a few key donors and its reliance on limited mine action human resources. It should address this by providing resources at headquarters to enable core functions to be maintained through non-project related funding. UNICEF should also encourage and enable a broader group of UNICEF staff to develop skills, experience and exposure to mine action.

172. UNICEF should develop performance management systems, procedures and metrics that apply in all contexts, which build on Programme Management System (ProMS) and the IMEP and enable mine action project managers to consider progress and report success, not only when planning or reviewing plans, but throughout the project cycle. This would demonstrate a more visible contribution by mine action to the UNICEF's MTSP and to donors, thereby improving the sustainability of UNICEF's approach to mine action. An example of how

this could be done, along with a sample of the performance indicators based on data that is currently generated by UNICEF support to mine action is attached in [Appendix E](#).

173. The priority of UNICEF support to mine/UXO related projects, be that advocacy, assistance to survivors or risk education, has to be seen alongside the imperative of other humanitarian concerns faced by children globally. The relevance of mine action to UNICEF and its sustainability within the organisation would be improved if HRBAP was adopted. UNICEF should consider the HRBAP approach in the development of its mine action strategy, policies and project priorities, and this should be integrated into PD, with some support maintained in EMOPS. Technical support to both PD and EMOPS should be provided by LASAT. An example of how this could be done, along with a sample of the legal instruments that might be associated to such an approach is attached in [Appendix F](#).

174. UNICEF should address the challenge of staff turnover and improve job security through core funding support for mine action and diversification of its donor base through more integration with PD. UNICEF should create permanent positions with mine action expertise and hire consultants only when needs arise. The permanent positions should be distributed in countries and at HQ level in such a way that regional support can be improved. UNICEF need not position more staff in regional offices, but rather reduce their role in technical support and coordination.

175. The ongoing questioning of the effectiveness of current approaches to MRE as a method of risk reduction is damaging the efforts of MRE implementing organisations and needs to be resolved. UNICEF should encourage constructive discussions on the impact of MRE which conforms to public health methods and enable debate that engages key stakeholders in endorsement of social science studies.

176. UNICEF should further develop its ability to support civil society organisations (CSOs) and to build the capacity of local partners in mine action through better mid to long term planning.

## METHODOLOGY

### Project approach and methodology

#### *Stages and schedule of evaluation*

177. The evaluation involved three information collection stages: (1) a 10-day scoping study, resulting in a scoping study report<sup>128</sup>; (2) a 15-day desk review; and (3) a field visit stage. This involved an 18-day evaluation covering Sudan, Ethiopia UNICEF COs and Kenya RO in the Horn of Africa, and another 18-day evaluation covering Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia UNICEF COs and Thailand RO in South East Asia. A Discussion and Issues Paper was developed along with Summary Field Notes, a list of people contacted and met and a bibliography of documents reviewed<sup>129</sup>. The evaluation report was drafted and key findings reviewed in a 1-day workshop on the 17 March 2006. The report was finalised prior to submission on the 10 April 2006. UNICEF requested further changes on 31 March, leading to submission of the finalised version on Wednesday 14 June. The schedule followed is illustrated in [Figure 13](#).

Weeks		November				December				January				February				March				
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
1	Plan work <sup>130</sup>	█	█	█																		
2	Desk review <sup>131</sup>				█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█				
3	Field visits <sup>132</sup>											█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█			
4	Draft report <sup>133</sup>													█	█	█	█	█	█			
5	Findings <sup>134</sup> /report <sup>135</sup>																				█	█

Figure 13: Schedule of the evaluation of UNICEF support to mine action.

#### *The evaluation team*

178. The evaluation team composed of Ms. Taz Khaliq, Deputy Director (Humanitarian Resilience) at CU, and CU consultants Mr. Ralph Hassall and Mr. Steve Harknett, with contribution at particular stages by Mr. Alastair McAslan, Director (Humanitarian Resilience) at CU. A Group of Experts and a Project Steering Committee were also established. A description of the profiles of the evaluation team, experts and steering committee, as well as the methods of

<sup>128</sup> EMER-ICC-005 Stage 1 Report, Cranfield University, November 2005.

<sup>129</sup> Note to the Project Steering Committee submitted on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March 2006.

<sup>130</sup> Stage 1: The scoping study over 3 weeks. The deliverable at the end of this stage was a scoping report. To obtain this document contact [humanitarianresilience@cranfield.ac.uk](mailto:humanitarianresilience@cranfield.ac.uk).

<sup>131</sup> Stage 2: The deliverable was a bibliography, a Discussion and Issues paper and a list of organisations contacted and met.

<sup>132</sup> Stage 3: The field visits and RO/CPC interviews over 4 weeks for two teams in parallel, 18 days per region. The deliverable was a Summary of Field Notes.

<sup>133</sup> Stage 4: The final report production over 4 weeks (including a week for the Group of Experts).

<sup>134</sup> Stage 5a: The 1-day workshop with PSC, on Friday 17<sup>th</sup> March. The deliverable was a workshop notes document.

<sup>135</sup> Stage 5b: Finalisation of report over 4 days. UNICEF requested further changes on 31<sup>st</sup> of March, leading to submission of the finalised version on Wednesday 5<sup>th</sup> April.

investigation and analysis that were applied is attached in [Appendix G](#). The overall process followed and quality assurance processes is illustrated in [Figure 14](#).




Figure 14: Process behind the evaluation of UNICEF support to mine action.

### Stage 1: Scoping study

179. The scoping stage took place in November 2005 and took 3 weeks. During scoping, CU researched publicly sourced information regarding UNICEF support to mine action to ascertain the breadth and depth of data that was available regarding UNICEF support to mine action. This was conducted predominantly by internet search and review of documentation to judge their format and content by typology<sup>136</sup>. Key reference documents were identified and categorised as follows: Literature Defining UNICEF and mine action needs in 2002 – 2005; Additional Literature Defining UNICEF and Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) / mine action needs in 2006 – 2009; Literature Defining Method of Evaluation<sup>137</sup>. This was reconciled against the resources (staff effort, time and funds) allocated by UNICEF to choose specific areas of study that could best achieve the aim of the evaluation. This involved identification of information required to answer the questions posed by UNICEF<sup>138</sup> and consideration of various methods of information collection and analysis that could be applied within the resource parameters. A scoping report was submitted to UNICEF and the Project Steering Committee (PSC) in November 2005.

<sup>136</sup> Whether the programme is UN supported or UN managed.

<sup>137</sup> *EMER-ICC-005 Stage 1 Report*, Cranfield University, November 2005.

<sup>138</sup> *Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action – Request for Proposals* dated 29 June 2005 contains some key questions posed by UNICEF. A further elaboration of these was included in *EMER-ICC-005 Stage 1 Report*, Annexes B and G, Cranfield University, November 2005.



## Stage 2: Desk review

180. The desk review stage took place from December 2005 to March 2006. It was extended from the original 3 weeks to a total of 13 weeks in light of the large amount of written information, much of which could not be immediately discounted because the quality and relevancy remained to a large extent unknown by UNICEF. Three approaches were adopted: (1) questionnaires; (2) document review; and (3) interviews.

181. Questionnaires were finalised in consultation with the Group of Experts and PSC. All ROs and UNICEF COs that had supported any form of mine action since 2002 received a questionnaire in December 2005. Forty questionnaires were sent. A full list of the documents that were reviewed is attached in [Appendix H](#). Data in documents were separated into those of global relevance and those relating more to HQ, RO or CO organisation, processes, activities, inputs and outputs. Interviews with focus group and key informants at HQ level were conducted around the themes and issues raised in the scoping study with UNICEF, other UN agencies, donors, independent mine action organisations and implementing partners<sup>139</sup>. A full list of organisations represented by people interviewed is included in [Appendix I](#).

182. A Summary Discussion and Issues Paper, bibliography of documents reviewed and people contacted and met were submitted to the PSC on 6 March 2006<sup>140</sup>. Given that Desk Review had been extended to 13 weeks and ended at the same time as field visits, this paper included findings relating to both stages.

## Stage 3: Field visits

183. The field visit stage took place from January to February 2006. CU visited UNICEF ROs at Bangkok and Nairobi, and the UNICEF COs in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Lao PDR. These countries were selected by UNICEF based on geographical spread and variation in role of UNICEF. The field visits included interviews with similar organisations to those interviewed at HQ level, but also provided the unique opportunity to directly observe UNICEF support to mine action and talk to national implementing partners and beneficiaries of UNICEF support. One-to-one interviews were reinforced through key informant group discussions, focus group discussions and direct observation and evaluation. A list of people interviewed during the field visits is included in [Appendix I](#).

184. UNICEF interviews included some stages of the Organisational Development (OD) method. Although not originally designed as an evaluation method as such, consideration of such approaches did enable analysis of change management requirements and potential action planning. Key informant interviews adopted goals, process and outcomes based evaluation methods. These were described in detail in the scoping study report. The OD-based interviews focussed on: human resources, global trends, organisation and processes adopted by UNICEF in the conduct of its activities. The goals-based interviews focused on the rationalisation of activities in relation to goals. The outcome-based interviews focussed on indicators of outputs and outcomes and means of verification of these. The process-based interviews functionally analysed processes associated to the project cycle. As is to be expected when interviewing,

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<sup>139</sup> It was agreed that confidentiality would be assured during the scoping stage. CU will retain interview notes for a period of 2 years after submission of the Final Evaluation Report and can provide summary information regarding overall interview findings. However, transcripts, tapes and notes will not be made public.

<sup>140</sup> Note to the PSC dated 6<sup>th</sup> March, which included a Summary Discussion and Issues Paper.

these methods served as guidelines. However, the order in which they were applied or the ability of respondents to provide information varied.

185. Detailed field notes were shared with all UNICEF participants in the field visits before being finalised, not only to ensure transparency of CU analysis, but also to provide UNICEF with an opportunity to improve the quality and reliability of findings. A summary of field notes including details of persons met, documents reviewed and projects visited was provided to the PSC at the end of this stage<sup>141</sup>.

#### **Stage 4: Draft report**

186. Drafting of the report took place over a 10 day period in March 2006, and included a week for Group of Experts comments. CU analysed the information collected during desk review and field visits, and conducted a number of internal consultation sessions. This included consultations with Mr. Harknett who resides in Cambodia, evaluation team meetings, and consultation with members of the Group of Experts and with other CU Humanitarian Resilience staff. Wherever possible, findings and recommendations were objective and quantitative, and analysis consistent with the format proposed in CU's catalogue of mine action measures<sup>142</sup>. Some of the information was subjective and qualitative, and the Group of Experts was consulted to ensure that the views expressed are consistent, logical and verifiable from other sources. A series of meetings took place following the 'red team,' 'pink team' and 'gold team' process of editing to ensure that all findings were marked in the following fashion: fact (corroborated) fact (uncorroborated), opinion (reliable) or opinion (reliability unknown). These notes were removed, along with names of individuals who provided information since confidentiality had been agreed.

187. A draft report was then compiled. The Executive Summary was shared with the PSC and the full draft report was sent to the Group of Experts prior to the 1-day workshop that took place in New York on Friday 17 March. The findings encapsulated in the Discussion and Issues Paper, content of the Executive Summary and report format were discussed and agreement on the final format and general content made<sup>143</sup>. Changes were made and this Final Evaluation Report was submitted along with all completed data collection instruments, the EXCEL files used for report analysis, in the form of computer files and the computer files that comprise all of the above deliverables.

#### **Limitations of the methods used**

188. The evaluation design included ethical safeguards where appropriate, including protection of the confidentiality, dignity, rights and welfare of human subjects, particularly children, and respect for the values of the beneficiary communities. Confidentiality of data provided through interviews was agreed with UNICEF<sup>144</sup> before embarking on information collection. CU will maintain tapes, transcripts and notes relating to sources of information for two years. However, CU will not disclose sources of such information unless authorisation to do so has been obtained. The evaluation did deviate from gender policy as a result of unavoidable

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<sup>141</sup> Note to the PSC dated 6<sup>th</sup> March, which included Summary Field Notes.

<sup>142</sup> CU has developed a compendium of mine action performance indicators, notably as a result of past collaboration with the US State Department. Ms. Taz Khaliq is currently studying for a Masters in performance management and it was originally envisaged that CU would use these materials to assess progress of UNICEF support. This was not possible because the baseline data had not been collected in the 4 COs visited.

<sup>143</sup> Note to the PSC dated Monday 20<sup>th</sup> March, which included Notes from the 1-day Findings Workshop.

<sup>144</sup> EMER-ICC-005 Stage 1 Report, Cranfield University, November 2005.

changes in evaluation team composition. UNICEF stipulated that it required at least half of the evaluation team to be female. This was not the case and may have resulted in gender bias of information, although significant effort was made to prevent such bias.

189. The main limitation of these methods was time. UNICEF has supported mine action in almost 40 countries during the period of the strategy, but only 4 UNICEF mine action programmes could be visited and 5 working days spent in each. Reliance on questionnaires for feedback from the majority of countries, half of which were responded to, was not ideal. This did enable the capture of a broad range of information and provided an opportunity for programmes to contribute to the evaluation in an unrestricted way. Few assumptions could be made regarding the quality and relevance of documentation since little was known about these. This led to inefficient use of time in order to extract data that the evaluation required, given the brevity of field visits. Notwithstanding these challenges, patterns did emerge, corroborated by factual data that enabled conclusions to be drawn.

## Appendices

- Appendix A UNICEF Evaluation Terms of Reference
- Appendix B UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002 - 2005
- Appendix C Summary Stakeholder Analysis
- Appendix D Analysis of Data from UNICEF Support to Mine Action
- Appendix E Overall Performance of UNICEF Support to Mine Action
- Appendix F HRBAP and UNICEF Support to Mine Action
- Appendix G Information Collection and Analytical Approach
- Appendix H Bibliography
- Appendix I People Contacted and Met

## UNICEF Evaluation Terms of Reference

[This is an extract from the Request for Proposals issued by UNICEF dated 29 June 2005. An extract from the CU proposal leading to this report can be obtained by contacting the Resilience Centre at Cranfield University.]

### Aims

The aim of this evaluation is to examine and evaluate the current organisational structure and procedures of UNICEF in relation to mine action to determine the relevance, appropriateness and sustainability of UNICEF's approach to mine action. The project will also analyse and evaluate the global effectiveness and impact of UNICEF supported activities in mine action.

Both aims will be examined against the goals, objectives and activities outlined in the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005, the Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies, the UN Interagency Mine Action Policy (1998 and 2005 versions), and related project documents.

This evaluation is intended to contribute to UNICEF in three main ways:

1. To measure progress that has been achieved to date in terms of the implementation of the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002-2005.
2. To capture lessons learned and provide an examination of the general impact of UNICEF's work in mine action in terms of reducing risk for communities, promoting compliance with relevant international legal instruments, and in providing assistance to landmine survivors.
3. To inform the development of a new UNICEF Mine Action Strategy, and advise on current mine action operations and strategies and policies in UNICEF.

### Key Questions

The following questions provide a list of issues which, together, describe the extent and range of the subjects to be addressed in the evaluation in terms of analysis and the provision of recommendations.

#### *Relevance and appropriateness*

- Are the activities, goals and objectives outlined in the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy and Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies consistent with the requirements of affected populations, international humanitarian and human rights instruments, global and national priorities, partner and donor policies?
- Are UNICEF strategies and activities in mine action effectively tailored to local and international needs as the case may be?
- Are the activities, inputs and approach for delivering the programme consistent with the expected outcomes and impact, and organisational structure of UNICEF?
- How well do UNICEF's mine action objectives and approach fit with UNICEF organisational priorities and programmes?

- Are UNICEF mine action activities and strategies consistent with UN reform policies and programmes?
- Does UNICEF have sufficient human, financial and material resources to implement the activities as outlined in the Strategy?
- Are the activities and approaches sustainable? Is there a better way that activities and approaches might be organised?
- Is the timeframe set for the Strategy realistic to meet the goals and objectives?

### ***Effectiveness and impact***

- Are national and international activities identified in the Strategy being implemented as envisioned?
- Are the activities cost effective, timely and of a high quality according to best practice in mine action?
- Are the activities well coordinated?
- Are the activities appropriate to realise the goals and objectives of the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy?
- Are the activities having the desired impact on target populations, in terms of reducing risk, promoting compliance with relevant legal instruments and providing support to landmine survivors?

In addition to these questions the evaluation should undertake an analysis of the risks and impact on communities and UNICEF's programme partners if UNICEF should be unable to meet any of its different commitments contained in the mine action strategy.

### **Approach**

The evaluation process will include visits to UNICEF headquarters, regional and country offices, focus groups, interviews and a comprehensive review of documents. In addition a questionnaire will need to be formulated to elicit information from a greater number of UNICEF and partner locations than will be possible to visit in the timeframe of the evaluation. The Contractor will develop a range of tools and methodologies for use in the study, including observations, small group interviews, demonstrations, questionnaires, home visits and discussions with key stakeholders including teachers, pupils, community members, local authorities and others.

### **Audience**

The result of this evaluation process will be used to inform the development of a new UNICEF mine action strategy and measure overall progress to date. As a result the primary audience are policy and decision makers within UNICEF, partners and donor organisations and ultimately UNICEF target populations.

## UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002 - 2005

[An extract from the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002 – 2005, dated April 2003.]

### Matrix of HQ, Regional and Country Office Mine Action Responsibilities

Goal	Objective	Country Programme of Cooperation	Regional Office	Headquarters
GOAL 1  Mine Risk Education (MRE) needs are identified and met in an appropriate, effective and timely fashion.	OBJECTIVE 1.1 At risk populations are identified, mine risk education needs are assessed, and appropriate mine risk reduction education is provided, in all new and existing UN mine action programmes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Incorporation of mine/UXO issues into Sitan, CCA/UNDAF, MPO, and Annual and MT Reviews.</li> <li>Advise government of option to request UN Interagency Mine Action Assessment<sup>145</sup>.</li> <li>Mine/UXO<sup>146</sup> assessment<sup>147</sup>, in collaboration with other agencies.</li> <li>MRE needs assessment<sup>148</sup>.</li> <li>Advocate for inter-ministerial coordination on mine action</li> <li>Identify other local partners and capacities.</li> <li>Resource mobilisation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Incorporate Strategy into Regional plans</li> <li>Participate in/support UN Interagency Country Mine Action Assessments.</li> <li>Oversight, monitoring and evaluation of programmatic response at country level.</li> <li>Identification of specific areas where HQ support is required.</li> <li>Coordination of cross- border needs assessments, analysis, and MRE responses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Programme guidance</li> <li>Incorporate Strategy into cluster/section workplans</li> <li>Participate in UN Interagency Mine Action Assessments and coordinate with UN and other agencies on initiation of new programmes.</li> <li>Technical support for MRE needs assessments at country level</li> <li>Assist with resource mobilisation via UN Portfolio, VTF, MASG.</li> </ul>

<sup>145</sup> UN Interagency Mine Action Assessments are conducted by UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF (and sometimes other agencies) headquarters, usually in response to a formal request by a government or Humanitarian Coordinator. They are intended to establish the nature, extent, and potential impact of the mine/UXO problem in the country concerned.

<sup>146</sup> Explosive remnants of war (ERW) is the collective term for any explosive devices, including mines, left over as the result of a conflict. UXO refers to unexploded ordnance, meaning shells, rockets, grenades, mortars and so on which have been fired but have failed to function, rendering them highly unstable. The term ERW is usually used in an advocacy context and UXO in an operational context.

<sup>147</sup> Mine/UXO assessments can also be carried out less formally, in-country, if technical expertise is available, however for full engagement by the UN system and for purposes of making the problem known in international forum, a UN assessment mission is useful. These two levels of assessment are by no means mutually exclusive.

<sup>148</sup> MRE needs assessment refers to identification of at risk populations, with a detailed analysis of who is getting injured, where, and for what reason. This requires an understanding of knowledge, attitudes and practice in relation to mines/UXO, and must therefore be done by direct sampling of affected populations. The results are used to design appropriate mine risk education programmes.



Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action

Goal	Objective	Country Programme of Cooperation	Regional Office	Headquarters
Continued ... GOAL 1  Mine Risk Education (MRE) needs are identified and met in an appropriate, effective and timely fashion.	OBJECTIVE 1.2 Mine risk education is coordinated at global and country levels, and is integrated with other mine action components, and with broader humanitarian development and peace-building activities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform R Rep/RC/HC of mine action needs and responses.</li> <li>• Support development of and second advisors to national/UN Mine Action Centres (MACs)</li> <li>• Coordination of MRE via MACs</li> <li>• Support and participate in development of national mine action strategic plans.</li> <li>• Incorporate mine action into CAPs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review CAPs</li> <li>• Regional coordination with UN agencies, ICRC, NGOs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interagency Coordination Group on Mine Action</li> <li>• Convene Mine Risk Education Working Group (with ICBL)</li> <li>• Technical assistance in development of national mine action strategic plans</li> <li>• Review CAPs</li> </ul>
	OBJECTIVE 1.3 Threat monitoring <sup>149</sup> and rapid response capacity is in place to meet emergency mine reduction education needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primary responsibility for early warning, preparedness, and response as part of ongoing Situation Analysis (Sitan)</li> <li>• Include mine/UXO issues into MICS</li> <li>• Support incorporation into public health surveillance systems</li> <li>• Link surveillance data to mine/UXO reporting systems, and mine action response</li> <li>• Support UN Mine Action Rapid Response Plan</li> <li>• Incorporate into early warning systems and contingency plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Threat monitoring at regional level, esp. ref cross-border issues</li> <li>• Identify surge capacity requirements</li> <li>• Incorporate into regional contingency and other plans</li> <li>• Technical support to country offices for contingency planning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interagency threat monitoring.</li> <li>• Provide info and analysis to RO and CO</li> <li>• Standby capacity</li> <li>• MOUs for surge capacity.</li> <li>• Coordinate with other UN agencies on threat monitoring and emergency response</li> <li>• UN Mine Action Rapid Response Plan</li> </ul>
	OBJECTIVE 1.4 Mine risk education is fully reflected in, and mutually supportive of, UNICEF's work in education, health promotion, child protection, integrated early childhood development (IECD), and other sectors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incorporate mine action into relevant programmes based on ongoing Sitan.</li> <li>• Link these in MPO/plans</li> <li>• During country programme strategy development and annual and mid-term reviews, determine role of sectoral programmes in mine action</li> <li>• Use annual and MT reviews to identify emergency mine risk/impact and need to adjust programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Oversight of programme content, and integration between programmes at country level (e.g. child protection, health, education)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technical Notes to MTSP</li> <li>• Incorporate mine action into sectoral guidelines and tools</li> </ul>

<sup>149</sup> Threat monitoring is, as it sounds, actively watching out for new mine/ERW threats, either due to new contamination, or because existing contamination poses a new problem due to population movements.

Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action

Goal	Objective	Country Programme of Cooperation	Regional Office	Headquarters
Continued ... GOAL 1  Mine Risk Education (MRE) needs are identified and met in an appropriate, effective and timely fashion	OBJECTIVE 1.5 Mine risk education is supported by surveillance systems which enable affected communities to report and receive assistance with mine problems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support incorporation of mine/UXO accidents into public health surveillance systems, MICS, etc. and link to IMSMA</li> <li>• Support development of systems for communities to report mine/UXO problems</li> <li>• Link this to mine action response and prioritisation (inc. national plan)</li> <li>• Strengthen capacity of schools and health facilities to report mine/UXO problems as well as provide MRE</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disseminate technical guidance and tools, and identify technical support needs at country level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technical guidance for and training on MRE needs assessments and surveillance systems, in conjunction with CDC and other partners</li> <li>• Link MRE to mine action survey, surveillance, and response in to international norms and standards, encourage participatory approaches within these</li> </ul>
	OBJECTIVE 1.6 Technical guidance is provided, and best practice is promoted in mine risk education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MRE capacity building for national/local authorities and local NGOs</li> <li>• Support development of national Mine Action Standards which incorporate child-focus, gender awareness and participatory approaches</li> <li>• Capture and disseminate lessons learnt</li> <li>• Monitoring and evaluation of mine risk education programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capture lessons learned and identify models of best practice in region</li> <li>• Disseminate IMAS</li> <li>• Compile and analyse lessons learnt</li> <li>• Ensure monitoring and evaluation of mine risk education programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capture lessons learned and identify models of best practice in MRE</li> <li>• Develop tools for MRE evaluation (with GICHD)</li> <li>• MRE components of International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)<sup>150</sup>, &amp; supplementary manuals</li> <li>• Incorporate child-focus, gender awareness and participatory approaches in mine action norms and standards globally</li> <li>• Convene Mine Risk Education Working Group (with ICBL) to identify technical guidance, support, and training needs</li> </ul>

<sup>150</sup> IMAS are the International Mine Action Standards, developed in ISO 9000 format by the UN with the support of GICHD. UNICEF is responsible for the MRE components, and is developing supplementary user-friendly implementation, or 'how to' manuals. IMAS and the manual/s will supersede the existing International Guidelines for Mine/UXO Awareness Education published by UNICEF in 1998.

Goal	Objective	Country Programme of Cooperation	Regional Office	Headquarters
<b>GOAL 2</b> The Mine Ban Treaty and other related legal instruments are universally ratified and implemented	<b>OBJECTIVE 2.1</b> States and non-state actors are encouraged and assisted to respectively ratify or endorse, and comply with regional and international legal instruments relevant to landmines and other explosive remnants of war	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure States and non-State Actors are fully aware of the implications of mine use</li> <li>Advocate for and support ratification and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty (and endorsement and observance by non-State Actors)</li> <li>Support Landmine Monitor in verification of implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advocate for MBT and related instruments in regional forum</li> <li>Support regional advocacy initiatives, especially in relation to non-State Parties with shared borders</li> <li>Develop strategic alliances with other groups for regional advocacy purposes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Represent UNICEF in meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, the CCCW, and related forum, raise children's and human rights issues</li> <li>Develop advocacy materials for CO/ROs</li> <li>Support Landmine Monitor in global verification of implementation</li> </ul>
	<b>OBJECTIVE 2.2</b> Local, national and global advocacy efforts in relation to mines and other explosive remnants of war are supported, in particular those by and for those most affected	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Action research mine/ERW impact especially on children and women</li> <li>Develop links with civil society groups, especially national CBLs and survivor groups</li> <li>Disseminate information and support public campaigns on mines/ERW</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Compile case studies and share info/lessons learn with COs and other agencies</li> <li>Input into and dissemination of advocacy materials</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Research on mine/ERW impact, particularly on children and women</li> <li>Link UNICEF national committees into advocacy efforts</li> </ul>
	<b>OBJECTIVE 2.3</b> The needs of mine affected countries are identified and assessed, and subsequent planning and response supported	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Request and support UN Interagency Country Mine Action Assessments<sup>151</sup>.</li> <li>Use MRE work to gather data on mine impact, and demonstrate need for other mine action components</li> <li>Work with partners to use this information to raise awareness of country mine action needs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participate in/support UN Interagency Country Mine Action Assessments.</li> <li>Briefings to other UN agencies and missions to region</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participate in UNMAS-led Interagency Country Mine Action Assessment</li> <li>Brief UN HQ missions on mine action issues</li> <li>Use data and info coming from MRE programmes to raise awareness of country mine action needs</li> </ul>

<sup>151</sup> UN Interagency Mine Action Assessments are conducted by UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF (and sometimes other agencies) headquarters, usually in response to a formal request by a government or Humanitarian Coordinator. They are intended to establish the nature, extent, and potential impact of the mine/UXO problem in the country concerned.

Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action

Goal	Objective	Country Programme of Cooperation	Regional Office	Headquarters
<p>Continued ... GOAL 2</p> <p>The Mine Ban Treaty and other related legal instruments are universally ratified and implemented.</p>	<p>OBJECTIVE 2.4 International assistance for all mine action requirements in affected countries is promoted</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disseminate information from Sitans, CCAs, MICs, and other sources/surveys</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop strategic alliances at regional level, and raise awareness of mine action needs via regional bodies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Include in annual UN Mine Action Portfolio, UNICEF HAR and other documents</li> <li>Raise in MASG and other donor for a</li> </ul>
	<p>OBJECTIVE 2.5 Development and implementation of the interagency UN Mine Action Strategy is supported</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Work with other mine action agencies to develop an advocacy approach, especially UN Mine Action Centres and national authorities</li> <li>Input into UN mine action advocacy strategy</li> <li>Involve senior UN leaders in advocacy efforts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use Regional Office and other visitors to raise Mine Ban Treaty with non-States Parties</li> <li>Input into UN mine action advocacy strategy</li> <li>Involve senior UN leaders in advocacy efforts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Work with UNMAS and other UN mine action agencies on the Strategy</li> <li>Work closely with ICBL and other civil society groups</li> <li>Brief UN HQ missions on mine action issues</li> <li>Involve senior UN leaders in advocacy efforts</li> </ul>
	<p>OBJECTIVE 2.6 Advocacy for the further development of international law on mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), including ERW protocols to the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, is promoted.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document impact of mines/ERW based on work in-country (action research and data collection)</li> <li>Disseminate this information in-country</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Collate regional examples of mine/ERW impact and raise in regional forum</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Work with partners, especially ICRC and ICBL on international law</li> <li>Provide data and case studies to demonstrate impact of ERW on children and women</li> </ul>

Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action

Goal	Objective	Country Programme Of Cooperation	Regional Office	Headquarters
<b>GOAL 3</b>  Mine survivors, especially children, have access to the highest attainable standards of services and support	<b>OBJECTIVE 3.1</b> The needs of mine survivors are identified and assessed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support rapid survey and longer-term inclusion of mine survivors into public health surveillance systems</li> <li>Incorporate into MICS and other relevant surveys/research</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitor and assist in collecting cross-border information on mine survivors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide technical support for mine accident incidence and prevalence surveys</li> </ul>
	<b>OBJECTIVE 3.2</b> Local and national strategies for assistance to survivors are developed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promote a rights-based approach to survivor assistance</li> <li>Support survivor-led advocacy groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promote a rights-based view of survivor assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promote a rights-based view of survivor assistance</li> </ul>
	<b>OBJECTIVE 3.3</b> Public and community health, disability and other services are accessible to mine survivors, especially children and women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assess the availability and accessibility of appropriate services</li> <li>Work with partners, particularly survivor groups, to overcome access issues</li> <li>Raise awareness of the rights of the disabled, and link this work to CRC and CEDAW</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disseminate information on best practice</li> <li>Raise awareness of the rights of the disabled, and link this work to CRC and CEDAW</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disseminate information on best practice</li> <li>Raise awareness of the rights of the disabled, and link this work to CRC and CEDAW</li> </ul>
	<b>OBJECTIVE 3.4</b> Special rehabilitation and social reintegration services, if needed, are provided, especially to children	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use data and research to advocate for provision of services</li> <li>Support service provision</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disseminate information on best practice</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disseminate information on best practice</li> <li>Liaise with international organizations providing such services, at global level</li> </ul>
	<b>OBJECTIVE 3.5</b> Child survivors are able to attend school	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assess school attendance among children with disabilities</li> <li>Work with Ministry of Education and others to ensure disabled children are able to attend school</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disseminate information on best practice</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disseminate information on best practice</li> </ul>
	<b>OBJECTIVE 3.6</b> Survivor assistance is supported by mine action programmes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Input into UN policy</li> <li>Promote a rights-based approach to survivor assistance, in which mine survivors are not distinguished from other people with disabilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Input into UN policy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Work with UNMAS and other UN mine action agencies on survivor policy issues</li> <li>Promote a rights-based view of survivor assistance</li> </ul>

## **Summary Stakeholder Analysis**

'Key' stakeholders, i.e. those with high power and high interest in the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy on the basis of Desk Review, are highlighted in bold red. Organisations mentioned in the list below have been selected on the basis that the Desk Review included data relating to those organisations, or because they were interviewed as part of the evaluation, or as a result of stakeholder analysis of UNICEF with UNICEF staff. As such, the list of stakeholders is not exhaustive. Key stakeholders should be included in any strategic development process undertaken by UNICEF mine action.

**UNICEF**  
**Key Mine Action Stakeholders**



	Mine action programme			INTEREST			POWER		
	'Owners' & beneficiaries	Wider environment		Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
CDC		•			•				•
CIDA		•			•				•
Cranfield University			•		•		•		
DDA			•		•		•		
<b>DfID</b>		•				•			•
EC and European donors		•	•		•			•	
FAO			•	•			•		
GICHD			•		•		•		
Handicap International (Belgium and France)	•					•	•		
ICBL			•		•		•		
<b>ICRC</b>	•					•			•
JMU			•		•		•		
MAG	•					•	•		
Mine / UXO affected people, including children		•				•	•		
National implementing partners e.g. CMAC, MoEYS, RaDO	•					•		•	
National mine action authorities e.g. CMAA, EMAO	•					•		•	
OHCHR			•	•			•		
Provincial or district authorities		•			•		•		
UNDP DPKO			•	•			•		
UNDP mine action	•				•				•
UNHCR	•				•			•	
<b>UNICEF COs</b>	•					•			•
<b>UNICEF EMOPS in HQ</b>	•					•			•
<b>UNICEF LASAT in HQ</b>	•					•			•
<b>UNICEF PD in HQ</b>	•					•			•
<b>UNICEF ROs</b>	•					•			•
<b>UNMAS mine action</b>	•					•			•
UNOCHA			•	•			•		
UNOPS mine action	•			•			•		
<b>US State Department (Weapons Removal and Abatement)</b>		•				•			•
USAID		•		•					•
VVAF	•					•	•		
WFP			•		•		•		
WHO	•			•					•
World Bank		•		•					•



## Analysis of Data from UNICEF Support to Mine Action

The document review, which focussed on specific COs, went part way in establishing - by indirect and passive means – whether the UNICEF strategy was being fulfilled either deliberately or inadvertently through the activities of discrete country programmes. Matrixes that listed CO responsibilities according to the strategy were populated with data, implicitly stated or inferred, in the documents reviewed for that country. This data included activity types, input and activity/process indicators, and output and outcome indicators. Areas where no documented evidence was available were left blank, indicating potential areas where little contribution had been made by that country. The country matrixes were then separated by typology, and the results analysed to see whether there were any conclusions that could be drawn about the way UNICEF programmes were operating.<sup>152</sup>

### General Findings from Document Review

The direct relevancy and appropriateness of the strategy is determined by the phase of country development and the maturity of the mine action programme. Both of these issues have a strong hand in determining the typology. More developed countries are likely to have more mature mine action programmes and will be working through national partners and thus the programme will be supported. In the reverse case, poorly developed countries emerging from conflict are likely to have nascent mine action programmes, there is likely to be no national partner and thus these countries are likely to be managed programmes.<sup>153</sup> Development and programme maturity are time dependant variables, and because the strategy contains no time element, gaps and trends began to appear when the goals and objectives of each country is examined.

UNICEF Country Offices of more developed programmes showed a greater emphasis on fulfilling later Mine Risk Education (MRE) goals – 1.4 and 1.5 – which are focussed more on capacity building, working with government and devising national standards. UNICEF Country Offices in emergency phase programmes were evidently conducting more needs assessment, situation analyses and preparing for surge capacity and emergency requirements, i.e. the goals of 1.1 and 1.2. Not all goals and objectives are relevant to each CO. and the global strategy is interpreted according to country specific relevance.

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<sup>152</sup> At the outset it must be noted that there was only brief overlap between the strategy document and the roles of both Regional Office (RO) and Headquarters (HQ). This is presumed to be because the types of documents examined in this part of the desk review focussed exclusively on CPC projects and not on the work of either RO or HQ.

<sup>153</sup> Notable exceptions to this rule include Afghanistan which is probably the most pertinent example of both a managed and highly mature programme.




Figure 1 : Differences in achieved of MRE Goals between supported and managed programmes

Although all programmes provided MRE, approximately half of the programmes offered support to or implemented VA and only a handful provided any kind of advocacy. Due to the nature of the materials being studied<sup>154</sup> it is not possible to draw any concrete conclusions as to why activities are distributed in this way.<sup>155</sup> These findings suggest that the MRE goal is the most relevant of the three.

The Inter-Agency Coordination Group for Mine Action (IACG–MA) Strategy clearly lays out the roles for various UN agencies in Mine Action. It is not only apparent that UNICEF is struggling to fulfil its obligations in VA, but there is a notable absence of documented interagency coordination. It is critical that Mine Action remains a consolidated and coordinated process in order to function efficiently. In this regard the lack of mention of the role of WHO especially, as the designated VA partner, and UNDP, as the lead agency for supported programmes, in both the documentation and the strategy itself is worth noting.

In some instances, activities that have neither been delegated to UNICEF by the IAGC-MA nor laid out in the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002 – 2005 were taking place in-country. This mainly involved some limited clearance and mine marking and fencing activities. It is appreciated that in certain countries where UNICEF plays a much more central role in country programmes, clearance tasks may have to be coordinated by UNICEF out of necessity. However, these significantly diverge from the 3 goals in the UNICEF strategy and are not conclusively a product of the stage of country development or phase of programme maturity. These activities should be reviewed for consistency with the strategy and either included in it, or not supported at country level.

In other cases of divergence or consistency with other binding or overriding strategies and policies, it is interesting to note the incorporation of UNICEF's greater mandate for women and children and human rights into mine action activities as undertaken by UNICEF.

In terms of the available VA documentation, there was clear evidence of strong HRBAP at the programmatic implementation level and this included a clear consideration of rights of women and children. This was mainly by disaggregating data, providing access to facilities and services

<sup>154</sup> A list of which appear in the bibliography

<sup>155</sup> Reasonable anticipated factors may include: a cross over of responsibilities with WHO on VA, cost versus impact of activities, and a lack of in-house technical expertise.

as well as reintegrating and encouraging non-discrimination amongst different disability types – which fully supports the strategy and UNICEF's greater mandate.

The same cannot be said for MRE activities. Firstly, human rights – for which UNICEF has specific mandate – are not enshrined in any of the MRE goals or objectives of the UNICEF 2002-2005 strategy. If UNICEF COs were using the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy as a basis for the formation of their specific country strategies, the human rights element of MRE is likely to be lost.

Secondly, it is accepted that women and children are not necessarily the groups most at-risk from landmine/UXO injury and that in nearly all cases<sup>156</sup> the most vulnerable group is young men. This provides a paradox for UNICEF, which is broadly evident from the documentation i.e.: the mandate for UNICEF and the protection of women and children is clear, but the people UNICEF is called to primarily assist are not necessarily in either group. If UNICEF were to operate purely from a human rights based approach across all goals in the strategy, this dilemma may cease to be relevant.

Other more pragmatic conventions such as IMAS are well represented in some areas of the documentation, but are notably absent in others. In terms of the goals it would be advised that monitoring and evaluation of MRE programmes for example, are specifically conducted in accordance with IMAS.

In general, the document review provides a good picture of the types of outputs that UNICEF programmes have generated and some of the processes used. The documents provide little indication as to the underlying motivation behind the processes and little suggestion as to the outcomes under all three goals. It is recommended that for future strategies, UNICEF COs should be encouraged to show from the outset how their work plans and country programme strategies fit into the greater UNICEF strategy rather than at the annual plan or review stage in a forced and formulaic way, sometimes after the decision to support the activity has already taken place. Not only will this greatly assist future strategy evaluations of this nature, but will also provide UNICEF with an opportunity to give greater weight to its considerable achievements.

### **Analysis of the Questionnaire Data – Supported Programmes**

[Extracts from the analysed data from questionnaires.]

#### ***Part 1: Relevance and appropriateness of the UNICEF's global 2002 – 2005 mine action strategy***

The majority of the respondents replied that the strategy was relevant for all three goals.

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<sup>156</sup> Notable exception of Lao and the sudden rise in Child casualties – associated with the scrap metal trade.




Figure 2 : Relevancy of goals to UNICEF supported mine action.

In all cases, reasons that the strategy was said to be relevant was because activities related to these goals were taking place in the COs. For all activities, UNICEF operated through implementing partners the numbers of which ranged between 1 and 14. In most cases, advocacy work was conducted through just one implementing partner.

MRE receives the most funding, but VA activities also receive significant funds.

Respondents felt that over the next 2 to 5 years, VA activities should either integrate further or increase, MRE should stay the same or increase and advocacy, capacity building and research efforts should all increase.

In general, the goals and objectives are seen as meeting the future expectations of UNICEF over the next MTSP period. However, under half of the respondents felt that activities defined in the strategy reflect what is actually happening on the ground. In terms of disconnects between CO, RO and HQ, all respondents felt that there was no disconnect between CO and HQ, but 62.5% stated that there was a disconnect between CO and RO.

Specific comments regarding the appropriateness, relevancy and sustainability of the strategy include:

*“This document was a great start for mine action within UNICEF however the implementation of activities was sometimes tough and in many cases did not relate to the TOR of the MRE staff.”*

*“MRE moving to child protection which is under disability umbrella thus part of bigger programme and will lose the attention it deserves.*

*“Would like to see best practices and lessons learned coming from R.O/H.Q to C.P.C.”*

*“Include global funding arrangement with main donors.”*

### **Part 2: Effectiveness and outcome resulting from implementation of the 2002 – 2005 UNICEF mine action strategy**

Respondents stated that UNICEF should not be placed under UNDP, but in partnership with it and that UNICEF should remain in a coordination role. It was suggested that MRE should remain

with UNICEF and that UNICEF should continue to provide technical assistance, develop policy and provide catalytic, but limited, financial support and capacity building support.

The majority of respondents stated that country Common Country Assessments and UN Development Assistance Frameworks were still used for planning and these influenced the Master Plans of Operation of the country. Sometimes these strategies do not make reference to mine action issues.

In general, needs assessments either formal or informal, precede mine action intervention by UNICEF. In a number of cases, these were admitted to be weak or undertaken by other organisations, in which case UNICEF reviews / considers the findings.

37.5% of respondents stated that they either used the global strategy for planning purposes or advocate for support by UNICEF to mine action projects. 25% of respondents said they used specific country strategies and 25% said that they used both kinds of strategies for planning purposes.




Figure 3 : Planning criteria in UNICEF supported mine action.

In general the following priorities were listed for each CO: Health – Education – Nutrition – Water & Sanitation – Protection. It was also stated that priorities do not affect the mine action programme and regardless of the priorities in 75% of the UNICEF Country Offices sent questionnaires, there is one dedicated mine action focal point.

In most cases, the mine action focal point is located within the Child Protection section. The divisions focal points liaised with most were Education section in PD, Communications Division, EMOPS at RO and HQ. 50% of respondents felt that the current set up was negatively impacting on mine action activities. The main reasons given were as follows: (1) regulations required for activity implementation; (2) linkage of CO to RO not being strong enough; (3) a clearer corporate commitment needed and; (4) that mine action is not visible enough in regular programming and UNICEF humanitarian response.

Improvements that could be made included: (1) sharing lessons learned and visit exchanges within programming regions; (2) better management of organisational memory; (3) better human resources for project officers; (4) clarification of the RO role; (5) efforts to make the UNICEF mandate for mine action better publicised in country offices; (6) a more developed a consultant roster; (7) fundraising assistance and; (8) more technical guidance and field visits from the HQ and RO.

75% of respondents believe that their programmes are being implemented in accordance with IMAS and that national standards are in-line with IMAS. This is checked through monitoring and evaluations and use of external evaluations.

The range of outputs was listed for the activities undertaken. The quality of answers was poor, suggesting that respondents had either misunderstood the question or were unfamiliar with output measures. Those provided included:

Mine Action:	National Standards Development.
Capacity Building:	Support to Regional Government, continuous training, technical assistance, workshops and manual development.
Interagency Assessment:	Assessments produced.
MRE:	Volunteers recruited and trained, sessions held, materials developed, teacher training, school visits, NGOs funded, refresher courses, monitoring and evaluation.
VA:	Physiotherapy, rehabilitation, counselling, orthopaedics, vocational training, access, reintegration, support to NGOs.
Advocacy:	Celebrity endorsement, Mine Awareness Day, drama festival, translating and distributing the Landmine Monitor.

In the majority of cases (>50%) no suitable or satisfactory performance indicators or means of verification for these outputs were listed. Performance indicators that were listed included annual reviews, reporting and monitoring missions; means of verification included reports, questionnaires. It must also be noted that although respondents were prompted to provide both outputs and outcomes, in the overwhelming majority of cases only output were listed.<sup>157</sup> Other processes used to assess impact of work include: informal programme review meetings, impact assessments through IMSMA, monthly meetings with evaluations/inspection teams and accreditation.

### **Part 3: Sustainability of the 2002 – 2005 UNICEF mine action strategy**

Respondents listed bureaucracy and UNICEF's level of commitment to mine action as the biggest internal risks that adversely affect ability to implement a programme. Funding issues and a shift in humanitarian priorities were listed as adverse factors beyond UNICEF's control.

In terms of impact on UNICEF's implementing partners if the UNICEF programme was halted, the majority of respondents expected that work would continue at a lower scale although funding, training/capacity building, access to materials, publicity/awareness, rehabilitation equipment and other support would be reduced.

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<sup>157</sup> In one case, 'improved economic status of victims' families' and 'child victims' learning achievements improved,' were listed.

#### **Part 4: Resources**

2004 Average spending per country office was as follows: MRE, \$480,257; VA, \$141,072; Advocacy, \$65,000. The percentage of total UNICEF country budget ranged from 0.05% to 6% and the average was 2.41%.

2005 Average spending per country office was as follows: MRE, \$390,198; VA, \$237,000; Advocacy, \$66,667. The percentage of total UNICEF country budget ranged from 1% to 3.76% and the average was 2.75%.

So although spending has been reduced in real terms, mine action is allocated a similar proportion of funding relative to other UNICEF programmes over the two year period. MRE is clearly the most funded activity followed by VA and then finally advocacy.

#### **Analysis of the Questionnaire Data – Managed Programmes**

[Extracts from the analysed data from questionnaires.]

##### **Part 1: Relevance and appropriateness of the UNICEF's global 2002 – 2005 mine action strategy**

The majority of the respondents replied that the strategy was relevant for all three goals.




Figure 4 : Relevancy of goals in UNICEF managed mine action.

In all cases, reasons that the strategy was said to be relevant was because: activities were being implemented; UNICEF was the focal point for these activities in-country. Two thirds of COs stated that, if the advocacy goal was relevant it was because the Ottawa treaty had been ratified.

All respondents indicated that UNICEF operates through between 3 and 6 implementing partners for MRE. Only one country has a Committee to Ban Landmines and it appeared that absence of suitable implementing partners in the other countries affected advocacy contributions. No specific VA partner was mentioned by any of the COs.

Respondents felt that over the next 2 to 5 years, VA activities should increase, MRE and advocacy should stay the same or increase. In addition, fencing, marking, surveys and database work and integration with national authorities should all increase.

In general, the goals and objectives are seen as meeting (66%) or exceeding (33%) the future expectations of UNICEF over the next MTSP period. However, only one of the respondents felt that activities defined in the strategy reflect what is actually happening on the ground the others have reservations. Most respondents felt that there was a disconnect between CO and RO.

Specific comments regarding the appropriateness, relevancy and sustainability of the strategy include:

*"There is little understanding of further development phase work."*

*"Lack of institutional buy-in and competing priorities."*

*"UNICEF should advocate for involvement in LIS."*

*"Combine LIS with MRE needs assessment."*

*"The RO should take on an advocacy role for IMAS in region and sharing of IEC [Information, Education, Communication] material developed in the region."*

**Part 2: Effectiveness and outcome resulting from implementation of the 2002 – 2005 UNICEF mine action strategy**

All respondents believed that UNICEF should have a coordination role and lead on project/programme implementation, including through financial support to implementing partners.

The respondents did not state that either CCA or UNDAF were of any use to planning. Needs assessments and UN joint annual planning were more useful for planning in UNICEF's work than CCA or UNDAF.

Only one third of respondents stated that a needs assessment systematically precedes a mine action intervention. Assessments carried out have included a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey and capacity development assessment. Two thirds of respondents used both the global strategy and country-specific assessments. One respondent did not use the global strategy for planning purposes at all.

In general the following priorities were listed for each CO: Health/immunisation/security – Education – Water & Sanitation – HIV/AIDS – Protection.

It was stated that if external funding were to cease, core funding would not be allocated internally. They also indicated that national government priorities may diverge from mine action priorities as perceived by UNICEF, even in those countries where support for MBT had progressed.

In all cases the mine action focal point was full time and located within Child Protection section. It is also clear from responses that mine action would be dropped if no dedicated person was tasked with dealing with it, i.e. that presence of funding for human resources dictate whether support to mine action took place.



Two thirds of respondents believe that the current organisational structure hinders activities. They believe that UNICEF staff should be better integrated into the national structures. They state that a lack of understanding of mine action exists within CO staff.

66% of respondents believe that their programmes are being implemented in accordance with IMAS and that national standards are in-line with IMAS. Some difficulties concerning practical implementation do exist.

The range of outputs was listed for the activities undertaken. The quality of answers was poor, suggesting that respondents had either misunderstood the question or were unfamiliar with output measures. Those provided included:

Mine Action:	Strategy development
Capacity Building:	Database system training, Monitoring and Evaluation training.
Interagency Assessment:	-
MRE:	Emergency MRE, distribution of MRE kits, MRE teachers receive training
VA:	Victim data collection, strategy development, technical assistance, rights advocacy
Advocacy:	Formulation of national mine action legislation

In the majority of cases (>50%) no suitable or satisfactory performance indicators or means of verification for these outputs were listed. Performance indicators that were listed included coordination meetings, reporting and monitoring missions; means of verification included plans, strategy papers and progress reports. Although respondents were prompted to provide both outputs and outcomes, in the overwhelming majority of cases only output were listed. Other processes used to assess impact of work include: informal surveys of recent victims, annual work plans, integrated monitoring and evaluation plan, monitoring or Q.A mechanisms, KAP survey and field visits.

### **Part 3: Sustainability of the 2002 – 2005 UNICEF mine action strategy**

Respondents listed bureaucracy and UNICEF's commitment to mine action as the biggest internal risks that adversely affect ability to implement a programme. Other adverse factors included limited access (due to security, weather or climate), government control/restriction, lack of country presence and low capacity of counterparts.

In terms of impact on UNICEF's implementing partners if the UNICEF programme was halted, the majority of respondents expected that work would continue at a lower scale although funding, training/capacity building, access to materials, publicity/awareness, rehabilitation equipment and other support would be reduced.

**Part 4: Resources**

2004 Average spending was as follows: MRE, \$617,737; VA, \$40,000; Advocacy, \$0.

2005 Average spending was as follows: MRE, \$535,816; VA, \$300,000; Advocacy, \$0.

Funding for VA appears to have increased, although it is not appropriate to extrapolate a trend on the basis of 2 years.

## Overall Performance of UNICEF Support to Mine Action

### Performance management of UNICEF mine action support

Monitoring and evaluation activities in UNICEF relate to the CO planning and implementation and included the Situation Analysis (SITAN), the Integrated Monitoring, Evaluation and Research Plan (IMEP), the Mid-Term Reviews (MTRs) or country programme Evaluation, and the thematic evaluation all at CO level; and programme evaluations and field visits at programme / project level. The SITAN is a survey conducted to determine the situation within which UNICEF will develop a country programme and forms part of the UNDAF. IMEP is part of the country programme preparation process and involves joint identification of monitoring and evaluation requirements to be conducted jointly with government as part of that programme. IMEP is included in the Master Plans of Operations (MPO), which encapsulates the key elements of the country programme. The MTR is held approximately halfway through the country programme cycle, usually towards the end of the second half of the mid-year. A Programme Management System (ProMS) accompanies the country programme plans. However, it requires training and according to the 'Strengthening Management in UNICEF' report in December 2004, "About three-quarters of offices audited in 2002-2003 continued to have weaknesses in – and weak quality assurance process for – the development of annual project plans. Some 78 percent of offices did not use the available ProMS-based reporting facility to maintain awareness of programmes and office performance".

None of the mine action focal points interviewed as part of this evaluation had received training in ProMS and some non-mine action UNICEF stakeholders indicated that ProMS was used for more administrative purposes, rather than as a performance tracking tool for management decisions. Most documented mine action monitoring and evaluation by UNICEF relates to planning at the MPO level, and is oriented towards annual planning and MTR. Other monitoring and evaluation documents relate to field visits from LASAT at programme and project level. However, there is little documented evidence of systems approach to monitoring and evaluation during the project cycle. Performance data in UNICEF mine action documents is mainly anecdotal, used to illustrate a point in reports rather than to monitor and evaluate progress and success during the life of the project.

### Performance Indicators extracted from UNICEF documents regarding the 3 goals

Document review clearly shows that a) performance targets get set during the annual planning process used by UNICEF and these are reviewed during an annual review, but that b) aside from these two planning procedures there is very little evidence of monitoring or evaluation of performance *during* the project cycle. UNICEF tends to assess needs prior to intervention and assess impact after intervention, but the absence of systematic collection of performance indicators or of performance reporting suggests that progress is not tracked and data is not collected in such a way that it can be analysed over time. As such Cranfield University could not 'retro-fit' generic performance indicators onto data that was generated by UNICEF, as was originally envisaged. That data was not available. The 3 tables below illustrate only a sample of data that is quoted or implied in UNICEF mine action project documents and that could be further developed into indicators and tracked over time using any number of performance management systems commonly

associated to project monitoring and evaluation. Words in italics indicate that the data is implied, but not evident, from document review.

Activity	Input indicator	Lag indicator	Lead indicator	Output indicator	Outcome indicator
<b>MRE Coordination</b>	\$N provided for funding of a TA in the MAC and Ministry of Education. X number of TAs provided to the MAC.	X coordination meetings with MRE agencies. % <i>MRE activities coordinated through MAC versus % coordinated by UNICEF.</i>	X NMAA coordination meetings with UNICEF as participant. X implementing partners send reports to UNICEF MRE officer at the MAC.	% <i>IMSMA Gazeteers including MRE data.</i> X <i>monthly MRE work plans approved by IPs.</i>	X <i>MRE plans including collaboration between at least 2 IPs or other MRE agencies.</i> % of <i>MRE task duplication reported by IPs or MRE agencies..</i>
<b>MRE Capacity Building</b>	\$N provided for MRE training. X hours spent / week by MRE TA conducting on the job training with counterpart.	X MRE workers trained. X MRE workshops held for community volunteers and other delivery partners	% trainees requiring refresher training as a result of MRE QA/QC of IPs. % of high impact provinces with qualified MRE staff.	X training workshops held. X <i>Training Needs Assessments conducted.</i>	X <i>IPs accredited in MRE.</i> % <i>decrease in UNICEF funding for Ministry of Education at same activity level.</i>
<b>Support to MRE Activities</b>	\$N sub-contracts to MRE IPs. X MRE materials distributed to MRE organisations.	X UNICEF developed TV spots aired. X communities received MRE through UNICEF IP.	% <i>communities yet to receive MRE through UNICEF IPs.</i> X <i>children trained in child-to-child techniques.</i>	X Information, Education, Communication Materials developed. X <i>community based Mine Risk Reduction volunteers working</i>	X positive KAP survey indicating behaviour change. % <i>increase in abandoned ordnance reports.</i>
<b>MRE Needs Assessment</b>	X weeks to attend EPIINFO course for 2 TAs. \$N for field worker salaries.	% needs assessment results accepted by host government and endorsed by the UN. X interagency rapid needs assessment reports complete.	X trials / field test of risk assessment interview method successful. % of needs assessment team who have been formally trained in participatory rural appraisal.	X <i>needs assessment reports exist.</i> X <i>workshop to present needs to stakeholders conducted.</i>	% <i>MRE interventions planned to target demographic groups identified in the needs assessment.</i> \$N <i>funds raised for MRE to target groups identified in the needs assessment.</i>
<b>MRE Impact Assessment</b>	\$N for rent of computer with ACCESS database software. X <i>weeks community development expert salary and travel / living costs.</i>	X Group of Experts endorse impact assessment findings. % compliance with IMAS guidelines on impact assessment.	% of impact assessment team who have been formally trained in methods mentioned in IMAS. X M&E reports are conducted during the assessment and approved by stakeholders.	X Impact Assessment Report exists. X IMSMA impact data reports and X Ministry of Education reports generated.	\$N <i>final payment made by donor for the completed MRE project upon satisfactory performance reporting.</i> X <i>Lessons Learned report presented to mine action stakeholders.</i>

Table 1: MRE Performance indicators generated by UNICEF.

## Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action

Activity	Input Indicator	Lag Indicator	Lead Indicator	Output indicator	Outcome indicator
<b>Advocacy Coordination</b>	\$N provided for funding coordination workshop for Landmine Monitor researchers. X hours a week TA time reporting to UNICEF policy units in HQ.	X coordination meetings with local disability rights campaigners. % advocacy activities coordinated by MAC versus % coordinated by UNICEF.	X <i>Human Rights Watch</i> meetings attended with UNICEF as a participant. % relevant government organisations attending monthly disability coordination meetings.	X advocacy newsletters published by UNICEF. X contributions made to local researcher reports for Landmine Monitor by UNICEF.	X government ministries are aware of rights of disabled people through the efforts of more than one organisation. % of Landmine Monitor Reports that include information provided by UNICEF.
<b>Advocacy Capacity Building</b>	\$N provided for training on campaigning methods to local IPs. X hours spent per week briefing UNICEF policy units on advocacy developments.	% increase in participation in national CBLs as a result of invitations by UNICEF. X organisations for the disabled organise fundraising events with UNICEF support.	% of total budget increase allocation for CBL. X disability law changes required to protect minimum rights of mine / UXO survivors.	X campaign management training curriculum developed. X CBL project proposals written with national campaigners.	% CBL projects managed independently of UNICEF. X disability group campaign plans are conducted with UNICEF finance.
<b>Support to Advocacy Activities</b>	\$N subcontracts to advocacy IPs. X Ministry of Youth and Sport meetings attended.	X MBT poster competitions organised. X organisations for disabled people received technical advice.	% children with disability attending school. X municipal hospitals with wheelchair access.	X draft disability benefit law developed. X invitations sent to government officials for social networking.	X statement by the government regarding MBT ratification intentions. X disability pension exists.
<b>Advocacy Needs Assessment</b>	X days oversight from UNICEF LASAT and policy units. \$N consultancy fees for sub-contract.	% needs assessment results accepted by UNICEF policy units. X key stakeholders interviewed during the needs assessment.	% of pre-identified government departments taking up the mantle of advocacy for disability rights. X reports from RO with information on regional coordination on MBT advocacy initiatives.	X Needs Assessment Report. X Interview notes completed.	% CBLs reporting improved reception from government stakeholders due to improved campaign efforts. X laws identified by the needs assessment have campaign strategies developed as a result of needs assessment.
<b>Advocacy Impact Assessment</b>	\$N for local researcher / monitor salary. X days for telephone interviews and costs of communication.	X assessment conducted regarding implementation of articles of the MBT. X reports sent to LM regarding article 7 commitments.	% meetings between UNICEF and government that result in some form of positive action. X local newspaper articles relating to disability issues.	X press conference statements by UNICEF. X government organisations attending advocacy meetings when invited.	% progress towards all articles of the MBT. % of disability rights that are respected in national law.

Table 2: Advocacy Performance indicators generated by UNICEF.

## Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action

Activity	Input Indicator	Lag Indicator	Lead Indicator	Output indicator	Outcome indicator
<b>VA Coordination</b>	\$N for the cost of a TA in the MAC and Ministry of Health. \$N for office space rental for X months.	X coordination meetings between UNICEF and other VA agency staff seconded to MAC. X meetings with Ministry of Social Welfare.	% of VA coordination meetings with ICRC as a participant. % of incident reports received by the MAC from the local Red Cross.	X IMSMA incident reports provided by agencies in the VA data collection network. % of communities providing data that has undergone a QA/QC task.	X NGOs, UN agencies, government bodies and community organisations provide victim data in the IMSMA database. X Ministries have developed plans that include mine/UXO victims.
<b>VA Capacity Building</b>	\$N provided for training of community based social workers. X hours spent / week by VA TA conducting on the job training with counterpart.	X implementing partner staff trained in management of micro-credit schemes. X civil servants pass exam on HRBAP of VA.	% of government physical rehabilitation technicians who have received a counselling information pack. X recommendations followed as a result of the evaluation of the VA training programme.	X report on the evaluation of the VA training programme exists. X studies on the requirement for legal instruments to be developed by government published.	% of Ministry of Social Welfare VA coordination meetings attended by groups representing survivors. X social, economic and physical rehabilitation projects managed by government bodies.
<b>Support to VA Activities</b>	\$N for sub-contract to VA IPs. X adapted furniture manufactured with UNICEF funds.	X proposals received by civil society organisations that receive a micro-credit loan. X technicians purchase orders for polypropylene completed.	% of funding of government physical rehabilitation centres provided by non-UNICEF sources. X local VA IP organisations with approved exit strategies.	X final reports for projects with youth workers received. X community based physiotherapist practical test papers completed.	% of reported children living with disability that attend school. X trained community based rehabilitation workers conducting home visits.
<b>VA Needs Assessment</b>	X days oversight from UNICEF Child Protection section. \$N for sub-contract to IP for information needs assessment in existing healthcare systems.	X meetings with Landmine Impact Survey team attended. % of known victims within the past 24 months interviewed as part of needs assessment.	% of physical rehabilitation protocols reported to comply with international standards by WHO. X trials / field test of risk assessment interview method successful.	X psycho-social study report for victims exist. X workshop to present needs to stakeholders conducted.	% VA interventions planned to target groups from needs assessment. \$N funds raised for VA to target groups identified in the needs assessment.
<b>VA Impact Assessment</b>	\$N for funding victim surveillance mechanisms. X day oversight by Child Protection in HQ.	% communities participating in community reporting mechanisms. X Monitoring and evaluation tasks with IPs to their VA programmes conducted.	% survivors leaving physical rehabilitation assistance prematurely. X M&E reports are conducted during the assessment and approved by stakeholders.	X Impact Assessment Report exists. X IMSMA impact data reports and X Ministry of Health reports generated.	\$N final payment made by donor for the completed VA project upon satisfactory performance reporting. X Lessons Learned report presented to mine action stakeholders.

Table 3: VA Performance indicators generated by UNICEF.

**Performance indicators extracted from UNICEF documents regarding one sub-objective**

UNICEF's approach to country programme planning is elaborate and comprehensive. Efforts directed towards the more operational and tactical levels of information management will enable UNICEF support to mine action function in a way that can be used, potentially, as an example to implementing partners and other UN agencies. The granularity of performance data referred that could currently be obtained at CO level associated to Objective 1.1 (even though this data is not systematically collected or analysed) is illustrated below:

Activity	Input indicator	Lag indicator	Lead indicator	Output indicator	Outcome indicator
<b>SITAN</b>	X days staff time and X meetings attended with UNSECOORD for security update.  X meetings attended with UNOCHA, UNHCR to develop comprehensive SITAN.	X mine action issues identified in regular SITANs that are of direct relevance to the UN mission in-country.  X meetings attended that effectively incorporate mine action issues into the SITAN.	X mine action issues that have been identified by the UNICEF country team that will be incorporated into the SITAN.  % of planned meetings for developing SITAN attended by mine action aware UNICEF staff.	X reports highlighting mine action issues for inclusion in SITAN submitted.  <i>X maps of mine / UXO hazard areas annexed to the SITAN.</i>	X comprehensive SITAN is developed that include mine action issues that are relevant to the UN and other aid-workers, beneficiaries and other stakeholders.  X issues identified in the SITAN that have direct relevance to UNICEF planning for mine action activities.
<b>Interagency Assessment/ Rapid Emergency &amp; Response Survey/ Other surveys (e.g. KAP)</b>	X mine action focal point staff allocated at HQ for assessment team to join UNMAS, UNDP or other agencies in a formal assessment of mine action requirements in-country.  X technical experts hired to assist on specific needs assessments as they might arise, e.g. KAP.	X government bodies the UNICEF country team has advised of the interagency assessment for mine action option.  X interagency assessments the UNICEF HQ team and COs have participated in.	X countries where UNICEF will take the lead in advising the government of interagency mine action assessment option.  X countries UNICEF will participate in an interagency assessment.	X formal interagency assessment documents that provide the basis of mine action programming in-country.  X needs and ways of addressing their needs, with government buy-in have been identified.	X issues identified with national buy-in to be addressed by country team that relate to mine action.  X issues gaining government buy-in such as KAP and other related assessments.
<b>CCA</b>	X staff days.  \$N logistical costs covered to meet UN counterparts in-country.	X mine action issues that UNICEF is able to bring to the table in the formation of the CCA.  % mine action related activities that UNICEF has committed to taking on out of total UNICEF country team identified and brought to the CCA discussions.	X mine action issues that will be identified by UNICEF country team and that will become part of UNICEF in-country programming.  X CCA teams that include mine aware UNICEF staff.	X assessment reports by UNICEF mine action staff involved in CCA exist.  X briefing papers produced regarding CCA for mine action IPs.	X mine action plans exist that include CCA agreements as to the division of tasks between agencies and with host government.  % of CCAs that refer to impact from mines / UXO.

## Evaluation of UNICEF's Support to Mine Action

<b>UNDAF/ Joint Annual Work Plan (JAWP)</b>	X staff days. \$N logistical costs covered to meet UN counterparts in-county.	X issues that UNICEF drafting contingent have been able to place into the UNDAF/JAWP in line with their remit for mine action activities developed by the country team and the CCA. \$N raised as a result of fundraising through the JAWP and associated portfolio.	X issues that UNICEF can realistically plan to incorporate into the UNDAF/JAWP that are in-line with roles and responsibilities established in the CCA. % increase of anticipated funds for mine action related activities as a result of joint fundraising.	X JAWP exists that includes mine/UXO related considerations. X Master Plan of Operations that includes mine / UXO related considerations.	% of JAWP UN agencies that are aware of UNICEF's mine action support plan. % of JAWP organisations that receive mine/UXO programme related data for their own planning.
<b>MPO/UNICEF Annual Work Plans</b>	X staff days. \$N logistical costs covered to meet UN counterparts in-county.	X mine/UXO issues that have been jointly identified with the government and included into the MPO with the host government. X Annual work plans developed in conjunction with national counterparts that have reflected the projects, tasks and activities outlined in the MPO.	X mine/UXO issues that are identified by UN and government and will be included into future MPOs with government. Inline with the host government priorities. X UNICEF mine action government counterparts expected to participate in annual planning.	X MPO drafted with the government. X annual work plans accompanied by capability analysis of host government.	<i>% of government responsibilities identified in the MPO met.</i> % of host government priorities included in annual review of work plans that have been met.
<b>Identification of local partners and capacity</b>	\$N cost of placing advertisements in local media. X staff days attending meetings with government ministries and departments, attending exhibitions, conferences and symposia.	% of pre-identified stakeholder ministries assessed for their ability to contribute to commitments in the MPO. X local implementing partners identified with the requisite skills or potential illustrated by capability analysis.	X ministries and other government stakeholders identified with appropriate capacity and mission. % of potential and existing partners that are expected to be self-sustaining by the end of the annual plan.	MoU with national Red Cross exists. Capability analysis report is published.	X NGOs implement activities with UNICEF support in mine action. % of NGOs implementing UNICEF supported mine action that effectively manage their accounts.
<b>Resource Mobilisation</b>	X staff days for fundraising. \$N for technical advisor contract for the development of materials and resources.	% of core mine action donors that met by UNICEF mine action staff. X mine action project plans accompanied by resource mobilisation plans.	% of global funds required compared with MRE project funds. % MRE project concepts that could not be implemented due to lack of funds / resources.	X proposals produced for MRE. X donors attend MRE working groups and meetings.	\$N raised as a result of fundraising activities. X in-kind contributions made as a result of fundraising activities.

Table 4: Objective 1.1 Performance indicators generated by UNICEF.



**An example of decision-based information management systems for performance**

Overly labour intensive systems run the risk of disuse as the effort required. An example, one of many, is the Balanced Scorecard.




Figure 5 : Overall strategic performance at CO level.

This example uses real data obtained in document review at CO level. This approach, although requiring some time to set up, has the advantage of enabling management decisions that can 'drill down' from a strategic level to annual plans and from there to project results and activities, using indicators developed using the Logical Framework Approach (LFA). The emphasis in this example is on decision-making. CO mine action focal points can investigate the underlying reasons for performance in Objective 1.1. By selecting

that objective, they can be directed towards two underlying sheets of data relating to the objective, measures, activities and targets set by the CO, illustrated as follows:

Objective 1.1: By December 2005, at risk populations are identified, MRE needs are assessed and appropriate mine risk reduction education is provided, in all new and existing UN mine action programmes.

**Measure: definition, description and 'ownership'**



Number:	Name:	'Perspective:	'Owner' of measure:
<b>0-101</b>	<b>Needs and Response (Mine Risk Education)</b>	Output (of mine action)	Sharif Baaser, Programme Officer, CO Sudan
Description of measure:			
Mine Risk Education aims to reduce the risk related to mines / UXO to a level which is deemed by local communities to be tolerable for normal life. MRE will normally be preceded by a needs assessment to determine the nature of the risk to determine the degree of risk and extent of the socio-economic impact, and to agree the MRE measures with local communities. This may be accompanied by temporary marking of hazards.			
Activities:			
An MRE needs assessment was conducted in 2003-04. A specific assessment took place in South Kordofan and joint technical surveys and local MRE needs assessments were made in Khartoum. These conducted according to priorities established by Regional MACs using IMSMA data and data provided by UNOCHA. Based on these joint surveys/assessments, plans will be made for MRE projects accompanied by marking fencing.			
Indicators of progress and success:			
The number of completed joint technical surveys and MRE needs assessments; the number of prepared and funded plans for marking and fencing projects; the number of completed projects resulting in impacted communities 'made safer' through marking and fencing projects.			

**Tracking progress and success**

Indicators of progress and success:				Jun 03 Target	Jun 03 Actual	Dec Target	Dec Predic	Jun 05 Target	Jun 05 Predic	Dec 05 Target
The number of completed joint tech surveys and MRE needs assessments				86	80	96	85	93	93	855
The number of prepared and funded plans for MRE projects				68	65	75	80	75	75	895

Figure 6 : MRE Programme performance at CO level.

The effort to gather and analyse baseline performance data should not dominate, and clear relevance to programme and strategy level decisions should be emphasised. For this reason, approaches that rely on tactical effort by mine action focal points who are already over-stretched in some countries should not be favoured. The LFA is often only used partially. It serves as an excellent tool

for cause-effect analysis and development of performance indicators and assumptions when designing and planning projects. However, most UNICEF mine action focal points are less familiar with its use as a monitoring and evaluation mechanism. UNICEF should either provide training on the operational management functions and methods associated to LFA, or adopt simple tools such as the Balanced Scorecard approach. In the above example, performance indicators (targets) for the MRE needs assessment objective have been set and the UNICEF mine action focal point in Sudan is responsible for periodically update the database with actual performance figures based on those same indicators. In the same way as the Balanced Scorecard, red indicates critical limitations and blue indicates excess capacity. Various analyses can be done with the performance predictions and time and cost variables can be calculated to assist the manager decide on the optimal requirements. This analysis can be illustrated graphically as follows:




Figure 7 : Possible analysis of MRE Project performance.

Such systems are only as good as the baseline data and person using such data. This evaluation finds that while UNICEF does not have adequate performance based management practices, it has the capacity to obtain a wealth of valuable information that can be used to develop an effective performance management system. The data generated by UNICEF is not systematically collected and analysed, using methods illustrated above or other methods. It tends not to be SMART and analysis is not conducive to strategic and operational decision-making. Effort must go into the setting of realistic targets within a project cycle and pre-emptive analysis of performance towards those targets so that they can be used to inform field visits, to improve resource management and ensure that reports to partners and donors are based on data with means of verification.

## HRBAP and UNICEF Support to Mine Action

### The 2002-2005 Strategy in HRBAP

The table below illustrates how the UNICEF Mine Action Strategy 2002 – 2005 might be modified as one of many steps to conform to a HRBAP.

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS TO BE ACHIEVED BY 2015 & HRBAP MINE ACTION 2002-2005		
MDG	DESCRIPTION	HRBAP FOR MINE ACTION - 2002-05 (EXAMPLES OF RELEVANT HUMAN RIGHTS IN BRACKETS – NOT COMPREHENSIVE)
1	<p><b>HALVE EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER</b></p> <p>1.2 billion people still live on less than \$1 a day. But 43 countries, with more than 60 per cent of the world's people, have already met or are on track to meet the goal of cutting hunger in half by 2015.</p>	<p><i>Ensure that no less than <b>1/6th</b> of the projected numbers who would otherwise suffer from hunger, directly or indirectly as a result of landmines of other remnants of war, receive sufficient food for their survival, growth and healthy development.</i></p> <p><i>(CRC Arts 6, 23 and 24 &amp; CEDAW Preamble and Art 12)</i></p>
2	<p><b>ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION</b></p> <p>113 million children do not attend school, but this goal is within reach; India, for example, should have 95 per cent of its children in school by 2005.</p>	<p><i>Ensure projected numbers of those who would otherwise not achieve universal education, directly or indirectly as a result of landmines of other remnants of war, achieve no less than universal primary education.</i></p> <p><i>(CRC Art 19, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 33 and 40 &amp; CEDAW Preamble, Arts 5, 10, 14 and 16)</i></p>
3	<p><b>EMPOWER WOMEN AND PROMOTE EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN</b></p> <p>Two-thirds of the world's illiterates are women, and 80 per cent of its refugees are women and children. Since the 1997 Microcredit Summit, progress has been made in reaching and empowering poor women, nearly 19 million in 2000 alone.</p>	<p><i>Ensure projected numbers of un-empowered women who would otherwise not have equality with men, directly or indirectly as a result of landmines of other remnants of war, achieve empowerment and empowerment and equality with men.</i></p> <p><i>(CRC Preamble, Arts 29 and 40 &amp; CEDAW Preamble, Arts 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 &amp; 23)</i></p>
4	<p><b>REDUCE UNDER-FIVE MORTALITY BY TWO THIRDS</b></p> <p>11 million young children die every year, but that number is down from 15 million in 1980.</p>	<p><i>Ensure no less than <b>2/9ths</b> of projected numbers of young children who would otherwise die, directly or indirectly as a result of landmines of other remnants of war, survive in a healthy and safe condition.</i></p> <p><i>(CRC Arts 6, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 23, 24, 25, 32 and 39 &amp; CEDAW Preamble, Arts 5 and 16)</i></p>
5	<p><b>REDUCE MATERNAL MORTALITY BY THREE QUARTERS</b></p> <p>In the developing world, the risk of</p>	<p><i>Ensure no less than <b>1/4</b> of projected numbers of mothers who would otherwise die, caused directly or indirectly as a result of landmines of other remnants of</i></p>

	dying in childbirth is one in 48. But virtually all countries now have safe motherhood programmes and are poised for progress.	<i>war, survive in a healthy and safe condition. (CRC Art 24 &amp; CEDAW Preamble, Arts 10, 11, 12 and 14)</i>
6	<b>REVERSE THE SPREAD OF DISEASES, ESPECIALLY HIV/AIDS AND MALARIA</b>  Killer diseases have erased a generation of development gains. Countries like Brazil, Senegal, Thailand and Uganda have shown that we can stop HIV in its tracks.	<i>Ensure a reversal of the projected number of potential people suffering from diseases, especially HIV/AIDS and Malaria, caused directly or indirectly as a result of landmines of other remnants of war, by access to appropriate public health programmes. (CRC Arts 3, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 23, 24,25, 32 and 39 &amp; CEDAW Preamble, Arts 10, 11, 12 and 14)</i>
7	<b>ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY</b>  More than one billion people still lack access to safe drinking water; however, during the 1990s, nearly one billion people gained access to safe water and as many as 1 billion people gained access to sanitation.	<i>Ensure projected numbers of people who would be living in an unsustainable environment, directly or indirectly as a result of landmines of other remnants of war, are provided with sustainable environments. (CRC Arts 3, 14, 15 and 24 &amp; CEDAW Preamble, Arts 11 and 14)</i>
8	<b>CREATE A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT, WITH TARGETS FOR AID, TRADE AND DEBT RELIEF</b>  Too many developing countries are spending more on debt service than on social services. New aid commitments made in the/ first half of 2002 alone, though, will reach an additional \$12 billion per year by 2006.	<i>Ensure children who would otherwise have restrictions or suspension of their basic human rights, directly or indirectly as a result of landmines of other remnants of war, receive assistance from Global Partnerships with targets for Aid, Trade and Debt Relief. (CRC Preamble, Arts 6, 17, 18, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29 and 32 &amp; CEDAW Preamble, Arts 3, 5, 11, 14 )</i>

### International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law Instruments Pertinent to Mine Action

The list is not comprehensive, but illustrative of the wide range of instruments available to protect human rights and to call perpetrators of human rights abuses to account, as States and Individuals.

- Hague Conventions Various 1899-1954.
- Charter of the United Nations, 1945.
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
- Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GC I), 12 August 1949.
- Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick, Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II), 12 August 1949.
- Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III), 12 August 1949.

- Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War (GC IV), 12 August 1949.
- Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951.
- International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
- International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966.
- Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (PI), 8 June 1977.
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (PII), 8 June 1977.
- UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1979.
- UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 1980 -1996:
  - Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments, 1980;
  - Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, 1980;
  - Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, 1995;
  - Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, 1996.
- UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989.
- UN General Assembly Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, A/RES/48/96, 20 December 1993.
- Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 1997.
- UNICEF Human Rights for Children and Women: How UNICEF Helps Make Them a Reality, June 1999.
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, 12 February 2002.
- UN General Assembly Comprehensive and integral international convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities, A/RES/56/168, February 2002.

### **UNICEF Definition of HRBAP**

“A rights-based approach to programming means that we must be mindful in our development work of the basic principles of human rights that have been universally recognised and which underpin both CRC and CEDAW: inter alia, the equality of each individual as a human being, the inherent dignity of each person, the rights to self determination, peace and security... A human rights approach to UNICEF programming also calls for more inherently integrated, cross-sectoral and decentralized activities, and for participatory approaches recognizing that those we

are trying to help are central actors in the development process.” (A Human Rights Approach to UNICEF: Programming for Women and Children UNICEF April 1998)

“It (rights-based development) is generating an inclusion of concepts related to the realization of human rights and covers issues such as empowerment, justice, accountability and governance. Economic and social development objectives are integrated and redefined as rights. Goals become mechanisms or instruments to ensure benefits to which people have legitimate claims” (Human Rights as an Emerging Development Paradigm and some implications for Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation” Mahesh Patel UNICEF May 2001) “Rights approach is transformative” (Human Rights as an Emerging Development Paradigm and some implications for Programme Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation” Mahesh Patel UNICEF May 2001)

For UNICEF, a human rights-based approach to programming means that:

- All UNICEF Programmes of Cooperation are focused on the realization of the rights of children and women;
- Human Rights principles are applied in all programming in all sectors; and
- Human rights principles guide all phases of the programme process.

(*Programme Policy and Procedure Manual: Programme Operations*, Revised April 2002, p. 4. UNICEF)

### **Steps in HRBAP**

Much work has been undertaken by UNICEF and these approaches and lessons learned should be integrated into mine action in a way that is consistent with HRBAP in other thematic areas. Quoting from *A Human Rights Based Approach to Programming (HRBAP)*, by Urban Jonsson, Senior Advisor on Human Rights-Based Programming, UNICEF, 09 October 2004:

All projects and programmes should follow the following three principles:

- All programmes of development co-operation, policies and technical assistance should further the realization of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments.
- Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide all development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the programming process.
- Development cooperation contributes to the development of capacities of ‘duty-bearers’ to meet their obligations and/or of ‘right-holders’ to claim their rights.

And all projects and programmes must have the following unique characteristics:

- Assessment and analysis in order to identify the human rights claims of right-holders and the corresponding human rights obligations of duty-bearers as well as the immediate, underlying, and structural causes of the non-realization of rights.
- Programmes assess the capacity of right-holders to claim their rights and of duty-bearers to fulfil their obligations. They then develop strategies to build these capacities.
- Programmes monitor and evaluate both outcomes and processes guided by human rights standards and principles.

- Programming is informed by the recommendations of international human rights bodies and mechanisms.

All programmes and projects should follow the following five steps:

- **Step 1: Causality Analysis:** Once awareness exists, the first step is to identify the immediate, underlying and basic causes of the problem. Causality Analysis results in the identification of a set of rights that are being violated or at risk of being violated.
- **Step 2: Pattern Analysis:** Pattern Analysis aims at identifying key claim/duty relationships in a particular societal context. Role/Pattern Analysis identifies key claim-holder/duty-bearer relationships for each specific right.
- **Step 3. Capacity Gap Analysis:** After the key claim-duty relationships for a specific right have been identified, the next step is to analyse why the right is not realized. Capacity Analysis defines the capacity gaps of claim-holders to claim their rights and of duty-bearers to meet their duties.
- **Step 4: Identification of Candidate Actions:** A programmatic response aimed at the realisation of rights must contribute to narrowing, or closing, these capacity gaps. Candidate actions are those actions that are likely to contribute to reduce or close the capacity gaps of claim-holders and duty-bearers.
- **Step 5: Programme Design:** The priority actions or activities selected should be aggregated into projects and programmes. This is the reverse of most current programming practices, which disaggregate programmes into projects, and projects into activities. Activities can be clustered, or aggregated, according to the level of society in which claim-holders and duty-bearers operate. At each level some activities will aim at developing capacities of individuals as claim-holders, while others will aim at developing capacities of individuals as duty-bearers. Some activities will do both—sometimes even in relation to more than one right. For example, development of teachers' communication skills will strengthen teachers both to meet their duties to children and to claim their rights in relation to the Ministry of Education.



## Information Collection and Analytical Approach

### Evaluation Team Profiles

The evaluation team included evaluation expertise, mine action management experience and technical experience in MRE, VA and advocacy. The team knowledge of Khmer and Arabic meant that the local language was spoken in half of the countries visited.

Ms. Khaliq has over 10 years of relevant field experience, including management of mine clearance programmes. In addition, she has spent the last 4 years working at headquarters level, as Head of the Mine Action Unit in HI Belgium and in her current capacity as Deputy Director (Humanitarian Resilience) at CU. She is familiar with UNICEF at country level and has worked with many of its staff members, including some of the LASAT team and Country Office staff before. Aside from overall management of the evaluation, she conducted the scoping study, parts of the desk review, produced the Discussion and Issues paper<sup>158</sup>, presented findings in the 1-day workshop and was the main author of the Final Evaluation Report. She has been trained in appraisal and evaluation methods.

Mr. Harknett has over 10 years experience in disability and victim assistance, has conducted numerous evaluations including those sponsored by UNICEF, has extensive working experience in South East Asia and he speaks Khmer. He is a grass-roots community development expert and has worked for HI in mine action. Mr. Harknett conducted all the evaluation field visits in South East Asia. He has experience of outcomes based evaluation.

Mr. Ralph Hassall has conducted needs assessments and evaluations before – mainly for RONCO Consulting Corporation in Iraq on behalf of the mine action authority there. He speaks Arabic, which enables him to conduct interviews in much of Sudan without need for interpretation. The main reason Mr. Hassall was chosen was not because of his technical MRE or advocacy expertise, but rather because he had been involved in the desk review at CU since January 2006 and led much of the document review and questionnaire analysis. This put him in an ideal position to cross-check, confirm or negate findings in the field and to guide interviews in a much more informed way than someone less familiar with documentary evidence. Mr. Hassall conducted parts of the desk review and conducted evaluation field visits to UNICEF Country Offices in Sudan and Ethiopia.

Mr. Alastair McAslan, Director (Humanitarian Resilience) at CU, conducted parts of the desk review and the evaluation field visit to the RO in Kenya. Mr. McAslan has had a prestigious career in mine action, in the UK MoD, in UNMAS and in Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). He was involved in the writing of International Mine Action Standards, including those for MRE, has conducted numerous evaluations of this kind before and is the author of the original CU proposal for this evaluation.

### Quality management of the evaluation

Three formal quality management mechanisms were instated: (1) A group of experts was established by CU; (2) a PSC by UNICEF during the scoping study; and (3) a 1-day Findings workshop was held with the PSC and other stakeholders.

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<sup>158</sup> Note to the Project Steering Committee submitted on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March 2006.

### ***Group of Experts***

The Group of Experts reviewed the quality of the evaluation method and analysis during each of the five evaluation stages. The group was not as independent as originally envisaged. However, subject matter expertise related to HRBAP was improved as a result of changes. The group comprised of: (1) Professor Ian Davis, Quality Manager, and international humanitarian specialist, lecturer at Oxford Brookes University was kept informed of developments. However, CU included (2) Dr. Yasamin Izadkhah, disaster management specialist and Research Associate at CU as a quality manager on a more full-time basis. Her particular contributions related predominantly to method of analysis and reporting; (3) Dr. Dirk Salomons, Director of the Humanitarian Affairs Programme, School of International and Affairs (SIPA), Columbia University, New York. His particular contributions related predominantly to method (4) Mr. Timothy Randall, Head of Disaster Management at CU, who is a human rights expert with mine action experience. His contribution was significant, not only in terms of quality management of methods, but also detailed analysis of HRBAP data and provision of recommendations as a subject matter expert.<sup>159</sup> Ms. Taz Khaliq liaised with this group bilaterally.

To counter CU bias given that the group was predominantly staffed by CU, the role of Dr. Dirk Salomons of Columbia University was changed from regular participant to external quality controller at key stages. The initial scoping and development of methods involved quite significant input from Dr. Salomons. Thereafter, once information collection, analysis and reporting methods had been agreed, Dr. Salomons was involved in review of deliverables only. By maintaining a distance from CU and reducing his day to day involvement in the processes behind the deliverables, Dr. Salomons review remained objective and impartial.

### ***Project Steering Committee***

The Project Steering Committee reviewed scoping findings at the end of stage 1 and attended a 1-day workshop during stage 4, where findings were presented and the content of the final evaluation report agreed. The committee comprised of: (1) Julien Temple, Landmines Programme Officer and Officer in Charge of the Landmines and Small Arms Team in UNICEF New York; (2) Justin Brady, Programme Officer for the UN Mine Action Service in New York; (3) Sarah Norton-Staal, Senior Programme Officer in the UNICEF eastern and southern Africa office, working on emergencies and planning; (4) Gary Risser, Programme Officer from the Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy Unit in New York working on a monitoring and reporting system for child rights' violations; (5) Stan Brabant, Chief of Policy in HI Belgium and represents the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL); (6) Sam Bickel, Senior Advisor from UNICEF evaluation office in New York.

### ***1 - day Findings Workshop***

In addition to the above mechanisms, a 1-day Findings workshop took place on 17th March 2006. The main aim of the workshop was to debate findings, including the extent to which these were evidence-based. Mr. Alastair McAslan facilitated the meeting, which was chaired by Ms. Paula Claycomb, the coordinator of the UNICEF LASAT. Mr. Stan Brabant, who represented HI (Belgium) and ICBL in the PSC did not attend. Ms. Sarah Norton Staal, who represented a UNICEF regional office (RO) in the PSC did not attend. Mr. John Flanagan represented UNMAS on Mr. Justin Brady's behalf. LASAT was represented by Mr. Reuben Nogueira-McCarthy, Mr.

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<sup>159</sup> The Project Steering Committee meeting in November 2005 clearly indicated that a focus on HRBAP would be desirable and inclusion of Tim Randall as the subject matter expert was approved at that time.

Gianluca Buono, Ms. Julie Myers, Mr. Julien Temple and Ms. Paula Claycomb. Mr. Jean-Luc Borries represented the Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy Unit instead of Mr. Gary Risser. Mr. Sam Bickel represented the UNICEF Evaluation Office. Two additional stakeholders were represented: Ms. Rebecca Symington represented the Child Protection section of UNICEF and Ms. Sara Sekkenes represented UNDP.

## **Methods of Analysis per Evaluation Stage**

### ***Scoping Analysis***

Once the breadth and depth of available data was assessed, the most pertinent evaluation methods, given the available time and resources, were chosen. The methods considered included questionnaires, surveys, checklists, interviews and composition of focus group and key informants, document review, observation and case studies. Various evaluation methods were also considered including those authored by UNICEF, other UN agencies, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Swedish International Development and Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This also involved consultation with the Group of Experts which was established at the start of the scoping stage. The methods for information collection and analysis were elaborated based on the appropriateness of the method to obtain the required information and its suitability given the resources available.

The Scoping Study Report contained a revised scope with more confined parameters that restricted information analysis to that relating to the three UNICEF strategic mine action goals in terms of inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes with only secondary consideration of techniques and technology, future needs for example in small arms or activities relating to before 2002. Furthermore the evaluation would assume the need for UNICEF mine action support in the UNICEF Country Offices and would not conduct humanitarian needs assessment. The scoping report contained a detailed list of questions, issues and themes to be raised and proposed information collection and analysis methods for the consecutive stages. It also included a detailed work plan that included a travel plan and itinerary, draft questionnaires, and identified members of both the focus group (UNICEF) and key informant organisations. Contact details for these were also obtained.

The main weakness in the scoping stage related to communication difficulties between CU and UNICEF since Ms. Khaliq was no-longer based in Washington DC, which was the assumption when CU originally proposed to conduct this evaluation. This led to extended consultations during the Desk Review stage, which was conducted in New York.

### ***Document Analysis***

Gap analysis was conducted with data from documents of global relevance to ascertain areas of relevance and appropriateness of the UNICEF mine action strategy in relation with global policies; this was extremely time consuming. CU hired a research assistant, Ms. Erika Fraser, to contribute to this effort and engaged Mr. Randall of the Group of Experts in more substantive research regarding IHL, IHRL and documents of relevance to HRBAP<sup>160</sup>. Mr. Ralph Hassall was also recruited to assist, notably in relation to review project related documents.

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<sup>160</sup> *Observations and Recommendations from the Global Document Review*, Erika Fraser, January 2006 and *Evaluation of Human Rights Aspects of UNICEF Strategy for Support to Mine Action 2002-2005*, Cranfield University report by Mr. Tim Randall, January 2006.

More operational and tactical data regarding UNICEF mine action support was mapped onto the HQ, RO or CO roles and activities as stated in the mine action strategy. Data was categorised according to the goal, objective or activity area of relevance in the UNICEF mine action strategy. A series of matrixes were developed illustrating contribution or not to the relevant HQ, RO or CO responsibilities stated in that strategy, 1 for each country. These were summarised in narrative and matrix form according to MRE, VA or advocacy goal at a global level. In parallel, indicators or statements relating to outputs and outcomes were also extracted and mapped onto the global strategy, once again for each CO, and summarised at a global level. Strategic contribution data was transformed, using a traffic light system based on activity and output analysis.

There was little indication regarding the number of documents that were relevant or the quality of these documents. In hindsight both CU and UNICEF underestimated the staff effort involved in reviewing hundreds of documents and analysing and categorising content. The document review would have been far more efficient if UNICEF reporting followed guidelines oriented around specific project cycle stages or strategy. The existence of such information management systems is, in itself, an indication of the extent to which quality and performance is monitored within UNICEF supported mine action programmes. Furthermore, there is no clear family of papers that are authoritative and reflective of UNICEF's HRBAP and how this then might apply to mine action.

### ***HQ Interview Data Analysis***

HQ informants were recommended by UNICEF. These were further elaborated on by CU. Field visit key informants were selected in consultation with UNICEF regional and country offices and government authorities where appropriate. These included UNICEF mine action and non-mine action staff, other UN agencies, government representatives, implementing partners, independent organisations and beneficiaries of UNICEF support to mine action. Almost 100 interviews were conducted. The interviews conducted in UNICEF HQ at the start of the desk review stage served as a trial and the order of questions in interview guidelines adapted accordingly.

Reliability and accuracy of interview data has been improved through control questions and provision of examples where possible. Bias was reduced in the following ways:

- Bias related to data sources: Interviews were conducted with a wide range of stakeholders in order to ensure accuracy. A representative stakeholder sample was selected that sought many different points of views to balance. Where possible, more than one person was interviewed per organisation. However, in some cases the preferred interviewee was not available or only one person per organisation was interviewed.
- Bias related to methods of data collection: To avoid favouring one factor, preconceived idea or viewpoint over another, a checklist of areas for questioning was followed. Furthermore three interviewers were used: Ms. Taz Khaliq, Mr. Ralph Hassall and Mr. Alastair McAslan.
- Bias related to data analysis: To avoid the evaluator's bias towards a certain viewpoint that colours their interpretation of the findings, analysis was taken as a group and Dr. Yasamin Izadkhah of the Group of Experts advised on analysis methods.

This ensured that the choice of methodology and actions to limit bias provided a complete and fair assessment.

### ***Field Visit Interview Data Analysis***

The sample of 4 COs were chosen by UNICEF on the basis of geographical spread and difference in UNICEF role. Ethiopia, Laos and Cambodia were UN supported government programmes and Sudan was a UN managed programme. In order to compensate for potential imbalance of analysis, questionnaire data was analysed according to the same typologies and further research was conducted regarding the Afghanistan programme, which is currently UN managed.

Each CO visit included at least two opportunities for dialogue with mine/UXO affected populations. Some document review was conducted in-country and there were opportunities for direct observation of UNICEF support to mine action. However, the primary means of information collection were semi-structured interviews. Where necessary, CU consultants used interviewer/interpreters recommended by the UNICEF regional or country office. Bias due to interpreter opinion was reduced through the conduct of interviews in Arabic in Ethiopia and in Khmer in Cambodia.

The confidentiality of interviews both at field and HQ level was important and many interviewees provided candid information as a result of this. Rather than a census of opinion, an analysis of needs and performance was conducted and conclusions of strategic and practical relevance to UNICEF were extracted. This included features and benefits, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis and reporting that related back to relevancy and appropriateness of the UNICEF mine action strategy; effectiveness and impact of the UNICEF mine action strategy; and risks and impact of non-implementation of the UNICEF mine action strategy. Control questions were asked to ensure that answers were reliable and valid.

To assess the relevancy, appropriateness and sustainability of the UNICEF mine action programme the first three stages of the OD method were used in semi-structured interviews with the focus group, UNICEF, at HQ, RO and CO level. These were 'entry and scoping', 'start up and responsibilities', finally 'analysis and diagnosis' to assess the strategic organisational needs of UNICEF at a global level. Although OD is not an evaluation tool, but rather one that is used following evaluation, to institute organisational change, this method served as an interview guideline because it enabled practical consideration of implications of recommendations on UNICEF and the feasibility of recommendations was deemed to be important during the scoping stage. This was conducted in stage 2, Desk Review, by Ms. Taz khaliq, and, again by Mr. Steve Harknett and Mr. Ralph Hassall in focus group discussions with UNICEF in stage 3, 'Field Work'; further analysis and diagnosis was conducted in stage 5 'Workshop' through debate of findings.

*Organisational Development (OD)* is "an effort, planned, organisation-wide, and managed from the top, to increase organisation effectiveness and health through planned interventions in the organisation's processes, using behavioural-science knowledge." In essence, OD is a planned system of change. OD phases include 'Entry and Scoping', 'Start-up and Responsibilities', 'Analysis and Diagnosis', 'Intervention', 'Evaluation', 'Adoption' and finally 'Separation'.

This UNICEF evaluation applied an abridged version of these first three OD phases. Entry and Scoping aims to establish terms of reference and methods to be used. Start-up and Responsibilities aims to collect information and establish roles, processes, resistance and support, and was incorporated into the Desk Review stage. Analysis and Diagnosis engages employees in a learning process that determines needs, focussing on four areas that affect management, processes and organisational development. These are human resources, implications of global markets (relevant to sustainability and risk), processes and organization. Analysis and diagnosis OD formed part of stages 3 (field work) and 5 (workshop). In each of

these three OD phases we assess current planning and management practices that affected human resource potential, that deviate or support global market trends and affect sustainability of UNICEF's current approach to mine action, that have processes that appeared to functionally respond to needs and that enable efficient organisation of resources.

In addition, a combination of goals and process-based evaluation was used for continuation of that strategic and organisational needs assessment at the regional and country level. This was through semi-structured interview with UNICEF at CO level, mainly to ascertain outcomes, and then with key informants at CO and RO level. This was conducted by Mr. Steve Harknett and Mr. Ralph Hassall in focus group discussion, with UNICEF in stage 3, 'Field Work'.

*Goal - based* evaluations assess the extent to which programmes are meeting predetermined goals or objectives. The country programmes are established to meet one or more of the three UNICEF mine action goals. These goals are described in the original programme plans. Mr. Hassall and Mr. Harknett conducted group analysis of goals through focus group discussion with CO staff.

*Process - based* evaluations are geared to fully understanding how a programme works - how does it produce the results that it does? These evaluations are useful if programmes are long-standing and have changed over the years, employees or customers report a large number of complaints about the programme, there appear to be large inefficiencies in delivering programme services and they are also useful for accurately portraying to outside parties how a programme truly operates (e.g., for replication elsewhere). This approach was chosen because the scoping study highlighted suspected inefficiencies and uncovered some quite significant differences of perspective regarding the role of mine action within the two divisions (PD and EMOPS). Mr. Hassall and Mr. Harknett conducted analysis of processes through focus group discussion with CO staff in-country.

To assess the effectiveness and impact of UNICEF mine action programmes, outcome-based evaluation method was used for key informant and focus group interviews at the CO level. These were conducted by Mr. Steve Harknett and Mr. Ralph Hassall in key informant group discussion in stage 3, 'Field Work'.

*Outcomes - based* evaluation facilitates your asking if your organisation is really doing the right programme activities to bring about the outcomes you believe (or better yet, you've verified) to be needed by your target groups (rather than just engaging in busy activities which seem reasonable to do at the time). Programme evaluation with an outcomes focus is increasingly important for nonprofits and asked for by donors. Outcomes are benefits to target groups from participation in the programme. Outcomes are usually in terms of enhanced learning (knowledge, perceptions/attitudes or skills) or conditions, e.g., increased awareness, self-reliance, etc. Outcomes are often confused with programme outputs or units of services, e.g., the number of target group who went through a programme. Mr. Hassall and Mr. Harknett prepared outcome analysis through focus group discussion with CO staff in-country, and validated the achievement or not of these outcomes through key informant group discussion with UNICEF partners, government and non-government stakeholders in UNICEF programmes over the majority of the days in-country.

### **Questionnaire Data Analysis**

The following questionnaire was used to obtain qualitative and quantitative data from UNICEF programmes that had conducted any support to mine action since 2002 relating to relevancy, appropriateness, sustainability, effectiveness and impact. This was an open questionnaire and

respondents were given relatively free reign to express themselves. It was not field tested due to constraints of time.

The questionnaire was sent to 40 UNICEF offices, approximately half of which responded. The original key informant questionnaire drafted by CU was removed and reliance on interviews preferred. The focus group questionnaire drafted by CU was changed from closed and comparatively quantitative to one that was much more open and allowed relatively free scope for respondents. Data from respondents of questionnaires was collated and analysed by typology – UN managed programmes versus UN supported programmes. Analysis entailed identification of areas of consensus and disagreement, as well as a summary of issues and themes raised. This data was separated into three categories: relevancy and appropriateness of the UNICEF mine action strategy; effectiveness and impact of the UNICEF mine action strategy; and risks and impact of non-implementation of the UNICEF mine action strategy.

The use of an open questionnaire as opposed to a closed one reduced CU's ability to predefine analysis methods and resulted in some information collection that served no purpose. Approximately half of questionnaire recipients responded and it was not possible to verify the quality of data obtained by questionnaire, although there are some indications that it was, at times, low.

## **UNICEF LASAT / CPC / RO STAFF FEEDBACK QUESTIONNAIRE**

As part of the evaluation of UNICEF's work in relation to the UNICEF strategy, we would like to hear your views, related to the questions posed in the following questionnaire. The aim of this questionnaire is to assess the relevance of the global UNICEF 2002-2005 strategy to the range of national UNICEF programmes. The outcome of this evaluation will significantly shape the future UNICEF strategy and UNICEF global activities. Your input is therefore of significant importance.

Please type your answers in the space under each question. When you have completed the questionnaire, save it with a unique file name which includes your country programme and your name. For example "USA - Reuben McCarthy.doc". It is important that you include your name to allow us to contact you should we require clarification or further information on any issues raised in your response.

This questionnaire is solely for mine action country focal points (either full-time or a focal point whose main responsibilities are different, such as Child Protection, Education, Communication or other). If you are not the mine action country focal point, please contact [t.khaliq@cranfield.ac.uk](mailto:t.khaliq@cranfield.ac.uk) with the name and contact details of the focal point as soon as possible.

Confidentiality is assured and no reference to individual responses will be made in any communication or evaluation report submitted by Cranfield University to UNICEF.

Please send the completed questionnaire to Ms. Taz Khaliq by e-mail at [t.khaliq@cranfield.ac.uk](mailto:t.khaliq@cranfield.ac.uk) before 20 January 2006.

**Name**

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**Position**

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**Select which you work for:**

- Country Programme of Cooperation / Country Office (CPC)
- Regional Office (RO)?



**PART 1: Relevance and appropriateness of the UNICEF's global 2002 – 2005 mine action strategy**

Please review UNICEF's mine action policies which state its Mission, Goals, Values and Beliefs and give your views on the following questions. Please provide examples and reasoning to support your view.

4. Is the UNICEF goal “Mine Risk Education needs are identified and met in an appropriate, effective, and timely fashion” relevant to your programme?

Why? Are you / have you conducted activities that contribute to any of the 6 associated objectives (p9 of the strategy)? Which ones? Have you conducted any activities that relate to the listed HQ/RO/CPC responsibilities (pp12-14) at any time from 2002 - 2005? Which ones and how? Did you have an implementation partner? If so, who? What was the budget associated to that goal in 2004 and in 2005?

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5. Is the goal “The Mine Ban Treaty and other related legal instruments are universally ratified and implemented” relevant to your programme?

Are you / have you conducted activities that contribute to any of the 6 associated 6 objectives (p10)? Which ones? Have you conducted any activities that relate to the listed HQ/RO/CPC responsibilities (pp14-15) at any time from 2002 – 2005? Which ones and how? Did you have an implementation partner? If so, who? What was the budget associated to that goal in 2004 and in 2005?

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6. Is the goal “Mine survivors, especially children, have access to the highest attainable standards of services and support” relevant to your programme?

Why? Are you / have you conducted activities that contribute to any of the associated objectives? Which ones? Have you conducted any activities that relate to the listed HQ/RO/CPC responsibilities (p16) at any time from 2002 - 2005? Which ones and how? Did you have an implementation partner? If so, who? What was the budget associated to that goal in 2004 and in 2005?

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7. What are the areas of activity that you feel UNICEF should focus attention on over the next 2 to 5 years?

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8. Do you feel that the current goals and objectives of in the 2002-2005 mine action strategy adequately address the future expectations of UNICEF over the next Medium Term Strategic Plan period?

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9. What mine action activities that you conduct are not covered by the UNICEF goals and supporting objectives?

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10. Do the matrix of HQ, regional and country office responsibilities as detailed in the strategy reflect what happens in reality? What disconnections exist?

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11. Do you have any other comments relating to appropriateness, relevancy or sustainability of the 2002-2005 UNICEF mine action strategy?

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**Part 2: Effectiveness and outcome resulting from implementation of the 2002 – 2005 UNICEF mine action strategy:**

12. How would you classify the overall UN mine action role in the country:

- a) UN supports a country programme;
- b) UN manages a country programme;
- c) not applicable. Why?

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13. How would you classify the role of UNICEF within the UN mine action effort:

- a) UNICEF leads on mine action on behalf of other UN agencies;
- b) UNICEF leads on MRE / victim assistance and/or advocacy within a mine action programme lead by a different UN agency;
- c) UNICEF is the only UN agency in the country;
- d) not applicable. Why?

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14. Based on your experiences, what style of mine action best suits UNICEF (lead role, coordination role, focus on projects and programmes etc.)? Why?

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15. Do you have the Common Country Assessment, the UN United Nations Development Assistance Framework, UN/World Bank joint needs assessments and/or needs assessments conducted by peacekeeping task forces? Which has been most relevant and how have you used these to plan UNICEF's work?

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16. Do UNICEF needs assessments systematically precede any mine action intervention by UNICEF that you know of? If yes, please attach a representative example of a needs assessment that you found particularly useful.

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17. What has influenced your programme more: the global 2002-2005 UNICEF mine action strategy or country-specific MRE / VA / advocacy needs assessments? Please explain.

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18. List all of the humanitarian priorities within UNICEF in the country / region and rank them, to illustrate where mine action is compared with other needs, such as health, education etc. How does this affect the mine action programme?

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19. Do you have a full-time dedicated mine action person in the UNICEF team, or do you have a part-time focal person who combines mine action with other UNICEF responsibilities, such as Child Protection, Education, Communication etc? Which division within UNICEF at the country/HQ level do they liaise with most? Does mine action focal point availability or interest affect the outputs and outcomes of your plan?

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20. Do you feel that the current organisational structure within UNICEF including the roles and responsibilities assists or hinders the conduct of UNICEF mine action activities? From your perspective, where do you feel improvements could be made? Why?

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21. What organisation, process or resource management (human and financial) improvements would you like to see in the HQ / CPC / RO organisation? Are there procedures / organisational changes that could improve implementation of global UNICEF mine action and/or country-specific mine action UNICEF supports?

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22. Do you believe that your MRE programmes implemented through partners or directly by UNICEF are compliant with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)? Why?

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23. Has your programme provided coordination of mine action activities? If so, can you list the outputs and outcomes during 2004 and 2005, including performance indicators and the means of verification, if any, you have used over the past 24 month period?

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24. Has your programme provided support to national capacity building? If so, can you list the outputs and outcomes over 2004 and 2005, including performance indicators and the means of verification, if any, that you have used over the past 24 month period?

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25. Has your programme provided inter-agency assessment? If so, can you list the outputs and outcomes over 2004 and 2005, including performance indicators and means of verification, if any, you have used over the past 24 month period?

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26. Has your programme provided support to implementation of MRE? If so, can you list the outputs and outcomes over 2004 and 2005, including performance indicators and means of verification, if any, you have used over the past 24 month period?

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27. Has your programme provided support to implementation of victim assistance? If so, can you list the outputs and outcomes over 2004 and 2005, including performance indicators and means of verification, if any, you have used over the past 24 month period?

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28. Has your programme provided advocacy? If so, can you list the outputs and outcomes over 2004 and 2005, including performance indicators and means of verification, if any, you have used over the past 24 month period?

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29. Does your programme have any formal or informal processes to assess impact of your work, outputs or outcomes? Please describe.

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**Part 3: Your opinion on sustainability of the 2002 – 2005 UNICEF mine action strategy:**

30. Are the main risks that adversely affect your ability to implement a programme internal to UNICEF (i.e. things that UNICEF can change) or external (i.e. beyond UNICEF's control)? Please explain.

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31. Rank the following risks that adversely effect your ability to implement a programme from 6 'most significant', to 1 'least important'. Please explain your reasoning below the table.

	Humanitarian needs change
	Funding is late / insufficient
	Project / programme plans are inadequate or need to change
	Project / programme human resources are unavailable or inappropriate
	Project / programme techniques / technology are inappropriate
	Monitoring / evaluation of project / programme performance is inadequate / absent / does not prevent non-performance
	Other

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32. Which of the following would be the main impact on UNICEF implementing partners if you were unable to implement the mine action programme? Explain your reasoning in the space below the options.

- e) Lack of funding, but continued work at a lower scale, lack of training / capacity building, reduced access to materials, such as publicity / awareness pamphlets, facilities, rehabilitation equipment or other in-kind support
- f) Total cessation of survivor assistance , advocacy or risk education activities due to withdrawal of UNICEF support
- g) Little impact other than delays getting funding directly from donors or acquisition of sub-contracts, as opposed to funding via UNICEF
- h) Other

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**Part 4: Resources:**

33. What was RO/CPC (choose) mine action budget in 2004, in US dollars, and how was this divided between MRE, VA, advocacy? What proportion of the total UNICEF budget did the mine action budget represent in 2004?

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34. What was the RO/CPC (choose) mine action budget in 2005, in US dollars, and how was this divided between MRE, VA, advocacy? What proportion of the total UNICEF budget did the mine action budget represent in 2005?

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**Please attach your 2004 and 2005 mine action work plans to the completed questionnaire and send all three to [t.khalig@cranfield.ac.uk](mailto:t.khalig@cranfield.ac.uk)**

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. In a small number of instances, we may contact you to seek further clarification or additional detail relating to your answers.

The final evaluation report will be submitted by Cranfield University to UNICEF LASAT in New York at the end of March 2006 and we hope the findings assist your programme.

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*United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child*

*United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women*

*United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination*

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*UXO Press Release, Iraq, UNICEF, 2003*

## V

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## **W**

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*World Fit for Children*, Outcome Document

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*World Report 2004 – Africa on its Own* at [http://hrw.org/wr2k4/4.htm#\\_Toc58744953](http://hrw.org/wr2k4/4.htm#_Toc58744953) Human Rights watch, accessed on 10 January 2006

*World Report 2005 – Africa Section* at <http://hrw.org/wr2k5/> Human Rights Watch, accessed on 10 January 2006.

## People Contacted and Met

### UNICEF Offices that received a questionnaire:

Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Indonesia, Lebanon, Liberia, Mauritania, Nepal, Nicaragua, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Panama, Russian Federation, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Vietnam and Zambia.

### UN key informant organisations that were contacted:

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank. To note, for their specific contributions were: UNMAS: John Flanagan, Chief Programme Support; Noel Mulliner, Technology Officer, Ilene Cohn, Chief Policy; UNOPS: Johannes van der Merwe, Mine Action Technical Advisor; WHO: David Meddings, Injuries and Violence Protection; UNHCR, Harry Leefe; WFP: Alan Johnson, Mines Advisor; UNDP: Jacqueline Seck Diouf, Programme Officer.

### International key informants organisations that were contacted:

ICRC, ICBL, GICHD and the main three international NGOs with whom UNICEF has had partnerships during the period 2002 to now: HI (Belgium), HI (France) and Mines Advisory Group. DfID, US State Department, CIDA, Germany, Sweden, CDC. To note, for their specific contributions were: ICRC: Ben Lark, Mine Action Communications Division; GICHD: Ian Mansfield, Operations Director; Stuart Maslen, Consultant; Cranfield University: Alastair McAslan, Director; Belinda Goslin, Consultant; James Maddison University, Dennis Barlow, Director; Baric Consulting: Alistair Craib; VVAF: Bill Barron, Operations Manager; US State Department: Dick Stickels, Programme Manager; Canadian Foreign Affairs: Earl Turcotte; DfID: Andy Willson; CDC: Mike Lipton-Gerber.

More informal contacts were made with the following: Adopt-A-Minefield , CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, Clear Path International, DanChurchAid, Danish Demining Group, Halo Trust, Help, Intersos, Landmine Survivors Network, Medico International, Mine Clearance Planning Agency, Mines Action Canada, Mines Awareness Trust, Monitoring Evaluation and Training Agency, Norwegian People's Aid, Prosthetics Outreach Foundation, World Rehabilitation Fund, IHSCO, OMAR.

### UNICEF focus group organisations that were contacted:

Headquarters: New York and Regional Offices: The Americas and Caribbean Regional Office, Panama City, Panama , Central and Eastern Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States and Baltic States Regional Office, Geneva, Switzerland , East Asia and the Pacific Regional Office, Bangkok, Thailand , Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office, Nairobi, Kenya , Middle East and North Africa Regional Office, Amman, Jordan , South Asia Regional Office,

Kathmandu, Nepal , West and Central Africa Regional Office, Dakar, Senegal. To note, for their specific contributions were: Afshan Khan, Deputy Director EMOPS; Annalies Borrel, Chief, Policy Section, EMOPS; Daniel Toole, Director, EMOPS; Dermot Carty, Senior Programme Officer; Gianluca Buono, Project Officer, LASAT; Julie Myers, Project Officer, LASAT; Julien Temple, Project Officer, LASAT; Reuben McCarthy, Project Officer, LASAT; Susan Helseth, Programme Officer, Afghanistan; Sarah Norton Staal, Senior Programme Officer.

**Thailand field visit contacts:**

Richard Bridle	Deputy Director, East Asia and Pacific Regional Office (EAPRO), Bangkok
Christopher Davids	Regional Planning Officer, Bangkok
Rieko Nishijima	Planning Officer, Emergency Section, Bangkok

**Kenya field visit contacts:**

Sarah Norton-Staal	Mine Action focal point, Regional Office
Katherine Grant	Child Protection Officer, UNICEF Somalia Support Centre
Una McCauley	Child Protection Officer

**Cambodia field visit contacts:**

Tomoo Hozumi	Programme Coordinator, UNICEF, Cambodia
Michel Lepechoux	Project Officer, Seth Komar, UNICEF, Cambodia
Lesley Miller	Head of Section, Child Protection, Cambodia
Plong Chaya	Assistant Project Officer, Accidents, Injuries and Disabilities, UNICEF, Cambodia
Cloth Sareth	Administrative and HR manager, Veterans International, Cambodia
Chea Samnag	Project Coordinator, Capacity Building of People with Disability in the Community (CABDIC), Cambodia
Chan Ratha	MRE Focal Point, Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), Cambodia
Heng Ratha	Deputy Director, CMAC, Cambodia
OI Seine	Community Based Mine Risk Reduction (CBMRR) Project Manager, Cambodia
Un Kor	CBMRR Coordinator, Pailin, Cambodia
Mr. Sothy	Director, Disability Action Council, Cambodia
Kong Vichetra	Inclusive Education Project Coordinator, Cambodia
Kim Sarin	MRE Project Manager, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport

Mr. Theara	MRE Coordinator, Dept. for Education, Youth and Sport, Pailin
Yi Veasna	Executive Director, National Centre for Disabled Persons
In Tithya	Project Coordinator, Operation Enfants de Battambang

**Ethiopia field visit contacts:**

Bjorn Ljungqvist	UNICEF Representative
Marc Rubin	Head, EW/DP
Orlaith Gallagher	Project Officer – MRE
Alessandro Conticini	Project Officer, Child Protection HIV/AIDS Section
Massimo Maroli	Executive Director, CUAMM (Doctors for Africa)
Ato Yiberta Tadesse	Executive Director, RaDO
Ato Ambachew Negus	RaDO
Ato Woldegebriel	Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs, Tigray
Ato Girmay	Tigray disabled Veterans Association (TDVA) & Ministry of Planning and Coordination (MOPC)
Ato Dirar	RaDO, Tigray Office
Ato Temesgen	Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO)
Scott Pilkington	Senior Technical Advisor, UNDP
Vic Thackwray	Technical Advisor, UNDP
Timor Obuhkov	IMSMA Systems, UNDP
Malin Ahrne	WHO
Marco Budermann	Head, ICRC
Jo Nagel	Head, Orthopaedics, ICRC
Etsay G. Selassie	Head, EMAO
Berhane Achame	Head, MRE, EMAO
Ato Bekele Gonfa	Director, Landmine Survivors Network (LSN)

**Lao PDR field visit contacts:**

Victoria Juat	Head of Section, Child Protection
Amy Delneuville	Assistant Programme Officer, Child Protection
Ounheuang Keoamphone	Assistant Project Officer, Child Protection

Jane Davies	Programme Officer, Development Cooperation Section, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)
Martin Dunn	Project Director, Consortium
Luc Delneuville	Country Director, HI Belgium
May Latanabouneheuang	Director of Young Pioneer Department, Lao Youth Union
Kaysone Lakenchanh	Project Director, Lao Youth Union
Tongsoy Kantivong	Provincial Coordinator, Savannakhet
Cham Nanthanavone	District Coordinator, Phine District
Outhin Vimaxay	District Coordinator, Xepone District
Jo Durham	Director, Mines Advisory Group
Jo Wenkoff	Chief Technical Advisor, National Regulatory Authority
Vanthong Khamdala	Deputy National Programme Director, UXO Lao
Mr. Soubihn	Provincial Coordinator, Savannakhet
Mr. Bumpheng	Head of Team 4, Phine District

**Sudan field visit contacts:**

Dermot Carty	Director of Operations, UNICEF North
Sharif Baaser	Mine Action Programme Officer
Ramachandran Kadayapreth	Senior Programme Officer
Ms. Samira	Officer In-Charge for Child Protection Section
Justus Olielo	Programme Communication Officer, UNICEF North
Hamid Abul Aleen	Director, National Mine Action Office
Gangari Ahmed	MRE Associate, UNMAS
Zaki El-Jack	Director, Friends of Peace and Development Organisation
Sjeord Smit	Second Secretary, Embassy of the Netherlands
Abu Osama	Director, Jasmar NGO
Bojan Vokovic	MRE Officer, Southern Regional Mine Action Office
Diana Surur	Assistant Programme Officer, MRE, UNICEF South
Phil Rowe	Technical Advisor, Southern Regional Mine Action Office
Paul Fizman	Child Protection Officer, UNICEF South